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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.vii" class="div2">
2 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
3 <a href="summa.FP_Q50.html"></a>
4 <h2 id="FP.vii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)</h2>
5 <div id="FP_Q50" class="div3">
6 <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a>
7 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
8 <h3 id="FP_Q50-p0.1">OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
9 <p id="FP_Q50-p1"></p>
10 <p id="FP_Q50-p2"> Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy
11 Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual,
12 which is man.
13 </p>
14 <p id="FP_Q50-p3"> Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly,
15 what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.
16 </p>
17 <p id="FP_Q50-p4"> Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things.</p>
18 <p id="FP_Q50-p5"> Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry:</p>
19 <p id="FP_Q50-p6"> (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?</p>
20 <p id="FP_Q50-p7"> (2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form?</p>
21 <p id="FP_Q50-p8"> (3) We ask concerning their number.</p>
22 <p id="FP_Q50-p9"> (4) Of their difference from each other.</p>
23 <p id="FP_Q50-p10"> (5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.</p>
24 <div id="FP_Q50_A1" class="div4">
25 <a href="summa.FP_Q50.html"></a>
26 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html"></a>
27 <h4 id="FP_Q50_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?</h4>
28 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p1"></p>
29 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p2">
30 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation
31 to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and
32 immaterial as regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal."
33 </p>
34 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p3">
35 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii)
36 that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.
37 </p>
38 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p4">
39 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature is limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs
40 to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's creatures, as appears from
41 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q50_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.2" target="asv"> Ps. 148:2</a>: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and
42 they were created." Therefore angels are corporeal.
43 </p>
44 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p5">
45 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
46 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q50_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.4" target="asv">Ps. 103:4</a>): "Who makes His angels spirits."
47 </p>
48 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p6">
49 <b>I answer that,</b> There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists
50 in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates
51 the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His
52 intellect and will (
53 <a id="FP_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>;
54 <a id="FP_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19],
55 A[4]
56 </a> ). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be
57 the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and "now." Hence the perfection of
58 the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.
59 </p>
60 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p7"> The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between
61 sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And
62 because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes
63 (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (
64 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q50_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.23.8" target="asv">Acts
65 23:8
66 </a>).
67 </p>
68 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p8"> But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible
69 by the intellect alone.
70 </p>
71 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p9">
72 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the
73 other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material
74 and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.
75 </p>
76 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p10">
77 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever
78 mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially,
79 as we are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.
80 </p>
81 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p11">
82 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all
83 creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained
84 in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance."
85 </p>
86 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p12"></p>
87 <p id="FP_Q50_A1-p13"></p>
88 <a href="summa.FP_Q50.html"></a>
89 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html"></a>
90 </div>
91 <div id="FP_Q50_A2" class="div4">
92 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
93 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html"></a>
94 <h4 id="FP_Q50_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?</h4>
95 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p1"></p>
96 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p2">
97 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed
98 of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the
99 difference from the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form.
100 But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.
101 </p>
102 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p3">
103 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
104 whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot be a subject": and the above properties are found in the angel.
105 Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form.
106 </p>
107 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p4">
108 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore
109 an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.
110 </p>
111 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p5">
112 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the
113 form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel is in matter.
114 </p>
115 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p6">
116 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal."
117 </p>
118 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p7">
119 <b>I answer that,</b> Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book
120 of the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as
121 regards incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which
122 it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from
123 corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common,
124 is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be
125 understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form
126 of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.
127 </p>
128 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p8"> But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible
129 that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would
130 be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives
131 the spiritual form. Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity; and
132 without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter
133 of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things
134 should have the same matter.
135 </p>
136 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p9"> It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything
137 is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object,
138 whence any act receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because
139 forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it
140 must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.
141 </p>
142 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p10"> But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
143 things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in
144 our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect;
145 and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own
146 mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God
147 <a id="FP_Q50_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>.
148 </p>
149 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p11">
150 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is difference which constitutes the species. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined
151 to some special grade of being because "the species of things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction
152 of unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things there is one thing which determines to a
153 special grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is
154 the matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the former the "difference." Whereas in immaterial
155 things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in being;
156 and therefore in them "genus" and "difference" are not derived from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless,
157 this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea
158 of
159 their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their "difference."
160 </p>
161 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p12">
162 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect
163 and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in
164 some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way;
165 otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true,
166 to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the
167 very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but
168 of an immaterial substance.
169 </p>
170 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p13">
171 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made
172 evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter,
173 whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature
174 itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if
175 there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation
176 of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels;
177 and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as
178 Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the
179 running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was explained above (
180 <a id="FP_Q50_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Hence God alone is pure act.
181 </p>
182 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p14">
183 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to
184 which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite
185 on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it. But immaterial created
186 substances are finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that
187 their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite
188 as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its "being" is finite as determined
189 to some one special nature.
190 </p>
191 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p15"> Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite from above," as receiving its being from above itself,
192 and is "infinite from below," as not received in any matter.
193 </p>
194 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p16"></p>
195 <p id="FP_Q50_A2-p17"></p>
196 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
197 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html"></a>
198 </div>
199 <div id="FP_Q50_A3" class="div4">
200 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html"></a>
201 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html"></a>
202 <h4 id="FP_Q50_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels exist in any great number?</h4>
203 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p1"></p>
204 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p2">
205 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of
206 a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above
207 <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number.
