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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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| 1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.x" class="div2"> | |
| 2 <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3 <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a> | |
| 4 <h2 id="FP.x-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)</h2> | |
| 5 <div id="FP_Q103" class="div3"> | |
| 6 <a href="summa.FP.x.html"></a> | |
| 7 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a> | |
| 8 <h3 id="FP_Q103-p0.1">OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 9 <p id="FP_Q103-p1"></p> | |
| 10 <p id="FP_Q103-p2"> Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, | |
| 11 and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there | |
| 12 are eight points of inquiry: | |
| 13 </p> | |
| 14 <p id="FP_Q103-p3"> (1) Whether the world is governed by someone?</p> | |
| 15 <p id="FP_Q103-p4"> (2) What is the end of this government?</p> | |
| 16 <p id="FP_Q103-p5"> (3) Whether the world is governed by one?</p> | |
| 17 <p id="FP_Q103-p6"> (4) Of the effects of this government?</p> | |
| 18 <p id="FP_Q103-p7"> (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?</p> | |
| 19 <p id="FP_Q103-p8"> (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</p> | |
| 20 <p id="FP_Q103-p9"> (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?</p> | |
| 21 <p id="FP_Q103-p10"> (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?</p> | |
| 22 <div id="FP_Q103_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 23 <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a> | |
| 24 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a> | |
| 25 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A1-p0.1">Whether the world is governed by anyone?</h4> | |
| 26 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 27 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p2"> | |
| 28 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work | |
| 29 for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have | |
| 30 no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed. | |
| 31 </p> | |
| 32 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p3"> | |
| 33 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but | |
| 34 has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed. | |
| 35 </p> | |
| 36 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p4"> | |
| 37 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle | |
| 38 of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their | |
| 39 actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed. | |
| 40 </p> | |
| 41 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p5"> | |
| 42 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 43 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this | |
| 44 universe by mandate eternal." | |
| 45 </p> | |
| 46 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p6"> I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. | |
| 47 But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that | |
| 48 in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed | |
| 49 nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is | |
| 50 a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that | |
| 51 put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration | |
| 52 of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above ( | |
| 53 <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html">Q[44], A[4]</a>; | |
| 54 <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65], A[2]</a>), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is | |
| 55 not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate | |
| 56 perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, | |
| 57 so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern. | |
| 58 </p> | |
| 59 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p7"> | |
| 60 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; | |
| 61 and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for | |
| 62 an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end | |
| 63 unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end | |
| 64 shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, | |
| 65 shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason. | |
| 66 </p> | |
| 67 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p8"> | |
| 68 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement | |
| 69 we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, | |
| 70 would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later ( | |
| 71 <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html">Q[104], A[1]</a>). | |
| 72 </p> | |
| 73 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p9"> | |
| 74 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, | |
| 75 directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression | |
| 76 from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their | |
| 77 nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their | |
| 78 nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, | |
| 79 so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence. | |
| 80 </p> | |
| 81 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p10"></p> | |
| 82 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 83 <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a> | |
| 84 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a> | |
| 85 </div> | |
| 86 <div id="FP_Q103_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 87 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a> | |
| 88 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a> | |
| 89 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A2-p0.1">Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?</h4> | |
| 90 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 91 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p2"> | |
| 92 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the | |
| 93 government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the | |
| 94 thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of | |
| 95 things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves. | |
| 96 </p> | |
| 97 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p3"> | |
| 98 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation. | |
| 99 But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic | |
| 100 can be the end of the government of things. | |
| 101 </p> | |
| 102 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p4"> | |
| 103 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine | |
| 104 says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the | |
| 105 world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good. | |
| 106 </p> | |
| 107 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p5"> | |
| 108 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 109 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of | |
| 110 all things is something extrinsic to them. | |
| 111 </p> | |
| 112 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p6"> | |
| 113 <b>I answer that,</b> As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their | |
| 114 beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what | |
| 115 has been expounded above ( | |
| 116 <a id="FP_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear | |
| 117 that good has the nature | |
| 118 of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things | |
| 119 is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a | |
| 120 particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which | |
| 121 is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe. | |
| 122 </p> | |
| 123 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p7"> | |
| 124 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something | |
| 125 done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the | |
| 126 buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe | |
| 127 being the good to which it is directed. | |
| 128 </p> | |
| 129 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p8"> | |
| 130 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the | |
| 131 end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder | |
| 132 is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, | |
| 133 but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that | |
| 134 Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is | |
| 135 the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation | |
| 136 thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible. | |
| 137 </p> | |
| 138 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p9"> | |
| 139 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate | |
| 140 end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in | |
| 141 Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10. | |
| 142 </p> | |
| 143 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p10"></p> | |
| 144 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 145 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a> | |
| 146 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a> | |
| 147 </div> | |
| 148 <div id="FP_Q103_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 149 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a> | |
| 150 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a> | |
| 151 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A3-p0.1">Whether the world is governed by one?</h4> | |
| 152 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 153 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p2"> | |
| 154 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government | |
| 155 of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously | |
| 156 different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one. | |
| 157 </p> | |
| 158 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p3"> | |
| 159 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the | |
| 160 ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the | |
| 161 case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one. | |
| 162 </p> | |
| 163 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p4"> | |
| 164 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" ( | |
| 165 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.4.9" target="asv">Eccles. 4:9</a>). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many. | |
| 166 </p> | |
| 167 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p5"> | |
| 168 <b>On the contrary,</b> We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle ( | |
| 169 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs | |
| 170 dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above ( | |
| 171 <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">Q[13], A[8]</a>). Therefore the world is governed by one. | |
| 172 </p> | |
| 173 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p6"> | |
| 174 <b>I answer that,</b> We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which | |
| 175 is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the | |
| 176 best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things | |
| 177 governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, | |
| 178 as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which | |
| 179 they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as | |
| 180 they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is | |
| 181 unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, | |
| 182 except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several | |
| 183 things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of | |
| 184 the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, | |
| 185 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler." | |
| 186 </p> | |
| 187 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p7"> | |
| 188 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity | |
| 189 of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe ( | |
| 190 <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2; | |
| 191 <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html">Q[48], A[2]</a>), and not by a diversity of governors. | |
| 192 </p> | |
| 193 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p8"> | |
| 194 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so | |
| 195 far as they are included in the one order of the universe. | |
| 196 </p> | |
| 197 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p9"> | |
| 198 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is | |
| 199 possible. | |
| 200 </p> | |
| 201 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p10"></p> | |
| 202 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 203 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a> | |
| 204 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a> | |
| 205 </div> | |
| 206 <div id="FP_Q103_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 207 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a> | |
| 208 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a> | |
| 209 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A4-p0.1">Whether the effect of government is one or many?</h4> | |
| 210 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 211 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p2"> | |
| 212 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that | |
| 213 which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example | |
| 214 of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect. | |
| 215 </p> | |
| 216 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p3"> | |
| 217 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved | |
| 218 <a id="FP_Q103_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore also the effect of this government is but one. | |
| 219 </p> | |
| 220 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p4"> | |
| 221 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the | |
| 222 many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects | |
| 223 of government. | |
| 224 </p> | |
| 225 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p5"> | |
| 226 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs | |
| 227 to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government. | |
| 228 </p> | |
| 229 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p6"> | |
| 230 <b>I answer that,</b> The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. | |
| 231 Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things | |
| 232 tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; | |
| 233 and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. | |
| 234 Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature | |
| 235 is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in | |
| 236 two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, | |
| 237 with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to | |
| 238 be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things | |
| 239 to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without | |
| 240 number. | |
| 241 </p> | |
| 242 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p7"> | |
| 243 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two | |
| 244 things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another. | |
| 245 </p> | |
| 246 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p8"> From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.</p> | |
| 247 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p9"></p> | |
| 248 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p10"></p> | |
| 249 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a> | |
| 250 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a> | |
| 251 </div> | |
| 252 <div id="FP_Q103_A5" class="div4"> | |
| 253 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a> | |
| 254 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a> | |
| 255 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A5-p0.1">Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?</h4> | |
| 256 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p1"></p> | |
| 257 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p2"> | |
| 258 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written ( | |
| 259 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.11" target="asv">Eccles. 9:11</a>): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches | |
| 260 to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not | |
| 261 ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine | |
| 262 government. | |
| 263 </p> | |
| 264 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p3"> | |
| 265 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( | |
| 266 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject | |
| 267 to the Divine government. | |
| 268 </p> | |
| 269 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p4"> | |
| 270 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it | |
| 271 is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. | |
| 272 Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government. | |
| 273 </p> | |
| 274 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p5"> | |
| 275 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, | |
| 276 even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their | |
| 277 nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government. | |
| 278 </p> | |
| 279 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p6"> | |
| 280 <b>I answer that,</b> For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; | |
| 281 and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal | |
| 282 being, as proved above ( | |
| 283 <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. | |
| 284 This can also | |
| 285 be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under | |
| 286 the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown | |
| 287 <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have | |
| 288 said above ( | |
| 289 <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html">Q[44], A[4]</a>; | |
| 290 <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65], A[2]</a>), so it is impossible for | |
| 291 anything to escape from the Divine government. | |
| 292 </p> | |
| 293 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p7"> Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even | |
| 294 human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" | |
| 295 ( | |
| 296 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.9.9" target="asv">Ezech. 9:9</a>). | |
| 297 </p> | |
| 298 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p8"> | |
| 299 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such | |
| 300 things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element | |
| 301 of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government | |
| 302 of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would | |
| 303 tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which | |
| 304 constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher | |
| 305 cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects | |
| 306 may be found in these things according to some order of time. | |
| 307 </p> | |
| 308 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p9"> | |
| 309 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable | |
| 310 thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is | |
| 311 an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. | |
| 312 Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed | |
| 313 according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these | |
| 314 are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, | |
| 315 that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational | |
| 316 creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God | |
| 317 hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which | |
| 318 rational creatures are governed. | |
| 319 </p> | |
| 320 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p10"> | |
| 321 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the | |
| 322 Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own | |
| 323 act, it requires to be governed by God. | |
| 324 </p> | |
| 325 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p11"></p> | |
| 326 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p12"></p> | |
| 327 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a> | |
| 328 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a> | |
| 329 </div> | |
| 330 <div id="FP_Q103_A6" class="div4"> | |
| 331 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a> | |
| 332 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a> | |
| 333 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A6-p0.1">Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</h4> | |
| 334 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p1"></p> | |
| 335 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p2"> | |
| 336 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the | |
| 337 opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly | |
| 338 things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to | |
| 339 watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain | |
| 340 spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God. | |
| 341 </p> | |
| 342 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p3"> | |
| 343 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But | |
| 344 God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately. | |
| 345 </p> | |
| 346 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p4"> | |
| 347 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; | |
| 348 thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the | |
| 349 same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately. | |
| 350 </p> | |
| 351 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p5"> | |
| 352 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater | |
| 353 subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled | |
| 354 by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself." | |
| 355 </p> | |
| 356 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p6"> | |
| 357 <b>I answer that,</b> In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution | |
| 358 of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some | |
| 359 things by means of others. | |
| 360 </p> | |
| 361 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p7"> The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest | |
| 362 degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design | |
| 363 of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his | |
| 364 attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we | |
| 365 must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least. | |
| 366 </p> | |
| 367 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p8"> But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better | |
| 368 in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself | |
| 369 and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some | |
| 370 of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, | |
| 371 but gives also the faculty of teaching others. | |
| 372 </p> | |
| 373 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p9"> | |
| 374 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of | |
| 375 government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts. | |
| 376 </p> | |
| 377 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p10"> | |
| 378 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would | |
| 379 not be accomplished by one. | |
| 380 </p> | |
| 381 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p11"> | |
| 382 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his | |
| 383 dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence. | |
| 384 </p> | |
| 385 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p12"></p> | |
| 386 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p13"></p> | |
| 387 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a> | |
| 388 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a> | |
| 389 </div> | |
| 390 <div id="FP_Q103_A7" class="div4"> | |
| 391 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a> | |
| 392 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a> | |
| 393 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A7-p0.1">Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?</h4> | |
| 394 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p1"></p> | |
| 395 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p2"> | |
| 396 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. | |
| 397 iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would | |
| 398 follow that no evil exists. | |
| 399 </p> | |
| 400 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p3"> | |
| 401 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs | |
| 402 outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual. | |
| 403 </p> | |
| 404 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p4"> | |
| 405 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. | |
| 406 Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, | |
| 407 and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine | |
| 408 government. | |
| 409 </p> | |
| 410 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p5"> | |
| 411 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 412 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Esth.13.9" target="asv">Esther 13:9</a>): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will." | |
| 413 </p> | |
| 414 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p6"> | |
| 415 <b>I answer that,</b> It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal | |
| 416 cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding | |
| 417 cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of | |
| 418 the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which | |
| 419 again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the | |
| 420 first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside | |
| 421 the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order | |
| 422 of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards | |
| 423 some other | |
| 424 cause. | |
| 425 </p> | |
| 426 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p7"> | |
| 427 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above ( | |
| 428 <a id="FP_Q103_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped | |
| 429 from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist. | |
| 430 </p> | |
| 431 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p8"> | |
| 432 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order | |
| 433 of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24). | |
| 434 </p> | |
| 435 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p9"> | |
| 436 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not | |
| 437 as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside | |
| 438 the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government. | |
| 439 </p> | |
| 440 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p10"></p> | |
| 441 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p11"></p> | |
| 442 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a> | |
| 443 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a> | |
| 444 </div> | |
| 445 <div id="FP_Q103_A8" class="div4"> | |
| 446 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a> | |
| 447 <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a> | |
| 448 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A8-p0.1">Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?</h4> | |
| 449 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p1"></p> | |
| 450 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p2"> | |
| 451 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written ( | |
| 452 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.8" target="asv">Is. 3:8</a>): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord." | |
| 453 </p> | |
| 454 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p3"> | |
| 455 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against | |
| 456 God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God. | |
| 457 </p> | |
| 458 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p4"> | |
| 459 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things | |
| 460 rebel against the order of the Divine government. | |
| 461 </p> | |
| 462 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p5"> | |
| 463 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign | |
| 464 good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said ( | |
| 465 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8" target="asv">Wis. 8</a>) of Divine wisdom. | |
| 466 </p> | |
| 467 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p6"> | |
| 468 <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause | |
| 469 of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government. | |
| 470 </p> | |
| 471 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p7"> Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly | |
| 472 from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and | |
| 473 effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, | |
| 474 as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is | |
| 475 nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but | |
| 476 an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, | |
| 477 as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things sweetly." | |
| 478 </p> | |
| 479 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p8"> | |
| 480 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for | |
| 481 even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their | |
| 482 nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God. | |
| 483 </p> | |
| 484 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p9"> Reply OBJ 2 is clear from the above.</p> | |
| 485 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p10"> | |
| 486 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; | |
| 487 but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things. | |
| 488 </p> | |
| 489 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p11"></p> | |
| 490 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p12"></p> | |
| 491 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a> | |
| 492 <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a> | |
| 493 </div> | |
| 494 <a href="summa.FP.x.html"></a> | |
| 495 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a> | |
| 496 </div> | |
| 497 <div id="FP_Q104" class="div3"> | |
| 498 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a> | |
| 499 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a> | |
| 500 <h3 id="FP_Q104-p0.1">THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 501 <p id="FP_Q104-p1"></p> | |
| 502 <p id="FP_Q104-p2"> We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:</p> | |
| 503 <p id="FP_Q104-p3"> (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?</p> | |
| 504 <p id="FP_Q104-p4"> (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?</p> | |
| 505 <p id="FP_Q104-p5"> (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?</p> | |
| 506 <p id="FP_Q104-p6"> (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?</p> | |
| 507 <div id="FP_Q104_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 508 <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a> | |
| 509 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a> | |
| 510 <h4 id="FP_Q104_A1-p0.1">Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?</h4> | |
| 511 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 512 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p2"> | |
| 513 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in | |
| 514 being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature | |
| 515 cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which | |
| 516 is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be | |
| 517 in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, | |
| 518 because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of | |
| 519 the angels ( | |
| 520 <a id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], AA[2]</a>,5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality | |
| 521 to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies ( | |
| 522 <a id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A2.html">Q[66], A[2]</a>). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality | |
| 523 to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since | |
| 524 it is not in potentiality to any other form. | |
| 525 </p> | |
| 526 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p3"> | |
| 527 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect | |
| 528 to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for | |
| 529 some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He | |
| 530 has ceased to create it. | |
| 531 </p> | |
| 532 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p4"> | |
| 533 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and | |
| 534 violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through | |
| 535 some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are | |
| 536 spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to | |
| 537 not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action. | |
| 538 </p> | |
| 539 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p5"> | |
| 540 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, | |
| 541 produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is | |
| 542 not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does | |
| 543 it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature | |
| 544 in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore | |
| 545 creatures are not kept in being by God. | |
| 546 </p> | |
| 547 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p6"> | |
| 548 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 549 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>): "Upholding all things by the word of His power." | |
| 550 </p> | |
| 551 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p7"> | |
| 552 <b>I answer that,</b> Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a | |
| 553 thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything | |
| 554 by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. | |
| 555 In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a | |
| 556 nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said | |
| 557 to preserve another 'per se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot | |
| 558 exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, | |
| 559 so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the | |
| 560 Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi). | |
| 561 </p> | |
| 562 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p8"> This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an | |
| 563 agent may be the cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being." This may be seen both in artificial | |
| 564 and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct cause of its "being." | |
| 565 For it is clear that the "being" of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and | |
| 566 arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying | |
| 567 the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able | |
| 568 to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house depends on the nature of these | |
| 569 materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For | |
| 570 if | |
| 571 an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of "being" which results from that form; | |
| 572 but it will be the cause of the effect, in its "becoming" only. | |
| 573 </p> | |
| 574 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p9"> Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would | |
| 575 then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this | |
| 576 form for as much as it is in matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives "this form." And this | |
| 577 is to be the cause of "becoming," as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is | |
| 578 such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, | |
| 579 then the "becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the agent. | |
| 580 </p> | |
| 581 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p10"> Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists | |
| 582 in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus | |
| 583 the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause | |
| 584 of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of | |
| 585 "becoming" but also the cause of "being." | |
| 586 </p> | |
| 587 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p11"> Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of | |
| 588 the effect: so neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of | |
| 589 the effect not only in "becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's | |
| 590 action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to | |
| 591 act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if | |
| 592 it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly | |
| 593 and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On | |
| 594 the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the | |
| 595 principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun. | |
| 596 </p> | |
| 597 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p12"> Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by | |
| 598 its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, | |
| 599 since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. | |
| 600 Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His | |
| 601 creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: | |
| 602 "As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns | |
| 603 at once to darkness." | |
| 604 </p> | |
| 605 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p13"> | |
| 606 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Being" naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from | |
| 607 the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures | |
| 608 and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures. | |
| 609 </p> | |
| 610 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p14"> | |
| 611 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make | |
| 612 it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an | |
| 613 effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but | |
| 614 only of "becoming." | |
| 615 </p> | |
| 616 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p15"> | |
| 617 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not | |
| 618 need to be preserved thus, as stated above. | |
| 619 </p> | |
| 620 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p16"> | |
| 621 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either | |
| 622 motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun. | |
| 623 </p> | |
| 624 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p17"></p> | |
| 625 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p18"></p> | |
| 626 <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a> | |
| 627 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a> | |
| 628 </div> | |
| 629 <div id="FP_Q104_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 630 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a> | |
| 631 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a> | |
| 632 <h4 id="FP_Q104_A2-p0.1">Whether God preserves every creature immediately?</h4> | |
| 633 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 634 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p2"> | |
| 635 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as | |
| 636 above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately. | |
| 637 </p> | |
| 638 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p3"> | |
| 639 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less | |
| 640 therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause | |
| 641 preserving them. | |
| 642 </p> | |
| 643 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p4"> | |
| 644 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes | |
| 645 do not seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause only by moving, as above stated ( | |
| 646 <a id="FP_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html">Q[45], A[3]</a>). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being. | |
| 647 </p> | |
| 648 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p5"> | |
| 649 <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore | |
| 650 He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes. | |
| 651 </p> | |
| 652 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p6"> | |
| 653 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 654 <a id="FP_Q104_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a | |
| 655 corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per se," by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of | |
| 656 the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal | |
| 657 things there are many causes which | |
| 658 hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; | |
| 659 and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when | |
| 660 we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally | |
| 661 on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the | |
| 662 principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all | |
| 663 the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause. | |
| 664 </p> | |
| 665 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p7"> For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: | |
| 666 thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation | |
| 667 of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation | |
| 668 and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which | |
| 669 are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes. | |
| 670 </p> | |
| 671 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p8"> | |
| 672 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend | |
| 673 on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation. | |
| 674 </p> | |
| 675 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p9"> | |
| 676 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only | |
| 677 produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving | |
| 678 another. | |
| 679 </p> | |
| 680 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p10"> | |
| 681 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue | |
| 682 of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in | |
| 683 the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is | |
| 684 lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of | |
| 685 the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light. | |
| 686 </p> | |
| 687 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 688 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 689 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a> | |
| 690 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a> | |
| 691 </div> | |
| 692 <div id="FP_Q104_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 693 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a> | |
| 694 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a> | |
| 695 <h4 id="FP_Q104_A3-p0.1">Whether God can annihilate anything?</h4> | |
| 696 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 697 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p2"> | |
| 698 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything | |
| 699 tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate | |
| 700 anything. | |
| 701 </p> | |
| 702 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p3"> | |
| 703 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because | |
| 704 God is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be | |
| 705 the case were He to annihilate anything. | |
| 706 </p> | |
| 707 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p4"> | |
| 708 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action | |
| 709 is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated | |
| 710 another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything. | |
| 711 </p> | |
| 712 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p5"> | |
| 713 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 714 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." | |
| 715 </p> | |
| 716 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p6"> | |
| 717 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate | |
| 718 anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above ( | |
| 719 <a id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things | |
| 720 of His own free-will, according to | |
| 721 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.134.6" target="asv"> Ps. 134:6</a>: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He | |
| 722 hath done." Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence | |
| 723 otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, | |
| 724 God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; | |
| 725 and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them. | |
| 726 </p> | |
| 727 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p7"> | |
| 728 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as | |
| 729 such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has | |
| 730 this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to | |
| 731 non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom. | |
| 732 </p> | |
| 733 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p8"> | |
| 734 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on | |
| 735 creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, | |
| 736 so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence. | |
| 737 </p> | |
| 738 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p9"> | |
| 739 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action. | |
| 740 </p> | |
| 741 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p10"></p> | |
| 742 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 743 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a> | |
| 744 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a> | |
| 745 </div> | |
| 746 <div id="FP_Q104_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 747 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a> | |
| 748 <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a> | |
| 749 <h4 id="FP_Q104_A4-p0.1">Whether anything is annihilated?</h4> | |
| 750 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 751 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p2"> | |
| 752 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing | |
| 753 but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced | |
| 754 to nothing. | |
| 755 </p> | |
