Mercurial > hg > Aquinas

comparison summa/english/FS_iv.html @ 64:11682db9b870

Find changesets by keywords (author, files, the commit message), revision number or hash, or revset expression.
from auto-split
author ht
date Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000
parents
children 5cef55a2686a
comparison
equal deleted inserted replaced
63:4665e252e26e 64:11682db9b870
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.iv" class="div2">
2 <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A4.html"></a>
3 <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a>
4 <h2 id="FS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)</h2>
5 <div id="FS_Q49" class="div3">
6 <a href="summa.FS.iv.html"></a>
7 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a>
8 <h3 id="FS_Q49-p0.1">OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
9 <p id="FS_Q49-p1"></p>
10 <p id="FS_Q49-p2"> After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly
11 of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated
12 of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues
13 and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts.
14 </p>
15 <p id="FS_Q49-p3"> Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third,
16 the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another.
17 </p>
18 <p id="FS_Q49-p4"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
19 <p id="FS_Q49-p5"> (1) Whether habit is a quality?</p>
20 <p id="FS_Q49-p6"> (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?</p>
21 <p id="FS_Q49-p7"> (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?</p>
22 <p id="FS_Q49-p8"> (4) Of the necessity of habit.</p>
23 <div id="FS_Q49_A1" class="div4">
24 <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a>
25 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a>
26 <h4 id="FS_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether habit is a quality?</h4>
27 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p1"></p>
28 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p2">
29 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the
30 verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as
31 "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
32 </p>
33 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p3">
34 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi).
35 But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality.
36 </p>
37 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p4">
38 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the
39 order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore
40 habit is not a quality.
41 </p>
42 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p5">
43 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change."
44 </p>
45 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p6">
46 <b>I answer that,</b> This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,
47 inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation
48 [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
49 </p>
50 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p7"> Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various
51 predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the
52 various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there
53 seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that
54 which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which
55 there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there
56 are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion:
57 thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says
58 (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had";
59 as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which
60 are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit
61 between clothing and the man who is clothed."
62 </p>
63 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p8"> But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit
64 is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text.
65 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself
66 or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say
67 that habit is a quality.
68 </p>
69 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p9">
70 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
71 </p>
72 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p10">
73 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had:
74 and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
75 </p>
76 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p11">
77 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher
78 goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying
79 this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when
80 he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is
81 the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation
82 and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes
83 perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
84 </p>
85 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p12"></p>
86 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p13"></p>
87 <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a>
88 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a>
89 </div>
90 <div id="FS_Q49_A2" class="div4">
91 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a>
92 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a>
93 <h4 id="FS_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?</h4>
94 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p1"></p>
95 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p2">
96 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said
97 <a id="FS_Q49_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this
98 happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner,
99 in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct
100 species of quality.
101 </p>
102 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p3">
103 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits,
104 just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality.
105 </p>
106 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p4">
107 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion.
108 Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus,"
109 as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not
110 to be a distinct species of quality.
111 </p>
112 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p5">
113 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition."
114 </p>
115 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p6">
116 <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality.
117 Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that
118 some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious,
119 being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are
120 adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities,
121 some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality:
122 while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted,
123 we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is
124 the shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes,
125 and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious
126 but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the
127 more natural is always first.
128 </p>
129 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p7"> Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly
130 speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure
131 determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance
132 with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called
133 quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined
134 to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher
135 (Metaph. v, text. 19).
136 </p>
137 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p8"> Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject,
138 or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to
139 quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species
140 of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of
141 good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or
142 slowly transitory.
143 </p>
144 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p9"> But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species
145 of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory
146 or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions
147 have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.
148 </p>
149 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p10"> On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species
150 of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the
151 soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed
152 in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause
153 why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness,
154 whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph.
155 v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by
156 "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature,
157 it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration
158 in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.
159 </p>
160 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p11">
161 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality
162 except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must
163 consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said
164 to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a
165 thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as
166 they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and
167 color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability
168 to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species
169 of
170 quality.
171 </p>
172 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p12"> Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary
173 on the Predicaments.
174 </p>
175 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p13">
176 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This difference, "difficult to change," does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition.
177 Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition
178 of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so
179 called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect
180 within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so
181 as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition
182 becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern
183 genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily
184 lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason
185 of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this
186 sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for
187 in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason
188 of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while
189 the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have
190 a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that
191 he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition"
192 does not.
193 </p>
194 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p14"> Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong
195 to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless
196 designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take
197 accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are
198 designated.
199 </p>
200 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p15"></p>
201 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p16"></p>
202 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a>
203 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a>
204 </div>
205 <div id="FS_Q49_A3" class="div4">
206 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a>
207 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a>
208 <h4 id="FS_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether habit implies order to an act?</h4>
209 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p1"></p>
210 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p2">
211 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher
212 says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise
213 than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act.
214 </p>
215 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p3">
216 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put
217 in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially.
218 Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is
219 posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of
220 quality.