208 </p>
209 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p3">
210 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
211 created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is
212 the least possible number in the angelic nature.
213 </p>
214 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p4">
215 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements
216 of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater
217 number than the movements of the heavenly bodies.
218 </p>
219 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p5">
220 <b>Objection 4:</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
221 goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their
222 matter is receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above
223 <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can
224 only be according to the requirements of the first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding
225 form of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before.
226 </p>
227 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p6">
228 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
229 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q50_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>): "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood before Him."
230 </p>
231 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p7">
232 <b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
233 substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself:
234 and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separate substances is the number of the
235 species of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
236 because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the
237 exemplar species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are higher than the natures of sensible
238 things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible
239 things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the
240 number
241 of the first movements.
242 </p>
243 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p8"> But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both
244 into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied according to the number
245 of heavenly movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended that in the Scriptures even men
246 bearing a divine message are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which manifest God's
247 almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated
248 as angels.
249 </p>
250 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p9"> Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number,
251 far beyond all material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv): "There are many blessed armies of the heavenly
252 intelligences, surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers." The reason whereof is this, because, since
253 it is the perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect
254 some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard
255 to their magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible
256 bodies, exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive is
257 something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances
258 as it were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude.
259 </p>
260 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p10">
261 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that which is
262 caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (
263 <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html">Q[30], A[3]</a>;
264 <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11.html">Q[11])</a>.
265 </p>
266 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p11">
267 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the angelic nature being the nighest unto God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not so
268 as to be found in few subjects.
269 </p>
270 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p12">
271 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text 44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were made
272 for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were
273 to appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal, because
274 the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii,
275 text 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make use of this argument, since only
276 through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones.
277 </p>
278 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p13">
279 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was
280 refuted above (
281 <a id="FP_Q50_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but according
282 to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances.
283 </p>
284 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p14"></p>
285 <p id="FP_Q50_A3-p15"></p>
286 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html"></a>
287 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html"></a>
288 </div>
289 <div id="FP_Q50_A4" class="div4">
290 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html"></a>
291 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A5.html"></a>
292 <h4 id="FP_Q50_A4-p0.1">Whether the angels differ in species?</h4>
293 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p1"></p>
294 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p2">
295 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things
296 which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same
297 according to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them---that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all
298 the angels are of one species.
299 </p>
300 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p3">
301 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and
302 less---namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.
303 </p>
304 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p4">
305 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore
306 are the angels.
307 </p>
308 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p5">
309 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were
310 but one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one species.
311 </p>
312 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p6">
313 <b>On the contrary,</b> In things of one species there is no such thing as "first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
314 iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x).
315 Therefore the angels are not of the same species.
316 </p>
317 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p7">
318 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are
319 of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of
320 the one species.
321 </p>
322 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p8"> But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially.
323 If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above
324 <a id="FP_Q50_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several
325 whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in
326 several substances. And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would
327 be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of
328 quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes
329 diversity not merely of species, but of genus.
330 </p>
331 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p9">
332 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Difference" is nobler than "genus," as the determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common,
333 but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species;
334 or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species
335 according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in
336 like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature.
337 </p>
338 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p10">
339 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according
340 as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way
341 the angels are diversified according to more or less.
342 </p>
343 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p11">
344 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied
345 in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species.
346 </p>
347 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p12">
348 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication,
349 as was said above (
350 <a id="FP_Q50_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html">Q[47], A[3]</a>). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals
351 in one species.
352 </p>
353 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p13"></p>
354 <p id="FP_Q50_A4-p14"></p>
355 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A3.html"></a>
356 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A5.html"></a>
357 </div>
358 <div id="FP_Q50_A5" class="div4">
359 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html"></a>
360 <a href="summa.FP_Q51.html"></a>
361 <h4 id="FP_Q50_A5-p0.1">Whether the angels are incorruptible?</h4>
362 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p1"></p>
363 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p2">
364 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that
365 he is "an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature."
366 </p>
367 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p3">
368 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by
369 nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it." But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore
370 the angels are corruptible by their nature
371 </p>
372 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p4">
373 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved
374 them." But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that
375 they are corruptible of their own nature.
376 </p>
377 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p5">
378 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual substances "have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death,
379 matter, and generation."
380 </p>
381 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p6">
382 <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing
383 is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from
384 what was said above
385 <a id="FP_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated
386 from it; but what belongs to a
387 thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which
388 it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can
389 lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything
390 is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed
391 of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being,
392 as happens in the angels, as was said above
393 <a id="FP_Q50_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature.
394 </p>
395 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p7"> A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as
396 it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood
397 from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible
398 of its own nature.
399 </p>
400 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p8">
401 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of death,"
402 as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later
403 <a id="FP_Q50_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62.html">(Q[62])</a>.
404 </p>
405 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p9">
406 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore
407 dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in existence by the Divine will.
408 </p>
409 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p10">
410 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As was observed above (
411 <a id="FP_Q50_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible
412 being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would
413 lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption
414 in the angels;
415 but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because
416 God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption
417 within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.