| 756 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p3"> | |
| 757 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves | |
| 758 (Phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; | |
| 759 and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing. | |
| 760 </p> | |
| 761 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p4"> | |
| 762 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are | |
| 763 reduced to nothing. | |
| 764 </p> | |
| 765 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p5"> | |
| 766 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 767 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever." | |
| 768 </p> | |
| 769 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p6"> | |
| 770 <b>I answer that,</b> Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, | |
| 771 and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained ( | |
| 772 <a id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things | |
| 773 which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To | |
| 774 each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" ( | |
| 775 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles. | |
| 776 </p> | |
| 777 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p7"> Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no | |
| 778 potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, | |
| 779 since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation | |
| 780 of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in | |
| 781 existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated. | |
| 782 </p> | |
| 783 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p8"> | |
| 784 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that | |
| 785 they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving | |
| 786 all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" ( | |
| 787 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). | |
| 788 </p> | |
| 789 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p9"> | |
| 790 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence | |
| 791 is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, | |
| 792 however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent | |
| 793 from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot | |
| 794 resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue | |
| 795 to exist for ever. | |
| 796 </p> | |
| 797 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p10"> | |
| 798 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for | |
| 799 it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely | |
| 800 reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of | |
| 801 the subject. | |
| 802 </p> | |
| 803 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 804 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p12"></p> | |
| 805 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a> | |
| 806 <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a> | |
| 807 </div> | |
| 808 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a> | |
| 809 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a> | |
| 810 </div> | |
| 811 <div id="FP_Q105" class="div3"> | |
| 812 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a> | |
| 813 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a> | |
| 814 <h3 id="FP_Q105-p0.1">OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 815 <p id="FP_Q105-p1"></p> | |
| 816 <p id="FP_Q105-p2"> We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures | |
| 817 by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another. | |
| 818 </p> | |
| 819 <p id="FP_Q105-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 820 <p id="FP_Q105-p4"> (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?</p> | |
| 821 <p id="FP_Q105-p5"> (2) Whether He can immediately move a body?</p> | |
| 822 <p id="FP_Q105-p6"> (3) Whether He can move the intellect?</p> | |
| 823 <p id="FP_Q105-p7"> (4) Whether He can move the will?</p> | |
| 824 <p id="FP_Q105-p8"> (5) Whether God works in every worker?</p> | |
| 825 <p id="FP_Q105-p9"> (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?</p> | |
| 826 <p id="FP_Q105-p10"> (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?</p> | |
| 827 <p id="FP_Q105-p11"> (8) Of the diversity of miracles.</p> | |
| 828 <div id="FP_Q105_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 829 <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a> | |
| 830 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a> | |
| 831 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A1-p0.1">Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?</h4> | |
| 832 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 833 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p2"> | |
| 834 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, | |
| 835 Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets | |
| 836 like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter. | |
| 837 </p> | |
| 838 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p3"> | |
| 839 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by | |
| 840 some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means | |
| 841 of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any | |
| 842 particular form, except by means of a particular agent. | |
| 843 </p> | |
| 844 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p4"> | |
| 845 <b>Objection 3:</b> As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as | |
| 846 we have seen above ( | |
| 847 <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html">Q[104], A[2]</a>). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, | |
| 848 only by means of particular causes. | |
| 849 </p> | |
| 850 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p5"> | |
| 851 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 852 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth." | |
| 853 </p> | |
| 854 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p6"> | |
| 855 <b>I answer that,</b> God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active | |
| 856 power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it | |
| 857 can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing | |
| 858 else but the act of matter. | |
| 859 </p> | |
| 860 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p7"> | |
| 861 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, | |
| 862 and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in | |
| 863 its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they | |
| 864 are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that | |
| 865 over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above ( | |
| 866 <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; | |
| 867 <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the | |
| 868 composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating | |
| 869 a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But | |
| 870 no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence | |
| 871 angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds. | |
| 872 </p> | |
| 873 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p8"> | |
| 874 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows | |
| 875 the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that | |
| 876 form on matter. | |
| 877 </p> | |
| 878 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p9"> | |
| 879 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes | |
| 880 to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause. | |
| 881 </p> | |
| 882 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p10"></p> | |
| 883 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 884 <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a> | |
| 885 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a> | |
| 886 </div> | |
| 887 <div id="FP_Q105_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 888 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a> | |
| 889 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a> | |
| 890 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A2-p0.1">Whether God can move a body immediately?</h4> | |
| 891 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 892 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p2"> | |
| 893 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher | |
| 894 says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between | |
| 895 God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. | |
| 896 </p> | |
| 897 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p3"> | |
| 898 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object | |
| 899 of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal | |
| 900 power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. | |
| 901 </p> | |
| 902 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p4"> | |
| 903 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a | |
| 904 body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist | |
| 905 at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God's | |
| 906 power is infinite, as we have explained ( | |
| 907 <a id="FP_Q105_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore God | |
| 908 cannot move a body immediately. | |
| 909 </p> | |
| 910 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p5"> | |
| 911 <b>On the contrary,</b> God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from | |
| 912 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.9" target="asv"> Gn. 1:9 </a>"Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone can move a body immediately. | |
| 913 </p> | |
| 914 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p6"> | |
| 915 <b>I answer that,</b> It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. | |
| 916 Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any | |
| 917 bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated | |
| 918 <a id="FP_Q105_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light | |
| 919 result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else | |
| 920 tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to | |
| 921 that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and | |
| 922 moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever | |
| 923 in | |
| 924 respect of any movement whatever. | |
| 925 </p> | |
| 926 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p7"> | |
| 927 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of | |
| 928 sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, | |
| 929 nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural | |
| 930 power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the | |
| 931 words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched. | |
| 932 </p> | |
| 933 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p8"> | |
| 934 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended | |
| 935 by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness. | |
| 936 </p> | |
| 937 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p9"> | |
| 938 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of | |
| 939 bulk," by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover | |
| 940 can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk," would move without time, which is impossible; | |
| 941 therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is | |
| 942 not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite | |
| 943 power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an | |
| 944 infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the | |
| 945 velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does | |
| 946 not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is | |
| 947 not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and | |
| 948 therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time. | |
| 949 </p> | |
| 950 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p10"></p> | |
| 951 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 952 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a> | |
| 953 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a> | |
| 954 </div> | |
| 955 <div id="FP_Q105_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 956 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a> | |
| 957 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a> | |
| 958 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A3-p0.1">Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?</h4> | |
| 959 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 960 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p2"> | |
| 961 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its | |
| 962 own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is | |
| 963 moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; | |
| 964 and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect. | |
| 965 </p> | |
| 966 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p3"> | |
| 967 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the | |
| 968 intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as | |
| 969 the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle | |
| 970 of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another. | |
| 971 </p> | |
| 972 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p4"> | |
| 973 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible | |
| 974 to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect. | |
| 975 </p> | |
| 976 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p5"> | |
| 977 <b>On the contrary,</b> The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written ( | |
| 978 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God moves the human intellect. | |
| 979 </p> | |
| 980 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p6"> | |
| 981 <b>I answer that,</b> As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said | |
| 982 to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement | |
| 983 of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual | |
| 984 power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; | |
| 985 while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. | |
| 986 So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses | |
| 987 on him the likeness of the thing understood. | |
| 988 </p> | |
| 989 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p7"> Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result | |
| 990 of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause | |
| 991 of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First | |
| 992 Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in | |
| 993 Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived | |
| 994 from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they | |
| 995 may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, | |
| 996 or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and | |
| 997 species in existence. | |
| 998 </p> | |
| 999 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p8"> | |
| 1000 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from | |
| 1001 God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands. | |
| 1002 </p> | |
| 1003 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p9"> | |
| 1004 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but | |
| 1005 it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle. | |
| 1006 </p> | |
| 1007 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p10"> | |
| 1008 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of | |
| 1009 which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient | |
| 1010 to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above ( | |
| 1011 <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">Q[12], A[2]</a>; | |
| 1012 <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Hence He moves the created | |
| 1013 intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained ( | |
| 1014 <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). | |
| 1015 </p> | |
| 1016 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 1017 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p12"></p> | |
| 1018 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1019 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1020 </div> | |
| 1021 <div id="FP_Q105_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 1022 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1023 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a> | |
| 1024 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A4-p0.1">Whether God can move the created will?</h4> | |
| 1025 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 1026 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p2"> | |
| 1027 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be | |
| 1028 forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God. | |
| 1029 </p> | |
| 1030 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p3"> | |
| 1031 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for | |
| 1032 to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will. | |
| 1033 </p> | |
| 1034 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p4"> | |
| 1035 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, | |
| 1036 but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward | |
| 1037 or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will. | |
| 1038 </p> | |
| 1039 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p5"> | |
| 1040 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 1041 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish." | |
| 1042 </p> | |
| 1043 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p6"> | |
| 1044 <b>I answer that,</b> As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above | |
| 1045 <a id="FP_Q105_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved | |
| 1046 by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently | |
| 1047 unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the | |
| 1048 potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal | |
| 1049 good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone | |
| 1050 is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner | |
| 1051 the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the | |
| 1052 will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate | |
| 1053 end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects | |
| 1054 to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior | |
| 1055 inclination of the will. | |
| 1056 </p> | |
| 1057 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p7"> | |
| 1058 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the | |
| 1059 proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then | |
| 1060 it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural | |
| 1061 inclination. | |
| 1062 </p> | |
| 1063 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p8"> | |
| 1064 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be | |
| 1065 caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another. | |
| 1066 </p> | |
| 1067 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p9"> | |
| 1068 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed | |
| 1069 for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have | |
| 1070 stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit. | |
| 1071 </p> | |
| 1072 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p10"></p> | |
| 1073 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 1074 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1075 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a> | |
| 1076 </div> | |
| 1077 <div id="FP_Q105_A5" class="div4"> | |
| 1078 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1079 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a> | |
| 1080 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A5-p0.1">Whether God works in every agent?</h4> | |
| 1081 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p1"></p> | |
| 1082 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p2"> | |
| 1083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God | |
| 1084 works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all. | |
| 1085 </p> | |
| 1086 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p3"> | |
| 1087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong | |
| 1088 to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same | |
| 1089 time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all. | |
| 1090 </p> | |
| 1091 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p4"> | |
| 1092 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, | |
| 1093 if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. | |
| 1094 But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature. | |
| 1095 </p> | |
| 1096 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p5"> | |
| 1097 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 1098 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv">Is. 26:12</a>): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." | |
| 1099 </p> | |
| 1100 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p6"> | |
| 1101 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God | |
| 1102 alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, | |
| 1103 and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: | |
| 1104 and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, | |
| 1105 that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be | |
| 1106 bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, | |
| 1107 to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less | |
| 1108 perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form | |
| 1109 which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. | |
| 1110 We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation. | |
| 1111 </p> | |
| 1112 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p7"> In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, | |
| 1113 but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles | |
| 1114 of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; | |
| 1115 the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own | |
| 1116 form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, | |
| 1117 for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp. | |
| 1118 </p> | |
| 1119 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p8"> Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for | |
| 1120 the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates | |
| 1121 in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again | |
| 1122 it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the | |
| 1123 first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is | |
| 1124 the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying | |
| 1125 their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the | |
| 1126 axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action | |
| 1127 not | |
| 1128 only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy | |
| 1129 and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation | |
| 1130 of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is | |
| 1131 within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things | |
| 1132 God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works | |
| 1133 intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according | |
| 1134 to | |
| 1135 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.10.11" target="asv"> Job 10:11</a>: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews." | |
| 1136 </p> | |
| 1137 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p9"> | |
| 1138 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents | |
| 1139 is superfluous. | |
| 1140 </p> | |
| 1141 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p10"> | |
| 1142 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a | |
| 1143 primary and a secondary agent. | |
| 1144 </p> | |
| 1145 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p11"> | |
| 1146 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the | |
| 1147 end of every action, as above explained. | |
| 1148 </p> | |
| 1149 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p12"></p> | |
| 1150 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p13"></p> | |
| 1151 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1152 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a> | |
| 1153 </div> | |
| 1154 <div id="FP_Q105_A6" class="div4"> | |
| 1155 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a> | |
| 1156 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a> | |
| 1157 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?</h4> | |
| 1158 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p1"></p> | |
| 1159 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p2"> | |
| 1160 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) | |
| 1161 says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order | |
| 1162 seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order. | |
| 1163 </p> | |
| 1164 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p3"> | |
| 1165 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of | |
| 1166 justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature. | |
| 1167 </p> | |
| 1168 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p4"> | |
| 1169 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that | |
| 1170 He is changeable; which cannot be said. | |
| 1171 </p> | |
| 1172 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p5"> | |
| 1173 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature." | |
| 1174 </p> | |
| 1175 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p6"> | |
| 1176 <b>I answer that,</b> From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the | |
| 1177 multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. | |
| 1178 Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human | |
| 1179 affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is | |
| 1180 contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that | |
| 1181 of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered. | |
| 1182 </p> | |
| 1183 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p7"> If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, | |
| 1184 if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things | |
| 1185 depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary | |
| 1186 causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural | |
| 1187 necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something | |
| 1188 outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, | |
| 1189 or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts | |
| 1190 against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against | |
| 1191 Himself." | |
| 1192 </p> | |
| 1193 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p8"> | |
| 1194 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which | |
| 1195 did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to | |
| 1196 him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent | |
| 1197 on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is | |
| 1198 clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in | |
| 1199 a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies | |
| 1200 depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not | |
| 1201 against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from | |
| 1202 Whom | |
| 1203 is all mode, number, and order in nature." | |
| 1204 </p> | |
| 1205 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p9"> | |
| 1206 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing | |
| 1207 against such order. | |
| 1208 </p> | |
| 1209 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p10"> | |
| 1210 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do | |
| 1211 otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change. | |
| 1212 </p> | |
| 1213 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p11"></p> | |
| 1214 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p12"></p> | |
| 1215 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a> | |
| 1216 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a> | |
| 1217 </div> | |
| 1218 <div id="FP_Q105_A7" class="div4"> | |
| 1219 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a> | |
| 1220 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a> | |
| 1221 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A7-p0.1">Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?</h4> | |
| 1222 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p1"></p> | |
| 1223 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p2"> | |
| 1224 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of | |
| 1225 the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being | |
| 1226 accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God | |
| 1227 does outside the natural order is a miracle. | |
| 1228 </p> | |
| 1229 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p3"> | |
| 1230 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond | |
| 1231 our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of | |
| 1232 nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare | |
| 1233 occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be | |
| 1234 healed by the shadow of Peter ( | |
| 1235 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.15" target="asv">Acts 5:15</a>). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we | |
| 1236 all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things | |
| 1237 are outside the course of natur are miraculous. | |
| 1238 </p> | |
| 1239 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p4"> | |
| 1240 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes | |
| 1241 things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge | |
| 1242 without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous. | |
| 1243 </p> | |
| 1244 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p5"> | |
| 1245 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed | |
| 1246 to observe, we call it a miracle." | |
| 1247 </p> | |
| 1248 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p6"> | |
| 1249 <b>I answer that,</b> The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when | |
| 1250 a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause | |
| 1251 of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all | |
| 1252 to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so | |
| 1253 called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things | |
| 1254 which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles. | |
| 1255 </p> | |
| 1256 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p7"> | |
| 1257 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because | |
| 1258 they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do | |
| 1259 not belong to that order. | |
| 1260 </p> | |
| 1261 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p8"> | |
| 1262 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses | |
| 1263 the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside | |
| 1264 the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of | |
| 1265 the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in | |
| 1266 which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes | |
| 1267 from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection. | |
| 1268 </p> | |
| 1269 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p9"> | |
| 1270 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown | |
| 1271 to be wonderful. | |
| 1272 </p> | |
| 1273 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p10"></p> | |
| 1274 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p11"></p> | |
| 1275 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a> | |
| 1276 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a> | |
| 1277 </div> | |
| 1278 <div id="FP_Q105_A8" class="div4"> | |
| 1279 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a> | |
| 1280 <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a> | |
| 1281 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A8-p0.1">Whether one miracle is greater than another?</h4> | |
| 1282 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p1"></p> | |
| 1283 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p2"> | |
| 1284 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In miraculous | |
| 1285 deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore | |
| 1286 one miracle is not greater than another. | |
| 1287 </p> | |
| 1288 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p3"> | |
| 1289 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason | |
| 1290 exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. | |
| 1291 </p> | |
| 1292 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p4"> | |
| 1293 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works ( | |
| 1294 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.12" target="asv">Jn. 14:12</a>): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do." | |
| 1295 </p> | |
| 1296 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p5"> | |
| 1297 <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power | |
| 1298 of God, according to | |
| 1299 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.15" target="asv"> Is. 40:15</a>: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called | |
| 1300 a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater | |
| 1301 the miracle. Now the power of | |
| 1302 nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, | |
| 1303 or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold | |
| 1304 the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it | |
| 1305 is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the | |
| 1306 dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which | |
| 1307 it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air | |
| 1308 is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; | |
| 1309 and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different | |
| 1310 ways | |
| 1311 in which the power of nature is surpassed. | |
| 1312 </p> | |
| 1313 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p6"> From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.</p> | |
| 1314 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p7"></p> | |
| 1315 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p8"></p> | |
| 1316 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a> | |
| 1317 <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a> | |
| 1318 </div> | |
| 1319 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1320 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1321 </div> | |
| 1322 <div id="FP_Q106" class="div3"> | |
| 1323 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a> | |
| 1324 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1325 <h3 id="FP_Q106-p0.1">HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1326 <p id="FP_Q106-p1"></p> | |
| 1327 <p id="FP_Q106-p2"> We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely | |
| 1328 spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. | |
| 1329 </p> | |
| 1330 <p id="FP_Q106-p3"> Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel | |
| 1331 acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man. | |
| 1332 </p> | |
| 1333 <p id="FP_Q106-p4"> The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both | |
| 1334 of the good and of the bad angels. | |
| 1335 </p> | |
| 1336 <p id="FP_Q106-p5"> Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 1337 <p id="FP_Q106-p6"> (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?</p> | |
| 1338 <p id="FP_Q106-p7"> (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?</p> | |
| 1339 <p id="FP_Q106-p8"> (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</p> | |
| 1340 <p id="FP_Q106-p9"> (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?</p> | |
| 1341 <div id="FP_Q106_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 1342 <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a> | |
| 1343 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1344 <h4 id="FP_Q106_A1-p0.1">Whether one angel enlightens another?</h4> | |
| 1345 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 1346 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p2"> | |
| 1347 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. | |
| 1348 But one man will not then enlighten another, according to | |
| 1349 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.34" target="asv"> Jer. 31:34</a>: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten | |
| 1350 another now. | |
| 1351 </p> | |
| 1352 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p3"> | |
| 1353 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of | |
| 1354 nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes | |
| 1355 from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another. | |
| 1356 </p> | |
| 1357 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p4"> | |
| 1358 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as | |
| 1359 Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another. | |
| 1360 </p> | |
| 1361 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p5"> | |
| 1362 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the | |
| 1363 angels of the first hierarchy." | |
| 1364 </p> | |
| 1365 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p6"> | |
| 1366 <b>I answer that,</b> One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation | |
| 1367 of truth, according to | |
| 1368 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv"> Eph. 5:13</a>: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation | |
| 1369 of the known truth; according to the Apostle ( | |
| 1370 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.8" target="asv">Eph. 3:8</a>): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all | |
| 1371 men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one | |
| 1372 angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): | |
| 1373 "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds." | |
| 1374 </p> | |
| 1375 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p7"> Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said ( | |
| 1376 <a id="FP_Q106_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html">Q[105], A[3]</a>), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known | |
| 1377 truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened | |
| 1378 by the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is | |
| 1379 hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual | |
| 1380 things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the | |
| 1381 truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by | |
| 1382 a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is | |
| 1383 natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth | |
| 1384 which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. | |
| 1385 Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he | |
| 1386 possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident | |
| 1387 power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards | |
| 1388 by analogy." | |
| 1389 </p> | |
| 1390 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p8"> | |
| 1391 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. | |
| 1392 It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know | |
| 1393 the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which | |
| 1394 are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He | |
| 1395 comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior | |
| 1396 angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the | |
| 1397 latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things." | |
| 1398 </p> | |
| 1399 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p9"> | |
| 1400 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural | |
| 1401 light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above. | |
| 1402 </p> | |
| 1403 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p10"> | |
| 1404 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image | |
| 1405 of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, | |
| 1406 except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, | |
| 1407 dispositions to this ultimate form. | |
| 1408 </p> | |
| 1409 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 1410 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p12"></p> | |
| 1411 <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a> | |
| 1412 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1413 </div> | |
| 1414 <div id="FP_Q106_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 1415 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1416 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1417 <h4 id="FP_Q106_A2-p0.1">Whether one angel moves another angel's will?</h4> | |
| 1418 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 1419 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p2"> | |
| 1420 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above | |
| 1421 <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to | |
| 1422 the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an | |
| 1423 end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's | |
| 1424 will. | |
| 1425 </p> | |
| 1426 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p3"> | |
| 1427 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are | |
| 1428 so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another | |
| 1429 angel's will. | |
| 1430 </p> | |
| 1431 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p4"> | |
| 1432 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior | |
| 1433 angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel. | |
| 1434 </p> | |
| 1435 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p5"> | |
| 1436 <b>On the contrary,</b> To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the | |
| 1437 will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will. | |
| 1438 </p> | |
| 1439 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p6"> | |
| 1440 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( | |
| 1441 <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both | |
| 1442 the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out | |
| 1443 the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above ( | |
| 1444 <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>), other goods in a | |
| 1445 measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good | |
| 1446 He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee | |
| 1447 all good" ( | |
| 1448 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.18" target="asv">Ex. 33:18,19</a>). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines | |
| 1449 the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's | |
| 1450 goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion. | |
| 1451 </p> | |
| 1452 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p7"> But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination | |
| 1453 of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: | |
| 1454 just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. | |
| 1455 Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the | |
| 1456 intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will. | |
| 1457 </p> | |
| 1458 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p8"> | |
| 1459 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing | |
| 1460 the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect | |
| 1461 and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above | |
| 1462 <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience | |
| 1463 in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius | |
| 1464 says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things | |
| 1465 unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal | |
| 1466 of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored | |
| 1467 object. | |
| 1468 </p> | |
| 1469 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p9"> | |
| 1470 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above. | |
| 1471 </p> | |
| 1472 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p10"> | |
| 1473 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because | |
| 1474 it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does | |
| 1475 not apply to the angels. | |
| 1476 </p> | |
| 1477 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 1478 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 1479 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p13"></p> | |
| 1480 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1481 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1482 </div> | |
| 1483 <div id="FP_Q106_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 1484 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1485 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1486 <h4 id="FP_Q106_A3-p0.1">Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</h4> | |
| 1487 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 1488 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p2"> | |
| 1489 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and | |
| 1490 represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" ( | |
| 1491 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.26" target="asv">Gal. 4:26</a>). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says ( | |
| 1492 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:31</a>): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted." | |
| 1493 Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors. | |
| 1494 </p> | |
| 1495 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p3"> | |
| 1496 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. | |
| 1497 But, as was said above ( | |
| 1498 <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual | |
| 1499 substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened | |
| 1500 by God can enlighten | |
| 1501 superiors. | |
| 1502 </p> | |
| 1503 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p4"> | |
| 1504 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained | |
| 1505 <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore | |
| 1506 he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors. | |
| 1507 </p> | |
| 1508 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p5"> | |
| 1509 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier. | |
| 1510 iv; Eccl. Hier. v). | |
| 1511 </p> | |
| 1512 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p6"> | |
| 1513 <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained | |
| 1514 ( | |
| 1515 <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore | |
| 1516 there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior | |
| 1517 cause, as in human affairs the command of | |
| 1518 the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of | |
| 1519 corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual | |
| 1520 substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are | |
| 1521 the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that | |