221 </p>
222 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p4">
223 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore
224 it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act.
225 </p>
226 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p5">
227 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says
228 (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will."
229 </p>
230 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p6">
231 <b>I answer that,</b> To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which
232 the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential
233 to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature,
234 which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an
235 operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not
236 only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive
237 to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that
238 which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something
239 else, that is to the end.
240 </p>
241 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p7"> But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation
242 to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the
243 nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally
244 implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a
245 principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act.
246 </p>
247 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p8">
248 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in
249 a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is
250 explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.
251 </p>
252 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p9">
253 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which
254 power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.
255 </p>
256 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p10">
257 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature
258 is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1),
259 that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies
260 to other habits.
261 </p>
262 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p11"></p>
263 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p12"></p>
264 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a>
265 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a>
266 </div>
267 <div id="FS_Q49_A4" class="div4">
268 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a>
269 <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a>
270 <h4 id="FS_Q49_A4-p0.1">Whether habits are necessary?</h4>
271 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p1"></p>
272 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p2">
273 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated
274 above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being.
275 Therefore there is no necessity for habits.
276 </p>
277 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p3">
278 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers,
279 without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits.
280 </p>
281 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p4">
282 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit.
283 Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.
284 </p>
285 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p5">
286 <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the
287 nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits.
288 </p>
289 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p6">
290 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
291 <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition
292 a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary.
293 The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should
294 be related to it as
295 potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance
296 is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case
297 in God.
298 </p>
299 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p7"> The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination
300 in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but
301 in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due
302 relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is
303 not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the
304 <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html">FP, Q[56], A[2]</a>, there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the
305 heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.
306 </p>
307 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p8"> The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things
308 should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation.
309 Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called
310 dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as
311 health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability.
312 For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order
313 of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 3).
314 Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their
315 relative
316 adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.
317 </p>
318 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p9">
319 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition.
320 But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is
321 limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form
322 be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be
323 disposed to its operations by means of habits.
324 </p>
325 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p10">
326 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not
327 a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do
328 not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation.
329 </p>
330 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p11">
331 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (
332 <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html">Q[54], A[3]</a>): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined
333 to good.
334 </p>
335 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p12"></p>
336 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p13"></p>
337 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a>
338 <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a>
339 </div>
340 <a href="summa.FS.iv.html"></a>
341 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a>
342 </div>
343 <div id="FS_Q50" class="div3">
344 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a>
345 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a>
346 <h3 id="FS_Q50-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
347 <p id="FS_Q50-p1"></p>
348 <p id="FS_Q50-p2"> We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
349 <p id="FS_Q50-p3"> (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?</p>
350 <p id="FS_Q50-p4"> (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</p>
351 <p id="FS_Q50-p5"> (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?</p>
352 <p id="FS_Q50-p6"> (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?</p>
353 <p id="FS_Q50-p7"> (5) Whether there is a habit in the will?</p>
354 <p id="FS_Q50-p8"> (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?</p>
355 <div id="FS_Q50_A1" class="div4">
356 <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a>
357 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a>
358 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A1-p0.1">Whether there is a habit in the body?</h4>
359 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p1"></p>
360 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p2">
361 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby
362 we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit
363 in the body.
364 </p>
365 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p3">
366 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition
367 can be a habit.
368 </p>
369 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p4">
370 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is
371 divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.
372 </p>
373 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p5">
374 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called
375 habits.
376 </p>
377 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p6">
378 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
379 <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], AA[2]</a> seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore
380 in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation
381 of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those
382 operations which proceed from
383 its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we
384 have already said (
385 <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations
386 which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits
387 are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits
388 are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can
389 be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations
390 of the soul.
391 </p>
392 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is
393 related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions.
394 Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.
395 </p>
396 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p8"> On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or
397 dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone.
398 And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the
399 first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy
400 or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But
401 this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples,
402 as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.
403 </p>
404 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p9">
405 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from
406 nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will.
407 </p>
408 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p10">
409 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they
410 may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot
411 be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply
412 difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And
413 therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read
414 in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.
415 </p>
416 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p11">
417 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species,
418 in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called
419 passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then
420 passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary
421 disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas
422 Aristotle puts heat in the third.
423 </p>
424 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p12"> Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit,
425 differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated,
426 and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent.
427 But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and
428 if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would
429 be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves
430 of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse
431 participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore
432 we must say otherwise that, as was explained above (
433 <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion
434 of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture
435 and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions,
436 primarily and of
437 themselves.
438 </p>
439 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p13"></p>
440 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p14"></p>
441 <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a>
442 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a>
443 </div>
444 <div id="FS_Q50_A2" class="div4">
445 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a>
446 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a>
447 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A2-p0.1">Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</h4>
448 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p1"></p>
449 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p2">
450 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions
451 and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (
452 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul
453 is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in
454 respect of its powers.
455 </p>
456 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p3">
457 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of
458 accident, as we have said in the
459 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A1.html">FP, Q[77], A[1]</a>, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.
