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+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="SS.i" class="div2">
+            <a href="summa.SS.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q1.html"></a>
+            <h2 id="SS.i-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)</h2>
+            <div id="SS_Q1" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS.i.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q1-p0.1">OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p2"> Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly,
+                  of Charity.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p3"> The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding;
+                  (3) Of the opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p4"> About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3) the habit of faith.</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p5"> Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p6"> (1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p7"> (2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p8"> (3) Whether anything false can come under faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p9"> (4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p10"> (5) Whether it can be anything known?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p11"> (6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain number of articles?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p12"> (7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p13"> (8) Of the number of articles;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p14"> (9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q1-p15"> (10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A1-p0.1">Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed
+                     to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed,
+                     but also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore
+                     the object of faith is not only the First Truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
+                     contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about
+                     all things contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object
+                     of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">FS, Q[62], A[3]</a>). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is
+                     not only the First Truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth. Therefore
+                     the object of faith is the First Truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object,
+                     so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry,
+                     the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the mean of demonstration, through
+                     which the conclusions are known.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p7"> Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith
+                     of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith
+                     is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only
+                     God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing
+                     some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey
+                     towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth,
+                     in as much as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it
+                     considers nothing save in relation to health.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in
+                     so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p9"> The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things contained in Holy Writ.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further
+                     on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25] , A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A2-p0.1">Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
+                     Truth, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for
+                     it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . . almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not
+                     a proposition but a thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I
+                     am known." But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of
+                     the wayfarer is also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
+                     opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about propositions; so that its object is something complex.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
+                     the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A5.html">FP, Q[85], A[5]</a>. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the
+                     other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p7"> Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is believed, and
+                     thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith. Secondly, on the part of
+                     the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p8"> Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of truth.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the object of faith on the part of the thing believed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is evident
+                     from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For
+                     as in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in
+                     faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>: "We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is": hence that vision will
+                     not be by way of a proposition but by way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not apprehend the
+                     First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A3-p0.1">Whether anything false can come under faith? </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something false can come under faith. For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false
+                     can come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many
+                     are loved as being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be the object of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.56" target="asv"> Jn. 8:56</a>: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham, God might
+                     not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have
+                     been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching
+                     of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born.
+                     Therefore something false can come under faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
+                     altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but
+                     only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
+                     declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], AA[2]</a>,5). Therefore nothing false can come under it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
+                     except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as
+                     it stands under the First Truth, under which nothing false can
+                     stand, as neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false can come
+                     under faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the
+                     intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone.
+                     On the other hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude the false, for it is possible
+                     to act in accordance with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about
+                     what one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison
+                     between them fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p9"> Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since
+                     this would be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life
+                     surely and infallibly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p10"> In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be; so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in
+                     the individual whom we love for God's sake.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands
+                     in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], AA[13]</a>,15: and it is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot be false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time,
+                     wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have
+                     a false opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ
+                     is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does
+                     not follow that anything false comes under faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A4-p0.1">Whether the object of faith can be something seen?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the object of faith is something seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.29" target="asv">Jn. 20:29</a>): "Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed." Therefore vision and faith regard the same object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of faith, says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Therefore what is believed is seen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv"> Rom. 10:17</a>: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore faith is of things seen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>) that "faith is the evidence of things that appear not."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
+                     through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which
+                     are held by the habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which are
+                     held by the habit of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
+                     sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one
+                     side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while,
+                     if there be certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p8"> Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore
+                     it is evident that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the senses or by the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [*St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to be
+                     God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and
+                     believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this
+                     way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he
+                     saw that they ought to be believed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is becoming
+                     to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming
+                     to a right faith, and not to assent to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not follow
+                     that these things are seen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A5-p0.1">Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion
+                     through its demonstration]?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance,
+                     since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance
+                     of such things savors of unbelief, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore
+                     such things can be an object of science.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science."
+                     Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
+                     Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion
+                     and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the
+                     same object also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception." Therefore
+                     things that are of faith are not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception.
+                     Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of science.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> All science is derived from self-evident and therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be,
+                     in a fashion, seen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p8"> Now as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally impossible
+                     for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing
+                     which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe
+                     about the Trinity, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor.
+                        13:12
+                     </a>: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess already; so that what
+                     we believe, they see. In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even
+                     in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p9"> Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such
+                     are the things which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they
+                     know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which
+                     makes them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad 2,3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments
+                     showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith,
+                     i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well
+                     proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident
+                     principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q1_A2.html">FP, Q[1], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply
+                     by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration
+                     must know them first of all by faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we
+                     have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the same man to have science and faith about the
+                     same thing relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the same person,
+                     about one and the same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like
+                     manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and
+                     the same man, about the same object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for
+                     different reasons. Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason that science
+                     demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should
+                     be
+                     deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed
+                     impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same respect is
+                     because the object of science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A6-p0.1">Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain articles?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those things that are of faith should not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in
+                     Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore
+                     it seems superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal
+                     aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice
+                     should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into articles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning
+                     God, exacting [arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man
+                     believes against his will." Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be divided into articles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine truth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth by
+                     way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided
+                     into articles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek; for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which
+                     the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which
+                     fit together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which
+                     are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are
+                     parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced singly
+                     and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p7"> Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit
+                     together. Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Consequently any matter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known
+                     or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one
+                     difficulty in seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of the
+                     Resurrection is distinct from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same difficulty,
+                     so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but only
+                     in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put
+                     forward in order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things which we hope to see, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.2" target="asv"> Heb. 11:2</a>: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped
+                     for," it follows that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trinity
+                     of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's
+                     Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed
+                     to our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for instance,
+                     that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are related in Holy
+                     Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct
+                     articles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there
+                     is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of
+                     articles. Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect
+                     of a matter of faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view
+                     there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in accordance
+                     with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
+                     although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him
+                     by a necessity of end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
+                     "without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A7-p0.1">Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the articles of faith have not increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>), "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at
+                     all times, the same things are to be believed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
+                     them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us
+                     by God, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "It is the gift of God." Since then there can be no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith
+                     was perfect from the beginning and did not
+                     increase as time went on.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes
+                     a beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also
+                     began with perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it most perfectly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge
+                     of faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.7" target="asv">Dt. 32:7</a>: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee." Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for "they
+                     received them more fully than others, even as they received them earlier," as a gloss says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.23" target="asv"> Rom. 8:23</a>:
+                     "Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the Spirit." Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased
+                     as time went on.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer
+                     they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the mysteries of salvation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based
+                     on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus
+                     all principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the
+                     same time," as the Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles
+                     are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation
+                     of man, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11" target="asv">Heb. 11</a>: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." For the existence of God includes
+                     all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes
+                     all those things which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way to
+                     that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained in others: thus faith
+                     in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p8"> Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the articles of faith, they have not received any increase
+                     as time went on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those
+                     Fathers who preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly, since to those who lived
+                     in later times some were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence
+                     the Lord said to Moses (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.6.2" target="asv">Ex. 6:2,3</a>): "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac,
+                     and to Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.100" target="asv">Ps. 118:100</a>): "I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv">Eph. 3:5</a>) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and
+                     prophets."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among men the same things were always to be hoped for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through Christ,
+                     the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence
+                     the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.13" target="asv">Heb. 11:13</a>): "All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the further off
+                     a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore
+                     those who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in knowledge
+                     as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the
+                     learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very
+                     outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the
+                     disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith
+                     as time went on. Hence the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>) compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active
+                     cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect
+                     is not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material
+                     cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
+                     imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity;
+                     while man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed
+                     from imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active causes, through being doctors
+                     of faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at
+                     the time for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of fulness
+                     [*Vulg.: 'fulness of time']" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.4" target="asv">Gal. 4:4</a>). Hence those who were nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had a fuller
+                     knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth,
+                     and that a man's
+                     state is all the more perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A7-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A8-p0.1">Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration,
+                     do not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above (A[5] ). Now it can be known by demonstration that
+                     there is one God; hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many other philosophers demonstrated the same
+                     truth. Therefore that "there is one God" should not be set down as an article of
+                     faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe
+                     Him to be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points some have erred. Therefore, among the articles
+                     of faith, mention should have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His omnipotence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know the Son, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.9" target="asv"> Jn. 14:9</a>: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and Son, and, for
+                     the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several articles
+                     about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about
+                     the Person of the Father.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost,
+                     so too is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a
+                     place is given to a work appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work appropriated to the Holy Ghost,
+                     viz. that "He spoke by the prophets." Therefore the articles of faith should contain some
+                     work appropriated to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should
+                     have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that there is not a sufficient number of articles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p8"> On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the articles thus.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,6), to faith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought
+                     to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which
+                     is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons of God,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A8-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.2" target="asv"> Rom.
+                        5:2.
+                     </a> Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A8-p9.3" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the
+                     first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery
+                     of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A8-p9.4" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.16" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:16</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p10"> Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead,
+                     to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, corresponding to the
+                     three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of nature, in relation
+                     to which the article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to
+                     which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of
+                     glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting.
+                     Thus there are seven articles referring to the Godhead.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p11"> In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation
+                     or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent
+                     into hell; the fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so that
+                     in all there are fourteen articles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p12"> Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one
+                     article the three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while they divide the article
+                     referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory of the soul. Likewise they
+                     unite the conception and nativity into one article.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By faith we hold many truths about God, which the philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance His
+                     providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of which are contained in the one article of the unity
+                     of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching over things, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A8-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">FP, Q[13], A[8]</a>. Now in beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes,
+                     in a way, universal knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills in things here below, unless He
+                     knew them, and exercised His providence over them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
+                     refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed,
+                     in a way, include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost.
+                     From this point of view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one
+                     article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain points have to be observed, about which
+                     some happen to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the three Persons. For
+                     Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and consubstantial
+                     with the Father; hence the need for an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point. In like manner it
+                     was
+                     necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way Christ's conception
+                     and birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one article, in
+                     so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as each
+                     one separately presents a special difficulty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be believed.
+                     Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father,
+                     Who is never sent, as we stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A8-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html">FP, Q[43], A[4]</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which
+                     is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs
+                     by appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this respect
+                     it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus
+                     it is included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are ascribed to God's almighty power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p19"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A8-p20"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A9-p0.1">Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
+                     faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.2" target="asv">Dt. 4:2</a>): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it was unlawful to
+                     make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been published.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.5" target="asv">Eph. 4:5</a>) there is but "one faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is not fitting that there should be more
+                     than one symbol.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
+                     competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith. Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be
+                     expressed in the words: "I believe in one God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A9-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But the descent into hell is not mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A9-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.1" target="asv">Jn. 14:1</a>) says: "We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God." Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created
+                     being, it seems unfitting to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly.
+                     Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish
+                     the articles of faith in a symbol.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's
+                     promise to His disciples (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A9-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.13" target="asv">Jn. 16:13</a>): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth." Now the symbol is published by the authority of the
+                     universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing defective.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A9-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>), "he that cometh to God, must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be proposed to him that he
+                     may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be proposed
+                     to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims
+                     of faith that the symbol [*The Greek
+                     {symballein}] takes its name.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that,
+                     in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those
+                     who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was
+                     necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be
+                     proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about the
+                     truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave
+                     rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy
+                     of heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together
+                     by faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church
+                     not only outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping
+                     with living faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they
+                     should endeavor to acquire it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No error about the descent into hell had arisen among heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that point.
+                     For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles.
+                     For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy
+                     Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better
+                     and more in keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus,
+                     Comm. in Sym. Apost.] observes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was already
+                     spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of
+                     the Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and
+                     Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A9-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q1_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q1_A10-p0.1">Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol
+                     becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A10-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of
+                     faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q1_A10-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A7.html">(A[7])</a>.
+                     Since then this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and more
+                     explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden
+                     under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first*
+                     council of Ephesus (P. ii, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.6" target="asv">Act. 6</a>) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter,
+                     write or draw up any other creed, than that which was
+                     defined by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote
+                     'first' (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the "Latrocinium" and condemned
+                     by the Pope.] The same was repeated in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A10-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.5" target="asv">Act. 5</a>). Therefore it seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new edition of the symbol.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung
+                     in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a
+                     new edition of the symbol.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the
+                     Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5]. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign
+                     Pontiff to draw up a symbol.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (OBJ 1), a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise. Consequently
+                     to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so
+                     that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the
+                     more important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred,"
+                     as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.32" target="asv">Lk. 22:32</a>): "I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren." The reason
+                     of this is that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:10</a>: "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this could not be secured unless
+                     any question of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole Church may hold
+                     firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of
+                     the symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general council and so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q1_A10-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.16" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:16, </a> some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction,
+                     it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors which arose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide matters
+                     of faith: for this decision of the general council did not take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new
+                     edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with greater explicitness. For every council
+                     has taken into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more fully than
+                     the preceding council, if this became necessary through some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff,
+                     by whose authority the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine,
+                     as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority
+                     of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q1_A10-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS.i.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q2" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q2-p0.1">OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p2"> We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the external act.</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p3"> Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p4"> (1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p5"> (2) In how many ways is it expressed?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p6"> (3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above natural reason?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p7"> (4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable by natural reason?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p8"> (5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things explicitly?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p9"> (6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p10"> (7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p11"> (8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity explicitly?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p12"> (9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q2-p13"> (10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether to believe is to think with assent?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent. Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a research,
+                     for "cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to "coagitare," i.e. "to discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
+                     iv) that faith is "an assent without research." Therefore thinking has no place in the act of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show further on (Q[4], A[2]). Now to think is an act of the cogitative
+                     power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>. Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect,
+                     but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q15_A1.html">FS, Q[15], A[1]</a>, ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. ii).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
+                     Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now the faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly,
+                     "to think" is more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and
+                     which precedes the intellect's arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the
+                     certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the
+                     Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must
+                     be understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed." In
+                     this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear
+                     sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of deliberation either about universal notions, which
+                     belongs to the intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive part, hence it is that "to
+                     think" is taken secondly for an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the cogitative power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p7"> Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the first sense, then "to think with assent," does not express
+                     completely what is meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with assent even when he considers what he knows
+                     by science [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.], or understands. If, on
+                     the other hand, "to think" be understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the
+                     act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking,
+                     as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or understands, for this consideration is already formed. But
+                     some acts of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they incline to neither side, as in one
+                     who "doubts"; or incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some slight motive, as in one who "suspects";
+                     or
+                     incline to one side yet with fear of the other, as in one who "opines." But this act "to believe," cleaves firmly to one side,
+                     in which respect belief has something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection
+                     of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to think with assent:
+                     so that the act of believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or
+                     the false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith has not that research of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby
+                     a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To think" is not taken here for the act of the cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken
+                     here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God and believing in God?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God.
+                     For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there
+                     are three acts of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe
+                     God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish
+                     it from certain other acts of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe
+                     in a God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not
+                     of the will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned
+                     as a species of that act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p6"> On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi---Tract. xxix in Joan.).</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
+                     considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as
+                     stated above (A[1], ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the
+                     will that moves the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p8"> If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>). One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object,
+                     for it is the medium on account
+                     of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A2-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to whatever
+                     he believes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p9"> Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe
+                     in God." For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three do not denote different acts of faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the object of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p11"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God" as we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not believe
+                     that God exists under the conditions that faith determines; hence they do not truly believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher
+                     observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things defectively is not to know them at all."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">FS, Q[9], A[1]</a>) the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this respect an act of faith is "to believe
+                     in God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of
+                     a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since
+                     they are things unseen as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">Q[1], A[4]</a>). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true
+                     or false, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.12.11" target="asv"> Job 12:11</a>: "Doth not the ear discern words?" Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he cannot trace
+                     them back to first principles, by which all our judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters.
+                     Therefore to believe is not necessary
+                     for salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.39" target="asv"> Ps. 36:39</a>: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood
+                     by the things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20</a>: and those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary
+                     for man's salvation, that he
+                     should believe certain things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "Without faith it is impossible to please God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature,
+                     one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature.
+                     Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it
+                     moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper
+                     movements from west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to
+                     west. Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other creatures do not attain to the
+                     universal, but only to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in "being" only, as inanimate
+                     things, or also in "living," and in "knowing singulars," as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as much as
+                     it
+                     apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p7"> Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but
+                     also in that which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">FS, Q[3], A[8]</a>) that man's ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man cannot attain unless he be taught
+                     by God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.6.45" target="asv"> Jn. 6:45</a>: "Every one that hath heard of
+                     the Father and hath learned cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little
+                     and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire
+                     science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a learner to believe."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p8"> Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple
+                     believes the master who is teaching him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some supernatural
+                     knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue,
+                     judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents
+                     to matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently "there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that
+                     are in Christ Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God
+                     from His creatures. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 3:25</a>): "Many things are shown to thee above the understandings of man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A4-p0.1">Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
+                     works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
+                     Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things must be believed, which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">Q[1], AA[4]</a>,5). Since therefore all things that can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no need
+                     to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration]
+                     would seem to come under one head: so that if some of them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others
+                     should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by
+                     natural reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is necessary to believe that God is one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason:
+                     and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the
+                     science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of all to offer itself to human research,
+                     since it presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that
+                     man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general. For
+                     many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations,
+                     and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p7"> the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is
+                     for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that philosophers
+                     in their researches, by natural investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among
+                     themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was
+                     necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot
+                     lie.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved
+                     by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can
+                     be an object of faith for another, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A5.html">Q[1], A[5]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although all things that can be known by science are of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to beatitude:
+                     hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A5-p0.1">Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now
+                     it is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.14" target="asv">Rom. 10:14,15</a>): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they
+                     preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity,
+                     and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of Our Lord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.39" target="asv">Mat. 5:39</a>): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: 'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the same kind, according
+                     to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound
+                     to believe anything explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.5" target="asv"> Rom. 1:5</a>: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed precepts,
+                     but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A5-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.60" target="asv"> Ps. 118:60</a>: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man should
+                     be ready to believe
+                     whatever God may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation.
+                     Now an act of virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">FS, Q[60], A[5]</a>) depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely,
+                     that which is the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is accidental and consequent to the object properly
+                     so
+                     called. Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the
+                     foe with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another with
+                     his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of fortitude, but indirectly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p7"> Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act
+                     should terminate in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the precept does not require that
+                     a virtuous act should terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the proper and direct object
+                     of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the direct
+                     object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>): while the indirect and secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham
+                     had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p8"> Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have
+                     faith; but as to other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to be ready to
+                     believe them, in so far as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then alone is he bound
+                     to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If we understand those things alone to be in a man's power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound
+                     to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise
+                     to believe the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for this help "to whomsoever it is given from
+                     above it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a
+                     punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed.
+                     Sanct. viii.]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God
+                     and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority, suffices
+                     for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental
+                     or consequent to that proper and direct object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A6-p0.1">Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all are equally bound to have explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary for
+                     salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed
+                     explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is not bound to believe. But simple reasons are sometimes tested
+                     in reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe everything explicitly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the
+                     faith of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple
+                     should also have explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.14" target="asv">Job 1:14</a>): "The oxen were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17),
+                     the simple, who are signified by the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by the oxen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now Divine
+                     revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through
+                     the angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore
+                     the unfolding of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher
+                     degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine
+                     things than the lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of higher degree, whose business it is to
+                     teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe them more explicitly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree, whose
+                     duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly more things than others are.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Simple persons should not be put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been corrupted
+                     by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are
+                     free from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The simple have no faith implied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine teaching. Hence
+                     the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:16</a>): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth that is the rule
+                     of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the
+                     learned believe aright; unless
+                     the simple hold obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err, since
+                     Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.32" target="asv">Lk. 22:32</a>): "I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A7-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
+                     For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are ignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result
+                     of Divine revelation, which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q2_A6.html">(A[6];</a> 
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A7-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the mystery of the
+                     Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.23.8" target="asv">Ps. 23:8</a>): "Who is this king of glory?" and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.1" target="asv">Is. 63:1</a>): "Who is this that cometh from Edom?" Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>) that "there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater than" he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to
+                     have known the mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.3" target="asv">Mat. 11:3</a>): "Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore even the teachers were not bound
+                     to explicit faith in Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it
+                     would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith in Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore
+                     it seems that it was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc): "Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is delivered
+                     from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q2_A5.html">(A[5];</a> Q[1], A[8]), the object of faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man obtains beatitude. Now the
+                     mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.4.12" target="asv">Acts 4:12</a>): "There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved." Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery
+                     of Christ's Incarnation was
+                     necessary at all times and for all persons, but this belief differed according to differences of times and persons. The reason
+                     of this is that before the state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for
+                     the consummation of glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection, since man had
+                     no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the
+                     fact that he said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>): "Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.32" target="asv">Eph. 5:32</a>) that "this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the Church," and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about
+                     this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p7"> But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection,
+                     whereby the human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else, have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain
+                     sacrifices both before and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the learned explicitly, while the simple
+                     folk, under the veil of those sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to
+                     Christ's coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak. And, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A7.html">Q[1], A[7]</a>), the nearer they were to Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p8"> After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly
+                     as regards those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the
+                     Incarnation, of which we have spoken above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>). As to other minute points in reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more or
+                     less explicitly according to each
+                     one's state and office.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19), yet
+                     certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ revealed them to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist inquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly professed
+                     his belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the Son of God" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.34" target="asv">Jn. 1:34</a>). Hence he did not say: "Art Thou He that hast come?" but "Art Thou He that art to come?" thus saying about the future, not
+                     about the past. Likewise it is not to be believed that he was ignorant of Christ's future
+                     Passion, for he had already said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p10.2" href="./asv.html#John.1.39" target="asv">Jn. 1:39</a>): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling His future
+                     immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with Gregory
+                     (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His
+                     own Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of
+                     Christ's Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Zech.9.11" target="asv"> Zech. 9:11</a>: "Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no water"; nor
+                     was he bound to believe explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p11"> It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.19" target="asv"> Lk. 7:19, </a> he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that
+                     he inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ:
+                     hence the latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing to the signs of His works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.25" target="asv">Job 19:25</a>): "I know that my Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things about Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust.
+                     xiii, 15). Moreover, we read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine Augustus and his mother Irene a
+                     tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man on whose breast was a golden plate
+                     with the inscription: "Christ shall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime of Irene and Constantine,
+                     thou shalt see me again" [*Cf. Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they
+                     were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have
+                     implicit faith through believing in Divine providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in
+                     whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A7-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.11" target="asv">Job 35:11</a>: "Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A7-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A8-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Now one can believe this without
+                     believing in the Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.5" target="asv">Jn. 17:5,6</a>): "Father, I have manifested Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows: "Not the name by which
+                     Thou art called God, but the name whereby Thou art called My Father," and further on he adds: "In that He made this world,
+                     God is known to all nations; in that He is not to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in Judea'; but, in
+                     that He is the Father of this Christ,
+                     through Whom He takes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name of His, which hitherto they knew not."
+                     Therefore before the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity
+                     was not believed explicitly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly
+                     happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was
+                     not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is written in
+                     manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image and likeness" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ
+                     includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the world through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He
+                     was conceived by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned,
+                     but implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the
+                     mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery
+                     of the Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.19" target="asv"> Mat. 28:19</a>: "Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times
+                     and for all people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles
+                     it was shown to the world.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of Persons: but
+                     as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the
+                     mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A9-p0.1">Whether to believe is meritorious?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to believe in not meritorious. For the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A9-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html">FS, Q[114], A[4]</a>). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not
+                     merit by our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known [*Science
+                     is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not
+                     meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient
+                     motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to
+                     believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of levity, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.4" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:4</a>: "He that is hasty to give credit, is light of heart," so that, seemingly,
+                     he gains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.33" target="asv">Heb. 11:33</a>) that the saints "by faith . . . obtained promises," which would not be the case if they did not merit by believing. Therefore
+                     to believe is meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A3.html">FS, Q[114], AA[3]</a>,4), our actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every human
+                     act proceeding from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act of the
+                     intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the
+                     free-will in relation to God;
+                     and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as
+                     the disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue
+                     of the form, nor can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after the advent of the form, both the subject
+                     and the preceding disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief
+                     principle of action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor
+                     faith can, without charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious
+                     thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free-will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things may be considered in science: namely the scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that
+                     fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration,
+                     wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject
+                     to his free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider.
+                     Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the
+                     good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will so that in both
+                     respects the act of faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no firm assent, since it is weak and
+                     infirm, as the Philosopher observes (Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect act of the will: and
+                     for this reason, as regards the assent, it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the actual
+                     consideration.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles,
+                     and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however,
+                     sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the merit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A9-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q2_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q2_A10-p0.1">Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.)
+                     that "there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason." If, therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the
+                     merit of faith is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human reasoning in support of matters of faith,
+                     diminishes the merit of believing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue,"
+                     as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it
+                     is essential to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">Q[1], AA[4]</a>,5). Now the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore human reasons in support of matters of
+                     faith diminish the merit of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether
+                     it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading
+                     him to do so. Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.3.15" target="asv">1 Pet. 3:15</a>): "Being ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you.'
+                     St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken from Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give this advice,
+                     if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith. Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q2_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, the act of faith can be meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the use, but also as to the
+                     assent. Now human reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer. First,
+                     as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe,
+                     unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this
+                     way human reason diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A10-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html">FS, Q[24], A[3]</a>, ad 1; Q[77], A[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy.
+                     For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account of a
+                     passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority.
+                     Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves
+                     the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human
+                     reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion
+                     is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q2_A10-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html">FS, Q[24], A[3]</a>, ad 1). We have an indication
+                     of this in the words of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We now believe, not for thy saying" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q2_A10-p6.4" href="./asv.html#John.4.42" target="asv">Jn. 4:42</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons. But
+                     when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
+                     of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reasons which are brought forward in support of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring intellectual
+                     vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that
+                     what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other
+                     hand, though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith
+                     [*The Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,'
+                     etc.], but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet
+                     they do not diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if they were unseen; and so
+                     the measure of merit is not diminished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit
+                     of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith,
+                     through not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have greater merit of faith, through not renouncing
+                     their faith on account of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics
+                     in opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the
+                     will to believe, and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q2_A10-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q1_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q3" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q3_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q3-p0.1">OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q3-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q3-p2"> We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q3-p3"> (1) Whether confession is an act of faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q3-p4"> (2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q3_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q3_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether confession is an act of faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession
+                     belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q3_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.19" target="asv">Eph. 6:19</a>) asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence, to make known the mystery of the gospel." Now it belongs to
+                     fortitude, which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore
+                     it seems that confession is not an act of faith, but rather of
+                     fortitude or constancy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one's faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works,
+                     for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q3_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv">Gal. 5:6</a>) that "faith . . . worketh by charity." But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore neither is confession
+                     an act of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss explains the words of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q3_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.1.11" target="asv">2 Thess. 1:11, </a> "and the work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a work proper to faith."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred specifically
+                     to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and consequently it is an act of abstinence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p7"> Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.13" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:13</a>: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, and therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended to
+                     signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too
+                     is the outward confession of them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures. One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act
+                     of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above. Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and
+                     this is an act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God, which is the end of "latria." The third is the
+                     confession of sins, which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end
+                     of penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence
+                     fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz. fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of
+                     confession, but an indirect cause so to speak.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but
+                     not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its proper act, without the help of any other virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q3_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q3_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q3_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation,
+                     if it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth,
+                     and this can be realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith is not necessary for salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who
+                     have to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple folk are not bound to confess the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others, is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q3_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.32" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:32</a>): "Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church of God." Now confession of faith sometimes causes
+                     a disturbance among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q3_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.10" target="asv">Rom. 10:10</a>): "With the heart we believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things that are necessary for salvation come under the precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something
+                     affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under
+                     an affirmative precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">FS, Q[71], A[5]</a>, ad 3; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q3_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">FS, Q[88], A[1]</a>, ad 2) do not bind for always, although
+                     they are always binding; but they bind as to place and time according to other due circumstances, in respect of which human
+                     acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p7"> Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at all times and in all places, but in certain places
+                     and at certain times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due honor, or our neighbor of a service
+                     that we ought to render him: for instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain silent, so as to make
+                     people believe either that he is without faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from the
+                     faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is necessary for salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our
+                     neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith
+                     to God's truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good example
+                     and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty
+                     of all the faithful to instruct others in the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is nothing commendable in making a public confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among unbelievers,
+                     without any profit either to the faith or to the faithful. Hence Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q3_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.6" target="asv">Mat. 7:6</a>): "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest turning upon you, they tear you."
+                     Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance of
+                     unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q3_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.12" target="asv">Mat. 15:12</a>) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord that "the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized," He answered:
+                     "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q3_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q3_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q2_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q3_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q4" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q3_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q4-p0.1">OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p2"> We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly,
+                  the cause of faith; fourthly, its effects.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p4"> (1) What is faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p5"> (2) In what power of the soul does it reside?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p6"> (3) Whether its form is charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p7"> (4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one identically?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p8"> (5) Whether faith is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p9"> (6) Whether it is one virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p10"> (7) Of its relation to the other virtues;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q4-p11"> (8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual virtues.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q4_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that
+                     appear not?"
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of faith (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>) when he says: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For no quality
+                     is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">FS, Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore it is not a substance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should
+                     not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further
+                     on 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the same thing should not be placed in different genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
+                     neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its
+                     truth is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and
+                     so faith is unfittingly defined.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of the Apostle suffices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright,
+                     this definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not
+                     arranged in the form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the syllogism, without employing
+                     the syllogistic form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p9"> In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith,
+                     being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. Now the act of faith is to believe, as
+                     stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3), which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will's command. Hence an act
+                     of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
+                     intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html">FS, Q[62], A[2]</a>), has one same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now it has
+                     been already stated (Q[1], AA[1],4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account
+                     thereof: so that it must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the
+                     act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.25" target="asv">Rom. 8:25</a>): "We hope for that which we see not": because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has already,
+                     but for what one has not, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A1-p9.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html">FS, Q[67], A[4]</a>). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith
+                     is the substance of things to be hoped for." For we
+                     are wont to call by the name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is virtually
+                     contained in the first beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are the substance of science,
+                     because, to wit, these principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them
+                     virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for," for the reason that in
+                     us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all things
+                     to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made
+                     evident when we were speaking of happiness (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A1-p9.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">FS, Q[3], A[8]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A1-p9.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html">FS, Q[4], A[3]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p10"> The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the
+                     words, "evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of evidence. For evidence induces the
+                     intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is called
+                     "evidence" here. Hence another reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the believer is
+                     convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words
+                     to the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the
+                     intellect assent to what is non-apparent."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p11"> In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence,"
+                     we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go
+                     on to say, "of things that appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something
+                     apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of
+                     faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p12"> Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says
+                     (Tract. xl in Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we do not see," and when Damascene
+                     says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith is that certainty
+                     of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of science," these all amount to the
+                     same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is
+                     the solid foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him," comes to the same
+                     as "substance of things to be hoped for."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance
+                     which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance
+                     thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects
+                     of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q18_A1.html">Q[18], A[1]</a>). For this reason the definition of faith includes the object of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so adapted
+                     to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and the unseen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor different acts,
+                     but different relationships of one act to different objects, as is clear from what has been said.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority does
+                     not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in the definition of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p18"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A1-p19"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q4_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether faith resides in the intellect?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith resides
+                     in the believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes
+                     all its praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is in the will, and not in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not
+                     concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas
+                     "faith . . . worketh by charity" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv">Gal. 5:6</a>). Likewise, neither is it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true, contingent thing, that can be made
+                     or done. For the object
+                     of faith is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>). Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." Now vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is
+                     likewise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active principles,
+                     each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the
+                     art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition
+                     to act well is a habit, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">FS, Q[49], A[4]</a>,
+                     ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of them. Again,
+                     it has been stated above (Q[2], AA[1],2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as the will moves it to assent.
+                     And this act proceeds from the will and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in this way.
+                     Consequently, if the act of faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect: even
+                     as
+                     there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order
+                     that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that
+                     act is "the true," which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the proper principle of that act,
+                     must needs reside in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his intellect
+                     assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of
+                     the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there
+                     needs to be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First Truth,
+                     is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves (De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just
+                     as "the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima iii, 10).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q4_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether charity is the form of faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two
+                     things are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite
+                     members of a division, as different species of virtue (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Therefore charity is not the form of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith
+                     is in the intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the form of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing,
+                     on the part of the will, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.5" target="asv"> Rom. 1:5</a>: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the form of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Each thing works through its form. Now faith works through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what has been said above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], A[6]</a>), voluntary acts take their species from their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing its species,
+                     is after the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which
+                     that act is directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and because the mode of an
+                     action should correspond proportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end
+                     of faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity. Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as
+                     the act of faith is perfected and formed by charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened
+                     by different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain order, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], AA[6]</a>,7; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">FS, Q[61], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of human acts in general.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that
+                     it quickens the act of faith, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as
+                     we shall show further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html">Q[23], A[8]</a>), and consequently charity is spoken of as the form of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q4_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q4_A4-p0.1">Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10, </a> "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison
+                     with living faith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they are not one identical habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now lifeless faith is dead, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.20" target="asv"> James 2:20</a>: "Faith without works is dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever
+                     it causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes
+                     another habit of faith in him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents cannot be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same
+                     faith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.20" target="asv">James 2:20</a>) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith which was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions on this question. For some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that
+                     living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in
+                     like manner, when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of lifeless faith is infused into him by God.
+                     But it seems unfitting that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and
+                     that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p8"> Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct
+                     habits, but that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith is not taken away, and that it remains
+                     together with the habit of living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that the habit of lifeless faith
+                     should remain inactive in a person having living faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p9"> We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit
+                     is differentiated by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a perfection of the intellect, that pertains
+                     directly to faith, which pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not pertain directly to faith,
+                     so as to be able to differentiate the habit of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in
+                     respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore
+                     living and lifeless faith are not distinct habits.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the perfect
+                     comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
+                     "of the things that appear not." When, however, imperfection is not inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical
+                     thing which was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential
+                     to man and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith,
+                     but is accidental thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes living.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul: consequently
+                     a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
+                     gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith. Hence there is no comparison.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html">FP, Q[104], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A4-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A9.html">FS, Q[109], A[9]</a>) that God is always working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air. Hence grace is not less effective
+                     when it comes to a believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith in both, in the former
+                     by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter by creating it anew.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p13"> We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause
+                     faith in one who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does not take away grace from one who has
+                     already lost it through a previous mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without
+                     charity, and at another time, with charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A4-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q4_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q4_A5-p0.1">Whether faith is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject
+                     good," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among
+                     the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an
+                     infused virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living faith
+                     a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:9</a>) and likewise among the fruits (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv">Gal. 5:23</a>). Therefore faith is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice is all virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified
+                     by faith according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.1" target="asv"> Rom. 5:1</a>: "Being justified therefore by faith let us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of
+                     a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting
+                     to the truth at the command of the will, two things are required that this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect
+                     should infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is that
+                     the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are
+                     to be found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the intellect should ever tend to
+                     the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore
+                     living faith is
+                     a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p8"> On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part
+                     of the intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance be in the concupiscible, without
+                     prudence being in the rational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>), because the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as
+                     the act of faith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some
+                     good in so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it has a relation to the good considered as the object
+                     of the will, inasmuch as it is formed by charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity,
+                     from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith
+                     of which we are speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object cannot be anything
+                     false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect
+                     and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect
+                     virtue, for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that faith which is numbered among the gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason, since
+                     the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the
+                     Apostle says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given" this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless
+                     faith is common to all members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part
+                     of its substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain
+                     excellency of faith, for instance, "constancy in faith," according to a gloss, or the "word of faith."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p13"> Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore
+                     the gloss on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated, explains faith as being "certainty about
+                     the unseen."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q4_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q4_A6-p0.1">Whether faith is one virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is a gift of God according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8, </a> so also wisdom and knowledge are numbered among God's gifts according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2.</a> Now wisdom and knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine
+                     states (De Trin. xii, 14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about some temporal things, it
+                     seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided into several parts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all: since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as
+                     yet to come, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.14" target="asv"> Is. 7:14</a>: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Therefore faith is not one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have
+                     one faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.5" target="asv">Eph. 4:5</a>): "One Lord, one faith."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith.
+                     Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith.
+                     Secondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is evident
+                     that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its
+                     object, but is individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it is one specifically,
+                     but differs numerically according to its various subjects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p7"> If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then, again, there is one faith, since what is believed
+                     by all is one same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be diverse from one another, yet they
+                     are all reduced to one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something
+                     eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>). Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider
+                     temporal and eternal matters under their respective aspects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This difference of past and future arises, not from any difference in the thing believed, but from the different relationships
+                     of believers to the one thing believed, as also we have mentioned above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q103_A4.html">FS, Q[103], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A6-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q107_A1.html">FS, Q[107], A[1]</a>, ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q4_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q4_A7-p0.1">Whether faith is the first of the virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues. For a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.4" target="asv"> Lk. 12:4, </a> "I say to you My friends," says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is founded
+                     thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36" target="asv">Ps. 36</a>, "Be not emulous," says that hope "leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A7-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html">Q[17], A[1]</a>). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that the intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of faith. Now obedience also is
+                     a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as a gloss remarks on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:11</a> [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.]. Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A7-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is the foundation yet more than faith is
+                     (for the foundation is the first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected
+                     by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore
+                     charity precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>) that "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is that which comes first. Therefore
+                     faith is first among the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes
+                     all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of action, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html">FS, Q[13], A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q34_A4.html">FS, Q[34], A[4]</a>, ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last
+                     end must of necessity be present to
+                     the intellect before it is present to the will, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it is apprehended
+                     by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first
+                     of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss,
+                     which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p9"> On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally.
+                     Now that which removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this
+                     sense certain virtues may be said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude
+                     removes the inordinate fear that hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself
+                     to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed,
+                     as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible,
+                     since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">FS, Q[40], A[1]</a>). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this
+                     sense that hope is said to lead to faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it is
+                     not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the
+                     Divine law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A7-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A2.html">FS, Q[100], A[2]</a>); and thus it is requisite for faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the commandments considered
+                     as a duty. In
+                     this way it is a special virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he obeys him: and thus
+                     obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building:
+                     since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual
+                     edifice is charity, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A7-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv"> Col. 3:14</a>: "Above all . . . things have charity which is the bond of perfection." Consequently faith without charity cannot be the
+                     foundation: and yet
+                     it does not follow that charity precedes faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Some act of the will is required before faith, but not an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes
+                     faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A7-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q4_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q4_A8-p0.1">Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith is not more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude,
+                     wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less
+                     it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas
+                     the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of
+                     faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the intellectual virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is through hearing" according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv"> Rom. 10:17</a>; whereas understanding, science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science and understanding are
+                     more certain than faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p4"> Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than
+                     faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another version [*The Septuagint] of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.9" target="asv"> Is. 7:9</a>: "If you will not believe, you shall not understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "faith
+                     is strengthened by science." Therefore it seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q4_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.2.15" target="asv">1 Thess. 2:15</a>): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you received it not as the word of men, but,
+                     as it is indeed, the word of God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is not more certain
+                     than faith; nor is anything else.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">FS, Q[57], A[4]</a>, ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is preferable in
+                     point of certitude, by reason of its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas the other three
+                     intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and understanding, are
+                     about necessary things, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q4_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html">FS, Q[57], A[5]</a>, ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual virtues,
+                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first
+                     way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has
+                     a more certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more
+                     certain than those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based
+                     on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a man's intellect lays
+                     hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human
+                     intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard
+                     to its
+                     cause, but relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more certain simply,
+                     while the others are more certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this present
+                     life, they are related to faith as to their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith
+                     with our intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Other things being equal sight is more certain than hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly
+                     surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about
+                     what he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason: and
+                     much more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived,
+                     than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness,
+                     but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises
+                     from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses.
+                     But in so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they
+                     are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q4_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q3_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q5" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q5-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q5-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q5-p2"> We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q5-p3"> (1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q5-p4"> (2) Whether the demons have faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q5-p5"> (3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q5-p6"> (4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q5_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no faith, either in the angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh St. Victor says
+                     in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation."