| 1522 the | |
| 1523 inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely. | |
| 1524 </p> | |
| 1525 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p7"> | |
| 1526 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy | |
| 1527 the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more | |
| 1528 sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas | |
| 1529 in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in | |
| 1530 sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, | |
| 1531 and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors. | |
| 1532 </p> | |
| 1533 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p8"> | |
| 1534 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual | |
| 1535 nature. Hence the argument does not hold. | |
| 1536 </p> | |
| 1537 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p9"> | |
| 1538 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made | |
| 1539 the order in the angels. | |
| 1540 </p> | |
| 1541 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p10"></p> | |
| 1542 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 1543 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1544 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1545 </div> | |
| 1546 <div id="FP_Q106_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 1547 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1548 <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a> | |
| 1549 <h4 id="FP_Q106_A4-p0.1">Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?</h4> | |
| 1550 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 1551 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p2"> | |
| 1552 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says | |
| 1553 (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual | |
| 1554 knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the | |
| 1555 superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the | |
| 1556 former. | |
| 1557 </p> | |
| 1558 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p3"> | |
| 1559 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, | |
| 1560 whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, | |
| 1561 as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King | |
| 1562 of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior | |
| 1563 angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so. | |
| 1564 </p> | |
| 1565 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p4"> | |
| 1566 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be | |
| 1567 unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears | |
| 1568 open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things. | |
| 1569 </p> | |
| 1570 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p5"> | |
| 1571 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there | |
| 1572 are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the | |
| 1573 inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above | |
| 1574 <a id="FP_Q106_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. | |
| 1575 </p> | |
| 1576 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p6"> | |
| 1577 <b>I answer that,</b> Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature | |
| 1578 of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So | |
| 1579 the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections | |
| 1580 to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace | |
| 1581 share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards | |
| 1582 of the manifold grace of God" ( | |
| 1583 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10</a>). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same | |
| 1584 to those below them. | |
| 1585 </p> | |
| 1586 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p7"> Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior | |
| 1587 ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the | |
| 1588 pupil who learns from him. | |
| 1589 </p> | |
| 1590 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p8"> | |
| 1591 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge. | |
| 1592 </p> | |
| 1593 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p9"> | |
| 1594 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation | |
| 1595 but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards | |
| 1596 when the Mystery was accomplished. | |
| 1597 </p> | |
| 1598 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p10"> | |
| 1599 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the | |
| 1600 world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to | |
| 1601 the inferior. | |
| 1602 </p> | |
| 1603 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 1604 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p12"></p> | |
| 1605 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1606 <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a> | |
| 1607 </div> | |
| 1608 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a> | |
| 1609 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1610 </div> | |
| 1611 <div id="FP_Q107" class="div3"> | |
| 1612 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1613 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1614 <h3 id="FP_Q107-p0.1">THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1615 <p id="FP_Q107-p1"></p> | |
| 1616 <p id="FP_Q107-p2"> We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 1617 <p id="FP_Q107-p3"> (1) Whether one angel speaks to another?</p> | |
| 1618 <p id="FP_Q107-p4"> (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?</p> | |
| 1619 <p id="FP_Q107-p5"> (3) Whether an angel speaks to God?</p> | |
| 1620 <p id="FP_Q107-p6"> (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?</p> | |
| 1621 <p id="FP_Q107-p7"> (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?</p> | |
| 1622 <div id="FP_Q107_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 1623 <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a> | |
| 1624 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1625 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A1-p0.1">Whether one angel speaks to another?</h4> | |
| 1626 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 1627 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p2"> | |
| 1628 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection | |
| 1629 "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. | |
| 1630 But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to | |
| 1631 another. | |
| 1632 </p> | |
| 1633 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p3"> | |
| 1634 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior | |
| 1635 speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and | |
| 1636 this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another. | |
| 1637 </p> | |
| 1638 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p4"> | |
| 1639 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another | |
| 1640 to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another. | |
| 1641 </p> | |
| 1642 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p5"> | |
| 1643 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 1644 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels." | |
| 1645 </p> | |
| 1646 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p6"> | |
| 1647 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties | |
| 1648 of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech." | |
| 1649 </p> | |
| 1650 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p7"> To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above ( | |
| 1651 <a id="FP_Q107_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">Q[82], A[4]</a>), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible | |
| 1652 object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7); | |
| 1653 secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear | |
| 1654 that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition | |
| 1655 of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second | |
| 1656 to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either | |
| 1657 to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual | |
| 1658 consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior | |
| 1659 word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel | |
| 1660 himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another | |
| 1661 only means to make known the mental concept to another. | |
| 1662 </p> | |
| 1663 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p8"> | |
| 1664 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, | |
| 1665 or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to | |
| 1666 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept | |
| 1667 is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens | |
| 1668 that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but | |
| 1669 some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof | |
| 1670 as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the | |
| 1671 tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another | |
| 1672 at | |
| 1673 once. | |
| 1674 </p> | |
| 1675 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p9"> | |
| 1676 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit | |
| 1677 an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also | |
| 1678 its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, | |
| 1679 whereby he manifests his mental concept. | |
| 1680 </p> | |
| 1681 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p10"> | |
| 1682 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one | |
| 1683 ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, | |
| 1684 and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as | |
| 1685 sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the | |
| 1686 sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power. | |
| 1687 </p> | |
| 1688 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 1689 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p12"></p> | |
| 1690 <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a> | |
| 1691 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1692 </div> | |
| 1693 <div id="FP_Q107_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 1694 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1695 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1696 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A2-p0.1">Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?</h4> | |
| 1697 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 1698 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p2"> | |
| 1699 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text ( | |
| 1700 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby | |
| 1701 the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained ( | |
| 1702 <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior. | |
| 1703 </p> | |
| 1704 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p3"> | |
| 1705 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as was said above ( | |
| 1706 <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and | |
| 1707 to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows. | |
| 1708 </p> | |
| 1709 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p4"> | |
| 1710 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and | |
| 1711 invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic | |
| 1712 speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel. | |
| 1713 </p> | |
| 1714 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p5"> | |
| 1715 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of | |
| 1716 Glory?" | |
| 1717 </p> | |
| 1718 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p6"> | |
| 1719 <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an | |
| 1720 angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said | |
| 1721 <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such | |
| 1722 a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be | |
| 1723 reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby | |
| 1724 we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; | |
| 1725 the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for | |
| 1726 example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of | |
| 1727 what | |
| 1728 depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when | |
| 1729 one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light, | |
| 1730 nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an | |
| 1731 enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; | |
| 1732 but | |
| 1733 only to know the truth in reality. | |
| 1734 </p> | |
| 1735 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p7"> Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, | |
| 1736 which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will | |
| 1737 as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed | |
| 1738 to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and | |
| 1739 the inferior speak to the superior. | |
| 1740 </p> | |
| 1741 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p8"> From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p> | |
| 1742 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p9"> | |
| 1743 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the | |
| 1744 perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the | |
| 1745 angels, as was explained above. | |
| 1746 </p> | |
| 1747 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p10"></p> | |
| 1748 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 1749 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1750 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1751 </div> | |
| 1752 <div id="FP_Q107_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 1753 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1754 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1755 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel speaks to God?</h4> | |
| 1756 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 1757 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p2"> | |
| 1758 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make | |
| 1759 known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God. | |
| 1760 </p> | |
| 1761 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p3"> | |
| 1762 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above | |
| 1763 <a id="FP_Q107_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways | |
| 1764 appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks | |
| 1765 to God. | |
| 1766 </p> | |
| 1767 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p4"> | |
| 1768 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 1769 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.12" target="asv">Zech. 1:12</a>): "The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem." Therefore an | |
| 1770 angel speaks to God. | |
| 1771 </p> | |
| 1772 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p5"> | |
| 1773 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( | |
| 1774 <a id="FP_Q107_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. | |
| 1775 In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in | |
| 1776 human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns | |
| 1777 the truth, or of whatever | |
| 1778 depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing | |
| 1779 is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech | |
| 1780 the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to | |
| 1781 be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels | |
| 1782 speak | |
| 1783 to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration." | |
| 1784 </p> | |
| 1785 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p6"> | |
| 1786 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose | |
| 1787 of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master. | |
| 1788 </p> | |
| 1789 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p7"> | |
| 1790 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting | |
| 1791 Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment. | |
| 1792 </p> | |
| 1793 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p8"></p> | |
| 1794 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p9"></p> | |
| 1795 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1796 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1797 </div> | |
| 1798 <div id="FP_Q107_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 1799 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1800 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a> | |
| 1801 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A4-p0.1">Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?</h4> | |
| 1802 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 1803 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p2"> | |
| 1804 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works | |
| 1805 where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's | |
| 1806 speech is limited by the bounds of that place. | |
| 1807 </p> | |
| 1808 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p3"> | |
| 1809 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one | |
| 1810 to another" ( | |
| 1811 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect. | |
| 1812 </p> | |
| 1813 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p4"> | |
| 1814 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance ( | |
| 1815 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.24" target="asv">Lk. 16:24</a>). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another. | |
| 1816 </p> | |
| 1817 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p5"> | |
| 1818 <b>I answer that,</b> The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above ( | |
| 1819 <a id="FP_Q107_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual operation | |
| 1820 takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at | |
| 1821 all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time | |
| 1822 nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment. | |
| 1823 </p> | |
| 1824 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p6"> | |
| 1825 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists | |
| 1826 in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel | |
| 1827 seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is | |
| 1828 to perceive his speech. | |
| 1829 </p> | |
| 1830 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p7"> | |
| 1831 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of | |
| 1832 what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less | |
| 1833 one cries out." | |
| 1834 </p> | |
| 1835 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p8"></p> | |
| 1836 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p9"></p> | |
| 1837 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1838 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a> | |
| 1839 </div> | |
| 1840 <div id="FP_Q107_A5" class="div4"> | |
| 1841 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1842 <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a> | |
| 1843 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A5-p0.1">Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?</h4> | |
| 1844 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p1"></p> | |
| 1845 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p2"> | |
| 1846 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do | |
| 1847 not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained | |
| 1848 <a id="FP_Q107_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another. | |
| 1849 </p> | |
| 1850 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p3"> | |
| 1851 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known | |
| 1852 by one, it is for the same reason known by all. | |
| 1853 </p> | |
| 1854 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p4"> | |
| 1855 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, | |
| 1856 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore | |
| 1857 the speech of one angel to another extends to all. | |
| 1858 </p> | |
| 1859 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p5"> | |
| 1860 <b>On the contrary,</b> One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels. | |
| 1861 </p> | |
| 1862 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p6"> | |
| 1863 <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( | |
| 1864 <a id="FP_Q107_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his | |
| 1865 will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of | |
| 1866 one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; | |
| 1867 whereas others do not, not through the | |
| 1868 obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above. | |
| 1869 </p> | |
| 1870 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p7"> From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p> | |
| 1871 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p8"> | |
| 1872 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; | |
| 1873 and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created | |
| 1874 will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all. | |
| 1875 </p> | |
| 1876 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p9"></p> | |
| 1877 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p10"></p> | |
| 1878 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1879 <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a> | |
| 1880 </div> | |
| 1881 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a> | |
| 1882 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1883 </div> | |
| 1884 <div id="FP_Q108" class="div3"> | |
| 1885 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a> | |
| 1886 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1887 <h3 id="FP_Q108-p0.1">OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1888 <p id="FP_Q108-p1"></p> | |
| 1889 <p id="FP_Q108-p2"> We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above ( | |
| 1890 <a id="FP_Q108-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely. | |
| 1891 </p> | |
| 1892 <p id="FP_Q108-p3"> Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 1893 <p id="FP_Q108-p4"> (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?</p> | |
| 1894 <p id="FP_Q108-p5"> (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?</p> | |
| 1895 <p id="FP_Q108-p6"> (3) Whether in one order there are many angels?</p> | |
| 1896 <p id="FP_Q108-p7"> (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?</p> | |
| 1897 <p id="FP_Q108-p8"> (5) Of the names and properties of each order.</p> | |
| 1898 <p id="FP_Q108-p9"> (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.</p> | |
| 1899 <p id="FP_Q108-p10"> (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</p> | |
| 1900 <p id="FP_Q108-p11"> (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</p> | |
| 1901 <div id="FP_Q108_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 1902 <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a> | |
| 1903 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1904 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A1-p0.1">Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?</h4> | |
| 1905 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 1906 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p2"> | |
| 1907 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident | |
| 1908 that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the | |
| 1909 Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, | |
| 1910 it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. | |
| 1911 </p> | |
| 1912 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p3"> | |
| 1913 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one | |
| 1914 order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy. | |
| 1915 </p> | |
| 1916 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p4"> | |
| 1917 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. | |
| 1918 Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy. | |
| 1919 </p> | |
| 1920 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p5"> | |
| 1921 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels. | |
| 1922 </p> | |
| 1923 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p6"> | |
| 1924 <b>I answer that,</b> Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and | |
| 1925 the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also | |
| 1926 of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can | |
| 1927 be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are | |
| 1928 two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality | |
| 1929 on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude | |
| 1930 can be subject in "one" way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince | |
| 1931 belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws | |
| 1932 and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; | |
| 1933 for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says | |
| 1934 (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner | |
| 1935 we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above ( | |
| 1936 <a id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), in treating of the | |
| 1937 angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal | |
| 1938 knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be | |
| 1939 considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs | |
| 1940 to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius | |
| 1941 says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already | |
| 1942 multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things | |
| 1943 as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat | |
| 1944 of each of the orders | |
| 1945 <a id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the | |
| 1946 multitude of subjects. | |
| 1947 </p> | |
| 1948 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p7"> Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, | |
| 1949 and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is | |
| 1950 no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, | |
| 1951 enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to | |
| 1952 the Divine Persons. | |
| 1953 </p> | |
| 1954 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p8"> | |
| 1955 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the | |
| 1956 Philosopher asserts in those passages. | |
| 1957 </p> | |
| 1958 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p9"> | |
| 1959 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical distinction | |
| 1960 among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained. | |
| 1961 </p> | |
| 1962 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p10"> | |
| 1963 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence | |
| 1964 the same argument does not apply to both. | |
| 1965 </p> | |
| 1966 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 1967 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p12"></p> | |
| 1968 <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a> | |
| 1969 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1970 </div> | |
| 1971 <div id="FP_Q108_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 1972 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1973 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1974 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A2-p0.1">Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?</h4> | |
| 1975 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 1976 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p2"> | |
| 1977 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined | |
| 1978 is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there | |
| 1979 is not one hierarchy only, but many. | |
| 1980 </p> | |
| 1981 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p3"> | |
| 1982 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But | |
| 1983 among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore | |
| 1984 there are not different orders of angels. | |
| 1985 </p> | |
| 1986 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p4"> | |
| 1987 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening," | |
| 1988 and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting," | |
| 1989 as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction | |
| 1990 of orders among the angels. | |
| 1991 </p> | |
| 1992 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p5"> | |
| 1993 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 1994 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) that "God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders | |
| 1995 of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained | |
| 1996 <a id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. | |
| 1997 </p> | |
| 1998 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p6"> | |
| 1999 <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. | |
| 2000 Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy | |
| 2001 requires diversity of orders. | |
| 2002 </p> | |
| 2003 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p7"> This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different | |
| 2004 orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and | |
| 2005 another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth. | |
| 2006 </p> | |
| 2007 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p8"> But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has | |
| 2008 a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as | |
| 2009 the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus | |
| 2010 honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their | |
| 2011 actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so | |
| 2012 in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi). | |
| 2013 </p> | |
| 2014 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p9"> | |
| 2015 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy | |
| 2016 is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are | |
| 2017 so called. | |
| 2018 </p> | |
| 2019 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p10"> | |
| 2020 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than | |
| 2021 by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate | |
| 2022 it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone | |
| 2023 can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect | |
| 2024 grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among | |
| 2025 the angels, according to their different offices and actions. | |
| 2026 </p> | |
| 2027 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p11"> | |
| 2028 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the | |
| 2029 kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that | |
| 2030 are born of women" ( | |
| 2031 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher | |
| 2032 way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the | |
| 2033 heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts. | |
| 2034 </p> | |
| 2035 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 2036 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p13"></p> | |
| 2037 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2038 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2039 </div> | |
| 2040 <div id="FP_Q108_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 2041 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2042 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2043 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A3-p0.1">Whether there are many angels in one order?</h4> | |
| 2044 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 2045 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p2"> | |
| 2046 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above ( | |
| 2047 <a id="FP_Q108_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order. | |
| 2048 </p> | |
| 2049 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p3"> | |
| 2050 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs | |
| 2051 to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs | |
| 2052 to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by | |
| 2053 their offices, as stated above | |
| 2054 <a id="FP_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, several angels in one order | |
| 2055 would be superfluous. | |
| 2056 </p> | |
| 2057 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p4"> | |
| 2058 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or | |
| 2059 four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than | |
| 2060 with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. | |
| 2061 Therefore there are not many angels of one order. | |
| 2062 </p> | |
| 2063 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p5"> | |
| 2064 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" ( | |
| 2065 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim. | |
| 2066 </p> | |
| 2067 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p6"> | |
| 2068 <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas | |
| 2069 he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, | |
| 2070 one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one | |
| 2071 order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; | |
| 2072 whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and | |
| 2073 in each of the other orders. | |
| 2074 </p> | |
| 2075 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p7"> Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic | |
| 2076 offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions | |
| 2077 of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much | |
| 2078 more so than any star, though this be hidden from us. | |
| 2079 </p> | |
| 2080 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p8"> | |
| 2081 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely | |
| 2082 speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those | |
| 2083 who are first, middle, and last. | |
| 2084 </p> | |
| 2085 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p9"> | |
| 2086 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us. | |
| 2087 </p> | |
| 2088 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p10"> | |
| 2089 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as | |
| 2090 regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary | |
| 2091 of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin | |
| 2092 in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite | |
| 2093 limit. | |
| 2094 </p> | |
| 2095 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 2096 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p12"></p> | |
| 2097 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2098 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2099 </div> | |
| 2100 <div id="FP_Q108_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 2101 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2102 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a> | |
| 2103 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A4-p0.1">Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?</h4> | |
| 2104 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 2105 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p2"> | |
| 2106 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a | |
| 2107 sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. | |
| 2108 Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of | |
| 2109 hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature. | |
| 2110 </p> | |
| 2111 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p3"> | |
| 2112 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which | |
| 2113 comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" ( | |
| 2114 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic | |
| 2115 orders are not from nature, but from grace. | |
| 2116 </p> | |
| 2117 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p4"> | |
| 2118 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the | |
| 2119 gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore | |
| 2120 neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only. | |
| 2121 </p> | |
| 2122 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p5"> | |
| 2123 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some | |
| 2124 gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the | |
| 2125 angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature. | |
| 2126 </p> | |
| 2127 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p6"> | |
| 2128 <b>I answer that,</b> The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels | |
| 2129 may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge | |
| 2130 and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, | |
| 2131 the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural | |
| 2132 powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end | |
| 2133 they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the | |
| 2134 gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the | |
| 2135 capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained ( | |
| 2136 <a id="FP_Q108_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html">Q[62], A[6]</a>). Hence | |
| 2137 among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts. | |
| 2138 </p> | |
| 2139 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p7"> From the above the replies to the objections are evident.</p> | |
| 2140 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p8"></p> | |
| 2141 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p9"></p> | |
| 2142 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2143 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a> | |
| 2144 </div> | |
| 2145 <div id="FP_Q108_A5" class="div4"> | |
| 2146 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2147 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a> | |
| 2148 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A5-p0.1">Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?</h4> | |
| 2149 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p1"></p> | |
| 2150 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p2"> | |
| 2151 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly | |
| 2152 virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly | |
| 2153 named. | |
| 2154 </p> | |
| 2155 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p3"> | |
| 2156 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" ( | |
| 2157 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.3" target="asv">Ps. 99:3</a>). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations." | |
| 2158 </p> | |
| 2159 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p4"> | |
| 2160 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore | |
| 2161 these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders. | |
| 2162 </p> | |
| 2163 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p5"> | |
| 2164 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the | |
| 2165 "Principalities." | |
| 2166 </p> | |
| 2167 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p6"> | |
| 2168 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But | |
| 2169 charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders. | |
| 2170 </p> | |
| 2171 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p7"> | |
| 2172 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. | |
| 2173 Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the | |
| 2174 orders of angels are not properly styled. | |
| 2175 </p> | |
| 2176 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p8"> On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in | |
| 2177 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.2" target="asv"> Is. 6:2</a>; the name "Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in | |
| 2178 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv"> Col. 1:16</a>; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in | |
| 2179 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.21" target="asv"> Eph. 1:21</a>; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of | |
| 2180 Scripture. | |
| 2181 </p> | |
| 2182 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p9"> | |
| 2183 <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of | |
| 2184 each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, | |
| 2185 something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is | |
| 2186 said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its | |
| 2187 nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, | |
| 2188 as we have stated ( | |
| 2189 <a id="FP_Q108_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not | |
| 2190 fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating | |
| 2191 its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates | |
| 2192 imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we | |
| 2193 wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter | |
| 2194 is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; | |
| 2195 nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of | |
| 2196 a man, | |
| 2197 and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals. | |
| 2198 </p> | |
| 2199 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p10"> So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are | |
| 2200 all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior | |
| 2201 perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely | |
| 2202 the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of | |
| 2203 excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection. | |
| 2204 </p> | |
| 2205 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p11"> So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections | |
| 2206 they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior | |
| 2207 ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; | |
| 2208 by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities | |
| 2209 preside over the good spirits themselves." | |
| 2210 </p> | |
| 2211 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p12"> | |
| 2212 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the | |
| 2213 superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. | |
| 2214 The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation | |
| 2215 only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest | |
| 2216 order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels," | |
| 2217 forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately. | |
| 2218 </p> | |
| 2219 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p13"> "Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in | |
| 2220 that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain | |
| 2221 excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the | |
| 2222 "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine | |
| 2223 operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly | |
| 2224 the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind. | |
| 2225 </p> | |
| 2226 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p14"> | |
| 2227 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word | |
| 2228 gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the | |
| 2229 Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free | |
| 2230 from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and | |
| 2231 from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy | |
| 2232 which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies | |
| 2233 "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation | |
| 2234 of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the | |
| 2235 same principle applies to the rest. | |
| 2236 </p> | |
| 2237 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p15"> | |
| 2238 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to | |
| 2239 prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are | |
| 2240 subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the | |
| 2241 Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God" | |
| 2242 ( | |
| 2243 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv">Rom. 13:2</a>). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception | |
| 2244 of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. | |
| 2245 Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside | |
| 2246 [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first | |
| 2247 in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies | |
| 2248 "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according | |
| 2249 to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers" ( | |
| 2250 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.26" target="asv">Ps. 67:26</a>). | |
| 2251 </p> | |
| 2252 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p16"> | |
| 2253 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared | |
| 2254 to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, | |
| 2255 and hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the | |
| 2256 "Angels," and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory | |
| 2257 (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing | |
| 2258 greater things: and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine | |
| 2259 commands. | |
| 2260 </p> | |
| 2261 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p17"> | |
| 2262 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. | |
| 2263 Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of | |
| 2264 heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they | |
| 2265 are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which | |
| 2266 is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to | |
| 2267 the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised | |
| 2268 powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly | |
| 2269 we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an | |
| 2270 inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others. | |
| 2271 </p> | |
| 2272 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p18"> In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," | |
| 2273 which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the | |
| 2274 Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this | |
| 2275 knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others. | |
| 2276 </p> | |
| 2277 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p19"> | |
| 2278 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; | |
| 2279 whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two | |
| 2280 excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the other two; and so the | |
| 2281 order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the | |
| 2282 "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not | |
| 2283 conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may | |
| 2284 consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones" | |
| 2285 are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed | |
| 2286 strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made | |
| 2287 firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive | |
| 2288 God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open | |
| 2289 on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him. | |
| 2290 </p> | |
| 2291 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p20"></p> | |
| 2292 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p21"></p> | |
| 2293 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2294 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a> | |
| 2295 </div> | |
| 2296 <div id="FP_Q108_A6" class="div4"> | |
| 2297 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a> | |
| 2298 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a> | |
| 2299 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A6-p0.1">Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?</h4> | |
| 2300 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p1"></p> | |
| 2301 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p2"> | |
| 2302 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the | |
| 2303 names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be | |
| 2304 supreme. | |
| 2305 </p> | |
| 2306 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p3"> | |
| 2307 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is | |
| 2308 nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest. | |
| 2309 </p> | |
| 2310 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p4"> | |
| 2311 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher | |
| 2312 than the "Seraphim." | |
| 2313 </p> | |
| 2314 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p5"> | |
| 2315 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately | |
| 2316 above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix). | |
| 2317 </p> | |
| 2318 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p6"> | |
| 2319 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the | |
| 2320 "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the | |
| 2321 "Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels." | |
| 2322 </p> | |
| 2323 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p7"> | |
| 2324 <b>I answer that,</b> The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as | |
| 2325 regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above | |
| 2326 the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" | |
| 2327 between the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers" | |
| 2328 and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who ( | |
| 2329 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the | |
| 2330 heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and | |
| 2331 "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same | |
| 2332 orders from the highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created | |
| 2333 by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory. | |
| 2334 </p> | |
| 2335 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p8"> Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above | |
| 2336 <a id="FP_Q108_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in | |
| 2337 their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the | |
| 2338 whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the | |
| 2339 universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which | |
| 2340 is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering | |
| 2341 the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are | |
| 2342 taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy | |
| 2343 those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition---the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers"; | |
| 2344 and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," | |
| 2345 and "Archangels." | |
| 2346 </p> | |
| 2347 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p9"> As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of | |
| 2348 the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition | |
| 2349 to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, | |
| 2350 Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the | |
| 2351 dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; | |
| 2352 and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition | |
| 2353 in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, | |
| 2354 in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first | |
| 2355 hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence | |
| 2356 of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones"; | |
| 2357 as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels." | |
| 2358 </p> | |
| 2359 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p10"> As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be | |
| 2360 done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs | |
| 2361 to the "Virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which | |
| 2362 belongs to the "Powers." | |
| 2363 </p> | |
| 2364 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p11"> The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there | |
| 2365 are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." | |
| 2366 There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others hold a middle place; and these | |
| 2367 are the "Archangels," as above explained. | |
| 2368 </p> | |
| 2369 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p12"> This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the | |
| 2370 lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, | |
| 2371 which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, | |
| 2372 denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones," | |
| 2373 who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called | |
| 2374 "because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate | |
| 2375 enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers" | |
| 2376 is akin to the order of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to | |
| 2377 them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples | |
| 2378 and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; | |
| 2379 "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of | |
| 2380 the kingdom of the Persians resisted me" ( | |
| 2381 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). | |
| 2382 </p> | |
| 2383 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p13"> The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order | |
| 2384 what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things | |
| 2385 in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order; | |
| 2386 the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good | |
| 2387 spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then | |
| 2388 the "Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written ( | |
| 2389 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.3" target="asv">Rom. 13:3,4</a>). After these come the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the | |
| 2390 "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within | |
| 2391 the purview of reason. | |
| 2392 </p> | |
| 2393 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p14"> | |
| 2394 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel's subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. | |
| 2395 Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their | |
| 2396 name from their nearness and relation to God. | |
| 2397 </p> | |
| 2398 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p15"> | |
| 2399 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more | |
| 2400 excellent way, as above explained. | |
| 2401 </p> | |
| 2402 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p16"> | |
| 2403 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As above explained ( | |
| 2404 <a id="FP_Q108_A6-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. | |
| 2405 Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler | |
| 2406 way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, | |
| 2407 God above all, is | |
| 2408 better than to know them. | |
| 2409 </p> | |
| 2410 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p17"> | |
| 2411 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according | |
| 2412 to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also | |
| 2413 agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in | |
| 2414 the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the | |
| 2415 "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; | |
| 2416 since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels." | |
| 2417 </p> | |
| 2418 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p18"></p> | |
| 2419 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p19"></p> | |
| 2420 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a> | |
| 2421 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a> | |
| 2422 </div> | |
| 2423 <div id="FP_Q108_A7" class="div4"> | |
| 2424 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a> | |
| 2425 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a> | |
| 2426 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A7-p0.1">Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</h4> | |
| 2427 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p1"></p> | |
| 2428 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p2"> | |
| 2429 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 2430 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24</a>), that Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the | |
| 2431 Father," and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state. | |
| 2432 </p> | |
| 2433 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p3"> | |
| 2434 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment | |
| 2435 one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore | |
| 2436 the angelic orders would remain for no purpose. | |
| 2437 </p> | |
| 2438 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p4"> | |
| 2439 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says of the angels ( | |
| 2440 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence | |
| 2441 it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit | |
| 2442 of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment. | |
| 2443 </p> | |
| 2444 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p5"> | |
| 2445 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 2446 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.5.20" target="asv">Judges 5:20</a>): "Stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in | |
| 2447 their orders. | |
| 2448 </p> | |
| 2449 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p6"> | |
| 2450 <b>I answer that,</b> In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction | |
| 2451 of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained | |
| 2452 <a id="FP_Q108_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless | |
| 2453 they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever | |
| 2454 remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain | |
| 2455 degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are | |
| 2456 directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. | |
| 2457 Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph. | |
| 2458 </p> | |
| 2459 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p7"> | |
| 2460 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to | |
| 2461 their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words | |
| 2462 of the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful | |
| 2463 to the enjoyment of God Himself. | |
| 2464 </p> | |
| 2465 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p8"> | |
| 2466 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. | |
| 2467 In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually | |
| 2468 arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding | |
| 2469 middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as | |
| 2470 regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms | |
| 2471 he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since | |
| 2472 the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the | |
| 2473 light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the | |
| 2474 knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, | |
| 2475 still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels. | |
| 2476 </p> | |
| 2477 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p9"> | |
| 2478 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who | |
| 2479 are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry. | |
| 2480 </p> | |
| 2481 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p10"></p> | |
| 2482 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p11"></p> | |
| 2483 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a> | |
| 2484 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a> | |
| 2485 </div> | |
| 2486 <div id="FP_Q108_A8" class="div4"> | |
| 2487 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a> | |
| 2488 <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a> | |
| 2489 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A8-p0.1">Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</h4> | |
| 2490 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p1"></p> | |
| 2491 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p2"> | |
| 2492 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest | |
| 2493 heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest | |
| 2494 hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders. | |
| 2495 </p> | |
| 2496 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p3"> | |
| 2497 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the | |
| 2498 like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders. | |
| 2499 </p> | |
| 2500 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p4"> | |
| 2501 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls | |
| 2502 of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the | |
| 2503 souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels. | |
| 2504 </p> | |
| 2505 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p5"> | |
| 2506 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of God" ( | |
| 2507 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>). I answer that, As above explained ( | |
| 2508 <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. | |
| 2509 Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction | |
| 2510 will always remain. In view of this | |
| 2511 distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting | |
| 2512 as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven ( | |
| 2513 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.20.36" target="asv">Lk. 20:36</a>). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends | |
| 2514 on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men | |
| 2515 can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are | |
| 2516 taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, | |
| 2517 but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole | |
| 2518 society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies | |
| 2519 of | |
| 2520 men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone." | |
| 2521 </p> | |
| 2522 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p6"> | |
| 2523 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained | |
| 2524 | |
| 2525 <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">(A[4];</a> | |
| 2526 <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html">Q[62], A[6]</a>). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred | |
| 2527 to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature. | |
| 2528 </p> | |
| 2529 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p7"> | |
| 2530 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human | |
| 2531 affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature | |
| 2532 with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the | |
| 2533 things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a | |
| 2534 certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, | |
| 2535 by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi). | |
| 2536 </p> | |
| 2537 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p8"> | |
| 2538 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons | |
| 2539 are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects. | |
| 2540 </p> | |
| 2541 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p9"></p> | |
| 2542 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p10"></p> | |
| 2543 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a> | |
| 2544 <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a> | |
| 2545 </div> | |
| 2546 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a> | |
| 2547 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2548 </div> | |
| 2549 <div id="FP_Q109" class="div3"> | |
| 2550 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a> | |
| 2551 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2552 <h3 id="FP_Q109-p0.1">THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2553 <p id="FP_Q109-p1"></p> | |
| 2554 <p id="FP_Q109-p2"> We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 2555 <p id="FP_Q109-p3"> (1) Whether there are orders among the demons?</p> | |
| 2556 <p id="FP_Q109-p4"> (2) Whether among them there is precedence?</p> | |
| 2557 <p id="FP_Q109-p5"> (3) Whether one enlightens another?</p> | |
| 2558 <p id="FP_Q109-p6"> (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?</p> | |
| 2559 <div id="FP_Q109_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 2560 <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a> | |
| 2561 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2562 <h4 id="FP_Q109_A1-p0.1">Whether there are orders among the demons?</h4> | |
| 2563 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 2564 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p2"> | |
| 2565 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine | |
| 2566 says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. | |
| 2567 Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders. | |
| 2568 </p> | |
| 2569 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p3"> | |
| 2570 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a | |
| 2571 holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders. | |
| 2572 </p> | |
| 2573 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p4"> | |
| 2574 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said | |
| 2575 to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. | |
| 2576 But we never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not | |
| 2577 to be placed in any other order. | |
| 2578 </p> | |
| 2579 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p5"> | |
| 2580 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 2581 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness." | |
| 2582 </p> | |
| 2583 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p6"> | |
| 2584 <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above ( | |
| 2585 <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">Q[108], AA[4]</a>,7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace | |
| 2586 has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory. | |
| 2587 </p> | |
| 2588 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p7"> If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic | |
| 2589 orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in | |
| 2590 the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above ( | |
| 2591 <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are | |
| 2592 still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). | |
| 2593 </p> | |
| 2594 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p8"> | |
| 2595 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good ( | |
| 2596 <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html">Q[49], A[3]</a>); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature. | |
| 2597 </p> | |
| 2598 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p9"> | |
| 2599 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; | |
| 2600 but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil. | |
| 2601 </p> | |
| 2602 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p10"> | |
| 2603 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations" | |
| 2604 imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned. | |
| 2605 </p> | |
| 2606 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 2607 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p12"></p> | |
| 2608 <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a> | |
| 2609 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2610 </div> | |
| 2611 <div id="FP_Q109_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 2612 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2613 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2614 <h4 id="FP_Q109_A2-p0.1">Whether among the demons there is precedence?</h4> | |
| 2615 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 2616 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p2"> | |
| 2617 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But | |
| 2618 the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them. | |
| 2619 </p> | |
| 2620 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p3"> | |
| 2621 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is | |
| 2622 not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are always contentions" ( | |
| 2623 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. | |
| 2624 </p> | |
| 2625 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p4"> | |
| 2626 <b>Objection 3:</b> If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not | |
| 2627 according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according | |
| 2628 to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the | |
| 2629 inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. | |
| 2630 </p> | |
| 2631 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p5"> | |
| 2632 <b>On the contrary,</b> On | |
| 2633 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24 </a>the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons." | |
| 2634 </p> | |
| 2635 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p6"> | |
| 2636 <b>I answer that,</b> Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. | |
| 2637 Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and | |
| 2638 movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said | |
| 2639 <a id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence | |
| 2640 their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence---that the action of the | |
| 2641 subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should | |
| 2642 be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to | |
| 2643 end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" ( | |
| 2644 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>). | |
| 2645 </p> | |
| 2646 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p7"> | |
| 2647 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things. | |
| 2648 </p> | |
| 2649 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p8"> | |
| 2650 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness | |
| 2651 whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those | |
| 2652 whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness. | |
| 2653 </p> | |
| 2654 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p9"> | |
| 2655 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, | |
| 2656 who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather | |
| 2657 to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in | |
| 2658 evil is to be more unhappy. | |
| 2659 </p> | |
| 2660 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p10"></p> | |
| 2661 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 2662 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2663 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2664 </div> | |
| 2665 <div id="FP_Q109_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 2666 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2667 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2668 <h4 id="FP_Q109_A3-p0.1">Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?</h4> | |
| 2669 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 2670 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p2"> | |
| 2671 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon | |
| 2672 can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten | |
| 2673 the inferior. | |
| 2674 </p> | |
| 2675 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p3"> | |
| 2676 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior | |
| 2677 demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior. | |
| 2678 </p> | |
| 2679 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p4"> | |
| 2680 <b>On the contrary,</b> Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above ( | |
| 2681 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" ( | |
| 2682 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>). Therefore neither can they enlighten. | |
| 2683 </p> | |
| 2684 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p5"> | |
| 2685 <b>I answer that,</b> There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained ( | |
| 2686 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html">Q[107], A[2]</a>), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. | |
| 2687 Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's | |
| 2688 perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the | |
| 2689 Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of | |
| 2690 speech. | |
| 2691 </p> | |
| 2692 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p6"> | |
| 2693 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described. | |
| 2694 </p> | |
| 2695 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p7"> | |
| 2696 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or | |
| 2697 in the demons, because, as above explained ( | |
| 2698 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>; | |
| 2699 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html">Q[58], A[2]</a>; | |
| 2700 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">Q[79], A[2]</a>), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior | |
| 2701 demons does not prove that they can enlighten | |
| 2702 others. | |
| 2703 </p> | |
| 2704 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p8"></p> | |
| 2705 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p9"></p> | |
| 2706 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2707 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2708 </div> | |
| 2709 <div id="FP_Q109_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 2710 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2711 <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a> | |
| 2712 <h4 id="FP_Q109_A4-p0.1">Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?</h4> | |
| 2713 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 2714 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p2"> | |
| 2715 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected | |
| 2716 with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels | |
| 2717 do not rule over the bad. | |
| 2718 </p> | |
| 2719 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p3"> | |
| 2720 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. | |
| 2721 Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot | |
| 2722 be admitted. | |
| 2723 </p> | |
| 2724 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p4"> | |
| 2725 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained | |
| 2726 <a id="FP_Q109_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the | |
| 2727 natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels. | |
| 2728 </p> | |
| 2729 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p5"> | |
| 2730 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just | |
| 2731 spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers." | |
| 2732 </p> | |
| 2733 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p6"> | |
| 2734 <b>I answer that,</b> The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer | |
| 2735 to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection | |
| 2736 and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection | |
| 2737 the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the | |
| 2738 bad, and these are ruled by them. | |
| 2739 </p> | |
| 2740 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p7"> | |
| 2741 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice | |
| 2742 requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's | |
| 2743 assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called | |
| 2744 an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an | |
| 2745 enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness. | |
| 2746 </p> | |
| 2747 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p8"> | |
| 2748 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels | |
| 2749 or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm. | |
| 2750 </p> | |
| 2751 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p9"> | |
| 2752 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the | |
| 2753 power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise | |
| 2754 among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" ( | |
| 2755 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts." | |
| 2756 </p> | |
| 2757 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p10"></p> | |
| 2758 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 2759 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2760 <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a> | |
| 2761 </div> | |
| 2762 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a> | |
| 2763 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2764 </div> | |
| 2765 <div id="FP_Q110" class="div3"> | |
| 2766 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2767 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2768 <h3 id="FP_Q110-p0.1">HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2769 <p id="FP_Q110-p1"></p> | |
| 2770 <p id="FP_Q110-p2"> We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 2771 <p id="FP_Q110-p3"> (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</p> | |
| 2772 <p id="FP_Q110-p4"> (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?</p> | |
| 2773 <p id="FP_Q110-p5"> (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?</p> | |
| 2774 <p id="FP_Q110-p6"> (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?</p> | |
| 2775 <div id="FP_Q110_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 2776 <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a> | |
| 2777 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2778 <h4 id="FP_Q110_A1-p0.1">Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</h4> | |
| 2779 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 2780 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p2"> | |
| 2781 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, | |
| 2782 needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal | |
| 2783 things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government | |
| 2784 of angels. | |
| 2785 </p> | |
| 2786 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p3"> | |
| 2787 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore | |
| 2788 they need not be governed by the angels. | |
| 2789 </p> | |
| 2790 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p4"> | |
| 2791 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled | |
| 2792 by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders | |
| 2793 of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above ( | |
| 2794 <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">Q[108], A[2]</a>). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. | |
| 2795 </p> | |
| 2796 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p5"> | |
| 2797 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, | |
| 2798 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature." | |
| 2799 </p> | |
| 2800 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p6"> | |
| 2801 <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the | |
| 2802 universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained | |
| 2803 above ( | |
| 2804 <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a> ; | |
| 2805 <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">Q[108], A[1]</a>), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power | |
| 2806 of | |
| 2807 any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized | |
| 2808 by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the | |
| 2809 inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. | |
| 2810 This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal | |
| 2811 substances. | |
| 2812 </p> | |
| 2813 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p7"> | |
| 2814 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs | |
| 2815 to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature. | |
| 2816 </p> | |
| 2817 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p8"> | |
| 2818 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved | |
| 2819 by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly | |
| 2820 bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps | |
| 2821 human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any | |
| 2822 operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. | |
| 2823 But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the | |
| 2824 movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate | |
| 2825 presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies. | |
| 2826 </p> | |
| 2827 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p9"> | |
| 2828 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were | |
| 2829 types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances | |
| 2830 preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial | |
| 2831 substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more | |
| 2832 universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, | |
| 2833 the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to | |
| 2834 preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these | |
| 2835 sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial | |
| 2836 substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence." | |
| 2837 </p> | |
| 2838 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p10"> The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine | |
| 2839 says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide | |
| 2840 Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen says on the text, | |
| 2841 "When the ass saw the angel" ( | |
| 2842 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.23" target="asv">Num. 22:23</a>), that "the world has need of angels who | |
| 2843 preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (Hom. | |
| 2844 xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than | |
| 2845 over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: | |
| 2846 the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow | |
| 2847 that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded ( | |
| 2848 <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">Q[108], A[2]</a>), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office | |
| 2849 it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to | |
| 2850 belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed. | |
| 2851 </p> | |
| 2852 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 2853 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p12"></p> | |
| 2854 <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a> | |
| 2855 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2856 </div> | |
| 2857 <div id="FP_Q110_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 2858 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2859 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2860 <h4 id="FP_Q110_A2-p0.1">Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?</h4> | |
| 2861 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 2862 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p2"> | |
| 2863 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. | |
| 2864 But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards | |
| 2865 heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception | |
| 2866 of an angel. | |
| 2867 </p> | |
| 2868 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p3"> | |
| 2869 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior | |
| 2870 to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore | |
| 2871 much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter. | |
| 2872 </p> | |
| 2873 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p4"> | |
| 2874 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above | |
| 2875 <a id="FP_Q110_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in | |
| 2876 effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the | |
| 2877 instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to | |
| 2878 the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to | |
| 2879 the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is | |
| 2880 from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, | |
| 2881 is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form. | |
| 2882 </p> | |
| 2883 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p5"> | |
| 2884 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone." | |
| 2885 </p> | |
| 2886 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p6"> | |
| 2887 <b>I answer that,</b> The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial | |
| 2888 forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion | |
| 2889 to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal | |
| 2890 agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on | |
| 2891 this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. | |
| 2892 But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly | |
| 2893 speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something | |
| 2894 is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but | |
| 2895 the way to existence. | |
| 2896 </p> | |
| 2897 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural | |
| 2898 things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole | |
| 2899 "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter | |
| 2900 is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel. | |
| 2901 </p> | |
| 2902 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p8"> | |
| 2903 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's | |
| 2904 concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject | |
| 2905 to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does | |
| 2906 not hold. | |
| 2907 </p> | |
| 2908 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p9"> | |
| 2909 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, | |
| 2910 the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter | |
| 2911 in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior | |
| 2912 cause. | |
| 2913 </p> | |
| 2914 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p10"> | |
| 2915 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would | |
| 2916 not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating | |
| 2917 the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since | |
| 2918 to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the | |
| 2919 power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like. | |
| 2920 </p> | |
| 2921 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 2922 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 2923 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a> | |
| 2924 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2925 </div> | |
| 2926 <div id="FP_Q110_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 2927 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2928 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2929 <h4 id="FP_Q110_A3-p0.1">Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?</h4> | |
| 2930 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 2931 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p2"> | |
| 2932 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their | |
| 2933 forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above | |
| 2934 <a id="FP_Q110_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion. | |
| 2935 </p> | |
| 2936 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p3"> | |
| 2937 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause | |
| 2938 other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion. | |
| 2939 </p> | |
| 2940 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p4"> | |
| 2941 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle | |
| 2942 of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion. | |
| 2943 </p> | |
| 2944 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p5"> | |
| 2945 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this | |
| 2946 without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion. | |
| 2947 </p> | |
| 2948 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p6"> | |
| 2949 <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence | |
| 2950 it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is | |
| 2951 below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves | |
| 2952 (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in | |
| 2953 potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has | |
| 2954 a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted | |
| 2955 that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and | |
| 2956 chiefly by a local motion. | |
| 2957 </p> | |
| 2958 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p7"> | |
| 2959 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the | |
| 2960 sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements | |
| 2961 result from the power of spiritual substances. | |
| 2962 </p> | |
| 2963 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p8"> | |
| 2964 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal | |
| 2965 agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron. | |
| 2966 </p> | |
| 2967 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p9"> | |
| 2968 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the | |
| 2969 body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to | |
| 2970 any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it. | |
| 2971 </p> | |
| 2972 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p10"></p> | |
| 2973 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 2974 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a> | |
| 2975 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a> | |
| 2976 </div> | |
| 2977 <div id="FP_Q110_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 2978 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a> | |
| 2979 <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a> | |
| 2980 <h4 id="FP_Q110_A4-p0.1">Whether angels can work miracles?</h4> | |
| 2981 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 2982 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p2"> | |
| 2983 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues | |
| 2984 by whom signs and miracles are usually done." | |
| 2985 </p> | |
| 2986 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p3"> | |
| 2987 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, | |
| 2988 bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he | |
| 2989 says elsewhere in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore | |
| 2990 the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels. | |
| 2991 </p> | |
| 2992 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p4"> | |
| 2993 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] | |
| 2994 that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in | |
| 2995 our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, | |
| 2996 as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. | |
| 2997 Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles. | |
| 2998 </p> | |
| 2999 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p5"> | |
| 3000 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore | |
| 3001 an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles. | |
| 3002 </p> | |
| 3003 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p6"> | |
| 3004 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written of God ( | |
| 3005 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.4" target="asv">Ps. 135:4</a>): "Who alone doth great wonders." | |
| 3006 </p> | |
| 3007 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p7"> | |
| 3008 <b>I answer that,</b> A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if | |
| 3009 something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone | |
| 3010 upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order | |
| 3011 of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or | |
| 3012 any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence | |
| 3013 God alone can work miracles. | |
| 3014 </p> | |
| 3015 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p8"> | |
| 3016 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are | |
| 3017 said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the | |
| 3018 dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind. | |
| 3019 </p> | |
| 3020 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p9"> | |
| 3021 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. | |
| 3022 But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created | |
| 3023 nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own | |
| 3024 natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in | |
| 3025 reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private | |
| 3026 contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in | |
| 3027 a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the | |
| 3028 other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far | |
| 3029 as | |
| 3030 they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public | |
| 3031 justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs. | |
| 3032 </p> | |
| 3033 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p10"> | |
| 3034 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement. | |
| 3035 </p> | |
| 3036 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p11"> | |
| 3037 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside | |
| 3038 the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained. | |
| 3039 </p> | |
| 3040 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p12"></p> | |
| 3041 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p13"></p> | |