460 </p>
461 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p4">
462 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it
463 is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.
464 </p>
465 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p5">
466 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.
467 </p>
468 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p6">
469 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
470 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation
471 to nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the
472 human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation
473 to the soul, than in the
474 soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according
475 to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in
476 the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (
477 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>).
478 </p>
479 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in
480 so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we
481 have said above (
482 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the
483 soul in respect of its powers.
484 </p>
485 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p8">
486 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a
487 form and nature to which someone is disposed.
488 </p>
489 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p9">
490 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject,
491 according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident
492 is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit.
493 </p>
494 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p10">
495 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation
496 to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does
497 not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence
498 of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes
499 precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation
500 and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
501 </p>
502 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p11"></p>
503 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p12"></p>
504 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a>
505 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a>
506 </div>
507 <div id="FS_Q50_A3" class="div4">
508 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a>
509 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a>
510 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A3-p0.1">Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?</h4>
511 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p1"></p>
512 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p2">
513 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational
514 part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to
515 put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part.
516 </p>
517 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p3">
518 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is
519 no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (
520 <a id="FS_Q50_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html">Q[49], A[3]</a>). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.
521 </p>
522 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p4">
523 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it
524 virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals,
525 which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part.
526 </p>
527 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p5">
528 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part."
529 </p>
530 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p6">
531 <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according
532 as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as
533 nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can
534 be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.
535 </p>
536 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p7">
537 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits
538 in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them:
539 for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
540 </p>
541 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p8">
542 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals
543 act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain
544 dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom
545 to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can
546 admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts,
547 deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we
548 say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of
549 using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no
550 habits in them.
551 </p>
552 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p9">
553 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57:
554 but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is
555 more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since
556 in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at
557 the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby
558 man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom
559 conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.
560 </p>
561 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p10"> On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are
562 ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are
563 no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.
564 </p>
565 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p11"></p>
566 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p12"></p>
567 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a>
568 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a>
569 </div>
570 <div id="FS_Q50_A4" class="div4">
571 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a>
572 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a>
573 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A4-p0.1">Whether there is any habit in the intellect?</h4>
574 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p1"></p>
575 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p2">
576 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above
577 <a id="FS_Q50_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But
578 the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit.
579 </p>
580 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p3">
581 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter,
582 is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at
583 the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form.
584 Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the
585 same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which
586 is composed of soul and body.
587 </p>
588 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p4">
589 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text.
590 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore
591 also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of
592 knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act
593 of some part of the body.
594 </p>
595 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p5">
596 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the
597 intellective part of the soul.
598 </p>
599 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p6">
600 <b>I answer that,</b> concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [*
601 <a id="FS_Q50_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior
602 sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly
603 in that, which, being only one, would be common
604 to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ
605 from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers,
606 which differ in various men.
607 </p>
608 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p7"> Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers
609 are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues,
610 which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive
611 powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when
612 the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars
613 by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the
614 intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way
615 as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by
616 which the
617 intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary
618 to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand
619 and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect
620 itself.
621 </p>
622 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p8">
623 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain
624 extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul
625 only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate,
626 as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a
627 disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to
628 be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object.
629 </p>
630 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p9"> Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in
631 De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text.
632 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of
633 the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the
634 subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the
635 "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.
636 </p>
637 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p10">
638 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible"
639 intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and
640 perfect act.
641 </p>
642 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p11">
643 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the
644 good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand.
645 And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect.
646 </p>
647 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p12"></p>
648 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p13"></p>
649 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a>
650 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a>
651 </div>
652 <div id="FS_Q50_A5" class="div4">
653 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a>
654 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a>
655 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A5-p0.1">Whether any habit is in the will?</h4>
656 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p1"></p>
657 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p2">
658 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species,
659 by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is
660 not the subject of habit.
661 </p>
662 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p3">
663 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an
664 active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above (
665 <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no habit in the will.
666 </p>
667 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p4">
668 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing.
669 But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in
670 the will.
671 </p>
672 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p5">
673 <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v,
674 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
675 </p>
676 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p6">
677 <b>I answer that,</b> Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will
678 is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit
679 whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related
680 to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above
681
682 <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
683 </p>
684 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p7">
685 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive
686 power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing
687 but a certain inclination, as we have said above (
688 <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>;
689 <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html"> Q[22], A[2]</a>). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the
690 nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life,
691 that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has
692 a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there
693 be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
694 </p>
695 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p8">
696 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved
697 (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs
698 to that which is somehow in potentiality.
699 </p>
700 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p9">
701 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways,
702 the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more
703 promptly.
704 </p>
705 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p10"></p>
706 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p11"></p>
707 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a>
708 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a>
709 </div>
710 <div id="FS_Q50_A6" class="div4">
711 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a>
712 <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a>
713 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A6-p0.1">Whether there are habits in the angels?</h4>
714 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p1"></p>
715 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p2">
716 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It
717 is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels)
718 after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign
719 to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
720 </p>
721 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p3">
722 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other
723 things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another
724 [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means
725 of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds:
726 "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified
727 of itself."