+                     Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes
+                     opened to contemplation, since "they saw things in the Word," according to Augustine
+                     (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation;
+                     for Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that "in his original state man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception
+                     of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him clearly present
+                     to their contemplation." Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original state.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Now in their original state there was not obscurity either in the angels
+                     or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original
+                     state.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>) that "faith . . . cometh by hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in their original state; for then they
+                     could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "He that cometh to God, must believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of approach to God. Therefore they
+                     had need of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that there was no faith in the angels before they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he
+                     sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of
+                     things that appear not," according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.2" target="asv">Heb. 11:2</a>), and since "by faith we believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that
+                     manifestation
+                     alone excludes faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the principal object of faith is the
+                     First Truth, the sight of which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as the angels before
+                     their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is evident
+                     that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p7"> It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object
+                     of faith. And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold,
+                     perhaps one might hold that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in grace, or in man before sin, because
+                     the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p8"> Since, however, we stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html">FP, Q[62], A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a> that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning
+                     of hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope
+                     and charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q[4], A[7]). Consequently we must hold that the angels had
+                     faith before they were confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe that in the object of faith, there
+                     is something formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a creature, and something
+                     material, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before obtaining
+                     the happiness to come, faith is common to all who have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with regard
+                     to the things which are proposed as the material object of faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another,
+                     even in the present state, as we have shown above (Q[1], A[5]; Q[2], A[4], ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that
+                     the angels before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries,
+                     which now we cannot know except by believing them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the words of Hugh of St. Victor are those of a master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that
+                     the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its
+                     essence. Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their
+                     contemplation was of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached
+                     nearer to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence
+                     faith was not in them so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light of wisdom He was more present to
+                     them than He is to us, although He was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural obscurity
+                     in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine
+                     light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the original state there was no hearing anything from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring inwardly:
+                     thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.9" target="asv"> Ps. 84:9</a>: "I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q5_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether in the demons there is faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons have no faith. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the believer's
+                     will": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html">FP, Q[64], A[2]</a>, ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is no faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift of God." Now, according to a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.3.1" target="asv"> Osee 3:1, </a> "They look to strange gods, and love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their gifts of grace by sinning. Therefore
+                     faith did not remain in the demons after they sinned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.22" target="asv"> Jn. 15:22, </a> "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin." Now the sin of
+                     unbelief is in some men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a sin graver than that of the
+                     demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in the demons there is no
+                     faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv">James 2:19</a>): "The devils . . . believe and tremble."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">Q[1], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q2_A1.html"> Q[2], A[1]</a>), the believer's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it
+                     to first self-evident principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now, that the will moves the intellect
+                     to assent, may be due to two causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to believe is a
+                     praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction
+                     is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something, and were
+                     to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly
+                     that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently
+                     the essence of faith would not be removed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p7"> Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not
+                     in the demons, but only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby they recognize that the teaching of the
+                     Church is from God, although they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for instance that there are three
+                     Persons in God, and so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their
+                     belief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that
+                     faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe
+                     through their natural intellectual acumen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so
+                     that their malice is by no means diminished by their believe.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q5_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the
+                     natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift
+                     of faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of
+                     faith without the gift of lifeless faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may
+                     possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a
+                     man can believe some articles of faith without believing the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law.
+                     Now a man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe some articles, and disbelieve others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not
+                     remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves one article.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p7"> The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species
+                     of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching
+                     of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule,
+                     to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit
+                     of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion
+                     without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he
+                     who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if,
+                     of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no
+                     longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic
+                     who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but
+                     if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard
+                     to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful
+                     does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith;
+                     but he holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The various conclusions of a science have their respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another,
+                     so that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles
+                     of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching
+                     of the Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever
+                     abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without
+                     another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.10" target="asv"> James 2:10</a>: "Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is become guilty of all."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q5_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q5_A4-p0.1">Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object.
+                     Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q5_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which consist in something supreme cannot be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme,
+                     because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of
+                     faith are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A7.html">Q[1], A[7]</a>). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree
+                     by all the faithful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever we find great and little, there we find more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our
+                     Lord said to Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.14.31" target="asv">Mat. 14:31</a>): "O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?" And to the woman he said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q5_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.28" target="asv">Mat. 15: 28</a>): "O woman, great is thy faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">FS, Q[52], AA[1]</a>,2; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A4.html">FS, Q[112], A[4]</a>), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part
+                     of its participation by the subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p7"> Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the
+                     material object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A6.html">Q[4], A[6]</a>). But the things which
+                     are proposed as the matter of our belief are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this respect one man
+                     can believe explicitly more things than another, so that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more explicit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p8"> If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its participation by the subject, this happens in two
+                     ways, since the act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q2_A1.html">Q[2], AA[1]</a>,2;
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A2.html"> Q[4], A[2]</a>). Consequently a man's faith may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of its
+                     greater certitude and firmness, and, in another way, on the part
+                     of his will, on account of his greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly
+                     believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In this respect, one man has greater faith than another,
+                     on the part of the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is essential to faith that one should give the first place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit
+                     to it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater in one than in another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The understanding of principles results from man's very nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from
+                     the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q5_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A4.html">FS, Q[112], A[4]</a>). Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p12"> Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q5_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q4_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q6" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q6-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q6-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q6-p2"> We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q6-p3"> (1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q6-p4"> (2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q6_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether faith is infused into man by God?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in
+                     us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than
+                     infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by
+                     seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q6_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.53" target="asv">Jn. 4:53</a>): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and
+                     his whole house"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q6_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>) it is said that "faith is through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by
+                     acquiring it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according
+                     to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q6_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv">Eph. 2:8,9</a>): "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . . . for it is the gift
+                     of God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary
+                     in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things
+                     which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things
+                     which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's knowledge,
+                     unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the
+                     apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q6_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.15" target="asv">Rom. 10:15</a>: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p7"> As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external
+                     inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient
+                     cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must
+                     assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p8"> The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of
+                     faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that
+                     the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man,
+                     by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some
+                     supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act
+                     of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of
+                     faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe
+                     by words or deeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order
+                     that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q6_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q2_A3.html">Q[2] , A[3]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q6_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q6_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>) that "the works of God are perfect." Now lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when
+                     it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q6_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html">FS, Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q6_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.7.23" target="asv">Jn. 7:23</a>): "If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because
+                     I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God the
+                     gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by living faith. Therefore
+                     living faith alone is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q6_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2 </a>says that "the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless faith is a gift
+                     of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes
+                     it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the
+                     humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it.
+                     Since, therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that
+                     thing as existing in its proper species, it follows that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the cause
+                     of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness,
+                     something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something
+                     which is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the diaphanous body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p7"> Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of
+                     an extrinsic form, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith is that which is the cause of faith
+                     strictly so called: and this is God, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q6_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q6_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a gift of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a perfection
+                     that suffices for the essential notion of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The deformity of an act is essential to the act's species, considered as a moral act, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q6_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">FP, Q[48], A[1]</a>, ad 2; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q6_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">FS, Q[18], A[5]</a>): for an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act's
+                     circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though
+                     He is the cause
+                     of the act as such.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p10"> We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity
+                     is compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith;
+                     and as lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity, as is frequently
+                     the case in sinners, are from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who receives faith from God without charity, is healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous unbelief
+                     is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently
+                     that a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to desist, without desisting from another act of sin,
+                     through the instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is
+                     granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like,
+                     is given to some without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q6_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q5_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q7" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q7-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q7-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q7-p2"> We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q7-p3"> (1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q7-p4"> (2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q7_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether fear is an effect of faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q7_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.2.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 2:8</a>): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him." Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">FS, Q[23], A[2]</a>): and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q7_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2.</a> Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object
+                     of fear is an evil, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q7_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A1.html">FS, Q[42], A[1]</a>). Again, acts take their species from the object, according to what was stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q7_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], A[2]</a>). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q7_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv">James 2:19</a>): "The devils . . . believe and tremble."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q7_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A1.html">FS, Q[41], A[1]</a>). Now the principle of all appetitive movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the principle of fear and
+                     of every appetitive movement must be an apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension of certain penal
+                     evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the
+                     fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p7"> It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself
+                     to Him, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation
+                     from which is the greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless
+                     faith is the cause, while living faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it
+                     makes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and punishments,
+                     concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain articles
+                     of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his intellect
+                     to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence the
+                     text quoted continues: "And your reward shall not be made void."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same thing in respect of contraries can be the cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets hope,
+                     in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far
+                     as it makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on sinners.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The primary and formal object of faith is the good which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes also
+                     certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners
+                     will suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q7_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith
+                     is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying the heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as
+                     may be seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not purify the heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way, it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not
+                     purify the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge. Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Peter said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q7_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.9" target="asv">Acts 15:9</a>): "Purifying their hearts by faith."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters
+                     it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and
+                     corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity
+                     the rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, namely, by tending
+                     to that which is above it, viz. God. The first beginning of this movement is faith: since "he that cometh to God must believe
+                     that He is," according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q7_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6.</a> Hence the first beginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this be perfected through being quickened by charity,
+                     the heart will be perfectly purified thereby.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things that are in the intellect are the principles of those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good
+                     moves the appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the human
+                     intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible
+                     objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity, because "charity covereth
+                     all sins" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q7_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.10.12" target="asv">Prov. 10:12</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect,
+                     according to the present state of life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q7_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q8" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q8-p0.1">OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p2"> We must now consider the gifts of understand and knowledge, which respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift
+                  of understanding there are eight points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is only speculative, or practical also?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of understanding?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p7"> (5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p8"> (6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p9"> (7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q8-p10"> (8) Which of the fruits?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q8_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of nature,
+                     since they are given in addition to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident principles
+                     are known, as stated in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv).
+                     Now the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of understanding), but discursively (which
+                     is a sign of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge which is bestowed on man, should
+                     be called a gift of reason rather than a gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the
+                     Holy Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost should receive the name of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2</a>): "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for "intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read inwardly].
+                     This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned
+                     with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the
+                     object of the intellect is "what a thing is," as stated in De Anima iii, 6.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p7"> Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak.
+                     Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hidden their meaning; under
+                     likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as compared with
+                     the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa.
+                     Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p8"> Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of
+                     the understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural light of our understanding is of
+                     finite power; wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate
+                     further still so as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is
+                     bestowed on man is called the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural light instilled within us, manifests only certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man
+                     is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[3]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">FS, Q[3] , A[8]</a>), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for which he requires the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The discourse of reason always begins from an understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding
+                     from certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored.
+                     Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the light
+                     of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore this addition is
+                     not called "reason" but "understanding," since the additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what
+                     the natural light is in regard to those things which we known from the first.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a certain
+                     excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding
+                     rather than after the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q8_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of understanding is incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that "the
+                     thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension of him who understands it." But the thing which is believed is not
+                     comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv"> Philippians 3:12</a>: "Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'], or were already perfect." Therefore it seems that faith
+                     and understanding are incompatible in the same subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding. But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">Q[1], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A1.html"> Q[4], A[1]</a>). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding in the same subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, understanding is more certain than science. But science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A4.html">Q[1], AA[4]</a>,5). Much less, therefore, can understanding and faith be in the same subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard." Now one who has
+                     faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard; thus it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.27" target="asv">Lk. 24:27</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.32" target="asv">32</a>) that Our Lord opened the scriptures to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore understanding is compatible
+                     with faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on the side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p7"> On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain things, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as
+                     the mystery to three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; whereas other things come under faith, through
+                     being subordinate, in one way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is contained in the Divine Scriptures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p8"> On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that there are two ways in which we may be said to understand.
+                     In one way, we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence of the thing we understand, and the very
+                     truth considered in itself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of faith lasts, we cannot understand
+                     those things which are the direct object of faith: although certain other things that are subordinate to
+                     faith can be understood even in this way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p9"> In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known
+                     as to its quiddity or mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward appearances, they do not contradict the
+                     truth, in so far as we understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the sake of things that appear externally.
+                     In this way, even during the state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those things which
+                     are the direct object of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p10"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the
+                     last refers to the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q8_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according
+                     to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more exalted things." But the practical intellect is occupied,
+                     not with exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered
+                     as a gift, is not practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gift of understanding is something more excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the intellectual
+                     virtue of understanding is concerned with none but necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much more,
+                     therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about
+                     necessary things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and which
+                     may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with
+                     which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason, which is the directing principle in matters of
+                     action, as was made clear above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html">FS, Q[58], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A3-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">FS, Q[71], A[6]</a>). Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.10" target="asv">Ps. 110:10</a>): "A good understanding to all that do it."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the gift of understanding is not only about those things which come under faith first and principally, but also about all
+                     things subordinate to faith. Now good actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh through charity,"
+                     according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv">Gal. 5:6</a>). Hence the gift of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these were its principal object,
+                     but in so far as the rule of our actions is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by the gift of
+                     understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The things with which human actions are concerned are not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred
+                     to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The excellence of the gift of understanding consists precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only
+                     as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its
+                     object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rule of human actions is the human reason and the eternal law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">FS, Q[71], A[6]</a>). Now the eternal law surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses
+                     the natural reason, and requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q8_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q8_A4-p0.1">Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49)
+                     that "the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind." Now many who are in a state of grace suffer
+                     from dulness of mind. Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith
+                     Christ dwells in our hearts, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17.</a> Now the gift of understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who have faith ought to pray that they may
+                     understand, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary for salvation: and,
+                     consequently, is not
+                     in all who are in a state of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which are common to all who are in a state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of
+                     understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with
+                     understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49).
+                     Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.5" target="asv">Ps. 81:5</a>): "They have not known or understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state of grace walks in darkness,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.8.12" target="asv"> Jn. 8:12</a>: "He that followeth Me, walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a state of grace is without the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
+                     according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already
+                     some knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good understood, as stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as
+                     the Holy Ghost directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it directly to some
+                     supernatural good; so also, by the gift of understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some supernatural
+                     truth, to which the right will needs to tend.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p7"> Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of mind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but
+                     with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.27" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:27</a>: "His unction teacheth you of all things."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although not all who have faith understand fully the things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that they
+                     ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order
+                     that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable
+                     to penetrate all things clearly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q8_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q8_A5-p0.1">Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding
+                     the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.20" target="asv"> Ps. 118:20</a>: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will is weak and slow
+                     to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace, the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of understanding
+                     can be in those who have not
+                     sanctifying grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.1" target="asv">Dan. 10:1</a>) that "there is need of understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is no prophecy without the gift
+                     of understanding. But there can be prophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.22" target="asv"> Mat. 7:22, </a> where those who say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not prophesied in Thy name?]," are answered with the
+                     words: "I never knew you." Therefore the gift
+                     of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.9" target="asv"> Is. 7:9, </a> following another reading [*The Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand." Now faith can be without
+                     sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding can be without it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.45" target="asv">Jn. 6:45</a>): "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by the intellect, as Gregory observes
+                     (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of understanding, cometh to Christ,
+                     which is impossible without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be without sanctifying grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], AA[1]</a>,2) the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly
+                     then, the intellectual light of grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's understanding is easily moved
+                     by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore unless the human
+                     intellect be moved by the Holy
+                     Ghost so far as to have a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however much the Holy
+                     Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p7"> Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to
+                     the greatest good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in moral matters a man has a right estimate about
+                     the end through a habit of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without sanctifying grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By understanding Augustine means any kind of intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions of a gift,
+                     unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a right estimate about the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed
+                     to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs
+                     to the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which perception,
+                     except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding
+                     and faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q8_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q8_A6-p0.1">Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of understanding is not distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between things
+                     whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary
+                     to rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference
+                     between folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does understanding
+                     differ from the other gifts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it
+                     to be about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not about any self-evident principles, since the natural
+                     habit of first principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident: while faith is sufficient
+                     in respect of such things as are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first
+                     principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A7.html">Q[1], A[7]</a>). Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other intellectual gifts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore it is not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> When several things are enumerated together they must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is
+                     the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together with the other gifts, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2.</a> Therefore the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The difference between the gift of understanding and three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since
+                     the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the three belong to the appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p7"> But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which
+                     also belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that
+                     the gift of understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to practical knowledge,
+                     while the gift of understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom,
+                     which also belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding renders the mind
+                     apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned the
+                     number of the gifts, above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">FS, Q[68], A[4]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p8"> But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is concerned not only with speculative, but also with
+                     practical matters, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards both matters, as we shall show further on (Q[9], A[3]), and consequently, we
+                     must take their distinction in some other way. For all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in
+                     us, takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is
+                     through hearing" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>). Hence some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by faith. But
+                     faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and
+                     furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as it works through charity, as appears from what has been
+                     said above (Q[4], A[2], ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p9"> Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two things are requisite on our part: first that they
+                     be penetrated or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man
+                     should judge these things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and to withdraw from their
+                     opposites: and this judgment, with regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard to
+                     created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of
+                     counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The foregoing difference between those four gifts is clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which Gregory
+                     assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp,
+                     when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders
+                     the mind unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if
+                     he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright
+                     about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any particular things whatever, so that it is
+                     contrary to knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes, viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly
+                     opposed to counsel, whereby man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The gift of understanding is about the first principles of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than
+                     faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind
+                     the things that are said.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment,
+                     but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A6-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q8_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q8_A7-p0.1">Whether the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart," etc., responds to the gift of understanding?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the
+                     gift of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs,
+                     not to the appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not respond to the gift
+                     of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.9" target="asv">Acts 15:9</a>): "Purifying their hearts by faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart being purified. Therefore the aforesaid
+                     beatitude is related to the virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the
+                     present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">FS, Q[3], A[8]</a>). Therefore the sixth beatitude which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to
+                     the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye hath not seen."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as also in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the
+                     other by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A2.html">FS, Q[69], AA[2]</a> ,4), and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p7"> For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to seeing God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of
+                     inordinate affections: and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and gifts belonging to the appetitive power.
+                     The other cleanness of heart is a kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of the mind that is purged
+                     of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of
+                     corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations: and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p8"> Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though
+                     we see not what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we
+                     understand that He surpasses all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God belongs to the gift of understanding;
+                     the first, to the gift of understanding in its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the second, to
+                     the gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as possessed by wayfarers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while
+                     the third refers to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in this life by way of inchoation, and will
+                     be fulfilled, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A2.html">FS, Q[69], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q8_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q8_A8-p0.1">Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit
+                     of faith, since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.9" target="asv">Is. 7:9</a>) according to another reading [*The Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand," where our version has:
+                     "If you will not believe, you shall not continue." Therefore fruit is not the fruit of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the
+                     foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], AA[1]</a>,7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
+                     namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding
+                     more than to wisdom, knowledge or counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith, which
+                     certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q8_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22 </a>says that the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen." Therefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the
+                     gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q8_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html">FS, Q[70], A[1]</a>), when we were discussing them, are so called because they are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power
+                     of the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently
+                     that which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be, after a fashion, the fruit of all the other
+                     things that pertain to the other powers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p7"> Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging
+                     to the same power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. In this way we must conclude that the fruit
+                     which properly responds to the gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while the fruit that responds
+                     to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue. But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of
+                     certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be believed,
+                     without understanding it in some way. However, the perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which perfection
+                     of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its
+                     own sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand, speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which
+                     fruit is the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which belongs only to practical knowledge, has no
+                     corresponding fruit of its own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and
+                     knowledge, which can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by
+                     the name of faith. The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is because, as already stated,
+                     the character of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective part.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q8_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q9" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q9-p0.1">OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q9-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q9-p2"> We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether knowledge is a gift?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether it is about Divine things?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q9-p5"> (3) Whether it is speculative or practical?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q9-p6"> (4) Which beatitude responds to it?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q9_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether knowledge is a gift?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies
+                     an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge."
+                     Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy persons, as stated above (Q[8], A[4]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html">FS, Q[68], A[5]</a>). Now Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack knowledge though they have faith." Therefore knowledge
+                     is not a gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html">FS, Q[68], A[8]</a>). Therefore one gift suffices for the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith,
+                     as stated above (Q[8], A[2]). Therefore the gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to which
+                     other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are perfections of virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], AA[1]</a>,2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q9_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature.
+                     Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of
+                     that truth: first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p7"> Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one
+                     of these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift
+                     of understanding, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A6.html">Q[8], A[6]</a>): while the other is that he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be believed, from
+                     what is not to be believed, and for this
+                     the gift of knowledge is required.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a
+                     sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative
+                     reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition,
+                     as was stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">FP, Q[14], A[7]</a>; wherefore
+                     God's knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is
+                     a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated likeness thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning things
+                     to be believed from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other
+                     is a knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith
+                     known, how to induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith.
+                     This knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the
+                     words quoted, adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense
+                     what he believes to the godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues;
+                     rather are all the gifts ordained to the perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not unreasonable
+                     if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q9_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets,
+                     nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things, because its object is the First Truth, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
+                     things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q9_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20, </a> "the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." If therefore there is
+                     knowledge about created things, it seems that there is also knowledge of Divine things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human
+                     affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order
+                     of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed
+                     through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which
+                     is formed through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p7"> Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated for those things which
+                     fall short of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in
+                     the genus of convertible terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of "definition," but the
+                     convertible terms which fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called "proper" terms.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p8"> Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q9_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, if this certitude of the judgment is derived from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom:
+                     for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge
+                     of all matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely
+                     God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge of human things is called "knowledge," this
+                     being the common name denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes.
+                     Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge
+                     is only about human or created things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence
+                     to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe,
+                     by a kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which
+                     unites man's mind to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but
+                     according as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>), every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the things that are known
+                     through the mean. And since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions
+                     about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their
+                     matter they have more in
+                     common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly,
+                     since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which it belongs formally, rather than
+                     to "wisdom," to which it belongs materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this
+                     pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q9_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q9_A3-p0.1">Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin.
+                     xii, 14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use of external things." But the knowledge which is
+                     concerned about actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless
+                     if it lacks the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this authority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot
+                     apply to a speculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the righteous, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q9_A5.html">Q[9], A[5]</a>). But speculative knowledge can be also in the unrighteous, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q9_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv"> James 4:17</a>: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative
+                     but practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the
+                     mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the
+                     gift of knowledge is both speculative and practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q9_A8.html">Q[9], A[8]</a>), the gift of knowledge, like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith. Now faith consists primarily
+                     and principally in speculation, in as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the last
+                     end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that faith extends to works, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q9_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv"> Gal. 5:6</a>: "Faith . . . worketh by
+                     charity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p7"> The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man
+                     knows what he ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we are directed in our actions by the knowledge
+                     of matters of faith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet
+                     not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p9"> Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have already stated (
+                     <a id="SS_Q9_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A5.html">Q[8], A[5]</a>) about the gift of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of understanding, but only he that understands
+                     through a habit of grace: and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that they alone have the gift of
+                     knowledge, who judge aright about matters of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never to wander from
+                     the straight path of
+                     justice. This is the knowledge of holy things, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q9_A3-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.10.10" target="asv"> Wis. 10:10</a>: "She conducted the just . . . through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy things."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q9_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q9_A4-p0.1">Whether the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," etc. corresponds to the gift of knowledge?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For,
+                     even as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now knowledge brings good to light rather than
+                     evil, since the latter is known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the crooked line" (De Anima i,
+                     5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there
+                     joy, since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q9_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness." Therefore the aforesaid beatitude
+                     does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow
+                     does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima
+                     iii, 9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift of knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by
+                     the evil which he coveted as though it were good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is
+                     occasioned, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q9_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.11" target="asv"> Wis. 14:11</a>: "Creatures . . . are turned to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those, namely, who do not
+                     judge aright about creatures, since they deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end
+                     in them, and lose the true good. It
+                     is by forming a right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the occasion), which
+                     judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p7"> Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of knowledge.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause
+                     of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of
+                     knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right
+                     judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is
+                     set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life, and
+                     is perfected in the life to come.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers:
+                     it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
+                     considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures,
+                     and in well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation
+                     is not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are
+                     about Divine things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q9_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q8_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q10" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q10-p0.1">OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p2"> In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which
+                  is opposed to confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p3"> As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p4"> Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p5"> (1) Whether unbelief is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p6"> (2) What is its subject?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p7"> (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p8"> (4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p9"> (5) Of the species of unbelief;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p10"> (6) Of their comparison, one with another;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p11"> (7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p12"> (8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p13"> (9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p14"> (10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p15"> (11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q10-p16"> (12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against their parents' will?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether unbelief is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4).
+                     Now unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having
+                     faith, just as to be capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith, even as to have charity, belongs
+                     to the grace of the faithful." Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is
+                     not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief,
+                     for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.14" target="asv">Rom. 10:14</a>): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore unbelief
+                     does not seem to be a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html">FS, Q[84], A[4]</a>), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under any of them.
+                     Therefore unbelief is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because
+                     he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear
+                     the faith, or despises it, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.53.1" target="asv"> Is. 53:1</a>: "Who hath believed our report?" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief
+                     is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p7"> If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears
+                     the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin of our first
+                     parent. If such like unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away without faith, but
+                     not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.22" target="asv">Jn. 15:22</a>) "If I had not
+                     come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as "referring to the
+                     sin whereby they believed not in Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner
+                     instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is contrary to nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules
+                     of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations
+                     arise from vainglory."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p11"> It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them,
+                     so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine
+                     (De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore
+                     unbelief is in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.11.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 11:14 </a>"Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be
+                     taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a good angel."
+                     This seems to be because of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his intention is to adhere
+                     to a good
+                     angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it does not reside in
+                     the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are contrary to one another are in the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the
+                     intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">FS, Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2), sin is said to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two principles: one
+                     is its first and universal principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because every sin is voluntary.
+                     The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible
+                     is the principle of
+                     gluttony and lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief,
+                     is an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p7"> Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle,
+                     in which way every sin is said to be in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p8"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief is
+                     in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are
+                     deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right judgment" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx].
+                     But, according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error,
+                     is not without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate
+                     to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible
+                     beyond the fact that he is a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief
+                     is the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not, seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes
+                     sin: for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.12" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:12,13</a>): "I . . . before was a blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it
+                     ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due to believers
+                     than to unbelievers, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.29" target="asv"> Heb. 10:29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed
+                     the blood of the testament unclean, by which
+                     he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.22" target="asv"> Jn. 15:22, </a> "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): "Under the general name,
+                     He refers to a singularly great sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others may be traced." Therefore
+                     unbelief is the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">FS, Q[71], A[6]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html">FS, Q[73], A[3]</a>). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because
+                     he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p7"> Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion
+                     is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals.
+                     This does not apply to the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q20_A3.html">Q[20], A[3]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q34_A2.html"> Q[34], A[2]</a>, ad 2;
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q39_A2.html"> Q[39], A[2]</a>, ad
+                     3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence Augustine
+                     hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more
+                     grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance,
+                     be aggravated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect
+                     it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man
+                     sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider
+                     the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer,
+                     other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith,
+                     and on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and
+                     which he insults by committing sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. Because a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of unbelievers consists of
+                     their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among unbelievers,
+                     no action can be good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts
+                     of all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action
+                     of theirs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.4" target="asv">Acts 10:4</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.31" target="asv">31</a>), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are
+                     good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html">FS, Q[85], AA[2]</a>,4) mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, unbelief is
+                     a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that
+                     unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent,
+                     do those good works for which the
+                     good of nature suffices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p7"> Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they
+                     sin. For even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he does not refer to the end
+                     of faith, so too, an unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin
+                     is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same authority adds: "Because every one that
+                     lives or acts according to his unbelief, sins grievously."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the
+                     intention in respect of a connatural good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them,
+                     whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that
+                     he was not an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom none can please without faith. Now he
+                     had implicit faith, as the truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter
+                     was sent to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A5-p0.1">Whether there are several species of unbelief?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
+                     they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although
+                     its matter contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First Truth; while the things which
+                     an unbeliever disbelieves are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends
+                     not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several species of unbelief, according to the various points
+                     which the unbeliever disbelieves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species
+                     of unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to follow that there is an infinite number of species
+                     of unbelief, and consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our consideration.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different
+                     points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several
+                     species of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue, because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to
+                     Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are
+                     opposed to it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">FS, Q[64], A[1]</a>), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way
+                     in one matter, whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one virtue. The diversity
+                     of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different
+                     relations to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue
+                     one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices
+                     opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In
+                     this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number
+                     of ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For
+                     this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p7"> Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate
+                     in number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is
+                     resisted before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after
+                     it has been accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the
+                     very manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these three as species
+                     of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p8"> If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there
+                     are not determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case
+                     the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly,
+                     it may be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is the formal object of the sin; which however
+                     does not derive its species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We
+                     must therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal
+                     aspect, considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that it follows: and it is from this point of view
+                     that unbelief derives its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while
+                     there are various species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various temporal
+                     goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one
+                     First Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the various species of unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since faith is one because it believes in many things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things,
+                     be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief,
+                     even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily diseases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A6-p0.1">Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according
+                     as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed
+                     to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of
+                     God, from which the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their
+                     unbelief is the gravest of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important
+                     points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity
+                     of Christ from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more important points than
+                     Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief
+                     is the gravest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being
+                     from God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than
+                     heathens, who receive neither Testament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.21" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:21</a>): "It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back." Now the
+                     heathens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way. Therefore
+                     theirs is the graver sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, two things may be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists
+                     the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even
+                     as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the unbelief
+                     of heretics, who confess their belief
+                     in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted
+                     the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false
+                     interpretations, their unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not accepted the
+                     Gospel faith in any way at all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p7"> The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err
+                     on more points than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more grievous than the unbelief
+                     of the Jews, and that of the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who, in matters
+                     of faith, err even more than heathens do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p8"> Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A1.html">(A[1])</a> unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter
+                     as was stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A6-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A1.html">(A[1])</a> seems rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A7-p0.1">Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not to dispute with unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.14" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:14</a>): "Contend not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers." But it is impossible to dispute with
+                     unbelievers publicly without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with unbelievers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:
+                     "It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters
+                     which have once been judged and disposed of." Now all matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it
+                     is an insult to the councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in
+                     public about matters of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter:
+                     whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute
+                     in public about matters of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.9.22" target="asv">Acts 9:22</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A7-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.9.29" target="asv">29</a>) that "Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that "he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed
+                     with the Greeks."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In disputing about the faith, two things must be observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of his
+                     hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about
+                     the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to probe it with arguments, without
+                     doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it
+                     is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p7"> On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith,
+                     or simple and wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no danger in disputing about
+                     the faith in their presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are provoked
+                     and molested by unbelievers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or
+                     else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there are not unbelievers. In the first
+                     case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of
+                     confuting errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity
+                     to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to
+                     strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet
+                     silence leave those in error who might have been instructed." On the other hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute
+                     in public about the faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that they have
+                     never heard anything differing from what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to
+                     say against the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than
+                     of sound speeches.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That law forbade those public disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are
+                     for the safeguarding thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,
+                     and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes
+                     by defending the faith, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.3.15" target="asv">1 Pet. 3:15</a>: "Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that
+                     hope which is in
+                     you' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken from Bede]." Sometimes again, it is necessary, in order to convince those who
+                     are in error, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A7-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.9" target="asv"> Titus 1:9</a>: "That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A8-p0.1">Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.28" target="asv">Mat. 13:28</a>) that the servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it
+                     up?" and that he answered: "No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it": on which
+                     passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the
+                     slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily slay many innocent persons."
+                     Therefore it seems that for the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that
+                     for the future, none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to
+                     the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he
+                     cannot believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> It is said in God's person (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.32" target="asv">Ezech. 18:32</a> [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A8-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.33.11" target="asv">Ezech. 33:11</a>]): "I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']." Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q10_A8-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A9.html">FS, Q[19], AA[9]</a>,10). Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put to death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.23" target="asv">Lk. 14:23</a>): "Go out into the highways and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into the house of God, i.e. into Holy
+                     Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be compelled to the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Among unbelievers there are some who have never received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no
+                     means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they
+                     should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies,
+                     or by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this reason
+                     that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even
+                     if they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will, but in
+                     order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p8"> On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and
+                     all apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold
+                     what they, at one time, received.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from
+                     the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should
+                     be compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments. However this opinion of mine is
+                     undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the
+                     law was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder." Accordingly the meaning of
+                     Our Lord's words, "Suffer both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from those which precede, "lest perhaps gathering
+                     up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with it." For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) "these words show
+                     that when this is not to be feared, that is to say, when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he
+                     has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have
+                     received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same chapter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter
+                     of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should
+                     be compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying
+                     out continually: 'We may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ
+                     compel?' They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught Him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to
+                     have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic
+                     Church gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so
+                     many nations."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A8-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A9-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.27" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:27</a>): "If any of them that believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before you." And Chrysostom
+                     says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad Heb.): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any reservation." Now to
+                     sit at table with anyone is to communicate with him. Therefore it is lawful to
+                     communicate with unbelievers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:12</a>): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When, therefore, the Church forbids the
+                     faithful to communicate with certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
+                     servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they
+                     can lawfully communicate with them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.2" target="asv">Dt. 7:2,3</a>): "Thou shalt make no league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages with them": and a gloss
+                     on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.15.19" target="asv"> Lev. 15:19, </a> "The woman who at the return of the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we should not come in touch
+                     with idolaters or their disciples, nor have any dealings with them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Communication with a particular person is forbidden to the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with
+                     whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both
+                     motives can be gathered from the Apostle's words (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A9-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:6</a>). For after he had pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know you not that a little leaven corrupts
+                     the
+                     whole lump?" and afterwards he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of the Church when
+                     he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A9-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:12</a>): "Do not you judge them that are within?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p7"> Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any
+                     way received the Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the right to exercise spiritual judgment
+                     over them, but only temporal judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are guilty of some misdemeanor,
+                     and are condemned by the faithful to some temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a
+                     punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received,
+                     either by corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces
+                     sentence of excommunication on both.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p8"> With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances
+                     and time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating with unbelievers will lead to
+                     the conversion of the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not to be forbidden to
+                     communicate with unbelievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there
+                     be some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion
+                     is to be feared as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very
+                     familiar terms with them, or to communicate with them without necessity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Church does not exercise judgment against unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them: but she
+                     does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
+                     for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication with certain unbelievers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is more probability that a servant who is ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his master
+                     who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants.
+                     If, however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant, he should send him away, according to Our
+                     Lord's command (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A9-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.8" target="asv">Mat. 18:8</a>): "If . . . thy foot scandalize thee,
+                     cut it off, and cast it from thee."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p12"> With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply
+                     is that the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory the Jews were about to enter. For the
+                     latter were inclined to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those nations, they should
+                     be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A9-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.4" target="asv">Dt. 7:4</a>): "For she will turn away
+                     thy son from following Me."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A9-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A10-p0.1">Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.1" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:1</a>): "Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking
+                     of unbelievers, since he adds (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:2</a>): "But they that have believing masters, let them not despise them." Moreover it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A10-p2.3" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.18" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:18</a>): "Servants
+                     be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward." Now this command would
+                     not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that
+                     unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the members of a prince's household are his subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
+                     households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All the saints salute you, especially they that are of
+                     Caesar's household," referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life,
+                     even as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer
+                     can be subject to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore unbelievers may have authority over the
+                     faithful even as to dominion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce judgment
+                     on the faithful, for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:1</a>): "Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust," i.e. unbelievers, "and not before
+                     the saints?" Therefore it seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> That this question may be considered in two ways. First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful
+                     as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and
+                     endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects
+                     are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see
+                     the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church
+                     altogether forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any capacity whatever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p7"> Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force: and here we must observe that dominion and authority
+                     are institutions of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the Divine law. Now the
+                     Divine law which is the law of grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural reason. Wherefore the distinction
+                     between faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
+                     unbelievers over the faithful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p8"> Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church
+                     who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful
+                     who are converted into children of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p9"> This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters,
+                     to the Church and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a Christian, he should forthwith
+                     receive his freedom, without paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in slavery; and likewise if, when
+                     yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be
+                     offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject
+                     to the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their
+                     subjects, in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are not
+                     subject to her or her members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in order to avoid scandal,
+                     for as Our Lord showed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A10-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.25" target="asv">Mat. 17:25,26</a>) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because "the children are free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid
+                     in order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their masters, adds, "lest the name
+                     of the Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the conversion
+                     of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household,
+                     that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture,
+                     and, the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of
+                     Diocletian.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas the
+                     craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have
+                     dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church
+                     permits Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their
+                     living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A10-p12.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 5:6.</a> Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely
+                     forbidden.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A10-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A11-p0.1">Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
+                     rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss observes on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv"> Rom. 1:32</a>: "Not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it is a sin to tolerate their rites.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.1" target="asv"> Gal. 5:1, </a> "Be not held again under the yoke of bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry." But
+                     it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples
+                     of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54).
+                     Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above (A[3] ). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like,
+                     are not tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be tolerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory [*Regist. xi, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 15</a>: cf. Decret., dist. xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed to observe all their feasts,
+                     just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages observed them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely
+                     good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater
+                     goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly
+                     tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be
+                     incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust." Hence,
+                     though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because
+                     of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith
+                     which we hold, there follows this good---that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is
+                     represented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p7"> On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated,
+                     except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation
+                     of those who if they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church, at times, has
+                     tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A11-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q10_A12" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q10_A12-p0.1">Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
+                     bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children, since the right of parental authority can
+                     be made to cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A12-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv"> Mat. 19:6</a>: "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder." And yet the
+                     marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A12-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:15</a>): "If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can.
+                     Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without
+                     insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation." Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate
+                     the right of
+                     unbelieving parents' authority over their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against their parents'
+                     will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death.
+                     Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children
+                     of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents who would imbue them
+                     with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
+                     instructed in the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen
+                     of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and princes have the power to do what they will
+                     with Jewish children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their parents' wishes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body.
+                     Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the
+                     debt of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted
+                     to preach, according to the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A12-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.33.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 33:6 </a>about the man who "sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through
+                     not being baptized
+                     are they accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their
+                     will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore
+                     these should not be baptized against their parents' will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine
+                     of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than
+                     by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children
+                     of the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there have
+                     been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly
+                     terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor
+                     from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews
+                     should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p9"> There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to the faith. For children baptized before coming
+                     to the use of reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what
+                     they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p10"> The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is
+                     not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother's womb; and later on after birth,
+                     and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, for
+                     so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a
+                     horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according
+                     to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural
+                     justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done
+                     to it against its parents' wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to
+                     itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be induced,
+                     not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against
+                     its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that
+                     they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents' duty to look after
+                     the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other's
+                     consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the
+                     child has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No one should be snatched from natural death against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the
+                     judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law,
+                     whereby a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of everlasting death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural
+                     order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose
+                     of the child in all matters relating to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching.
+                     Hence it had already been said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q10_A12-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.3.17" target="asv">Ezech. 3:17</a>): "I have made thee a watchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other hand, to provide the sacraments
+                     of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if
+                     through being deprived of
+                     the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q10_A12-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q11" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q11-p0.1">OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q11-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q11-p2"> We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q11-p4"> (2) Of the matter about which it is;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether converts should be received?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q11_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief. For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]).
+                     Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv"> Gal. 5:19</a>: [*Cf. Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning
+                     choice, whereby a man makes choice of that school which he deems best."
+                     But choice is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">FS, Q[13], A[1]</a>). Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery
+                     that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer." Now the end of heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and
+                     glory, which belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util. Credendi i) that "a heretic is one
+                     who either devises or follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit,
+                     especially that he may lord and be honored above others." Therefore heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works
+                     of the flesh, for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the others, he adds, "dissensions,
+                     sects," which are the same as heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is one who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is opposed
+                     to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is a species of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html">FS, Q[13], A[3]</a>) is about things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters of faith, the will assents to some truth,
+                     as to its proper good, as was shown above (Q[4], A[3]): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has the character of last
+                     end, while those which are secondary truths, have the character of being
+                     directed to the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p7"> Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is
+                     given seems to hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding which one assents to that person
+                     hold a secondary place. Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his will, to Christ, in those things
+                     which truly belong to His doctrine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p8"> Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is
+                     unwilling to assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in respect of the very end. This belongs to the
+                     species of unbelief in pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, yet he fails in his choice
+                     of those things wherein he assents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the
+                     suggestions of his own mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p9"> Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will regards faith, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vices take their species from their proximate end, while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus in
+                     the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the species of adultery taken from its proper end and object;
+                     but the ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the theft, and is included under it, as an effect
+                     under its cause, or a species under its genus, as appears from what we have said
+                     about acts in general (
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A7.html">FS, Q[18], A[7]</a>). Wherefore, as to the case in point also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false opinion, and from
+                     this it derives its species, while its remote end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing [*From the Greek {airein} [hairein], to cut off], so does sect derive
+                     its name from its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same
+                     thing, and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate
+                     object, but by reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end
+                     in which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second objection, or some illusion of the imagination
+                     (which gives rise to error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for this faculty has a certain connection
+                     with the flesh, in as much as its act is independent on a bodily organ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q11_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians,
+                     so were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym. viii, 3,4,5). Now their dissensions were not about
+                     matters of faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though they were its proper matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about
+                     interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.20" target="asv"> Gal. 5:20 </a>that "whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic,
+                     though he may not have left the Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies spring up from words spoken amiss." [*St. Thomas
+                     quotes
+                     this saying elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and 
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q16_A8.html">TP, Q[16], A[8]</a>, but it is not to be found in St. Jerome's works.] Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome,
+                     on the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this was without any heresy on their part. Therefore
+                     heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold mischievous
+                     and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing
+                     to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending them." Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but
+                     those which are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.17" target="asv">Rom. 1:17</a>). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the
+                     Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and
+                     so forth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a person has a false opinion about things belonging
+                     to the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p7"> Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html">FP, Q[32], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A6.html">FS, Q[1], A[6]</a>, ad 1; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html">FS, Q[2], A[5]</a>), in one way, directly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way, indirectly and secondarily, e.g. those
+                     matters, the denial of which leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be heresy in either way, even
+                     as there can be faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies among
+                     Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning
+                     of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has revealed. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.13.6" target="asv">Ezech. 13:6</a>) about the false prophets: "They have persisted to confirm what they have said," viz. by false interpretations of Scripture.
+                     Moreover a man professes his faith by the words that he utters, since confession is
+                     an act of faith, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a> ). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope Leo says
+                     in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The enemies of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so
+                     that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no means should
+                     we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek
+                     the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth," because, to wit, they do not
+                     make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly,
+                     certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so
+                     far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church; although if anyone were
+                     obstinately to deny them after they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic.
