Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FS_iv.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,1826 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.iv" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a> + <h2 id="FS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)</h2> + <div id="FS_Q49" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS.iv.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q49-p0.1">OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q49-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49-p2"> After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly + of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated + of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues + and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49-p3"> Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, + the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49-p4"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q49-p5"> (1) Whether habit is a quality?</p> + <p id="FS_Q49-p6"> (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?</p> + <p id="FS_Q49-p7"> (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?</p> + <p id="FS_Q49-p8"> (4) Of the necessity of habit.</p> + <div id="FS_Q49_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether habit is a quality?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the + verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as + "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). + But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the + order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore + habit is not a quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, + inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation + [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p7"> Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various + predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the + various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there + seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that + which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which + there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there + are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: + thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says + (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; + as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which + are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit + between clothing and the man who is clothed." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p8"> But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit + is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. + 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself + or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say + that habit is a quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: + and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher + goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying + this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when + he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is + the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation + and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes + perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q49_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said + <a id="FS_Q49_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this + happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, + in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct + species of quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, + just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. + Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus," + as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not + to be a distinct species of quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. + Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that + some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, + being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are + adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, + some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: + while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, + we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is + the shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, + and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious + but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the + more natural is always first. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p7"> Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly + speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure + determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance + with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called + quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined + to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher + (Metaph. v, text. 19). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p8"> Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, + or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to + quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species + of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of + good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or + slowly transitory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p9"> But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species + of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory + or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions + have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p10"> On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species + of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the + soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed + in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause + why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, + whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. + v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by + "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, + it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration + in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality + except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must + consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said + to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a + thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as + they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and + color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability + to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species + of + quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p12"> Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary + on the Predicaments. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This difference, "difficult to change," does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition. + Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition + of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so + called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect + within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so + as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition + becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern + genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily + lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason + of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this + sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for + in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason + of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while + the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have + a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that + he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition" + does not. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p14"> Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong + to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless + designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take + accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are + designated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p15"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q49_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether habit implies order to an act?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher + says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise + than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put + in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. + Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is + posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of + quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore + it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says + (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which + the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential + to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, + which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an + operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not + only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive + to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that + which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something + else, that is to the end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p7"> But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation + to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the + nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally + implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a + principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in + a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is + explained in De Anima ii, text. 5. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which + power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature + is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), + that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies + to other habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q49_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q49_A4-p0.1">Whether habits are necessary?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated + above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. + Therefore there is no necessity for habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, + without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. + Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the + nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition + a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. + The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should + be related to it as + potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance + is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case + in God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p7"> The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination + in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but + in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due + relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is + not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the + <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html">FP, Q[56], A[2]</a>, there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the + heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p8"> The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things + should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. + Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called + dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as + health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. + For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order + of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 3). + Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their + relative + adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. + But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is + limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form + be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be + disposed to its operations by means of habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not + a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do + not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on ( + <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html">Q[54], A[3]</a>): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined + to good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS.iv.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q50" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q50-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q50-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50-p2"> We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q50-p3"> (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?</p> + <p id="FS_Q50-p4"> (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</p> + <p id="FS_Q50-p5"> (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?</p> + <p id="FS_Q50-p6"> (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?</p> + <p id="FS_Q50-p7"> (5) Whether there is a habit in the will?</p> + <p id="FS_Q50-p8"> (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?</p> + <div id="FS_Q50_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q50_A1-p0.1">Whether there is a habit in the body?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby + we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit + in the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition + can be a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is + divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called + habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], AA[2]</a> seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore + in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation + of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those + operations which proceed from + its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we + have already said ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations + which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits + are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits + are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can + be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations + of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is + related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. + Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p8"> On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or + dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. + And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the + first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy + or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But + this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, + as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from + nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they + may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot + be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply + difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And + therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read + in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, + in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called + passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then + passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary + disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas + Aristotle puts heat in the third. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p12"> Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, + differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated, + and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. + But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and + if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would + be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves + of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse + participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore + we must say otherwise that, as was explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion + of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture + and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, + primarily and of + themselves. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q50_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q50_A2-p0.1">Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions + and habits in relation to nature, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul + is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in + respect of its powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of + accident, as we have said in the + <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A1.html">FP, Q[77], A[1]</a>, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it + is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation + to nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the + human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation + to the soul, than in the + soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according + to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in + the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in + so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we + have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the + soul in respect of its powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a + form and nature to which someone is disposed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, + according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident + is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation + to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does + not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence + of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes + precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation + and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q50_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q50_A3-p0.1">Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational + part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to + put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is + no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html">Q[49], A[3]</a>). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it + virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals, + which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according + as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as + nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can + be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits + in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: + for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals + act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain + dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom + to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can + admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, + deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we + say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of + using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no + habits in them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: + but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is + more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since + in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at + the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby + man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom + conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p10"> On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are + ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are + no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q50_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q50_A4-p0.1">Whether there is any habit in the intellect?