728 </p>
729 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p4">
730 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that
731 which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
732 </p>
733 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p5">
734 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring
735 of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits."
736 </p>
737 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p6">
738 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence
739 Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential,
740 through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which
741 is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For
742 everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
743 </p>
744 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p7"> Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said (
745 <a id="FS_Q50_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are
746 immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and
747 any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still
748 some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them,
749 so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance
750 are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual
751 substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in
752 itself."
753 </p>
754 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p8"> However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the
755 lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect
756 of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is
757 not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for
758 this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has.
759 And therefore, as we said in the
760 <a id="FS_Q50_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">FP, Q[55], A[1]</a>, so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard
761 to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself,
762 and other things according to the mode of its
763 substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
764 </p>
765 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p9"> But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order
766 to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard
767 to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them
768 they are made like to God.
769 </p>
770 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p10"> But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.</p>
771 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p11">
772 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents.
773 </p>
774 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p12">
775 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves,
776 as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far
777 do they need to have habits.
778 </p>
779 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p13">
780 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several
781 species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.
782 </p>
783 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p14"></p>
784 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p15"></p>
785 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a>
786 <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a>
787 </div>
788 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a>
789 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a>
790 </div>
791 <div id="FS_Q51" class="div3">
792 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a>
793 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a>
794 <h3 id="FS_Q51-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
795 <p id="FS_Q51-p1"></p>
796 <p id="FS_Q51-p2"> We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as
797 to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
798 </p>
799 <p id="FS_Q51-p3"> (1) Whether any habit is from nature?</p>
800 <p id="FS_Q51-p4"> (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?</p>
801 <p id="FS_Q51-p5"> (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?</p>
802 <p id="FS_Q51-p6"> (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</p>
803 <div id="FS_Q51_A1" class="div4">
804 <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a>
805 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a>
806 <h4 id="FS_Q51_A1-p0.1">Whether any habit is from nature?</h4>
807 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p1"></p>
808 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p2">
809 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will.
810 But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
811 </p>
812 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p3">
813 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the
814 habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.
815 </p>
816 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p4">
817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (
818 <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is
819 clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
820 </p>
821 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p5">
822 <b>On the contrary,</b> In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore
823 also first principles are said to be known naturally.
824 </p>
825 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p6">
826 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural
827 to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural
828 to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again,
829 in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first,
830 because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle.
831 For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine,
832 health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
833 </p>
834 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p7"> Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either
835 of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without
836 it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude,
837 it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the
838 individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic
839 principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.
840 </p>
841 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p8"> But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]),
842 may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific
843 nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect
844 of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it
845 happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen,
846 since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said
847 in the
848 <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">FP, Q[55], A[2]</a>;
849 <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">FP, Q[84], A[3]</a>.
850 </p>
851 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p9"> There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic
852 principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive
853 powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual
854 nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the
855 understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that
856 man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part:
857 and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know except
858 through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end
859 of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.
860 </p>
861 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p10"> But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from
862 the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for
863 the operation of the intellect.
864 </p>
865 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p11"> In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance
866 of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries
867 of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit,
868 does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers.
869 </p>
870 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p12"> But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings.
871 For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like.
872 </p>
873 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p13">
874 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.
875 </p>
876 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p14">
877 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance,
878 with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would
879 have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the
880 actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel
881 knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels'
882 intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the
883 Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so
884 it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
885 </p>
886 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p15">
887 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not,
888 as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural.
889 </p>
890 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p16"></p>
891 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p17"></p>
892 <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a>
893 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a>
894 </div>
895 <div id="FS_Q51_A2" class="div4">
896 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a>
897 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a>
898 <h4 id="FS_Q51_A2-p0.1">Whether any habit is caused by acts?</h4>
899 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p1"></p>
900 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p2">
901 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (
902 <a id="FS_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html">Q[49], A[1]</a>). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts,
903 does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts.
904 </p>
905 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p3">
906 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or
907 cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If
908 therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and
909 passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8.
910 </p>
911 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p4">
912 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as
913 is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes
914 the habit.
915 </p>
916 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p5">
917 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.
918 </p>
919 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p6">
920 <b>I answer that,</b> In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle
921 of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed
922 or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the
923 passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the
924 appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and
925 further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident
926 proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle,
927 but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and
928 moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed
929 in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in
930 the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect,
931 according as it is moved by first propositions.
932 </p>
933 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p7">
934 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something
935 from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
936 </p>
937 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p8">
938 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself
939 as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.
940 </p>
941 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p9">
942 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle
943 than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced
944 in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than
945 the science of conclusions.
946 </p>
947 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p10"></p>
948 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p11"></p>
949 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a>
950 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a>
951 </div>
952 <div id="FS_Q51_A3" class="div4">
953 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a>
954 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a>
955 <h4 id="FS_Q51_A3-p0.1">Whether a habit can be caused by one act?</h4>
956 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p1"></p>
957 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p2">
958 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit
959 of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.