418 </p>
419 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p11"></p>
420 <p id="FP_Q50_A5-p12"></p>
421 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html"></a>
422 <a href="summa.FP_Q51.html"></a>
423 </div>
424 <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a>
425 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
426 </div>
427 <div id="FP_Q51" class="div3">
428 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A5.html"></a>
429 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
430 <h3 id="FP_Q51-p0.1">OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
431 <p id="FP_Q51-p1"></p>
432 <p id="FP_Q51-p2"> We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with
433 bodies; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their comparison with local movement.
434 </p>
435 <p id="FP_Q51-p3"> Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:</p>
436 <p id="FP_Q51-p4"> (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?</p>
437 <p id="FP_Q51-p5"> (2) Whether they assume bodies?</p>
438 <p id="FP_Q51-p6"> (3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?</p>
439 <p id="FP_Q51-p7"></p>
440 <div id="FP_Q51_A1" class="div4">
441 <a href="summa.FP_Q51.html"></a>
442 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
443 <h4 id="FP_Q51_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?</h4>
444 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p1"></p>
445 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p2">
446 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute alone---that
447 is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without
448 any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.):
449 "Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature
450 alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that
451 every created spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. iii): "The demons are called animals of
452 the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies." But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore
453 angels have bodies naturally united to them.
454 </p>
455 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p3">
456 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore
457 angels have bodies naturally united to them.
458 </p>
459 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p4">
460 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore
461 the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.
462 </p>
463 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p5">
464 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are understood to be incorporeal."
465 </p>
466 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p6">
467 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally
468 in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every
469 animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (
470 <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the
471 nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something
472 else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus
473 of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through
474 the bodily senses, as will be explained later on (
475 <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">Q[84], A[6]</a>;
476 <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">Q[89],
477 A[1]
478 </a>). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in
479 the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible
480 things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these
481 we call angels.
482 </p>
483 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p7">
484 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As was said above (
485 <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>) it was the opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal
486 substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine
487 tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according
488 to
489 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.2" target="asv">
490 Ps. 8:2
491 </a>: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above
492 opinion of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following the
493 opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument,
494 which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained
495
496 <a id="FP_Q51_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are
497 some aerial animals, which they termed demons.
498 </p>
499 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p8">
500 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.
501 </p>
502 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p9">
503 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (
504 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.2.6" target="asv">1 Kings 2:6</a>): "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and
505 which has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body
506 is more perfect than one which is united to a body.
507 </p>
508 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p10"></p>
509 <p id="FP_Q51_A1-p11"></p>
510 <a href="summa.FP_Q51.html"></a>
511 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
512 </div>
513 <div id="FP_Q51_A2" class="div4">
514 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
515 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A3.html"></a>
516 <h4 id="FP_Q51_A2-p0.1">Whether angels assume bodies?</h4>
517 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p1"></p>
518 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p2">
519 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing
520 of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need
521 for a body, since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body.
522 </p>
523 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p3">
524 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But
525 a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated
526 <a id="FP_Q51_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that
527 all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.
528 </p>
529 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p4">
530 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire,
531 otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore
532 the angels do not assume bodies.
533 </p>
534 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p5">
535 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.
536 </p>
537 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p6">
538 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels
539 happened in prophetic vision---that is, according to imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever
540 is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine
541 Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all;
542 just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom;
543 in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions
544 were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen
545 by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies
546 naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said
547 <a id="FP_Q51_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
548 <a id="FP_Q51_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>), it follows that they sometimes assume bodies.
549 </p>
550 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p7">
551 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give
552 evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed
553 bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God would take a human body; because all the apparitions
554 in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God
555 appeared in the flesh.
556 </p>
557 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p8">
558 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed
559 movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things
560 sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible
561 properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a
562 body.
563 </p>
564 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p9">
565 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped
566 and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far
567 as is needful for forming the assumed body.
568 </p>
569 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p10"></p>
570 <p id="FP_Q51_A2-p11"></p>
571 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
572 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A3.html"></a>
573 </div>
574 <div id="FP_Q51_A3" class="div4">
575 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
576 <a href="summa.FP_Q52.html"></a>
577 <h4 id="FP_Q51_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?</h4>
578 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p1"></p>
579 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p2">
580 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth.
581 But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess
582 these functions. Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.
583 </p>
584 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p3">
585 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of
586 the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means.
587 Consequently, the angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life.
588 </p>
589 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p4">
590 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels
591 are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said (
592 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.16" target="asv">Gn. 18:16</a>) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had appeared to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to the
593 angel (
594 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Tob.5.7" target="asv">Tob. 5:7,8</a>): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of Medes?" he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all
595 the ways thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.
596 </p>
597 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p5">
598 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed
599 from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in
600 their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.
601 </p>
602 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p6">
603 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having
604 resumed life (
605 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24" target="asv">Lk. 24</a>). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored
606 them as God (
607 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.18" target="asv">Gn. 18</a>). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.
608 </p>
609 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p7">
610 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related:
611 "After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old,
612 men of renown" (
613 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.6.4" target="asv">Gn. 6:4</a>). Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies.
