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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_vii.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,5175 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.vii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.vii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q50" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q50-p0.1">OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q50-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p2"> Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy + Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, + which is man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p3"> Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, + what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p4"> Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things.</p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p5"> Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p6"> (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?</p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p7"> (2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form?</p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p8"> (3) We ask concerning their number.</p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p9"> (4) Of their difference from each other.</p> + <p id="FP_Q50-p10"> (5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.</p> + <div id="FP_Q50_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q50_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation + to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and + immaterial as regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) + that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature is limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs + to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's creatures, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q50_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.2" target="asv"> Ps. 148:2</a>: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and + they were created." Therefore angels are corporeal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q50_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.4" target="asv">Ps. 103:4</a>): "Who makes His angels spirits." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists + in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates + the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His + intellect and will ( + <a id="FP_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], + A[4] + </a> ). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be + the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and "now." Hence the perfection of + the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p7"> The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between + sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And + because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes + (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q50_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.23.8" target="asv">Acts + 23:8 + </a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p8"> But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible + by the intellect alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the + other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material + and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever + mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, + as we are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all + creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained + in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q50_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q50_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed + of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the + difference from the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form. + But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand; + whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot be a subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. + Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore + an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the + form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel is in matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book + of the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as + regards incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which + it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from + corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, + is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be + understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form + of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p8"> But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible + that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would + be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives + the spiritual form. Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity; and + without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter + of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things + should have the same matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p9"> It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything + is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object, + whence any act receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because + forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it + must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p10"> But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend + things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in + our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect; + and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own + mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God + <a id="FP_Q50_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is difference which constitutes the species. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined + to some special grade of being because "the species of things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction + of unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things there is one thing which determines to a + special grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is + the matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the former the "difference." Whereas in immaterial + things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in being; + and therefore in them "genus" and "difference" are not derived from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, + this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea + of + their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their "difference." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect + and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in + some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; + otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, + to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the + very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but + of an immaterial substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made + evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, + whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature + itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if + there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation + of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; + and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as + Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the + running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q50_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Hence God alone is pure act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to + which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite + on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it. But immaterial created + substances are finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that + their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite + as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its "being" is finite as determined + to some one special nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p15"> Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite from above," as receiving its being from above itself, + and is "infinite from below," as not received in any matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q50_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q50_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels exist in any great number?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of + a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other + created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is + the least possible number in the angelic nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements + of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater + number than the movements of the heavenly bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine + goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their + matter is receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can + only be according to the requirements of the first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding + form of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q50_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>): "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood before Him." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate + substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: + and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separate substances is the number of the + species of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31) + because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the + exemplar species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are higher than the natures of sensible + things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible + things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the + number + of the first movements. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p8"> But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both + into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied according to the number + of heavenly movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended that in the Scriptures even men + bearing a divine message are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which manifest God's + almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated + as angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p9"> Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, + far beyond all material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv): "There are many blessed armies of the heavenly + intelligences, surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers." The reason whereof is this, because, since + it is the perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect + some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard + to their magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible + bodies, exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive is + something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances + as it were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that which is + caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html">Q[30], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11.html">Q[11])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the angelic nature being the nighest unto God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not so + as to be found in few subjects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text 44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were made + for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were + to appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal, because + the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, + text 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make use of this argument, since only + through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was + refuted above ( + <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but according + to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q50_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q50_A4-p0.1">Whether the angels differ in species?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things + which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same + according to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them---that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all + the angels are of one species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and + less---namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore + are the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were + but one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In things of one species there is no such thing as "first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says (Metaph. + iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). + Therefore the angels are not of the same species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are + of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of + the one species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p8"> But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. + If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q50_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several + whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in + several substances. And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would + be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of + quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes + diversity not merely of species, but of genus. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Difference" is nobler than "genus," as the determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, + but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; + or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species + according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in + like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according + as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way + the angels are diversified according to more or less. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied + in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication, + as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q50_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html">Q[47], A[3]</a>). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals + in one species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q50_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q50_A5-p0.1">Whether the angels are incorruptible?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that + he is "an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by + nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it." But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore + the angels are corruptible by their nature + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved + them." But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that + they are corruptible of their own nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual substances "have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death, + matter, and generation." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing + is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from + what was said above + <a id="FP_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated + from it; but what belongs to a + thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which + it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can + lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything + is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed + of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, + as happens in the angels, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q50_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p7"> A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as + it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood + from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible + of its own nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of death," + as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later + <a id="FP_Q50_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62.html">(Q[62])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore + dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in existence by the Divine will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As was observed above ( + <a id="FP_Q50_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible + being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would + lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption + in the angels; + but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because + God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption + within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q51" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q51-p0.1">OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q51-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q51-p2"> We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with + bodies; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their comparison with local movement. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51-p3"> Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q51-p4"> (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?</p> + <p id="FP_Q51-p5"> (2) Whether they assume bodies?</p> + <p id="FP_Q51-p6"> (3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?</p> + <p id="FP_Q51-p7"></p> + <div id="FP_Q51_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q51_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute alone---that + is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without + any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.): + "Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature + alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that + every created spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. iii): "The demons are called animals of + the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies." But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore + angels have bodies naturally united to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore + angels have bodies naturally united to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore + the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are understood to be incorporeal." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally + in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every + animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later ( + <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the + nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something + else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus + of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through + the bodily senses, as will be explained later on ( + <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">Q[84], A[6]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">Q[89], + A[1] + </a>). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in + the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible + things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these + we call angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>) it was the opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal + substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine + tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.2" target="asv"> + Ps. 8:2 + </a>: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above + opinion of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following the + opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, + which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained + + <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are + some aerial animals, which they termed demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.2.6" target="asv">1 Kings 2:6</a>): "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and + which has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body + is more perfect than one which is united to a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q51_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q51_A2-p0.1">Whether angels assume bodies?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing + of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need + for a body, since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But + a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated + <a id="FP_Q51_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that + all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, + otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore + the angels do not assume bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels + happened in prophetic vision---that is, according to imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever + is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine + Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all; + just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; + in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions + were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen + by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies + naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said + <a id="FP_Q51_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q51_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>), it follows that they sometimes assume bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give + evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed + bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God would take a human body; because all the apparitions + in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God + appeared in the flesh. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed + movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things + sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible + properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a + body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped + and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far + as is needful for forming the assumed body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q51_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q51_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. + But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess + these functions. Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of + the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. + Consequently, the angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels + are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.16" target="asv">Gn. 18:16</a>) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had appeared to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to the + angel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Tob.5.7" target="asv">Tob. 5:7,8</a>): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of Medes?" he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all + the ways thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed + from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in + their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having + resumed life ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24" target="asv">Lk. 24</a>). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored + them as God ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.18" target="asv">Gn. 18</a>). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: + "After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, + men of renown" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.6.4" target="asv">Gn. 6:4</a>). Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise functions + of life through assumed bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of + a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, + in so far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which + is common in such operations; but not as to that which is special to living + subjects; because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which has the faculty has the action." Hence nothing + can have a function of life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such action. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since + it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible + things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy + angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although + they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels + may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true + men; because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs + of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation + through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as + by the eye the power of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the + other members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved, + since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in + them as movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, + although God is not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since + He is everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not + moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because + the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality + according to any restricted part of the world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but according to + a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is always in the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as + they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance + of the eater. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p15"> Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing + matter; nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. + But the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a nature that food could + be changed into it; consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the + angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.12.19" target="asv">Tob. 12:19</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p16"> Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the + prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as have + experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, + and have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it. But God's holy angels could not fall in + such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons + of Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor + is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more before + than after the deluge." Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such demons, nor from + their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman, + and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin. + iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p18"></p> + <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q52" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q52-p0.1">OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q52-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q52-p2"> We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are three subjects of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q52-p3"> (1) Is the angel in a place?</p> + <p id="FP_Q52-p4"> (2) Can he be in several places at once?</p> + <p id="FP_Q52-p5"> (3) Can several angels be in the same place?</p> + <div id="FP_Q52_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q52_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel is in a place?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "The common opinion of the learned is that + things incorporeal are not in a place." And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing + which is in a place, but only a movable body." But an angel is not a body, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q52_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50.html">(Q[50])</a>. Therefore an angel is not in a place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, place is a "quantity having position." But everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position + cannot benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position. + Therefore an angel is not in a place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. + iv, text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the container is more formal than + the contained; as air with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not in a place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline, Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. + A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; + but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal + place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p7"> Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space + in the continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is + not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains + the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body as containing + it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, + but as somehow containing it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p8"> And hereby we have the answers to the objections.</p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q52_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q52_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel can be in several places at once?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. + But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). + Therefore an angel can be in several places at once. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that + he is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time + in various places. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the angel operates, there he is." But occasionally he operates in + several places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q52_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19.25" target="asv">Gn. 19:25</a>). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things, + is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. + Now since the angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared + with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently + since all being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic + power. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, + nor in several places, but in only one place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p7"> Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed + the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place + which is a point. But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas + the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no + occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible or indivisible, + great or small suffices, according as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the entire + body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one place to him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p8"> Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied + only to what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all, namely, + the part to the east: hence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which + is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres + immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p9"> So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body + is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed + fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not + in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p10"> From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately + applied, is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q52_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q52_A3-p0.1">Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place? </h4> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time + in the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so + that it be not empty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several angels can be in the one place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body + are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved + in Phys. iv, text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess + souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place; and consequently + for the same reason all other spiritual substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are not two angels in the same place. The reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be + the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every class of causes: for there is one proximate form + of one thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several + individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one + man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united strengths + all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches + the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said + <a id="FP_Q52_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, there can be but one angel in one place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place; but for another reason, + as has been said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way; hence the conclusion does not follow. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its form, + while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q53" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q53-p0.1">OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q53-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q53-p2"> We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which heading there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q53-p3"> (1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.</p> + <p id="FP_Q53-p4"> (2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space?</p> + <p id="FP_Q53-p5"> (3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?</p> + <div id="FP_Q53_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q53_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel can be moved locally?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid + of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," + for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in + the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term "whereto." But an angel is without parts. + Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel + is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said + that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore + a beatified angel is moved locally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise + does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. + Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence + it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; + and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is + not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement + of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity + therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said + above ( + <a id="FP_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a>), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places + successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q53_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html">Q[52], A[2]</a>). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such + contacts. Because, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q53_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a>), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible + place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in + which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible + place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all + at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will + not be continuous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what + is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p8"> Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, + it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and while it is in the term "whereto": because + the very succession of "wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those "wheres" + the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing + which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing + moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, + according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's + movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the + term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto" (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance, + but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he + begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of + the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from + this, + that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding + a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his + power can be applied to something which is divisible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application + of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any + need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q53_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>: "They are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance + of salvation." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q53_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q53_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space first + travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is + indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in + his movement: which is not possible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another + without going through the middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which + stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but is + changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change: consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. + But he was not moved so long as he was in the term "whence." Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it + was necessary for him to pass through intervening space. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it + be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said + by the Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes, + before arriving at the last into which it is moved"; because the order of first and last in + continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p6"> But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through + the middle: which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places; whether the places + be taken as divisible or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which are indivisible; because between + every two points that are infinite intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a + middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from + the continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in time. But in the whole time which + measures the movement of a body, there are not two "nows" in which the body moved is not in one place and in another; for + if it were in one and the same place in two "nows," it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be at rest is + nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore since there are infinite "nows" between the first + and the last "now" of the time which measures the movement, there must be infinite places between the first from which the + movement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be + a body of a palm's length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first + place + from which the movement starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the other palm. + Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as + the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in the + magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit + of the + same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, + it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p7"> Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the + intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is + continuous. Consequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be actually numbered. + If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not + pass through all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly, + then, as the angel's movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p8"> Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's + nature; but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow + the laws of place in its movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained thereby, but is above it + as containing it: hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through + or without the intervening place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the + angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as + was said above: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident from the foregoing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the things + thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change. + Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit + is a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such movement. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q53_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q53_A3-p0.1">Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist + the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power + which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time. But between one length + of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is + moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as + illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does + not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel's movement instantaneous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in + the term "whereto": but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken + as the term "wherefrom"; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible; which + is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom." + Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said + <a id="FP_Q53_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every + movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place + to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom"; but in the last instant of such time he is + in the term "whereto." Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as there is no medium between time and the + limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a + last "now" cannot be assigned in which it was in the term "wherefrom," just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation + of fire, there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter was under the privation + of the form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air, + or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p7"> But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose + be not otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which measures rest, the subject reposing + is in the same "where" in the first, in the middle, and in the last "now." On the other hand, it is of the very nature of + movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of + time which measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last "now" it must have a different + form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in + whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during + the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible + in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore + all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is the term of the alteration + of matter, and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement of an angel + is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is + impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last "now" he is in another place: but some + "now" must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many "nows" succeeding one another, + there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, + that the movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time + if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said + <a id="FP_Q53_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher + says (Phys. iv, text 99). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p8"> But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and + whereby all corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens; because the angel's + movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the time of the angel's movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no proportion to + the time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, + it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on + account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides, + the swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of + his will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood to + be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not + the term of movement; hence there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection is based on continuous time. But the same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel can + be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the + angel's movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'; + as was already shown + <a id="FP_Q53_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Nevertheless he is partly + in one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because his + power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q53_A3-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q54" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q54-p0.1">OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q54-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54-p2"> After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. + In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into + the objects known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54-p3"> Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q54-p4"> (1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?</p> + <p id="FP_Q54-p5"> (2) Is his being his understanding?</p> + <p id="FP_Q54-p6"> (3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q54-p7"> (4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q54-p8"> (5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect?</p> + <div id="FP_Q54_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q54_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel's act of understanding is his substance?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active + intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) + and from his Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the angel's substance his action---that is, his + act of understanding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that "the action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things + to live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect + is the essence of an angel who understands. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than + the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands + his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with + the substance of the angel who understands. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance, + for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q54_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality + of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is + not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. + But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as + His existence and His action. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p7"> Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting + act of intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel's substance would neither + be distinguished from God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance + of another angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p8"> Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; + for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the active intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since + its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive + intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that between + "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, + if "to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. + x), "Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it is + not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the act of the intellect is life." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The action which is transient, passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving + the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according + to the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is + brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who + understands it, as an effect which differs from both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q54_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q54_A2-p0.1">Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says + (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand + is to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as + the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement. + Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), + there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; + and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such + actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent. + It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence + is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the + second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act + "to understand," of which the object is "the true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each of which + is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives + its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; + as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God's being + alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone + is + its own act of understanding and its own act of will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby + something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he + distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since + he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared + to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal + object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the + same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does + not follow that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.' + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q54_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q54_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and "intellect" + express the power of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds." + Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that + which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states + (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said ( + <a id="FP_Q54_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter + "nigh unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to + God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore substance, + power, and operation, are all distinct in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident + thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and + on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from + the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has + been already said ( + <a id="FP_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to + exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is + not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is + partly intellectual and partly sensitive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality + is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, + but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows + the species: for such accident belongs to the form---whereas an accident which + belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle + of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental + being. Hence there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q54_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q54_A4-p0.1">Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. + 17) that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something + whereby it can make all things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in + an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active + intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens + a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive + intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. + 18. But this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, + and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible + things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This + is the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for + admitting an active intellect is due to this---that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside + the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the + soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: + and this power in us is called the active intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p6"> But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with + regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually + such; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later ( + <a id="FP_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q54_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a>). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in + them, except equivocally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to + be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is not + need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality, + in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality + with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one + angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active + intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, + to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive + intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q54_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q54_A5-p0.1">Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that + in the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many + remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to + the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, + since they are of the same nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts + of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not + performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no + bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already ( + <a id="FP_Q54_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">Q[51], A[1]</a>). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p7"> The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. + And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and + not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was said above (A[3], ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p8"> A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking + according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often + makes use of this opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that "such + an inquiry does not call for much labor." Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be + understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common + usage of speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we "sense it." And hence it is that we use the word + "sentence." Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by likeness + of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know + single objects, as we shall show ( + <a id="FP_Q54_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], A[2]</a>), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the + mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' + is attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while deception in us comes + properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold + fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q55" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q55-p0.1">OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q55-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q55-p2"> Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of + inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55-p3"> (1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some species?</p> + <p id="FP_Q55-p4"> (2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as they have derived from things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q55-p5"> (3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower angels?</p> + <div id="FP_Q55_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q55_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels know all things by their substance?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels know all things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels, according + to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore + the angel knows things by his essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, + the intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object understood is the same as the one who understands it, + as regards that whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as the angels, the medium whereby the object + is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is contained in another is there according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an intellectual + nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower orders + of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all. Therefore the + angel knows all things in his substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms + of things, and not by their own substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The medium through which the intellect understands, is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it + is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary + for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible, + the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: because the + potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But the intellective power of + the angel extends to understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth. + The angel's essence, however, does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. + This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore + God + alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected + by some species in order to know things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that the angel knows things according to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the medium + of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs + to the angel of his own nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the sensible + object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise + the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude + by which it understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it + is precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," + as to say that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a thing is actually understood, precisely because + it is immaterial. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things which are beneath the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed perfectly, + nor according to their own proper formality---because the angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality + from other things---but according to some common formality. Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality + in God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from + which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: + and this the angel has not, but only a common knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q55_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q55_A2-p0.1">Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness + within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so + that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, + then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or + else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. + Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect + abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible + things. So there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through species drawn from things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from + sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent + as to things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that + there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal + substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower + bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from + some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances ---that is to say, human souls---have + a power of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible + species from things. But in the higher spiritual substances---that is, the angels---the power of understanding is naturally + complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to understand all + things which they can know naturally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p7"> The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances. The lower spiritual substances---that is, souls---have + a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very mode of existence it + behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with bodies + to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher substances---that is, the angels---are utterly free from bodies, + and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through + an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature. + Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first + receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of + creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, + according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge + of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the + very fashioning of the creature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination, + which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, + and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently, + however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms + to an intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since + the angel has no imagination, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q55_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html">Q[54], A[5]</a>). Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so; because he would + not need them, for he has connatural intelligible species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless + on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q55_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q55_A3-p0.1">Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal, + seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore + it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically; because to know anything generically + is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than + the lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower; which is not befitting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, + which the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses one universal form for knowing + various things. Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which seems unbecoming. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis + it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which + is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine + essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and + less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what + God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p7"> Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. + Therefore his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more things. An example of this can + in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained + to them in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others + of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge + from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will + not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them; either according to the order of causality, + as the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the + order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To know anything universally can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only the + universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect + knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In this + way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by + one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the proper + type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which + can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox + to acts of wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of Its + eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according + to its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, + many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q56" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q56-p0.1">OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q56-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q56-p2"> We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, + first, of immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56-p3"> (1) Does an angel know himself?</p> + <p id="FP_Q56-p4"> (2) Does one angel know another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q56-p5"> (3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?</p> + <div id="FP_Q56_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q56_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel knows himself?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel. + Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an angel does not know his own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing + single is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 understanding is a kind + of passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand + himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been previously said ( + <a id="FP_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q56_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>), the object is on a different footing in an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the object or matter + into which the action passes is something separate from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and the + building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the action to proceed, the + object must be united with the agent; just as the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that sense may actually + perceive. And the object which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the form which + is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species + of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p7"> It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; + and then there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may be actual knowledge, it is required that the + faculty of knowledge be actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it can thereby have actual + knowledge without any preceding change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of + knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the + action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth + heat none the less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something else. So therefore, if in the order of + intelligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since an angel is immaterial, + he + is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his + form, which is his substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That is the text of the old translation, which is amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is to say + the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the old translation read---"and furthermore they do not know their own + powers." Although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their + own power perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine Wisdom, + Which to the angels is incomprehensible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which + is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, + there is nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to the intellect, in so far as if is in potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not happen + in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect + is not of the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes into some other matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q56_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q56_A2-p0.1">Whether one angel knows another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not know another. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human intellect + were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending + external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored with some particular color, it could not see every color. + But as the human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is + the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate + nature from the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot understand other natures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in De Causis that "every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and + what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause." But one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not + know another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected + by way of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the angel known, except generically; + as is clear from what has been said before ( + <a id="FP_Q56_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q56_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>, ad 3). Hence, it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of another, but only a + general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known; because + that whereby the intellect understands is something within the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. + Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species; because that species would not differ from the angel + understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can understand another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if + God were now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing angels; or else he would have to be + known by a species drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower, from whom they + receive nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in De Causis that "every intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him + in two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic + mind in such a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things which He produced in their own natural + being. Now in the Word of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of + corporeal things, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of these spiritual creatures, the forms + of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in every angel there was impressed + the form of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist in the + nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed + in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual + creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order, as was already observed ( + <a id="FP_Q56_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>, ad 1,2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and + lower bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to their various degrees of perfection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and + effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One angel knows another by the species of such angel existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image + it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself + a subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses + only an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall has a natural + existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has only intentional existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> God made every creature proportionate to the universe which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more + angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, + if he had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the + universe, means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q56_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q56_A3-p0.1">Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by + His incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards he adds that, "since He is above all substances, + He is remote from all knowledge." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it + appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q56_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." From this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge + of God; the one, whereby He is seen in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the other whereby + He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already shown ( + <a id="FP_Q56_A3-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his + natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God + from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet men can know God through their natural principles; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q56_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv"> Rom. 1:19</a>: "what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more so can the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing + is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have + said that an angel knows himself---secondly, by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is + seen by the eye from its image being in the eye---thirdly, when the image of the object + known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold + a man in a mirror. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p7"> To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as + this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q56_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q56_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20</a>: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the + things that are made." Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to his natural + principles the angel knows God, stands midway between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen + through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, + the angel knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold God's essence; because no created likeness + is + sufficient to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind; because the angelic + nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Divine image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not known by any + created intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can + he see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at + all: because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above the + knowledge which an angel has of Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more to + one of them, as was said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q57" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q57-p0.1">OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q57-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57-p2"> We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q57-p3"> (1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q57-p4"> (2) Whether they know single things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q57-p5"> (3) Whether they know the future?</p> + <p id="FP_Q57-p6"> (4) Whether they know secret thoughts?</p> + <p id="FP_Q57-p7"> (5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?</p> + <div id="FP_Q57_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q57_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels know material things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands + it. But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know + material things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On + + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor + into the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images + of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in + themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels + cannot know material things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which + does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior + to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the mind of an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained + deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain + degree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially + in respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among + other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the + Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply + and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p7"> Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual + beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch + as they are in the angels by their intelligible species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in + his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard + to that intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination; + for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima + iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense + regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material + things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their + real natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual + vision. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would require to make them + actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves; + he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him; just + as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by + abstraction. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q57_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q57_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel knows singulars?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object + singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power, + as is evident from what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html">Q[54], A[5]</a>). Consequently they do not know singulars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any + assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; because, as was observed above + ( + <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], A[2]</a>), an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know singulars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species; + because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal + is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are not known in the universal except + potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.11" target="asv"> Ps. 90:11</a>: "He hath given His angels charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith, which + asserts that these lower things are administered by angels, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv"> Heb. 1:14</a>: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what + is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is against the text of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.5" target="asv"> Eccles. + 5:5 + </a>: "Say not before the angel: There is no providence." Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, according + to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and + will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p7"> Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all + particular effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements + of the heavens. This opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in its universal + causes, is not to know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from + computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know + it as taking place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here + and now existing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p8"> Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending + universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both + by his one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power + united and far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than + the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other + things which no outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in other + cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any + one of his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle + pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. + text. 15). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p9"> The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from God in order + that they may subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind. Now + it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but likewise all that goes + to make up their principles of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to + both its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was + shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not + only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the angels + know things, not only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their + individual conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction + from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the + nature of the angels, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>, A[3] ad 1), and consequently there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement + in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way + there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause + whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the + angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but + also as to their matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as + to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the same species, has been already stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q57_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q57_A3-p0.1">Whether angels know the future?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future + events. Therefore much more do the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said + in De Causis, "an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is, aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future + are not different, but he knows each indifferently. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel does not understand by species derived from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species + refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past, present, + and future. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which + are distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive + sign of the Divinity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.41.23" target="asv"> Is. 41:23</a>: "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore the angels do not know future + events. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily + from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their + causes in the majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus the doctor knows beforehand the health + of the patient. This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the + more than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who + penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the future issue thereof. But events + which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance events. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p8"> In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely + to know those events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance events; for God sees + all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And therefore God's one glance + is cast over all things which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are + in themselves, as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge ( + <a id="FP_Q57_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>). But the mind of an angel, and every created intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the future as it is in itself + cannot be known by any created intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Men cannot know future things except in their causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way, + but much more distinctly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the angel's intellect is above that time according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a time + in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves + the spiritual creature according to time." And thus, since there is succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that + happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past, + and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same relations + to the species. Present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so + they can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature + whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they cannot be known by those species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Things distant according to place are already existing in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel; + whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q57_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q57_A4-p0.1">Whether angels know secret thoughts?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.28.17" target="asv"> Job 28:17</a>: "Gold or crystal cannot equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, "one shall be as + evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same time be penetrated." + But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. + 22:30 + </a>). Therefore an angel can see what is in another's conscience. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its + shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, + when one angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the thoughts of both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than do the images in our imagination; because the former are + actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an + angel as corporeal things are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can + know the thoughts of the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What is proper to God does not belong to the angels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.9" target="asv">Jer. 17:9</a>: "The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart." Therefore + angels do not know the secrets of hearts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also + by man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered + not merely by outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. + Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those + occult bodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons "sometimes with the greatest faculty learn + man's dispositions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by + certain signs in the body"; although (Retract. ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p7"> In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone + can know the thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational creature is subject to + God only, and He alone can work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be developed later ( + <a id="FP_Q57_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html">Q[63], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q57_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html">Q[105], A[5]</a>). Consequently all that is in the will, and all + things that depend only on the will, are known to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone + actually to consider anything; because a man who has a habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will. + Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>): "For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness + of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not + exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body + will show forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of + glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although one angel sees the intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of + these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes + use of them by actual consideration. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause. + Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite + or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through + following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens + in brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension + of man in so far as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason, + as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through + man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject + to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses of them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q57_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q57_A5-p0.1">Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. + But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through + the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places." And the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.16" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:16</a>): "That great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels*." [*Vulg.: + 'Great is the mystery of godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which + is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries + of grace; for it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.7" target="asv">Amos 3:7</a>): "For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Therefore angels know the mysteries + of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated + (Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the + knowledge of His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is evident in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.1" target="asv">Is. 63:1</a>, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice." + Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by + his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend + upon the pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such + angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons + in this fashion ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>): "No one knoweth the things of a man [*Vulg.: 'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ?'], but the spirit of a + man that is in him." So, "the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p7"> There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things + in the Word. By such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do they all know them equally; but just + as God wills them to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>): "But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, + learn + more and deeper mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them. + Some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as befits + their ministrations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to + all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all + their duties are ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall + receive the inheritance of salvation ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>)"; and this is + brought by the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the + very beginning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p9"> We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were + instructed on all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as appears from the passage + of Dionysius already quoted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to + know everything hidden in it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And + although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still + the apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.4" target="asv">Eph. 3:4,5</a>): "As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which + in other generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." Among the prophets also, + the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.100" target="asv">Ps. 118:100</a>: "I have had understanding above ancients," and Gregory says: "The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on" + (Hom. xvi in Ezech.). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q58" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q58-p0.1">OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q58-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58-p2"> After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of + inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58-p3"> (1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act?</p> + <p id="FP_Q58-p4"> (2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?</p> + <p id="FP_Q58-p5"> (3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive?</p> + <p id="FP_Q58-p6"> (4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?</p> + <p id="FP_Q58-p7"> (5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q58-p8"> (6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?</p> + <p id="FP_Q58-p9"> (7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they differ?</p> + <div id="FP_Q58_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q58_A1-p0.1">Whether the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in act?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what + is in potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels' minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv). Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality + thereto. But it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>): "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that "an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance." But + the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes understands potentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout + contemplation." Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not + in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, "as + before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit + of knowledge, but does not actually consider." In the first way an angel's intellect is never in potentiality with regard + to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the + heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, + the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard + to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the heavenly + bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p7"> In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is + not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of + the things he beholds in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always actually beholding the Word, + and the things he sees in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not + consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the + act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as + stated in De Anima iii, text. 28. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire + the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have + to perform. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the angel's substance there is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so in + potentiality as to be without act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q58_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q58_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that + "it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by + shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various + intelligible things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be + understood altogether. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time + all things that it wills." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens + that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered + severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. + In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped + both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is + stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming + parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From + this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are + comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according + as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible + object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as + different intelligible objects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p7"> Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all things under one intelligible + species, which is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all things at once: just as in heaven + "our thoughts will not be fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all our knowledge at + the same time by one glance," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels + know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species; but not such + as are under various species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand many things as one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many intelligible + objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p10"> To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.</p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q58_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q58_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel's knowledge is discursive?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing + being known through another. But the angels know one thing through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore + the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do. But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects; + all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with + greater reason do this. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that "demons learn more things by experience." But experimental knowledge is discursive: + for, "one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from many experiences," as Aristotle observes (Poster. + ii; Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led + to something particular from something common." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As has often been stated + <a id="FP_Q58_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q58_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>), the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius + calls them "heavenly minds" + <a id="FP_Q58_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q58_A3-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>). Now, the difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by chance + and movement: + while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the + human, intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation; + that is to say, as they advance from one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known principle they were + straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is + the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that + can be known in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p7"> Therefore they are called "intellectual beings": because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the + mind are said to be understood [intelligi]; hence "intellect" is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls + which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called "rational"; and this comes of the feebleness of their + intellectual light. For if they possessed the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first + aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all movement is from something before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge + comes about according as from something previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which + was previously unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and its image + are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in + this way the angels know things in the Word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet + they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are + present, yet without any discursion withal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q58_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q58_A4-p0.1">Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels understand by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, + there is composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there is a multitude of things understood in the + angelic mind; because angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at one time. Therefore there is composition + and division in the angel's mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions + is that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is + evident from what was said + <a id="FP_Q58_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and + dividing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which + are signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore + it seems that the angel understands by composing and dividing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine + concepts." But a simple intelligence is without composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without composition + or division. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing, + the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle, + it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the + subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or + removed from, the subject, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus + it is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, + that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in + it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said + <a id="FP_Q58_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p7"> Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: + for he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable immovably, and material things immaterially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every multitude of things understood causes composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of them is + attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever + can be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that + we can learn by composing and dividing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The various natures of things differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way + in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation + is known, the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet + not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply the nature of a thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q58_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q58_A5-p0.1">Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius + says (Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect + of the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in + the angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in + its intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be error in the + minds of the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that "the intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83, qu. + 32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence" Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood + in the angel's knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of this question depends partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said + <a id="FP_Q58_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html">(A[4])</a> that an angel understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the intellect is always + true as regards what a thing is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 26. But + by accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by + some kind of composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or when the parts + of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature, "a four-footed flying beast," + for there is no such animal. And this comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements, + one of which is as matter to the other. But there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is stated in + Metaph. ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known + precisely as they exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p7"> So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; + but very differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing + process, as when, by division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such is not the method of the angels; + but through the (knowledge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding + it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging + to such thing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing + to their upright will, from their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form no judgments as to the nature + of the qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the + minds of + demons are utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the natural + conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with regard + to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man, they may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding + Christ, they may judge Him not to be God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p8"> From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes + of their not being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as regards things knowable, not naturally + but supernaturally. It is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing is, is always true, save accidentally, + according as it is, in an undue manner, referred to some composition or division. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q58_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q58_A6-p0.1">Whether there is a "morning" and an "evening" knowledge in the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an + admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore + the angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes; while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, + if there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday + and a night knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference of the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima + iii, text. 38), "The sciences are divided just as things are." But there is a threefold existence of things: to wit, in the + Word; in their own natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning + and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in + the Word, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge, on account of the existence + of things in the angelic mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,31; De Civ. Dei xii, 7,20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The expression "morning" and "evening" knowledge was devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all + things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, + namely, the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the ordinary day, morning is the beginning, + and evening the close of day, so, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is + called morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their knowledge of the very being of the + thing created, as it stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the being of things flows from the Word, + as from a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in themselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as compared + to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent + us from calling something light in comparison with one thing, and darkness with respect to another. In the same way the life + of the faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.8" target="asv"> Eph. 5:8</a>: "You were heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord": yet this very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to + the life of glory, is termed darkness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:19</a>: "You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place." So the + angel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark + in + comparison with the vision of the Word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, + that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn + to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things. + Consequently after "evening" there is no night, but "morning"; so that + morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the angels refer to God's praise + their knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day, as the middle between the two extremes. + Or else the noon can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither beginning nor end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under + evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q58_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q58_A7-p0.1">Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge are one. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.5" target="asv">Gn. 1:5</a>): "There was evening and morning, one day." But by the expression "day" the knowledge of the angels is to be understood, + as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their + morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv"> Mat. 18:10.</a> Therefore, if the evening knowledge were different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>): "When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But, if the evening knowledge be different + from the morning, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together + with the morning knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): "There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God, and + as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the evening." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was observed + <a id="FP_Q58_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This cannot be understood as if they + drew their knowledge from the proper nature of things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the form of a principle; because, + as has been already stated ( + <a id="FP_Q58_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>), the angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that when we say "in their + proper nature" we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say, that the + evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things have in their own nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p7"> Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas, or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For + by beholding the Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but the being as possessed by the + things themselves; as God by contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own nature. It, therefore, it + be called evening knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have + in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, and only differ as to + the things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have + in their own natures, then the morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns + one as inferior to the other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day's + unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing + it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There can be two operations of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when + the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles + and conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), + the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence + there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that are not + seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of + the morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is + there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is more + perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion. + In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated Word, and through an innate idea. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q59" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q59-p0.1">THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q59-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59-p2"> In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will + itself; secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q59-p4"> (2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q59-p5"> (3) Is there free-will in the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q59-p6"> (4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?</p> + <div id="FP_Q59_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q59_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in + the reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, + but something higher than the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite + argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection + in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible + object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding, + and will. But God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of + knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow + from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined + to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is + called "a natural appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some + knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which + knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other + things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs + to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by + another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things + which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly, + since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according + to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore + there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency + towards particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason + differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of + discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, + namely, the universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of + intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the name of the appetitive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches + out not to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the + foot [laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from + anger [ira]; though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as + hope, daring, and the rest. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there + is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, + as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q59_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q59_A2-p0.1">Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple + than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more + so is the angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect. + Therefore the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an + intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not + differ from his nature or his intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ, + not really but only logically [*Cf. + <a id="FP_Q59_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html">Q[16], A[4]</a>]. Therefore will and intellect are not really different. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives + color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular; for the true is a particular + good, to wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object + is the true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both. + Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their + nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends + to anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from + anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before + possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic + comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination + to make something like itself comes from the active qualities. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p7"> Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good + is contained within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing beyond Himself except on account + of His goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created + thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its + essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p8"> In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in + so far as the object known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it, according + as what, in its essence, is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is + beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to + one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently + intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God, for He has within Himself + universal being, and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by something + additional, as has been said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, + which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true + suffices for the difference of intellect from will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the good and the true are really convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something + true; while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient + for diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q59_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q59_A3-p0.1">Whether there is free-will in the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice + with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as + stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness + of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such + indifference; because, as was observed already ( + <a id="FP_Q59_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html">Q[58], A[5]</a>), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of + their appetitive faculty can there be free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher + angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there + is no free-will in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, + with much more reason is it in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as + the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as + irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: + such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an + intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can + judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest + that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's + in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice + in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As was observed already + <a id="FP_Q59_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to + have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were + not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection + is directed to + something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something + which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to + things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect. + Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less + degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or + through the addition of some qualification. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q59_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q59_A4-p0.1">Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that + in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has + not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred + Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible + appetite in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance + appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore + there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does + not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The + reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by + the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea, there will be + no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained + under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers + of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, + as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p7"> Now it is quite evident from what has been said + <a id="FP_Q59_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q59_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; + nor can there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appetite is not divided according + to the distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does not crave + for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the + angels only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; + and it is called the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;---on account + of the resemblance in the effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act + of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the + will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appetite + is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. + For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible + appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of + hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals + with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and + fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible + part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no + passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated + of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed + to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or + concupiscible appetite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q60" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q60-p0.1">OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q60-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60-p2"> The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive + faculty comes of love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60-p3"> Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q60-p4"> (1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q60-p5"> (2) Whether there is in them love of choice?</p> + <p id="FP_Q60-p6"> (3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice?</p> + <p id="FP_Q60-p7"> (4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?</p> + <p id="FP_Q60-p8"> (5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?</p> + <div id="FP_Q60_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q60_A1-p0.1">Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual + love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its + own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess free-will, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q60_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html">Q[59], A[3]</a>). Consequently there is no natural love in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs + to wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature. + Therefore there is no natural love in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there + is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always + sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently + whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature + to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This + inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual + nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive + appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since + an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature + which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in + no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being + moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved + to act that he does not act himself, because he has free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination + implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author + of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude + perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, + and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q60_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q60_A2-p0.1">Whether there is love of choice in the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice + follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which + is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to + acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards + first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated + <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Consequently, besides their infused love, + there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love + of choice in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; + because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, + what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p6"> This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; + and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery, + or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid + down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally + wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of + the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes + of this, which is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p7"> There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated already ( + <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html">Q[59], A[2]</a>), the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection + of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only + a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The + act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves, + and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on + account of something else. Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally + as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of + the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both + natural love and love of choice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p8"> In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient + principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on + <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62.html">(Q[62])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love + is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html">Q[59], A[3]</a>, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. Consequently + the conclusion does not follow. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p10"> The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.</p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q60_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q60_A3-p0.1">Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said + <a id="FP_Q60_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard + to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the + same object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various + things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot + love himself with either natural or elective love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others comes of love for oneself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6, + a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That + is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as + an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but + that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name "concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p7"> Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as + fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection. This is to love + self. Hence angel and man naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self. On the + other hand, each loves self with the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will + benefit himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective + love, as was observed above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites + one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and "binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things + outside self; as uniting is derived from unity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As love is an action which remains within the agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not + of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge + is reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q60_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q60_A4-p0.1">Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But + an angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows himself by his essence, while he knows another by his + similitude, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q60_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html">Q[56], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another + comes of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but + loves himself more. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such + love can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does + not love another with natural love as he loves himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That seems to be a natural property which is found in all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its + like," as is said, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q60_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19.</a> Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he loves himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was observed + <a id="FP_Q60_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, both angel and man naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself: consequently every thing loves + what is one with itself. So, if this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with + it by non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love, + while he loves a blood relation with natural + affection, in so far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p7"> Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with another, is the one according to nature. And so everything + loves another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest + even in things devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another thing, wherein consists + this other thing's good; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne + upwards. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p8"> So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. + But so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from him in other respects, he does not + love him with natural love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and + thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the + expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another + as himself, because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the + other's essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but + he does not love another by the other's will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The expression "as" does not denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the angel + naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what + is one only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself, in this + respect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in + wishing well to him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills + for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, + without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. + But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to + righteousness and unrighteousness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q60_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q60_A5-p0.1">Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated + <a id="FP_Q60_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural + love, the angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so." But every one loves another with natural love for his + own sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than self with natural + love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But + nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore + the angel does not love God more than himself from natural love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it + is poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore + the angels do not love God more than themselves by natural love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man + who sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of + God has made the earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city." Therefore it is not + natural to love God more than self. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept + of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence, + through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, + in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while + as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of + the natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p9"> The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider whither natural movement tends in the natural order + of things; because the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in + the will of an intellectual nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to another, is principally, + and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural + tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because "according as a thing is moved naturally, it + has an inborn aptitude to be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that the part naturally exposes + itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole + body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the + virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part + of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p10"> Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because + every creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angel and man alike + love God before themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than God, it would follow + that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the + other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself + than it is with the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally + more loved than self; because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole + more than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good. Now God is + not only the good of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything in its own way naturally loves God + more than itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far" denotes + an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature + of love on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love God, except from this---that + everything is dependent on that good which is God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for + everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but likewise its species. And much more has everything a + natural inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love. + So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's substance and universal goodness are one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement + of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other things, and according as it is the universal good. And + because He is naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence + should not love Him. But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some + particular effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, + so far as He is the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q61" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q61-p0.1">OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q61-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61-p2"> After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation, + or, speaking in a general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the first place we must see how they were + brought into natural existence; secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly, how some of them became + wicked. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61-p3"> Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q61-p4"> (1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q61-p5"> (2) Whether he has existed from eternity?</p> + <p id="FP_Q61-p6"> (3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?</p> + <p id="FP_Q61-p7"> (4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?</p> + <div id="FP_Q61_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q61_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels have no cause of their existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created + by God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has + being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity." But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q61_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], A[2]</a>). Therefore they have no cause of their being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the + angels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels have no active cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.2" target="asv">Ps. 148:2</a>): "Praise ye Him, all His angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while + in everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q61_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). From this it is clear that God alone exists of His own essence: while all other things have their existence by participation. + Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what exists essentially; as everything + ignited is caused by fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, + but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light." And they were either passed over, or else designated by the names + of corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; + and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal + nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and from which Moses especially + meant to safeguard them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal' cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as produces + its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire + substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p9"> From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.</p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q61_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q61_A2-p0.1">Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel was produced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does + not act through something besides His essence. But His being is eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything which exists at one period and not at another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is + laid down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at another non-existing, but exists always. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But + as truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, + but likewise eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), in the person of begotten Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the + beginning." But, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q61_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary + must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not + been. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's being is His will. So the fact that God produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude that + He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q61_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q61_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a> ), God's will does not act by necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He willed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel is above that time which is the measure of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a + corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, + and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) + that "God moves the spiritual creature according to time." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth. + But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it + does not follow that the angels existed from eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q61_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q61_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand + years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, + Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God?" Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels + were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all + devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity; + while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal + nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much + more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Now, this would not be true if anything had been created previously. Consequently + the angels were not created before corporeal nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the + angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute + a universe of themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe. This stands in evidence + from the relationship of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures + makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, + Whose "works are perfect," as it is said + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>, should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; + especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no + one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the case with + the doctrine of Athanasius," as Jerome says. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken + place previously to that of the corporeal world. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is not a part of, but far above, the whole universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe + in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the comparison does not hold. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation of + the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does + not involve creation of the universe. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p10"> If the contrary view be held, then in the text of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning," must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In + the beginning of time": but not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say "Before which there was + nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q61_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q61_A4-p0.1">Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a substance + which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation. + Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in + the empyrean heaven. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, + it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in + the person of the sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.14.13" target="asv">Is. 14:13</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the visible + firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from + its splendor; and which was filled with angels directly it was made." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was observed + <a id="FP_Q61_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear + some relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the angels + to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, + or whatever else it be called. So + Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.14" target="asv"> Dt. 10:14</a>: "Behold heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their + being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in + a corporeal place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that they are by their power in touch with + bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity + owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in + the opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, + as having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created + in the highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as having more restricted powers, were created among + the inferior bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning angel + wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as will appear later on ( + <a id="FP_Q61_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html">Q[63], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q62-p0.1">OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q62-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p2"> In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the order of grace and of glory; under which heading there + are nine points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p3"> (1) Were the angels created in beatitude?</p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p4"> (2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p5"> (3) Were they created in grace?</p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p6"> (4) Did they merit their beatitude?</p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p7"> (5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?</p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p8"> (6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural capacities?</p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p9"> (7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?</p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p10"> (8) Could they have sinned afterwards?</p> + <p id="FP_Q62-p11"> (9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?</p> + <div id="FP_Q62_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels were created in beatitude?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude. For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue + in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess the excellence they have." Therefore the angels + were created in beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation + was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. + ad lit. i, 15). Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and incomplete. But its formation and perfection + are derived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in + beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5), the things which we read of as being made in the works of the + six days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation. + But, according to his exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic knowledge, according to which they knew + the Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew the + Word, and things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude + straightway from the very beginning of their creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To be established or confirmed in good is of the nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as soon as + they were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that + it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection + of rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure + called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's ultimate + happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and + that is God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby "we shall see God + as He is." This is beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q62_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p7"> So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural power, + he was created already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action, as man does, + but, as was observed above ( + <a id="FP_Q62_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], AA[3]</a> ,4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of + their creation that ultimate beatitude which is + beyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not + to have it immediately from the beginning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by + its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v, 4,23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth + did not take place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the + earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the + perfection of its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural + knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby + he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural + knowledge, and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first + knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only + when the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can + accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been + said ( + <a id="FP_Q62_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html">Q[60], A[5]</a>). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because + there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace; hence it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you." But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace: + for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It was by turning to God that the angel reached to beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it + would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the + Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>): "The grace of God is life everlasting." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above ( + <a id="FP_Q62_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html">Q[60], A[2]</a>) the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is directed + towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined + towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural + principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate fire; whereas to generate + flesh is beyond the natural power of fire; consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally + by the nutritive soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p7"> Now it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q62_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], AA[4]</a>,5), when we were treating of God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the rational + creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the movement + of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the + help of grace. Therefore it must be said that an + angel could not of his own will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, + so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural + capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be + attained, then it is "impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, + not according to the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening + hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered + in itself, can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult + for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man, both because it is beyond his nature, + and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But it is difficult for an + angel, only because it is supernatural. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The + first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, + consummate grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits beatitude; and for this there is required habitual + grace, which is the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man + disposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is required; but the operation of God, Who draws the + soul towards Himself, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv"> Lam 5:21</a>: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels were created in grace?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels were not created in grace. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature + was first made without form, and was called "heaven": but afterwards it received its form, and was then called "light." But + such formation comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would + ever have turned away from God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems + that they were not created in grace; but that they were first created in nature only, and then received grace, and that last + of all they were beatified. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), "Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will, + that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on + them?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although there are conflicting opinions on this point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state, + while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of + holy men, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of time, being created + by the work of Divine Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were created in + the first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, + and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature + does to the natural effect; hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>) grace is called the "seed" of God. As, then, in Augustine's opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural + effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally + created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the absence + of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and + so it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as Augustine holds with regard to the formation of + corporeal things (Gen. ad lit. i, 15). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be + inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has + grace can fail to make use of it, and can sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in created + nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace + stands not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the principle of right operation. Therefore it was + fitting for grace to be given straightway with nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A4-p0.1">Whether an angel merits his beatitude?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But + the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action was not meritorious for him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he + did not thereby merit beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not + before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because + thus he would be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to + the rank of a higher, and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not + admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.17" target="asv">Apoc. 21:17</a>) that the "measure of the angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man." Therefore the same is the case with + the angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude, however, + is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation + leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, + as the healing art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when + such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it; wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now + it is evident from what has gone before ( + <a id="FP_Q62_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2; + <a id="FP_Q62_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], AA[4]</a>,5), ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains, then, that both man and angel merited their + beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p7"> And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited + beatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p8"> But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, + even as we have grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which conveys the notion of an end, and is + the reward of virtue, as even the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as some others have maintained, + that the angels merit beatitude by their present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite + contrary, again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end; while what is already in its end + cannot, properly speaking, be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he already enjoys. Or else it will + have to be said that one and the same act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious; and so far as + it attains the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even this view will not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient + cause of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free-will, except in so far as it is informed + by grace; but it cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect + grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the + same time to merit it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p9"> Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited + beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel's difficulty of working righteously does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but from + the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p12"> The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.</p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A5-p0.1">Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man + to do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant, from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin + to be moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of a body could be instantaneous, like operations of + mind and will, it would have movement in the first instant of its generation. Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude + by one act of his will, he merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their + beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the first instant. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there must be many intervals between things which are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far + remote from their natural condition: while merit comes midway between. Therefore the angel would have to pass through many + stages of merit in order to reach beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints. Now + the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some + obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, + since there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by only one + meritorious act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because + grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, + according to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage + to another; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above + + <a id="FP_Q62_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q62_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], AA[3]</a>,4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly + after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act; because + man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one + act of charity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to man than + to the angel for securing beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angel is above the time of corporeal things; hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except + as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with + the act of beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, + it remains for different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel + merited beatitude, and in another was beatified. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one meritorious + act is required; which act can so far be called an interval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A6-p0.1">Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is + bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural + gifts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. + But grace does not come "of works," as is said + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.6" target="asv"> Rom. 11:6.</a> Therefore much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural gifts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree + of his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent. ii, D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle natures + and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with greater gifts of grace." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the + degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in + the order of His wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the angelic nature was made by God for + attaining grace and beatitude, so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be + ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the builder chisels the stones for building + a house, from the fact that he prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is clear that he is setting + them apart for the more ornate part of the house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and + fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p7"> Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination + of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in whom the movement of his intellective part + is either retarded or thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is nothing to retard or thwart it, + nature is moved with its whole energy. So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher + nature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in men, since greater grace and glory are + bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that the angels who had the greater + natural powers, had the more grace and glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise does the nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for grace, + so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The acts of the rational creature are from the creature itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems + rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than according to works. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way + in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on account of the end; while numerical difference is because + of the matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or impede the movement of his intellective nature; + but not in the angels. Consequently the argument is not the same for both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A7-p0.1">Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not remain in the beatified angels. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>): "When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But natural love and knowledge are + imperfect in comparison with beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural knowledge and love cease. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels. + Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love to remain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points. + But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified knowledge and love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness + consists not in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge and love in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> So long as a nature endures, its operation remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection. Therefore + it does not take away natural knowledge and love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations + themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. + But the first must ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved in beatitude: and in like manner + the act of nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The advent of a perfection removes the opposite imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection + of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not + taken away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge + is not opposed to the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing + hinders us from knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the one time through a probable medium + and through a demonstrative one. In like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains to his knowledge + of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural + gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural knowledge + and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love + from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A8-p0.1">Whether a beatified angel can sin?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q62_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html">(A[7])</a>, beatitude does not do away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified + angel can sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of + the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not + lessened in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin." Therefore the holy angels + cannot sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence. + Now, God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same + way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to + do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good + precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills + or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of + beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already alleged. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the things + whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally + known principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good; because the will is naturally + ordained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is + referred to opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites with regard to God + Himself, Whom they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards God, which ever alternative + they choose, that is not sinful. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident that it + belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, according to given principles; but for + it to proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs + to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between + opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by + turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot + sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q62_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q62_A9-p0.1">Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect + charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases. + Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "God makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same + thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations"; since "they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . + . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It + remains, then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are + not in the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and + defect in them; which is not admissible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they + are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In every movement the mover's intention is centered upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject; + because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature + cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before + ( + <a id="FP_Q62_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>), that it needs to be moved by God towards its + beatitude. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p7"> Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth + is seen by all the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand + by the intention of Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision + of the Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which + is comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q62_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">Q[12], A[7]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q62_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html">Q[14], A[3]</a>). But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite; + and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that the rational creature + understands God more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beatitude + consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p8"> Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought + even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely + passively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said + to procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, + then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the + ultimate term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of + this life; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in acquired habits, the operation + preceding the habit is productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In + the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is useful. + Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for + the beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of + the nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the highest + degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation + of such as are saved by their ministrations, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A9-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.10" target="asv"> Lk. 15:10</a>: "There is [Vulg.'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance." Such joy belongs to their + accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental + reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor; + like Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude, rather than merit it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q63-p0.1">THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q63-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p2"> In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as + to the evil of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p3"> (1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p4"> (2) What kind of sins can be in them?</p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p5"> (3) What did the angel seek in sinning?</p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p6"> (4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are any of them naturally evil?</p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p7"> (5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his + own will? + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p8"> (6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his creation and fall?</p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p9"> (7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p10"> (8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?</p> + <p id="FP_Q63-p11"> (9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?</p> + <div id="FP_Q63_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A1-p0.1">Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, + as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the + angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies. + Therefore neither can there by in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love + towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels + cannot sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not + a true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire + only what it truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Consequently the angel does not sin by desire. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.18" target="asv">Job 4:18</a>): "In His angels He found wickedness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to + sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning + is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or + morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall + short of rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; + but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will + is the sole rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so + far only as it is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of a + subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of + his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature; + considering the condition of its nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as regards + their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so + neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natural action there is the action of free-will + in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. + But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away + by sinning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery, + which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. + The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from + the inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his + universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there + are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q63_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html">Q[59], A[4]</a>); nor, again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin comes of free-will by choosing + something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces sin + is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were + to pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence + of consideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his + own free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A2-p0.1">Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in + any kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the + spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise + sloth and avarice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause + is granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise + be other vices in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil "is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet + he is proud and envious." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are + in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in + the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain + to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is + affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is + incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the + sin of pride---not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none + other than pride. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p7"> Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something + involves on its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another, inasmuch + as he deems his neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good + coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be + singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning + angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil's will God + makes use of man for the Divine glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures: + it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human + life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal + pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created + good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which + is in the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the + demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which + does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; + yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A3-p0.1">Whether the devil desired to be as God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under + desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists + only in such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; + for it the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an + angel could not desire to be as God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature + naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did + not thereby sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being + the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes + deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, in the person of the devil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.14.13" target="asv">Is. 14:13,14</a>), "I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High." And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being + "inflated with pride, he wished to be called God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly, + by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: + and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what + was impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And + even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural desire + of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature + of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to + be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that, + because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, + he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident + that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently + it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p7"> To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is + made to be likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he desires + such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like + unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like + unto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper + to God; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to + resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since no creature + can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect---by desiring, as + his + last end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural + beatitude, which is attained by God's grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, + he sought to have it by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering. This harmonizes + with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli, iv.] that "he sought that to which he would have come had + he stood fast." These two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his + own power, whereas this is proper to God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p8"> Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought + to have dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p9"> From this we have the answer to all the objections.</p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A4-p0.1">Whether any demons are naturally wicked?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There + is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to + be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.12.10" target="asv">Wis. 12:10</a>): "Their malice is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally + rapacious; yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons are not naturally wicked." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes + from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil + connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but with the universal good no + evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some + particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything + of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that + every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. + Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil + whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally + so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons + are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may + be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil; + yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural + proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful + or lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils + are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. + Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius + observes (De Div. Nom. iv). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A5-p0.1">Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said + of the devil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>): "He was a murderer from the beginning." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order + of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8), the "heaven," which is said to have been + created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said that God said: "Be + light made: and light was made," we are to understand the full formation of the angel by + turning to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant. But at the + same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from "darkness," whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore + in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul + of Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation + in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel + could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate. + It ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the + reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q63_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html">Q[62], A[5]</a>). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, + that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>): "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also the demons. Therefore the + demons were at some time good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature, + but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's + nature is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the + authority of Scripture---for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.14.12" target="asv">Is. 14:12</a>): "How art thou fallen . . . O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning!" and it is said to the devil in the person of the + King of Tyre ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.13" target="asv">Ezech. 28:13</a>): "Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God," ---consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters + as erroneous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p8"> Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this + view also is repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation + to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to his creation. But the term + of the creative act is the angel's very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems, + then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p9"> This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time, and take place + successively; thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the + same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first + and the second change; thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit + up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels; for, + as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning ( + <a id="FP_Q63_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a> ). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p10"> We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate + act of free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that operation + which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward movement in fire comes of + its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause, which can + be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg, + which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which + brought the angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently it cannot be said that the devil + was wicked in the first instant of his creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is stated that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be thought + of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning of sin": that is to say, because he never + went back from his sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken + as according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness, + Who also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason + does not hold good of sin; as has been said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some + of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were + deprived of the beatitude which they had merited. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A6-p0.1">Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel? </h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was some interval between the angel's creation and his fall. For, it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.15" target="asv">Ezech. 28:15</a>): "Thou didst walk perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire; thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy + ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is continuous movement, it requires + an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the devil's creation and + his fall. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; + which refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his + sin. Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation and his sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle + time between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of the devil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>): "He stood not in the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must understand this in the sense, that he + was in the truth, but did not remain in it." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of + the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held + that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace; as we have said + ( + <a id="FP_Q63_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). For since the angels attain beatitude by one + meritorious act, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q63_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html">Q[62], A[5]</a>), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that first + instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p8"> If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in + the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his creation and fall. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured by + time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the movement of free-will tending towards good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in + which he was not wicked. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a natural + movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with + man; and therefore the argument does not hold good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is true to say that there is a middle time between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved Phys. + vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time, + time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood + to respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects + itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in + them all. From such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge while others, + absorbed in themselves, became night, "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act + was common to them all; but in their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the first instant; + but in the second the good were set apart from the wicked. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A7-p0.1">Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.14" target="asv">Ezech. 28:14</a>): "Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God." Now the order of the Cherubim + is under the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore, the highest angel among those who + sinned was not the highest of all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels + sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature which is unfitting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel + is, so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it + seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them + in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels + we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account + Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems + to agree with the view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x, + 9,10,11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' + the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons" the intellectual substances + which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith; + because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently + there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, + the higher over the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) + that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p7"> But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as + has been said + <a id="FP_Q63_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory + says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view: because the angels' sin did + not come of any proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that + argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the + other view; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," while "Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire." Consequently + Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity, + which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end + of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual + creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual + creature was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its + end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> However great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently + it was in his power not to follow it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A8-p0.1">Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect. + But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of + the others' sinning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q63_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior; + and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin + of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them to be his subjects. + Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against God, than to wish to be over another against God; because + there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that + he induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which + is contrary to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.26" target="asv"> Ps. 103:26</a>: "This dragon which Thou + hast formed---He who was the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice." Therefore the sin of the + highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.12.4" target="asv">Apoc. 12:4</a>) that the dragon "drew" with him "the third part of the stars of heaven." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind + of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that highest one; as is evident from + our Lord's words: "Go [Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his + angels" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>). For the order of Divine justice exacts that whosoever + consents to another's evil suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:19</a>): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel + needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, + and vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in + the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, + another who catches his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, "which + everyone accepts directly they are heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.]. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p8"> Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us; in the same instant in which the highest + angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be + subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior. + Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they + wanted to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their + ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in the order of nature they were even then subject to the + highest angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As was observed above ( + <a id="FP_Q63_A8-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html">Q[62], A[6]</a>), an angel has nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it + good or bad. Consequently since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin with + intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater in malice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q63_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q63_A9-p0.1">Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but + good is in few." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found + than good; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.15" target="asv"> Eccles. 1:15</a>: "The number of fools is infinite." Therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would + appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:16</a>): "There are more with us than with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us to aid us, and the wicked + spirits who are our foes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the natural + order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its effects either always, or more often than not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are + known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good is known to the few. In the angels there is + only an intellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p8"> And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.</p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to those who hold that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly affairs, + it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but only those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that + the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order; just as men are taken up into every + order to supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is + more established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of + some orders, as of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are derived from the ardor of love and from + God's indwelling, which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities are attributed + to them; because these names are derived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both good and bad. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q64" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q64-p0.1">THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q64-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64-p2"> It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons; under which heading there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q64-p3"> (1) Of their darkness of intellect;</p> + <p id="FP_Q64-p4"> (2) Of their obstinacy of will;</p> + <p id="FP_Q64-p5"> (3) Of their grief;</p> + <p id="FP_Q64-p6"> (4) Of their place of punishment.</p> + <div id="FP_Q64_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q64_A1-p0.1">Whether the demons' intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For it they knew any + truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to know separated substances. But this is not in keeping with + their unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as that some writers have assigned as man's last + happiness the knowledge of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all + knowledge of truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the + same is not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; + as it comes from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the sun. But the demons cannot know God, + Who is most manifest of Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because + they are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and + evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge, + because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the Creator's praise (hence, after "evening" comes "morning" [ + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>]). Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. + Dei xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord + of glory," as is said + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:8</a>. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of all other knowledge of truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from someone + else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the things we learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the + truth by their own nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33), the good angels are separated from them as light + is from darkness; and every manifestation is made through light, as is said + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv"> Eph. + 5:13. + </a> In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from the good angels: because "there is no fellowship of + light with darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath . . . ?']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Nor can they learn by long experience: because experience comes of the senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth + in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at + all, but remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the knowledge of truth stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there + is some knowledge of truth in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of + grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other + is effective, and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the gift of wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p9"> Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very + nature of the angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on account of the simplicity of his substance, + nothing can be withdrawn from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural powers, as a man is punished + by being deprived of a hand or a foot or of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that + the natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, + however, which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been utterly taken away from them, but lessened; because, + of these Divine secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is done either by means of the angels, + or "through some temporal workings of Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in the same degree as + to the holy angels, to whom many more things are revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third knowledge, + as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness consists in self-application to something higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature; + hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing + the first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one separate substance to know another; as it is natural for + us to know sensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in knowing + sensible natures; so neither does the angel's happiness consist in knowing separated substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because + our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, + but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the + perfection of his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God + than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although they do not possess the purity which comes with + grace, nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the knowledge of God which belongs to them from their + nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is darkness in comparison with the excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's knowledge in + its own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the + light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of + the Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine light, and can + be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but + "nocturnal" knowledge. Accordingly we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.5" target="asv">Gn. 1:5</a> that the darkness, which God separated from the light, "He called night." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its completion + in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never + had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence the demons much less fully understood the mystery of + the Incarnation, when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De + Civ. Dei ix, 21), "It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels, who enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; + but it was made known by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them." For had they fully and certainly known + that He was the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by privation + of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the + holy angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will, they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual + nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by + others: thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it from the senses; but when the similitude of their innate + intelligible species is completed in individual things, they know some things as present, which they previously did not know + would come to pass, as we said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels ( + <a id="FP_Q64_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html">Q[57], A[3]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q64_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q64_A2-p0.1">Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual + being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above + <a id="FP_Q64_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so obstinate + in evil as not to be able to return to what is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the + malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy. Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state + of malice to the state of justice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they + fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. + Therefore the demon is not obstinate in malice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed + already ( + <a id="FP_Q64_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html">Q[63], A[8]</a>), the lower demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not + obstinate in malice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses + the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.1.24" target="asv">Mk. 1:24</a>). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv">Jam. 2:19</a>). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand." + Therefore they are not obstinate in + malice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.73.23" target="asv">Ps. 73:23</a>): "The pride of them that hate Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the demons. Therefore they remain + ever obstinate in their malice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good + and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and + saints of true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude; hence it is termed "life + everlasting." It is also contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that + demons and wicked men shall be sent "into everlasting punishment," and the good brought "into everlasting life." Consequently + such an opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will + of the good angels is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p9"> We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. + For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is to the angels." Now it is clear that all the + mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they are without remission and endure + for ever. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p10"> To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned + to the apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; + while the will seeks the universal good, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q64_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html">Q[59], A[1]</a>); as also the sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers universals. Now the angel's apprehension + differs from + man's in this respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which + are the object of the habit of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration + to another; and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's will adheres to + a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly + and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite + (namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary + to say that man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible + either opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed + therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who are damned + (SP, + <a id="FP_Q64_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q98_A1.html">Q[98], AA[1]</a>, 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good and wicked angels have free-will, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and are + not delivered by the Divine mercy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil's first sin still remains in him according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what + he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power + is taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would he had done it, or still would do + it if he could. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the + argument does not hold good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's + part is always wicked; because, although at times he does something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the + truth in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. + Another kind of act is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to + the goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q64_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q64_A3-p0.1">Whether there is sorrow in the demons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the + same subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: + "The devil has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this sinister power." Therefore there + is no sorrow in the demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are + present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv"> Job 41:24, </a> "Who was made to fear no one." Therefore there is no grief in the demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at + least for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.18.7" target="asv"> Apoc. 18:7, </a> "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." Consequently + much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he especially glorified himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the + sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they + can be in the demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, + is nothing else than the resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is + evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they + would wish others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in them: and especially because + it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of happiness, which + they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed in many respects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man + from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will; + because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be something that we will, and something + that we will not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He was made + to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God which restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the + devils believe and tremble" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv">James 2:19</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin + is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, for the evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to + the goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow + for good lost by punishment, is the witness to a good nature." Consequently, since + the demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q64_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.viii.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q64_A4-p0.1">Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons' place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual + nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of punishment for demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the + demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome atmosphere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire. But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome + atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angels in their own nature stand midway between God and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it + procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two + ways: first of all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil; and this is fittingly done through the + good angels. In another way, indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting + against opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be brought about through the wicked spirits, lest + they should cease to be of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of punishment is due to the demons: + one, by reason of their sin, and this is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the darksome atmosphere + is their due place of punishment. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p7"> Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and + wrestling with demons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here; and the demons are in this + dark atmosphere for our trial: although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they have led astray; just + as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men + and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it: + because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One soul is not set over another in the order of nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently + there is no parallel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude + of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:1</a>): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have a house in heaven." Others, again, while not admitting the + same of souls, admit it as to demons. But it + is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good souls and good angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p11"> Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not + lessened by their coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same way as we say that the bishop's + honor is not lessened while he is not actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, that although the demons + are not actually bound within the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their + punishment is none the less; because they know that such confinement is their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.6" target="asv"> James 3:6</a>: "They carry fire of hell with them wherever they go." Nor is this contrary to what is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.8.31" target="asv">Lk. 8:31</a>), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss"; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them + to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, "They [Vulg. 'He'] besought + Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. 'him'] out of the country" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A4-p11.3" href="./asv.html#Mark.5.10" target="asv">Mk. 5:10</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.viii.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q50.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file