960 </p>
961 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p3">
962 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by
963 multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit.
964 </p>
965 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p4">
966 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act
967 can cause a habit.
968 </p>
969 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p5">
970 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short
971 time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13).
972 Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.
973 </p>
974 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p6">
975 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already
976 <a id="FS_Q51_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused
977 in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at
978 once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming
979 it entirely, it may impress
980 its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power
981 in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act,
982 what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely
983 overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the
984 habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.
985 </p>
986 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p7"> But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See
987 <a id="FS_Q51_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a> ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular
988 reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is
989 possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one
990 act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm
991 assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many
992 acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act
993 of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same
994 acts
995 need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et
996 Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle
997 is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.
998 </p>
999 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p8"> Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.</p>
1000 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p9"></p>
1001 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p10"></p>
1002 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a>
1003 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a>
1004 </div>
1005 <div id="FS_Q51_A4" class="div4">
1006 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a>
1007 <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a>
1008 <h4 id="FS_Q51_A4-p0.1">Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</h4>
1009 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p1"></p>
1010 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p2">
1011 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some,
1012 He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.
1013 </p>
1014 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p3">
1015 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence
1016 to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above
1017
1018 <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
1019 </p>
1020 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p4">
1021 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit
1022 is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the
1023 other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a
1024 habit is not infused into man by God.
1025 </p>
1026 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p5">
1027 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (
1028 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:5</a>): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits
1029 are infused into man by God.
1030 </p>
1031 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p6">
1032 <b>I answer that,</b> Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons.
1033 </p>
1034 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p7"> The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human
1035 nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (
1036 <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">Q[5], A[5]</a>). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those
1037 habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except
1038 by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
1039 </p>
1040 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p8"> The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in
1041 the
1042 <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature
1043 could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can
1044 be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the
1045 science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.
1046 </p>
1047 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p9">
1048 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives
1049 certain things to some, which He does not give to others.
1050 </p>
1051 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p10">
1052 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from
1053 this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.
1054 </p>
1055 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p11">
1056 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies
1057 of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he
1058 had before.
1059 </p>
1060 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p12"></p>
1061 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p13"></p>
1062 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a>
1063 <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a>
1064 </div>
1065 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a>
1066 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a>
1067 </div>
1068 <div id="FS_Q52" class="div3">
1069 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a>
1070 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a>
1071 <h3 id="FS_Q52-p0.1">OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
1072 <p id="FS_Q52-p1"></p>
1073 <p id="FS_Q52-p2"> We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
1074 <p id="FS_Q52-p3"> (1) Whether habits increase?</p>
1075 <p id="FS_Q52-p4"> (2) Whether they increase by addition?</p>
1076 <p id="FS_Q52-p5"> (3) Whether each act increases the habit?</p>
1077 <div id="FS_Q52_A1" class="div4">
1078 <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a>
1079 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a>
1080 <h4 id="FS_Q52_A1-p0.1">Whether habits increase?</h4>
1081 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p1"></p>
1082 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p2">
1083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the
1084 genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.
1085 </p>
1086 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p3">
1087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems
1088 that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
1089 </p>
1090 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p4">
1091 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more
1092 hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits
1093 cannot increase.
1094 </p>
1095 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p5">
1096 <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (
1097 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.5" target="asv">Lk. 17:5</a>): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase.
1098 </p>
1099 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p6">
1100 <b>I answer that,</b> Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things,
1101 on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal
1102 quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain
1103 quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so
1104 also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things
1105 which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).
1106 </p>
1107 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p7"> Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of
1108 the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself,
1109 thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider
1110 the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
1111 "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form
1112 has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature,
1113 and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
1114 </p>
1115 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p8"> In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as
1116 Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits
1117 themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness,
1118 on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves
1119 were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect
1120 of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes
1121 to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding
1122 opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that
1123 some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible
1124 of more or less, but that material forms are.
1125 </p>
1126 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p9"> In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species,
1127 must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under
1128 the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher
1129 says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
1130 subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself,
1131 or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature,
1132 which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation
1133 to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species
1134 from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless
1135 they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive
1136 their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on
1137 account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to
1138 the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may
1139 be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence
1140 the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
1141 always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health."
1142 </p>
1143 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p10"> Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were
1144 given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a
1145 quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
1146 </p>
1147 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p11"> But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities
1148 and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that
1149 substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is
1150 participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of
1151 substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity,
1152 therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text.
1153 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are
1154 further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect
1155 of their participation by the subject.
1156 </p>
1157 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p12"> Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives
1158 its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that
1159 a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for
1160 this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii,
1161 text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in
1162 respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material
1163 dispositions, "more or less are found in substance."
1164 </p>
1165 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p13"> Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form,
1166 it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as
1167 varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be
1168 said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
1169 three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
1170 </p>
1171 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p14"> This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible
1172 of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles":
1173 to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate
1174 it in its indivisibility.
1175 </p>
1176 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p15"> It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text.