614 </p>
615 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p8">
616 <b>On the contrary,</b> The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise functions
617 of life through assumed bodies.
618 </p>
619 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p9">
620 <b>I answer that,</b> Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of
621 a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements,
622 in so far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which
623 is common in such operations; but not as to that which is special to living
624 subjects; because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which has the faculty has the action." Hence nothing
625 can have a function of life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such action.
626 </p>
627 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p10">
628 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since
629 it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible
630 things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy
631 angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although
632 they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels
633 may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true
634 men; because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels.
635 </p>
636 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p11">
637 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs
638 of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation
639 through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as
640 by the eye the power of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the
641 other members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.).
642 </p>
643 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p12">
644 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved,
645 since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in
646 them as movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly,
647 although God is not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since
648 He is everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not
649 moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because
650 the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality
651 according to any restricted part of the world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but according to
652 a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is always in the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.
653 </p>
654 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p13">
655 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as
656 they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.
657 </p>
658 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p14">
659 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance
660 of the eater.
661 </p>
662 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p15"> Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing
663 matter; nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating.
664 But the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a nature that food could
665 be changed into it; consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the
666 angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" (
667 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q51_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.12.19" target="asv">Tob. 12:19</a>).
668 </p>
669 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p16"> Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the
670 prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).
671 </p>
672 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p17">
673 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as have
674 experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women,
675 and have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it. But God's holy angels could not fall in
676 such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons
677 of Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor
678 is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more before
679 than after the deluge." Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such demons, nor from
680 their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman,
681 and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin.
682 iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.
683 </p>
684 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p18"></p>
685 <p id="FP_Q51_A3-p19"></p>
686 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
687 <a href="summa.FP_Q52.html"></a>
688 </div>
689 <a href="summa.FP_Q50_A5.html"></a>
690 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
691 </div>
692 <div id="FP_Q52" class="div3">
693 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A3.html"></a>
694 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
695 <h3 id="FP_Q52-p0.1">OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
696 <p id="FP_Q52-p1"></p>
697 <p id="FP_Q52-p2"> We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are three subjects of inquiry:</p>
698 <p id="FP_Q52-p3"> (1) Is the angel in a place?</p>
699 <p id="FP_Q52-p4"> (2) Can he be in several places at once?</p>
700 <p id="FP_Q52-p5"> (3) Can several angels be in the same place?</p>
701 <div id="FP_Q52_A1" class="div4">
702 <a href="summa.FP_Q52.html"></a>
703 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
704 <h4 id="FP_Q52_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel is in a place?</h4>
705 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p1"></p>
706 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p2">
707 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "The common opinion of the learned is that
708 things incorporeal are not in a place." And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing
709 which is in a place, but only a movable body." But an angel is not a body, as was shown above
710 <a id="FP_Q52_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50.html">(Q[50])</a>. Therefore an angel is not in a place.
711 </p>
712 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p3">
713 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, place is a "quantity having position." But everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position
714 cannot benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position.
715 Therefore an angel is not in a place.
716 </p>
717 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p4">
718 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys.
719 iv, text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the container is more formal than
720 the contained; as air with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not in a place.
721 </p>
722 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p5">
723 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline, Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace."
724 </p>
725 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p6">
726 <b>I answer that,</b> It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense.
727 A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity;
728 but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal
729 place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place.
730 </p>
731 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p7"> Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space
732 in the continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is
733 not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains
734 the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body as containing
735 it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained,
736 but as somehow containing it.
737 </p>
738 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p8"> And hereby we have the answers to the objections.</p>
739 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p9"></p>
740 <p id="FP_Q52_A1-p10"></p>
741 <a href="summa.FP_Q52.html"></a>
742 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
743 </div>
744 <div id="FP_Q52_A2" class="div4">
745 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
746 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
747 <h4 id="FP_Q52_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel can be in several places at once?</h4>
748 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p1"></p>
749 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p2">
750 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul.
751 But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi).
752 Therefore an angel can be in several places at once.
753 </p>
754 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p3">
755 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that
756 he is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time
757 in various places.
758 </p>
759 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p4">
760 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the angel operates, there he is." But occasionally he operates in
761 several places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (
762 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q52_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19.25" target="asv">Gn. 19:25</a>). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.
763 </p>
764 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p5">
765 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth."
766 </p>
767 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p6">
768 <b>I answer that,</b> An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things,
769 is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere.
770 Now since the angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared
771 with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently
772 since all being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic
773 power. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere,
774 nor in several places, but in only one place.
775 </p>
776 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p7"> Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed
777 the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place
778 which is a point. But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas
779 the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no
780 occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible or indivisible,
781 great or small suffices, according as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the entire
782 body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one place to him.
783 </p>
784 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p8"> Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied
785 only to what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all, namely,
786 the part to the east: hence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which
787 is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres
788 immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.
789 </p>
790 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p9"> So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body
791 is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed
792 fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not
793 in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.
794 </p>
795 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p10"> From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately
796 applied, is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
797 </p>
798 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p11"></p>
799 <p id="FP_Q52_A2-p12"></p>
800 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
801 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
802 </div>
803 <div id="FP_Q52_A3" class="div4">
804 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
805 <a href="summa.FP_Q53.html"></a>
806 <h4 id="FP_Q52_A3-p0.1">Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place? </h4>
807 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p1"></p>
808 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p2">
809 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time
810 in the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so
811 that it be not empty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several angels can be in the one place.