+                     This authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: "Whenever a question
+                     of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other than Peter,
+                     as being the source of their name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy doctors
+                     defended their opinion." Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol [*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): "This, most
+                     blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly or
+                     carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of Peter. If however this, our profession,
+                     be approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself is ignorant, or malicious,
+                     or even not a catholic but a heretic."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q11_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.24" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:24,25</a>): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if peradventure God
+                     may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil." Now if heretics
+                     are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the
+                     Apostle's command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle
+                     says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:19</a>): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . . who are reproved, may be manifest among you." Therefore it seems that heretics
+                     should be tolerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Master commanded his servants (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.30" target="asv">Mat. 13:30</a>) to suffer the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i.e. the end of the world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain
+                     that the cockle denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.10" target="asv">Titus 3:10,11</a>): "A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that he, that is such an one, is subverted."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their
+                     own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be
+                     severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge
+                     money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers
+                     are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted
+                     of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p7"> On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns
+                     not at once, but "after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church
+                     no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the
+                     Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death.
+                     For Jerome commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.9" target="asv"> Gal. 5:9, </a> "A little leaven," says: "Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole
+                     paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was
+                     not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This very modesty demands that the heretic should be admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to retract,
+                     he must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather from the words of the Apostle quoted above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the faithful
+                     being put to the test, and "makes us shake off our sluggishness, and search the Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine states
+                     (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the corruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm
+                     indeed. Consequently we should consider what they directly intend, and expel them,
+                     rather than what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum), "to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted." A man is excommunicated,
+                     as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:5</a>) that his "spirit may be saved in the day of Our Lord." Yet if heretics be altogether uprooted by death, this is not contrary
+                     to Our Lord's command, which is to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot be plucked up without plucking
+                     up the wheat, as we
+                     explained above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q11_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A8.html">Q[10], A[8]</a>, ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q11_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.1" target="asv">Jer. 3:1</a>) in the person of the Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord." Now
+                     the sentence of the Church is God's sentence, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.17" target="asv"> Dt. 1:17</a>: "You shall hear the little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the
+                     judgment of God." Therefore even those who are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual prostitution, should
+                     be received all the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.22" target="asv">Mat. 18:22</a>) to forgive his offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy times seven times," which Jerome expounds
+                     as meaning that "a man should be forgiven, as often as he has sinned." Therefore he ought to be received by the Church as
+                     often as he has sinned by falling back into heresy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers who wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore
+                     heretics also should be received.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix) says that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which they
+                     had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal." Therefore they should not be received by the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
+                     persecute her, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv"> Mat. 5:44</a>: "Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you." Now it is part of charity that we should both wish and work our neighbor's
+                     good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiritual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the object of charity,
+                     since it is this chiefly that
+                     we should wish for one another. Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who return after falling no matter how often,
+                     are admitted by the Church to Penance whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p7"> The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz. temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions,
+                     good repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by charity to wish others this good, except in relation
+                     to the eternal salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of these goods in one individual might be an
+                     obstacle to eternal salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a good to that person,
+                     rather should we desire him to be without it, both because eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and because
+                     the good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics were always received on their return, in order
+                     to save their lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial to the salvation of others, both because they would
+                     infect others if they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped without punishment, others would feel more assured in lapsing
+                     into heresy. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.8.11" target="asv">Eccles. 8:11</a>): "For because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p8"> For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards
+                     their lives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical dignities which they may have had before,
+                     should their conversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done for the good of peace. But when
+                     they fall again, after having been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore when
+                     they return again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In God's tribunal, those who return are always received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who return
+                     in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes that those who relapse after being once received,
+                     are not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of salvation, but neither does she protect them
+                     from the sentence of death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare our
+                     brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it
+                     is not left to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q11_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.15" target="asv"> Mat. 18:15, </a> "If thy brother shall offend against thee." Yet even in this matter the law prescribes limits
+                     according as God's honor or our neighbor's good demands.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When other unbelievers, who have never received the faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy in
+                     faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q11_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q10_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q12" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q12-p0.1">OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q12-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q12-p2"> We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q12-p3"> (1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q12-p4"> (2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q12_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly,
+                     pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it
+                     is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God," and further on, (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin."
+                     Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance,
+                     or even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.12" target="asv">Prov. 6:12-14</a>): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with
+                     the foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he soweth discord." Moreover if
+                     anyone were to have himself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy
+                     does not pertain to unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to unbelief,
+                     it would follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said (
+                     <a id="SS_Q12_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A5.html">Q[10], A[5]</a>). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.67" target="asv">Jn. 6:67</a>): "Many of his disciples went back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.6.65" target="asv">Jn. 6:65</a>): "There are some of you that believe not." Therefore apostasy pertains to unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen in various ways according to the different kinds of union between
+                     man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying
+                     His commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical
+                     state, or Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which precedes, remains,
+                     but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to which
+                     he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious life"
+                     or "Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his mind against the Divine commandments: and though man
+                     may apostatize in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p7"> But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely
+                     is that whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called,
+                     pertains to unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy, which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's commandments,
+                     an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to faith not only that the heart should believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness to
+                     the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief,
+                     in so far as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself to be healthy. Now although the authority
+                     quoted may be understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies most
+                     truly to an apostate from the faith. For since faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without
+                     faith it is "impossible to please God"; when once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining
+                     of eternal salvation, for which reason it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.12" target="asv">Prov. 6:12</a>): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is the life of the soul, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.17" target="asv"> Rom. 1:17</a>: "The just man liveth by faith." Therefore, just as
+                     when the life of the body is taken away, man's every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of justice,
+                     which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands
+                     revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result
+                     is that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from the faith even as he severed himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The species of a quality or form are not diversified by the fact of its being the term "wherefrom" or "whereto" of movement:
+                     on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term "whereto"
+                     of the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating
+                     circumstance thereof, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.21" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:21</a>: "It had
+                     been better for them not to know the truth [Vulg.: 'the way of justice'], than after they had known it, to turn back."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q12_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe
+                     him allegiance?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that
+                     they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, Super
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.124.3" target="asv"> Ps. 124:3</a>] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate, nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to them,
+                     "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from
+                     their allegiance to their prince on account of his apostasy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus
+                     Joseph served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does
+                     not release subjects from allegiance to their sovereign.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of
+                     apostasy from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of their subjects who are believers, they would
+                     equally lose it on account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we ought not to refuse allegiance to
+                     a sovereign on account of his apostatizing from the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority,
+                     absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons:
+                     and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons, until these shall have made amends." Now apostates
+                     from the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal
+                     [*Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore princes should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q12_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A10.html">Q[10], A[10]</a>), unbelief, in itself, is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the law of nations which is a human
+                     law: whereas the distinction between believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul human right. Nevertheless
+                     a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account of other
+                     sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p7"> Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief in those who have never received the faith, according
+                     to the saying of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q12_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:12</a>): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbelief of those
+                     who have received the faith: and it is fitting that they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their subjects:
+                     for this same allegiance might conduce to
+                     great corruption of the faith, since, as was stated above (A[1], OBJ[2]), "a man that is an apostate . . . with a wicked heart
+                     deviseth evil, and . . . soweth discord," in order to sever others from the faith. Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication
+                     is passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are "ipso facto" absolved from his authority and from
+                     the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> At that time the Church was but recently instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she
+                     allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring
+                     a yet greater danger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in the article, it is not a question of those unbelievers who have never received the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q12_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, which is not the case in any other sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q12_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q13" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q13-p0.1">OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q13-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q13-p2"> We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2)
+                  that blasphemy which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q13-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q13-p4"> (1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q13_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or insult
+                     against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed
+                     to the confession of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.31" target="asv"> Eph. 4:31, </a> "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the saints." But confession
+                     of faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blasphemy
+                     is not always opposed to the confession of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to some, there are three kinds of blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed
+                     of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to
+                     a creature, so that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His creatures. Now the object of faith is
+                     God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.12" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:12,13</a>): "I . . . before was a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it ignorantly in" my "unbelief." Hence it seems
+                     that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius
+                     says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever
+                     does not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies
+                     anything befitting God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine
+                     goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p7"> Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the
+                     second way this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, even as, on the other hand, faith in God is
+                     perfected by love of Him. Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the intellect alone, or in the
+                     affections also. If it is in thought only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in
+                     speech it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the
+                     falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the
+                     honor due to God, and this is perfect blasphemy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does blasphemy
+                     against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things,
+                     or to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species
+                     of habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance
+                     which errs in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according
+                     to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something
+                     unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God,
+                     is to assert that God is the same as a creature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q13_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin. Because a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc.
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.8" target="asv">Col. 3:8</a>) says: "After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins": and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore
+                     blasphemy is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to
+                     any of them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal: hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede
+                     the deliberation of the reason, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q13_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html">FS, Q[74], AA[3]</a>,10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.24.16" target="asv">Lev. 24:16</a>): "He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment is not inflicted except for a mortal
+                     sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q13_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">FS, Q[72], A[5]</a>), a mortal sin is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual life, which principle is the charity
+                     of God. Therefore whatever things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now blasphemy, as to
+                     its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q13_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the object of
+                     charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those mentioned
+                     previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more
+                     grievous sins are included.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q13_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, blasphemy is contrary to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the prohibition of unbelief, expressed
+                     by the words: "I am the Lord thy God," etc. (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.1" target="asv">Ex. 20:1</a>). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.7" target="asv">Ex. 20:7</a>). Because he who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even more than he who
+                     uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur unawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing to
+                     advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break
+                     out into words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of those words: this is a venial sin, and is not
+                     a blasphemy properly so called. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of
+                     his words, and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in
+                     a sudden movement of anger, kills one who is sitting beside him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q13_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q13_A3-p0.1">Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is
+                     said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since it destroys a man's life, does more harm than the sin of
+                     blasphemy, which can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more grievous than that of blasphemy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood, and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer
+                     goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more grievous sin than blasphemy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.74.6" target="asv"> Ps. 74:6, </a> "Lift not up your horn on high," a gloss says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all." Therefore blasphemy
+                     is not the greatest sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> On
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.18.2" target="asv"> Is. 18:2, </a> "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss says: "In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q13_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief: while the sin is aggravated
+                     if the will's detestation is added thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love and confession add to
+                     the praise of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p7"> Therefore, since, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q13_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>), unbelief is the greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy also is a very great sin, through belonging
+                     to the same genus as unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin committed
+                     directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them
+                     in respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for murder does more harm to one's neighbor, than blasphemy
+                     does to God. Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of
+                     the evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q13_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html">FS, Q[73], A[8]</a>), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do harm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously that
+                     the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away from you" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.31" target="asv">Eph. 4:31</a>) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false about God,
+                     as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope,
+                     as it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the most grievous
+                     sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q13_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q13_A4-p0.1">Whether the damned blaspheme?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of
+                     the fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore,
+                     much more are they restrained from blaspheming.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting
+                     or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.11.3" target="asv">Eccles. 11:3</a>) that "the tree . . . in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it clearly follows that, after this
+                     life, man acquires neither merit nor sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were
+                     not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they blaspheme in the life to come.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q13_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.16.9" target="asv">Apoc. 16:9</a>): "The men were scorched with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power over these plagues," and a
+                     gloss on these words says that "those who are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will nevertheless complain
+                     that God is so powerful as to torture them thus." Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and consequently it
+                     will also be in their future state.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3), detestation of the Divine goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in hell retain their wicked
+                     will which is turned away from God's justice, since they love the things for which they are punished, would wish to use them
+                     if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins which they have
+                     committed, not because they hate them, but
+                     because they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy
+                     of the heart: and it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even as the saints will
+                     praise Him with their voices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy through fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas,
+                     in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests
+                     to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer, wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious.
+                     In the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in
+                     the damned, evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in
+                     this respect there can be blasphemy in him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q13_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q14" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q14-p0.1">OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q14-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q14-p2"> We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q14-p3"> (1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q14-p4"> (2) Of the species of this sin;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q14-p5"> (3) Whether it can be forgiven?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q14-p6"> (4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost before committing other sins?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q14_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the
+                     sin against the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.32" target="asv"> Mat. 12:32.</a> But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed
+                     through certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain
+                     malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sin committed through certain malice is condivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed through
+                     weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is condivided with the sin against the Son of Man (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.32" target="asv">Mat. 12:32</a>). Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice, since things whose
+                     opposites differ, are themselves different.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic sin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed
+                     through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any
+                     kind of sin at all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that "to sin against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for its own
+                     sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the
+                     same as the sin against the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Three meanings have been given to the sin against the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super Matth.
+                     xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. xii, 10), Jerome (Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in
+                     Matth.), say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy
+                     Spirit we understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each Person of which
+                     is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity, in which sense blasphemy against the Holy
+                     Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy against the Son of Man (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.32" target="asv">Mat. 12:32</a>), for Christ did certain things in respect of His human nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He did
+                     others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power
+                     of His own Godhead and by the
+                     operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full, according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking blasphemy
+                     against the Son of Man, when they said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.19" target="asv">Mat. 11:19</a>) that He was "a glutton . . . a wine drinker," and a "friend of publicans": but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy
+                     Ghost, when they ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the power of His own Divine Nature and by
+                     the operation of the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p7"> Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence
+                     when, namely, a man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not confined to utterance by word of mouth, but extends
+                     to words in thought and deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word, in this sense, is said to be uttered against
+                     the Holy Ghost, because it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the work of the Holy Ghost, Who
+                     is the charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor did Our Lord say this to the Jews, as though they had sinned against
+                     the Holy Ghost, since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence, but He warned them, lest by similar utterances they should
+                     come to sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that we are to understand
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.3.29" target="asv"> Mark 3:29,30, </a> where after Our Lord had said: "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost," etc. the Evangelist adds, "because they
+                     said: He hath an unclean spirit."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p8"> But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against
+                     that good which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated
+                     to the Father, and wisdom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins through weakness, it is a sin "against the Father";
+                     that when he sins through ignorance, it is a sin "against the Son"; and that when he sins through
+                     certain malice, i.e. through the very choosing of evil, as explained above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html">FS, Q[78], AA[1]</a> ,3), it is a sin "against the Holy Ghost."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p9"> Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very inclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in
+                     this way, to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy Ghost. In another way it happens that by reason
+                     of contempt, that which might have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or removed; thus hope is removed by despair,
+                     and fear by presumption, and so on, as we shall explain further on (QQ[20],21). Now all these things which prevent
+                     the choosing of sin are effects of the Holy Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin through malice is to sin against the
+                     Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the confession of faith consists in a protestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy against the
+                     Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the third interpretation, blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son of Man,
+                     forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of God and the wisdom of God" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:24</a>). Wherefore, in this sense, the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is committed through ignorance, or through
+                     weakness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but
+                     a general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a special contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us,
+                     it has the character of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin against the Holy Ghost is a special kind of
+                     sin, as also according to the first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it
+                     is not a species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of any kind of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q14_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy,
+                     resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual good, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to
+                     deny God's justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man rejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice.
+                     Therefore each of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the
+                     Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not
+                     diversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith whereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of
+                     old believed that He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not be reckoned as two species of sin against
+                     the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv">Jn. 1:17</a>). Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against
+                     the Son rather than against the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that "to refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost." Moreover a gloss
+                     on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.10.16" target="asv">Lev. 10:16</a>, says that "a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the Holy Ghost." Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to
+                     the Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems that the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are
+                     insufficiently enumerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii) says that "those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without merits
+                     presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost," and (Enchiridion lxxxiii) that "he who dies in a state of obstinacy is
+                     guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that "impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost,"
+                     and (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xxii), that "to resist fraternal goodness with the
+                     brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost," and in his book De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says
+                     that "a man who spurns the truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the truth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by
+                     Whose inspiration the Church is taught," and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are distinguished
+                     in respect of the removal of contempt of those things whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These things
+                     are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the
+                     Divine judgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered from
+                     sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the consideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds,
+                     which hope is removed by "despair"; and by fear, arising from the consideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins,
+                     which fear is removed by "presumption," when, namely, a man presumes that he can obtain glory without merits, or pardon without
+                     repentance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p8"> God's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the
+                     "resistance of the known truth," when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has acknowledged, in order to sin more freely:
+                     while the other is the assistance of inward grace, against which there is "envy of a brother's spiritual good," when, namely,
+                     a man is envious not only of his brother's person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the
+                     world.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p9"> On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of
+                     the act, the consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the sin he has committed, and against this there
+                     is "impenitence," not as denoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken above (for thus it would not
+                     be a special sin, but a circumstance of sin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing is the
+                     smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.21" target="asv"> Rom. 6:21</a>: "What fruit had you therefore then in those things, of which you are now ashamed?" The consideration of this is wont to
+                     prevent man's will from being hardened in sin, and this is removed by "obstinacy," whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging
+                     to sin. Of these two it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.8.6" target="asv">Jer. 8:6</a>): "There is none that doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?" as regards the first; and,
+                     "They are all turned to their own course, as a horse rushing to the battle," as regards the second.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects
+                     by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be considered in sin, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a brother's
+                     spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are united together.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q14_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): "We should
+                     despair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to repentance." But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would
+                     be possible to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being healed by God. But "no disease is incurable to an all-powerful
+                     physician," as a gloss says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.3" target="asv"> Ps. 102:3, </a> "Who healeth all thy diseases." Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil. Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any
+                     virtue, since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.18" target="asv">Job 4:18,19</a>): "In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall they that dwell in houses of clay?" Therefore, in like manner,
+                     a man can return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.32" target="asv">Mat. 12:32</a>): "He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come":
+                     and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22) that "so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot submit to the
+                     humiliation of asking for pardon."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the various interpretations of the sin against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said
+                     that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost we understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable,
+                     since in no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life
+                     to come, since it was not remitted by repentance in this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p7"> According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because,
+                     considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that
+                     sins through ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins through certain malice, can offer no excuse
+                     in alleviation of his punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man before His Godhead
+                     was revealed, could have some excuse, on account of the weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence, they
+                     deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the
+                     Holy Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore, according to Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in
+                     Matth.), the Jews are said not to be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in the world to come, because they were
+                     punished for it, both in the present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, in the pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius
+                     adduces the example of their forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with Moses on account of the shortage of water and bread;
+                     and this the Lord bore with patience, because they were to be excused on account of the weakness of the flesh: but afterwards
+                     they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought them out of
+                     Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the Holy Ghost, saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.4" target="asv">Ex. 32:4</a>): "These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out of the land of Egypt." Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal
+                     punishment on them, since "there were slain on that day about three and twenty thousand men" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.28" target="asv">Ex. 32:28</a>), and threatened them with punishment in the life to come, saying, (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.34" target="asv">Ex. 32:34</a>): "I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin .
+                     . . of theirs."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p8"> Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of
+                     the disease, which removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the power of nature, or causes loathing
+                     for food and medicine, although God is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be unpardonable,
+                     by reason of its nature, in so far as it removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of
+                     sins. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing to an all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes,
+                     by a miracle, so to speak, restores spiritual health to such men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We should despair of no man in this life, considering God's omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of
+                     sin, some are called (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.2" target="asv">Eph. 2:2</a>) "children of despair" [*'Filios diffidentiae,' which the Douay version renders 'children of unbelief.'].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the question on the part of God's omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain subject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as it
+                     is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself this sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q14_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against the Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins.
+                     For the natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from imperfection. This is evident as regards good things,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.4.18" target="asv"> Prov. 4:18</a>: "The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards and increases even to perfect day." Now, in evil things, the perfect
+                     is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher
+                     states (Metaph. v, text. 21). Since then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it seems that man comes
+                     to commit this sin through committing lesser sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until
+                     he has sinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6,9) that "although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he
+                     cannot all at once do them as an unjust man does," viz. from choice. Therefore it seems that the sin against the Holy Ghost
+                     cannot be committed except after other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same object. But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore
+                     the same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost
+                     presupposes other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make a poor man rich" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:23</a>). Therefore, conversely, it is possible for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts him, to be led to commit
+                     the most grievous of sins which is that against the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q14_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, in one way, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin through certain malice in two
+                     ways, as stated in the same place: first, through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly speaking, to sin against
+                     the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to commit this sin all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede so as to cause
+                     the habit that induces to sin. Secondly,
+                     one may sin through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things whereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is, properly
+                     speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q14_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; and this also, for the most part, presupposes other sins, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q14_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.18.3" target="asv">Prov. 18:3</a>) that "the wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p7"> Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account
+                     of his free-will, and on account of the many previous dispositions, or again, through being vehemently moved to evil, while
+                     but feebly attached to good. Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that the perfect sin all at once against the Holy
+                     Ghost: wherefore Origen says (Peri Archon. i, 3): "I do not think that anyone who stands on the highest step of
+                     perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can only happen by degrees and bit by bit."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p8"> The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy
+                     as Our Lord speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p9"> If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence,
+                     it does not regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy Ghost requires persistence in sin until the end
+                     of life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good
+                     or evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater (good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that
+                     from which a man begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus, although it may be imperfect as regards the
+                     series of good or evil actions whereby a man progresses in good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the sin which is committed through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear
+                     that it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we take it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a
+                     sin against the Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is possible for a man who has never sinned to have
+                     the purpose either of repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q14_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q13_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q15" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q15-p0.1">OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q15-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q15-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which
+                  is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins (
+                  <a id="SS_Q15-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76.html">FS, Q[76])</a>, we must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; and under
+                  this head there are three points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q15_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether blindness of mind is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin. Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin. Now
+                     blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q15_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.41" target="asv">Jn. 9:41</a>): "If you were blind, you should not have sin." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind is a punishment as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q15_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.10" target="asv"> Is. 6:10, </a> "Blind the heart of this people," for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it not a punishment. Therefore
+                     blindness of mind is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since,
+                     as Augustine says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent truth," and as we read in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q15_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.11.7" target="asv"> Eccles. 11:7, </a> "the light is sweet and it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of mind among the vices arising from lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of the
+                     principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light,
+                     since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never forfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented
+                     from exercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers which the human
+                     intellect needs in order to understand, for instance in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q15_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], AA[7]</a>,8.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p7"> Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light superadded to the natural light of reason, which light
+                     is sometimes forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a punishment, in so far as the privation of the light
+                     of grace is a punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q15_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.21" target="asv">Wis. 2:21</a>): "Their own malice blinded them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p8"> A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle, through which a man understands other things; to which
+                     principle a man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the
+                     fact that a man's will is deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q15_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.4" target="asv">Ps. 35:4</a>, "He would not understand, that he might do well": whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about things
+                     which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q15_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.57.9" target="asv"> Ps. 57:9, </a> "Fire," i.e. of concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun." In either of these ways blindness of
+                     mind is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The blindness that excuses from sin is that which arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the second kind of blindness which is a punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all; and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a
+                     man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q15_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now dulness
+                     is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding
+                     denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness describes it as "dullness of sense in respect of understanding."
+                     Now dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness
+                     of mind. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q15_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q15_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would
+                     not be a sin, which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Different causes produce different effects. Now Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony,
+                     and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through being
+                     obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives
+                     its object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a
+                     thing. Hence in corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can
+                     perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on the other hand they are said to be dull, through
+                     being unable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or of great power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p7"> Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in
+                     respect of certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of
+                     certain principles of knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does not perceive its object through
+                     a medium of corporeal distance, but through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a thing's
+                     essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in
+                     connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature
+                     or the thing itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details: whereas a man is said to have a dull sense
+                     in connection with his understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a thing, without many explanations; in
+                     which
+                     case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the nature of that thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p8"> Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration
+                     of spiritual goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge of such things. Both are opposed
+                     to the gift of understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending them, and has a subtle penetration of their
+                     inmost nature. This dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that is, in so far as
+                     it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration
+                     of spiritual things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q15_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the flesh?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i,
+                     4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst wish none but the clean to know the truth," and says
+                     that one might reply that "many, even those who are unclean, know many truths." Now men become unclean chiefly by sins of
+                     the flesh. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the
+                     flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas
+                     carnal sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore
+                     the sins of the flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things are more passive to what is near them than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind
+                     than carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's
+                     intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in
+                     order all things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be "detached" in order to command, and that
+                     the agent must have power over matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident
+                     that pleasure fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that
+                     we all do best that which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted
+                     fashion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p7"> Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are
+                     the most impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices cause man's attention to be very firmly fixed
+                     on corporeal things, so that in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things is weakened, more, however, by
+                     lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore lust
+                     gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense
+                     arises from gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues,
+                     viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q15_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.17" target="asv">Dan. 1:17</a>) that "to these children" on account of their abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and
+                     understanding in every book, and wisdom."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things,
+                     on account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the
+                     pleasures of the body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore
+                     the unclean can know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their
+                     knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's attention
+                     to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's contemplation all the more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q15_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q16.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q16" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q16-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q16-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q16-p2"> We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q16-p3"> (1) The precepts concerning faith;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q16-p4"> (2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q16_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have been given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something
+                     due and necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should believe, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6, </a> "Without faith it is impossible to please God." Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith to be given.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the reality in the figure, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q16_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q107_A3.html">FS, Q[107], A[3]</a>). Now the New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#John.14.1" target="asv"> Jn. 14:1</a>: "You believe in God; believe also in Me." Therefore it seems that some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the
+                     Old Law also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many
+                     precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.3" target="asv">Ex. 20:3</a>): "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.13.1" target="asv">Dt. 13:1-3</a>) they were forbidden to hear the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them away from their faith in God.
+                     Therefore precepts of faith should have been given in the Old Law
+                     also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q16_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.27" target="asv">Ex. 12:27</a>) that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them the meaning of the paschal observance, and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.13.9" target="asv">Dt. 13:9</a>) they were commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith.
+                     Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.25" target="asv">Jn. 15:25</a>) that it was written in the Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is found written in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.34" target="asv">Ps. 34</a> and 68. Now it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.2.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 2:8</a>): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe Him." Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. 3:27</a>) calls the Old Law the "law of works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith." Therefore the Old Law ought not to have
+                     contained precepts of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A master does not impose laws on others than his subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone who receives
+                     the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the primary subjection of man to God is by faith, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6</a>: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is." Hence faith is presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which reason
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.2" target="asv">Ex. 20:2</a>) that which is of faith, is set down
+                     before the legal precepts, in the words, "I am the Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," and, likewise
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God is one," precede the recording of the precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p9"> Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and
+                     chief of all articles of faith, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q16_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], AA[1]</a>,7), it follows that, if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to Him, it is possible for precepts to
+                     be given about other articles of faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#John.15.12" target="asv">Jn. 15:12</a>) says (Tract.
+                     lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received many precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of faith were not
+                     to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing their faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the
+                     Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith, namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God," and
+                     commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs
+                     to the faith of the New Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q16_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html">FS, Q[18], A[4]</a>, ad 3; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q16_A1-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A6.html">FS, Q[19], A[6]</a>, ad 1, A[7], ad 3). Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts had to be given in the Old Law, so
+                     that men might be warned off those particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law could
+                     contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith, rather than to faith itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the Lord,"
+                     which is not possible without faith. The words which follow---"believe Him"---must be referred to certain special articles
+                     of faith, chiefly to those things which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore the passage concludes---"and your reward
+                     shall not be made void."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q16_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingly set down in the Old Law?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For knowledge
+                     and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge
+                     and understanding should precede the precepts of the Law referring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are
+                     those of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and understanding
+                     should have been given a place among the precepts of the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains
+                     precepts about teaching---both affirmative precepts as, for example, (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.9" target="asv">Dt. 4:9</a>), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"---and prohibitive precepts, as, for instance, (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.2" target="asv">Dt. 4:2</a>), "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it seems that man ought
+                     to
+                     have been given also some precepts directing him to learn.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.7" target="asv">Malachi 2:7</a>): "The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his mouth," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.4.6" target="asv">Osee 4:6</a>): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood to Me." Now
+                     the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.18" target="asv">Dt.
+                        17:18,19
+                     </a>). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded the priests to learn the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is
+                     hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.7" target="asv">Dt. 6:7</a>): "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising." Therefore the precepts
+                     relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly set down in the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.6" target="asv">Dt. 4:6</a>): "That, hearing all these precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Three things may be considered in relation to knowledge and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly, the use;
+                     and thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of knowledge or understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and
+                     both are prescribed in the Law. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.6" target="asv">Dt. 6:6</a>): "These words which I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart." This refers to learning, since it is the duty of a disciple
+                     to apply
+                     his mind to what is said, while the words that follow---"and thou shalt tell them to thy children"---refer to teaching.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p8"> The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those things which one knows or understands. In reference to
+                     this, the text goes on: "thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p9"> Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this, the text continues---"and thou shalt bind them as a sign
+                     on thy hand, and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write them in the entry, and on the doors of
+                     thy house." Thus the continual remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it is impossible for us to forget those
+                     things which are continually attracting the notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those things we hold
+                     in our hands, or by sight, as those things which are ever before our eyes, or to which we are continually returning, for instance,
+                     to the house door. Moreover it is clearly stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.9" target="asv">Dt. 4:9</a>): "Forget not the words that thy eyes have seen and let them not go out of thy heart all the days of thy life."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p10"> We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in
+                     that of the apostles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q16_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.6" target="asv"> Dt. 4:6, </a> "this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of the nations." By this we are given to understand that the wisdom and
+                     understanding of those who believe in God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the Law had to be
+                     given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know and understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid precepts
+                     should be placed among the precepts
+                     of the decalogue which take the first place.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are also in the Law precepts relating to learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more expressly
+                     than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were not under any other authority, but were immediately under the law,
+                     and to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand learning concerned the people of lower degree, and these
+                     the precepts of the Law have to reach through the learned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the priestly office that being charged with the office implies being charged
+                     to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts to be given about the training of the priests. On the other
+                     hand, the doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office, because a king is placed over his people in temporal
+                     matters: hence it is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by
+                     the priests about things pertaining to the law of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That precept of the Law does not mean that man should meditate on God's law of sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he should
+                     meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep, because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep,
+                     in so far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13).
+                     In like manner we are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not
+                     that we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but that we should regulate all our actions according to it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q16_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q17" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q17-p0.1">OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p2"> After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the
+                  corresponding precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2)
+                  its subject.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p4"> (1) Whether hope is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p5"> (2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p6"> (3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's happiness?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p7"> (4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p8"> (5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p9"> (6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p10"> (7) Of its relation to faith;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q17-p11"> (8) Of its relation to charity.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q17_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether hope is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18).
+                     But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore
+                     hope is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib.
+                     Arb. xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing" (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect
+                     thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore
+                     hope is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good
+                     likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured
+                     and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls
+                     short of its proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q[8], A[3], ad 3) human acts
+                     have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God:
+                     wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains
+                     God. For, as we have already stated (
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">FS, Q[40], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now
+                     a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by
+                     ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as being possible
+                     to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident that
+                     hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.
+                     Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man
+                     cannot make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because
+                     to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we
+                     speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A5.html">(A[5];</a> Q[18], A[1]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace
+                     and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not
+                     flow from our merits, but from grace alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in
+                     so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q17_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every
+                     movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human
+                     soul, for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>) that it hath not "entered into the heart of man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.5" target="asv">Ps. 36:5</a>): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for eternal
+                     happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer,
+                     to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object
+                     of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore
+                     eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.19" target="asv">Heb. 6:19</a>) that we have hope "which entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i.e. into the happiness of heaven,
+                     according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the hope of which we speak now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect
+                     must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is the infinite
+                     good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an
+                     infinite good. Such a good is eternal
+                     life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His
+                     goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and principal
+                     object of hope is eternal happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its
+                     nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and
+                     it is in this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.19" target="asv">Heb. 6:19</a>) that hope "enters in, even within the veil," because that which we hope for is
+                     as yet veiled, so to speak.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness
+                     chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith
+                     regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To him that longs for something great, all lesser things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing
+                     else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things
+                     besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to its principal object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q17_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether one man may hope for another's eternal happiness?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal happiness. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.6" target="asv">Phil. 1:6</a>): "Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ."
+                     Now the perfection of that day will be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv"> James 5:16</a>: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore we can hope for another's eternal happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine
+                     would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore
+                     one can also hope for another's eternal salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining
+                     to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way its
+                     object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in
+                     this, that love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement
+                     or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can
+                     directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always
+                     towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not
+                     that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and desire something
+                     for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal's life, inasmuch as he is united to him
+                     by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the
+                     same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q17_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain
+                     eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints'
+                     prayers." Therefore one may hope in man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to
+                     hope in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.4" target="asv"> Jer. 9:4</a>: "Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust
+                     in a man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
+                     Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.5" target="asv">Jer. 17:5</a>): "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Hope, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1];</a> 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html">FS, Q[40], A[7]</a>), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good
+                     which a man hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to obtain that good, has the
+                     character of an efficient cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a secondary cause. For the
+                     principal end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the principal efficient
+                     cause is the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal
+                     happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as the first cause leading to happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p7"> Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred
+                     to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the first cause of movement
+                     towards happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and instrumental agent through
+                     whom one is helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to
+                     the saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted
+                     to give help.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q17_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q17_A5-p0.1">Whether hope is a theological virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope
+                     has for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological
+                     virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A4.html">FS, Q[64], A[4]</a>). But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation,
+                     it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
+                     arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope is enumerated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>) together with faith and charity, which are theological virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope,
+                     we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p8"> Now it has been stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains
+                     both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it
+                     expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
+                     virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological
+                     virtue is one that has God for its object, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A5-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html">FS, Q[62], A[1]</a>), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A4.html">(A[4])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
+                     excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean
+                     or extremes. Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things are its proper object; wherefore
+                     it is proper to it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other
+                     hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper object.
+                     Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may
+                     happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have no mean or
+                     extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of
+                     the
+                     things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has
+                     no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet
+                     it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his
+                     capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs
+                     to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper
+                     object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained
+                     by another's help, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q17_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q17_A6-p0.1">Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the other theological
+                     virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and
+                     the life of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral.
+                     i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A virtue is said to be theological from having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
+                     ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to
+                     God for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p7"> On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we
+                     derive from God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God,
+                     as the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true: while hope makes us
+                     adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine
+                     assistance for obtaining happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is the object of these virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices
+                     for the distinction of habits, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope
+                     presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, properly
+                     speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q17_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q17_A7-p0.1">Whether hope precedes faith?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.3" target="asv">Ps. 36:3</a>, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is
+                     by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is included in a definition should precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included
+                     in the definition of faith (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>): "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:10</a>): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes
+                     faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv">Mat. 1:2</a>): "Abraham begot Isaac," i.e. "Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
+                     therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope
+                     is, in one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as explained above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A2.html">(A[2];</a> A[6], ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know
+                     that we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A7-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6</a>: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Therefore it is evident that
+                     faith precedes hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called "the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope
+                     we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins
+                     to be established and perfected in faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent
+                     in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q17_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q17_A8-p0.1">Whether charity precedes hope?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.27.6" target="asv">Lk. 27:6</a>, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc.: "Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity." But faith precedes
+                     charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now
+                     to hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it flows from charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
+                     also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q17_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i.e. "from hope," according to a gloss.
+                     Therefore hope precedes charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the
+                     other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of
+                     the first order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all movements of the appetite flow from
+                     love, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html">FS, Q[27], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A6.html">FS,
+                        Q[28], A[6]
+                     </a>, ad 2; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q17_A8-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html">FS, Q[40], A[7]</a>) in the treatise on the passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p7"> Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes
+                     a person some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that whereby a man love something, not
+                     for its own sake, but that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first love of God pertains
+                     to charity, which adheres to God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that
+                     hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p8"> Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a man is led to love God, through fear of being punished
+                     by Him for his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too, hope leads to charity, in as much as
+                     a man through hoping to be rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments. On the other hand, in the
+                     order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more
+                     perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states (OBJ[1]) that charity flows from
+                     hope: so that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every
+                     kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from
+                     God, as from a friend.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Master is speaking of living hope, which is naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q17_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q18" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q18-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q18-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q18-p2"> We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q18-p3"> (1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q18-p4"> (2) Whether it is in the blessed?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether it is in the damned?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q18_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether hope is in the will as its subject?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17],
+                     A[1]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">FS, Q[40], A[1]</a>). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which
+                     is the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously.
+                     Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
+                     will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares
+                     (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory,
+                     nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is in the will as its subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A2.html">FP, Q[87], A[2]</a>), habits are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive faculty, since its object is a good.
+                     And, since there is a twofold appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, and
+                     the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A5.html">FP, Q[82], A[5]</a>, those movements which occur in the lower appetite, are
+                     with passion, while those in the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A2.html">FP, Q[87], A[2]</a>, ad 1; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A1-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">FS, Q[22], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal
+                     object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will,
+                     and not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible,
+                     or rather superintelligible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required
+                     in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of hope and the movement of charity are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is no
+                     reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the same power: even as the intellect can understand many
+                     things at the same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A4.html">FP, Q[85], A[4]</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q18_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether in the blessed there is hope?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His conception.
+                     Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.2" target="asv"> Ps. 30:2, </a> "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person. Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness,
+                     men hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue in its possession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A3.html">Q[17], A[3]</a>). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there
+                     can be hope in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the
+                     saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.6.10" target="asv">Apoc. 6:10</a>; Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore hope has no place in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If what gives a thing its species be removed, the species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as when
+                     a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
+                     even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q[17], AA[5],6; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>): and its principal object is eternal happiness as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as
+                     stated above (Q[17], A[2]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p8"> Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except in so far as it is something future, it follows that
+                     when happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith,
+                     is voided in heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same time,
+                     a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for
+                     the glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the
+                     glory of the body but the enjoyment of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The happiness of the saints is called eternal life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of God's
+                     eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future.
+                     Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as regards this there is no future), but are in
+                     actual possession thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others.
+                     But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others
+                     indeed, yet not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same
+                     charity loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity, but by some other
+                     love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists
+                     in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison
+                     with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small
+                     thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the
+                     glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q18_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether hope is in the damned?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv"> Mat. 25:41</a>: "Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.40.28" target="asv"> Job 40:28, </a> "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that the damned have hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv">James 2:19</a>: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.11.3" target="asv"> Eccles. 11:3, </a> "If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be." Now many who are
+                     damned, in this life hoped and never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope causes joy, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv"> Rom. 12:12, </a> "Rejoicing in hope." Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.65.14" target="asv">Is. 65:14</a>, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit."
+                     Therefore no hope is in the damned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what
+                     is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to
+                     the will: wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could not be perfectly happy in their first state
+                     before their confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge
+                     of what would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for ever,
+                     else the will would not rest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p7"> In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary condition of the punishment of the damned, it would
+                     not be truly penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the everlastingness
+                     of their damnation. Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that they cannot by any means
+                     escape from damnation and obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.15.22" target="asv">Job 15:22</a>): "He
+                     believeth not that he may return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happiness as
+                     a possible good, as neither can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope either in the blessed
+                     or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either case
+                     they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if
+                     it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense
+                     we read just before (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.18" target="asv">Job 40:18</a>): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or another's;
+                     whereas hope is only about good things, future and concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the
+                     damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future possible things, but far removed from them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Lack of hope in the damned does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase their
+                     merit: but both these things are due to the change in their respective states.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q18_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains
+                     not to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above (Q[17], A[1]). Now it is impossible in this life to know for
+                     certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q18_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A5.html">FS, Q[112], A[5]</a>). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
+                     wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness," as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered
+                     from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q18_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.1.12" target="asv">2 Tim. 1:12, </a> "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power;
+                     by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with
+                     certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the
+                     moral virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a
+                     second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing
+                     in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace,
+                     can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
+                     not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty
+                     of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q18_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q17_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q19" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q19-p0.1">OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p2"> We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether God is to be feared?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p4"> (2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether servile fear is good?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether it grows when charity grows?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p13"> (11) Whether it remains in heaven?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q19-p14"> (12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether God can be feared?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of fear is a future evil, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">FS, Q[41], AA[2]</a>,3). But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God cannot be feared.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God. Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not
+                     from God, but from ourselves, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv"> Osee 13:9</a>: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be feared.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.7" target="asv">Jer. 10:7</a>): "Who shall not fear Thee, O King of nations?" and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malachi 1:6</a>): "If I be a master, where is My fear?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's
+                     help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very
+                     evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who
+                     is goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the
+                     second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation to Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p7"> From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is
+                     a good. Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of this order,
+                     that which excludes the order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other hand the evil
+                     of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely speaking,
+                     it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p8"> In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be
+                     feared.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection considers the object of fear as being the evil which a man shuns.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which
+                     He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise
+                     to hope, so that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under different aspects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The evil of fault is not from God as its author but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment is
+                     from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good, since it is something just, through being inflicted on us
+                     justly; although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A1-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.16" target="asv">16</a>): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide
+                     Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness, shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html">FS, Q[41], A[4]</a>), and which are not mentioned in the division in question. Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
+                     since it is in the demons, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv"> James 2:19, </a> "The devils . . . believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.14.33" target="asv"> Mk. 14:33, </a> Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master.
+                     Now filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the
+                     servant in comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the wife in comparison with her husband,
+                     ought to be distinguished from all these other fears.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between
+                     them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is
+                     the desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure.