1177 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself:
1178 thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly,
1179 in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more
1180 in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition
1181 do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility.
1182 </p>
1183 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p16"> We shall say further on (
1184 <a id="FS_Q52_A1-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a>) how it is with the virtues.
1185 </p>
1186 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p17">
1187 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the
1188 word "growth," the term of which is something great.
1189 </p>
1190 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p18">
1191 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject
1192 its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore
1193 there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.
1194 </p>
1195 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p19">
1196 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first
1197 species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness.
1198 In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension,
1199 an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
1200 </p>
1201 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p20"></p>
1202 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p21"></p>
1203 <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a>
1204 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a>
1205 </div>
1206 <div id="FS_Q52_A2" class="div4">
1207 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a>
1208 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a>
1209 <h4 id="FS_Q52_A2-p0.1">Whether habits increases by addition?</h4>
1210 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p1"></p>
1211 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p2">
1212 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred
1213 to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener.
1214 i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is
1215 no increase without addition.
1216 </p>
1217 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p3">
1218 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
1219 instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition.
1220 </p>
1221 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p4">
1222 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be
1223 more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less
1224 white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness.
1225 </p>
1226 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p5">
1227 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
1228 that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when
1229 they increase.
1230 </p>
1231 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p6">
1232 <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question depends on what we have said above
1233 <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on
1234 the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
1235 of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or
1236 less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning,
1237 as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by
1238 an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though
1239 something were added to the form.
1240 </p>
1241 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p7"> For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in
1242 the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated
1243 <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from
1244 being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be
1245 either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man
1246 who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in
1247 the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we
1248 have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing.
1249 </p>
1250 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p8"> Since, however, as stated above
1251 <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For
1252 movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the
1253 same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e.
1254 in so far as the same movement can be executed more
1255 or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions
1256 of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's
1257 participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions.
1258 </p>
1259 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p9"> As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said
1260 to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this
1261 is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of
1262 the subject partaking of them.
1263 </p>
1264 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p10"> How this question affects virtues we shall state further on (
1265 <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a> ).
1266 </p>
1267 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p11">
1268 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things.
1269 Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated
1270 in Phys. iv, text. 63.
1271 </p>
1272 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p12">
1273 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject
1274 to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further.
1275 </p>
1276 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p13">
1277 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new
1278 form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already
1279 actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action.
1280 </p>
1281 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p14"></p>
1282 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p15"></p>
1283 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a>
1284 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a>
1285 </div>
1286 <div id="FS_Q52_A3" class="div4">
1287 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a>
1288 <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a>
1289 <h4 id="FS_Q52_A3-p0.1">Whether every act increases its habit?</h4>
1290 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p1"></p>
1291 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p2">
1292 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes
1293 of habits, as stated above (
1294 <a id="FS_Q52_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied.
1295 </p>
1296 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p3">
1297 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
1298 (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it.
1299 </p>
1300 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p4">
1301 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
1302 </p>
1303 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p5">
1304 <b>On the contrary,</b> Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
1305 proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit.
1306 </p>
1307 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p6">
1308 <b>I answer that,</b> "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
1309 the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is
1310 unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from
1311 one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
1312 </p>
1313 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p7"> But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (
1314 <a id="FS_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html">Q[50], A[5]</a>); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
1315 an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion
1316 to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase
1317 thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually
1318 increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results
1319 at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the
1320 intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
1321 </p>
1322 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p8"> From this it is clear how to solve the objections.</p>
1323 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p9"></p>
1324 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p10"></p>
1325 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a>
1326 <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a>
1327 </div>
1328 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a>
1329 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a>
1330 </div>
1331 <div id="FS_Q53" class="div3">
1332 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a>
1333 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a>
1334 <h3 id="FS_Q53-p0.1">HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
1335 <p id="FS_Q53-p1"></p>
1336 <p id="FS_Q53-p2"> We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
1337 <p id="FS_Q53-p3"> (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?</p>
1338 <p id="FS_Q53-p4"> (2) Whether it can be diminished?</p>
1339 <p id="FS_Q53-p5"> (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?</p>
1340 <div id="FS_Q53_A1" class="div4">
1341 <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a>
1342 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a>
1343 <h4 id="FS_Q53_A1-p0.1">Whether a habit can be corrupted?</h4>
1344 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p1"></p>
1345 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p2">
1346 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant
1347 to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long
1348 as its subject remains.
1349 </p>
1350 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p3">
1351 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness
1352 ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through
1353 corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i,
1354 text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary:
1355 since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise
1356 be lost.
1357 </p>
1358 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p4">
1359 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by
1360 a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement
1361 of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since
1362 the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
1363 reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted.
1364 For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher
1365 declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning."
1366 </p>
1367 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p5">
1368 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover,
1369 by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
1370 </p>
1371 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p6">
1372 <b>I answer that,</b> A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore
1373 a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case
1374 with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted
1375 indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an
1376 incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly
1377 indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above (
1378 <a id="FS_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html">Q[50], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only
1379 on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
1380 </p>
1381 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p7"> We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary,
1382 either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot
1383 be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no contrary;
1384 nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the
1385 "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly
1386 and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by
1387 any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost
1388 by being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of
1389 conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those
1390 very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion
1391 "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is
1392 contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a
1393 true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science."