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q50_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But + the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, + is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at + the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. + Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the + same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which + is composed of soul and body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. + 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore + also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of + knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act + of some part of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the + intellective part of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [* + <a id="FS_Q50_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior + sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly + in that, which, being only one, would be common + to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ + from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, + which differ in various men. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p7"> Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers + are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, + which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive + powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when + the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars + by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the + intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way + as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by + which the + intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary + to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand + and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect + itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain + extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul + only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, + as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a + disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to + be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p9"> Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in + De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. + 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of + the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the + subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the + "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible" + intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and + perfect act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the + good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. + And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q50_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q50_A5-p0.1">Whether any habit is in the will?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, + by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is + not the subject of habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an + active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no habit in the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. + But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in + the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, + 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will + is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit + whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related + to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above + + <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive + power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing + but a certain inclination, as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html"> Q[22], A[2]</a>). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the + nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, + that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has + a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there + be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved + (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs + to that which is somehow in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, + the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more + promptly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q50_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q50_A6-p0.1">Whether there are habits in the angels?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It + is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) + after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign + to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other + things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another + [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means + of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: + "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified + of itself." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that + which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring + of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence + Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, + through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which + is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For + everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p7"> Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said ( + <a id="FS_Q50_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are + immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and + any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still + some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, + so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance + are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual + substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in + itself." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p8"> However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the + lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect + of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is + not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for + this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. + And therefore, as we said in the + <a id="FS_Q50_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">FP, Q[55], A[1]</a>, so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard + to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, + and other things according to the mode of its + substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p9"> But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order + to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard + to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them + they are made like to God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p10"> But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.</p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, + as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far + do they need to have habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several + species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q51" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q51-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q51-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51-p2"> We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as + to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51-p3"> (1) Whether any habit is from nature?</p> + <p id="FS_Q51-p4"> (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?</p> + <p id="FS_Q51-p5"> (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?</p> + <p id="FS_Q51-p6"> (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</p> + <div id="FS_Q51_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q51_A1-p0.1">Whether any habit is from nature?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. + But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the + habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is + clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore + also first principles are said to be known naturally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural + to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural + to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, + in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, + because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. + For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, + health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p7"> Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either + of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without + it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, + it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the + individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic + principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p8"> But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), + may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific + nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect + of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it + happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, + since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said + in the + <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">FP, Q[55], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">FP, Q[84], A[3]</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p9"> There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic + principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive + powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual + nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the + understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that + man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: + and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know except + through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end + of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p10"> But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from + the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for + the operation of the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p11"> In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance + of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries + of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, + does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p12"> But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. + For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, + with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would + have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the + actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel + knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' + intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the + Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so + it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, + as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q51_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q51_A2-p0.1">Whether any habit is caused by acts?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html">Q[49], A[1]</a>). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, + does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or + cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If + therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and + passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as + is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes + the habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle + of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed + or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the + passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the + appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and + further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident + proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, + but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and + moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed + in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in + the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, + according as it is moved by first propositions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something + from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself + as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle + than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced + in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than + the science of conclusions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q51_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q51_A3-p0.1">Whether a habit can be caused by one act?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit + of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by + multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act + can cause a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short + time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). + Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already + <a id="FS_Q51_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused + in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at + once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming + it entirely, it may impress + its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power + in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, + what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely + overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the + habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p7"> But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See + <a id="FS_Q51_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a> ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular + reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is + possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one + act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm + assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many + acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act + of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same + acts + need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et + Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle + is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p8"> Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.</p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q51_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q51_A4-p0.1">Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, + He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence + to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above + + <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit + is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the + other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a + habit is not infused into man by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:5</a>): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits + are infused into man by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p7"> The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human + nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">Q[5], A[5]</a>). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those + habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except + by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p8"> The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in + the + <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature + could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can + be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the + science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives + certain things to some, which He does not give to others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from + this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies + of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he + had before. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q52" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q52-p0.1">OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q52-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q52-p2"> We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q52-p3"> (1) Whether habits increase?</p> + <p id="FS_Q52-p4"> (2) Whether they increase by addition?</p> + <p id="FS_Q52-p5"> (3) Whether each act increases the habit?</p> + <div id="FS_Q52_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q52_A1-p0.1">Whether habits increase?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the + genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems + that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more + hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits + cannot increase. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.5" target="asv">Lk. 17:5</a>): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, + on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal + quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain + quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so + also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things + which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p7"> Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of + the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, + thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider + the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or + "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form + has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, + and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p8"> In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as + Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits + themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness, + on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves + were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect + of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes + to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding + opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that + some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible + of more or less, but that material forms are. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p9"> In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, + must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under + the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher + says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or + subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, + or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, + which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation + to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species + from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless + they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive + their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on + account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to + the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may + be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence + the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it + always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p10"> Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were + given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a + quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p11"> But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities + and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that + substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is + participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of + substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, + therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. + 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are + further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect + of their participation by the subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p12"> Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives + its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that + a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for + this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, + text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in + respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material + dispositions, "more or less are found in substance." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p13"> Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, + it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as + varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be + said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, + three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p14"> This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible + of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": + to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate + it in its indivisibility. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p15"> It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. + 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: + thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, + in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more + in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition + do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p16"> We shall say further on ( + <a id="FS_Q52_A1-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a>) how it is with the virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the + word "growth," the term of which is something great. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject + its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore + there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first + species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. + In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, + an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p20"></p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p21"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q52_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q52_A2-p0.1">Whether habits increases by addition?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred + to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. + i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is + no increase without addition. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for + instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be + more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less + white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, + that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when + they increase. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question depends on what we have said above + <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on + the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase + of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or + less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, + as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by + an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though + something were added to the form. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p7"> For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in + the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated + <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from + being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be + either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man + who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in + the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we + have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p8"> Since, however, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For + movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the + same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. + in so far as the same movement can be executed more + or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions + of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's + participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p9"> As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said + to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this + is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of + the subject partaking of them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p10"> How this question affects virtues we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a> ). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things. + Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated + in Phys. iv, text. 63. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject + to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new + form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already + actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q52_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q52_A3-p0.1">Whether every act increases its habit?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes + of habits, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q52_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike + (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they + proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being + the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is + unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from + one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p7"> But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html">Q[50], A[5]</a>); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing + an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion + to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase + thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually + increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results + at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the + intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p8"> From this it is clear how to solve the objections.</p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q53" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q53-p0.1">HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q53-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q53-p2"> We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q53-p3"> (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?</p> + <p id="FS_Q53-p4"> (2) Whether it can be diminished?</p> + <p id="FS_Q53-p5"> (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?</p> + <div id="FS_Q53_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q53_A1-p0.1">Whether a habit can be corrupted?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant + to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long + as its subject remains. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness + ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through + corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, + text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: + since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise + be lost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by + a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement + of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since + the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which + reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. + For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher + declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover, + by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore + a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case + with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted + indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an + incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly + indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html">Q[50], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only + on the part of the lower sensitive powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p7"> We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, + either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot + be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no contrary; + nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the + "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly + and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by + any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost + by being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of + conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those + very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion + "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is + contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a + true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science." + As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what + we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the + same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to + it + to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever + its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature + of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, + as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove + an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded + by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the + very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. + Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject + or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does + not. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q53_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q53_A2-p0.1">Whether a habit can diminish?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed + either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does + not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals + more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is + accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now + whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text. + 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined + with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its + inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore + a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained ( + <a id="FS_Q53_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a>). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as + that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other + hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different + ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through + its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that + a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take + an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the + subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not + put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but + we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But + if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins + in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining + this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum" + is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence + of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in + certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies + to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish + by a + kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained ( + <a id="FS_Q53_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html">Q[52], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q53_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q53_A3-p0.1">Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than + passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 3; + <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"> Q[50], A[1]</a>). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through + not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. + Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation + from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from + act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above + time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through + length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of + science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other + habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement + by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It + is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, + as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened + that habit. For it has been stated + <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually + undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even + destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident + that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose + the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions + or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination + of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from + act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured + by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition + to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his + intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus + the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were + to increase. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained + above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore + in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. + Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q54" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q54-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q54-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54-p2"> We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q54-p3"> (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?</p> + <p id="FS_Q54-p4"> (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</p> + <p id="FS_Q54-p5"> (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</p> + <p id="FS_Q54-p6"> (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?</p> + <div id="FS_Q54_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q54_A1-p0.1">Whether many habits can be in one power?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the + same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same + thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in + one power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is + the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there + cannot be many habits in one power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at + the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several + habits cannot be at the same time in one power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the + end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since + in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. + Thus, if we take the humors + as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition + of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is + strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion + to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, + there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act + of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive + power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move + one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits + are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several + habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as + stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity + of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ + generically belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of + objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in + species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that + different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one + genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and + powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different + acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, + but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at + the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes, + save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided + figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things + at the same time "habitually." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q54_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q54_A2-p0.1">Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of + science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by + objects specifically distinct. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both + the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished + by their objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, + if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, + if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. + Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a>). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms + differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished + from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. + Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something, + are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying + a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p7"> Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such + dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what + follows. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which + may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they + are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one + aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of + mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. + by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism + producing science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And + consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative + matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover + the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been + said ( + <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">Q[18], A[6]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html"> Q[19], + A[2] + </a>, ad 1; + <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q34_A4.html"> Q[34], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q54_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q54_A3-p0.1">Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards + contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, + as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. + Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters + of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, + as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation + to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way + a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the + agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which + disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, + whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished + specifically by the difference of good and bad. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p7"> Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable + to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes + to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher + nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen + that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are + divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something + good, and another about something bad. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate + good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference + of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated + above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which + is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q54_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.v.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q54_A4-p0.1">Whether one habit is made up of many habits?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems + to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html">Q[51], A[3]</a>). Therefore one habit is made up of several. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, + temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to + but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made + up of many. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection + should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so + far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far + as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to + one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p7"> If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this + multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, + not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation + to one, whence it derives its unity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that + the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins + by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective + or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4; + <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">SS, Q[48])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. + And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in + him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions + and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from + another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.v.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file