+                     Therefore "worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from "human fear," whereby one fears harm
+                     to one's own person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p7"> On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of
+                     fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while
+                     sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of
+                     punishment, and evil of fault.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p9"> Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on
+                     account of fear of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to fear offending its father. If, however,
+                     it be on account of both, it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether it is possible to fear
+                     the evil of fault, the question has been treated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">FS, Q[42], A[3]</a>) when we were
+                     considering the passion of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul: whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as explained
+                     above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all
+                     the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and
+                     so it is not numbered among these kinds of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The relation of servant to master is based on the power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the contrary,
+                     the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom
+                     he submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial
+                     and chaste fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God
+                     becomes our Father, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.15" target="asv">Rom. 8:15</a>, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and by this same charity He is called
+                     our spouse, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.11.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 11:2, </a> "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection
+                     with these, since it does not include charity in its definition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These three fears regard punishment but in different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man
+                     away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment
+                     whereby men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while
+                     initial fear regards it secondarily.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of forfeiting
+                     the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
+                     they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity
+                     of sins, all of which alike however lead man away from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether worldly fear is always evil?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil. Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
+                     blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of whom we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.2" target="asv">Lk. 18:2</a>) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
+                     incite us to good actions, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.3" target="asv"> Rom. 13:3, </a> "Wilt thou not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same." Therefore worldly
+                     fear is not always evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man
+                     to fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that
+                     worldly fear is not always evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>): "Fear ye not them that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is evil is forbidden by God.
+                     Therefore worldly fear is evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html">FS, Q[18], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>) moral acts and habits take their name and species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement is
+                     the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if
+                     anyone were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on
+                     account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means:
+                     the end that he seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the desire or the love of wealth, and this
+                     is evil. Accordingly worldly love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world as his end, so that worldly
+                     love is always evil. Now fear is born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii,
+                     qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is always
+                     evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
+                     grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in this way those are blamed who have no regard for man.
+                     Secondly, one may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is praiseworthy to have no regard for men,
+                     according as we read of Elias or Eliseus (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.48.13" target="asv">Ecclus. 48:13</a>): "In his
+                     days he feared not the prince."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.4" target="asv">Rom. 13:4</a>, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is
+                     part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
+                     account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful
+                     deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether servile fear is good?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
+                     servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.15" target="asv"> Rom. 8:15, </a> "if a man do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well done." Therefore servile fear is not good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.3.11" target="asv"> Job 3:11, </a> "Why did I not die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a man dreads the punishment which confronts him for
+                     his sin and no longer loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of pride, not of humility." Therefore
+                     servile fear is evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear.
+                     But mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.15" target="asv"> Rom. 8:15, </a> "You have not received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit that bestows two fears, viz. servile
+                     and chaste fear." Therefore servile fear is not evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
+                     is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as cause of his own action, but as though moved from without.
+                     Now whoever does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it is by his own inclination that he is moved
+                     to act: so that it is contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act
+                     from love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if servility were essential to fear, servile
+                     fear would be evil simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary to charity belongs to its
+                     very species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p7"> This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species
+                     of lifeless faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment,
+                     and it is by accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the last end, and that consequently
+                     the punishment is feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of charity,
+                     or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which
+                     is the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not destroyed through its object or end being directed
+                     to a further end. Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not
+                     justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to subject
+                     his affections to the yoke of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so
+                     that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not
+                     this be feared as the principal evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently
+                     as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless
+                     faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they
+                     both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be
+                     punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A2.html">Q[17], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a> ), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear correspond to different kinds of evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p7"> Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns,
+                     as shown above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are not the same substantially but differ specifically.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in
+                     respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other
+                     hand, servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the infliction
+                     of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
+                     to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz. God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since
+                     also natural movements differ specifically according to their different
+                     relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot
+                     be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether servile fear remains with charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that servile fear does not remain with charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that "when
+                     charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had prepared a place for it."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>). Now "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>). Since then freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away when charity comes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
+                     self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the
+                     contempt of self builds up the city of God." Therefore it seems that servile fear is driven out when charity comes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us. Therefore
+                     servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the
+                     fear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love
+                     his own good and that he fear to be deprived of it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p7"> Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his
+                     end in the love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man loves himself for the sake of God and
+                     in God. In a third way, it is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a man loves himself from
+                     the point of view of his own good, yet not so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have
+                     another special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity which is founded on God, when we love him by reason of
+                     usefulness, consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is referable to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p8"> Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity, because separation from God is a punishment, which charity
+                     shuns exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from
+                     the punishment that is opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition to the good which he loves as
+                     an end; and in this way fear of punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of punishment
+                     is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from
+                     God, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place his end in this good, so that neither does he dread
+                     this evil as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity; but it is not called servile, except
+                     when punishment is dreaded as a principal evil, as explained above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,4). Hence fear
+                     considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love
+                     can remain with charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom. For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a
+                     part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that
+                     fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of the Lord, that is wisdom," according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.28.28" target="asv"> Job 28:28.</a> Therefore it seems that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems
+                     that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.10" target="asv"> Ps. 110:10</a>: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to
+                     its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art as to its essence consists in the principles from
+                     which that art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance
+                     we might say that the beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
+                     where the builder begins his work.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p7"> Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html">Q[45], A[1]</a>), it is considered by us in one way, and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained to the enjoyment
+                     of God, and is directed thereto according to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom,
+                     as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as
+                     directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows
+                     (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom, i.e.
+                     the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning
+                     of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one
+                     way, and filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so far as
+                     he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:27, </a> "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin." On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the
+                     first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in
+                     order to make a beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that in all things
+                     he will be ruled by God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life that is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:25</a>): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for [Vulg.: 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as the root
+                     is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said to be wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 25:16</a>): "The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith is to be fast joined to it."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear
+                     is the beginning of love, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.16" target="asv"> Ecclus. 25:16, </a> "The fear of God is the beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem
+                     to be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore initial fear also is substantially distinct from
+                     initial fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial
+                     fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection
+                     and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ
+                     substantially from filial fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning [initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some
+                     way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p7"> It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial
+                     fear, but in the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom there is a beginning of filial fear
+                     resulting from a beginning of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear, because they have not yet
+                     attained to the perfection of charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear
+                     as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we
+                     must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the
+                     thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the
+                     beginning of love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it: for
+                     this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains
+                     with imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not only through love of justice, but also through
+                     fear of punishment, though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity,
+                     which "casteth out fear," according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A8-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.18" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:18.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect
+                     is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph. ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect
+                     being, while it differs altogether from non-being.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
+                     from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue.
+                     Therefore fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God
+                     is feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being
+                     connected with the same matter, as it were.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed
+                     to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral.
+                     ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue,
+                     it should not be said that fear is a gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.3" target="asv">Is. 11:3</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fear is of several kinds, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A9-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"---for it was
+                     by this fear that Peter denied Christ---but that fear of which it was said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A9-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>): "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p9"> Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according
+                     to Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible
+                     with the will to sin, as they are inseparable from charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A9-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html">FS, Q[68], A[5]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p10"> It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste
+                     fear. For it was stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A9-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], AA[1]</a>,3) that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby these are rendered amenable
+                     to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as, by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to the motion
+                     of reason. Now for a thing to be
+                     amenable to the motion of a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a non-resistant subject of that mover,
+                     because resistance of the movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or chaste fear does, since
+                     thereby we revere God and avoid separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4)
+                     filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place,
+                     in the descending order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by
+                     God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one
+                     another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The proper and principal object of fear is the evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A9-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, God cannot be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the other theological virtues, since, by
+                     the virtue of hope, we trust in God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to obtain God Himself, as the
+                     principal good. The same evidently applies to the other theological virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity
+                     which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect
+                     of different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because love regards good, to which virtue is principally
+                     directed by reason of its own nature, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A9-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">FS, Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4); for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it
+                     denotes, wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A9-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:14, </a> "the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to God, and this is opposed to
+                     filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy against
+                     pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the
+                     Holy Ghost are the origin of the
+                     intellectual and moral virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A9-p14.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">FS, Q[68], A[4]</a>), while the theological virtues are the origin of the gifts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A9-p14.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A4.html">FS, Q[69], A[4]</a>, ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p15"> This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A9-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether fear decreases when charity increases?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
+                     increases, the more fear decreases."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity increases when hope increases, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A8.html">Q[17], A[8]</a>). Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation. Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear
+                     decreases when the love of charity increases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the fear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God
+                     above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fear is twofold, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,4); one is filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be separated from him; the other is servile fear,
+                     whereby one fears punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p7"> Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an effect increases with the increase of its cause. For
+                     the more one loves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p8"> On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment
+                     remains as to its substance, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A10-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. This fear decreases as charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man loves God, the less he fears
+                     punishment; first, because he thinks less of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the faster he
+                     clings, the more confident he
+                     is of the reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases, because
+                     the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another's help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from
+                     him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in
+                     a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation
+                     is to be observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase
+                     of the love of charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence
+                     of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A10-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether fear remains in heaven?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.33" target="asv">Prov. 1:33</a>): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who already enjoy
+                     wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A11-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,5; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A11-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A1.html">FS, Q[42], A[1]</a>). Therefore there will be no fear in
+                     heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2, </a> "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore
+                     neither will there be fear in heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.10" target="asv">Ps. 18:10</a>): "The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is
+                     essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A4.html">FS, Q[5], A[4]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p7"> But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect;
+                     hence, in heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p8"> In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object
+                     of hope is a possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible
+                     arduous evil, for little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its staying in its own order, so a thing's
+                     evil consists in forsaking its order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and
+                     above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too
+                     is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible
+                     to a rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the
+                     blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this evil that consists in
+                     non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life
+                     there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), "The
+                     pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing,
+                     tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,"
+                     because, to wit, they wonder at God's supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this sense,
+                     admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for ever and
+                     ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that
+                     holds fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we have acquired, with an unchangeable love,
+                     without doubt, if it is allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste fear denotes a will that cannot
+                     consent to sin, and whereby we avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess ourselves in the tranquillity
+                     born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever, because that
+                     which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear
+                     which is accompanied by security.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable imitation
+                     of the Inimitable"---that is, because, so far as they can, they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly---"they are unlike
+                     because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short infinitely and immeasurably." Hence, if there be no fear in
+                     God (since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not
+                     follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect subjection to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear implies
+                     a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven.
+                     Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A11-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q19_A12" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear? </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of
+                     the spiritual life, as explained above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A7.html">(A[7])</a>: whereas poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A12-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv"> Mat. 19:21, </a> "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond
+                     to the gift of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv">Ps. 118:120</a>): "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to restrain the flesh. But the
+                     curbing of the flesh seems to belong rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of mourning corresponds
+                     to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of poverty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (A[9], ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,
+                     "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A12-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.2" target="asv"> Rom. 5:2, </a> "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather
+                     than poverty of spirit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A12-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html">FS, Q[70], A[2]</a>) that the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore,
+                     does any of the beatitudes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed are
+                     the poor in spirit."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission
+                     to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God,
+                     it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent
+                     with perfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A12-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.19.8" target="asv">Ps.
+                        19:8
+                     </a>): "Some trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our God." It follows that if a man
+                     fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and riches.
+                     In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and
+                     proud spirit, according to Augustine's interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly
+                     goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the expounding
+                     of Ambrose on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A12-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20 </a>and Jerome on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q19_A12-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.3" target="asv"> Mat. 5:3.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this perfection
+                     seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly
+                     goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts. Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself
+                     of temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial
+                     fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q19_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A7.html">AA[7]</a>,10).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is the
+                     result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and
+                     is subject to Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with
+                     the arduous character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of
+                     poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation of
+                     withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope,
+                     by way of ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal from external things which hinder submission
+                     to God, fittingly corresponds to fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As regards the fruits, it seems that those things correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of temporal
+                     things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty, continency and chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q19_A12-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q20" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q20-p0.1">OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q20-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q20-p2"> We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether despair is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether it can be without unbelief?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether it arises from sloth?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q20_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether despair is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from
+                     the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore
+                     it is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore
+                     despair is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their
+                     fault but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle
+                     says of certain men (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.19" target="asv">Eph. 4:19</a>): "Who, despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and [Vulg.: 'unto'] covetousness."
+                     Therefore despair is not only a sin but also the origin of other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance
+                     in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every
+                     appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed
+                     to a false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the
+                     intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners, according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire
+                     not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live" [*Vulg.: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die .
+                     . . and not that he should be converted and live?' Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.33.11" target="asv"> Ezech. 33:11</a>]: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself
+                     by sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as
+                     the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement
+                     of despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not always
+                     in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such
+                     as hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply
+                     conversion to a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from
+                     God, must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist principally in conversion to a mutable good, and,
+                     consequently, in aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal
+                     pleasure, the result of which is that he departs from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act proceeds
+                     from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,
+                     18,19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a
+                     virtue, and in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus
+                     sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep. ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that
+                     they may die." In this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of
+                     those good things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed
+                     to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of
+                     obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if
+                     a physician were to despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of
+                     ever becoming rich.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q20_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether there can be despair without unbelief?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be no despair without unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so long
+                     as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless
+                     his faith be removed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and
+                     so savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the Divine mercy and goodness, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.13" target="asv"> Gn. 4:13</a>: "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy,
+                     viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs,
+                     is an unbeliever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If we remove that which follows, that which precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q20_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A7.html">Q[17], A[7]</a>). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the appetite
+                     is moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in themselves,
+                     are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as to
+                     his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter, because, in
+                     order to pass from the universal opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to have a particular estimate
+                     (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal proposition, except through
+                     the holding of a particular proposition. Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive
+                     movement, in regard to some particular, his particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as the
+                     fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular
+                     matter, although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith, viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the
+                     same way, a man while retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that there is in the Church the power of
+                     forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, there is no hope of pardon,
+                     his
+                     estimate being corrupted in a particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there can be other mortal sins,
+                     without belief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect is done away, not only when the first cause is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the
+                     movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first
+                     cause of the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs judges
+                     not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p9"> The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins
+                     in the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q20_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether despair is the greatest of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins. For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q20_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is
+                     not the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater
+                     than hope, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13.</a> Therefore hatred of God is a greater sin than despair.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only
+                     inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion. Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than
+                     other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.30.12" target="asv"> Jer. 30:12</a>: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very grievous." Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.15.18" target="asv"> Jer. 15:18</a>: "My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [*Vulg.: 'Why is my wound,' etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since the
+                     theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally.
+                     Now every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact of its turning away from God, for if it were possible
+                     to turn to a mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it
+                     would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous
+                     among mortal sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p7"> Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God
+                     and unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in respect of their proper species, they are more grievous.
+                     For unbelief is due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of God arises from man's will being opposed to
+                     God's goodness itself; whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of God's goodness.
+                     Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him, according
+                     as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly speaking it is more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to hate
+                     God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p8"> If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope
+                     withdraws us from evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is given up, men rush headlong into sin,
+                     and are drawn away from good works. Wherefore a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.10" target="asv"> Prov. 24:10, </a> "If thou lose hope being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished," says: "Nothing is more hateful
+                     than despair, for the man
+                     that has it loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle of faith." And
+                     Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14): "To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into hell."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q20_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether despair arises from sloth?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth. Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now despair
+                     of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv"> Rom. 12:12, </a> "rejoicing in hope." Therefore sloth arises from despair, and not vice versa.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration
+                     of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise our
+                     hope, than that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof could we have of this than that God's Son
+                     should deign to unite Himself to our nature?" Therefore despair arises rather from
+                     the neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among the effects of sloth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[17], A[1]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q20_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">FS, Q[40], A[1]</a>), the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining
+                     happiness may be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not deeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his
+                     deeming it impossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact that spiritual goods taste good to us no more,
+                     or seem to be
+                     goods of no great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among which,
+                     sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiritual things,
+                     and not to hope for them as arduous goods. In this way despair is caused by lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p7"> On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due
+                     to his being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his affections, it seems to him that he will never be
+                     able to rise to any good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way despair is born of sloth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p8"> Now this is the proper object of hope---that the thing is possible, because the good and the arduous regard other passions
+                     also. Hence despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise from lust, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope:
+                     and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into despair, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q20_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:7</a>: "Lest . . . such an one be swallowed up by overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is good, to which the appetite
+                     tends naturally, and which it shuns, not naturally but only on account of some
+                     supervening obstacle, it follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the contrary despair is born of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he considers
+                     chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful
+                     things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his thoughts away from sadness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q20_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q19_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q21" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q21-p0.1">OF PRESUMPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q21-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q21-p2"> We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q21-p3"> (1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether presumption is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q21-p5"> (3) To what is it opposed?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q21-p6"> (4) From what vice does it arise?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q21_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the
+                     lesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much. But man's power is less than God's. Therefore
+                     it is a more grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost
+                     is most grievous. Therefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy
+                     Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which
+                     sins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby man presumes on himself rather than from the presumption
+                     whereby he presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore
+                     it seems that presumption which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human
+                     power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from
+                     turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Just as, through despair, a man despises the Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he despises the
+                     Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in
+                     aversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible to
+                     a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power of God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption
+                     owing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good
+                     as though it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q21_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jdt.6.15" target="asv"> Judith 6:15</a>: "Thou humblest them that presume of themselves." This presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to
+                     the mean in this kind of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p7"> But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that
+                     a man tends to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it is not possible, for instance,
+                     if a man hope to obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This presumption is, properly, the sin against
+                     the Holy Ghost, because, to wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit,
+                     whereby he is withdrawn from sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (Q[20], A[3]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html">FS, Q[73], A[3]</a>) a sin which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately,
+                     is a more grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power, since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining
+                     what is unbecoming to God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is a graver sin to detract from the
+                     Divine
+                     power than to exaggerate one's own.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately.
+                     For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure it through others, even though we cannot.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Presumption on God's mercy implies both conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an inordinate desire of
+                     one's own good, and aversion from the immutable good, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is unbecoming
+                     to it, for thus man turns away from God's power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q21_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether presumption is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin is a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption
+                     some are heard by God, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q21_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jdt.9.17" target="asv">Judith 9:17</a>): "Hear me a poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy." Therefore presumption on God's mercy is
+                     not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and
+                     mercy are infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that "Adam sinned less, because
+                     he sinned in the hope of pardon," which seems to indicate presumption. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q21_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a>) with regard to despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false intellect, is evil in itself and sinful.
+                     Now presumption is an appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it is conformed to a false intellect,
+                     just as despair is: for just as it is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not turn sinners to repentance,
+                     so is it false that He
+                     grants forgiveness to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to those who cease from good works: and it
+                     is to this estimate that the movement of presumption is conformed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p7"> Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair, since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper
+                     to God to have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes God in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason
+                     of our sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be
+                     measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the immensity of the goodness of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God
+                     something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power;
+                     as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does not
+                     diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining
+                     from sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin, because this seems to indicate a will less hardened
+                     in sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q21_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now
+                     presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q21_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.17.10" target="asv">Wis. 17:10</a>): "A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay: 'forecasteth'] grievous things," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q21_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.17.11" target="asv">Wis. 17:11</a>) that "fear is a help to presumption [*Vulg.: 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the succours from thought.']."
+                     Therefore presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because
+                     presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption
+                     is contrary to fear rather than to hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope.
+                     Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> When two vices are opposed to one another they are contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to fortitude.
+                     Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that presumption
+                     also is more directly opposed to hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as temerity
+                     is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning
+                     is opposed to prudence." This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common
+                     with one of the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with
+                     insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p7"> Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear, especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment
+                     arising from God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of false likeness it is more opposed
+                     to hope, since it denotes an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed when they belong to the same
+                     genus, than when they belong to different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly opposed to hope
+                     than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the same object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in this
+                     way that inordinate fear is called presumption.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contraries are things that are most distant from one another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a movement
+                     of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to
+                     fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas
+                     it is opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the movement
+                     of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. Hence presumption
+                     excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by excluding
+                     its ordinateness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q21_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q22.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether presumption arises from vainglory? </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that presumption does not arise from vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine mercy.
+                     Now mercy [misericordia] regards unhappiness [miseriam] which is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from
+                     vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair arises from sorrow, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q21_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q20_A4.html">Q[20], A[4]</a>, ad 2). Since therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to arise from pleasure, and consequently from
+                     sins of the flesh, which give the most absorbing pleasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing
+                     to ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible. Therefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from
+                     vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q21_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, presumption is twofold; one whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something beyond his power, as though
+                     it were possible to him. Such like presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great desire for glory,
+                     that a man attempts things beyond his power, and especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory states
+                     explicitly that presumption of novelties
+                     is a daughter of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p7"> The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without
+                     merits, or pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise directly from pride, as though man thought so much
+                     of himself as to esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, however much he might be a sinner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q21_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q22.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q20_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q22" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q22_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q22-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q22-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q22-p2"> We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q22-p3"> (1) The precepts relating to hope;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q22-p4"> (2) The precepts relating to fear.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q22_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q22.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q22_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether there should be a precept of hope?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no precept should be given relating to the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured
+                     by one cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope
+                     for good. Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to do this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the
+                     chief of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope, faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts
+                     of the Law are those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q22_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html">FS, Q[100], A[3]</a>), it seems that if any precept of hope were given, it should be found among the
+                     precepts of the decalogue. But it is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is
+                     to be found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.12" target="asv"> Jn. 15:12, </a> "This is My commandment, that you love one another" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.): "How many things are commanded us about faith!
+                     How many relating to hope!" Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given about hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some belong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law. The
+                     preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible: such are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the
+                     act of hope, because the act of faith inclines man's mind so that he believes the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes
+                     submission, while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the precepts. The
+                     precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are those which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already subject
+                     and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these precepts were set forth from the very outset under form of a command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p7"> Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the form of a command, since, unless man already believed and
+                     hoped, it would be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of faith had to be given under the form of an announcement
+                     or reminder, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>), so too, the precept of hope, in the first promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a promise. For he
+                     who promises rewards to them that obey
+                     him, by that very fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in the Law are incitements to hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p8"> Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but
+                     also, and much more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after the first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ
+                     holds out to man many inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not merely by way of promise, as in the
+                     Law; for instance, in the
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q22_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.61.9" target="asv"> Ps. 61:9</a>: "Hope [Douay: 'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the
+                     people," and in many other passages of the Scriptures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural good
+                     he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly by promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless
+                     there was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those things to which natural reason inclines us, such
+                     as the acts of the moral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability,
+                     especially since the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept
+                     of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises,
+                     as in the case of the first and fourth commandments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In those observances to which man is bound as under a duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what
+                     he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor
+                     due to parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor
+                     their parents. And since in order to be saved it is man's duty to hope in God,
+                     he had to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively, so to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of
+                     the opposite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q22.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q22_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q22_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q22_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether there should have been given a precept of fear?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have been given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things which
+                     are a preamble to the Law, since it is the "beginning of wisdom." Now things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under
+                     a precept of the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love is the cause of fear, since "every fear proceeds from some kind
+                     of love," as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the precept of love, it would have been superfluous to
+                     command fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the Law contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it
+                     seems that neither should any precept of fear have been given.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q22_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" But He requires of
+                     us that which He commands us to do. Therefore it is a matter of precept that man should fear God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so too
+                     is he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is servile.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p7"> And just as according to what has been said 
+                     <a id="SS_Q22_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q22_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, in the promulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of hope, and men were to be induced thereto by
+                     promises, so neither was there need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which regards punishment, and men were to
+                     be induced thereto by the threat of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the decalogue, and afterwards,
+                     in due sequence, in the secondary
+                     precepts of the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p8"> Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered
+                     their teaching about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they in the matter of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p9"> On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind
+                     of principle of all observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of filial fear are given in the Law, even
+                     as precepts of love, because each is a preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to which the precepts of the
+                     decalogue refer. Hence in the passage quoted in the argument, "On the contrary," man is required "to have fear, to
+                     walk in God's ways," by worshipping Him, and "to love Him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just
+                     as love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like general principles of the whole Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of charity,
+                     precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the same time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity,
+                     just as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first principles, unless the conclusions also are given
+                     which follow from them proximately or remotely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption, even as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated above
+                     (A[1], ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q22_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q22_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q22_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q23" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q22_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q23-p0.1">OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p2"> In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself; (2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration
+                  will be fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating
+                  thereto.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p3"> The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity, considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in
+                  its relation to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p4"> (1) Whether charity is friendship?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p5"> (2) Whether it is something created in the soul?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p6"> (3) Whether it is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p7"> (4) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p8"> (5) Whether it is one virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p9"> (6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p10"> (7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q23-p11"> (8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q23_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether charity is friendship?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend,
+                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation']
+                     is not with men" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.2.11" target="asv">Dan. 2:11</a>). Therefore charity is not friendship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards
+                     the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says
+                     in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where
+                     men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by
+                     crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for
+                     the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic.
+                     viii). Therefore charity is not friendship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.15" target="asv">Jn. 15:15</a>): "I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity.
+                     Therefore charity is friendship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together
+                     with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love,
+                     but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but
+                     of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for
+                     wine or for a horse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p7"> Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between
+                     friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p8"> Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind
+                     of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:9</a>): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this communication,
+                     is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this
+                     life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect
+                     of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in
+                     this present state of life, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.20" target="asv">Phil.
+                        3:20
+                     </a>): "Our conversation is in heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants shall serve Him,
+                     and they shall see His face" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.3" target="asv">Apoc. 22:3,4</a>). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to
+                     one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person,
+                     for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do
+                     we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they
+                     hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity
+                     in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his
+                     sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship
+                     based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q23_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether charity is something created in the soul?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his
+                     neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again
+                     he says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something
+                     created in the soul, but is God Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.30.20" target="asv"> Dt. 30:20</a>: "He is thy life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens
+                     it by charity, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.14" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:14</a>: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed
+                     it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity
+                     is not something created in the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p5"> On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment
+                     of God for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created
+                     in the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q[17]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p7"> of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling
+                     in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this
+                     movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means
+                     of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he
+                     said on account of the excellence of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p8"> But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves
+                     the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved,
+                     without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary
+                     to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A1.html">FS, Q[6], A[1]</a>): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature,
+                     implies an act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p9"> Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will
+                     were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to
+                     act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html">FS, Q[114], A[4]</a>) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by
+                     the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p10"> Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some form which is
+                     the principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby
+                     it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things sweetly" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that,
+                     therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less
+                     perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this
+                     is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform
+                     its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be
+                     in us
+                     some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with
+                     ease and pleasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the
+                     goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation
+                     of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby
+                     formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this
+                     manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to
+                     this has been to some an occasion of error.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of
+                     the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately
+                     united to the body, so is charity to the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it
+                     is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites
+                     it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q23_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether charity is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship
+                     a virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither,
+                     therefore, is charity a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies
+                     rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing
+                     than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to
+                     God, for by it we love Him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle
+                     of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html">Q[17], A[1]</a>), viz. human reason and God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p7"> Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with right reason," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the
+                     nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith, (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q4_A5.html">Q[4], A[5]</a>) and hope (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A1.html">Q[17], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evidenced by the
+                     authority of Augustine quoted above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or with
+                     a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different
+                     aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas
+                     friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a
+                     gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct
+                     of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far,
+                     to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy
+                     and virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is
+                     something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded
+                     principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">FS, Q[25], A[2]</a>) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And when
+                     virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of
+                     excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident
+                     has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is
+                     inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a participation
+                     of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that
+                     higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as
+                     it is a participation of the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q23_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether charity is a special virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby
+                     we love God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv,
+                     22] that "virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore
+                     charity is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.16.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 16:14</a>: "Let all your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt
+                     love" is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing general is enumerated together with what is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz.
+                     hope and faith, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A1.html">FS, Q[27], A[1]</a>), so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it
+                     is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity,
+                     which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. Therefore charity is a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends
+                     on it in a way, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html">AA[7]</a>,8). In this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact
+                     that they depend on prudence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends
+                     which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for
+                     its object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man's whole
+                     life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precept of love is said to be a general command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>: "The end of the commandment is charity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q23_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q23_A5-p0.1">Whether charity is one virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects
+                     of charity---God and our neighbor---which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q[17],
+                     A[6]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of
+                     each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic.
+                     viii, 3,11,12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the
+                     Divine truth, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.5" target="asv"> Eph. 4:5</a>: "One faith." Therefore charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Charity, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a> is a kind of friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect
+                     of a diversity of end, and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the delightful,
+                     and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which friendships are based; thus there
+                     is one species of
+                     friendship between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural communion,
+                     the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p7"> Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship
+                     of everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue,
+                     and not divided into several species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the principal
+                     object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God's sake.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God's
+                     goodness, which is His substance, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.1" target="asv"> Ps. 105:1</a>: "Give glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love
+                     Him, are secondary and result from the first.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to
+                     charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q23_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q23_A6-p0.1">Whether charity is the most excellent of the virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even
+                     as it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which
+                     is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the thing by which another works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works,
+                     is beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv"> Gal. 5:6.</a> Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something
+                     additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is
+                     more excellent than charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "The greater of these is charity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since good, in human acts, depends on their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is
+                     a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the
+                     theological virtues, which consist in attaining this first
+                     rule, since their object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining
+                     human reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains
+                     God most.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p7"> Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far
+                     as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains God Himself that it may rest
+                     in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently,
+                     than all the other virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the
+                     other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human operations or passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The operation of the intellect is completed by the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the excellence
+                     of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the
+                     will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the
+                     excellence of the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is
+                     the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves,
+                     because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above
+                     the soul, are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. Consequently it is better to know than to love the things
+                     that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the
+                     moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge
+                     of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not
+                     prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance
+                     therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the
+                     character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q23_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q23_A7-p0.1">Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be true virtue without charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those
+                     who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true
+                     virtue is possible without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>). Now, in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly.
+                     Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic. vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore
+                     true virtue can be without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>): "If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it
+                     profiteth me nothing." And yet true virtue is very profitable, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A7-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv"> Wis. 8:7</a>: "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable
+                     in life." Therefore no true virtue is possible
+                     without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55] , A[4]</a>). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the end. Accordingly,
+                     just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal
+                     good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A7-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.28" target="asv"> Ps. 72:28</a>: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular
+                     good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be directed to the principal good, which is
+                     the last end; while the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the final good. Accordingly
+                     it is evident that simply true virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus
+                     also the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best":
+                     and in this way no true virtue is possible without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p7"> If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity,
+                     in so far as it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is not a true, but an apparent good, it is
+                     not a true virtue that is ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv,
+                     3), "the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser's
+                     justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby
+                     he curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude, whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses
+                     mountains, he goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the other hand, this particular
+                     good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect,
+                     however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something
+                     that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3)
+                     that the actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does
+                     any like thing, and directs it to his unbelief as end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p9"> There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with
+                     his possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good, which is not completely taken
+                     away by sin, as stated above (Q[10], A[4]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html">FS, Q[85], A[2]</a>). In this way it is possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly good, because it lacks
+                     its due order to the last
+                     end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the end is in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly true
+                     science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice,
+                     or chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however rightly a man may be affected about
+                     other matters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science and art of their very nature imply a relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life,
+                     as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">FS, Q[56] , A[3]</a>). Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q23_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q23_A8-p0.1">Whether charity is the form of the virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the true form of the virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.
+                     Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it would follow that the other virtues are of the same species
+                     as charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it
+                     is in no way the form of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their root and foundation, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q23_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing, since it is
+                     the first part in the making. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end
+                     and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that charity is the form of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the
+                     will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently,
+                     in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance
+                     with what has been said 
+                     <a id="SS_Q23_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html">(A[7])</a>, that it is charity which
+                     directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue:
+                     and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation
+                     to "informed" acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of
+                     efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom,
+                     and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character of a material cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is
+                     one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding
+                     them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q23_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q22_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q24" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q24-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p2"> We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p3"> (1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p4"> (2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine infusion?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p6"> (4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p7"> (5) Whether it increases by addition?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p8"> (6) Whether it increases by every act?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p9"> (7) Whether it increases indefinitely?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p10"> (8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p11"> (9) Of the various degrees of charity;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p12"> (10) Whether charity can diminish?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p13"> (11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q24-p14"> (12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether the will is the subject of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher
+                     (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A6.html">Q[23], A[6]</a>). But the reason is the subject of virtue. Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.16.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 16:14</a>: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity
+                     is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The object of charity is the good, which is also the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q80_A2.html">FP, Q[80], A[2]</a>, the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which is called the will, the object of each is the
+                     good, but in different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by sense, whereas the object of
+                     the intellective appetite or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended by the intellect.
+                     Now the object of
+                     charity is not a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity
+                     is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>: wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine
+                     good which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from the
+                     reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom,
+                     and transcends the rule of human reason, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence
+                     is, or as its rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q83_A4.html">FP, Q[83], A[4]</a>, the free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act of
+                     which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence
+                     charity, whose object is the last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in the free-will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not caused in us by infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man naturally.
+                     Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine good", which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of dilection
+                     and love." Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by infusion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.
+                     Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no infused habit in order to love other things. Neither,
+                     therefore, do we need one in order to love God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." Now these three
+                     have reference to human acts. Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from infusion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>), charity is a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness. Now this fellowship is in
+                     respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts, for, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv"> Rom. 6:23, </a> "the grace of God is life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities. Now that which surpasses
+                     the faculty of nature, cannot be natural or acquired by the
+                     natural powers, since a natural effect does not transcend its cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p7"> Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the
+                     Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A2.html">Q[23], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all naturally.
+                     On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural fellowship, so the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible
+                     things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely
+                     lovable to us in this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards visible goods. Hence it is evident that for
+                     us to love God above all things in this way, it is necessary that charity be
+                     infused into our hearts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that in us charity proceeds from "a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this must
+                     be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose
+                     man to receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.):
+                     "Fear leads to charity," and of a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2</a>: "Faith
+                     begets hope, and hope charity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.15" target="asv">Mat. 25:15</a>) that "He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper ability']." Now, in man, none but natural virtue
+                     precedes charity, since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html">Q[23], A[7]</a>). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure of his natural virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among things ordained towards one another, the second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things
+                     that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous gifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity
+                     is a perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is
+                     infused according to the capacity of nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv"> Mat. 22:30 </a>and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.20.36" target="asv"> Lk. 20:36.</a> Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the Master teaches
+                     (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently applies to man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.8" target="asv">Jn. 3:8</a>): "The Spirit breatheth where He will," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:11</a>): "All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." Therefore charity is given,
+                     not according to our natural capacity, but according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause of that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater effect.
+                     Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A2.html">(A[2])</a> it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on the sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the quantity
+                     of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on the capacity of natural virtue, but only on
+                     the will of the Holy Ghost Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will." Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv">Eph. 4:7</a>): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of
+                     the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more
+                     or less, according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.12" target="asv">Col. 1:12</a>): "Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter. In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for
+                     grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the
+                     comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly whithersoever
+                     he is borne, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q61_A6.html">FP, Q[61], A[6]</a>. Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those who persevered, and for evil in those who
+                     fell, and consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the others, and those who fell
+                     became worse.
+                     But man's is a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act: so that
+                     it is not necessarily borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater natural gifts there may be less
+                     effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A4-p0.1">Whether charity can increase?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely
+                     dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the
+                     objects in respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity.
+                     Therefore charity does not increase.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being
+                     the greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good. Therefore charity cannot increase.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase
+                     of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore
+                     charity cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or corrupted, which is unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. clxxxv.</a>] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit perfection."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the
+                     last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but
+                     by the affections of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and this approach is the result of charity, since
+                     it unites man's mind to God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it
+                     can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way,
+                     when he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:31</a>): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of objects,
+                     namely whether they be in greater number or of greater excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a
+                     thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual quantity of charity increases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it follows
+                     that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity
+                     of the act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have said that charity does not increase in its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according
+                     to its fervor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p10"> But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since charity is an accident, its being is to be in something.
+                     So that an essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet more in its subject, which implies a greater
+                     radication in its subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that an essential increase of
+                     charity implies ability to produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by
+                     beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A5-p0.1">Whether charity increases by addition?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be
+                     according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener.
+                     i, 5) that "increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude." Therefore the increase of charity which is according to virtual
+                     quantity is by addition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.10" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:10</a>: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the light." Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a house
+                     increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also increases in the soul by addition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as the causing of it, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:10</a>: "He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice." Now when God first infuses charity, He puts something in the
+                     soul that was not there before. Therefore also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was not there before.
+                     Therefore charity increases by addition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in Phys.
+                     iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase by addition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every addition is of something to something else: so that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things added
+                     together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed
+                     as distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction
+                     of thought. For God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which
+                     did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless
+                     capable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose
+                     the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p7"> Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects,
+                     while numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may receive increase through extending to
+                     objects to which it did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who acquires knowledge of geometrical
+                     matters which he ignored hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity extends
+                     to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as though
+                     the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to which it is added.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p8"> It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which
+                     follows a distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one white thing is added to another, although
+                     such an increase does not make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in point, since the subject of charity
+                     is none other than the rational mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place by one
+                     rational mind being added to another; which is impossible. Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater
+                     lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity,
+                     as some have held to be the case.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p9"> Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper
+                     mode of increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject.
+                     Consequently, since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is greater is the same as to say that
+                     it is more in its subject, and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case if the
+                     form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with its subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified
+                     in its subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, it is
+                     distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this way we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be
+                     seen in animals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this
+                     way it has its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of intensity in
+                     its subject, for instance in things subject to rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9. In like manner science, as a habit,
+                     has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an
+                     accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its subject, and in this way it increase in a man who knows the
+                     same scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard
+                     to that which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it follows that it increases solely by
+                     being intensified.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The addition of light to light can be understood through the light being intensified in the air on account of there being
+                     several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary
+                     shedding forth the light of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state of "having" charity from the state of "not having it," so that something
+                     must needs come which was not there before. On the other hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to "more having" from
+                     "less having," so that there is need, not for anything to be there that was not there before, but for something to be more
+                     there that previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases
+                     charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated
+                     by the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A6-p0.1">Whether charity increases through every act of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity increases through every act of charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less.
+                     But every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more than a simple addition of charity, since it includes
+                     the perfection of charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act
+                     of charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue. Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces
+                     to the increase of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.] says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now
+                     no man goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the
+                     way to God. Therefore charity increases through every act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or slackness. Therefore
+                     it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does it dispose one to a lower degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like the increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is not
+                     a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in
+                     each part of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space of time nature works by disposing for the increase,
+                     without causing any actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which
+                     it had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like manner charity does not actually increase through
+                     every act of charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far as one act of charity makes man
+                     more ready to act again according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent love,
+                     and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity increases actually.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which, however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper time.
+                     In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when
+                     we strive for that increase.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces towards
+                     that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded
+                     it, reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a stone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A7-p0.1">Whether charity increases indefinitely?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity does not increase indefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as stated in
+                     Metaph. ii, text. 8,9. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity
+                     does not increase indefinitely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity
+                     is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase, attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater,
+                     unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line
+                     into an indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive
+                     at any definite quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we
+                     subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But this does not occur in the case in point: because there
+                     is no need for the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since rather is it probable that it would be equal
+                     or greater. As, therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely,
+                     it would follow that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is absurd. Therefore the wayfarer's
+                     charity cannot increase indefinitely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv">Phil. 3:12</a>): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may, by any means apprehend,"
+                     on which words a gloss says: "Even if he has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.' For whosoever says
+                     this, leaves the road before coming to his destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and
+                     when this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made, another
+                     form is attained. And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so
+                     that whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent,
+                     whose power does not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which is
+                     not capable of ulterior perfection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p7"> Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer.
+                     For charity itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a participation of the infinite charity which
+                     is the Holy Ghost. In like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of infinite power. Furthermore,
+                     on the part of its subject, no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity
+                     increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not
+                     possible to fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is not in this, but in a future life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The capacity of the rational creature is increased by charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:11</a>: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of receiving a further increase.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds good in those things which have the same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds:
+                     thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity
+                     which follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows
+                     open vision. Hence the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A8-p0.1">Whether charity can be perfect in this life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all
+                     others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv">Phil. 3:12</a>): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect,
+                     cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world, wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity
+                     cannot be perfect in this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been brought
+                     to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the
+                     case of Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the
+                     person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now
+                     God is as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love
+                     Him infinitely since all created power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can
+                     be perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He loves Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p7"> On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First,
+                     so that a man's whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the perfection of the charity of heaven, and is
+                     not possible in this life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to think always actually of
+                     God, and to be moved by love towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God
+                     and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the perfection
+                     of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole
+                     heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is
+                     common to all who have charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a perfect
+                     wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the way leads."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is said on account of venial sins, which are contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are incompatible,
+                     not with the perfection of the way, but with that of heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfection of the way is not perfection simply, wherefore it can always increase.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A9-p0.1">Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning, progress, and perfection?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many
+                     degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection. Therefore it is not right to put only one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as
+                     progressing and as beginning.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may be, it can increase, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A9-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Now for charity to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be distinguished from progressing charity:
+                     and so the aforesaid degrees are unsuitably assigned to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "As soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to beginners, "after
+                     taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to those who are progressing, "and when it has become strong it is perfected,"
+                     which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The spiritual increase of charity may be considered in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For
+                     although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it has certain fixed divisions according to those particular
+                     actions or pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of a man being an infant until he has the use
+                     of reason, after which we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and
+                     to use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty when he begins to acquire the power of generation,
+                     and so on until he arrives at perfection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p7"> In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished according to the different pursuits to which man is brought
+                     by the increase of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting
+                     his concupiscences, which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in whom charity has to be fed or fostered
+                     lest it be destroyed: in the second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and this is the
+                     pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit is to
+                     aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to the perfect who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p8"> In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term,
+                     and thirdly, rest in this term.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even
+                     as every division of continuous things is included in these three---the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher
+                     states (De Coelo i, 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although those who are beginners in charity may progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins which
+                     disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection
+                     with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the other holding the sword as related in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A9-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiEsd.4.17" target="asv">2 Esdr 4:17 </a>about those who built up Jerusalem.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards
+                     union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things,
+                     with the beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing in virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A9-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A10-p0.1">Whether charity can decrease?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease
+                     are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A10-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, it seems that it can also decrease.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii,
+                     qu. 36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." For this it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses
+                     cupidity quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides God, can increase in man. Therefore charity
+                     can decrease.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God makes the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if
+                     the man turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine operation." From this we may gather that when God
+                     preserves charity in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity into him. Now at the first infusion of
+                     charity God infuses less charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in
+                     preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.6" target="asv"> Cant 8:6</a>: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are fire and flames." Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. Therefore
+                     as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e. decrease.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The quantity which charity has in comparison with its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as
+                     stated above (A[4], ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p7"> Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider
+                     whether it can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be either through an act, or by the mere cessation
+                     from act. It is true that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease altogether through cessation from act,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A10-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html">FS, Q[53], A[3]</a>). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to
+                     friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i.e. the neglect to call upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed
+                     many a friendship." Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause, and the cause of human virtue is
+                     a human act, so that when human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases altogether. Yet this
+                     does not occur to charity, because it is not the result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A10-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation
+                     involves a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p8"> The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect
+                     is caused in us by God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace in punishment of sin. Hence He does
+                     not diminish charity except by way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p9"> It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit.