1394 As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what
1395 we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the
1396 same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to
1397 it
1398 to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever
1399 its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.
1400 </p>
1401 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p8">
1402 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature
1403 of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.
1404 </p>
1405 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p9">
1406 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason,
1407 as stated above.
1408 </p>
1409 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p10">
1410 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove
1411 an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded
1412 by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the
1413 very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted.
1414 Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject
1415 or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does
1416 not.
1417 </p>
1418 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p11"></p>
1419 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p12"></p>
1420 <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a>
1421 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a>
1422 </div>
1423 <div id="FS_Q53_A2" class="div4">
1424 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a>
1425 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a>
1426 <h4 id="FS_Q53_A2-p0.1">Whether a habit can diminish?</h4>
1427 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p1"></p>
1428 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p2">
1429 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
1430 either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish.
1431 </p>
1432 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p3">
1433 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does
1434 not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals
1435 more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is
1436 accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now
1437 whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text.
1438 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible.
1439 </p>
1440 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p4">
1441 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
1442 with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its
1443 inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
1444 </p>
1445 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p5">
1446 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore
1447 a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
1448 </p>
1449 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p6">
1450 <b>I answer that,</b> Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained (
1451 <a id="FS_Q53_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a>). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as
1452 that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other
1453 hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase.
1454 </p>
1455 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p7">
1456 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different
1457 ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through
1458 its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.
1459 </p>
1460 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p8">
1461 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that
1462 a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.
1463 </p>
1464 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p9">
1465 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take
1466 an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the
1467 subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not
1468 put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but
1469 we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But
1470 if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins
1471 in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining
1472 this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum"
1473 is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence
1474 of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in
1475 certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies
1476 to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish
1477 by a
1478 kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained (
1479 <a id="FS_Q53_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html">Q[52], A[2]</a>).
1480 </p>
1481 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p10"></p>
1482 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p11"></p>
1483 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a>
1484 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a>
1485 </div>
1486 <div id="FS_Q53_A3" class="div4">
1487 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a>
1488 <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a>
1489 <h4 id="FS_Q53_A3-p0.1">Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?</h4>
1490 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p1"></p>
1491 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p2">
1492 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than
1493 passion-like qualities, as we have explained above (
1494 <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 3;
1495 <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"> Q[50], A[1]</a>). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through
1496 not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot.
1497 Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
1498 </p>
1499 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p3">
1500 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
1501 from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from
1502 act.
1503 </p>
1504 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p4">
1505 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
1506 time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through
1507 length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
1508 </p>
1509 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p5">
1510 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
1511 science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other
1512 habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
1513 </p>
1514 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p6">
1515 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
1516 by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It
1517 is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit,
1518 as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened
1519 that habit. For it has been stated
1520 <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually
1521 undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even
1522 destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident
1523 that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose
1524 the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions
1525 or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination
1526 of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from
1527 act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured
1528 by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition
1529 to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
1530 intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus
1531 the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.
1532 </p>
1533 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p7">
1534 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were
1535 to increase.
1536 </p>
1537 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p8">
1538 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained
1539 above.
1540 </p>
1541 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p9">
1542 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore
1543 in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension.
1544 Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
1545 </p>
1546 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p10"></p>
1547 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p11"></p>
1548 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a>
1549 <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a>
1550 </div>
1551 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a>
1552 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a>
1553 </div>
1554 <div id="FS_Q54" class="div3">
1555 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a>
1556 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a>
1557 <h3 id="FS_Q54-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
1558 <p id="FS_Q54-p1"></p>
1559 <p id="FS_Q54-p2"> We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
1560 <p id="FS_Q54-p3"> (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?</p>
1561 <p id="FS_Q54-p4"> (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</p>
1562 <p id="FS_Q54-p5"> (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</p>
1563 <p id="FS_Q54-p6"> (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?</p>
1564 <div id="FS_Q54_A1" class="div4">
1565 <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a>
1566 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a>
1567 <h4 id="FS_Q54_A1-p0.1">Whether many habits can be in one power?</h4>
1568 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p1"></p>
1569 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p2">
1570 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the
1571 same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same
1572 thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
1573 one power.
1574 </p>
1575 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p3">
1576 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is
1577 the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there
1578 cannot be many habits in one power.
1579 </p>
1580 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p4">
1581 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at
1582 the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several
1583 habits cannot be at the same time in one power.
1584 </p>
1585 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p5">
1586 <b>On the contrary,</b> The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences.
1587 </p>
1588 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p6">
1589 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
1590 <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the
1591 end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since
1592 in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits.
1593 Thus, if we take the humors
1594 as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition
1595 of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is
1596 strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion
1597 to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject.