812 </p>
813 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p3">
814 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body
815 are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved
816 in Phys. iv, text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.
817 </p>
818 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p4">
819 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess
820 souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place; and consequently
821 for the same reason all other spiritual substances.
822 </p>
823 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p5">
824 <b>On the contrary,</b> There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.
825 </p>
826 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p6">
827 <b>I answer that,</b> There are not two angels in the same place. The reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be
828 the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every class of causes: for there is one proximate form
829 of one thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several
830 individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one
831 man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united strengths
832 all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches
833 the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said
834 <a id="FP_Q52_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, there can be but one angel in one place.
835 </p>
836 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p7">
837 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place; but for another reason,
838 as has been said.
839 </p>
840 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p8">
841 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way; hence the conclusion does not follow.
842 </p>
843 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p9">
844 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its form,
845 while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.
846 </p>
847 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p10"></p>
848 <p id="FP_Q52_A3-p11"></p>
849 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
850 <a href="summa.FP_Q53.html"></a>
851 </div>
852 <a href="summa.FP_Q51_A3.html"></a>
853 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
854 </div>
855 <div id="FP_Q53" class="div3">
856 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
857 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
858 <h3 id="FP_Q53-p0.1">OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
859 <p id="FP_Q53-p1"></p>
860 <p id="FP_Q53-p2"> We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which heading there are three points of inquiry:</p>
861 <p id="FP_Q53-p3"> (1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.</p>
862 <p id="FP_Q53-p4"> (2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space?</p>
863 <p id="FP_Q53-p5"> (3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?</p>
864 <div id="FP_Q53_A1" class="div4">
865 <a href="summa.FP_Q53.html"></a>
866 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
867 <h4 id="FP_Q53_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel can be moved locally?</h4>
868 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p1"></p>
869 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p2">
870 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid
871 of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto,"
872 for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in
873 the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term "whereto." But an angel is without parts.
874 Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.
875 </p>
876 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p3">
877 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel
878 is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.
879 </p>
880 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p4">
881 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.
882 </p>
883 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p5">
884 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said
885 that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore
886 a beatified angel is moved locally.
887 </p>
888 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p6">
889 <b>I answer that,</b> A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise
890 does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place.
891 Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence
892 it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude;
893 and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is
894 not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement
895 of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity
896 therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said
897 above (
898 <a id="FP_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a>), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places
899 successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above (
900 <a id="FP_Q53_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A2.html">Q[52], A[2]</a>). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such
901 contacts. Because, as was said above (
902 <a id="FP_Q53_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a>), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible
903 place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in
904 which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible
905 place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all
906 at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will
907 not be continuous.
908 </p>
909 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p7">
910 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what
911 is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.
912 </p>
913 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p8"> Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous,
914 it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and while it is in the term "whereto": because
915 the very succession of "wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those "wheres"
916 the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing
917 which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing
918 moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore,
919 according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's
920 movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the
921 term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto" (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance,
922 but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he
923 begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of
924 the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from
925 this,
926 that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding
927 a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his
928 power can be applied to something which is divisible.
929 </p>
930 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p9">
931 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application
932 of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.
933 </p>
934 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p10">
935 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any
936 need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to
937 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q53_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>: "They are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance
938 of salvation."
939 </p>
940 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p11"></p>
941 <p id="FP_Q53_A1-p12"></p>
942 <a href="summa.FP_Q53.html"></a>
943 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
944 </div>
945 <div id="FP_Q53_A2" class="div4">
946 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
947 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
948 <h4 id="FP_Q53_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?</h4>
949 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p1"></p>
950 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p2">
951 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space first
952 travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is
953 indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in
954 his movement: which is not possible.
955 </p>
956 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p3">
957 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another
958 without going through the middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which
959 stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle.
960 </p>
961 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p4">
962 <b>On the contrary,</b> If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but is
963 changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change: consequently he was being moved while existing in some place.
964 But he was not moved so long as he was in the term "whence." Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it
965 was necessary for him to pass through intervening space.
966 </p>
967 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p5">
968 <b>I answer that,</b> As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it
969 be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said
970 by the Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes,
971 before arriving at the last into which it is moved"; because the order of first and last in
972 continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99).
973 </p>
974 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p6"> But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through
975 the middle: which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places; whether the places
976 be taken as divisible or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which are indivisible; because between
977 every two points that are infinite intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a
978 middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from
979 the continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in time. But in the whole time which
980 measures the movement of a body, there are not two "nows" in which the body moved is not in one place and in another; for
981 if it were in one and the same place in two "nows," it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be at rest is
982 nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore since there are infinite "nows" between the first
983 and the last "now" of the time which measures the movement, there must be infinite places between the first from which the
984 movement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be
985 a body of a palm's length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first
986 place
987 from which the movement starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the other palm.
988 Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as
989 the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in the
990 magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit
991 of the
992 same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality,
993 it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places.
994 </p>
995 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p7"> Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the
996 intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is
997 continuous. Consequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be actually numbered.