+                     But mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every
+                     mortal sin is contrary to charity, as we shall state further on 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A10-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html">(A[12])</a>, and by way of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity
+                     from
+                     him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p10"> In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it
+                     does not touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin is a disorder about things directed to the
+                     end: and a man's love for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as regards the things directed
+                     to the end. Thus sick people sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet: and
+                     thus again, in speculative sciences, the false opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the certitude
+                     of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he does
+                     not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore
+                     he that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is
+                     ordered to the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p11"> The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to
+                     its corruption may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins, or even the cessation from the
+                     practice of works of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contraries affect the same subject when that subject stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal
+                     relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument
+                     does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison,
+                     as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e. less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed
+                     by diminishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must understand the saying: "He loves Thee less,
+                     who loves aught beside Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for
+                     Thee." This does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which we love in venial sin, is loved for God's
+                     sake habitually though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is always diminished by charity:
+                     and yet this cupidity cannot diminish charity, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A movement of the free-will is requisite in the infusion of charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A10-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A3.html">FS, Q[113], A[3]</a>). Wherefore that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces dispositively to a diminution in the charity to
+                     be infused. On the other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the safe-keeping of charity, else it would not
+                     remain inn us while we sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an
+                     obstacle on the part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A10-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A11-p0.1">Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who
+                     has charity cannot sin, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God."
+                     But none save the children of God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of God from the children
+                     of perdition," as
+                     Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again
+                     in a letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true." [*The quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad
+                     quemdam comitem, vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.]
+                     Therefore it was no charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot lose
+                     it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases
+                     to work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning,
+                     both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity cannot be lost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A11-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.2.4" target="asv">Apoc. 2:4</a>): "I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A2.html">(A[2];</a> QQ[23],24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul
+                     to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly
+                     whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time---that the Holy Ghost should
+                     will
+                     to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perseverance
+                     is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says in his
+                     book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p8"> Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity
+                     cannot sin at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
+                     24).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p9"> Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover
+                     charity may be compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form in comparison with matter, and from
+                     the specific point of view of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its subject in such a way
+                     that it can be lost, when it does not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of
+                     things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality
+                     to another form, as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be lost
+                     by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter,
+                     so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly
+                     the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of
+                     that mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill
+                     the potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually
+                     directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is lost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p10"> It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable
+                     to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its disposition,
+                     even so does the human mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the Philosopher says
+                     (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is inseparable from
+                     its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is
+                     seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity
+                     of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills
+                     to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only for
+                     a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the
+                     changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The love of God ever works great things in its purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great
+                     things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting actually,
+                     and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A11-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q24_A12" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q24_A12-p0.1">Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not lost through one mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has mounted
+                     to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that he will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs
+                     do so gradually and by little and little." But man falls away by losing charity. Therefore charity is not lost through only
+                     one mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (60) addresses Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not
+                     an averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed
+                     away by the fount of charity." From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion
+                     that "charity in Peter was not quenched, but cooled." But Peter sinned mortally in denying
+                     Christ. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful
+                     act. Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love
+                     of God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things directed to the end, does not remove the love for the
+                     end, as stated above (A[10] ). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there be a mortal sin through an inordinate
+                     affection for some temporal good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end. Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are
+                     not done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless. Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when
+                     a mortal sin has been committed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A12-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv"> Rom. 6:23</a>: "The wages of sin is death." On the other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A12-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.14.21" target="asv">Jn. 14:21</a>): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in which manifestation
+                     everlasting life consists, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q24_A12-p7.3" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life; that they may
+                     know Thee the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal
+                     life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed
+                     by one mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> That one contrary is removed by the other contrary supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very nature,
+                     which consists in man's loving God above all things, and subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his
+                     to God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always
+                     to follow the rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His
+                     commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its very nature is capable of destroying charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p9"> If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one
+                     mortal sin, for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a habit in its subject does not require
+                     the endurance of its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done away. But charity,
+                     being an infused habit, depends on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion
+                     and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as stated above (A[10], OBJ 3). Consequently,
+                     just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity
+                     ceases at once to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p10"> Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring
+                     of charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God's friendship, which requires that we should obey
+                     His will, it follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
+                     viii, 12) that "man is enlightened by God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's absence, because
+                     distance from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of the will."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way, that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so
+                     far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said
+                     to be dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A12-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">FS, Q[88], A[3]</a>). Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin if he commits it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p12"> Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether,"
+                     we may reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied and falling away altogether, he means one who falls
+                     so as to sin through malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity. Secondly,
+                     indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, through some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against charity
+                     in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p14"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not every inordinate affection for things directed to the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only
+                     such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated
+                     above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain
+                     determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is
+                     evident that charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate
+                     form regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q24_A12-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html">Q[23], A[8]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q24_A12-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q25" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q25-p0.1">OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p2"> We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity:
+                  (2) The order in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p3"> (1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love our neighbor also?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p4"> (2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p5"> (3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p6"> (4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p7"> (5) Whether one's own body?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p8"> (6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p9"> (7) Whether sinners love themselves?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p10"> (8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p11"> (9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p12"> (10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p13"> (11) Whether we ought to love the demons?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q25-p14"> (12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we
+                     owe Him fear, according
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv"> Dt. 10:12</a>: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now the fear with which
+                     we fear man, and which is called human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either servile
+                     or filial, as is evident from what has
+                     been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a>). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known
+                     as "latria," is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as "dulia." Therefore again the love wherewith we love
+                     God, is distinct from that with which we love our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2.</a> Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.5" target="asv"> Jer. 17:5</a>: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man." Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.21" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:21</a>): "This commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[17], A[6]; Q[19], A[3]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html">FS, Q[54], A[3]</a>) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the
+                     same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of
+                     necessity that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that tends to the object under that
+                     aspect:
+                     thus it is specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color under the aspect of light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p7"> Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may
+                     be in God. Hence it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently
+                     the habit of charity extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as
+                     when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such
+                     like human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love. Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account
+                     of what he has of God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its
+                     exercising the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice: such like fear of man is not
+                     distinct from fear of God, as neither is such like love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition
+                     of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various
+                     persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is distinguished according to the good belonging
+                     to individuals. Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of
+                     charity, in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is God; whereas we give various honors to various
+                     people, according to each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor of latria on account of His singular
+                     virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us ministerially
+                     under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved
+                     him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether we should love charity out of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity need not be loved out of charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the
+                     two precepts of charity (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.37" target="asv">Mat. 22:37-39</a>): and neither of them includes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore charity need not be loved
+                     out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). But charity cannot participate in happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is
+                     essential to friendship, as stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love our
+                     neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for
+                     since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will:
+                     and since to will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the intellect, whose object is the true, understands
+                     that it understands, because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason
+                     of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved,
+                     wherefore from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p7"> Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom we wish good
+                     things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend. It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved
+                     out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those whom we love out of charity. The same
+                     applies to happiness, and to the other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God and our neighbor are those with whom we are friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love both
+                     God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which
+                     we desire for all whom we love out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers friendship as referred to those with whom we are friends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are conformed
+                     to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves "all things that are" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>), and whatever He loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love irrational creatures out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational
+                     creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as
+                     much as they bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html">FP, Q[45], A[7]</a>]. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since
+                     we believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and
+                     animals that walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The love of charity extends to none but God and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational creatures,
+                     since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to what has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom
+                     our friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for our friend. With regard to the first,
+                     no irrational creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer in a general way to
+                     friendship, which
+                     cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while,
+                     properly speaking, we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to
+                     possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the
+                     good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such like things,
+                     except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to
+                     friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship
+                     in human life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically
+                     speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which
+                     the
+                     irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p7"> Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good things that we desire for others,
+                     in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use; thus too does God love them out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p8"> Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness by way of trace does not confer the capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and so
+                     the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith can extend to all that is in any way true, whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a
+                     natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there
+                     "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has charity towards himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man
+                     towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.23.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 23:4</a>). Now a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.1" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:1,2</a>): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out
+                     of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>): "Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore we should love ourselves too
+                     out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>), we may consider charity from two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must hold
+                     that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union,
+                     for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a man is one with himself which is more than
+                     being united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the
+                     form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves,
+                     hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that "the origin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves." Thus
+                     too with regard to principles we have something greater than science, namely understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p7"> Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature, namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the
+                     first place, and, consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself who has charity. Hence, among these
+                     other things which he loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks there of charity under the general notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the same
+                     sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they
+                     humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which
+                     pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through charity that a man loves himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A5-p0.1">Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to
+                     associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.24" target="asv">Rom. 7:24</a>: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.23" target="asv"> Phil. 1:23</a>: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that
+                     enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot
+                     love us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them
+                     he reckons our own body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin
+                     and its punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p7"> Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use
+                     it for God's service, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.13" target="asv"> Rom. 6:13</a>: "Present . . . your members as instruments of justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of charity with which we
+                     love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of punishment;
+                     we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to
+                     long for the removal of such things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he was
+                     loth to be deprived thereof, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:4</a>: "We would not be unclothed, but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape from the taint of concupiscence, which remains
+                     in the body, and from the corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it from seeing God. Hence he
+                     says
+                     expressly: "From the body of this death."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we
+                     are able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness
+                     into the body, viz., "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the
+                     body has, in a fashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of
+                     charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in respect
+                     of his soul, or in respect of his body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A6-p0.1">Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of charity. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.113" target="asv">Ps. 118:113</a>): "I have hated the unjust." But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather than loved, out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of
+                     the unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of hate, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.100.8" target="asv"> Ps. 100:8</a>: "In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land": and God commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.18" target="asv">Ex. 22:18</a>): "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live." Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,
+                     desire evil things for the wicked, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.9.18" target="asv"> Ps. 9:18</a>: "May the wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: 'The wicked shall be,' etc. See Reply to this Objection.]." Therefore
+                     sinners should not be loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners
+                     will, nor to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is proper to friends to associate together, according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not to associate with sinners,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:17</a>: "Go ye out from among them." Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that "when it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that we ought
+                     to look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we
+                     ought to love sinners out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he
+                     has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[23], AA[1],5), wherefore we ought to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p9"> On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby
+                     they are opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or mother or kindred, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.26" target="asv"> Lk. 12:26.</a> For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and
+                     this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God's sake.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred
+                     is perfect, of which he himself says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.138.22" target="asv">Ps. 138:22</a>): "I have hated them with a perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent to love of his good. Hence also
+                     this perfect hatred belongs to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of friendship,
+                     so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
+                     money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great
+                     wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them
+                     friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like sinners to be put to death, because
+                     there is greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into
+                     effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good to
+                     the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation
+                     of his crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived
+                     of the power to sin any more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction, not
+                     by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked be," that is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell." Secondly, by
+                     way of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.57.11" target="asv"> Ps. 57:11</a>: "The just shall rejoice when he shall
+                     see the revenge," since, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv"> Wis. 1:13, </a> not even God "hath pleasure in the destruction of the wicked [Vulg.: 'living']" when He punishes them, but He rejoices in
+                     His justice, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv">Ps. 10:8</a>: "The Lord is just and hath loved justice." Thirdly, so that this desire is referred to the removal of the sin, and not to
+                     the punishment itself, to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man may live.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make
+                     them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.15.19" target="asv">Jer. 15:19</a>): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not to be turned to them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them.
+                     But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert
+                     them. For thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.11" target="asv"> Mat. 9:11-13.</a> Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A6-p14.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:17</a>): "Go out from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing," i.e. by consenting to sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A6-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A7-p0.1">Whether sinners love themselves?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that which is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love
+                     of self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that it "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore
+                     sinners most of all love themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even
+                     irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance, the preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore
+                     sinners love themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore
+                     many sinners love themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv">Ps. 10:6</a>): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked.
+                     For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first,
+                     in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul
+                     and body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so
+                     far as they love their own preservation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p7"> Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being
+                     the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In this way, all do not think themselves to be what they
+                     are. For the reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal nature takes the second place,
+                     the former of which the Apostle calls the "inward man," and the latter, the "outward man" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.16" target="asv">2 Cor.
+                        4:16
+                     </a>). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way
+                     they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the
+                     outward man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright,
+                     but love what they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and therefore truly love
+                     themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p8"> The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his
+                     friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him; fourthly, he takes
+                     pleasure in his company; fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things. In this way
+                     the good love themselves, as to the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its integrity,
+                     they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure
+                     in entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of past good, and the
+                     hope of future good, all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no clashing of wills, since their whole
+                     soul tends to one thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p9"> On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual
+                     goods for him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in their own company by entering into their own hearts,
+                     because whatever they find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do they agree with themselves, on account
+                     of the gnawings of conscience, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.21" target="asv"> Ps. 49:21</a>: "I will reprove thee and
+                     set before thy face."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p10"> In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves, as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas
+                     the good do not love themselves thus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The love of self which is the principle of sin is that which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of God,"
+                     as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire external goods as to despise spiritual goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but apparent:
+                     and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A7-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A8-p0.1">Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity does not require us to love our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great
+                     good," namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its application, as the object of our petition when we say:
+                     Forgive us our trespasses." Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity, because, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.10.12" target="asv"> Prov. 10:12, </a> "charity covereth all sins." Therefore charity does not require that we should
+                     love our enemies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary, as
+                     a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>). Now it seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate one's friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A8-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.19.6" target="asv">2 Kings 19:6</a>): "Thou lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee." Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.44" target="asv">Mat. 4:44</a>): "Love your enemies."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Love of one's enemies may be understood in three ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is perverse,
+                     and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that which is evil in another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p7"> Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires
+                     that we should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, we should not exclude our enemies from the love
+                     given to our neighbor in general.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p8"> Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement
+                     of love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely, because it does not require that we should have a special
+                     movement of love to every individual man, since this would be impossible. Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect
+                     of our being prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if
+                     the necessity were to occur. That man should actually do so, and love his enemy for God's sake, without it being necessary
+                     for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For since man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God's sake,
+                     the more he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain
+                     man very much, we would love his children though they were unfriendly towards us. This is the sense in which Augustine speaks
+                     in the
+                     passage quoted in the First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself should
+                     be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness:
+                     and it is as such that we are bound to love them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is wrong to love one's enemies as such: charity does not do this, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A9-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the signs and effects of love?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.18" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:18</a>): "Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth." Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves
+                     signs and effects of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such signs and effects of love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>): "Love your enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you." Now charity demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands
+                     also that we should "do good to them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang.
+                     xxx), that "love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer
+                     love." Hence charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity requires us to love our neighbor
+                     without exception, though he be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and
+                     effects of love towards our enemies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv"> Mat. 5:44, </a> "Do good to them that hate you," says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection" [*Augustine, Enchiridion
+                     lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not require us
+                     to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The effects and signs of charity are the result of inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely necessary,
+                     for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards
+                     the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A8.html">(A[8])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p7"> We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love
+                     are shown to our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or for a whole people, or when anyone bestows
+                     a favor on a whole community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like favors or signs of
+                     love towards our enemies. For if we did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to what is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens." But there are other favors or signs of love, which one
+                     shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and
+                     signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.21" target="asv"> Prov. 25:21</a>: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give
+                     him . . . drink." Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby
+                     we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but also wish to overcome evil by good [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.21" target="asv">Rom. 12:21</a>], which belongs to perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us,
+                     but purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our kindliness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A9-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A10-p0.1">Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity
+                     is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of the angels is not contained in the love of God, since
+                     they are created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our neighbor, since they do not belong with us
+                     to a common species. Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as
+                     we do. But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our companions;
+                     we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give them the friendship of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those who
+                     pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive
+                     many merciful favors."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>), the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in which men share in common with the
+                     angels. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>) that "in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of God in heaven." It is therefore evident that the friendship
+                     of charity extends also to the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the
+                     blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers of everlasting
+                     happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The companionship of the angels does not consist in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive nature;
+                     it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A10-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>, ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A10-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A11-p0.1">Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their fellowship
+                     with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and understanding,
+                     remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man
+                     loves the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the
+                     passage of Augustine quoted above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A11-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Now the demons are useful to us in many things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for us," as Augustine says (De Civ.
+                     Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q25_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.18" target="asv">Is. 28:18</a>): "Your league with death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not stand." Now the perfection of a peace
+                     and covenant is through charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who live in hell and compass death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, in the sinner, we are bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name of demon is given to
+                     designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying stress on
+                     the word, the question as to whether the spirits called demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance
+                     with the statement made above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A11-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), that a thing may be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as the person who is the object of
+                     friendship, and thus we cannot have the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential part of friendship
+                     that one should be a well-wisher towards one's friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of
+                     everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spirits whom God has condemned eternally,
+                     since this would be in opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p7"> Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be enduring as another's good. In this way we love irrational
+                     creatures out of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory to God and be useful to man, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>: and in this way too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as we desire those spirits to endure,
+                     as to their natural gifts, unto God's glory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The possession of everlasting happiness is not impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon; consequently
+                     the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of nature, is
+                     possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in
+                     hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the demons are useful to us is due not to their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this leads
+                     us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their perverse intention to our profit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A11-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q25_A12" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q25_A12-p0.1">Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, viz. God, our neighbor, our body and ourselves?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these four things are not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, our
+                     body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan. lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself."
+                     Hence love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is not distinct from the love of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole. But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be
+                     condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct
+                     from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct
+                     from the love with which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not rightly distinguished as objects to be
+                     loved out of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There are four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God, "another,
+                     which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely our neighbor, "and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own
+                     body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q25_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,5), the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this fellowship, one thing is considered as
+                     the principle from which happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes of happiness, namely men and
+                     angels; a third is a thing to which happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p7"> Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker
+                     of happiness, can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being identified with ourselves, or through being associated
+                     with us in partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to be loved out of charity, in as much as man
+                     loves both himself and his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The different relations between a lover and the various things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since
+                     the relation between the human lover and God is different from his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct
+                     objects of love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so that the former love being removed the
+                     latter is taken away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach
+                     directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity,
+                     loves himself in one way, and his own body in another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore,
+                     on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special
+                     object of love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q25_A12-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q26" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q26-p0.1">OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p2"> We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether there is an order in charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p4"> (2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether more than himself?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p7"> (5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p8"> (6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p9"> (7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who is more closely united to him?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p10"> (8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or one who is united to him by other ties?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p11"> (9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his father ?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p12"> (10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p13"> (11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p14"> (12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those whom we are kind to?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q26-p15"> (13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether there is order in charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no order in charity. For charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues.
+                     Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is
+                     appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should
+                     be ascribed to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Song.2.4" target="asv">Cant 2:4</a>): "He brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms "before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle. Now
+                     order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs
+                     be also order of some kind. But it has been said above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A12.html"> Q[25], A[12]</a>) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the
+                     fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out of
+                     charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A6.html">Q[23], A[6]</a> ). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of appetite and action, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html">Q[23], A[7]</a>, ad 2; FS, A[1], ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity
+                     above all, we find an order in
+                     reference to the First Principle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand,
+                     charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found
+                     in things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p9"> And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly about God, and secondarily about things referred to
+                     God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is
+                     in this way that order is stated to be in charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:20</a>): "He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" Whence it seems to follow that
+                     the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now God
+                     is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our
+                     neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness causes love, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19</a>: "Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor,
+                     out of charity, more than he loves God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now God is not greater
+                     in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we
+                     ought not to love God more than our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's sake,
+                     if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.26" target="asv"> Lk. 14:26</a>: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot
+                     be My disciple." Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that friendship
+                     is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends;
+                     hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship
+                     of happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it
+                     flows to all who are capable of happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p7"> Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas
+                     our neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since
+                     each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It
+                     is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because
+                     by seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is
+                     more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's
+                     argument. For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns,
+                     from those things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued
+                     that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but
+                     because he is the first thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we
+                     share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness
+                     we ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Considered in His substance, God is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in anything.
+                     And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by participation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether out of charity, man is bound to love God more than himself?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
+                     8) that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger
+                     than its effect. Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought
+                     to love himself more than God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing
+                     itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore
+                     man loves himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not love God more than himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God. But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since
+                     this is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him
+                     in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause
+                     of a thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God more than himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods bestowed
+                     on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired,
+                     loves God above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual,
+                     or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones
+                     do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more
+                     than its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the principal inclination of each part is towards
+                     common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer
+                     damage even to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much more is this realized with regard
+                     to the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p7"> Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in
+                     God as in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of that happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of friendship,
+                     resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself,
+                     but rather itself to the good of the whole.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love
+                     of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good
+                     in enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether our of charity, man ought to love himself more than his neighbor?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of charity
+                     is God, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[25], AA[1],12). Now sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are ourselves. Therefore we ought to love
+                     such a one more than ourselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his
+                     neighbor's sake, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.12.26" target="asv"> Prov. 12:26</a>: "He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to love his neighbor
+                     more than himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:5</a>) "charity seeketh not its own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most. Therefore a man does not,
+                     out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18, </a> 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.39" target="asv">Mat. 22:39</a>): "Thou shalt love thy neighbor (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A4-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love for another. But the
+                     model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of
+                     his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A7.html">Q[25], A[7]</a>): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p7"> This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], AA[1]</a>,12), God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself
+                     by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good.
+                     Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses
+                     union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should
+                     be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor: in sign
+                     whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free
+                     his neighbor from sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The love of charity takes its quantity not only from its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that
+                     has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is
+                     nearer to God, yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man is to himself, it does not follow that
+                     a man is bound to love his neighbor more than himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual
+                     mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought
+                     not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying, "'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the
+                     private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the individual than his private good, even as the good of the
+                     whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A3.html">(A[3])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A5-p0.1">Whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is not bound to love his neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his neighbor's
+                     body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's
+                     body more than his own.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his neighbor's, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Now a man's own body is nearer to his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more than our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil
+                     his own body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.13" target="asv">Jn. 15:13</a>: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound, out of
+                     charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Out of charity we ought to love more that which has more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[25], A[12]). Now fellowship in the full participation of happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a
+                     greater reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own
+                     body. Therefore, as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to
+                     love our neighbor more than our own body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that
+                     we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul, which is his predominant part.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our body is nearer to our soul than our neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as regards the participation
+                     of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every man is immediately concerned with the care of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps in
+                     cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare,
+                     except in a case where he is under obligation to do so and if a man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this
+                     belongs to the perfection of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A6-p0.1">Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another? </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One
+                     ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason
+                     of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought
+                     not to be loved more than another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one
+                     and the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore
+                     we ought to love all our neighbors equally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish
+                     an equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> One's obligation to love a person is proportionate to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. Now
+                     it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.10.9" target="asv">Lev. 10:9</a>), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.
+                     Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than
+                     others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There have been two opinions on this question: for some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors
+                     equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood
+                     as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are connected with us in preference to those who are
+                     unconnected, and not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all
+                     including our enemies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p7"> But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural
+                     appetite, which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical
+                     order that the natural inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that is becoming to the nature of
+                     that thing: thus in earth the inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to
+                     earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be proportionate
+                     to those actions which have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards
+                     those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p8"> We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is
+                     that, since the principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of love increases
+                     in proportion to the nearness to one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that principle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally
+                     out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be
+                     greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all equally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p10"> Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and not loving
+                     others. As regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence,
+                     love ought not to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some more than others: and Augustine does not
+                     mean to exclude the latter inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of
+                     beneficence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those
+                     we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the quantity of love on the part of the good which we wish our friends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A6-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A7-p0.1">Whether we ought to love those who are better more those who are more closely united us?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which
+                     is in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for
+                     having less black mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for some reason, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.26" target="asv"> Lk. 14:26</a>: "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father," etc. On the other hand
+                     good men are not hateful for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who are better more than those who
+                     are more closely connected with us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity,
+                     ought to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in every friendship that ought to be loved most which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for,
+                     by natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now
+                     the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has more to do with better men than with those
+                     who are more closely united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men
+                     more than those who are more closely connected with us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:8</a>): "If any man have not care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than
+                     an infidel." Now the inward affection of charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards those
+                     who are nearer to us before those who are better.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every act should be proportionate both to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from
+                     the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species from the term to which it tends,
+                     while the intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power of the mover. Accordingly love
+                     takes its species from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p7"> Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance
+                     with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish
+                     a greater good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is
+                     one in itself, yet it has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it belongs to
+                     charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness. And
+                     this regards the species of love; for there are different species of love according to the different goods that we wish for
+                     those whom we love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p8"> On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who
+                     are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are
+                     better as to the greater good he wishes for them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p9"> Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection
+                     which cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are. But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close
+                     to God, can come and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A4.html">Q[24], AA[4]</a>,10,11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, to be better
+                     than another, and so reach a higher degree of happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p10"> Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we love more those who are more nearly connected with us,
+                     since we love them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no other friendship than charity,
+                     whereas for those who are connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which they are connected.
+                     Now since the good on which every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to
+                     the good on which charity is based, it follows that charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art which
+                     is about the end commands the art which is about the means. Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin
+                     or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity,
+                     can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more
+                     nearly connected with us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and
+                     God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A7-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.6" target="asv">Micah 7:6</a>: "A men's enemies are they of his own household."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what
+                     is His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us which God does not will, because it becomes Him
+                     not to will them, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A7-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A10.html">FS, Q[19], A[10]</a>), when we were treating of the goodness of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result
+                     is that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A7-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A8-p0.1">Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of blood?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.18.24" target="asv">Prov. 18:24</a>): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor.
+                     iv 7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and
+                     undeniable, that as to the latter, the lot of birth is
+                     fortuitous, whereas we contract the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love more
+                     than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten
+                     you in wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we ought to love those whom we expect to be with us
+                     for ever more than those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not love our kindred more than those
+                     who are otherwise connected with us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others
+                     than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love
+                     our kindred most of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The commandments of the decalogue contain a special precept about the honor due to our parents (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.12" target="asv">Ex. 20:12</a>). Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of blood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A7.html">(A[7])</a>, we ought out of charity to love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense,
+                     and because there are more reasons for loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and
+                     therefore we should measure the love of different persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more
+                     loved in matters touching that particular
+                     union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one union with another. Accordingly
+                     we must say that friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens
+                     on their civic fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore
+                     in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning relations between
+                     citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+                     ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each class of people such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact
+                     the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty
+                     to afford our parents the means of living . . . and to honor them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p7"> The same applies to other kinds of friendship.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p8"> If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable
+                     than, all others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas other unions supervene and may cease altogether.
+                     Therefore the friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be stronger in respect of that which is proper
+                     to each of them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In as much as the friendship of comrades originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the love
+                     of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred
+                     is more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in matters touching nature: consequently we are more
+                     beholden to them in the providing of necessaries.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in this
+                     matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his
+                     body, whom he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not simply
+                     relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on fellowship in battle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A8-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A9-p0.1">Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to
+                     whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle
+                     says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14</a>): "Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children." Therefore a man ought to love
+                     his children more than his parents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states
+                     (Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity. But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore
+                     we also ought to love our children more than our parents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those
+                     of our household."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[4], ad 1; A[7]), the degrees of love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object.
+                     In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to
+                     love his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his principle, in which respect he is a more
+                     exalted good and more like God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p7"> Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that
+                     which is more closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher
+                     states (Ethic. viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of themselves, whereas the father is not part
+                     of his son, so that the love of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for himself.
+                     Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer
+                     to their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand in the relation of a principle.
+                     Fourthly, because parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas the child begins to
+                     love his father after a lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.9.14" target="asv"> Ecclus.
+                        9:14
+                     </a>: "Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The debt due to a principle is submission of respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and care.
+                     Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially
+                     one of care.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is natural for a man as father to love his children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we
+                     consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his father more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is related
+                     to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children
+                     to be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the
+                     favors received to provide for his parents before all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A9-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A10-p0.1">Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i,
+                     20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation,
+                     as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A10-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A2.html">FP, Q[90], A[2]</a>; Q[118]. Therefore a man receives more from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more than
+                     him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due. Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the
+                     Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing,
+                     and she knows more surely than the father who are her children."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love should be more fond towards those who have labored for us more, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A10-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.16.6" target="asv"> Rom. 16:6</a>: "Salute Mary, who hath labored much among you." Now the mother labors more than the father in giving birth and education
+                     to her child; wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A10-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.7.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 7:29</a>): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a man ought to love his mother more than his father.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.44.25" target="asv"> Ezech. 44:25 </a>that "man ought to love God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions the mother afterwards.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In making such comparisons as this, we must take the answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether
+                     the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a
+                     difference in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii,
+                     7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked
+                     children."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p7"> Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the mother. For father and mother are loved as principles
+                     of our natural origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the mother, because he is the active principle,
+                     while the mother is a passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father is to be loved more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through the
+                     formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes
+                     the matter of the body to receive that form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This applies to another kind of love. For the friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the friendship
+                     between child and parent: while the friendship we are speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother through
+                     being begotten of them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A10-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A11-p0.1">Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another unless
+                     he love the latter more. Now it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>) that "a man shell leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore a man ought to love his wife more than his
+                     father and mother.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.33" target="asv">Eph. 5:33</a>) that a husband should "love his wife as himself." Now a man ought to love himself more than his parents. Therefore he ought
+                     to love his wife also more than his parents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship
+                     of a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12) that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility,
+                     pleasure, and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous." Therefore a man's love for his wife ought to be greater than
+                     his love for his parents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.28" target="asv"> Eph. 5:28, </a> "men ought to love their wives as their own bodies." Now a man ought to love his body less than his neighbor, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A11-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A5.html">(A[5])</a>: and among his neighbors he should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents more than his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, the degrees of love may be taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those who love. On the part of
+                     the good which is the object loved, a man should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as his principles
+                     and considered as a more exalted good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p7"> But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A11-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv"> Mat. 19:6</a>: "Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh." Consequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents with
+                     greater reverence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man does not in all respects leave his father and mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to
+                     succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union
+                     of carnal connection and co-habitation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for himself
+                     is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are also several reasons for a man's love for his father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good,
+                     are more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness
+                     of the union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p11"> As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality
+                     of love but the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife is her being united to him in the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A11-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A12" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A13.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A12-p0.1">Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud.
+                     iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who
+                     not only refuses to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's benefactor forestalls him in the kindly
+                     deeds of charity. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors above all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now
+                     it is a more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto
+                     done kindly actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those to whom we are kind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv,
+                     25]. Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should be loved above all others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that "benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A9.html">AA[9]</a>,11), a thing is loved more in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent good, secondly by reason of
+                     a closer connection. In the first way we ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of good to the
+                     man he has benefited, he has the character of a more excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father 
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A12-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A9.html">(A[9])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p7"> In the second way, however, we love those more who have received benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic.
+                     ix, 7) by four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont
+                     to say of a man: "He was made by so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is to be observed that
+                     poets love their own poems): and the reason is that we love "to be" and "to live," and these are made manifest
+                     in our "action." Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor
+                     has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor
+                     sees his virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure
+                     to see one's virtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and
+                     the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it present and because it is more pleasant to recall
+                     virtuous goods than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it the lover's part to act, since he wills
+                     and works the good of the beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so that to love surpasses being
+                     loved, for which reason the greater love is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult to give
+                     than to receive favors: and we are most fond of things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what comes
+                     easy to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient, not
+                     through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses
+                     what we do through another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other
+                     hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow
+                     that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and
+                     our parents, from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A12-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A13.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q26_A13" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A12.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q26_A13-p0.1">Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect charity
+                     consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less." Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will
+                     love those who are better more than either himself or those who are connected with him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have
+                     more good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's will: and there to be better is to have more good.
+                     Therefore in heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others more than himself, and one
+                     who is not connected with him, more than one who is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for then will be fulfilled the words of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q26_A13-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>: "That God may be all in all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that a man will love a better man more
+                     than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now the order of charity given above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A13-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3,4) is derived from nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others. Therefore this order of charity
+                     will endure in heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized
+                     simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order between man himself and other men, a distinction would
+                     seem to be necessary, because, as we stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A13-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A7.html">AA[7]</a>,9), the degrees of love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man desires for another, or according
+                     to the
+                     intensity of love itself. In the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those who are less good, less
+                     than himself: because, by reason of the perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will desire
+                     everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of merit to
+                     a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man,
+                     whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself
+                     more than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the person who loves,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q26_A13-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A7.html">AA[7]</a>,9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct
+                     his mind to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in
+                     the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and even work for that end according to his capacity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p7"> As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply love those who are better, according to the love of
+                     charity. Because the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to God, wherefore the entire ordering of
+                     their love will be ruled with respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer to himself those who
+                     are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each
+                     man has to succor those who are closely connected with him rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of
+                     their distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity, loves more those who are more closely
+                     united to him, for he is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity. It will however be possible in
+                     heaven for a man to love in several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be banished
+                     from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nighness to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument should be granted as to those who are connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love himself
+                     so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity
+                     directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the order of charity in respect of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible supposition
+                     that God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love
+                     himself more than all else after God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q26_A13-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A12.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q25_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q27" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A13.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q27-p0.1">OF THE PRINCIPLE ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p2"> We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects
+                  which follow from that act.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p4"> (1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p5"> (2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p6"> (3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p7"> (4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p8"> (5) Whether God can be loved wholly?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p9"> (6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q27-p10"> (7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy? (8) Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q27_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q27_A1-p0.1">Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those
+                     who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better.
+                     Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved than love, and lovers of flattery always abound."
+                     Therefore it is better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping with charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more so." Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech.
+                     Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than that you love him first." Therefore charity consists in being
+                     loved rather than in loving.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind
+                     of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its proper
+                     act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent
+                     to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence
+                     it is clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which
+                     befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of
+                     something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more commended for loving than for
+                     being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love is the greatest,
+                     seeks rather to love than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their
+                     children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not to be loved."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A better man, through being better, is more lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more,
+                     however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought
+                     to be loved: whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as he ought to be loved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor
+                     is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good,
+                     since good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make
+                     known the good which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have
+                     charity seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of charity, even as the act of any virtue
+                     is that virtue's good. Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be loved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way
+                     leading a man to love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q27_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q27_A2-p0.1">Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to love, considered as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet.
+                     ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A1.html">Q[24], A[1]</a>). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the
+                     act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should
+                     wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his
+                     company; the fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he should grieve and rejoice with him.
+                     Now the first two pertain to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now
+                     charity is friendship, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Therefore goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from
+                     actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will.
+                     For the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness.
+                     And the passion of love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of
+                     the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says
+                     (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it
+                     is by the sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous acquaintance,
+                     whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers
+                     to win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union
+                     of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging
+                     to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well,
+                     even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of
+                     charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
+                     5) that "goodwill is a beginning of friendship."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
+                     which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not
+                     denoted by goodwill.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he says
+                     in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and
+                     this belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q27_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q27_A3-p0.1">Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
+                     homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to love those it knows not," where by things unknown he
+                     means the intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be
+                     loved for the sake of something else.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through something else, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20</a>: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Therefore He is also loved
+                     on account of something else and not for Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.1" target="asv"> Mat. 1:1, </a> and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon.
+                     Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by
+                     God. Therefore it seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some evil to be feared. Therefore
+                     He is not to
+                     be loved for Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be enjoyed"
+                     as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient,
+                     and material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According
+                     to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine,
+                     for instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue,
+                     because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love certain
+                     men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible
+                     to the genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for
+                     the favors received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors, but for
+                     his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not
+                     directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He require to receive any form
+                     in order to be good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other good things; nor again
+                     does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can be loved
+                     for something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by
+                     Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the things it knows the soul learns to love what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for
+                     its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge
+                     disposes man to love the unknown.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but
+                     through Himself, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.42" target="asv"> Jn. 4:42</a>: "We now believe, not for thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain disposition, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A8.html">Q[17], A[8]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A4.html"> Q[19], AA[4]</a>,7,10).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q27_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q27_A4-p0.1">Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De
+                     Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now through a glass, in a dark manner" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>). Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who
+                     is joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.17" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:17</a>). But man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him immediately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore
+                     man is less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be "enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12.</a> But charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A3.html">FP, Q[82], A[3]</a>; Q[84], A[7]), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive
+                     power consists in the appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the movement of the appetitive
+                     power is towards things in respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows the mode of the knower.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p7"> Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth
+                     and goodness itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through
+                     the senses, those things are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is that which is
+                     most remote from our senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p8"> Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God
+                     first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things through God.
+                     On the other hand, with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other things, either as a cause
+                     through its effects, or by way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">FP, Q[12], A[12]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since
+                     love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which
+                     is known through another thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since to love God is something greater than to know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God presupposes
+                     knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love
+                     begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures,
+                     tends to God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to
+                     creatures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving
+                     God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q27_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q27_A5-p0.1">Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
+                     would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved by us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God,
+                     because "God is greater than our heart" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:20</a>). Therefore God cannot be loved wholly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
+                     Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved by a creature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.5" target="asv">Dt. 6:5</a>): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since love may be considered as something between lover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question
+                     may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification "wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is
+                     to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p7"> Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since
+                     man ought to love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.5" target="asv"> Dt. 6:5</a>: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p8"> Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the
+                     mode of the thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion to its goodness, God is infinitely
+                     lovable, since His goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of creatures, whether
+                     it be natural or infused, is finite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first three objections consider the question in this third sense,
+                     while the last takes it in the second sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q27_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q27_A6-p0.1">Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order,
+                     as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing in man, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv"> Col. 3:14</a>: "Above all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with
+                     the desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless
+                     there were one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure
+                     of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint
+                     a mode to the exterior effect of charity, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv"> Rom. 12:1</a>: "Your reasonable service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (OBJ 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination
+                     is to be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure essentially,
+                     because a measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found
+                     relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be
+                     nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure, whether by
+                     deficiency or by excess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p7"> Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire or do
+                     should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means
+                     take their mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), "in every art, the
+                     desire for the end is endless and unlimited," whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not
+                     put limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as
+                     much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be
+                     immoderate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p8"> Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as
+                     stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A6.html">Q[23], A[6]</a>), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but
+                     as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that
+                     the more we love God the better our love is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the measure
+                     which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something
+                     else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode through being
+                     measured .
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to
+                     love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper to the measure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An affection, whose object is subject to reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine love
+                     which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity
+                     between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since
+                     man's ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A6-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.28" target="asv"> Ps.