| 3042 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3043 <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a> | |
| 3044 </div> | |
| 3045 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3046 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3047 </div> | |
| 3048 <div id="FP_Q111" class="div3"> | |
| 3049 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3050 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3051 <h3 id="FP_Q111-p0.1">THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 3052 <p id="FP_Q111-p1"></p> | |
| 3053 <p id="FP_Q111-p2"> We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; | |
| 3054 (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men. | |
| 3055 </p> | |
| 3056 <p id="FP_Q111-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 3057 <p id="FP_Q111-p4"> (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?</p> | |
| 3058 <p id="FP_Q111-p5"> (2) Whether he can change man's will?</p> | |
| 3059 <p id="FP_Q111-p6"> (3) Whether he can change man's imagination?</p> | |
| 3060 <p id="FP_Q111-p7"> (4) Whether he can change man's senses?</p> | |
| 3061 <div id="FP_Q111_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 3062 <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a> | |
| 3063 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3064 <h4 id="FP_Q111_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel can enlighten man?</h4> | |
| 3065 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 3066 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p2"> | |
| 3067 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes | |
| 3068 enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to | |
| 3069 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened | |
| 3070 by an angel; but immediately by God. | |
| 3071 </p> | |
| 3072 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p3"> | |
| 3073 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" ( | |
| 3074 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed | |
| 3075 them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God---that is, natural reason and the creature. | |
| 3076 Therefore God enlightens man immediately. | |
| 3077 </p> | |
| 3078 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p4"> | |
| 3079 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. | |
| 3080 Therefore he is not enlightened by them. | |
| 3081 </p> | |
| 3082 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p5"> | |
| 3083 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But | |
| 3084 such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated ( | |
| 3085 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>; | |
| 3086 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html">Q[107], A[2]</a>). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels. | |
| 3087 </p> | |
| 3088 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p6"> | |
| 3089 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above ( | |
| 3090 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html">Q[109], A[2]</a>); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them. | |
| 3091 </p> | |
| 3092 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p7"> The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above | |
| 3093 ( | |
| 3094 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect | |
| 3095 is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior | |
| 3096 intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. | |
| 3097 This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity | |
| 3098 of the inferior angel, as explained above ( | |
| 3099 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>). | |
| 3100 </p> | |
| 3101 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p8"> The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand | |
| 3102 by turning to the phantasms, as above explained ( | |
| 3103 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius | |
| 3104 says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of | |
| 3105 the sacred veils." On the | |
| 3106 other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two | |
| 3107 ways man is enlightened by an angel. | |
| 3108 </p> | |
| 3109 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p9"> | |
| 3110 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will | |
| 3111 tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded | |
| 3112 by the will; hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, | |
| 3113 faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is | |
| 3114 accomplished by man, according to | |
| 3115 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels | |
| 3116 have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be | |
| 3117 believed; but also as regards what is to be done. | |
| 3118 </p> | |
| 3119 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p10"> | |
| 3120 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the | |
| 3121 human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. | |
| 3122 Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God. | |
| 3123 </p> | |
| 3124 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p11"> | |
| 3125 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus | |
| 3126 whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made | |
| 3127 known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows | |
| 3128 what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like | |
| 3129 manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him. | |
| 3130 </p> | |
| 3131 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p12"></p> | |
| 3132 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p13"></p> | |
| 3133 <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a> | |
| 3134 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3135 </div> | |
| 3136 <div id="FP_Q111_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 3137 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3138 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3139 <h4 id="FP_Q111_A2-p0.1">Whether the angels can change the will of man?</h4> | |
| 3140 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 3141 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p2"> | |
| 3142 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers | |
| 3143 a flame of fire" ( | |
| 3144 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.7" target="asv">Heb. 1:7</a>), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be, however, | |
| 3145 unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will. | |
| 3146 </p> | |
| 3147 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p3"> | |
| 3148 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however, | |
| 3149 says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and | |
| 3150 put into men" (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could | |
| 3151 only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them. | |
| 3152 </p> | |
| 3153 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p4"> | |
| 3154 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination | |
| 3155 which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also | |
| 3156 is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will. | |
| 3157 </p> | |
| 3158 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p5"> | |
| 3159 <b>On the contrary,</b> To change the will belongs to God alone, according to | |
| 3160 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it." | |
| 3161 </p> | |
| 3162 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p6"> | |
| 3163 <b>I answer that,</b> The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the | |
| 3164 inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination | |
| 3165 to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the | |
| 3166 will is from God alone, Who causes the will. | |
| 3167 </p> | |
| 3168 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p7"> Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the | |
| 3169 intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move | |
| 3170 the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, | |
| 3171 as above explained ( | |
| 3172 <a id="FP_Q111_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html">Q[106], A[2]</a>). | |
| 3173 </p> | |
| 3174 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p8"> In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the | |
| 3175 sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being | |
| 3176 able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or | |
| 3177 to resist, the passion. | |
| 3178 </p> | |
| 3179 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p9"> | |
| 3180 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. | |
| 3181 </p> | |
| 3182 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p10"> | |
| 3183 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject | |
| 3184 to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of | |
| 3185 the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because | |
| 3186 such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher | |
| 3187 principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels. | |
| 3188 </p> | |
| 3189 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p11"> | |
| 3190 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something | |
| 3191 following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold. | |
| 3192 </p> | |
| 3193 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 3194 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p13"></p> | |
| 3195 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3196 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3197 </div> | |
| 3198 <div id="FP_Q111_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 3199 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3200 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3201 <h4 id="FP_Q111_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel can change man's imagination?</h4> | |
| 3202 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 3203 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p2"> | |
| 3204 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused | |
| 3205 by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it | |
| 3206 is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel. | |
| 3207 </p> | |
| 3208 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p3"> | |
| 3209 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But | |
| 3210 an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter ( | |
| 3211 <a id="FP_Q111_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it. | |
| 3212 </p> | |
| 3213 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p4"> | |
| 3214 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to | |
| 3215 the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." | |
| 3216 But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge | |
| 3217 of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination. | |
| 3218 </p> | |
| 3219 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p5"> | |
| 3220 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this | |
| 3221 there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, | |
| 3222 by changing the imagination. | |
| 3223 </p> | |
| 3224 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p6"> | |
| 3225 <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears | |
| 3226 from | |
| 3227 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.20" target="asv"> Mat. 1:20</a>;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination. | |
| 3228 </p> | |
| 3229 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p7"> | |
| 3230 <b>I answer that,</b> Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. | |
| 3231 For it was said above ( | |
| 3232 <a id="FP_Q111_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], A[3]</a>), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of | |
| 3233 bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused | |
| 3234 in us by the local movement of | |
| 3235 animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions | |
| 3236 in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend | |
| 3237 with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle"; | |
| 3238 so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects | |
| 3239 themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those | |
| 3240 who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes | |
| 3241 also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power | |
| 3242 of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation. | |
| 3243 </p> | |
| 3244 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p8"> | |
| 3245 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the | |
| 3246 senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed | |
| 3247 in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within. | |
| 3248 </p> | |
| 3249 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p9"> | |
| 3250 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from | |
| 3251 the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above | |
| 3252 explained. | |
| 3253 </p> | |
| 3254 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p10"> | |
| 3255 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect | |
| 3256 which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the | |
| 3257 way he knows. | |
| 3258 </p> | |
| 3259 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p11"> | |
| 3260 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these | |
| 3261 images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear | |
| 3262 in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things | |
| 3263 appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to | |
| 3264 the people in parables, which He did not explain to them. | |
| 3265 </p> | |
| 3266 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p12"></p> | |
| 3267 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p13"></p> | |
| 3268 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p14"></p> | |
| 3269 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3270 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3271 </div> | |
| 3272 <div id="FP_Q111_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 3273 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3274 <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a> | |
| 3275 <h4 id="FP_Q111_A4-p0.1">Whether an angel can change the human senses?</h4> | |
| 3276 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 3277 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p2"> | |
| 3278 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation | |
| 3279 does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel. | |
| 3280 </p> | |
| 3281 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p3"> | |
| 3282 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other | |
| 3283 natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power. | |
| 3284 </p> | |
| 3285 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p4"> | |
| 3286 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature ( | |
| 3287 <a id="FP_Q111_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object. | |
| 3288 </p> | |
| 3289 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p5"> | |
| 3290 <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the | |
| 3291 door" ( | |
| 3292 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19.11" target="asv">Gn. 19:11</a>). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses, | |
| 3293 in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom---namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin | |
| 3294 "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily | |
| 3295 imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria ( | |
| 3296 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:18</a>). | |
| 3297 </p> | |
| 3298 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p6"> | |
| 3299 <b>I answer that,</b> The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for | |
| 3300 we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged | |
| 3301 with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, | |
| 3302 can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object | |
| 3303 from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above ( | |
| 3304 <a id="FP_Q111_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways. | |
| 3305 </p> | |
| 3306 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p7"> | |
| 3307 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this | |
| 3308 interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained. | |
| 3309 </p> | |
| 3310 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p8"> | |
| 3311 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, | |
| 3312 and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ. | |
| 3313 </p> | |
| 3314 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p9"> | |
| 3315 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since | |
| 3316 he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode | |
| 3317 of nature. | |
| 3318 </p> | |
| 3319 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p10"></p> | |
| 3320 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 3321 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3322 <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a> | |
| 3323 </div> | |
| 3324 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3325 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3326 </div> | |
| 3327 <div id="FP_Q112" class="div3"> | |
| 3328 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3329 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3330 <h3 id="FP_Q112-p0.1">THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 3331 <p id="FP_Q112-p1"></p> | |
| 3332 <p id="FP_Q112-p2"> We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 3333 <p id="FP_Q112-p3"> (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?</p> | |
| 3334 <p id="FP_Q112-p4"> (2) Whether all are sent?</p> | |
| 3335 <p id="FP_Q112-p5"> (3) Whether those who are sent, assist?</p> | |
| 3336 <p id="FP_Q112-p6"> (4) From what orders they are sent.</p> | |
| 3337 <div id="FP_Q112_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 3338 <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a> | |
| 3339 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3340 <h4 id="FP_Q112_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?</h4> | |
| 3341 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 3342 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p2"> | |
| 3343 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual | |
| 3344 actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are | |
| 3345 intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions. | |
| 3346 </p> | |
| 3347 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p3"> | |
| 3348 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, | |
| 3349 it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly. | |
| 3350 </p> | |
| 3351 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p4"> | |
| 3352 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive | |
| 3353 wisdom" ( | |
| 3354 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:25</a>). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole | |
| 3355 of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is | |
| 3356 unfitting. | |
| 3357 </p> | |
| 3358 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p5"> | |
| 3359 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written ( | |
| 3360 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.27" target="asv">Lk. 22:27</a>): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are | |
| 3361 naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us. | |
| 3362 </p> | |
| 3363 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p6"> | |
| 3364 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 3365 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.20" target="asv">Ex. 23:20</a>): "Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee." | |
| 3366 </p> | |
| 3367 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p7"> | |
| 3368 <b>I answer that,</b> From what has been said above ( | |
| 3369 <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">Q[108], A[6]</a>), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated ( | |
| 3370 <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">Q[43], A[1]</a>), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin | |
| 3371 to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent | |
| 3372 as | |
| 3373 proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before | |
| 3374 by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, | |
| 3375 His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things ( | |
| 3376 <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html">Q[8], A[1]</a>). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such | |
| 3377 a way as not to reach | |
| 3378 another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was above stated ( | |
| 3379 <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal | |
| 3380 creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this | |
| 3381 takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God. | |
| 3382 </p> | |
| 3383 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p8"> Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose | |
| 3384 authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister | |
| 3385 is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels' | |
| 3386 actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry. | |
| 3387 </p> | |
| 3388 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p9"> | |
| 3389 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an | |
| 3390 operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting | |
| 3391 something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and | |
| 3392 commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently | |
| 3393 have sometimes a determinate place. | |
| 3394 </p> | |
| 3395 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p10"> | |
| 3396 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body | |
| 3397 should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the | |
| 3398 empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king | |
| 3399 lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his | |
| 3400 dignity. | |
| 3401 </p> | |
| 3402 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p11"> | |
| 3403 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through | |
| 3404 the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the | |
| 3405 contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in | |
| 3406 no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule | |
| 3407 and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels | |
| 3408 do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation." | |
| 3409 </p> | |
| 3410 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p12"> | |
| 3411 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them, | |
| 3412 absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior | |
| 3413 to every creature. Hence the Apostle says ( | |
| 3414 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "Esteeming others better than themselves." | |
| 3415 </p> | |
| 3416 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p13"></p> | |
| 3417 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p14"></p> | |
| 3418 <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a> | |
| 3419 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3420 </div> | |
| 3421 <div id="FP_Q112_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 3422 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3423 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3424 <h4 id="FP_Q112_A2-p0.1">Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?</h4> | |
| 3425 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 3426 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p2"> | |
| 3427 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 3428 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>): "All are ministering spirits, sent to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?']. | |
| 3429 </p> | |
| 3430 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p3"> | |
| 3431 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above ( | |
| 3432 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">Q[108], A[6]</a>). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet ( | |
| 3433 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.6" target="asv">Is. 6:6,7</a>). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent. | |
| 3434 </p> | |
| 3435 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p4"> | |
| 3436 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more | |
| 3437 are even the highest angels sent. | |
| 3438 </p> | |
| 3439 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p5"> | |
| 3440 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute | |
| 3441 the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above ( | |
| 3442 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry; | |
| 3443 which contradicts the words, "Thousands of thousands ministered to | |
| 3444 Him" ( | |
| 3445 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>). | |
| 3446 </p> | |
| 3447 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p6"> | |
| 3448 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil | |
| 3449 no exterior service." | |
| 3450 </p> | |
| 3451 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p7"> | |
| 3452 <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what has been said above ( | |
| 3453 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>; | |
| 3454 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior | |
| 3455 things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards | |
| 3456 corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for | |
| 3457 the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished | |
| 3458 immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these | |
| 3459 bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. | |
| 3460 Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels | |
| 3461 without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, | |
| 3462 but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent. | |
| 3463 </p> | |
| 3464 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p8"> It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers | |
| 3465 of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to | |
| 3466 any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law. | |
| 3467 </p> | |
| 3468 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p9"> | |
| 3469 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; | |
| 3470 but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. | |
| 3471 It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the | |
| 3472 ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying | |
| 3473 by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope | |
| 3474 is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else. | |
| 3475 </p> | |
| 3476 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p10"> | |
| 3477 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been | |
| 3478 said ( | |
| 3479 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">Q[43], A[1]</a>). | |
| 3480 </p> | |
| 3481 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p11"> | |
| 3482 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent | |
| 3483 immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the | |
| 3484 inferior ministries. | |
| 3485 </p> | |
| 3486 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 3487 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p13"></p> | |
| 3488 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3489 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3490 </div> | |
| 3491 <div id="FP_Q112_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 3492 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3493 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3494 <h4 id="FP_Q112_A3-p0.1">Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?</h4> | |
| 3495 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 3496 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p2"> | |
| 3497 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent, | |
| 3498 and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited." | |
| 3499 </p> | |
| 3500 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p3"> | |
| 3501 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before | |
| 3502 the Lord" ( | |
| 3503 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.12.15" target="asv">Tob. 12:15</a>). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist. | |
| 3504 </p> | |
| 3505 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p4"> | |
| 3506 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to | |
| 3507 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.6" target="asv"> Job 1:6</a>: "When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them." Therefore much more do the angels, | |
| 3508 who are sent to minister, assist. | |
| 3509 </p> | |
| 3510 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p5"> | |
| 3511 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, | |
| 3512 but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is | |
| 3513 highest of all. Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of | |
| 3514 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv"> Dan. 7:10</a>: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Therefore the angels who are | |
| 3515 sent also assist. | |
| 3516 </p> | |
| 3517 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p6"> | |
| 3518 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says, on | |
| 3519 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.25.3" target="asv"> Job 25:3</a>: "Is there any numbering of His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men." | |
| 3520 Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist. | |
| 3521 </p> | |
| 3522 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p7"> | |
| 3523 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and "administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of | |
| 3524 whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed | |
| 3525 by those who are in attendance---for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these | |
| 3526 are said to administer, not to assist. | |
| 3527 </p> | |
| 3528 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those | |
| 3529 who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are sent on the external ministry of our | |
| 3530 salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine | |
| 3531 mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the | |
| 3532 inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special | |
| 3533 prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God. | |
| 3534 </p> | |
| 3535 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p9"> From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.</p> | |
| 3536 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p10"> | |
| 3537 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii), "though | |
| 3538 he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels." | |
| 3539 </p> | |
| 3540 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p11"> | |
| 3541 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative | |
| 3542 of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than | |
| 3543 is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's | |
| 3544 secrets than another. | |
| 3545 </p> | |
| 3546 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p12"></p> | |
| 3547 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p13"></p> | |
| 3548 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3549 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3550 </div> | |
| 3551 <div id="FP_Q112_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 3552 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3553 <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a> | |
| 3554 <h4 id="FP_Q112_A4-p0.1">Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?</h4> | |
| 3555 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 3556 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p2"> | |
| 3557 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according | |
| 3558 to | |
| 3559 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as | |
| 3560 Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry. | |
| 3561 </p> | |
| 3562 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p3"> | |
| 3563 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the | |
| 3564 angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister. | |
| 3565 </p> | |
| 3566 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p4"> | |
| 3567 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore | |
| 3568 the dominations are not sent to minister. | |
| 3569 </p> | |
| 3570 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p5"> | |
| 3571 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated | |
| 3572 <a id="FP_Q112_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal | |
| 3573 creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, | |
| 3574 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify | |
| 3575 some kind of administration. But | |
| 3576 the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the | |
| 3577 other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; | |
| 3578 the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory | |
| 3579 says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to | |
| 3580 external ministry; not to the four superior orders. | |
| 3581 </p> | |
| 3582 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p6"> | |
| 3583 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be | |
| 3584 done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others | |
| 3585 are to do. | |
| 3586 </p> | |
| 3587 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p7"> | |
| 3588 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those | |
| 3589 who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words ( | |
| 3590 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands"; | |
| 3591 thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number | |
| 3592 of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him." This explanation | |
| 3593 rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are | |
| 3594 in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number | |
| 3595 of orders, as six administer and three assist. | |
| 3596 </p> | |
| 3597 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p8"> Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; | |
| 3598 so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures | |
| 3599 surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, | |
| 3600 as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, | |
| 3601 the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because | |
| 3602 ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants | |
| 3603 as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants | |
| 3604 are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but | |
| 3605 rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together | |
| 3606 of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage. | |
| 3607 </p> | |
| 3608 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p9"></p> | |
| 3609 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p10"></p> | |
| 3610 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3611 <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a> | |
| 3612 </div> | |
| 3613 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3614 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3615 </div> | |
| 3616 <div id="FP_Q113" class="div3"> | |
| 3617 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3618 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3619 <h3 id="FP_Q113-p0.1">OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 3620 <p id="FP_Q113-p1"></p> | |
| 3621 <p id="FP_Q113-p2"> We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first | |
| 3622 head eight points of inquiry arise: | |
| 3623 </p> | |
| 3624 <p id="FP_Q113-p3"> (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?</p> | |
| 3625 <p id="FP_Q113-p4"> (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?</p> | |
| 3626 <p id="FP_Q113-p5"> (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</p> | |
| 3627 <p id="FP_Q113-p6"> (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?</p> | |
| 3628 <p id="FP_Q113-p7"> (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?</p> | |
| 3629 <p id="FP_Q113-p8"> (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?</p> | |
| 3630 <p id="FP_Q113-p9"> (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?</p> | |
| 3631 <p id="FP_Q113-p10"> (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?</p> | |
| 3632 <div id="FP_Q113_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 3633 <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a> | |
| 3634 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3635 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A1-p0.1">Whether men are guarded by the angels?</h4> | |
| 3636 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 3637 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p2"> | |
| 3638 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, | |
| 3639 or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows | |
| 3640 how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel. | |
| 3641 </p> | |
| 3642 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p3"> | |
| 3643 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to | |
| 3644 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.120.4" target="asv"> Ps. 120:4</a>: "He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel. | |
| 3645 </p> | |
| 3646 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p4"> | |
| 3647 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this | |
| 3648 man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" ( | |
| 3649 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 20:39</a>). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in | |
| 3650 some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly | |
| 3651 false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men. | |
| 3652 </p> | |
| 3653 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p5"> | |
| 3654 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 3655 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.11" target="asv">Ps. 90:11</a>): "He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways." | |
| 3656 </p> | |
| 3657 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p6"> | |
| 3658 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by | |
| 3659 the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior | |
| 3660 which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various | |
| 3661 opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover | |
| 3662 manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so | |
| 3663 it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good. | |
| 3664 </p> | |
| 3665 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p7"> | |
| 3666 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection | |
| 3667 towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature | |
| 3668 belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the | |
| 3669 universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in | |
| 3670 many ways. Hence it is written ( | |
| 3671 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels. | |
| 3672 </p> | |
| 3673 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p8"> | |
| 3674 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the | |
| 3675 habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this | |
| 3676 the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him | |
| 3677 grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, | |
| 3678 Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated ( | |
| 3679 <a id="FP_Q113_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">Q[111], A[1]</a>). | |
| 3680 </p> | |
| 3681 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p9"> | |
| 3682 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation | |
| 3683 of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish | |
| 3684 is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside | |
| 3685 the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise | |
| 3686 that miracles occur outside the order of nature. | |
| 3687 </p> | |
| 3688 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p10"></p> | |
| 3689 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 3690 <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a> | |
| 3691 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3692 </div> | |
| 3693 <div id="FP_Q113_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 3694 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3695 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3696 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A2-p0.1">Whether each man is guarded by an angel?</h4> | |
| 3697 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 3698 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p2"> | |
| 3699 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard | |
| 3700 many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men. | |
| 3701 </p> | |
| 3702 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p3"> | |
| 3703 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). | |
| 3704 But as all the angels are unequal ( | |
| 3705 <a id="FP_Q113_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps | |
| 3706 men. | |
| 3707 </p> | |
| 3708 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p4"> | |
| 3709 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than | |
| 3710 another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says | |
| 3711 (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels. | |
| 3712 </p> | |
| 3713 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p5"> | |
| 3714 <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. ( | |
| 3715 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.10" target="asv">Mat. 8:10</a>), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth." | |
| 3716 </p> | |
| 3717 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p6"> | |
| 3718 <b>I answer that,</b> Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the | |
| 3719 execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible | |
| 3720 creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species, | |
| 3721 but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which | |
| 3722 cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what | |
| 3723 remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to | |
| 3724 the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things | |
| 3725 corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different "genera" | |
| 3726 of | |
| 3727 things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable | |
| 3728 that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose | |
| 3729 that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men. | |
| 3730 </p> | |
| 3731 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p7"> | |
| 3732 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian | |
| 3733 is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one | |
| 3734 man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to | |
| 3735 the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or | |
| 3736 weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation | |
| 3737 of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men. | |
| 3738 </p> | |
| 3739 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p8"> | |
| 3740 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above stated ( | |
| 3741 <a id="FP_Q113_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html">Q[112], A[3]</a>, ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things, | |
| 3742 only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the | |
| 3743 inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one | |
| 3744 immediately above him. Thus it | |
| 3745 is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens. | |
| 3746 </p> | |
| 3747 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p9"> | |
| 3748 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, | |
| 3749 and others to the lesser things, according to | |
| 3750 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.11" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:11,12</a>: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and | |
| 3751 some of them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another. | |
| 3752 </p> | |
| 3753 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p10"></p> | |
| 3754 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 3755 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a> | |
| 3756 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3757 </div> | |
| 3758 <div id="FP_Q113_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 3759 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3760 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3761 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A3-p0.1">Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</h4> | |
| 3762 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 3763 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p2"> | |
| 3764 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that | |
| 3765 the text ( | |
| 3766 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv">Mat. 18:10</a>), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels | |
| 3767 guard men. | |
| 3768 </p> | |
| 3769 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p3"> | |
| 3770 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" ( | |
| 3771 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external | |
| 3772 ministry ( | |
| 3773 <a id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html">Q[112], A[4]</a>). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men. | |
| 3774 </p> | |
| 3775 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p4"> | |
| 3776 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the | |
| 3777 Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders | |
| 3778 are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order. | |
| 3779 </p> | |
| 3780 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p5"> | |
| 3781 <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius | |
| 3782 (Coel. Hier. v, ix). | |
| 3783 </p> | |
| 3784 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p6"> | |
| 3785 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated | |
| 3786 <a id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard | |
| 3787 him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce | |
| 3788 the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one | |