1598 </p>
1599 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again,
1600 there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated
1601 above (
1602 <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (
1603 <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act
1604 of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive
1605 power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move
1606 one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits
1607 are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several
1608 habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power.
1609 </p>
1610 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p8">
1611 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as
1612 stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity
1613 of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ
1614 generically belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of
1615 objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in
1616 species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that
1617 different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one
1618 genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and
1619 powers.
1620 </p>
1621 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p9">
1622 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different
1623 acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power.
1624 </p>
1625 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p10">
1626 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power,
1627 but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at
1628 the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes,
1629 save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided
1630 figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things
1631 at the same time "habitually."
1632 </p>
1633 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p11"></p>
1634 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p12"></p>
1635 <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a>
1636 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a>
1637 </div>
1638 <div id="FS_Q54_A2" class="div4">
1639 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a>
1640 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a>
1641 <h4 id="FS_Q54_A2-p0.1">Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</h4>
1642 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p1"></p>
1643 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p2">
1644 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
1645 science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by
1646 objects specifically distinct.
1647 </p>
1648 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p3">
1649 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both
1650 the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished
1651 by their objects.
1652 </p>
1653 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p4">
1654 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue,
1655 if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while,
1656 if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits.
1657 Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects.
1658 </p>
1659 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p5">
1660 <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above (
1661 <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a>). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects.
1662 </p>
1663 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p6">
1664 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
1665 differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished
1666 from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species.
1667 Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something,
1668 are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying
1669 a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
1670 </p>
1671 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p7"> Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
1672 dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what
1673 follows.
1674 </p>
1675 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p8">
1676 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which
1677 may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they
1678 are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one
1679 aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
1680 </p>
1681 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p9">
1682 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of
1683 mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g.
1684 by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism
1685 producing science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
1686 consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished.
1687 </p>
1688 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p10">
1689 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative
1690 matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover
1691 the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been
1692 said (
1693 <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">Q[18], A[6]</a>;
1694 <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html"> Q[19],
1695 A[2]
1696 </a>, ad 1;
1697 <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q34_A4.html"> Q[34], A[4]</a>).
1698 </p>
1699 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p11"></p>
1700 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p12"></p>
1701 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a>
1702 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a>
1703 </div>
1704 <div id="FS_Q54_A3" class="div4">
1705 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a>
1706 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a>
1707 <h4 id="FS_Q54_A3-p0.1">Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</h4>
1708 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p1"></p>
1709 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p2">
1710 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
1711 contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad.
1712 </p>
1713 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p3">
1714 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference,
1715 as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being.
1716 Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
1717 </p>
1718 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p4">
1719 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters
1720 of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue,
1721 as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad.
1722 </p>
1723 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p5">
1724 <b>On the contrary,</b> A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
1725 </p>
1726 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p6">
1727 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
1728 <a id="FS_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation
1729 to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way
1730 a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the
1731 agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which
1732 disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason,
1733 whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished
1734 specifically by the difference of good and bad.
1735 </p>
1736 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p7"> Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable
1737 to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes
1738 to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher
1739 nature.
1740 </p>
1741 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p8">
1742 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen
1743 that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are
1744 divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something
1745 good, and another about something bad.
1746 </p>
1747 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p9">
1748 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate
1749 good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference
1750 of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature.
1751 </p>
1752 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p10">
1753 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated
1754 above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which
1755 is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue.
1756 </p>
1757 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p11"></p>
1758 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p12"></p>
1759 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a>
1760 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a>
1761 </div>
1762 <div id="FS_Q54_A4" class="div4">
1763 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a>
1764 <a href="summa.FS.v.html"></a>
1765 <h4 id="FS_Q54_A4-p0.1">Whether one habit is made up of many habits?</h4>
1766 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p1"></p>
1767 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p2">
1768 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems
1769 to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated
1770 above (
1771 <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html">Q[51], A[3]</a>). Therefore one habit is made up of several.
1772 </p>
1773 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p3">
1774 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
1775 temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
1776 </p>
1777 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p4">
1778 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to
1779 but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
1780 </p>
1781 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p5">
1782 <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made
1783 up of many.
1784 </p>
1785 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p6">
1786 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection
1787 should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so
1788 far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far
1789 as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to
1790 one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above (
1791 <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3).
1792 </p>
1793 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p7"> If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this
1794 multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality,
1795 not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation
1796 to one, whence it derives its unity.
1797 </p>
1798 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p8">
1799 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that
1800 the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins
1801 by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities.
1802 </p>
1803 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p9">
1804 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective
1805 or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4;
1806 <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">SS, Q[48])</a>.
1807 </p>
1808 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p10">
1809 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly.
1810 And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in
1811 him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions
1812 and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from
1813 another.
1814 </p>
1815 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p11"></p>
1816 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p12"></p>
1817 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a>
1818 <a href="summa.FS.v.html"></a>
1819 </div>
1820 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a>
1821 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a>
1822 </div>
1823 <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A4.html"></a>
1824 <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a>
1825 `
1826 </div>