+                        72:28
+                     </a>: "It is good for me to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both
+                     according to charity and according to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q27_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q27_A7-p0.1">Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.46" target="asv">Mat. 5:46</a>): "If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving of reward to love one's friend:
+                     whereas, as the same passage proves, to love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more meritorious to love
+                     one's enemy than to love one's friend.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children
+                     of God to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious
+                     to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward
+                     according to his own labor" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:8</a>). Now a man has to make a greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is more difficult. Therefore
+                     it seems more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The better an action is, the more meritorious it is. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love a
+                     better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love
+                     one's friend than to love one's enemy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>). When therefore it is asked which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's enemy, these two loves may
+                     be compared in two ways, first, on the part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason for which we
+                     love him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p7"> In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy, because a friend is both better and more closely united
+                     to us, so that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love that passes over this matter, is better,
+                     and therefore its opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p8"> In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than one's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because
+                     it is possible to love one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the only reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly,
+                     because if we suppose that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the stronger through carrying a man's
+                     affections to things which are furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the power of
+                     a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is
+                     proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire
+                     is so much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p9"> Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater
+                     fervor those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect the love of friends, considered in itself,
+                     is more ardent and better than the love of one's enemy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's
+                     sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this would seem to be the case when we love our friends in
+                     such a way that we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is meritorious, if we love them for God's
+                     sake, and not merely because they are our friends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p11"> The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in the article, because the two arguments that follow
+                     consider the reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those who are loved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q27_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q27_A8-p0.1">Whether it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem
+                     to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neighbor to the love of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.3" target="asv"> Rom. 9:3</a>: "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor
+                     than to love God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious to love one's friend, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q27_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q27_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Now God is our chief friend, since "He hath first loved us" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.10" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:10</a>). Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult
+                     and good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's neighbor, both because all things love God naturally,
+                     and because there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious
+                     to love one's neighbor than to love God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason
+                     of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love
+                     of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment
+                     of God, to Whom the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him that loves God (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.21" target="asv">Jn. 14:21</a>): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will . . . manifest
+                     Myself to him." Secondly, the comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the one side, and the love
+                     of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does
+                     not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor,
+                     and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his
+                     brother" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q27_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.21" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:21</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in
+                     a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this
+                     respect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p8"> We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to
+                     have loved his neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he wished to be deprived for a time of
+                     the Divine fruition which pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which pertains
+                     to the love of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man's love for his friends is sometimes less meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall short
+                     of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish
+                     the merit, but is the entire reason for merit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that whatever
+                     is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and at the same time better.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q27_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q26_A13.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q28" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q28-p0.1">OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q28-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q28-p2"> WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects,
+                  (2) the exterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q28-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q28-p4"> (1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q28-p5"> (2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q28-p6"> (3) Whether this joy can be full?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q28-p7"> (4) Whether it is a virtue?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q28_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q28_A1-p0.1">Whether joy is effected in us by charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity. For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But
+                     God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of life, since "while we are in the body,
+                     we are absent from the Lord" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6</a>). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than joy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
+                     those things whereby we merit happiness, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv"> Mat. 5:5</a>: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q28_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q17_A6.html">Q[17], A[6]</a>). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv"> Rom. 12:12</a>: "Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." But joy is caused in us by the
+                     Holy Ghost according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.17" target="asv"> Rom. 14:17</a>: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause
+                     of joy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q28_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">FS, Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2,3), when we were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in contrary ways. For joy is caused by
+                     love, either through the presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists and endures in
+                     it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his friend,
+                     though he be absent. On the other
+                     hand sorrow arises from love, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved object to which we wish
+                     well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable, since He
+                     is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore spiritual joy,
+                     which is about God, is caused by charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So long as we are in the body, we are said to be "absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is present
+                     to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on to say (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6</a>): "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him, by the indwelling
+                     of His grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mourning that merits happiness, is about those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the same
+                     that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same
+                     as to grieve for things that are contrary to it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways. First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself; secondly,
+                     when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly:
+                     while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself,
+                     whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's
+                     charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q28_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q28_A2-p0.1">Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an admixture of sorrow?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs
+                     to charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.6" target="asv">6</a>: "Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." But this joy is compatible with an admixture of
+                     sorrow, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.15" target="asv"> Rom. 12:15</a>: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep." Therefore the
+                     spiritual joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv), "penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
+                     those we have deplored." But there is no true penance without charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with Christ according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.23" target="asv"> Phil. 1:23</a>: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.119.5" target="asv"> Ps. 119:5</a>: "Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv"> Wis. 8:16</a>: "Her conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and
+                     with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of
+                     sorrow, even as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil: hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.4" target="asv">Phil. 4:4</a>): "Rejoice in the Lord always."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p7"> The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. This participation can be hindered
+                     by anything contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so
+                     far as a man grieves for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us or in our neighbor, whom we
+                     love as ourselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign good:
+                     hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our sins divide between us and God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins, or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating
+                     in the Divine good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness
+                     of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for
+                     the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of the Divine good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q28_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q28_A3-p0.1">Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more
+                     is our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness
+                     which is infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy in God can never be filled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is
+                     greater than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature
+                     is finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's
+                     joy in God can be filled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to His disciples (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.11" target="asv">Jn. 15:11</a>): "That My joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much
+                     as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this
+                     is condignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy
+                     may be understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire,
+                     as rest to movement, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q28_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">FS, Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there
+                     remains nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us, because it
+                     still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown above (Q[24], AA[4],7). When once, however,
+                     perfect happiness has been attained, nothing will
+                     remain to be desired, because then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he had desired, even
+                     with regard to other goods, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.5" target="asv"> Ps. 102:5</a>: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires:
+                     so that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection---indeed over-full, since they will obtain more than they were capable
+                     of desiring: for "neither hath it entered into the
+                     heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>). This is what is meant by the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.38" target="asv"> Lk. 6:38</a>: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet, since no creature
+                     is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary,
+                     man enters into it, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.21" target="asv"> Mat. 25:21</a>:
+                     "Enter into the joy of thy Lord."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to the thing in which we rejoice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When each one attains to happiness he will reach the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
+                     will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each
+                     one's joy will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater
+                     than another's, on account of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There
+                     is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.9" target="asv">Col. 1:9</a>): "That you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and spiritual understanding."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q28_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q28_A4-p0.1">Whether joy is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
+                     and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which is "good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to
+                     be virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.4" target="asv"> Phil. 4:4</a>: "Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident
+                     from what has been said above (FS, QQ[57],60,62).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q28_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html">FS, Q[55], AA[2]</a>,4), virtue is an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen
+                     that from the same habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from another. And since
+                     the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is
+                     defined and named in reference to
+                     that preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about
+                     the passions (
+                     <a id="SS_Q28_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">FS, Q[25], AA[2]</a>,4) that love is the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the same virtuous
+                     habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these
+                     acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but from
+                     love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which
+                     reason it is numbered among the Fruits (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q28_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the
+                     vices, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q28_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html">FS, Q[77], A[4]</a>); so that it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not arise from a special,
+                     but from a general vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be
+                     referred, as its
+                     proper act, as stated above (here and A[2]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz. "difficult,"
+                     and "possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any
+                     special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit not its first act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q28_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q27_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q29" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q29-p0.1">OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q29-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q29-p2"> We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q29-p3"> (1) Whether peace is the same as concord?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q29-p4"> (2) Whether all things desire peace?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q29-p5"> (3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q29-p6"> (4) Whether peace is a virtue?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q29_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q29_A1-p0.1">Whether peace is the same as concord?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered
+                     concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi)
+                     that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and
+                     peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.16.33" target="asv">1 Cor. 16:33</a>): "God is not the God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as concord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But "there is no peace to the wicked" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.48.22" target="asv">Is. 48:22</a>). Therefore peace is not the same as concord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever
+                     there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p7"> For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in
+                     consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First,
+                     in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational
+                     appetite, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv"> Gal. 5:17</a>: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit." Secondly, in
+                     so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time:
+                     so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace,
+                     because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains
+                     something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to
+                     concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union,
+                     the union of the appetites even in one man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not
+                     indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something
+                     befitting to both of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were,
+                     by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because
+                     the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that
+                     "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest
+                     together.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself,
+                     unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and
+                     another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q29_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q29_A2-p0.1">Whether all things desire peace?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But there
+                     cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all
+                     men do not desire peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.34" target="asv">Mat. 10:34</a>): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not desire peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since
+                     it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.9.49" target="asv">Mk. 9:49</a>): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not desire peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that "all things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence,
+                     to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by
+                     a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of
+                     necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires
+                     anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant
+                     by peace which Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which consent
+                     may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness,"
+                     where "consent" denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural appetites.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated
+                     above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means
+                     of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary
+                     to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace
+                     than that which they had heretofore.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good
+                     apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed
+                     to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has,
+                     nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed.
+                     Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof,
+                     wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.22" target="asv">Wis. 14:22</a>): "Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there
+                     is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all
+                     one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.3" target="asv"> Ps. 147:3</a>: "Who hath placed peace in thy borders." The other is imperfect peace,
+                     which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things
+                     within and without which disturb the peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q29_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q29_A3-p0.1">Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But
+                     some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is contrary
+                     to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some
+                     of their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one another (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15" target="asv">Acts 15</a>). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17</a>: "And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv">Ps. 118:165</a>): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q29_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q29_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite
+                     being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity---the first, in so far as man loves
+                     God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object---the second, in so far
+                     as we
+                     love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will as though it were ours: hence
+                     it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia)
+                     that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust, Catilin.)
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his
+                     end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence,
+                     without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and
+                     especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing
+                     hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern
+                     the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if
+                     there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little account is not contrary to charity:
+                     for such a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good, which is the
+                     object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such
+                     like dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein the
+                     truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity
+                     directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div.
+                     Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q29_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q29_A4-p0.1">Whether peace is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are precepts
+                     about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.9.49" target="asv">Mk. 9:49</a>). Therefore peace is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is meritorious to keep peace, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.9" target="asv"> Mat. 5:9</a>: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore peace is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q29_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.20" target="asv">Gal. 5:20</a>). Therefore peace is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
+                     11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q29_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>), when a number of acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other, they all arise from the same virtue,
+                     nor do they each have a virtue from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though fire by heating, both
+                     liquefies and rarefies, there are not two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire produces
+                     all such actions by its own
+                     power of calefaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p7"> Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and of our neighbor, as shown above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q29_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q29_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in reference to joy (Q[28], A[4]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it
+                     is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q29_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">FS, Q[69], AA[1]</a>,3). It is also numbered among the fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in
+                     respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q29_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q28_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q30" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q30-p0.1">OF MERCY (FOUR ARTICLES) [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either pity or mercy. The distinction between these
+                  two is that pity may stand either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for the virtue.]
+               </h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q30-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q30-p2"> We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q30-p3"> (1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person pitied?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q30-p4"> (2) To whom does it belong to pity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q30-p5"> (3) Whether mercy is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q30-p6"> (4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q30_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q30_A1-p0.1">Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q[19], A[1]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html">FS, Q[79], A[1]</a>, ad 4; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html">FP, Q[48] , A[6]</a>), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite
+                     mercy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not
+                     call for pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
+                     8). Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the
+                     motive of mercy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if
+                     we can. For mercy takes its name "misericordia" from denoting a man's compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another's unhappiness.
+                     Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes;
+                     for, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has whatever he
+                     desires, and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he
+                     wishes not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p7"> Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly,
+                     a man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man
+                     wishes to eat what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p8"> Accordingly the motive of "mercy," being something pertaining to "misery," is, in the first way, anything contrary to the
+                     will's natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the
+                     Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such
+                     like evils are yet more provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the Philosopher
+                     says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas
+                     we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls
+                     a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one
+                     who suffers undeservedly."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since, however,
+                     fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it may,
+                     in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom.
+                     in Evang. xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but compassionate," and
+                     again it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.36" target="asv">Mat. 9:36</a>) that Jesus "seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep that have
+                     no shepherd."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself, except
+                     figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.24" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:24</a>): "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A1-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q106_A3.html"> Q[106], A[3]</a>, ad 1].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p11"> Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself, but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment
+                     in ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children
+                     or our parents, we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the Philosopher says that "harshness
+                     drives pity away."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection
+                     of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so
+                     far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q30_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q30_A2-p0.1">Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be
+                     merciful, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.144.9" target="asv">Ps. 144:9</a>): "His tender mercies are over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the reason for
+                     taking pity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this
+                     is false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems
+                     that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed
+                     to contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the person who pities.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow
+                     more easily, as we shall say further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A1.html">Q[35], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since sorrow
+                     or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress
+                     as one's own.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p7"> Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves
+                     another looks upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so that he grieves for his friend's
+                     hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's friend" as being one
+                     of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.15" target="asv">Rom. 12:15</a>): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them
+                     that weep."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p8"> Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him.
+                     Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize
+                     that the same may happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that they may fall upon evil
+                     times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves
+                     happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p9"> Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through
+                     being united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in the same way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this
+                     applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the
+                     suffering of others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are incited
+                     to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man
+                     think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv"> Prov. 27:4</a>: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when
+                     it breaketh forth." For the same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so
+                     that they account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that "false
+                     godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not compassionate but disdainful."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q30_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q30_A3-p0.1">Whether mercy is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
+                     Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot
+                     be called a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel
+                     about matters of doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the mind does
+                     not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way." Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
+                     9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they result from charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A3-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q29_A4.html"> Q[29], A[4]</a>). Now mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them
+                     that rejoice. Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its
+                     object, neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because neither is it about operations, for
+                     this belongs to justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at once more
+                     humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful
+                     than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appetite,
+                     in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective appetite,
+                     in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another. This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in accordance
+                     with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite
+                     may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the reason,
+                     when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant."
+                     And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html">FS, Q[59], AA[4]</a>,5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it
+                     impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one another
+                     on the part of their respective estimation of another's evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to
+                     suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things
+                     go well with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from the
+                     same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall
+                     state further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q30_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q36_A3.html">Q[36], A[3]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue
+                     besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the misery of the person pitied.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis,
+                     because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues,
+                     but as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective
+                     habit, in which case they assume the character of a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q30_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q30_A4-p0.1">Whether mercy is the greatest of the virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is preferred
+                     before the worship of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.6.6" target="asv"> Osee 6:6 </a>and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.7" target="asv"> Mat. 12:7</a>: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>: "Godliness is profitable to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and
+                     godliness." Now the Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained in mercy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good," according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a
+                     man like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of
+                     mercy, since of God is it said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.144.9" target="asv">Ps. 144:9</a>) that "His tender mercies are over all His works," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.36" target="asv">Lk. 6:36</a>) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father also is merciful." Therefore mercy
+                     is the greatest of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle after saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.12" target="asv">Col. 3:12</a>): "Put ye on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv">Col. 3:14</a>): "Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself,
+                     mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others
+                     in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein
+                     His omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth Sunday after
+                     Pentecost].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p7"> On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all
+                     others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that which
+                     is above than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the
+                     mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.]. Hence,
+                     as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects
+                     of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all
+                     others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For
+                     He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor.
+                     Hence mercy, whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's
+                     well-being, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q30_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.16" target="asv">Heb. 13:16</a>: "Do not forget to do good and to
+                     impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby
+                     we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as
+                     regards similarity of works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q30_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q29_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q31" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q31-p0.1">OF BENEFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q31-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q31-p2"> We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence,
+                  (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q31-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q31-p4"> (1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q31-p5"> (2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q31-p6"> (3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q31-p7"> (4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q31_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q31_A1-p0.1">Whether beneficence is an act of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity. For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q31_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.7" target="asv"> Job 35:7</a>: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He receive of thy hand?" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of
+                     liberality and not of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice
+                     while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred
+                     is either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q31_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23] , A[1]</a>). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i.e. being beneficent, "to one's
+                     friends." Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of
+                     good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the
+                     act of love includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q31_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q31_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q27_A2.html"> Q[27] , A[2]</a>). Now the will carries into effect if possible, the
+                     things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore
+                     beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p7"> But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume
+                     a special character and will belong to some special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the inferior
+                     to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence
+                     is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of
+                     His love, to bestow good things on us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things must be observed in the bestowal of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward passion
+                     that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
+                     desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift,
+                     while yet desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
+                     other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does
+                     not detract from a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend something he would like to I keep for himself; rather
+                     does this prove the perfection of his friendship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as friendship or charity sees, in the benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see therein the
+                     aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of distress or defect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q31_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q31_A2-p0.1">Whether we ought to do good to all?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to
+                     do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q31_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.12.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 12:5</a>) "Give to the good, and receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners. Therefore we need not do good to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q31_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>). Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if
+                     one were to do good to an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding communion with him. Therefore, since
+                     beneficence is an act of charity, we ought not to do good to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q31_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.10" target="asv">Gal. 6:10</a>): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 1), beneficence is an effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the inferior.
+                     Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels, because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior
+                     in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should
+                     extend to all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of
+                     virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound
+                     to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared
+                     in mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each individual,
+                     at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well
+                     as for the faithful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the maintenance
+                     of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this would be to do evil rather than good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from
+                     doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if
+                     they be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like distress, unless this be according to the order of
+                     justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q31_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q31_A3-p0.1">Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q31_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv">Lk. 14:12</a>): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most
+                     closely united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us, but preferably
+                     to strangers and to those who are in want: hence the text goes on:
+                     "But, when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help
+                     a fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe. Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound
+                     to give the preference to those who are most closely united to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we should pay what is due before conferring gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who have
+                     been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his children, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q31_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A9.html">Q[26], A[9]</a>). Yet a man ought to be more beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the children to lay up for the parents," according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q31_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14.</a> Therefore we are not bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason
+                     of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that
+                     every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats
+                     most what is next to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first and most plentifully on the substances
+                     which are nearest to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of
+                     benefits is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely
+                     connected with us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p8"> Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to the various matters in which men are engaged together;
+                     (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters, that of the faithful
+                     is in spiritual matters, and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways according to these various
+                     connections, because we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in
+                     which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements
+                     of time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity,
+                     rather than one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they may
+                     invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought
+                     rather to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be understood that, other things being equal, one
+                     ought to succor those rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two,
+                     one be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, by any general rule, which of
+                     them we ought to help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as well as of connection: and the matter
+                     requires the judgment of a prudent man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The common good of many is more Godlike than the good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger
+                     even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage together
+                     in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him
+                     not as a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as
+                     a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be preferred to one who is a blood relation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as belonging
+                     to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because
+                     he has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to
+                     pay what he owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless
+                     perchance the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take another's property in order to relieve the one who
+                     is in need. Yet, again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in which case, however, the claims on
+                     either side would have to be weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would take into consideration,
+                     because, on account of the different particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down
+                     a
+                     general rule.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p12"> The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing
+                     may be due, not because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity, as in the case of benefits received
+                     gratis. Now no benefactor confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: wherefore in paying back
+                     benefits received, we should give the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the other side,
+                     there be such weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state.
+                     In other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit received; and here again no general rule can laid down.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to honor
+                     their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents,
+                     to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have
+                     received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q31_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q31_A4-p0.1">Whether beneficence is a special virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make
+                     men virtuous (Ethic. i 9,13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q31_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.44" target="asv">Mat. 4:44</a>): "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Therefore beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on
+                     our neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore beneficence is a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according
+                     to the various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue from charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The internal and the external act do not require different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as external
+                     and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of goodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity,
+                     so neither is beneficence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtues differ according to the different aspects of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of
+                     beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect of good, as explained above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q31_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q31_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Wherefore beneficence is not a distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not
+                     of habits, but of acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to
+                     love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things
+                     under certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to certain special virtues or vices, and in this way
+                     also there are various kinds of benefits.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p9"> Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q31_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q30_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q32" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q32-p0.1">OF ALMSDEEDS (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p2"> We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p3"> (1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p4"> (2) Of the different kinds of alms;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p5"> (3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p6"> (4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p7"> (5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p8"> (6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p9"> (7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p10"> (8) Who can give alms?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p11"> (9) To whom should we give alms?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q32-p12"> (10) How should alms be given ?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A1-p0.1">Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity. For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible
+                     to give alms without having charity, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>: "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving
+                     is not an act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv"> Dan. 4:24</a>: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of justice and not
+                     of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.16" target="asv"> Heb. 13:16</a>: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is not an
+                     act of charity, but of religion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, l) that to give for a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially
+                     true of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiJohn.3.17" target="asv">2 Jn. 3:17</a>: "He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how
+                     doth the charity of God abide in him?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> External acts belong to that virtue which regards the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to relieve
+                     one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being "a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion
+                     and for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q32_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html">Q[30], AA[1]</a>,2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its
+                     very name, for in Greek {eleemosyne} it is derived from having mercy {eleein} even as the Latin "miseratio" is. And since
+                     mercy is an effect of charity, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q32_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>, A[3], OBJ[3] ), it follows that almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an act
+                     of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural
+                     light of reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak of a thing being an act of justice formally,
+                     and thus an act of justice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e.
+                     with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be without the virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p9"> Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and
+                     readiness, and altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it
+                     to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for
+                     the one in distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far as it is directed to placate God, it has the
+                     character of a sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p11"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from excessive
+                     love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to them more than one ought.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A2-p0.1">Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds, namely,
+                     to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom
+                     the captive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the following verse: "To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom,
+                     clothe, harbor or bury."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p3"> Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful,
+                     to reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all
+                     contained in the following verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and to pray," yet so that counsel includes
+                     both advice and instruction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p4"> And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor.
+                     But a dead man profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have spoken truly when He said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>): "Be not afraid of them who kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." [*The quotation is from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.4" target="asv"> Lk. 12:4.</a>] This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating the works of mercy, made no
+                     mention of the burial of the dead (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.35" target="asv">Mat. 25:35,36</a>). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q32_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the purpose of giving alms is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs of human life other than those mentioned
+                     above, for instance, a blind man needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs riches. Therefore these
+                     almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of
+                     mercy. Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect. But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter
+                     or other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is ignorant of what he knows himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath
+                     abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share
+                     his skill and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned
+                     for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with him the cause
+                     of the poor." Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of those things whereof men have abundance
+                     or insufficiency.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably taken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect the
+                     soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others affect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal
+                     need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is either a common need in respect of
+                     things needed by all, or it is a special need occurring through some accident
+                     supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by
+                     solid food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have "to feed the hungry"; while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz.
+                     thirst, and in respect of this we have "to give drink to the thirsty." The common need with regard to external help is twofold;
+                     one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have "to clothe the naked": while the other is in respect of a dwelling
+                     place, and as to this we have "to harbor the harborless." Again if the need be special, it is either the result of an internal
+                     cause, like sickness, and then we have "to visit the sick," or it results from an external cause, and then we have "to ransom
+                     the captive." After this life we give "burial to the dead."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p10"> In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this
+                     respect we have "prayer," whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human assistance, and this in three ways.
+                     First, in order to relieve a deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in the speculative intellect,
+                     the remedy is applied by "instructing," and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by
+                     "counselling." Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the appetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which
+                     is remedied by "comforting." Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may be the subject of a threefold
+                     consideration. First, in respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate will, and thus the remedy
+                     takes the form of "reproof." Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be committed against
+                     ourselves, we apply the remedy by "pardoning the injury," while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is not
+                     in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly, in respect of the result of the inordinate act,
+                     on account of which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy
+                     is applied by "bearing with him," especially with regard to those who sin out of weakness, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15.1" target="asv"> Rom.
+                        15:1
+                     </a>: "We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the weak," and not only as regards their being infirm and consequently
+                     troublesome on account of their unruly actions, but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.2" target="asv"> Gal. 6:2</a>: "Bear ye one another's burdens."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord said
+                     that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do"; and for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead
+                     with the other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased
+                     what is done with his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose respect
+                     he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a man's fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness
+                     which kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and
+                     those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to
+                     support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to
+                     an extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely
+                     for the purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason for
+                     special mention of this particular need.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to
+                     the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.6" target="asv"> Prov. 27:6</a>: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses of an enemy."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to supply
+                     this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even
+                     as in other virtuous acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A3-p0.1">Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to
+                     one who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised because it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which
+                     is relieved by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal
+                     alms are of more account.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv">Lk. 14:12</a>): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again.
+                     Now there is always compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another, profits thereby, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.34.13" target="asv"> Ps. 34:13</a>: "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom: and he
+                     who teaches another, makes progress in knowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal almsdeeds
+                     are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is comforted by it: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.20" target="asv">Job 31:20</a>): "If his sides have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): "The bowels of the saints have been refreshed
+                     by thee, brother." Now a corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds
+                     are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.42" target="asv">Mat. 5:42</a>): "You should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what another asks you must not lose
+                     sight of the claims of justice, and send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than what is asked for,
+                     if you reprove him that asks unjustly." Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore
+                     spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place,
+                     for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal
+                     gift, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.4.2" target="asv"> Prov. 4:2</a>: "I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law." Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more
+                     excellent than the body, wherefore,
+                     even as a man in looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after his
+                     neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because
+                     spiritual acts are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p7"> Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for
+                     instance, a man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy
+                     man "money is better than philosophy," although the latter is better simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is better to give to one who is in greater want, other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and
+                     is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is thus in the case in point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not
+                     detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that "the less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and
+                     thus it is with spiritual almsdeeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p10"> Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not detract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it
+                     rests when it is inordinate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A4-p0.1">Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods exceed
+                     corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore
+                     one ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
+                     the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.3" target="asv">Lk. 21:3</a>) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all." Therefore
+                     bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:18</a>): "The alms of a man . . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways. First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely
+                     a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to
+                     their cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his neighbor, and in this respect they bring
+                     forth a spiritual fruit, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.29.13" target="asv">Ecclus. 29:13, 14</a>: "Lose thy money for thy brother . .
+                     . place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p7"> Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is
+                     succored by a corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above text goes on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.29.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 29:15</a>): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their substance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things infinitely
+                     surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a spiritual fruit through the love of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence corporal
+                     almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A5-p0.1">Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving
+                     is a matter of counsel, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv"> Dan. 4:24</a>: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins with alms." Therefore almsgiving
+                     is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore
+                     it is lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because positive
+                     precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point
+                     to some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an alms. But it does not appear how this can be so,
+                     because it can always be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some
+                     other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore
+                     it seems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
+                     Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for omitting
+                     to give alms, as is clear from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv"> Mat. 25:41-43.</a> Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter
+                     of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his
+                     well-doers, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.18" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:18</a>: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth." And in order to be a person's well-wisher and well-doer,
+                     we ought to succor his needs:
+                     this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p8"> Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far
+                     as it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right reason demands that we should
+                     take into consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the part of the
+                     giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.11.41" target="asv"> Lk. 11:41</a>: "That which
+                     remaineth, give alms." This surplus is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to
+                     the individual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression "necessary to the
+                     person" [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking the word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each
+                     one must first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge, and afterwards with what remains
+                     relieve the needs of others. Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the upkeep of one's own
+                     body, and afterwards yields the residue for the formation of another by the power of generation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p9"> On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms:
+                     yet since it is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who are in need,
+                     but only those who could not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of Ambrose apply, "Feed him
+                     that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence
+                     the words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose
+                     need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did
+                     not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not
+                     a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone
+                     but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super
+                     Luc. xii, 18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming from God, is He unjust because He apportions
+                     them unequally? Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may
+                     have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked
+                     man's cloak that you have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot, the money of the needy that you
+                     have buried underground: and so you injure as many as you might help." Ambrose expresses himself in the same way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is evident
+                     and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
+                     which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with probability. Nor need he consider every case that may
+                     possibly occur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which
+                     Our Lord forbade us to do (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.34" target="asv">Mat. 6:34</a>), but he should judge what is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle interpret
+                     it (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A5-p13.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and
+                     of that which is to come," and he says this because the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou
+                     mayest be longlived upon the land"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A5-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.12" target="asv">Ex. 20:12</a>): and dutifulness comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*"Pietas," whence our English word "Piety." Cf. also inf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q32_A5-p13.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A2.html"> Q[101], A[2]</a>.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A6-p0.1">Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only
+                     as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order
+                     of charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity requires that a man should love himself
+                     more than his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he
+                     needed, in order to succor his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to
+                     the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done. Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:8</a>): "If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than
+                     an infidel." Now if a man gives of what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the care he should
+                     have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv">Mat. 19:21</a>): "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Now he that gives all he has to the poor, gives
+                     not only what he needs not, but also what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms
+                     out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and
+                     had merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he would be throwing away his life
+                     and that of others if he were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I
+                     say this without prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might
+                     help a great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to endanger one's life
+                     and the lives of those who are under our charge for the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to be preferred
+                     to one's own.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p7"> Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it live in keeping with his social station, as regards
+                     either himself or those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not an invariable quantity, for one might
+                     add much more to a man's property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much from him, and he
+                     would still have sufficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to
+                     give alms of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not of precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive
+                     oneself of one's own, in order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be insufficient for one to live
+                     in keeping with one's station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly. There are, however,
+                     three exceptions to the above rule. The first is when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering religion,
+                     for then he gives away all his possessions for Christ's sake, and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself to another
+                     state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of, though it be required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless
+                     easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme indigence
+                     in an individual, or great need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the
+                     requirements of one's station, in order to provide for a greater need.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p8"> The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A7-p0.1">Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.9" target="asv">Lk. 16:9</a>): "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity." Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is lawful to make unto oneself
+                     spiritual friends by giving alms out of ill-gotten riches.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.18" target="asv">Dt. 23:18</a>) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: "Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of .
+                     . . thy God." In like manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take
+                     such like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to
+                     give." And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of
+                     such gains it is lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than
+                     to commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who is in extreme need, as appears from the words of
+                     Ambrose who says (Cf. Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken): "Feed him that dies of hunger, if
+                     thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give
+                     alms of ill-gotten goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to
+                     hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from interest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense
+                     the Body of Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it
+                     is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury,
+                     and of such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p7"> Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it, and yet he may not return it to the person from whom
+                     he received it, because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly. This happens in simony, wherein both giver
+                     and receiver contravene the justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the giver, but by giving alms.
+                     The same applies to all similar cases of illegal giving and receiving.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p8"> Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful, but because it is the outcome of something unlawful,
+                     as in the case of a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so called, because the practice of whoredom
+                     is filthy and against the Law of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the money. Consequently
+                     it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's property and
+                     give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended.
+                     Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest. Ev. ii, 34, because "riches are not unjust save for
+                     those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according to
+                     Ambrose in his commentary on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.9" target="asv"> Lk. 16:9, </a> "Make unto yourselves friends," etc., "He calls mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various allurements
+                     of wealth." Or, because "among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others
+                     unjustly, although you know nothing about it," as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled
+                     riches "of iniquity," i.e., of "inequality," because they are not
+                     distributed equally among all, one being in need, and another in affluence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We have already explained how alms may be given out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made
+                     therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give
+                     alms out of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid, indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the
+                     profits from games of chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being
+                     contrary to the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth,
+                     or when a man, with the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and wins from him by cheating. In
+                     these cases he is bound to restitution, and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there would seem to
+                     be something unlawful as being against the positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however,
+                     a
+                     civil law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through desuetude,
+                     it follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary
+                     custom prevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to restitution, because
+                     the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive law
+                     is
+                     in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in alms.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things are common property in a case of extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another's goods
+                     in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
+                     what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something if there be no other way of succoring the one who is
+                     in need. If however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner's
+                     consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A8-p0.1">Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one who is under another's power can give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to
+                     whom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion,
+                     for as Ambrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas]
+                     says on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>: "'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is
+                     profitable to all things': The sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by all," and the most creditable
+                     way of doing this is to give alms. Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wife is under her husband's power (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>). But a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms
+                     without the knowledge of her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of the Romans were so entirely different from
+                     ours that "sponsus" is no longer accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."] Therefore a person is not prevented
+                     from giving alms,
+                     by being under another's power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subjection of children to their parents is founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.1" target="asv">Eph. 6:1</a>): "Children, obey your parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children may give alms out of their parents' property. For
+                     it is their own, since they are the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it seems that much more
+                     can they use it in giving alms so as to profit their souls. Therefore those who are
+                     under another's power can give alms.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, servants are under their master's power, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.9" target="asv"> Titus 2:9</a>: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters." Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and
+                     this would be especially the case if they gave alms for them. Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Alms should not be given out of another's property; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor
+                     as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of
+                     another's property. Therefore those who are under another's power cannot give alms.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Anyone who is under another's power must, as such, be ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural
+                     order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior
+                     is subject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior's permission.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p8"> Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of anything in respect of which he is subject to that other,
+                     except in so far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has something in respect of which he is not under
+                     the power of his superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being independent in respect of that particular
+                     thing, and he can give alms therefrom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in
+                     accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot
+                     give alms without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some probable reason: except in a case of extreme
+                     necessity, when it would be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms.
+                     Nor does it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De Eccles. Dogm. lxxi, "it is a good thing to give
+                     one's property to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in order to follow Christ, and being
+                     freed from care, to be needy with Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property
+                     be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's
+                     permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought
+                     not to give alms without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in
+                     cases of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply. For though the wife be her husband's equal in
+                     the marriage act, yet in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:3</a>). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her mother's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What belongs to the children belongs also to the father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small quantity
+                     that one may presume the father to be willing: unless, perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular
+                     property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A8-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A9-p0.1">Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.12.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 12:4</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A9-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.12.6" target="asv">6</a>): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do good to the humble and give not to the ungodly." Now it happens
+                     sometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference
+                     to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal reward in return, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.18" target="asv"> Mat. 6:18</a>: "And thy Father Who seeth in secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly by the alms which are given
+                     to the saints, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A9-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.9" target="asv"> Lk. 16:9</a>: "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings,
+                     which passage Augustine expounds
+                     (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that shall be received
+                     by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy
+                     persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not
+                     bound to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:8</a>): "If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than
+                     an infidel."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those
+                     who are more closely united to us." Nevertheless in this matter we must employ discretion, according to the various degrees
+                     of connection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who
+                     is more useful to the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us,
+                     especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in
+                     very urgent need.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect
+                     an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we
+                     should, in preference, help those who are more closely connected with us. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It
+                     is with commendable liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to
+                     be in need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family, who would be ashamed to beg help from others."
+                     Secondly, almsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient, who prays for the giver, and it
+                     is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of comparison,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q32_A9-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html">Q[30], AA[1]</a>,2), so too, properly speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's person; thus when a man is appointed
+                     to distribute alms, he can take something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when he gives to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A9-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q32_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q32_A10-p0.1">Whether alms should be given in abundance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely
+                     connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose
+                     says (De Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out
+                     by degrees." But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms should not be given in abundance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A10-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.8.13" target="asv">2 Cor. 8:13</a>): "Not that others should be eased," i.e. should live on you without working themselves, "and you burthened," i.e. impoverished.
+                     But this would be the result if alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms abundantly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.93" target="asv">Tob. 4:93</a>): "If thou have much, give abundantly."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that
+                     which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.3" target="asv">Lk. 21:3,4</a>) commended the widow because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had." Nevertheless those conditions must be
+                     observed which were laid down when we spoke of giving alms out of one's
+                     necessary goods 
+                     <a id="SS_Q32_A10-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A9.html">(A[9])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p7"> On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways; first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this
+                     sense it is praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and
+                     it would be better to give to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A10-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>): "If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which words a gloss comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful
+                     in giving alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding the needs of the recipient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
+                     lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus
+                     who slew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household cares might keep him back" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q32_A10-p9.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:21</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the passage quoted the words, "not that others should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which surpasses
+                     the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief. Nevertheless
+                     we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily
+                     nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De
+                     Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should take into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes
+                     the shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of
+                     his own."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p11"> With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer to abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss
+                     says on the same passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give in abundance, but because he fears for the
+                     weak, and he admonishes them so to give that they lack not for themselves."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q32_A10-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q31_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q33" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q33-p0.1">OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p2"> We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p3"> (1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p4"> (2) Whether it is a matter of precept?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p5"> (3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p6"> (4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p7"> (5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p8"> (6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through being corrected?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p9"> (7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q33-p10"> (8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q33_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q33_A1-p0.1">Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of charity. For a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.15" target="asv"> Mat. 18:15, </a> "If thy brother shall offend against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal for justice." But justice
+                     is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence,
+                     for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity,
+                     but of prudence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.2" target="asv"> Gal. 6:2</a>: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems
+                     that the correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him, is not an act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be considered
+                     in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing
+                     them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by that man's sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p7"> Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the
+                     sinner himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to
+                     do away with anyone's evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's good is an act of charity, whereby
+                     we wish and do our friend well. Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because thereby we
+                     drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss,
+                     or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of external
+                     things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving
+                     of an external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered
+                     as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard
+                     the rectitude of justice between one man and another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it takes
+                     justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html">Q[58] , A[5]</a>), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.4" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:4</a>), through being contrary to justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel
+                     and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we perform some action aright which is directed to the end
+                     of some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since,
+                     then, the admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the
+                     removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity,
+                     which virtue commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, which executes and directs the action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with
+                     a sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives
+                     to make him do better.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q33_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q33_A2-p0.1">Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according
+                     to the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed be he who says that God has commanded any. thing impossible."
+                     Now it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv">Eccles. 7:14</a>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter
+                     of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not
+                     come under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin, which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are
+                     found to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "Not only those of low degree, but also those
+                     of high position, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, not by the claims of charity." Therefore fraternal
+                     correction is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due. If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it
+                     is due to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man owes anyone a material due, such as the payment
+                     of a sum of money, he must not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek him out, that he may pay him his
+                     due. Hence we should have to go seeking for those who need correction, in order that we might
+                     correct them; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great number of sinners, for whose correction one man
+                     could not suffice, and because religious would have to leave the cloister in order to reprove men, which would be unbecoming.
+                     Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him." But this would not
+                     be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept. Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid
+                     sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good,
+                     no matter how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature they are connected with an evil end, as stated
+                     in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the other
+                     hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due circumstances, which are requisite in order that an
+                     act be virtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And since the disposition of whatever is
+                     directed to the end depends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect
+                     of the end, which in this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous act, as
+                     entirely takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a
+                     virtuous act be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is
+                     not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not contrary
+                     to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed
+                     to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we have
+                     to correct our erring brother at all places and times.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his power.
+                     Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we ignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide
+                     our feelings, that we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with
+                     the hope of God's help.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A5.html">Q[32], A[5]</a>, ad 4), all the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept about the honor due to parents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p11"> First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man
+                     refrains from chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable time for so doing, or because he fears lest,
+                     if he does so, they may become worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who are weak and need to be
+                     instructed in a life of goodness and virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be counselled by
+                     charity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p12"> Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in
+                     the same passage) "one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain or death; provided, however, that
+                     the mind is so dominated by such things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity." This would seem to be the
+                     case when a man reckons that he might probably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, through
+                     fear or covetousness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p13"> Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults,
+                     and yet not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw him from sin, he would still forbear from so doing,
+                     through fear or covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to these things. It is in this way that
+                     holy men sometimes omit to correct wrongdoers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without
+                     waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor
+                     should seek him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that has spiritual charge of some person is bound
+                     to seek him out, in order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not
+                     bound to seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any certain person, but to all our neighbors in general,
+                     whether those favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow them when the opportunity occurs; because,
+                     as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. For this reason he says (De Verb.
+                     Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns us not to be listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by being on the
+                     lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting what we see": else we should become spies on the lives of others, which
+                     is against the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.19" target="asv"> Prov. 24:19</a>: "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest." It is evident from this that
+                     there is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q33_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q33_A3-p0.1">Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let priests
+                     endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others
+                     were usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in
+                     temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual
+                     matters, i.e. to prelates.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior
+                     is moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates
+                     alone to correct inferiors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam Sacerdotes): "Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be most solicitous
+                     for those who perish, so that their reproof may either correct their sinful ways. or, if they be incorrigible, cut them off
+                     from the Church."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, correction is twofold. One is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an erring brother by means
+                     of a simple warning: such like correction belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p7"> But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing the common good, which is procured not only by warning
+                     one's brother, but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear, desist from sin. Such a correction belongs
+                     only to prelates, whose business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of punishments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as regards that fraternal correction which is common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine says
+                     (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "for just as a man ought to bestow temporal favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so
+                     too ought he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual
+                     care." Therefore Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction
+                     concerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted
+                     with a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's wrong-doing, is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the physical order certain things act mutually on one another, through being in some respect higher than one another,
+                     in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can correct
+                     another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter wherein the other sins, though he is not his superior simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q33_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q33_A4-p0.1">Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no man is bound to correct his prelate. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.12" target="asv">Ex. 19:12</a>): "The beast that shall touch the mount shall be stoned," [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the mount, dying he shall die.']
+                     and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.6.7" target="asv">2 Kings 6:7</a>) it is related that the Lord struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our prelates. Therefore prelates
+                     should not be corrected by their subjects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.11" target="asv"> Gal. 2:11, </a> "I withstood him to the face," adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his prelate, he ought not
+                     to correct him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one ought not to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks
+                     better of oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself than of one's prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct
+                     one's prelate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not only to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position among you,
+                     is therefore in greater danger." But fraternal correction is a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A subject is not competent to administer to his prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the coercive nature
+                     of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is an act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of
+                     any person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be something in that person which requires correction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p7"> Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever is contained under the object of that power or habit:
+                     thus vision extends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since, however, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by
+                     due circumstances, it follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do so in a becoming manner, not with impudence
+                     and harshness, but with gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.1" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:1</a>):
+                     "An ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father." Wherefore Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii),
+                     for rebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of the church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a subject touches his prelate inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he speaks
+                     ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of those who touched the mount and the ark.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter then,
+                     unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of the faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately
+                     and respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17) tells them to admonish their prelate: "Say to Archippus:
+                     Fulfil thy ministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received
+                     in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.' Cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.4.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 4:5</a>]." It must be observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought to rebuke his prelate even publicly.
+                     Hence Paul, who was Peter's subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of scandal concerning faith,
+                     and, as the gloss of Augustine says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.11" target="asv"> Gal. 2:11, </a> "Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they should happen to stray from the straight path, they
+                     should not disdain to be reproved by their subjects."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To presume oneself to be simply better than one's prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no presumption
+                     in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in this life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that
+                     when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers
+                     his help to one who, "being in the higher position among you, is therefore in
+                     greater danger," as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q33_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q33_A5-p0.1">Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having committed
+                     a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it seems that a man ought not to forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has committed a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from
+                     administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a sin, a man is hindered from reproving
+                     his brother, there will be none to reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable: therefore the former
+                     is also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that is subject to vice should not correct the vices of others." Again it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.1" target="asv">Rom. 2:1</a>): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[3], ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right judgment.