998 If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not
999 pass through all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly,
1000 then, as the angel's movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places.
1001 </p>
1002 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p8"> Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's
1003 nature; but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow
1004 the laws of place in its movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained thereby, but is above it
1005 as containing it: hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through
1006 or without the intervening place.
1007 </p>
1008 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p9">
1009 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the
1010 angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as
1011 was said above: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident from the foregoing.
1012 </p>
1013 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p10">
1014 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the things
1015 thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no comparison.
1016 </p>
1017 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p11">
1018 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change.
1019 Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit
1020 is a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.
1021 </p>
1022 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p12"></p>
1023 <p id="FP_Q53_A2-p13"></p>
1024 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
1025 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
1026 </div>
1027 <div id="FP_Q53_A3" class="div4">
1028 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
1029 <a href="summa.FP_Q54.html"></a>
1030 <h4 id="FP_Q53_A3-p0.1">Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?</h4>
1031 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p1"></p>
1032 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p2">
1033 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist
1034 the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power
1035 which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time. But between one length
1036 of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is
1037 moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant.
1038 </p>
1039 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p3">
1040 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as
1041 illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does
1042 not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel's movement instantaneous.
1043 </p>
1044 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p4">
1045 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in
1046 the term "whereto": but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken
1047 as the term "wherefrom"; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible; which
1048 is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom."
1049 Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said
1050 <a id="FP_Q53_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.
1051 </p>
1052 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p5">
1053 <b>On the contrary,</b> In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every
1054 movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it.
1055 </p>
1056 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p6">
1057 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place
1058 to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom"; but in the last instant of such time he is
1059 in the term "whereto." Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as there is no medium between time and the
1060 limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a
1061 last "now" cannot be assigned in which it was in the term "wherefrom," just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation
1062 of fire, there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter was under the privation
1063 of the form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air,
1064 or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements.
1065 </p>
1066 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p7"> But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose
1067 be not otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which measures rest, the subject reposing
1068 is in the same "where" in the first, in the middle, and in the last "now." On the other hand, it is of the very nature of
1069 movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of
1070 time which measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last "now" it must have a different
1071 form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in
1072 whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during
1073 the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible
1074 in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore
1075 all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is the term of the alteration
1076 of matter, and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement of an angel
1077 is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is
1078 impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last "now" he is in another place: but some
1079 "now" must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many "nows" succeeding one another,
1080 there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then,
1081 that the movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time
1082 if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said
1083 <a id="FP_Q53_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher
1084 says (Phys. iv, text 99).
1085 </p>
1086 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p8"> But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and
1087 whereby all corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens; because the angel's
1088 movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens.
1089 </p>
1090 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p9">
1091 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the time of the angel's movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no proportion to
1092 the time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however,
1093 it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on
1094 account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides,
1095 the swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of
1096 his will.
1097 </p>
1098 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p10">
1099 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood to
1100 be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not
1101 the term of movement; hence there is no comparison.
1102 </p>
1103 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p11">
1104 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection is based on continuous time. But the same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel can
1105 be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the
1106 angel's movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now';
1107 as was already shown
1108 <a id="FP_Q53_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Nevertheless he is partly
1109 in one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because his
1110 power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above
1111 <a id="FP_Q53_A3-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
1112 </p>
1113 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p12"></p>
1114 <p id="FP_Q53_A3-p13"></p>
1115 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
1116 <a href="summa.FP_Q54.html"></a>
1117 </div>
1118 <a href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
1119 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
1120 </div>
1121 <div id="FP_Q54" class="div3">
1122 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
1123 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
1124 <h3 id="FP_Q54-p0.1">OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
1125 <p id="FP_Q54-p1"></p>
1126 <p id="FP_Q54-p2"> After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold.
1127 In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into
1128 the objects known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them.
1129 </p>
1130 <p id="FP_Q54-p3"> Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:</p>
1131 <p id="FP_Q54-p4"> (1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?</p>
1132 <p id="FP_Q54-p5"> (2) Is his being his understanding?</p>
1133 <p id="FP_Q54-p6"> (3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?</p>
1134 <p id="FP_Q54-p7"> (4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?</p>
1135 <p id="FP_Q54-p8"> (5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect?</p>
1136 <div id="FP_Q54_A1" class="div4">
1137 <a href="summa.FP_Q54.html"></a>
1138 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
1139 <h4 id="FP_Q54_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel's act of understanding is his substance?</h4>
1140 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p1"></p>
1141 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p2">
1142 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active
1143 intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii)
1144 and from his Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the angel's substance his action---that is, his
1145 act of understanding.
1146 </p>
1147 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p3">
1148 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that "the action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things
1149 to live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect
1150 is the essence of an angel who understands.
1151 </p>
1152 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p4">
1153 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than
1154 the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands
1155 his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with
1156 the substance of the angel who understands.
1157 </p>
1158 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p5">
1159 <b>On the contrary,</b> The action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance,
1160 for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above (
1161 <a id="FP_Q54_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance.
1162 </p>
1163 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p6">
1164 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality
1165 of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is
1166 not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality.