| 3789 man. The other kind of guardianship is | |
| 3790 universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship | |
| 3791 of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes. | |
| 3792 Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" ( | |
| 3793 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits | |
| 3794 by | |
| 3795 the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.). | |
| 3796 </p> | |
| 3797 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p7"> | |
| 3798 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each | |
| 3799 order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen | |
| 3800 by God for the higher degree of glory. | |
| 3801 </p> | |
| 3802 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p8"> | |
| 3803 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater | |
| 3804 or less, as above explained. | |
| 3805 </p> | |
| 3806 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p9"> | |
| 3807 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors' | |
| 3808 power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles. | |
| 3809 </p> | |
| 3810 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p10"></p> | |
| 3811 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 3812 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a> | |
| 3813 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3814 </div> | |
| 3815 <div id="FP_Q113_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 3816 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3817 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a> | |
| 3818 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A4-p0.1">Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?</h4> | |
| 3819 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 3820 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p2"> | |
| 3821 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ ( | |
| 3822 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.7" target="asv">Phil. 2:7</a>) that "He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship | |
| 3823 of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. | |
| 3824 Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. | |
| 3825 </p> | |
| 3826 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p3"> | |
| 3827 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state | |
| 3828 of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. | |
| 3829 </p> | |
| 3830 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p4"> | |
| 3831 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, | |
| 3832 encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, | |
| 3833 never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they | |
| 3834 have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in | |
| 3835 | |
| 3836 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.31" target="asv">Ps. 31</a>). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is written ( | |
| 3837 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men. | |
| 3838 </p> | |
| 3839 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p5"> | |
| 3840 <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Jerome quoted above | |
| 3841 <a id="FP_Q113_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it." | |
| 3842 </p> | |
| 3843 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p6"> | |
| 3844 <b>I answer that,</b> Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is | |
| 3845 threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to | |
| 3846 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.159.4" target="asv"> Ps. 159:4</a>: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have | |
| 3847 to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, | |
| 3848 however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign | |
| 3849 with him, in hell a demon to punish him. | |
| 3850 </p> | |
| 3851 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p7"> | |
| 3852 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards | |
| 3853 His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was | |
| 3854 right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is | |
| 3855 written ( | |
| 3856 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>) that "angels came and ministered to Him." | |
| 3857 </p> | |
| 3858 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p8"> | |
| 3859 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we | |
| 3860 have said above ( | |
| 3861 <a id="FP_Q113_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">Q[95], AA[1]</a>,3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason | |
| 3862 he needed a guardian angel. | |
| 3863 </p> | |
| 3864 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p9"> | |
| 3865 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither | |
| 3866 are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And | |
| 3867 although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless | |
| 3868 conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both | |
| 3869 themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like | |
| 3870 manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish. | |
| 3871 </p> | |
| 3872 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p10"></p> | |
| 3873 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 3874 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a> | |
| 3875 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a> | |
| 3876 </div> | |
| 3877 <div id="FP_Q113_A5" class="div4"> | |
| 3878 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3879 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a> | |
| 3880 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A5-p0.1">Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?</h4> | |
| 3881 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p1"></p> | |
| 3882 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p2"> | |
| 3883 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who | |
| 3884 shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says ( | |
| 3885 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard | |
| 3886 a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth. | |
| 3887 </p> | |
| 3888 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p3"> | |
| 3889 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction | |
| 3890 as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon | |
| 3891 as they are born. | |
| 3892 </p> | |
| 3893 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p4"> | |
| 3894 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel | |
| 3895 is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore | |
| 3896 angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth. | |
| 3897 </p> | |
| 3898 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p5"> | |
| 3899 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth." | |
| 3900 </p> | |
| 3901 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p6"> | |
| 3902 <b>I answer that,</b> as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian | |
| 3903 is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves | |
| 3904 (vide A, 4), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; | |
| 3905 such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man | |
| 3906 as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits | |
| 3907 we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above ( | |
| 3908 <a id="FP_Q113_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him. | |
| 3909 </p> | |
| 3910 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p7"> | |
| 3911 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if | |
| 3912 we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic | |
| 3913 ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, | |
| 3914 nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils. | |
| 3915 </p> | |
| 3916 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p8"> | |
| 3917 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many | |
| 3918 other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm. | |
| 3919 </p> | |
| 3920 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p9"> | |
| 3921 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still | |
| 3922 part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree | |
| 3923 of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes | |
| 3924 separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above | |
| 3925 quoted, says. | |
| 3926 </p> | |
| 3927 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p10"></p> | |
| 3928 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p11"></p> | |
| 3929 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a> | |
| 3930 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a> | |
| 3931 </div> | |
| 3932 <div id="FP_Q113_A6" class="div4"> | |
| 3933 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a> | |
| 3934 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a> | |
| 3935 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A6-p0.1">Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?</h4> | |
| 3936 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p1"></p> | |
| 3937 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p2"> | |
| 3938 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said ( | |
| 3939 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.51.9" target="asv">Jer. 51:9</a>) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her." And ( | |
| 3940 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.5" target="asv">Is. 5:5</a>) it is written: "I will take away the hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]---"and it shall be wasted." | |
| 3941 </p> | |
| 3942 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p3"> | |
| 3943 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to | |
| 3944 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21.2" target="asv"> Ps. 21:2</a>: "O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man. | |
| 3945 </p> | |
| 3946 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p4"> | |
| 3947 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes | |
| 3948 they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us. | |
| 3949 </p> | |
| 3950 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p5"> | |
| 3951 <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are ever assailing us, according to | |
| 3952 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good | |
| 3953 angels ever guard us. | |
| 3954 </p> | |
| 3955 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p6"> | |
| 3956 <b>I answer that,</b> As appears above | |
| 3957 <a id="FP_Q113_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor | |
| 3958 anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is | |
| 3959 it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of | |
| 3960 His providence, but only in so far as He | |
| 3961 allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes | |
| 3962 a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some | |
| 3963 trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House | |
| 3964 of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being | |
| 3965 subject to tribulation. | |
| 3966 </p> | |
| 3967 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p7"> From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.</p> | |
| 3968 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p8"> | |
| 3969 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: | |
| 3970 for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be | |
| 3971 with man in an instant. | |
| 3972 </p> | |
| 3973 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p9"></p> | |
| 3974 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p10"></p> | |
| 3975 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a> | |
| 3976 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a> | |
| 3977 </div> | |
| 3978 <div id="FP_Q113_A7" class="div4"> | |
| 3979 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a> | |
| 3980 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a> | |
| 3981 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A7-p0.1">Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?</h4> | |
| 3982 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p1"></p> | |
| 3983 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p2"> | |
| 3984 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written ( | |
| 3985 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.33.7" target="asv">Is. 33:7</a>): "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills | |
| 3986 of those whom they guard. | |
| 3987 </p> | |
| 3988 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p3"> | |
| 3989 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the | |
| 3990 loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men. | |
| 3991 </p> | |
| 3992 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p4"> | |
| 3993 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, | |
| 3994 as we are told, | |
| 3995 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv"> Lk. 15:7.</a> Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin. | |
| 3996 </p> | |
| 3997 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p5"> | |
| 3998 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, on | |
| 3999 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.12" target="asv"> Numbers 18:12</a>: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men | |
| 4000 have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which | |
| 4001 have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins. | |
| 4002 </p> | |
| 4003 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p6"> | |
| 4004 <b>On the contrary,</b> Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written ( | |
| 4005 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv">Apoc. 21:4</a>): "Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have | |
| 4006 no cause for grief. | |
| 4007 </p> | |
| 4008 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p7"> | |
| 4009 <b>I answer that,</b> Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De | |
| 4010 Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will | |
| 4011 of the angels and the other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens | |
| 4012 in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply | |
| 4013 speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is | |
| 4014 called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; | |
| 4015 although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo | |
| 4016 into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. | |
| 4017 Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking | |
| 4018 the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine | |
| 4019 justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin. | |
| 4020 </p> | |
| 4021 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p8"> | |
| 4022 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words | |
| 4023 of Rabsaces, as related | |
| 4024 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.37.2" target="asv"> Is. 37:2 </a>seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers | |
| 4025 who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression | |
| 4026 is metaphorical, and | |
| 4027 signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God | |
| 4028 and the angels. | |
| 4029 </p> | |
| 4030 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p9"> The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.</p> | |
| 4031 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p10"> | |
| 4032 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering | |
| 4033 of the Divine Providence. | |
| 4034 </p> | |
| 4035 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p11"> | |
| 4036 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness. | |
| 4037 </p> | |
| 4038 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p12"></p> | |
| 4039 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p13"></p> | |
| 4040 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a> | |
| 4041 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a> | |
| 4042 </div> | |
| 4043 <div id="FP_Q113_A8" class="div4"> | |
| 4044 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a> | |
| 4045 <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a> | |
| 4046 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A8-p0.1">Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? </h4> | |
| 4047 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p1"></p> | |
| 4048 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p2"> | |
| 4049 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be strife or discord among the angels. For it is written ( | |
| 4050 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.25.2" target="asv">Job 25:2</a>): "Who maketh peace in His high places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife. | |
| 4051 </p> | |
| 4052 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p3"> | |
| 4053 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. | |
| 4054 Therefore there is no strife among the angels. | |
| 4055 </p> | |
| 4056 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p4"> | |
| 4057 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the | |
| 4058 opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel | |
| 4059 is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels. | |
| 4060 </p> | |
| 4061 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p5"> | |
| 4062 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 4063 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>): "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of the Persians was the angel | |
| 4064 deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is | |
| 4065 strife among them. | |
| 4066 </p> | |
| 4067 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p6"> | |
| 4068 <b>I answer that,</b> The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the | |
| 4069 kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his | |
| 4070 prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having | |
| 4071 led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of | |
| 4072 the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people. | |
| 4073 </p> | |
| 4074 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p7"> But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship | |
| 4075 of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard | |
| 4076 to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. | |
| 4077 But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so | |
| 4078 that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels | |
| 4079 cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they | |
| 4080 consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their | |
| 4081 wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things | |
| 4082 about which they seek knowledge are in opposition. | |
| 4083 </p> | |
| 4084 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p8"> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p> | |
| 4085 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p9"></p> | |
| 4086 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p10"></p> | |
| 4087 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a> | |
| 4088 <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a> | |
| 4089 </div> | |
| 4090 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4091 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4092 </div> | |
| 4093 <div id="FP_Q114" class="div3"> | |
| 4094 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a> | |
| 4095 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4096 <h3 id="FP_Q114-p0.1">OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </h3> | |
| 4097 <p id="FP_Q114-p1"></p> | |
| 4098 <p id="FP_Q114-p2"> We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 4099 <p id="FP_Q114-p3"> (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?</p> | |
| 4100 <p id="FP_Q114-p4"> (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</p> | |
| 4101 <p id="FP_Q114-p5"> (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?</p> | |
| 4102 <p id="FP_Q114-p6"> (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?</p> | |
| 4103 <p id="FP_Q114-p7"> (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?</p> | |
| 4104 <div id="FP_Q114_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 4105 <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a> | |
| 4106 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4107 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A1-p0.1">Whether men are assailed by the demons?</h4> | |
| 4108 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 4109 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p2"> | |
| 4110 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by | |
| 4111 God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed | |
| 4112 to assail man. | |
| 4113 </p> | |
| 4114 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p3"> | |
| 4115 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men | |
| 4116 are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of | |
| 4117 all justice, that men should be assailed by demons. | |
| 4118 </p> | |
| 4119 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p4"> | |
| 4120 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed | |
| 4121 that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons. | |
| 4122 </p> | |
| 4123 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p5"> | |
| 4124 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 4125 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of | |
| 4126 this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places." | |
| 4127 </p> | |
| 4128 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p6"> | |
| 4129 <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself | |
| 4130 is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance | |
| 4131 of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's | |
| 4132 salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly | |
| 4133 use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof | |
| 4134 are to be referred to God as their first author. | |
| 4135 </p> | |
| 4136 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p7"> | |
| 4137 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail | |
| 4138 us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to | |
| 4139 man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in | |
| 4140 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 22:20.</a> For punishment is referred to God as its first author. | |
| 4141 Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they | |
| 4142 punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice. | |
| 4143 </p> | |
| 4144 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p8"> | |
| 4145 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally | |
| 4146 through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore ( | |
| 4147 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:16</a>), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them." | |
| 4148 </p> | |
| 4149 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p9"> | |
| 4150 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the | |
| 4151 demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of | |
| 4152 the elect. | |
| 4153 </p> | |
| 4154 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p10"></p> | |
| 4155 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 4156 <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a> | |
| 4157 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4158 </div> | |
| 4159 <div id="FP_Q114_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 4160 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4161 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4162 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A2-p0.1">Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</h4> | |
| 4163 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 4164 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p2"> | |
| 4165 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to | |
| 4166 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.1" target="asv"> Gn. 22:1, </a> "God tempted Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt | |
| 4167 man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt. | |
| 4168 </p> | |
| 4169 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p3"> | |
| 4170 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt. | |
| 4171 </p> | |
| 4172 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p4"> | |
| 4173 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, | |
| 4174 as appears from what has been said above ( | |
| 4175 <a id="FP_Q114_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">Q[111], A[2]</a>), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt. | |
| 4176 </p> | |
| 4177 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p5"> | |
| 4178 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 4179 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.3.5" target="asv">1 Thess. 3:5</a>): "Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is, the devil, whose office it | |
| 4180 is to tempt." | |
| 4181 </p> | |
| 4182 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p6"> | |
| 4183 <b>I answer that,</b> To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about | |
| 4184 it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be | |
| 4185 acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is | |
| 4186 as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is | |
| 4187 sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him. | |
| 4188 </p> | |
| 4189 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p7"> From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed | |
| 4190 merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, | |
| 4191 presumes to make an experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, | |
| 4192 however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper | |
| 4193 office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He | |
| 4194 may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written ( | |
| 4195 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.13.3" target="asv">Dt. 13:3</a>): "The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him." | |
| 4196 </p> | |
| 4197 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p8"> The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort | |
| 4198 of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages | |
| 4199 and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting. | |
| 4200 </p> | |
| 4201 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p9"> Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.</p> | |
| 4202 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p10"> | |
| 4203 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher | |
| 4204 of spirits" ( | |
| 4205 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore | |
| 4206 this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone. | |
| 4207 </p> | |
| 4208 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p11"> | |
| 4209 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above ( | |
| 4210 <a id="FP_Q114_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html">Q[111], A[3]</a>), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can | |
| 4211 nevertheless be inclined. | |
| 4212 </p> | |
| 4213 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 4214 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p13"></p> | |
| 4215 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4216 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4217 </div> | |
| 4218 <div id="FP_Q114_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 4219 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4220 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4221 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A3-p0.1">Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?</h4> | |
| 4222 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 4223 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p2"> | |
| 4224 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude | |
| 4225 of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all | |
| 4226 malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil." | |
| 4227 </p> | |
| 4228 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p3"> | |
| 4229 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews ( | |
| 4230 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>): "You are of your father the devil." But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore every | |
| 4231 sin is due to the devil's instigation. | |
| 4232 </p> | |
| 4233 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p4"> | |
| 4234 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the | |
| 4235 suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due | |
| 4236 to the instigation of the devil. | |
| 4237 </p> | |
| 4238 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p5"> | |
| 4239 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from | |
| 4240 the movement of our free-will." | |
| 4241 </p> | |
| 4242 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p6"> | |
| 4243 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a | |
| 4244 disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might | |
| 4245 say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of | |
| 4246 all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there | |
| 4247 resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius. | |
| 4248 </p> | |
| 4249 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p7"> But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil | |
| 4250 is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will | |
| 4251 and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire | |
| 4252 for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those | |
| 4253 desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will | |
| 4254 to curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the | |
| 4255 devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our | |
| 4256 first parents," as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii). | |
| 4257 </p> | |
| 4258 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p8"> Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.</p> | |
| 4259 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p9"> | |
| 4260 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, | |
| 4261 in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin. | |
| 4262 </p> | |
| 4263 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p10"> | |
| 4264 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to | |
| 4265 man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not | |
| 4266 due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion. | |
| 4267 </p> | |
| 4268 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 4269 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p12"></p> | |
| 4270 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4271 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4272 </div> | |
| 4273 <div id="FP_Q114_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 4274 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4275 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a> | |
| 4276 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A4-p0.1">Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?</h4> | |
| 4277 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 4278 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p2"> | |
| 4279 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show | |
| 4280 itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says ( | |
| 4281 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other | |
| 4282 times do the demons perform lying wonders. | |
| 4283 </p> | |
| 4284 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p3"> | |
| 4285 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine | |
| 4286 says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's | |
| 4287 art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles. | |
| 4288 </p> | |
| 4289 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p4"> | |
| 4290 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade | |
| 4291 one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written ( | |
| 4292 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv">Mk. 16:20</a>): "The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed." | |
| 4293 </p> | |
| 4294 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p5"> | |
| 4295 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says | |
| 4296 <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q83.html">(Q[83];</a> [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of the magic art miracles are | |
| 4297 wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God." | |
| 4298 </p> | |
| 4299 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p6"> | |
| 4300 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said above ( | |
| 4301 <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in | |
| 4302 the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power | |
| 4303 of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. | |
| 4304 And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power | |
| 4305 and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him | |
| 4306 to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle. | |
| 4307 </p> | |
| 4308 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p7"> It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they | |
| 4309 are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. | |
| 4310 And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house | |
| 4311 and with it his children---these were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, | |
| 4312 19). | |
| 4313 </p> | |
| 4314 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p8"> | |
| 4315 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive | |
| 4316 men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, | |
| 4317 they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him." | |
| 4318 </p> | |
| 4319 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p9"> | |
| 4320 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As we have said above ( | |
| 4321 <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute | |
| 4322 matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce | |
| 4323 these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal | |
| 4324 things which | |
| 4325 can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the | |
| 4326 operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, | |
| 4327 which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, | |
| 4328 cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body | |
| 4329 of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by | |
| 4330 the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality. | |
| 4331 </p> | |
| 4332 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p10"> Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his | |
| 4333 corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above ( | |
| 4334 <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html">Q[111], AA[3]</a>,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as | |
| 4335 he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same | |
| 4336 way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. | |
| 4337 Dei xviii, 18): "Man's imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, | |
| 4338 appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be understood as though the | |
| 4339 imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another | |
| 4340 man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses. | |
| 4341 </p> | |
| 4342 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p11"> | |
| 4343 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different | |
| 4344 right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the | |
| 4345 latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject." | |
| 4346 </p> | |
| 4347 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p12"></p> | |
| 4348 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p13"></p> | |
| 4349 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4350 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a> | |
| 4351 </div> | |
| 4352 <div id="FP_Q114_A5" class="div4"> | |
| 4353 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4354 <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a> | |
| 4355 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A5-p0.1">Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?</h4> | |
| 4356 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p1"></p> | |
| 4357 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p2"> | |
| 4358 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ | |
| 4359 overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore | |
| 4360 it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults. | |
| 4361 </p> | |
| 4362 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p3"> | |
| 4363 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is | |
| 4364 not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults. | |
| 4365 </p> | |
| 4366 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p4"> | |
| 4367 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 4368 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame. | |
| 4369 </p> | |
| 4370 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p5"> | |
| 4371 <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other | |
| 4372 sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to | |
| 4373 be so for a certain definite time: wherefore ( | |
| 4374 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv">Lk. 4:13</a>) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One | |
| 4375 is on the part | |
| 4376 of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], | |
| 4377 "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt | |
| 4378 for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. | |
| 4379 As to this, Ambrose says on | |
| 4380 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv"> Lk. 4:13</a>: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from | |
| 4381 frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from | |
| 4382 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.44" target="asv"> Mat. 12:44</a>: "I will return into my house from whence I came out." | |
| 4383 </p> | |
| 4384 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p6"> From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.</p> | |
| 4385 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p7"></p> | |
| 4386 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p8"></p> | |
| 4387 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4388 <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a> | |
| 4389 </div> | |
| 4390 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a> | |
| 4391 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4392 </div> | |
| 4393 <div id="FP_Q115" class="div3"> | |
| 4394 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a> | |
| 4395 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4396 <h3 id="FP_Q115-p0.1">OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 4397 <p id="FP_Q115-p1"></p> | |
| 4398 <p id="FP_Q115-p2"> We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal | |
| 4399 actions there are six points of inquiry: | |
| 4400 </p> | |
| 4401 <p id="FP_Q115-p3"> (1) Whether a body can be active?</p> | |
| 4402 <p id="FP_Q115-p4"> (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?</p> | |
| 4403 <p id="FP_Q115-p5"> (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?</p> | |
| 4404 <p id="FP_Q115-p6"> (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?</p> | |
| 4405 <p id="FP_Q115-p7"> (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?</p> | |
| 4406 <p id="FP_Q115-p8"> (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?</p> | |
| 4407 <div id="FP_Q115_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 4408 <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a> | |
| 4409 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4410 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A1-p0.1">Whether a body can be active?</h4> | |
| 4411 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 4412 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p2"> | |
| 4413 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but | |
| 4414 do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and | |
| 4415 are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances." | |
| 4416 </p> | |
| 4417 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p3"> | |
| 4418 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance | |
| 4419 below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. | |
| 4420 Therefore corporeal substance is not active. | |
| 4421 </p> | |
| 4422 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p4"> | |
| 4423 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because | |
| 4424 it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more | |
| 4425 a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active. | |
| 4426 </p> | |
| 4427 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p5"> | |
| 4428 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being | |
| 4429 most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active. | |
| 4430 </p> | |
| 4431 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p6"> | |
| 4432 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial | |
| 4433 form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and | |
| 4434 an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, | |
| 4435 neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," | |
| 4436 as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active. | |
| 4437 </p> | |
| 4438 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p7"> | |
| 4439 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power | |
| 4440 on that of which it lays hold." | |
| 4441 </p> | |
| 4442 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p8"> | |
| 4443 <b>I answer that,</b> It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. | |
| 4444 For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments | |
| 4445 mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, | |
| 4446 are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, | |
| 4447 according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion | |
| 4448 seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, | |
| 4449 and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that | |
| 4450 these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter | |
| 4451 is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned | |
| 4452 by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual | |
| 4453 and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else. | |
| 4454 </p> | |
| 4455 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p9"> But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion | |
| 4456 as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the | |
| 4457 participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be | |
| 4458 in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of | |
| 4459 its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: | |
| 4460 but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the | |
| 4461 form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form | |
| 4462 of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an | |
| 4463 action is effected by the contact of two bodies. | |
| 4464 </p> | |
| 4465 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p10"> But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while | |
| 4466 he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first | |
| 4467 contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him | |
| 4468 to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the | |
| 4469 substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial | |
| 4470 principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of | |
| 4471 the creation ( | |
| 4472 <a id="FP_Q115_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html">Q[45], A[8]</a>). | |
| 4473 </p> | |
| 4474 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p11"> The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, | |
| 4475 while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle | |
| 4476 (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would | |
| 4477 be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue. | |
| 4478 </p> | |
| 4479 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p12"> We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.</p> | |
| 4480 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p13"> | |
| 4481 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature | |
| 4482 inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. | |
| 4483 Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act. | |
| 4484 </p> | |
| 4485 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p14"> From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a | |
| 4486 mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is | |
| 4487 purely passive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God | |
| 4488 is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive. | |
| 4489 </p> | |
| 4490 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p15"> | |
| 4491 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch | |
| 4492 as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not | |
| 4493 to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, | |
| 4494 it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, | |
| 4495 the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, | |
| 4496 as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act. | |
| 4497 </p> | |
| 4498 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p16"> | |
| 4499 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch | |
| 4500 as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality. | |
| 4501 </p> | |
| 4502 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p17"> | |
| 4503 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although | |
| 4504 itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate | |
| 4505 in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. | |
| 4506 But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature | |
| 4507 of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that | |
| 4508 an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms. | |
| 4509 </p> | |
| 4510 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p18"></p> | |
| 4511 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p19"></p> | |
| 4512 <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a> | |
| 4513 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4514 </div> | |