+                     Now sin, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">FS, Q[85], AA[1]</a>,2), does not destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner's reason of all right judgment, and in this respect he
+                     may be competent to find fault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin proves somewhat of a hindrance
+                     to this correction, for
+                     three reasons. First because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke another; and especially is he unworthy to
+                     correct another for a lesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, "Why seest thou the
+                     mote?" etc. (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.3" target="asv">Mat. 7:3</a>): "He is speaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal sin, have no patience with the lesser sins of
+                     their brethren."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p7"> Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin
+                     be well known, because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more for the sake of ostentation. Hence the
+                     words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.4" target="asv"> Mat. 7:4, </a> "How sayest thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to
+                     St. John Chrysostom] thus: "That is---'With what object?' Out of charity,
+                     think you, that you may save your neighbor?" No, "because you would look after your own salvation first. What you want is,
+                     not to save others, but to hide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for your knowledge."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p8"> Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart,
+                     sets himself above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as though he himself were just man. Hence
+                     Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of others is the duty of good and kindly men: when
+                     a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke is the latter's acquittal." And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
+                     Monte ii, 19): "When we have to find fault with anyone, we should think whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then
+                     we must remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that we once had it on our conscience, but have it
+                     no longer: and then we should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our reproof may be the outcome, not of
+                     hatred, but of pity. But if we find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but groan with him, and invite
+                     him
+                     to repent with us." It follows from this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not sin, nor does he
+                     bring a further condemnation on himself, although thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his brother's
+                     or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p9"> Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q33_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q33_A6-p0.1">Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he become worse?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not to forbear from correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is weakness
+                     of the soul, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.3" target="asv"> Ps. 6:3</a>: "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease to take care of him,
+                     even if he be fractious or contemptuous, because then the danger is greater, as in the case of madmen. Much more, therefore
+                     should one correct a sinner, no matter
+                     how badly he takes it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be foregone on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital
+                     truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it seems that it should not be foregone for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.8" target="asv">Rom. 3:8</a>) we should not do evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should not be omitted lest evil befall.
+                     Now fraternal correction is a good thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person corrected become worse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.9.8" target="asv">Prov. 9:8</a>): "Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee," where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear lest the scorner insult you when you
+                     rebuke him: rather should you bear in mind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore one ought to forego
+                     fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may make a man worse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A3.html">(A[3])</a> the correction of the wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed to the common good, has coercive
+                     force. Such correction should not be omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is unwilling to amend
+                     his ways of his own accord, he should be made to cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible, the
+                     common good is safeguarded in this way,
+                     since the order of justice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an example of. Hence a judge does not desist
+                     from pronouncing sentence of condemnation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his friends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p7"> The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes.
+                     Consequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction
+                     should be foregone, because the means should be regulated according to the requirements of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with the correction
+                     administered by prelates, which has coercive power, but not with simple fraternal correction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far
+                     as it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse
+                     through it, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whatever is directed to end, becomes good through being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction hinders
+                     the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer good, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not
+                     omitted lest evil should befall.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q33_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q33_A7-p0.1">Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private admonition should precede denunciation?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction does not demand that a private admonition should precede denunciation.
+                     For, in works of charity, we should above all follow the example of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.1" target="asv"> Eph. 5:1,2</a>: "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children, and walk in love." Now God sometimes punishes a man for a sin, without previously
+                     warning him in secret. Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private admonition
+                     to precede denunciation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the commandments
+                     of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous admonition
+                     in private. Thus we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.37.2" target="asv">Gn. 37:2</a>) that "Joseph accused his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.4" target="asv">Acts 5:4</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.9" target="asv">9</a>) that Peter publicly denounced Ananias
+                     and Saphira who had secretly "by fraud kept back the price of the land," without beforehand admonishing them in private: nor
+                     do we read that Our Lord admonished Judas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not require that secret
+                     admonition should precede public denunciation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce. Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without
+                     previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing
+                     else need precede accusation except inscription." [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ
+                     of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound
+                     himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved
+                     guilty.] Therefore it seems that the precept does not require that a secret admonition should precede public denunciation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ.
+                     Now it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one for a fault, without any previous secret admonition.
+                     Therefore it seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in
+                     particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to
+                     tell them this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not require secret admonition before public
+                     denunciation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the words, "Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.15" target="asv">Mat. 18:15</a>): "Aiming at his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he might begin to defend his sin; and him
+                     whom you thought to make a better man, you make worse." Now we are bound by the precept of charity to beware lest our brother
+                     become worse. Therefore the order of fraternal correction comes under the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or
+                     secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for the sinner, that he may become better, but also for
+                     others, who know of his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be denounced in public, according to
+                     the saying of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.20" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:20</a>): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest
+                     also may have fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p9"> On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord seem to apply (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.15" target="asv">Mat. 18:15</a>): "If thy brother shall offend against thee," etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others, he no longer
+                     sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he 'disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even
+                     at his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our
+                     neighbor either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly to betray his country to its enemies,
+                     or when a heretic secretly turns other men away from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins not only against
+                     you in particular, but also against others, it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent him
+                     doing such harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be prevented by admonishing him
+                     secretly. On the other hand there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned against, either because
+                     he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least because he alone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be to succor
+                     our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off
+                     a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life of
+                     the whole body, so too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if possible, so amend him as regards his conscience,
+                     that he keep his good name.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p10"> For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not only in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses,
+                     if he lose his good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are restrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor,
+                     so that when a man finds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome says on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.15" target="asv">Mat. 18:15</a>: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke him in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become shameless
+                     or
+                     unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother's good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the
+                     dishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): "When a few of those who bear
+                     a name for holiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating
+                     it to make it believed of all": and also because when one man's sin is made public others are incited to sin likewise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p11"> Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name, Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our
+                     brother and so deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his good name. Therefore it is evident that
+                     the precept requires a secret admonition to precede public denunciation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the judgment
+                     of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration,
+                     either while they wake or while they sleep, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Job.33.15" target="asv"> Job 33:15-17</a>: "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men . . . then He openeth the ears of men,
+                     and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a man from the things he is doing."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did
+                     not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting
+                     as God's executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren,
+                     though Scripture does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard
+                     to his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused "his brethren."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When there is danger to a great number of people, those words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not
+                     sin against thee alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are about little faults which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore they
+                     are reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a nature as
+                     to injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord's precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine precept, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A7-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.29" target="asv"> Acts 5:29</a>: "We ought to obey God rather then men." Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything that he knows to need
+                     correction, the command rightly understood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal correction, whether the command
+                     be addressed to all in general, or to some particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate
+                     were to issue a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and
+                     the one obeying him, as disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be obeyed, because a prelate is not the
+                     judge of secret things, but God alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of hidden matters, except
+                     in so far as they are made known through certain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can command
+                     just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A7-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q33_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q33_A8-p0.1">Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought forward?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that before the public denunciation witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to
+                     be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray his brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine
+                     says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a brother's sin to others. Therefore in the
+                     case of secret sins one ought not to bring witnesses forward before the public
+                     denunciation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore
+                     ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our brother.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something. But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it
+                     is useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing it to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the
+                     superior." Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought
+                     forward before the public denunciation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q33_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.16" target="asv">Mat. 18:16</a>): "Take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The right way to go from one extreme to another is to pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning of
+                     fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects another between this one and himself alone, while He wished the
+                     end to be public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses
+                     should be placed between the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin be
+                     indicated to a few, who will be of use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be amended without dishonoring him before
+                     the public.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have understood the order of fraternal correction to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly,
+                     and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no
+                     further in the matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several by various signs, we ought to prosecute
+                     the matter, according to Our Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine
+                     says in his Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will cause a worse corruption in the heart." Wherefore
+                     we must say otherwise that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times, as long as there is probable hope
+                     of his amendment, we must continue to admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with any probability that
+                     the secret admonition is of no avail, we must take further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses,
+                     unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would not conduce to our brother's amendment, and that he would become worse:
+                     because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from correcting him, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q33_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A6.html">(A[6])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin: yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin. Hence
+                     the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First, to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly,
+                     to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (in his Rule): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked
+                     his brother, has done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as
+                     the prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than others, but not that it is to be told him as to the
+                     Church, i.e. as holding the position of judge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q33_A8-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q32_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q34" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q34-p0.1">OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p2"> We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed
+                  to the joy of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4) offense and scandal, which are contrary to
+                  beneficence and fraternal correction.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p4"> (1) Whether it is possible to hate God?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p5"> (2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p6"> (3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p7"> (4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p8"> (5) Whether it is a capital sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q34-p9"> (6) From what capital sin does it arise?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q34_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q34_A1-p0.1">Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object
+                     of love and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore He is hated by none.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Apocryphal books of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Esdras 4:36</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">39</a> it is written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well like of her works." Now God is the very truth
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A1-p3.3" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv"> Jn. 14:6.</a> Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore
+                     none can hate Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.73.23" target="asv">Ps. 73:23</a>): "The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.15.24" target="asv">Jn. 15:24</a>): "But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A1.html">FS, Q[29], A[1]</a>), hatred is a movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save by something apprehended. Now God can
+                     be apprehended by man in two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly, in His effects, when, to
+                     wit, "the invisible things" of God . . . "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). Now God in His
+                     Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate---for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible for one
+                     who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p7"> Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary to the human will, since "to be, to live, to understand,"
+                     which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider
+                     Him as the Author of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction
+                     of punishment, and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant to a
+                     will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look
+                     upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of those who see God's Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among
+                     which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to
+                     be like God, Who is Being itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q34_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q34_A2-p0.1">Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost,
+                     since it cannot be forgiven, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.32" target="asv"> Mat. 12:32.</a> Now hatred of God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as may be seen from what has been
+                     said above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>). Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further
+                     away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief
+                     is graver than the sin of hatred against God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which
+                     is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin. Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The best is opposite to the worst, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the love
+                     of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is man's worst sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>): and this aversion would not have the character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a
+                     voluntary aversion from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p7"> Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly.
+                     For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God,
+                     his will is directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns away from God, not directly,
+                     but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God
+                     is connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of
+                     God is more grievous than other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good things,
+                     even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver
+                     of all good things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God
+                     is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy
+                     Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it
+                     is universally found in every kind of that sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes
+                     voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its
+                     sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so
+                     hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on them,
+                     and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands
+                     us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments,
+                     is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most grievous sin.
+                     Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked
+                     to hate justice than, not to have done it."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q34_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q34_A3-p0.1">Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.8" target="asv"> Prov. 8:8</a>: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them." Now, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.26" target="asv">Lk. 14:26</a>): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore hatred of one's neighbor
+                     is not always a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.30" target="asv">Rom. 1:30</a>): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is possible to hate certain people without committing a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a "wandering away from what is according to nature," according to Damascene
+                     (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.
+                     Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:9</a>): "He that . . . hateth his brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore there cannot be hatred of
+                     one's neighbor without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html">FS, Q[29], A[2]</a>); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect
+                     of what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of what he has of himself and from the
+                     devil, i.e. in respect of sin and lack of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p7"> Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we
+                     cannot hate our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that we hate the fault
+                     and the lack of good in him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil. Consequently the hatred
+                     of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is always sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the commandment of God (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.12" target="asv">Ex. 20:12</a>) we must honor our parents---as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle
+                     to our attaining the perfection of Divine justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should
+                     love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect
+                     we should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q34_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q34_A4-p0.1">Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.15" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:15</a>): "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred
+                     is also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable
+                     to love. Therefore hatred is the worst.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man
+                     hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p5"> Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.19" target="asv"> Mat. 5:19, </a> "He that shall break one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt
+                     not commit adultery, count for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the other hand the
+                     commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great
+                     in their reward, but little in the transgression." Now hatred is an internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred
+                     of one's brother is a less grievous sin than murder.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins, secondly
+                     by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external
+                     actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is
+                     the root of sin, so that if a man's outward actions were to be inordinate, without any
+                     disorder in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for
+                     justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his inward
+                     hatred.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p7"> On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred.
+                     This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q34_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q34_A5-p0.1">Whether hatred is a capital sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among
+                     the virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of our passions, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q34_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv"> Rom. 7:5</a>: "The passions of sins . . . did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other passions of the soul
+                     seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A5-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">FS, Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned one of the capital sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should
+                     be reckoned a capital sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the seven capital sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is contrary to man's nature, in as much
+                     as he is a rational animal: and when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is corrupted little
+                     by little. Consequently it must first of all fail in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in
+                     that which is most in accordance with
+                     its nature, since what is first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural
+                     to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good. Wherefore hatred,
+                     which is opposed to this love, is not the first but the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and therefore
+                     it is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its nature."
+                     Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned
+                     the foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first among the vices, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of one's natural
+                     good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of
+                     an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of such
+                     an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is, however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
+                     namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of
+                     such an evil must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is
+                     not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q34_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q34_A6-p0.1">Whether hatred arises from envy?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow,
+                     for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate. Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A6-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html"> Q[26], A[2]</a>). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do
+                     not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet.
+                     ii). Therefore hatred does not
+                     arise from envy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows
+                     into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy cometh hatred."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q34_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, hatred of his neighbor is a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has
+                     for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally
+                     an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states
+                     (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love
+                     arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as
+                     much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for
+                     this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our
+                     neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of circular
+                     movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement,
+                     love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking
+                     pleasure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes
+                     love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love and hatred are essentially different, for the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore love
+                     is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place
+                     in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q34_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q34_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that God is not an object of hatred, except in so far as He is considered in relation to
+                     His effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our
+                     neighbor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred towards God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger
+                     and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and
+                     therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's
+                     evil according to a certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect
+                     of vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil,
+                     which desire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the
+                     object, but dispositively by anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q34_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q33_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q35" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q35-p0.1">OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q35-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q35-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary
+                  is sloth, or about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q35-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q35-p4"> (1) Whether sloth is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q35-p5"> (2) Whether it is a special vice?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q35-p6"> (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q35-p7"> (4) Whether it is a capital sin?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q35_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q35_A1-p0.1">Whether sloth is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as
+                     we stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html">FS, Q[35], A[8]</a> ). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast.
+                     x, [*De Institutione Caeobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent
+                     fever, and inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular and fixed intervals." Therefore sloth is
+                     not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says
+                     (De Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that
+                     other monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we dwell in": all of which seems to point
+                     to humility. Therefore sloth is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q35_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.21.2" target="asv"> Ecclus. 21:2</a>: "Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent." Now Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught
+                     of sloth is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance." Therefore sloth is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q35_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 6:26</a>): "Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved [acedieris] with her bands." Therefore
+                     sloth is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that
+                     he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a
+                     gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q35_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.106.18" target="asv"> Ps. 106:18, </a> "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
+                     which neglects to begin good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p8"> Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about
+                     that which is apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that which
+                     seems to be good but is, in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about spiritual good
+                     is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses
+                     man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q35_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:7</a>) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with overmuch sorrow."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p9"> Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in
+                     itself and in point of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil movement of the appetite, as appears
+                     from what has been said above (Q[10], A[2]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html">FS, Q[74], A[4]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as
+                     they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good. Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise
+                     nor for blame: whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil,
+                     call for blame. It is in this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The passions of the sensitive appetite may either be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And since
+                     the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit
+                     some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more insistent, through certain bodily transmutations
+                     occurring at certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves,
+                     dispose one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the
+                     want of food, and to be parched by the sun's heat.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is a sign of humility if a man does not think too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man contemns
+                     the good things he has received from God, this, far from being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such
+                     like contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think
+                     much of the goods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have
+                     received ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance; by flight
+                     when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as in lust; for which reason it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q35_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>): "Fly fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises
+                     from some trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because
+                     the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and forthwith sloth dies away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q35_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q35_A2-p0.1">Whether sloth is a special vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind
+                     of vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the
+                     good of continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it seems that sloth is not a special sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore
+                     sloth should not be reckoned a special vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object, which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
+                     virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth,
+                     if this be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth
+                     is a kind of weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to
+                     the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness,
+                     whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice, because,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">FS, Q[71], A[1]</a>), every vice shuns the spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that sloth is a special vice, in so
+                     far as it shuns spiritual good, as toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's pleasure, for this
+                     again would not sever sloth
+                     from carnal vices, whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p7"> Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts
+                     of each virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good, about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity.
+                     Hence it is proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in its own act, while it belongs specially
+                     to charity to have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner the
+                     sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but
+                     to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth.
+                     This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q35_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q35_A3-p0.1">Whether sloth is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth
+                     seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain
+                     in deed from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore
+                     it is not a mortal sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.
+                     Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore
+                     sloth is not always a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q35_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.20" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:20</a>): "The sorrow of the world worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow "according to God," which is contrasted
+                     with sorrow of the world. Therefore it is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">FS, Q[88], AA[1]</a>,2), mortal sin is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the effect of charity, whereby God dwells in
+                     us. Wherefore any sin which by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. And such is
+                     sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy in God, as stated above (Q[28], A[1]), while sloth is sorrow about spiritual
+                     good in as much as it is a
+                     Divine good. Therefore sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be observed with regard to all sins that
+                     are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because the consummation
+                     of sin is in the consent of reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human acts, the principle of which
+                     is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to the consent
+                     of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the concupiscence
+                     that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal sin.
+                     So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit,
+                     and then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason, which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation
+                     of
+                     the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept, implicitly
+                     commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind about the Divine good is contrary thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to adhere.
+                     Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin
+                     of sloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q35_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q35_A4-p0.1">Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful acts,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q34_A5.html">Q[34], A[5]</a>). Now sloth does not move one to action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it should not be accounted
+                     a capital sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth,
+                     viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful
+                     things." Now these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For "spite" is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises
+                     from envy, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q34_A6.html">Q[34], A[6]</a>); "malice" is a genus
+                     which contains all vices, and, in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful things is to be found in every vice;
+                     "sluggishness" about the commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness" and "despair" may arise from
+                     any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as
+                     a man shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose,
+                     it is sloth: and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite, faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair," whereas he states
+                     that from sloth seven things arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the mind,
+                     restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity, curiosity." Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has wrongly
+                     assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4), a capital vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final cause. Now just as we do many things on
+                     account of pleasure, both in order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the impulse of pleasure, so
+                     again we do many things on account of sorrow, either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing something
+                     under pressure thereof. Wherefore,
+                     since sloth is a kind of sorrow, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A2.html">(A[2];</a> 
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A8.html">FS, Q[85], A[8]</a>), it is fittingly reckoned a capital sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do certain
+                     things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) "no man can
+                     be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways:
+                     first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things that give him pleasure: thus those
+                     who find no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according
+                     to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant
+                     objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the
+                     sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of "despair," while avoidance of those goods which
+                     are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of "faint-heartedness,"
+                     and in matters of common righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the commandments." The struggle against spiritual
+                     goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is called "spite"; and sometimes
+                     it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is properly called "malice."
+                     In so far as a man has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after unlawful
+                     things." From this it is clear how to reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for "malice" does not denote
+                     here that which is generic to all vices, but must be understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with hatred,
+                     but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same applies to the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly
+                     (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q35_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any
+                     other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs
+                     essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things which Isidore
+                     reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore states to
+                     be the result of sorrow, is an effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced to "sluggishness about the precepts":
+                     for some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence. All the other five
+                     which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to wander,
+                     if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness
+                     of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called
+                     "loquacity"; and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called "restlessness of the body," when, to wit,
+                     a
+                     man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his body; while if it causes the body to
+                     move from one place to another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote changeableness of purpose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q35_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q34_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q36" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q36-p0.1">OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q36-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q36-p2"> We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q36-p3"> (1) What is envy?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q36-p4"> (2) Whether it is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q36-p5"> (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q36-p6"> (4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q36_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q36_A1-p0.1">Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the
+                     envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy
+                     is not a kind of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher
+                     says (Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation."
+                     Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q47_A3.html">FS, Q[47], A[3]</a>) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are
+                     envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection
+                     of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q32_A3.html">FS, Q[32], A[3]</a>) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those
+                     who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we possessed at some time." Therefore sloth is
+                     not a kind of sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a species of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and
+                     in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good,
+                     in so far as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear
+                     lest he may do him some harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear,
+                     as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p8"> Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own
+                     good name or excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good: and consequently men are envious of those
+                     goods in which a good name consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the Philosopher remarks (Rhet.
+                     ii, 10).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders what is good for one from being reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for sorrow to
+                     be about good, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a
+                     man is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far
+                     removed from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to rival or surpass in reputation those who
+                     are far above him. Thus a commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a
+                     commoner whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed from him, whether in place, time, or station,
+                     but those who are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our will that these should be in better
+                     repute than we are, and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far as it is in agreement
+                     with the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in
+                     such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
+                     wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love
+                     to be honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are envious,
+                     because all things are great to them, and whatever good may befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested
+                     in something great. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.2" target="asv">Job 5:2</a>): "Envy slayeth the little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those only whom we think better in some
+                     respect than ourselves."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow;
+                     and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher
+                     says (Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much in order to get something, envy those who have
+                     got it by spending little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods,
+                     and that others have acquired goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q36_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q36_A2-p0.1">Whether envy is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have
+                     companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and be nettled when they are praised." But no one should
+                     be advised to commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy:
+                     for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.29.2" target="asv">Prov. 29:2</a>): "When the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn." Therefore envy is not always a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good zeal, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.10" target="asv"> Ps. 68:10</a>: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up." Therefore envy is not always a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the
+                     foul sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness.
+                     For paleness seizes the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed, while the limbs are chilled, there
+                     is frenzy in the heart, there is gnashing with the teeth." Therefore envy is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.26" target="asv">Gal. 5:26</a>): "Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q36_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, envy is sorrow for another's good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man grieves for another's
+                     good, through fear that it may cause harm either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q36_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without charity being lost, both
+                     the
+                     destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we believe
+                     that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we dread lest many suffer unjustly."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p8"> Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, but because the good which he has, we have not: and this,
+                     properly speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:1</a>: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one
+                     may grieve over another's good, because he who happens to
+                     have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which make a man righteous,
+                     but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and he
+                     calls this sorrow {nemesis} [*The nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to signify "revenge"
+                     does not represent the original Greek.], saying that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he considered temporal
+                     goods
+                     in themselves, in so far as they may seem great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching
+                     of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either
+                     for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to
+                     come, which are prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.1" target="asv"> Ps.
+                        36:1
+                     </a>: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.2" target="asv">Ps. 72:2,3</a>): "My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because
+                     I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we grieve over a man's good, in so
+                     far as his good surpasses ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the Philosopher states (Rhet.
+                     ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to strive to progress with those who are better than we are.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers sorrow for another's good in the first sense given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html">FS, Q[87], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q36_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q36_A3-p0.1">Whether envy is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
+                     Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html">FS, Q[74], A[4]</a>]. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have
+                     seen and known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore
+                     envy is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to {nemesis}, which is a
+                     passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.2" target="asv">Job 5:2</a>): "Envy slayeth the little one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore envy is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the
+                     aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives its spiritual life, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.14" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:14</a>: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now the object both of charity and of envy
+                     is our neighbor's good, but by contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our
+                     neighbor's good, while envy grieves over it, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q36_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p7"> Nevertheless, as stated above (Q[35], A[4]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">FS, Q[72], A[5]</a>, ad 1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are
+                     the first movement of concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of anger, in the genus of murder, and
+                     so in the genus of envy we find sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are venial sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the
+                     principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children
+                     who have not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is manifest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is contrary both to {nemesis} and to pity, but for different reasons. For
+                     it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over
+                     his neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states
+                     in the same passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
+                     contrary to {nemesis} on the part of the man whose good grieves the envious man, for {nemesis} is sorrow for the good of the
+                     undeserving according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.3" target="asv"> Ps. 72:3</a>: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked,
+                     seeing the prosperity of sinners'], whereas the envious grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is
+                     clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter.
+                     Now pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is contrary to pity and charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q36_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q37.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q36_A4-p0.1">Whether envy is a capital vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the daughter
+                     of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy
+                     is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
+                     45): "The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them
+                     provoke the soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most grave
+                     sin, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom
+                     of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges
+                     the bane of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy is not a capital sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise
+                     "hatred, tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes, and grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's
+                     misfortunes and grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from what has been said above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q36_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore these should not be assigned as daughters of envy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p5"> On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid
+                     daughters thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good, so envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html">Q[35], A[4]</a>) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of avoiding
+                     sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a capital vice for the same reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital vices are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other.
+                     For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves
+                     for the power of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire that power." Consequently the notion of a
+                     capital vice does not exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it
+                     should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy
+                     manifestly arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De
+                     Instit. Caenob. v, 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy,
+                     he is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy
+                     of the devil, death came into the world" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q36_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.24" target="asv">Wis. 2:24</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p9"> There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most grievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good,
+                     which envy is a sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our neighbor's good. Hence it is accounted a sin
+                     against the Holy Ghost, because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is glorified in His works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The number of envy's daughters may be understood for the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by
+                     way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's
+                     reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have "tale-bearing," or openly, and then we have "detraction." The middle
+                     consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is either
+                     able to do so, and then we have "joy at another's misfortune," or he is unable, and then we have "grief at another's prosperity."
+                     The term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q36_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q34_A6.html">Q[34], A[6]</a>). Grief at another's prosperity is in one way the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over another's prosperity,
+                     in so far as it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter of
+                     envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand,
+                     "joy at another's misfortune" is not directly the same as envy, but is a result thereof, because grief over our neighbor's
+                     good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q36_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q37.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q37" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q37_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q37-p0.1">OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q37-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q37-p2"> We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention,
+                  which is on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz. schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the
+                  first head there are two points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q37-p3"> (1) Whether discord is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q37-p4"> (2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q37_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q37.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q37_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q37_A1-p0.1">Whether discord is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this does
+                     not seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our neighbor's, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is
+                     not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself. But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.23.6" target="asv">Acts 23:6</a>) that Paul, knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: "Men brethren, I
+                     am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he
+                     had so said, there arose a dissension between the
+                     Pharisees and the Sadducees." Therefore discord is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.39" target="asv">Acts 15:39</a>): "There arose a dissension" between Paul and Barnabas, "so that they departed one from another." Therefore discord is not
+                     a sin. and least of all a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Dissensions," that is, discords, are reckoned among the works of the flesh (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.20" target="asv">Gal. 5:20</a>), of which it is said afterwards (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>) that "they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from the
+                     kingdom of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q37_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q29_A1.html">Q[29], AA[1]</a>,3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the Divine
+                     good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p7"> But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now,
+                     human acts and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one's intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords
+                     with his neighbor, when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his neighbor's good, to which he
+                     ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although
+                     the first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being imperfect acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p8"> The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the intention. Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God's
+                     honor, or our neighbor's profit, while one deems a certain thing good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in
+                     this case accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor. Such like discord is neither sinful nor against
+                     charity, unless it be accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy, since
+                     it has also been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q37_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q29_A1.html">Q[29], AA[1]</a>,3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of wills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord
+                     is sometimes the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which the other knowingly resists; while sometimes
+                     it implies sin in both parties, as when each dissents from the other's good, and loves his own.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of another man's will; but in so far as our neighbor's will adheres to
+                     God's will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord
+                     with such a will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is opposed
+                     to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good. Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from
+                     charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.16" target="asv">Prov. 6:16</a>): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," which seventh is stated
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.19" target="asv">Prov. 6:19</a>) to be "him that soweth discord among brethren." On the other hand, to arouse a discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord
+                     in an evil will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for sowing discord among those who concorded
+                     together in evil, because Our Lord also said of Himself (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.34" target="asv">Mat. 10:34</a>): "I came not to send peace, but the sword."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought
+                     one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not
+                     about things necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine providence, on account of the good which would
+                     ensue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q37.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q37_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q37_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q37_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q38.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q37_A2-p0.1">Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that discord is not a daughter of vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord is apparently
+                     the daughter of anger, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.18" target="asv"> Prov. 15:18</a>: "A passionate man stirreth up strifes." Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine expounding the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv"> Jn. 7:39, </a> "As yet the Spirit was not given," says (Tract. xxxii) "Malice severs, charity unites." Now discord is merely a separation
+                     of wills. Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting
+                     on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q37_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.25" target="asv">Mat. 12:25</a>, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate," says: "Just as concord makes small things thrive, so discord
+                     brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of
+                     vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p5"> On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far, to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the other
+                     man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will holds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he
+                     prefers what is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory.
+                     Therefore discord, whereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that of
+                     others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from
+                     anger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor; whereas discord consists in a divergence in the movements of wills,
+                     which arises from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In discord we may consider that which is the term "wherefrom," i.e. another's will from which we recede, and in this respect
+                     it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is the term "whither," i.e. something of our own to which we cling,
+                     and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the term "whither" is more important than the term
+                     "wherefrom" (because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is
+                     accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from both for different reasons, as stated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united
+                     a force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the weaker it becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident
+                     that this is part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, and in no way indicates that other vices arise
+                     from discord, as though it were a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q37_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q37_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q38.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q36_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q37_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q38" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q37_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q38_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q38-p0.1">OF CONTENTION (TWO ARTICLES) </h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q38-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q38-p2"> We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q38-p3"> (1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q38-p4"> (2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q38_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q38.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q38_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q38_A1-p0.1">Whether contention is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to
+                     be found in them, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.24" target="asv"> Lk. 22:24</a>: "And there was also a strife amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the greatest." Therefore contention
+                     is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.17" target="asv">Phil. 1:17</a>): "Some out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.18" target="asv">Phil. 1:18</a>): "In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a
+                     good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.14.1" target="asv">1 Kings 14:1, </a> "It came to pass one day," etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless they are first challenged
+                     to dispute." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.39.32" target="asv">Job 39:32</a>: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?" And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said
+                     of him (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Job.42.7" target="asv">Job 42:7</a>): "You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant Job hath." Therefore contention is not always a mortal
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is against the precept of the Apostle who says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.14" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:14</a>): "Contend not in words." Moreover (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.20" target="asv">Gal. 5:20</a>) contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>) "they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is
+                     against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies
+                     contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various contrary things in a speech, this is called "contentio,"
+                     which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he says that "it consists in developing a speech
+                     from contrary things," for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most
+                     bitter end."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p8"> Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly,
+                     with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends against the truth, and
+                     then he is to be blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we must consider whether his
+                     manner of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be
+                     praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that "contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation"---or
+                     whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is blameworthy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p9"> Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus
+                     Ambrose [*Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence."
+                     If, however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas,
+                     if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin,
+                     unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.14" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:14</a>): "Contend not in words," adds, "for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The disciples of Christ contended together, not with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for
+                     what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, because they contended about a matter which they
+                     ought not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the
+                     same passage; and for this reason Our Lord checked them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who preached Christ "out of contention," were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith,
+                     but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle
+                     who was preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result
+                     therefrom, namely that Christ would be made known---since evil is sometimes the
+                     occasion of good results.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in
+                     a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse.
+                     But when, whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always
+                     a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to reason
+                     with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be
+                     inordinate in mind or in speech.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q38.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q38_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q38_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q38_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q38_A2-p0.1">Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contention is not a daughter of vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:3</a>): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?" Now
+                     zeal pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice. But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares
+                     (Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q38_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:1</a>: "Knowledge puffeth up." Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we
+                     know it. Therefore contention is not a daughter of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p5"> On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q38_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], A[2]</a>), discord is a daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce
+                     with the other. Now it is proper to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as people are discordant when they
+                     hold to their own opinion in their hearts, so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words. Consequently
+                     contention is reckoned a
+                     daughter of vainglory for the same reason as discord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with
+                     whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit,
+                     he clings to his own opinion, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q38_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], A[2]</a>, ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the
+                     chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is proud
+                     of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does so not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders
+                     one contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the "per se" and direct effects of pride or vainglory,
+                     should not result from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of
+                     pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q38_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q38_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q37_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q38_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q39" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q38_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q39-p0.1">OF SCHISM (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q39-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q39-p2"> We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the
+                  first place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q39-p3"> (1) Whether schism is a special sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q39-p4"> (2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q39-p5"> (3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q39-p6"> (4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q39_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q39_A1-p0.1">Whether schism is a special sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For "schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.), "denotes
+                     a division." But every sin causes a division, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59" target="asv">Is. 59</a>:: "Your sins have divided between you and your God." Therefore schism is not a special sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of
+                     the Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore
+                     every sin is a schism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith. If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem
+                     not to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon. ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a "schismatic
+                     is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the
+                     community, whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the Catholic Church." Therefore schism is not a generic
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its name "from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to unity.
+                     Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical
+                     order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is
+                     intended, and that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence the
+                     sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that
+                     unity which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one person to another with the bond of spiritual love,
+                     but also the whole Church in unity of spirit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p7"> Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of
+                     the Church; for this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several individuals among themselves is subordinate to
+                     the unity of the Church, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body is subordinate to the unity of the
+                     whole body. Now the unity of the Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection or communion of
+                     the members of the Church, and again in the subordination of all the members of the Church to the one head, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.18" target="asv"> Col. 2:18,19</a>: "Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands, being supplied
+                     with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God." Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent in the
+                     Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the
+                     Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his supremacy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division between man and God that results from sin is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as
+                     a result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is not schism properly so called.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The essence of schism consists in rebelliously disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a schismatic
+                     both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do
+                     this, wherefore not every sin is a schism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy
+                     is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just
+                     as faith and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are different
+                     vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely.
+                     This is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference
+                     between schism and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from the Church." Nevertheless,
+                     just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.6" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:6</a>: "From which things," i.e. charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling," so too, schism
+                     is the road to
+                     heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it is possible, in a certain respect, to find a
+                     difference between schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it may appear
+                     to have had a reason for separating from the Church."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q39_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q39_A2-p0.1">Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now we find the sin of schism punished more
+                     severely than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.28" target="asv">Ex. 32:28</a>) that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of idolatry: whereas of
+                     the sin of schism we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Num.16.30" target="asv">Num. 16:30</a>): "If the Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down, and all things that belong to them, and
+                     they go down alive into hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God." Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty
+                     of schism in revolting from the rule of David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore the sin of schism is graver
+                     than the sin of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more godlike than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states
+                     (Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude, namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary
+                     to the particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual. Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than
+                     unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed
+                     to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is opposed, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q39_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q39_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A6.html"> Q[23], A[6]</a>). Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which results from an addition to something else surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy results
+                     from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A[1],
+                     ad 3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways: first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its
+                     circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number
+                     of ways: wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the graver, the question must be understood to refer
+                     to the gravity derived from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from
+                     its object, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q39_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">FS, Q[72], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q39_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html">FS, Q[73], A[3]</a>). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is, in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed
+                     against God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p7"> Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which
+                     faith is founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a participated good, and a lesser good than
+                     God Himself. Wherefore it is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the sin of schism, although
+                     it may happen that a particular schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either because
+                     his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of greater danger, or for some similar reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It had already been declared to that people by the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no other
+                     God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was
+                     no need for those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough
+                     that they should be punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well
+                     known among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved those who rebelled against his authority to be
+                     punished in a miraculous and unwonted manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p9"> We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more severely punished in that people, because they were
+                     inclined to seditions and schisms. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">1 Esdra 4:15</a>): "This city since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and wars were raised therein [*Vulg.: 'This
+                     city is a rebellious city, and hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised therein of old']." Now sometimes
+                     a more severe punishment
+                     is inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, 
+                     <a id="SS_Q39_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q105_A2.html">FS, Q[105], A[2]</a>, ad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that where there is greater proneness to
+                     sin, a more severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, they were punished not only for the sin of
+                     schism, but also for that of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic
+                     good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief.
+                     In like manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is less than the good of Divine truth, to which
+                     unbelief is opposed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity has two objects; one is its principal object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is
+                     our neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good,
+                     which is less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the
+                     other hand, hatred of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal
+                     object, is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism
+                     would seem to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q39_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q39_A3-p0.1">Whether schismatics have any power?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that schismatics have some power. For Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to
+                     the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who return after being ordained, are not ordained again."
+                     Now Order is a kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they retain their Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even
+                     as he can have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great power. Therefore schismatics who are separated
+                     from the Church, have a spiritual power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf. Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons consecrated
+                     by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to the Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the
+                     Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of
+                     the Church, provided they be of commendable life and knowledge." But this would not be
+                     so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore schismatics have spiritual power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. 1, can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the
+                     concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal
+                     power or honor."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is
+                     conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing
+                     remains: as appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, is not consecrated again unless it has been
+                     broken up. Consequently such a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who
+                     has received it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact
+                     that if he come back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however, the lower power ought not to exercise its
+                     act, except in so far as it is moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical order, it follows that such
+                     persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its effect
+                     in sacramental acts, because therein man acts only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not precluded on account
+                     of any fault whatever in the person who confers the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p7"> On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this
+                     does not adhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in heretics and schismatics; and consequently they
+                     neither absolve nor excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and if they do, it is invalid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p8"> Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual power, it is to be understood as referring either to
+                     the second power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the essence of the power, but to its lawful
+                     use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q39_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q39_A4-p0.1">Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with excommunication?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly
+                     of a share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that "Baptism can be received from a schismatic." Therefore
+                     it seems that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain
+                     persons (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.34.4" target="asv">Ezech. 34:4</a>): "That which was driven away you have not brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost." Now schismatics are
+                     more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the same sin, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Nah.1.9" target="asv"> Nahum 1:9</a>: "God will not judge the same twice" [*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the sin of schism,
+                     according to
+                     <a id="SS_Q39_A4-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A5.html"> Q[23], A[5]</a>, where it is stated: "Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are severed from the unity of the Church,
+                     and disturb her peace, must be punished by the
+                     secular power." Therefore they ought not to be punished with excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.16.26" target="asv">Num. 16:26</a>): "Depart from the tents of these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and touch nothing of theirs, lest
+                     you be involved in their sins."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q39_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.11" target="asv"> Wis. 11:11, </a> "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg.: 'he is tormented']. Now a schismatic, as shown
+                     above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q39_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q39_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, commits a twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in this respect the
+                     fitting punishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church,
+                     wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the Church's spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled
+                     by the secular power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit
+                     this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived
+                     of that mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the Church
+                     those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their
+                     separation, they are sometimes led to do penance
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man, another
+                     is added: just as physicians employ several body medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommunication
+                     does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices,
+                     another should not be employed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q39_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q38_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q40" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q40-p0.1">OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q40-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q40-p2"> We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q40-p3"> (1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q40-p4"> (2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q40-p5"> (3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q40-p6"> (4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q40_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q40_A1-p0.1">Whether it is always sinful to wage war?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage
+                     war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.52" target="asv"> Mat. 26:52</a>: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Therefore all wars are unlawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.39" target="asv">Mat. 5:39</a>): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.19" target="asv">Rom. 12:19</a>): "Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath." Therefore war is always sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which
+                     take place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical
+                     burial. Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion forbade war
+                     altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and
+                     to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay'
+                     [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.3.14" target="asv">Lk. 3:14</a>]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he
+                     did not forbid soldiering."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war
+                     is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his
+                     rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people,
+                     which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those
+                     who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them.
+                     And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances,
+                     when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.4" target="asv">Rom. 13:4</a>): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so too,
+                     it is their business to have
+                     recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.4" target="asv">Ps. 81:4</a>): "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust.
+                     xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be
+                     in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p8"> Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account
+                     of some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that
+                     avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects,
+                     or to restore what it has seized unjustly."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p9"> Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good,
+                     or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works,
+                     but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement,
+                     or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting
+                     the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered
+                     unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the
+                     cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things,
+                     all these are rightly condemned in war."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without
+                     the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private
+                     person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority,
+                     so to speak, of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by
+                     another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain
+                     with the sword, yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for
+                     their sinful use of the sword.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so
+                     that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary
+                     sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine
+                     says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly
+                     severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of
+                     sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty
+                     impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came
+                     not to send upon earth" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.34" target="asv">Mat. 10:34</a>). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may
+                     have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the
+                     prosperity of peace."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying
+                     or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or
+                     "bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q40_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q40_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. For, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q40_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q40_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at the hands of the
+                     foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon the sheep,
+                     when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be
+                     the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against
+                     his injustice." Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): "As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side,
+                     some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which reason we commanded our people
+                     to gather together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it is lawful for bishops to fight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>: "They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do
+                     them." Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics
+                     to induce others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu)
+                     that Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are
+                     allowed to fight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and meritorious
+                     to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his country,
+                     or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Peter as representing bishops and clerics (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.52" target="asv">Mat. 16:52</a>): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulg.: 'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.18.11" target="asv"> Jn. 18:11</a>]." Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Several things are requisite for the good of a human society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number
+                     of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one
+                     another, that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those who are deputed to important duties are
+                     forbidden to occupy themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human
+                     laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p8"> Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason
+                     is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation
+                     of Divine things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as
+                     commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are
+                     warlike pursuits, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.4" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:4</a>: "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." The second reason is a special one, because,
+                     to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:26</a>: "As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He come." Wherefore
+                     it is
+                     unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ,
+                     so as to imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that those who shed blood,
+                     even without sin, become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders him unfit
+                     for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of
+                     blood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor
+                     who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according
+                     to the saying of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:4</a>): "The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God." Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for
+                     those who
+                     are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms themselves,
+                     but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps.
+                     Thus in the Old Testament (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.6.4" target="asv">Joshua 6:4</a>) the priests were commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics were
+                     first allowed to go
+                     to the front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q40_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>, ad 2) every power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to the end. Now, among the
+                     faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed.
+                     Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take
+                     up arms, not as though it were a
+                     sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their personality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being
+                     deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those
+                     who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q40_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q40_A3-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.20" target="asv">Dt. 16:20</a>): "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain
+                     to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
+                     with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith
+                     with one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.12" target="asv">Mat. 7:12</a>): "Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to observe this in all our dealings
+                     with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for
+                     himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos): "Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried
+                     on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city
+                     of Hai (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.8.2" target="asv">Joshua 8:2</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two
+                     ways. First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one
+                     ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even
+                     among enemies," as Ambrose states (De Officiis i).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p7"> Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are
+                     not always bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers,
+                     lest they deride it, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.6" target="asv"> Mat. 7:6</a>: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs." Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For
+                     this reason among other things that a soldier has
+                     to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated in the Book on Strategy [*Stratagematum
+                     i, 1] by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p8"> Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man
+                     would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q40_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q41.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q40_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God.