1167 But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as
1168 His existence and His action.
1169 </p>
1170 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p7"> Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting
1171 act of intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel's substance would neither
1172 be distinguished from God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance
1173 of another angel.
1174 </p>
1175 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p8"> Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly;
1176 for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.
1177 </p>
1178 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p9">
1179 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the active intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since
1180 its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive
1181 intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.
1182 </p>
1183 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p10">
1184 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that between
1185 "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow,
1186 if "to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin.
1187 x), "Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it is
1188 not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the act of the intellect is life."
1189 </p>
1190 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p11">
1191 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The action which is transient, passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving
1192 the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according
1193 to the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is
1194 brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who
1195 understands it, as an effect which differs from both.
1196 </p>
1197 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p12"></p>
1198 <p id="FP_Q54_A1-p13"></p>
1199 <a href="summa.FP_Q54.html"></a>
1200 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
1201 </div>
1202 <div id="FP_Q54_A2" class="div4">
1203 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
1204 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
1205 <h4 id="FP_Q54_A2-p0.1">Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?</h4>
1206 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p1"></p>
1207 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p2">
1208 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says
1209 (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand
1210 is to exist.
1211 </p>
1212 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p3">
1213 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as
1214 the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
1215 </p>
1216 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p4">
1217 <b>On the contrary,</b> The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement.
1218 Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.
1219 </p>
1220 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p5">
1221 <b>I answer that,</b> The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16),
1222 there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting;
1223 and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such
1224 actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent.
1225 It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence
1226 is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the
1227 second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act
1228 "to understand," of which the object is "the true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each of which
1229 is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives
1230 its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things;
1231 as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God's being
1232 alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone
1233 is
1234 its own act of understanding and its own act of will.
1235 </p>
1236 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p6">
1237 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby
1238 something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he
1239 distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life.
1240 </p>
1241 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p7">
1242 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since
1243 he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared
1244 to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal
1245 object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the
1246 same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does
1247 not follow that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.'
1248 </p>
1249 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p8"></p>
1250 <p id="FP_Q54_A2-p9"></p>
1251 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
1252 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
1253 </div>
1254 <div id="FP_Q54_A3" class="div4">
1255 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
1256 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
1257 <h4 id="FP_Q54_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence?</h4>
1258 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p1"></p>
1259 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p2">
1260 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and "intellect"
1261 express the power of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds."
1262 Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.
1263 </p>
1264 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p3">
1265 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that
1266 which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states
1267 (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said (
1268 <a id="FP_Q54_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], A[2]</a>).
1269 </p>
1270 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p4">
1271 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter
1272 "nigh unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to
1273 God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence.
1274 </p>
1275 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p5">
1276 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore substance,
1277 power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
1278 </p>
1279 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p6">
1280 <b>I answer that,</b> Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident
1281 thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and
1282 on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from
1283 the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has
1284 been already said (
1285 <a id="FP_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to
1286 exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is
1287 not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.
1288 </p>
1289 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p7">
1290 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is
1291 partly intellectual and partly sensitive.
1292 </p>
1293 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p8">
1294 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality
1295 is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence,
1296 but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows
1297 the species: for such accident belongs to the form---whereas an accident which
1298 belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle
1299 of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.
1300 </p>
1301 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p9">
1302 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental
1303 being. Hence there is no comparison.
1304 </p>
1305 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p10"></p>
1306 <p id="FP_Q54_A3-p11"></p>
1307 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
1308 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
1309 </div>
1310 <div id="FP_Q54_A4" class="div4">
1311 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
1312 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html"></a>
1313 <h4 id="FP_Q54_A4-p0.1">Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?</h4>
1314 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p1"></p>
1315 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p2">
1316 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
1317 17) that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something
1318 whereby it can make all things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in
1319 an angel.
1320 </p>
1321 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p3">
1322 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active
1323 intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens
1324 a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.
1325 </p>
1326 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p4">
1327 <b>On the contrary,</b> The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive
1328 intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text.
1329 18. But this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel.
1330 </p>
1331 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p5">
1332 <b>I answer that,</b> The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality,
1333 and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible
1334 things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This
1335 is the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for
1336 admitting an active intellect is due to this---that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside
1337 the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the
1338 soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible:
1339 and this power in us is called the active intellect.
1340 </p>
1341 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p6"> But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with
1342 regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually
1343 such; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later (
1344 <a id="FP_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>;
1345 <a id="FP_Q54_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a>). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in
1346 them, except equivocally.
1347 </p>
1348 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p7">
1349 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to
1350 be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is not
1351 need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.
1352 </p>
1353 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p8">
1354 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality,
1355 in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality
1356 with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one
1357 angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active
1358 intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries,
1359 to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive
1360 intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble.
1361 </p>
1362 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p9"></p>
1363 <p id="FP_Q54_A4-p10"></p>
1364 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
1365 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html"></a>
1366 </div>
1367 <div id="FP_Q54_A5" class="div4">
1368 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
1369 <a href="summa.FP_Q55.html"></a>
1370 <h4 id="FP_Q54_A5-p0.1">Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels?</h4>
1371 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p1"></p>
1372 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p2">
1373 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that
1374 in the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well.
1375 </p>
1376 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p3">
1377 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many
1378 remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory.