| 4515 <div id="FP_Q115_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 4516 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4517 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4518 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A2-p0.1">Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?</h4> | |
| 4519 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 4520 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p2"> | |
| 4521 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual | |
| 4522 order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in | |
| 4523 which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. | |
| 4524 </p> | |
| 4525 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p3"> | |
| 4526 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain | |
| 4527 seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable | |
| 4528 to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. | |
| 4529 </p> | |
| 4530 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p4"> | |
| 4531 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, | |
| 4532 matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. | |
| 4533 </p> | |
| 4534 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p5"> | |
| 4535 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production | |
| 4536 of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal | |
| 4537 virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. | |
| 4538 </p> | |
| 4539 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p6"> | |
| 4540 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds | |
| 4541 lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world." | |
| 4542 </p> | |
| 4543 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p7"> | |
| 4544 <b>I answer that,</b> It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal | |
| 4545 nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural | |
| 4546 things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation | |
| 4547 of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are | |
| 4548 generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, | |
| 4549 consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is | |
| 4550 manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things | |
| 4551 are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and | |
| 4552 passive | |
| 4553 virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement. | |
| 4554 </p> | |
| 4555 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p8"> These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad | |
| 4556 lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements | |
| 4557 of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things | |
| 4558 which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that | |
| 4559 animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are | |
| 4560 compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced. | |
| 4561 </p> | |
| 4562 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p9"> | |
| 4563 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal | |
| 4564 matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes | |
| 4565 ideales]. | |
| 4566 </p> | |
| 4567 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p10"> | |
| 4568 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement | |
| 4569 for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds. | |
| 4570 </p> | |
| 4571 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p11"> | |
| 4572 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female | |
| 4573 contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles. | |
| 4574 </p> | |
| 4575 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p12"> | |
| 4576 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, | |
| 4577 just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so | |
| 4578 is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," | |
| 4579 but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate | |
| 4580 principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought | |
| 4581 outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God | |
| 4582 commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities | |
| 4583 which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of | |
| 4584 seminal virtues. | |
| 4585 </p> | |
| 4586 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p13"></p> | |
| 4587 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p14"></p> | |
| 4588 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4589 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4590 </div> | |
| 4591 <div id="FP_Q115_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 4592 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4593 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4594 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A3-p0.1">Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?</h4> | |
| 4595 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 4596 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p2"> | |
| 4597 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De | |
| 4598 Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they | |
| 4599 are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes." | |
| 4600 </p> | |
| 4601 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p3"> | |
| 4602 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and | |
| 4603 there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need | |
| 4604 to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies. | |
| 4605 </p> | |
| 4606 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p4"> | |
| 4607 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through | |
| 4608 the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore | |
| 4609 the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below. | |
| 4610 </p> | |
| 4611 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p5"> | |
| 4612 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: | |
| 4613 a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly | |
| 4614 bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below. | |
| 4615 </p> | |
| 4616 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p6"> | |
| 4617 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more | |
| 4618 subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible | |
| 4619 bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection." | |
| 4620 </p> | |
| 4621 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p7"> | |
| 4622 <b>I answer that,</b> Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is | |
| 4623 moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. | |
| 4624 Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the | |
| 4625 heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save | |
| 4626 locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of | |
| 4627 the heavenly bodies, as to their cause. | |
| 4628 </p> | |
| 4629 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p8"> | |
| 4630 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption | |
| 4631 here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods. | |
| 4632 </p> | |
| 4633 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p9"> | |
| 4634 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. | |
| 4635 If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles | |
| 4636 of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle | |
| 4637 above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves | |
| 4638 sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions | |
| 4639 in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary | |
| 4640 to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions. | |
| 4641 </p> | |
| 4642 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p10"> This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive | |
| 4643 their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, | |
| 4644 would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior | |
| 4645 bodies: which is clearly false. | |
| 4646 </p> | |
| 4647 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p11"> Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of | |
| 4648 its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. | |
| 4649 Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: | |
| 4650 thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man." | |
| 4651 </p> | |
| 4652 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p12"> | |
| 4653 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason | |
| 4654 of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all | |
| 4655 things are like God. | |
| 4656 </p> | |
| 4657 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p13"> | |
| 4658 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. | |
| 4659 Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed | |
| 4660 sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because | |
| 4661 the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the | |
| 4662 various dispositions of matter. | |
| 4663 </p> | |
| 4664 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p14"></p> | |
| 4665 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p15"></p> | |
| 4666 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4667 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4668 </div> | |
| 4669 <div id="FP_Q115_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 4670 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4671 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a> | |
| 4672 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A4-p0.1">Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?</h4> | |
| 4673 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 4674 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p2"> | |
| 4675 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual | |
| 4676 substances, as stated above ( | |
| 4677 <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], A[3]</a>), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it | |
| 4678 seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions. | |
| 4679 </p> | |
| 4680 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p3"> | |
| 4681 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems | |
| 4682 that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles. | |
| 4683 </p> | |
| 4684 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p4"> | |
| 4685 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect | |
| 4686 and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human | |
| 4687 actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. | |
| 4688 </p> | |
| 4689 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p5"> | |
| 4690 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions." | |
| 4691 </p> | |
| 4692 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p6"> | |
| 4693 <b>I answer that,</b> The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above | |
| 4694 <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because | |
| 4695 the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore | |
| 4696 if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding | |
| 4697 that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice | |
| 4698 and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there | |
| 4699 are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action | |
| 4700 of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate | |
| 4701 actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, | |
| 4702 that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, | |
| 4703 as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the | |
| 4704 intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive | |
| 4705 powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, | |
| 4706 disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although | |
| 4707 the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains | |
| 4708 the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue | |
| 4709 of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, | |
| 4710 than on the intellect. | |
| 4711 </p> | |
| 4712 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p7"> To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does | |
| 4713 not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and | |
| 4714 of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal | |
| 4715 organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions. | |
| 4716 </p> | |
| 4717 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p8"> | |
| 4718 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; | |
| 4719 but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated | |
| 4720 above ( | |
| 4721 <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">Q[111], A[2]</a>). | |
| 4722 </p> | |
| 4723 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p9"> | |
| 4724 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: | |
| 4725 so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine | |
| 4726 intellect and will. | |
| 4727 </p> | |
| 4728 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p10"> | |
| 4729 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly | |
| 4730 bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the | |
| 4731 truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting | |
| 4732 his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say | |
| 4733 that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions. | |
| 4734 </p> | |
| 4735 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 4736 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p12"></p> | |
| 4737 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4738 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a> | |
| 4739 </div> | |
| 4740 <div id="FP_Q115_A5" class="div4"> | |
| 4741 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4742 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a> | |
| 4743 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A5-p0.1">Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?</h4> | |
| 4744 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p1"></p> | |
| 4745 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p2"> | |
| 4746 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass | |
| 4747 men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from | |
| 4748 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.24" target="asv"> Mat. 4:24 </a>and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them. | |
| 4749 </p> | |
| 4750 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p3"> | |
| 4751 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through | |
| 4752 the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them. | |
| 4753 </p> | |
| 4754 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p4"> | |
| 4755 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, | |
| 4756 namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine | |
| 4757 (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies. | |
| 4758 </p> | |
| 4759 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p5"> | |
| 4760 <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine | |
| 4761 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies. | |
| 4762 </p> | |
| 4763 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p6"> | |
| 4764 <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and | |
| 4765 held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. | |
| 4766 This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain | |
| 4767 powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is | |
| 4768 manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would | |
| 4769 in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors | |
| 4770 of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things. | |
| 4771 </p> | |
| 4772 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p7"> For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius | |
| 4773 says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which | |
| 4774 it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto | |
| 4775 <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above ( | |
| 4776 <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">Q[51], A[1]</a>): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action | |
| 4777 of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly. | |
| 4778 </p> | |
| 4779 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p8"> | |
| 4780 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame | |
| 4781 God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because | |
| 4782 as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above ( | |
| 4783 <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html">Q[114], A[4]</a>, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended | |
| 4784 result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. | |
| 4785 ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property | |
| 4786 of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according | |
| 4787 to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto | |
| 4788 disposed. | |
| 4789 </p> | |
| 4790 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p9"> | |
| 4791 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of | |
| 4792 believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations | |
| 4793 corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned. | |
| 4794 </p> | |
| 4795 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p10"> | |
| 4796 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, | |
| 4797 rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered | |
| 4798 to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous. | |
| 4799 </p> | |
| 4800 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p11"></p> | |
| 4801 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p12"></p> | |
| 4802 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a> | |
| 4803 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a> | |
| 4804 </div> | |
| 4805 <div id="FP_Q115_A6" class="div4"> | |
| 4806 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a> | |
| 4807 <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a> | |
| 4808 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A6-p0.1">Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?</h4> | |
| 4809 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p1"></p> | |
| 4810 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p2"> | |
| 4811 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the | |
| 4812 effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, | |
| 4813 with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity. | |
| 4814 </p> | |
| 4815 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p3"> | |
| 4816 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter | |
| 4817 to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher | |
| 4818 power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter. | |
| 4819 </p> | |
| 4820 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p4"> | |
| 4821 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal | |
| 4822 cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: | |
| 4823 since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle | |
| 4824 is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. | |
| 4825 Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity. | |
| 4826 </p> | |
| 4827 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p5"> | |
| 4828 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed | |
| 4829 in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of | |
| 4830 heavenly bodies take place of necessity. | |
| 4831 </p> | |
| 4832 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p6"> | |
| 4833 <b>I answer that,</b> This question is partly solved by what was said above | |
| 4834 <a id="FP_Q115_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations | |
| 4835 in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to | |
| 4836 prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other | |
| 4837 things to which human action extends. | |
| 4838 </p> | |
| 4839 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p7"> But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced | |
| 4840 by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning | |
| 4841 of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows | |
| 4842 of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. | |
| 4843 vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition. | |
| 4844 </p> | |
| 4845 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p8"> For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes | |
| 4846 are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to | |
| 4847 fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently | |
| 4848 the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity. | |
| 4849 </p> | |
| 4850 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p9"> Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, | |
| 4851 has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise | |
| 4852 (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly | |
| 4853 a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to | |
| 4854 its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these | |
| 4855 two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be | |
| 4856 reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take | |
| 4857 fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the | |
| 4858 surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight | |
| 4859 on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of | |
| 4860 heavenly bodies result of necessity. | |
| 4861 </p> | |
| 4862 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p10"> | |
| 4863 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which | |
| 4864 can fail in their effects in the minority of cases. | |
| 4865 </p> | |
| 4866 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p11"> | |
| 4867 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local | |
| 4868 distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly | |
| 4869 body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature | |
| 4870 or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly | |
| 4871 body. | |
| 4872 </p> | |
| 4873 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p12"> | |
| 4874 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless | |
| 4875 the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above. | |
| 4876 </p> | |
| 4877 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p13"></p> | |
| 4878 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p14"></p> | |
| 4879 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a> | |
| 4880 <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a> | |
| 4881 </div> | |
| 4882 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a> | |
| 4883 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4884 </div> | |
| 4885 <div id="FP_Q116" class="div3"> | |
| 4886 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a> | |
| 4887 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4888 <h3 id="FP_Q116-p0.1">ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 4889 <p id="FP_Q116-p1"></p> | |
| 4890 <p id="FP_Q116-p2"> We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 4891 <p id="FP_Q116-p3"> (1) Is there such a thing as fate?</p> | |
| 4892 <p id="FP_Q116-p4"> (2) Where is it?</p> | |
| 4893 <p id="FP_Q116-p5"> (3) Is it unchangeable?</p> | |
| 4894 <p id="FP_Q116-p6"> (4) Are all things subject to fate?</p> | |
| 4895 <div id="FP_Q116_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 4896 <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a> | |
| 4897 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4898 <h4 id="FP_Q116_A1-p0.1">Whether there be such a thing as fate?</h4> | |
| 4899 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 4900 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p2"> | |
| 4901 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the | |
| 4902 hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real." | |
| 4903 </p> | |
| 4904 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p3"> | |
| 4905 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived | |
| 4906 from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who | |
| 4907 decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will | |
| 4908 be neither luck nor chance in the world. | |
| 4909 </p> | |
| 4910 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p4"> | |
| 4911 <b>On the contrary,</b> What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to | |
| 4912 changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order." | |
| 4913 </p> | |
| 4914 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p5"> | |
| 4915 <b>I answer that,</b> In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like | |
| 4916 as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants | |
| 4917 are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared | |
| 4918 to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended. | |
| 4919 </p> | |
| 4920 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p6"> So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These | |
| 4921 denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what | |
| 4922 we have said above about Providence ( | |
| 4923 <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). | |
| 4924 </p> | |
| 4925 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p7"> On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural | |
| 4926 things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is | |
| 4927 nothing else than "a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, | |
| 4928 1,8,9]. But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ( | |
| 4929 <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">Q[115], A[4]</a>) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of | |
| 4930 fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what | |
| 4931 takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ( | |
| 4932 <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html">Q[115], A[6]</a>) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every | |
| 4933 action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect | |
| 4934 of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grace | |
| 4935 finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects | |
| 4936 in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what | |
| 4937 happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance. | |
| 4938 </p> | |
| 4939 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p8"> We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining | |
| 4940 cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: | |
| 4941 otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect | |
| 4942 can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is | |
| 4943 hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here | |
| 4944 by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine | |
| 4945 intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above ( | |
| 4946 <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone. | |
| 4947 </p> | |
| 4948 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p9"> So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were | |
| 4949 "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those | |
| 4950 who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If | |
| 4951 anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, | |
| 4952 but hold his tongue." For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest. | |
| 4953 </p> | |
| 4954 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p10"> | |
| 4955 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared | |
| 4956 to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24). | |
| 4957 </p> | |
| 4958 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 4959 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p12"></p> | |
| 4960 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p13"></p> | |
| 4961 <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a> | |
| 4962 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a> | |
| 4963 </div> | |
| 4964 <div id="FP_Q116_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 4965 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a> | |
| 4966 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a> | |
| 4967 <h4 id="FP_Q116_A2-p0.1">Whether fate is in created things?</h4> | |
| 4968 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 4969 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p2"> | |
| 4970 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is | |
| 4971 called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God. | |
| 4972 </p> | |
| 4973 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p3"> | |
| 4974 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal | |
| 4975 cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above | |
| 4976 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures. | |
| 4977 </p> | |
| 4978 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p4"> | |
| 4979 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according | |
| 4980 to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but | |
| 4981 in God. | |
| 4982 </p> | |
| 4983 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p5"> | |
| 4984 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things." | |
| 4985 </p> | |
| 4986 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p6"> | |
| 4987 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been stated above ( | |
| 4988 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>; | |
| 4989 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html">Q[103], A[6]</a>), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two | |
| 4990 ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this | |
| 4991 ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, | |
| 4992 thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is | |
| 4993 served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements | |
| 4994 of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain | |
| 4995 of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above | |
| 4996 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">(A[1];</a> | |
| 4997 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html">Q[104], | |
| 4998 A[2] | |
| 4999 </a>; | |
| 5000 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>; | |
| 5001 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.6" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113.html">Q[113];</a> | |
| 5002 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.7" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114.html">Q[114])</a>. It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects. | |
| 5003 </p> | |
| 5004 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p7"> | |
| 5005 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature | |
| 5006 of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But | |
| 5007 essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes. | |
| 5008 </p> | |
| 5009 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p8"> | |
| 5010 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate. | |
| 5011 </p> | |
| 5012 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p9"> | |
| 5013 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies | |
| 5014 order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; | |
| 5015 and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. | |
| 5016 In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee." | |
| 5017 </p> | |
| 5018 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p10"></p> | |
| 5019 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 5020 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5021 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5022 </div> | |
| 5023 <div id="FP_Q116_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 5024 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5025 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a> | |
| 5026 <h4 id="FP_Q116_A3-p0.1">Whether fate is unchangeable?</h4> | |
| 5027 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 5028 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p2"> | |
| 5029 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten | |
| 5030 is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity | |
| 5031 of Providence." | |
| 5032 </p> | |
| 5033 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p3"> | |
| 5034 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent | |
| 5035 to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable. | |
| 5036 </p> | |
| 5037 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p4"> | |
| 5038 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate | |
| 5039 seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen | |
| 5040 of necessity. | |
| 5041 </p> | |
| 5042 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p5"> | |
| 5043 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition. | |
| 5044 </p> | |
| 5045 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p6"> | |
| 5046 <b>I answer that,</b> The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, | |
| 5047 which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, | |
| 5048 therefore, have held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen | |
| 5049 of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the | |
| 5050 effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above ( | |
| 5051 <a id="FP_Q116_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html">Q[115], A[6]</a>). | |
| 5052 </p> | |
| 5053 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p7"> Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians | |
| 5054 said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved | |
| 5055 above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence. | |
| 5056 </p> | |
| 5057 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p8"> We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, | |
| 5058 it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional | |
| 5059 is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the | |
| 5060 chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable | |
| 5061 Providence must also itself be unchangeable." | |
| 5062 </p> | |
| 5063 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p9"> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p> | |
| 5064 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p10"></p> | |
| 5065 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 5066 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5067 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a> | |
| 5068 </div> | |
| 5069 <div id="FP_Q116_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 5070 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5071 <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a> | |
| 5072 <h4 id="FP_Q116_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are subject to fate?</h4> | |
| 5073 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 5074 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p2"> | |
| 5075 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and | |
| 5076 the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are | |
| 5077 born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be | |
| 5078 excluded from the domain of fate. | |
| 5079 </p> | |
| 5080 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p3"> | |
| 5081 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the | |
| 5082 Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject | |
| 5083 to fate. | |
| 5084 </p> | |
| 5085 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p4"> | |
| 5086 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are | |
| 5087 changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above ( | |
| 5088 <a id="FP_Q116_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html">Q[9], A[2]</a>). Therefore fate is in all things. | |
| 5089 </p> | |
| 5090 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p5"> | |
| 5091 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate." | |
| 5092 </p> | |
| 5093 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p6"> | |
| 5094 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 5095 <a id="FP_Q116_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject | |
| 5096 also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to | |
| 5097 fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. | |
| 5098 iv): viz. that "those things which are | |
| 5099 nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing | |
| 5100 is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes. | |
| 5101 </p> | |
| 5102 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p7"> | |
| 5103 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in | |
| 5104 the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above. | |
| 5105 </p> | |
| 5106 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p8"> | |
| 5107 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever | |
| 5108 is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated. | |
| 5109 </p> | |
| 5110 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p9"> | |
| 5111 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, | |
| 5112 therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above. | |
| 5113 </p> | |
| 5114 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p10"></p> | |
| 5115 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 5116 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5117 <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a> | |
| 5118 </div> | |
| 5119 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a> | |
| 5120 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5121 </div> | |
| 5122 <div id="FP_Q117" class="div3"> | |
| 5123 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a> | |
| 5124 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5125 <h3 id="FP_Q117-p0.1">OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 5126 <p id="FP_Q117-p1"></p> | |
| 5127 <p id="FP_Q117-p2"> We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual | |
| 5128 nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from | |
| 5129 man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry: | |
| 5130 </p> | |
| 5131 <p id="FP_Q117-p3"> (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?</p> | |
| 5132 <p id="FP_Q117-p4"> (2) Whether man can teach an angel?</p> | |
| 5133 <p id="FP_Q117-p5"> (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?</p> | |
| 5134 <p id="FP_Q117-p6"> (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?</p> | |
| 5135 <p id="FP_Q117-p7"></p> | |
| 5136 <div id="FP_Q117_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 5137 <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a> | |
| 5138 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5139 <h4 id="FP_Q117_A1-p0.1">Whether one man can teach another?</h4> | |
| 5140 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 5141 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p2"> | |
| 5142 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says ( | |
| 5143 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.8" target="asv">Mat. 22:8</a>): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to | |
| 5144 be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is | |
| 5145 proper to God. | |
| 5146 </p> | |
| 5147 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p3"> | |
| 5148 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge | |
| 5149 in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows | |
| 5150 that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is. | |
| 5151 </p> | |
| 5152 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p4"> | |
| 5153 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either | |
| 5154 of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man. | |
| 5155 </p> | |
| 5156 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p5"> | |
| 5157 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something | |
| 5158 by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. | |
| 5159 For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom | |
| 5160 these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from | |
| 5161 the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to | |
| 5162 speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in | |
| 5163 another by teaching him. | |
| 5164 </p> | |
| 5165 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p6"> | |
| 5166 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 5167 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.7" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:7</a>): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth." | |
| 5168 </p> | |
| 5169 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p7"> | |
| 5170 <b>I answer that,</b> On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have | |
| 5171 one passive intellect in common, as stated above ( | |
| 5172 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause | |
| 5173 another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which | |
| 5174 he | |
| 5175 has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. | |
| 5176 This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: | |
| 5177 for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, | |
| 5178 and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above | |
| 5179 ( | |
| 5180 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). | |
| 5181 </p> | |
| 5182 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p8"> Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, | |
| 5183 through the participation of separate forms, as stated above ( | |
| 5184 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it | |
| 5185 knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider | |
| 5186 what he | |
| 5187 knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose | |
| 5188 (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved | |
| 5189 above ( | |
| 5190 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">Q[79], A[2]</a>; | |
| 5191 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">Q[84], A[3]</a>) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima | |
| 5192 iii, 4). | |
| 5193 </p> | |
| 5194 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p9"> We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing | |
| 5195 him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of | |
| 5196 effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused | |
| 5197 to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes | |
| 5198 from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical | |
| 5199 art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things | |
| 5200 must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection | |
| 5201 of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not | |
| 5202 as | |
| 5203 principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, | |
| 5204 by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing | |
| 5205 the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended | |
| 5206 end. | |
| 5207 </p> | |
| 5208 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p10"> Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; | |
| 5209 and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle | |
| 5210 of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are | |
| 5211 naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal | |
| 5212 principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own | |
| 5213 research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, | |
| 5214 leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what | |
| 5215 the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge." | |
| 5216 </p> | |
| 5217 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p11"> Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing | |
| 5218 to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he | |
| 5219 may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous | |
| 5220 knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or | |
| 5221 something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, | |
| 5222 by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above | |
| 5223 ( | |
| 5224 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>; | |
| 5225 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">Q[111], A[1]</a>) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes | |
| 5226 to the disciple the order of principles to | |
| 5227 conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. | |
| 5228 Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator | |
| 5229 causes his hearer to know. | |
| 5230 </p> | |
| 5231 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p12"> | |
| 5232 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the | |
| 5233 principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these | |
| 5234 are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" ( | |
| 5235 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.3" target="asv">Ps. 102:3</a>); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" ( | |
| 5236 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>), | |
| 5237 inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" ( | |
| 5238 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), through which light all things are shown to us. | |
| 5239 </p> | |
| 5240 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p13"> | |
| 5241 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore | |
| 5242 knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle | |
| 5243 by which one is directed in working. | |
| 5244 </p> | |
| 5245 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p14"> | |
| 5246 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but | |
| 5247 he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs | |
| 5248 of which are proposed to him from without. | |
| 5249 </p> | |
| 5250 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p15"> | |
| 5251 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail | |
| 5252 and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his | |
| 5253 own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master. | |
| 5254 </p> | |
| 5255 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p16"></p> | |
| 5256 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p17"></p> | |
| 5257 <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a> | |
| 5258 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5259 </div> | |
| 5260 <div id="FP_Q117_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 5261 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5262 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5263 <h4 id="FP_Q117_A2-p0.1">Whether man can teach the angels?</h4> | |
| 5264 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 5265 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p2"> | |
| 5266 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 5267 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.10" target="asv">Eph. 3:10</a>): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the | |