+                     Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.8" target="asv"> Ex. 20:8</a>: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain persons are reproached (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.3" target="asv">Is. 58:3</a>) because on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more,
+                     therefore, is it unlawful to fight on holy days.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.
+                     Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal harm.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iMacc.2.41" target="asv">1 Mac. 2:41</a>): The Jews rightly determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath-day, we will fight
+                     against him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence
+                     Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q40_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.7.23" target="asv">Jn. 7:23</a>): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?" Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their
+                     patients on holy days. Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby many are saved from being slain,
+                     and
+                     innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. Therefore, for the purpose
+                     of safeguarding the common weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there be need for doing
+                     so: because it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from fighting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p7"> However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this
+                     suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q40_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q41.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q39_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q41" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q41_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q41-p0.1">OF STRIFE (TWO ARTICLES) [*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q41-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q41-p2"> We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q41-p3"> (1) Whether strife is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q41-p4"> (2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q41_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q41.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q41_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q41_A1-p0.1">Whether strife is always a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that the
+                     word "rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict;
+                     he delights in brawling, and provokes contention." Now contention is not always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is related (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.26.21" target="asv">Gn. 26:21</a>) that the servants of Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise." Now it is not credible that the
+                     household of Isaac quarrelled publicly, without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin. Therefore strife is not a
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are reckoned among the works of the flesh (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.20" target="asv">Gal. 5:20</a>), and "they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore strifes are not only sinful, but they are
+                     even mortal sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> While contention implies a contradiction of words, strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.20" target="asv"> Gal. 5:20 </a>says that "strifes are when persons strike one another through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes
+                     place between private persons, being declared not by public authority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife
+                     is always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who
+                     attacks another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the deed be done by the
+                     hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal
+                     sin; and this depends on his intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole intention be to withstand the
+                     injury done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say properly that there is
+                     strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin. It
+                     is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending
+                     himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous
+                     harm on him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Strife is not just the same as contention: and there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express the
+                     inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever
+                     ready to contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling
+                     itself, and so the passage proceeds, "and delights in brawling." Thirdly, "he"
+                     provokes others to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with
+                     them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore the calumny [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.26.20" target="asv"> Gn. 26:20</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In order for a war to be just it must be declared by authority of the governing power, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q41_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>); whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred. For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue
+                     of their public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it is not the former who are said to be guilty
+                     of strife, but those who resist the public authority. Hence it is
+                     not the assailants in this case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend themselves inordinately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q41.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q41_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q41_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q41_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q42.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q41_A2-p0.1">Whether strife is a daughter of anger?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.1" target="asv">James 4:1</a>): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are they not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?" But anger is
+                     not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.25" target="asv">Prov. 28:25</a>): "He that boasteth and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels." Now strife is apparently the same as quarrel. Therefore
+                     it seems that strife is a daughter of pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.18.6" target="asv">Prov. 18:6</a>): "The lips of a fool intermeddle with strife." Now folly differs from anger, for it is opposed, not to meekness, but to
+                     wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.10.12" target="asv">Prov. 10:12</a>): "Hatred stirreth up strifes." But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is
+                     not a daughter of anger, but of envy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.19" target="asv">Prov. 17:19</a>): "He that studieth discords, soweth [Vulg.: 'loveth'] quarrels." But discord is a daughter of vainglory, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q41_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], A[2]</a>). Therefore strife is also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives rise to strife"; and it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q41_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.18" target="asv">Prov. 15:18</a>; 29:22): "A passionate man stirreth up strifes."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q41_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q41_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, strife denotes an antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there are two ways in which one
+                     man may intend to harm another. In one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in this case is
+                     the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In another
+                     way a man intends to hurt another who
+                     knows and withstands his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly to anger which is the desire of vengeance:
+                     for the angry man is not content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to feel the hurt and know that
+                     what he suffers is in revenge for what he has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the passion of anger
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q41_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A6.html">FS, Q[46], A[6]</a>, ad 2). Therefore, properly speaking, strife arises from anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q41_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">FS, Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2), all the irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so that whatever is the immediate outcome of
+                     anger, arises also from concupiscence as from its first root.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of
+                     quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results
+                     in quarrel and strife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q41_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q48_A3.html">FS, Q[48], A[3]</a>) hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence they have a common effect, since it is due
+                     to a defect in the reason that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it
+                     is beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner, since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When,
+                     however, he sees himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel. But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the
+                     proper effect of anger, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies," i.e.,
+                     intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another
+                     sin, by directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q41_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q41_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q42.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q40_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q41_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q42" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q41_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q42_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q42-p0.1">OF SEDITION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q42-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q42-p2"> We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q42-p3"> (1) Whether it is a special sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q42-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q42_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q42.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q42_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q42_A1-p0.1">Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a seditious
+                     man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets discord." Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no
+                     other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q42_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q39_A1.html">Q[39], A[1]</a>). Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of schism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice.
+                     Now sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral.
+                     xxxi, 45, where both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special sin, distinct from other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q42_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.20" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:20</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Sedition is a special sin, having something in common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something
+                     in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because
+                     war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or
+                     the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q42_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.20" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:20
+                        
+                     </a>says that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number of people make preparations with the intention
+                     of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between
+                     one people and another, whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few on
+                     the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when
+                     one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good,
+                     namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a seditious
+                     man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only
+                     in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another inordinately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First, because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude, viz.
+                     ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city
+                     or kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual
+                     dissent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between
+                     the parts of a multitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q42.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q42_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q42_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q42_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q42_A2-p0.1">Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin. For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the
+                     gloss quoted above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q42_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q42_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But fighting is not always a mortal sin, indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q[40], A[1]). Much more,
+                     therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes
+                     without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension
+                     in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore
+                     there can be sedition without mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle forbids seditions together with other things that are mortal sins (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q42_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.20" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:20</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 2), sedition is contrary to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom. Now
+                     Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the
+                     assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common good." Wherefore it is evident
+                     that the unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence
+                     it follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal
+                     sin, and its gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails surpasses the private good which
+                     is assailed by strife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p7"> Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors, who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those
+                     who are led by them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common good, and withstand the seditious party,
+                     are not themselves seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q42_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q41_A1.html">Q[41], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common good, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q42_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>). But sedition runs counter to the common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin:
+                     and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the multitude, which is a manifest good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler,
+                     as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of
+                     this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent
+                     disturbance than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather
+                     that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely;
+                     for this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the injury of the multitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q42_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q42_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q41_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q42_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q43" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q42_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q43-p0.1">OF SCANDAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p2"> It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice,
+                  those, to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly
+                  we must here consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p3"> (1) What is scandal?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p4"> (2) Whether scandal is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p5"> (3) Whether it is a special sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p6"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p7"> (5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p8"> (6) Whether they can give scandal?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p9"> (7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q43-p10"> (8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q43_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q43_A1-p0.1">Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual downfall?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as "something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual downfall."
+                     For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on 
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q43_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore
+                     the definition given above is insufficient, since it omits "thought" or "desire."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect
+                     rectitude would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore, scandal is something "less" rightly said or done, it follows
+                     that every virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify
+                     the thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say that it is an "occasion."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another's spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate.
+                     Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and
+                     this seems unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with
+                     offense and weakness, for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.21" target="asv">Rom. 14:21</a>): "It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or weakened."
+                     Therefore the aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome in expounding
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.12" target="asv"> Mat. 15:12, </a> "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we read 'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the
+                     sense is 'Whosoever shall, by deed or word, occasion another's spiritual downfall.'"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Jerome observes the Greek {skandalon} may be rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a
+                     body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down:
+                     such an obstacle is a {skandalon}.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p9"> In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed,
+                     in so far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly
+                     so called.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p10"> Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall, except that which has some lack of rectitude, since
+                     what is perfectly right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly
+                     defined as "something less rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart, wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle
+                     conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the head of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is said to be less right, not because something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of rectitude,
+                     either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were
+                     to "sit at meat in the idol's temple" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:10</a>), though this is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet, since it has a certain appearance
+                     of
+                     evil, and a semblance of worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.22" target="asv">1 Thess. 5:22</a>): "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Scandal is therefore fittingly described as something done "less rightly,"
+                     so as to comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html">FS, Q[75], AA[2]</a>,3; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A1-p13.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html">FS, Q[80], A[1]</a>), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's spiritual downfall, which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man's
+                     words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford
+                     not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental cause. Nor is there
+                     any reason why certain definitions should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental to one,
+                     may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Another's words or deed may be the cause of another's sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man either
+                     intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a
+                     nature as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a sin or does something that has an appearance
+                     of sin. In this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an
+                     occasion of another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called "active scandal." One man's word or deed is the accidental
+                     cause of another's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and
+                     yet this other one, through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy of another's good, and then he who
+                     does this righteous act, does not, so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's downfall, but it is this
+                     other one who takes the occasion according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A1-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv"> Rom. 7:8</a>: "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence." Wherefore this is "passive," without
+                     "active scandal," since he that acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes
+                     therefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits
+                     a sin being induced thereto by another; sometimes
+                     there is active without passive scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does
+                     not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we have already said.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while "offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin, which
+                     resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and "scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q43_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q43_A2-p0.1">Whether scandal is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">FS, Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2). Now it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.7" target="asv">Mat. 18:7</a>): "It must needs be that scandals come." Therefore scandal is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>). But scandal may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.23" target="asv">Mat. 16:23</a>): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of
+                     dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore scandal is not always a
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual
+                     fall, can be without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Scandal is "something less rightly said or done." Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is always
+                     with sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As already said (A[1], ad 4), scandal is of two kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the
+                     person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual downfall. Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person
+                     scandalized; for he is not scandalized except in so far as he succumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p7"> Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the person whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance,
+                     when a person is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active scandal is always a sin in the person who gives
+                     scandal, since either what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it should always be left undone out
+                     of that love for our neighbor which binds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare;
+                     so that if he persist in doing it he acts against charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p8"> Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person scandalized, as stated above (A[1], ad 4).</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words, "It must needs be that scandals come," are to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional
+                     necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken
+                     conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], A[13]</a>, ad 3; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html">FP, Q[23], A[6]</a>, ad 2.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p10"> Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity of end, because they are useful in order that "they
+                     . . . who are reproved may be made manifest" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:19</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p11"> Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing
+                     a man partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs injure his health, which is to be understood on the
+                     condition that he does not change his diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals come, so long as men fail to change
+                     their evil mode of living.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance: for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense of dutifulness
+                     towards Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q43_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q43_A3-p0.1">Whether scandal is a special sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For scandal is "something said or done less rightly." But this applies to
+                     every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently, scandal is not a special sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated
+                     in Ethic. v, 3,5. But scandal is not to be found separately from other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every special sin is constituted by something which specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists
+                     in its being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin being committed openly, though it is an aggravating
+                     circumstance, does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal is not a special sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it. But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.15" target="asv">Rom. 14:15</a>): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity." Therefore scandal is a special
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q43_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, scandal is twofold, active and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through another's word or deed
+                     a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed, does not constitute
+                     a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p7"> On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways, directly and accidently. The scandal is accidental when
+                     it is beside the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual
+                     downfall, but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a special sin, because a species is
+                     not constituted by that which is accidental.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p8"> Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word or deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes
+                     a special kind of sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because moral actions take their species from
+                     their end, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html">FS, Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6). Hence, just as theft and murder are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of doing a special
+                     injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a special kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to his neighbor,
+                     and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended,
+                     as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Active scandal can be found separate from other sins, as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin
+                     in itself, but has an appearance of evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end,
+                     as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q43_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q43_A4-p0.1">Whether scandal is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q[24],
+                     A[12]; Q[35] , A[3]). But scandal is contrary to charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q43_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment of eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
+                     damnation, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.6" target="asv"> Mat. 18:6</a>: "He that shall scandalize one of these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a mill-stone should
+                     be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea." For, as Jerome says on this passage, "it
+                     is much better to receive a brief
+                     punishment for a fault, than to await everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin, because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is
+                     a sin against God, for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:12</a>): "When you wound the weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: 'When you sin thus against the brethren and wound their weak
+                     conscience'], you sin against Christ." Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It may be a venial sin to lead a person into venial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal may be
+                     a venial sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q43_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, scandal denotes a stumbling whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently passive scandal may sometimes
+                     be a venial sin, when it consists in a stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed by a movement
+                     of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the stumbling results
+                     in a downfall, for instance, when a
+                     person goes so far as to commit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or deed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p7"> Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin; for instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a
+                     person either commits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, but has some appearance of evil. On the
+                     other hand, it is sometimes a mortal sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because he has such contempt for
+                     his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he wishes to
+                     do. But in the case of active direct scandal, as when a person intends to lead another into sin, if he intends to lead him
+                     into mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing a mortal sin himself, to lead
+                     another into venial sin; whereas if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to lead another into venial sin, there will be
+                     a venial sin of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p8"> And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q43_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q43_A5-p0.1">Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to the perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to Peter
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.23" target="asv">Mat. 16:23</a>): "Thou art a scandal to Me." Much more therefore can other perfect men suffer scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
+                     progress along the spiritual way, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.2.18" target="asv">1 Thess. 2:18</a>: "We would have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath hindered us." Therefore even perfect men can suffer
+                     scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes
+                     venial, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A5-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q43_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore passive scandal may be found in perfect men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome, in commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.6" target="asv"> Mat. 18:6, </a> "He that shall scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is the little one that is scandalized, for the
+                     elders do not take scandal."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person who takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man can
+                     be unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, i.e. the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness
+                     is unchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:16</a>: "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ."
+                     Wherefore, however much others may appear to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they themselves do not stray
+                     from their righteousness, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.124.1" target="asv"> Ps. 124:1</a>: "They that trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem." Therefore
+                     scandal is not found in those who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv"> Ps. 118:165</a>: "Much peace have they that love Thy law, and to them there is no
+                     stumbling-block [scandalum]."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 2), in this passage, scandal is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our
+                     Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he was endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His
+                     Passion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of others,
+                     from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.38" target="asv">Rom. 8:38,39</a>: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal
+                     in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there can be an approach to scandal in them, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.2" target="asv"> Ps. 72:2</a>: "My feet were almost moved."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q43_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q43_A6-p0.1">Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that active scandal can be found in the perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are scandalized
+                     passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.12" target="asv"> Mat. 15:12</a>: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were scandalized?" Therefore active scandal can be found
+                     in the perfect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles:
+                     for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.14" target="asv">Gal. 2:14</a>): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i.e. Peter, "before them all:
+                     If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to
+                     live as do the Jews?" Therefore active
+                     scandal can be in the perfect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be
+                     in perfect men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much less,
+                     therefore, can active scandal be in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a man says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion another's
+                     spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all
+                     their actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.40" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:40</a>: "Let all things be done decently and according to order"; and they are careful to do this in those matters chiefly
+                     wherein not only would they do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of wrongdoing. And if indeed they fail in this
+                     moderation in such words or deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weakness wherein they fall
+                     short of perfection. Yet they do not fall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but only a little and in
+                     some slight matter: and this is not so grave that anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occasion for committing sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Passive scandal is always due to some active scandal; yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the very person
+                     who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii) and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in withdrawing
+                     from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles
+                     who had been converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action was not so grave a sin as to give others
+                     sufficient ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there
+                     was no active scandal in Peter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If, however,
+                     they commit any venial sins even in their external words or deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves
+                     to give scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q43_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q43_A7-p0.1">Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone on account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)
+                     teaches that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of schism is feared." But punishment of sins is a spiritual
+                     good, since it is an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone on account of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.6" target="asv"> Mat. 7:6</a>: "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you."
+                     Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity,
+                     in order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be
+                     foregone on account of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc. xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego
+                     whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold truth, i.e. "the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine."
+                     Now the observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold
+                     truth, else whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such things
+                     are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works should be omitted on account of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good, since any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that
+                     one ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing one's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially,
+                     one would prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because one is bound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor
+                     as much as one can without prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by
+                     a venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order to avoid scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people are scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of scandal,
+                     than to abandon the truth." Now spiritual goods belong, above all others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not
+                     to be foregone on account of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active scandal
+                     is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be done that implies active scandal. The question does, however,
+                     apply to passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction
+                     must be made in spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and
+                     cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another
+                     from sinning, because according to the order of charity, a man ought to love his own spiritual welfare more than another's.
+                     Therefore one ought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order to avoid giving scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p9"> Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which
+                     arises from such things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man wishes to hinder those spiritual goods by
+                     stirring up scandal. This is the "scandal of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's teaching: and Our Lord teaches
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.14" target="asv">Mat. 15:14</a>) that we ought to treat such like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal
+                     proceeds from weakness or ignorance, and such is the "scandal of little ones." In order to avoid this kind of scandal, spiritual
+                     goods ought to be either concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done without incurring immediate danger), until
+                     the matter being explained the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter has been explained, it would
+                     seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be right to forego that spiritual good in order to avoid such
+                     like scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties in
+                     checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that
+                     the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment
+                     will no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is
+                     speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it
+                     would be contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of teaching.
+                     The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that he whose duty it is to teach should no' teach what is contrary
+                     to the truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the requirements of times and persons: wherefore on no account
+                     ought he to suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal that
+                     might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>), and so the same is to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (ad 4).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q43_A7-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A1.html">Q[33], A[1]</a>), fraternal correction aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be reckoned among spiritual goods in so far
+                     as this end can be obtained, which is not the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected. And so, if the correction
+                     be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no spiritual good is foregone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also whatever
+                     is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A7-p13.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:31</a>: "Be zealous for the better gifts." Wherefore neither the counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted
+                     in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or deferred, on account of the scandal of the
+                     little ones, as stated above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the fulfilment of the works of mercy
+                     are necessary for salvation. This may be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and of those whose
+                     duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual matters
+                     (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise from their being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from
+                     the need
+                     on the part of the person in want; and then the same applies to these things as to others that are necessary for salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if
+                     it ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on
+                     account of some circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be were it not for that circumstance: thus an
+                     idle word is a venial sin, when it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a
+                     reasonable cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive a man of grace which is his means
+                     of salvation, yet, in so far as it disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A7-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q43_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q43_A8-p0.1">Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual
+                     welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake
+                     of what we love more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to avoid scandalizing our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A[7], OBJ[4]], whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth,
+                     should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth.
+                     Therefore they should be foregone in order to avoid scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But we ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.15" target="asv">Rom. 14:15</a>: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died." Much more therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on
+                     account of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to
+                     have recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.40" target="asv">Mat. 5:40</a>): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A8-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:7</a>): "Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits one with another. Why do you not
+                     rather take wrong? why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore it seems that we ought to forego temporal
+                     goods on account of scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet
+                     we ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend
+                     lest he "should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:12.</a> For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much
+                     more, therefore, ought we to forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the restitution of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took scandal from
+                     his doing so.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for either they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of them
+                     for someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to prelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to
+                     all such persons as have authority over the common weal. In this latter case the care of such things (as of things held in
+                     deposit) devolves of necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore, even as
+                     other things that are necessary for salvation, they are not to be foregone on account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards
+                     those temporalities of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal, we are bound to forego them, and sometimes
+                     we are not so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if we have them in our possession, or by omitting to claim
+                     them, if they are in the possession of others. For if the scandal arise therefrom through the ignorance or weakness of
+                     others (in which case, as stated above, A[7], it is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such temporalities altogether,
+                     or the scandal must be abated by some other means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
+                     in Monte i, 20): "Thou shouldst give so as to injure neither thyself nor another, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou
+                     refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou
+                     reprove him that asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees: and we
+                     ought not to forego temporal goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for this would both be harmful
+                     to the common good, since it would give wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious to the plunderers themselves,
+                     who would remain in sin as long as they were in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 13):
+                     "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as equity
+                     allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our property, but also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose
+                     themselves."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If it were permissible for wicked men to rob other people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the truth
+                     of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to forego our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Apostle had no intention of counselling total abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare requires
+                     that we should take food: but he intended to counsel abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q43_A8-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:13</a>: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should scandalize my brother."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of
+                     the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to
+                     law. But sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same applies to the saying of the Apostle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it behooved
+                     him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like
+                     reason the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it is not customary to pay them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q43_A8-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q42_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q44" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q44-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p2"> We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p3"> (1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p4"> (2) Whether there should be one or two?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p5"> (3) Whether two suffice?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p6"> (4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with thy whole heart"?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p7"> (5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p8"> (6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p9"> (7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q44-p10"> (8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q44_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q44_A1-p0.1">Whether any precept should be given about charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no precept should be given about charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it
+                     is the form of the virtues as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html">Q[23], A[8]</a>), while the precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the mode is not included in the
+                     precept. Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>). Now the obligation that arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity. Therefore no precept
+                     should be given about charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to which the precepts are directed, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">FS, Q[90], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A9.html">FS, Q[100], A[9]</a>). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they should have a place among the chief precepts which are those
+                     of the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv"> Dt. 10:12.</a> Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity, which is the love of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A1.html">FS, Q[99], A[1]</a>), a precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter of precept, in so far as it is something due.
+                     Now a thing is due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In every affair, it is the end that
+                     is due for its own sake, because it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to the end
+                     is due for the sake of
+                     something else: thus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake of something
+                     else that he should give a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and
+                     this union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their
+                     end. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart,
+                     and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed
+                     either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions---such are the virtues that regulate the passions---or at
+                     least to the possession of a good conscience---such are the virtues that regulate operations---or to the having of a right
+                     faith---such are those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God.
+                     For
+                     an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience
+                     gives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue
+                     representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence
+                     of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.39" target="asv"> Mat. 22:39.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A10.html">FS, Q[100], A[10]</a>) when we were treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under those precepts which are about the other
+                     acts of virtue: for instance, this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe that this should be done
+                     out of charity. The act of love does, however, fall under special precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed,
+                     as may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's
+                     own will, wherefore it is not opposed to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of charity
+                     had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they are included in all of them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q44_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q44_A2-p0.1">Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there should not have been given two precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to
+                     virtue, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A5.html">Q[33], A[5]</a>). Therefore only one precept of charity should have been given.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27), charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently
+                     directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about
+                     loving our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided
+                     we put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.26" target="asv">Lk. 15:26</a>): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the
+                     love of God is not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>): "He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless all its precepts be observed. Therefore
+                     all the precepts are included in the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of our neighbor suffices.
+                     Therefore there should not be two precepts of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.21" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:21</a>): "This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html">FS, Q[91], A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html">FS, Q[94], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for
+                     in these latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to
+                     their entire virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately before him. Since, however, some who
+                     know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, for their sake, that
+                     scientific conclusions should be traced to their principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law direct
+                     us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; Q[26], A[1], ad 1): and the love of God is
+                     the end to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of
+                     God
+                     but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one
+                     of these precepts is included in the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are
+                     given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an explicit
+                     precept about both, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The means derive their goodness from their relation to the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice
+                     from the same source and from no other
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each
+                     precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q44_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q44_A3-p0.1">Whether two precepts of charity suffice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished
+                     by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his
+                     own body, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A12.html">Q[25], A[12]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26.html"> Q[26])</a>, it seems that there ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the
+                     acts of the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do
+                     good, and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been not only positive, but also negative
+                     precepts about charity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.40" target="asv">Mat. 22:40</a>): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>), is a kind of friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity
+                     is not possible between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love oneself out of charity (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A4.html">Q[25], A[4]</a>). Now since good is the object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that there
+                     should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love
+                     our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a precept
+                     as regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the
+                     truth, the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him." And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed
+                     to man, namely, that he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner,
+                     and this is done by his loving God and his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q29_A3.html"> Q[29], A[3]</a>), the other acts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually
+                     include the precepts about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, special precepts were given
+                     about each act---about joy (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.4" target="asv">Phil. 4:4</a>): "Rejoice in the Lord always"---about peace
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>): "Follow peace with all men"---about beneficence (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.10" target="asv">Gal. 6:10</a>): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men"---and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of the parts of beneficence,
+                     as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter carefully.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore the positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. Nevertheless
+                     we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, against hatred it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.12.17" target="asv">Lev. 12:17</a>): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 6:26</a>): "Be not grieved with her bands"; against envy (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.26" target="asv">Gal. 5:26</a>): "Let us not
+                     be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another"; against discord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p9.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:10</a>): "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against scandal (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A3-p9.5" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.13" target="asv">Rom. 14:13</a>): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother's way."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q44_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q44_A4-p0.1">Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous
+                     act is not a matter of precept, as shown above (A[1], ad 1; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A9.html">FS, Q[100], A[9]</a>). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man
+                     should love God with his whole heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that
+                     God be loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to the love of God, acts counter to the precept,
+                     and consequently sins mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin,
+                     which is absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),
+                     "to be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection is not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel.
+                     Therefore we ought not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.5" target="asv">Dt. 6:5</a>): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it
+                     is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own matter, but also that it should be endued with its
+                     due circumstances, whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last end, to which all things are to
+                     be referred. Therefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection with the
+                     precept of the love of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and higher
+                     virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with
+                     thy whole heart."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always actually
+                     directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed
+                     to God, so that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not
+                     contrary to this latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of
+                     charity, since it does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That perfection of charity to which the counsels are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
+                     reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy
+                     the mind and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q44_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q44_A5-p0.1">Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul,
+                     and with thy whole strength"?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and
+                     with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.5" target="asv">Dt. 6:5</a>). For heart does not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily action: and therefore heart is to be
+                     taken here in a spiritual sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part of the soul. Therefore
+                     it is
+                     superfluous to mention both heart and soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love
+                     the Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with all thy strength."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.37" target="asv"> Mat. 22:37 </a>we read: "With all thy mind," which words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly worded in
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A5-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.6" target="asv">Dt. 6</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p5"> On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This precept is differently worded in various places: for, as we said in the first objection, in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6" target="asv">Dt. 6</a> three points are mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with thy whole strength." In 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22" target="asv">Mat. 22</a> we find two of these mentioned, viz. "with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole strength" is
+                     omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Mark.12" target="asv">Mark 12</a> we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with
+                     thy whole soul," and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is the same as "strength." Moreover, these four
+                     are indicated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A5-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.10" target="asv">Luke 10</a>, where in place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might." [*St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads
+                     "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Dt.), "ex tota virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus tuis" (Lk.), although the Greek in all three
+                     cases has {ex holes tes ischyos}, which the Douay renders "with thy whole strength."]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p7"> Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of them is omitted here or there is due to one implying
+                     another. We must therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted by the "heart," because just as the
+                     bodily heart is the principle of all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards the intention of the
+                     last end which is the object of charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are
+                     three principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive
+                     power, signified by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by "strength," "force" or "might." Accordingly
+                     we are commanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with thy whole heart"; to submit
+                     our intellect to God, and this is expressed in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according to
+                     God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our external actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength,"
+                     "force" or "might."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p8"> Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included
+                     in Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ.
+                     i, 22) refers "heart" to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the intellect. Again some explain "with
+                     thy whole heart" as denoting the intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy mind" as
+                     pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul,
+                     "soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to
+                     be referred by us to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q44_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q44_A6-p0.1">Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of God?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,
+                     Exposit. Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded anything impossible." But God gave this commandment,
+                     as is clear from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.5" target="asv"> Dt. 6:5.</a> Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally, since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else
+                     than "a transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." If therefore this precept cannot
+                     be fulfilled by wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal sin, and this is against the saying of
+                     the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:8</a>): "(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without
+                     crime," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:10</a>): "Let them minister, having no crime."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way of salvation, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.9" target="asv"> Ps. 18:9</a>: "The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone to what is impossible.
+                     Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this precept in this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt
+                     love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot
+                     love God with all his heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended
+                     by the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly however, when although the end intended by its author
+                     is not reached, nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the commander of an army order his soldiers
+                     to fight, his command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the
+                     foe, which is the commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight without gaining the victory,
+                     provided they do nothing contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that man should be entirely united
+                     to Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God will be "all in all," according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28.</a> Hence this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way.
+                     Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he approaches by some
+                     kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too
+                     he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man attains
+                     it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed
+                     it out."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q44_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q44_A7-p0.1">Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all
+                     men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv"> Mat. 5:44.</a> But the word "neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist towards all men. Therefore it seems that
+                     this precept is unfittingly expressed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation
+                     to ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle
+                     is greater than that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his neighbor as himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love
+                     his neighbor as himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.39" target="asv">Mat. 22:39</a>): "The second" commandment "is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving
+                     is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh
+                     to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say "neighbor,"
+                     or "brother" according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.21" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:21, </a> or "friend," according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A7-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv"> Lev. 19:18, </a> because all these words express the same affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p7"> The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as
+                     himself, but in like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end, namely, that he should love his
+                     neighbor for God's sake, even as he loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a "holy" love. Secondly,
+                     as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good
+                     things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his neighbor may be a "righteous"
+                     love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure,
+                     but in the sense of wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a
+                     "true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but
+                     loves himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A7-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q44_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q44_A8-p0.1">Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the order of charity is not included in the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong.
+                     But if man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more, he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress
+                     the precept. Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was
+                     given above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26.html">Q[26])</a> is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not included in the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the
+                     words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us first of all by His Law, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.33" target="asv"> Jer. 31:33</a>: "I will give My Law in their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their heart']." Now God causes in us
+                     the order of charity, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A8-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Song.2.4" target="asv">Cant 2:4</a>: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of charity comes under the precept of the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[4], ad 1), the mode which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that
+                     virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing
+                     beloved, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A12.html">Q[25], A[12]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q44_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A1.html"> Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2). It is therefore evident that the order of charity must come under the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to
+                     gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an injustice to the one he ought to love more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of those four things we have to love out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love
+                     God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love
+                     our neighbor "as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor. In like manner where we are commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:16</a>) "to lay down our souls," i.e. the life of our bodies,
+                     "for the brethren," we are given to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; and again when
+                     we are commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A8-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.10" target="asv">Gal. 6:10</a>) to "work good . . . especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and when a man is blamed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q44_A8-p8.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:8</a>) if he "have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love most those of our
+                     neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q44_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q43_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q45" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q45-p0.1">OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q45-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q45-p2"> We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity; and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite
+                  vice. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q45-p3"> (1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q45-p4"> (2) What is its subject?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q45-p5"> (3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q45-p6"> (4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q45-p7"> (5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q45-p8"> (6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q45_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q45_A1-p0.1">Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than
+                     the virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html">FS, Q[68], A[8]</a>). Now virtue is directed to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "no man makes bad use of
+                     the virtues." Much more therefore are the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is directed to evil
+                     also, for it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.15" target="asv">James 3:15</a>) that a certain wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy
+                     Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine
+                     things which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural
+                     knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as explained above (Q[4], A[5]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">FS, Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a
+                     gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.28.28" target="asv">Job 28:28</a>): "Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is understanding." And in this passage according
+                     to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: "Behold piety, that is wisdom."
+                     Now both fear and piety are gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost,
+                     as though it were distinct
+                     from the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2</a>): "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we
+                     are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according thereto all things should be set in order. Now
+                     the highest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the
+                     highest cause in any particular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order all
+                     the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:10</a>: "As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation." On the other hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which
+                     is God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things according to Divine rules.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p7"> Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in the same chapter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift of the Holy
+                     Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind
+                     of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph.
+                     v, text. 21). And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a highest cause, namely the sovereign
+                     good which is the last end, by knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in
+                     evil things something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a last end, by knowing which, man is said
+                     to be wise unto evil doing, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.4.22" target="asv"> Jer. 4:22</a>: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs
+                     fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom"
+                     is called "earthly," if in the goods of the body, it
+                     is called "sensual wisdom," if in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it imitates the devil's pride, of
+                     which it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Job.41.25" target="asv">Job 41:25</a>): "He is king over all the children of pride."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the
+                     latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending from above" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.15" target="asv">James 3:15</a>). In like manner it differs from faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the gift
+                     of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith,
+                     because "a man judges well what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith
+                     by worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the
+                     same reason, because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right judgment about Divine things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q45_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q45_A2-p0.1">Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity
+                     of God." Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A1.html">Q[24], A[1]</a>). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 6:23</a>): "The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name," for wisdom [sapientia] may be described as "sweet-tasting science [sapida
+                     scientia]," and this would seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore
+                     wisdom is in the appetite rather than in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require
+                     two things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is contrary to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, wisdom denotes a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold: first,
+                     on account of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about which one has to
+                     judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the
+                     science of morals, while he who has the
+                     habit of chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p7"> Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after
+                     reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of
+                     connaturality with them: thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he not only
+                     learns, but is patient of, Divine things."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p8"> Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to God, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.17" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:17</a>: "He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause
+                     is charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q14_A1.html">FS, Q[14], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence also wisdom [sapientia] takes its name, in so far as it denotes a
+                     certain sweetness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the
+                     text quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for
+                     wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other languages.
+                     Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of
+                     wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of knowledge, according to human ideas.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q45_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q45_A3-p0.1">Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
+                     which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom,
+                     as a gift, speculative and not practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the practical intellect is about matters of operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which
+                     are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under
+                     a mighty bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv"> Wis. 8:16, </a> "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not
+                     practical or active.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Col.4.5" target="asv">Col. 4:5</a>): "Walk with wisdom towards them that are without." Now this pertains to action. Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative,
+                     but also practical.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the
+                     domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration
+                     and consultation of the heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A9.html">FP, Q[79], A[9]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html">FS, Q[74], A[7]</a>]; it considers them, in so far as it contemplates Divine things in
+                     themselves, and it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human acts according
+                     to Divine rules.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p7"> Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also practical.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of things to which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop. x, xvii. Wherefore
+                     from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God
+                     more intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are the
+                     subject-matter of human actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing is considered in itself before being compared with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all contemplation
+                     which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the
+                     direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make
+                     the bitter sweet, and labor a rest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q45_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q45_A4-p0.1">Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are incompatible
+                     with mortal sin, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:12</a>: "Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience." Now one ought not to glory in one's wisdom, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv"> Jer. 9:23</a>: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom." Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine truth, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.18" target="asv"> Rom. 1:18</a>: "(Those men that) detain the truth of God in injustice." Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone
+                     that divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal perdition." But wisdom is distinct from charity.
+                     Therefore it does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.4" target="asv">Wis. 1:4</a>): "Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain connaturalness
+                     or union with Divine things, which is the effect of charity, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[23], A[5]). Hence the wisdom of which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible with mortal sin,
+                     as
+                     shown above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be together with mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words are to be understood as referring to worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human reasons.
+                     In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.2" target="asv"> Prov. 30:2</a>: "The wisdom of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine wisdom according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.30" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:30</a>: "(Who) of God is made unto us wisdom."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we speak but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason,
+                     and is compatible with mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it presupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of perdition from
+                     the children of the kingdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q45_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q45_A5-p0.1">Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace. For it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only
+                     for the perfect to hear wisdom, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:6</a>: "We speak wisdom among the perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it seems that much less all who have
+                     grace have wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.17" target="asv">James 3:17</a>) that the wise man "judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is from above . . . is . . . without judging,
+                     without dissimulation']". Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or put others in order, but only for those in authority.
+                     Therefore wisdom is not in all that have grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish,
+                     for instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom
+                     is not in all that have grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God; since he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that love
+                     Him (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.17" target="asv">Prov. 8:17</a>). Now it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>) that "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom." Therefore wisdom is in all those who have charity and are without
+                     mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these
+                     men obtain various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the measure of right judgment attained by some,
+                     whether in the contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices
+                     for
+                     their salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin through having sanctifying grace, since if nature
+                     does not fail in necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.27" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:27</a>): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p7"> Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as to the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing
+                     more exalted mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to the direction of human affairs according
+                     to Divine rules (by being able to direct not only themselves but also others according to those rules). This degree of wisdom
+                     is not common to all that have sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which the
+                     Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>: "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending to the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:7</a>): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it belongs to those alone who are in authority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to direct
+                     and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad Demophil.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Baptized idiots, like little children, have the habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not the
+                     act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of reason in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q45_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q45_A6-p0.1">Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are
+                     the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Now both these things belong to charity: since of peace it
+                     is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv">Ps. 118:165</a>): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>), "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and
+                     Who is "the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A6-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.15" target="asv">Rom. 8:15</a>). Therefore the seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than to wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather than by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom
+                     seems to be charity, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.27" target="asv"> Wis. 7:27</a>: "Through nations she conveyeth herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets": whereas peace and the
+                     adoption of sons seem to be remote effects, since they result from charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A6-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q29_A3.html">Q[29], A[3]</a>). Therefore the
+                     beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined in respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.17" target="asv">James 3:17</a>): "The wisdom, that is from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to be persuaded, consenting to the
+                     good, full of mercy and good fruits, judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without dissimulation']." Therefore
+                     the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of heavenly wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that "wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of rebellion,
+                     but only obedience to reason."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit is
+                     denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Now a peacemaker is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others:
+                     and in both cases this is the result of setting in due order those things in which peace is established, for "peace is the
+                     tranquillity of order," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it belongs to
+                     wisdom to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2), wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to
+                     wisdom. The reward is expressed in the words, "they shall be called the children of God." Now men are called the children
+                     of God in so far as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q45_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29, </a> "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son," Who is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by
+                     participating in the gift of wisdom, man attains to the sonship of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy
+                     Ghost is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we receive from Him the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten
+                     Wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and consequently
+                     reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the
+                     cause but the effect of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q45_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A3.html">(A[3])</a> it belongs to wisdom, as a gift, not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human acts. Now the first thing,
+                     to be effected in this direction of human acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is said to be "the
+                     beginning of wisdom," because it makes us shun evil, while the last thing is like an end, whereby all things are reduced to
+                     their right order; and it is this
+                     that constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that "the wisdom that is from above" (and this is the gift of the Holy
+                     Ghost) "first indeed is chaste," because it avoids the corruption of sin, and "then peaceable," wherein lies the ultimate
+                     effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. As to the things that follow, they declare in becoming
+                     order the means whereby wisdom leads to peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the first thing
+                     he has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in all things, and in this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly,
+                     in those matters in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be guided by the advice of others, and as to this we
+                     are told further that wisdom is "easy to be persuaded." These two are conditions required that man may be at peace with himself.
+                     But in order that man may be at peace with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be opposed to their
+                     good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the good." Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies, sympathy
+                     in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted by the words "full of mercy and good fruits." Thirdly, he should
+                     strive in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is indicated by the words "judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.:
+                     'The wisdom that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']," lest he should purpose to
+                     sate his hatred under cover of correction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q45_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q44_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q46" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q46-p0.1">OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q46-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q46-p2"> We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q46-p3"> (1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q46-p4"> (2) Whether folly is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q46-p5"> (3) To which capital sin is it reducible?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q46_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q46_A1-p0.1">Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does
+                     not seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine
+                     and human things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other. But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q46_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:18</a>): "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not
+                     opposed to wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q46_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.14" target="asv">Jer. 10:14</a>): "Every man is become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of knowledge. Moreover, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q46_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.47.10" target="asv">Is. 47:10</a>): "Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be deceived. Therefore folly is not
+                     contrary to wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is
+                     unconcerned when he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly
+                     is not opposed to wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of wisdom is given as a remedy against folly."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from "stupor"; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S): "A fool
+                     is one who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved." And folly differs from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym.
+                     x), in that folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual
+                     sense. Therefore folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p8"> For "sapiens" [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from sapor [savor], because just as the taste is quick to distinguish
+                     between savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and causes." Wherefore it is manifest that "folly" is opposed
+                     to "wisdom" as its contrary, while "fatuity" is opposed to it as a pure negation: since the fatuous man lacks the sense of
+                     judgment, while the fool has the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute and
+                     penetrating.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is contrary to wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense"; so that
+                     unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict
+                     of that judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails in judgment about some trivial matter, he is
+                     not for that reason called a fool.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q46_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html">Q[45], A[1]</a>, ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes for the highest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a
+                     good folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes us foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q46_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:19</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for
+                     heavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however
+                     it is the result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious
+                     to them, and this belongs to folly simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q46_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q46_A2-p0.1">Whether folly is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises in us from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly
+                     is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it
+                     is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly is not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q46_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.32" target="asv">Prov. 1:32</a>): "The prosperity of fools shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin. Therefore folly is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Folly, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q46_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q46_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, denotes dullness of sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is the last end and the sovereign
+                     good. Now a man may in this respect contract dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural indisposition, as in
+                     the case of idiots, and such like folly is no sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense
+                     is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine
+                     things, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q46_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:14, </a> "The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God," even as sweet things have no savor for a man
+                     whose taste is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense
+                     from spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same thing happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful
+                     man desires pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does not desire sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the
+                     pleasure without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Folly is opposed to the precepts about the contemplation of truth, of which we have spoken above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q46_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q16.html">Q[16])</a> when we were treating of knowledge and understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q46_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS.ii.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q46_A3-p0.1">Whether folly is a daughter of lust?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among
+                     which however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q46_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:19</a>): "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29) "the wisdom of this world
+                     consists in covering the heart with crafty devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter of duplicity
+                     rather than of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises
+                     from anger rather than from lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q46_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.7.22" target="asv">Prov. 7:22</a>): "Immediately he followeth her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn like a fool to bonds."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q46_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q46_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, folly, in so far as it is a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable of judging spiritual
+                     things. Now man's sense is plunged into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of pleasures; and these
+                     absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust,
+                     pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life to come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it
+                     were.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is
+                     folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q46_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html">FS, Q[48] , AA[2]</a>,3,4), produces a great change in the nature of the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which results from
+                     a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged
+                     into earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q46_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS.ii.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q45_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <a href="summa.SS.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q1.html"></a>
+         `
+     </div>
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