| 5268 Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men. | |
| 5269 </p> | |
| 5270 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p3"> | |
| 5271 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior | |
| 5272 angels, as stated above ( | |
| 5273 <a id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">Q[116], A[1]</a>; | |
| 5274 <a id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html">Q[112], A[3]</a>). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles | |
| 5275 from | |
| 5276 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.1" target="asv"> Heb. 1:1,2</a>: "Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore | |
| 5277 some men have been able to teach the angels. | |
| 5278 </p> | |
| 5279 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p4"> | |
| 5280 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are | |
| 5281 taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior | |
| 5282 angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things. | |
| 5283 </p> | |
| 5284 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p5"> | |
| 5285 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; | |
| 5286 but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same | |
| 5287 way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from | |
| 5288 Our Lord's words ( | |
| 5289 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>): "There hath not risen among them | |
| 5290 that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." | |
| 5291 Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels | |
| 5292 the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets. | |
| 5293 </p> | |
| 5294 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p6"> | |
| 5295 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least | |
| 5296 of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery | |
| 5297 which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities | |
| 5298 and powers in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church." As | |
| 5299 though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities | |
| 5300 and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection | |
| 5301 this Church composed of men will be gathered together." | |
| 5302 </p> | |
| 5303 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p7"> It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when | |
| 5304 it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and | |
| 5305 the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were | |
| 5306 hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from | |
| 5307 the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, | |
| 5308 the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which | |
| 5309 mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. | |
| 5310 </p> | |
| 5311 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p8"> | |
| 5312 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in | |
| 5313 His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove. | |
| 5314 </p> | |
| 5315 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p9"> | |
| 5316 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such | |
| 5317 great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might | |
| 5318 say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller. | |
| 5319 </p> | |
| 5320 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p10"></p> | |
| 5321 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 5322 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5323 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5324 </div> | |
| 5325 <div id="FP_Q117_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 5326 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5327 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a> | |
| 5328 <h4 id="FP_Q117_A3-p0.1">Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?</h4> | |
| 5329 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 5330 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p2"> | |
| 5331 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work | |
| 5332 miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his | |
| 5333 reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal | |
| 5334 matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter. | |
| 5335 </p> | |
| 5336 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p3"> | |
| 5337 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on these words ( | |
| 5338 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.1" target="asv">Gal. 3:1</a>): "Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single | |
| 5339 look bewitch others, especially children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. | |
| 5340 Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul. | |
| 5341 </p> | |
| 5342 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p4"> | |
| 5343 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is | |
| 5344 changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on | |
| 5345 sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter. | |
| 5346 </p> | |
| 5347 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p5"> | |
| 5348 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will." | |
| 5349 </p> | |
| 5350 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p6"> | |
| 5351 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 5352 <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or | |
| 5353 by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels | |
| 5354 also we have stated ( | |
| 5355 <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal | |
| 5356 agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, | |
| 5357 except by means of bodies. | |
| 5358 </p> | |
| 5359 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p7"> | |
| 5360 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same | |
| 5361 place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?" | |
| 5362 </p> | |
| 5363 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p8"> | |
| 5364 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance | |
| 5365 rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This | |
| 5366 he says is the cause of the "evil eye." | |
| 5367 </p> | |
| 5368 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p9"> But it has been shown above ( | |
| 5369 <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, | |
| 5370 that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits | |
| 5371 takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact | |
| 5372 with them to a certain distance: in the | |
| 5373 same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; | |
| 5374 [*De Insomniis ii]). | |
| 5375 </p> | |
| 5376 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p10"> Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, | |
| 5377 the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is | |
| 5378 also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may | |
| 5379 have some compact with them. | |
| 5380 </p> | |
| 5381 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p11"> | |
| 5382 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated | |
| 5383 above ( | |
| 5384 <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html">Q[81], A[3]</a>), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs | |
| 5385 be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change | |
| 5386 in exterior bodies, except by means of a | |
| 5387 change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2). | |
| 5388 </p> | |
| 5389 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p12"></p> | |
| 5390 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p13"></p> | |
| 5391 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5392 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a> | |
| 5393 </div> | |
| 5394 <div id="FP_Q117_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 5395 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5396 <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a> | |
| 5397 <h4 id="FP_Q117_A4-p0.1">Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?</h4> | |
| 5398 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 5399 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p2"> | |
| 5400 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance | |
| 5401 as to local motion, as stated above ( | |
| 5402 <a id="FP_Q117_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A5.html">Q[110], A[5]</a>). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command. | |
| 5403 </p> | |
| 5404 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p3"> | |
| 5405 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained | |
| 5406 power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not | |
| 5407 have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally. | |
| 5408 </p> | |
| 5409 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p4"> | |
| 5410 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own. | |
| 5411 </p> | |
| 5412 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p5"> | |
| 5413 <b>I answer that,</b> The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the | |
| 5414 body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey | |
| 5415 the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the | |
| 5416 limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, | |
| 5417 by the power of God, it can exceed those limits. | |
| 5418 </p> | |
| 5419 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p6"> | |
| 5420 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally | |
| 5421 unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance | |
| 5422 is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only | |
| 5423 one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower | |
| 5424 heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it | |
| 5425 is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body. | |
| 5426 </p> | |
| 5427 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p7"> | |
| 5428 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the | |
| 5429 dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some | |
| 5430 demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain. | |
| 5431 </p> | |
| 5432 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p8"></p> | |
| 5433 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p9"></p> | |
| 5434 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5435 <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a> | |
| 5436 </div> | |
| 5437 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a> | |
| 5438 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5439 </div> | |
| 5440 <div id="FP_Q118" class="div3"> | |
| 5441 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a> | |
| 5442 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5443 <h3 id="FP_Q118-p0.1">OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 5444 <p id="FP_Q118-p1"></p> | |
| 5445 <p id="FP_Q118-p2"> We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.</p> | |
| 5446 <p id="FP_Q118-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 5447 <p id="FP_Q118-p4"> (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</p> | |
| 5448 <p id="FP_Q118-p5"> (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?</p> | |
| 5449 <p id="FP_Q118-p6"> (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?</p> | |
| 5450 <div id="FP_Q118_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 5451 <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a> | |
| 5452 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5453 <h4 id="FP_Q118_A1-p0.1">Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</h4> | |
| 5454 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 5455 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p2"> | |
| 5456 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, | |
| 5457 not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing | |
| 5458 is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since | |
| 5459 it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist | |
| 5460 not by generation but by creation. | |
| 5461 </p> | |
| 5462 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p3"> | |
| 5463 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the | |
| 5464 vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive | |
| 5465 soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power. | |
| 5466 </p> | |
| 5467 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p4"> | |
| 5468 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But | |
| 5469 neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere | |
| 5470 than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle | |
| 5471 of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the | |
| 5472 sensitive soul is not produced through the semen. | |
| 5473 </p> | |
| 5474 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p5"> | |
| 5475 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the | |
| 5476 animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul | |
| 5477 of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: | |
| 5478 or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above | |
| 5479 ( | |
| 5480 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html">Q[76], A[4]</a>) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does | |
| 5481 not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore | |
| 5482 the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen. | |
| 5483 </p> | |
| 5484 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p6"> | |
| 5485 <b>On the contrary,</b> The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced | |
| 5486 from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, | |
| 5487 according to | |
| 5488 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20</a>: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated | |
| 5489 are produced by the seminal power. | |
| 5490 </p> | |
| 5491 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p7"> | |
| 5492 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God ( | |
| 5493 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html">Q[65], A[4]</a>). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having | |
| 5494 being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made | |
| 5495 except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation. | |
| 5496 </p> | |
| 5497 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p8"> But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above | |
| 5498 ( | |
| 5499 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html">Q[75], A[3]</a>): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to | |
| 5500 existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist | |
| 5501 forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them. | |
| 5502 </p> | |
| 5503 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p9"> Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that | |
| 5504 both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce | |
| 5505 the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed. | |
| 5506 </p> | |
| 5507 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p10"> Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance | |
| 5508 to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their | |
| 5509 like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, | |
| 5510 act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of | |
| 5511 nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant | |
| 5512 derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from | |
| 5513 the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, | |
| 5514 so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some | |
| 5515 seminal power derived therefrom. | |
| 5516 </p> | |
| 5517 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p11"> | |
| 5518 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough ( | |
| 5519 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">Q[25], A[3]</a>) on this point, nor need we repeat it here. | |
| 5520 </p> | |
| 5521 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p12"> | |
| 5522 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the | |
| 5523 generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to | |
| 5524 so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained. | |
| 5525 </p> | |
| 5526 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p13"> | |
| 5527 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement | |
| 5528 of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or | |
| 5529 the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; | |
| 5530 but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is | |
| 5531 attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, | |
| 5532 by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above ( | |
| 5533 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html">Q[115], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been | |
| 5534 said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's | |
| 5535 power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4). | |
| 5536 </p> | |
| 5537 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p14"> | |
| 5538 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. | |
| 5539 Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very | |
| 5540 beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it | |
| 5541 begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore | |
| 5542 is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as | |
| 5543 though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would | |
| 5544 be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after | |
| 5545 the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of | |
| 5546 the | |
| 5547 thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, | |
| 5548 by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved | |
| 5549 and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal | |
| 5550 but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced. | |
| 5551 </p> | |
| 5552 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p15"></p> | |
| 5553 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p16"></p> | |
| 5554 <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a> | |
| 5555 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5556 </div> | |
| 5557 <div id="FP_Q118_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 5558 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5559 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5560 <h4 id="FP_Q118_A2-p0.1">Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?</h4> | |
| 5561 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 5562 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p2"> | |
| 5563 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written ( | |
| 5564 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.46.26" target="asv">Gn. 46:26</a>): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from | |
| 5565 the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. | |
| 5566 </p> | |
| 5567 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p3"> | |
| 5568 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as shown above ( | |
| 5569 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html">Q[76], A[3]</a>), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated | |
| 5570 from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man | |
| 5571 are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual | |
| 5572 soul is produced from the | |
| 5573 semen. | |
| 5574 </p> | |
| 5575 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p4"> | |
| 5576 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the | |
| 5577 form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced | |
| 5578 by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen. | |
| 5579 </p> | |
| 5580 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p5"> | |
| 5581 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational | |
| 5582 soul is from the begetter. | |
| 5583 </p> | |
| 5584 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p6"> | |
| 5585 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in | |
| 5586 the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created | |
| 5587 by God. | |
| 5588 </p> | |
| 5589 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p7"> | |
| 5590 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition." | |
| 5591 </p> | |
| 5592 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p8"> | |
| 5593 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now | |
| 5594 it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no | |
| 5595 part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle. | |
| 5596 </p> | |
| 5597 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p9"> Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the | |
| 5598 body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. | |
| 5599 Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De | |
| 5600 Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without." | |
| 5601 </p> | |
| 5602 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p10"> Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above ( | |
| 5603 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through | |
| 5604 generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing | |
| 5605 else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with | |
| 5606 the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen. | |
| 5607 </p> | |
| 5608 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p11"> | |
| 5609 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche. | |
| 5610 </p> | |
| 5611 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p12"> | |
| 5612 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from | |
| 5613 the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, | |
| 5614 and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive | |
| 5615 soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul. | |
| 5616 </p> | |
| 5617 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p13"> Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; | |
| 5618 and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one | |
| 5619 would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above ( | |
| 5620 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html">Q[76], A[3]</a>). | |
| 5621 </p> | |
| 5622 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p14"> Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal | |
| 5623 power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, | |
| 5624 but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says | |
| 5625 that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is | |
| 5626 susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity | |
| 5627 constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. | |
| 5628 Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from | |
| 5629 the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an | |
| 5630 animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the | |
| 5631 beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further | |
| 5632 perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. | |
| 5633 Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be | |
| 5634 essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those | |
| 5635 who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: | |
| 5636 and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted. | |
| 5637 </p> | |
| 5638 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p15"> There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has | |
| 5639 been disproved above ( | |
| 5640 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). | |
| 5641 </p> | |
| 5642 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p16"> We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both | |
| 5643 in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening | |
| 5644 form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations | |
| 5645 and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is | |
| 5646 apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created | |
| 5647 by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being | |
| 5648 corrupted. | |
| 5649 </p> | |
| 5650 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p17"> | |
| 5651 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to | |
| 5652 one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior | |
| 5653 agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, | |
| 5654 but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been | |
| 5655 said above ( | |
| 5656 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html">Q[105], A[5]</a>; | |
| 5657 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders | |
| 5658 the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone. | |
| 5659 </p> | |
| 5660 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p18"> | |
| 5661 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form. | |
| 5662 </p> | |
| 5663 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p19"> | |
| 5664 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; | |
| 5665 in this God does not concur. | |
| 5666 </p> | |
| 5667 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p20"></p> | |
| 5668 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p21"></p> | |
| 5669 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5670 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5671 </div> | |
| 5672 <div id="FP_Q118_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 5673 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5674 <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a> | |
| 5675 <h4 id="FP_Q118_A3-p0.1">Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?</h4> | |
| 5676 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 5677 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p2"> | |
| 5678 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written ( | |
| 5679 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv">Gn. 2:2</a>): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore | |
| 5680 all souls were created at the same time. | |
| 5681 </p> | |
| 5682 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p3"> | |
| 5683 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created | |
| 5684 with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently | |
| 5685 at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to | |
| 5686 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv"> Gn. 2:2, </a> where it is said that "God ended" all "His work." | |
| 5687 </p> | |
| 5688 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p4"> | |
| 5689 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore | |
| 5690 it began to exist before the body. | |
| 5691 </p> | |
| 5692 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p5"> | |
| 5693 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body." | |
| 5694 </p> | |
| 5695 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p6"> | |
| 5696 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is | |
| 5697 of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of | |
| 5698 men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on | |
| 5699 which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would | |
| 5700 follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above | |
| 5701 ( | |
| 5702 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A4.html">Q[75], A[4]</a>). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, | |
| 5703 as shown above ( | |
| 5704 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>; | |
| 5705 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a> ): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above ( | |
| 5706 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7; | |
| 5707 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a>). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: | |
| 5708 whereas this cannot be said of an angel. | |
| 5709 </p> | |
| 5710 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p7"> Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, | |
| 5711 it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. | |
| 5712 Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without | |
| 5713 a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body. | |
| 5714 </p> | |
| 5715 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p8"> But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united | |
| 5716 to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed | |
| 5717 it---this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did | |
| 5718 not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not | |
| 5719 fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the | |
| 5720 world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above | |
| 5721 time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: | |
| 5722 since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the | |
| 5723 begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of | |
| 5724 some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion | |
| 5725 of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, | |
| 5726 we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into | |
| 5727 them. | |
| 5728 </p> | |
| 5729 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p9"> | |
| 5730 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read ( | |
| 5731 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.17" target="asv">Jn. 5:17</a>): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed | |
| 5732 in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, | |
| 5733 in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul. | |
| 5734 </p> | |
| 5735 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p10"> | |
| 5736 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number | |
| 5737 of species. | |
| 5738 </p> | |
| 5739 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p11"> | |
| 5740 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was | |
| 5741 not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written ( | |
| 5742 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>, | |
| 5743 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.16" target="asv">16</a>): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them." | |
| 5744 </p> | |
| 5745 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p12"></p> | |
| 5746 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p13"></p> | |
| 5747 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5748 <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a> | |
| 5749 </div> | |
| 5750 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a> | |
| 5751 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5752 </div> | |
| 5753 <div id="FP_Q119" class="div3"> | |
| 5754 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a> | |
| 5755 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5756 <h3 id="FP_Q119-p0.1">OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 5757 <p id="FP_Q119-p1"></p> | |
| 5758 <p id="FP_Q119-p2"> We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 5759 <p id="FP_Q119-p3"> (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?</p> | |
| 5760 <p id="FP_Q119-p4"> (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?</p> | |
| 5761 <div id="FP_Q119_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 5762 <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a> | |
| 5763 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5764 <h4 id="FP_Q119_A1-p0.1">Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?</h4> | |
| 5765 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 5766 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p2"> | |
| 5767 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written ( | |
| 5768 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not | |
| 5769 changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature. | |
| 5770 </p> | |
| 5771 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p3"> | |
| 5772 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter"; | |
| 5773 and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food | |
| 5774 is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore | |
| 5775 the food is not changed into true human nature. | |
| 5776 </p> | |
| 5777 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p4"> | |
| 5778 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according | |
| 5779 to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true | |
| 5780 human nature. | |
| 5781 </p> | |
| 5782 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p5"> | |
| 5783 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due | |
| 5784 only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity. | |
| 5785 </p> | |
| 5786 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p6"> | |
| 5787 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for | |
| 5788 what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow | |
| 5789 that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically | |
| 5790 the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, | |
| 5791 identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. | |
| 5792 </p> | |
| 5793 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p7"> | |
| 5794 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture | |
| 5795 of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality | |
| 5796 of human nature. | |
| 5797 </p> | |
| 5798 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p8"> | |
| 5799 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore | |
| 5800 that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered | |
| 5801 in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common | |
| 5802 matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate | |
| 5803 matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus | |
| 5804 a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul | |
| 5805 and this body. | |
| 5806 </p> | |
| 5807 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p9"> Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist | |
| 5808 save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain | |
| 5809 individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have | |
| 5810 been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human | |
| 5811 nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature. | |
| 5812 </p> | |
| 5813 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p10"> But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in | |
| 5814 this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed | |
| 5815 into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent | |
| 5816 the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed | |
| 5817 by fire. | |
| 5818 </p> | |
| 5819 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p11"> But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, | |
| 5820 or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. | |
| 5821 Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human | |
| 5822 body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be | |
| 5823 changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is | |
| 5824 only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one | |
| 5825 individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect | |
| 5826 of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the | |
| 5827 substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; | |
| 5828 for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore | |
| 5829 some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently | |
| 5830 no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other | |
| 5831 things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of | |
| 5832 matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect | |
| 5833 than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things | |
| 5834 were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of | |
| 5835 the | |
| 5836 human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does | |
| 5837 not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants | |
| 5838 do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which | |
| 5839 multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does | |
| 5840 anything | |
| 5841 increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of | |
| 5842 generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible. | |
| 5843 </p> | |
| 5844 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p12"> Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature | |
| 5845 in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain | |
| 5846 determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter | |
| 5847 until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true | |
| 5848 human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through | |
| 5849 the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase | |
| 5850 required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary | |
| 5851 existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does | |
| 5852 not | |
| 5853 belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of | |
| 5854 living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not | |
| 5855 the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, | |
| 5856 would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly, | |
| 5857 because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above ( | |
| 5858 <a id="FP_Q119_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html">Q[118], A[1]</a>). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power | |
| 5859 a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true | |
| 5860 form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for | |
| 5861 growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of | |
| 5862 natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore | |
| 5863 just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food. | |
| 5864 </p> | |
| 5865 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p13"> Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its | |
| 5866 assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food | |
| 5867 nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh." | |
| 5868 </p> | |
| 5869 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p14"> | |
| 5870 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of food | |
| 5871 is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and | |
| 5872 be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage. | |
| 5873 </p> | |
| 5874 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p15"> | |
| 5875 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from | |
| 5876 the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what | |
| 5877 is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the | |
| 5878 mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their | |
| 5879 species in matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something | |
| 5880 belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, | |
| 5881 or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water | |
| 5882 is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, | |
| 5883 cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying | |
| 5884 that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains. | |
| 5885 </p> | |
| 5886 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p16"> It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh | |
| 5887 considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that | |
| 5888 which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. | |
| 5889 But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and | |
| 5890 renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is | |
| 5891 substituted in its place. | |
| 5892 </p> | |
| 5893 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p17"> | |
| 5894 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot | |
| 5895 be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly | |
| 5896 the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue | |
| 5897 of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed. | |
| 5898 </p> | |
| 5899 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p18"> | |
| 5900 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming | |
| 5901 virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. | |
| 5902 Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; | |
| 5903 and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, | |
| 5904 the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, | |
| 5905 so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5). | |
| 5906 </p> | |
| 5907 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p19"> | |
| 5908 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be | |
| 5909 generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the | |
| 5910 entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. | |
| 5911 But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until | |
| 5912 the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes | |
| 5913 into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed | |
| 5914 by natural heat. | |
| 5915 </p> | |
| 5916 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p20"></p> | |
| 5917 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p21"></p> | |
| 5918 <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a> | |
| 5919 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html"></a> | |
| 5920 </div> | |
| 5921 <div id="FP_Q119_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 5922 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a> | |
| 5923 <a href="summa.FS.html"></a> | |
| 5924 <h4 id="FP_Q119_A2-p0.1">Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?</h4> | |
| 5925 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 5926 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p2"> | |
| 5927 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene | |
| 5928 says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which | |
| 5929 is begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of | |
| 5930 the begetter. | |
| 5931 </p> | |
| 5932 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p3"> | |
| 5933 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something | |
| 5934 is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom | |
| 5935 the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men. | |
| 5936 </p> | |
| 5937 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p4"> | |
| 5938 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced | |
| 5939 from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations. | |
| 5940 </p> | |
| 5941 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p5"> | |
| 5942 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance | |
| 5943 of the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom. | |
| 5944 </p> | |
| 5945 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p6"> | |
| 5946 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food." | |
| 5947 </p> | |
| 5948 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p7"> | |
| 5949 <b>I answer that,</b> This question depends in some way on what has been stated above | |
| 5950 <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html">(A[1];</a> | |
| 5951 <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html">Q[118], A[1]</a>). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its | |
| 5952 own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated | |
| 5953 to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from | |
| 5954 potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. | |
| 5955 But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the | |
| 5956 generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives | |
| 5957 a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that | |
| 5958 part. | |
| 5959 </p> | |
| 5960 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p8"> Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. | |
| 5961 For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of | |
| 5962 the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something | |
| 5963 else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, | |
| 5964 then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) | |
| 5965 the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of | |
| 5966 the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal | |
| 5967 from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut | |
| 5968 in | |
| 5969 two: which is inadmissible. | |
| 5970 </p> | |
| 5971 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p9"> It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather | |
| 5972 is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as | |
| 5973 stated above | |
| 5974 <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html">(A[1];</a> | |
| 5975 <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">Q[108], A[1]</a> ). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into | |
| 5976 the substance of the members. | |
| 5977 Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what | |
| 5978 is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, | |
| 5979 is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated | |
| 5980 seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason. | |
| 5981 </p> | |
| 5982 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p10"> | |
| 5983 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form | |
| 5984 of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance. | |
| 5985 </p> | |
| 5986 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p11"> | |
| 5987 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates | |
| 5988 its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should | |
| 5989 have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the | |
| 5990 father. In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in | |
| 5991 relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms. | |
| 5992 </p> | |
| 5993 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p12"> | |
| 5994 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from | |
| 5995 which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal | |
| 5996 matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and | |
| 5997 likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal | |
| 5998 virtue (in the production) of this man. | |
| 5999 </p> | |
| 6000 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p13"> But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because | |
| 6001 the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the | |
| 6002 active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation | |
| 6003 of the Holy Ghost. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], | |
| 6004 WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen. | |
| 6005 </p> | |
| 6006 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a> | |
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| 6008 </div> | |
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| 6014 ` | |
| 6015 </div> |