1379 </p>
1380 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p4">
1381 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to
1382 the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels,
1383 since they are of the same nature.
1384 </p>
1385 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p5">
1386 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."
1387 </p>
1388 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p6">
1389 <b>I answer that,</b> In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts
1390 of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not
1391 performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no
1392 bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (
1393 <a id="FP_Q54_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">Q[51], A[1]</a>). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.
1394 </p>
1395 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p7"> The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will.
1396 And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and
1397 not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was said above (A[3], ad 1).
1398 </p>
1399 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p8"> A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking
1400 according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often
1401 makes use of this opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that "such
1402 an inquiry does not call for much labor." Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be
1403 understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common
1404 usage of speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we "sense it." And hence it is that we use the word
1405 "sentence." Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by likeness
1406 of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know
1407 single objects, as we shall show (
1408 <a id="FP_Q54_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], A[2]</a>), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the
1409 mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy'
1410 is attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while deception in us comes
1411 properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold
1412 fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.
1413 </p>
1414 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p9"></p>
1415 <p id="FP_Q54_A5-p10"></p>
1416 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
1417 <a href="summa.FP_Q55.html"></a>
1418 </div>
1419 <a href="summa.FP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
1420 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
1421 </div>
1422 <div id="FP_Q55" class="div3">
1423 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html"></a>
1424 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
1425 <h3 id="FP_Q55-p0.1">OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
1426 <p id="FP_Q55-p1"></p>
1427 <p id="FP_Q55-p2"> Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of
1428 inquiry:
1429 </p>
1430 <p id="FP_Q55-p3"> (1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some species?</p>
1431 <p id="FP_Q55-p4"> (2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as they have derived from things?</p>
1432 <p id="FP_Q55-p5"> (3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower angels?</p>
1433 <div id="FP_Q55_A1" class="div4">
1434 <a href="summa.FP_Q55.html"></a>
1435 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
1436 <h4 id="FP_Q55_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels know all things by their substance?</h4>
1437 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p1"></p>
1438 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p2">
1439 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels know all things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels, according
1440 to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore
1441 the angel knows things by his essence.
1442 </p>
1443 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p3">
1444 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter,
1445 the intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object understood is the same as the one who understands it,
1446 as regards that whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as the angels, the medium whereby the object
1447 is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it.
1448 </p>
1449 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p4">
1450 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is contained in another is there according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an intellectual
1451 nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower orders
1452 of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div.
1453 Nom. iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all. Therefore the
1454 angel knows all things in his substance.
1455 </p>
1456 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p5">
1457 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms
1458 of things, and not by their own substance.
1459 </p>
1460 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p6">
1461 <b>I answer that,</b> The medium through which the intellect understands, is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it
1462 is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary
1463 for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible,
1464 the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: because the
1465 potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But the intellective power of
1466 the angel extends to understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth.
1467 The angel's essence, however, does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species.
1468 This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore
1469 God
1470 alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected
1471 by some species in order to know things.
1472 </p>
1473 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p7">
1474 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that the angel knows things according to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the medium
1475 of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs
1476 to the angel of his own nature.
1477 </p>
1478 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p8">
1479 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the sensible
1480 object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise
1481 the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude
1482 by which it understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it
1483 is precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object understood,"
1484 as to say that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a thing is actually understood, precisely because
1485 it is immaterial.
1486 </p>
1487 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p9">
1488 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things which are beneath the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed perfectly,
1489 nor according to their own proper formality---because the angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality
1490 from other things---but according to some common formality. Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality
1491 in God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from
1492 which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence:
1493 and this the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.
1494 </p>
1495 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p10"></p>
1496 <p id="FP_Q55_A1-p11"></p>
1497 <a href="summa.FP_Q55.html"></a>
1498 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
1499 </div>
1500 <div id="FP_Q55_A2" class="div4">
1501 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
1502 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
1503 <h4 id="FP_Q55_A2-p0.1">Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?</h4>
1504 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p1"></p>
1505 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p2">
1506 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness
1507 within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so
1508 that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge,
1509 then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or
1510 else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone.
1511 Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things.
1512 </p>
1513 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p3">
1514 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect
1515 abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible
1516 things. So there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through species drawn from things.
1517 </p>
1518 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p4">
1519 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from
1520 sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent
1521 as to things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose.
1522 </p>
1523 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p5">
1524 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible."
1525 </p>
1526 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p6">
1527 <b>I answer that,</b> The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that
1528 there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal
1529 substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower
1530 bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from
1531 some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances ---that is to say, human souls---have
1532 a power of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible
1533 species from things. But in the higher spiritual substances---that is, the angels---the power of understanding is naturally
1534 complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to understand all
1535 things which they can know naturally.
1536 </p>
1537 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p7"> The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances. The lower spiritual substances---that is, souls---have
1538 a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very mode of existence it
1539 behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with bodies
1540 to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher substances---that is, the angels---are utterly free from bodies,
1541 and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through
1542 an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature.
1543 Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first
1544 receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature."
1545 </p>
1546 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p8">
1547 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of
1548 creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type,
1549 according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge
1550 of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the
1551 very fashioning of the creature."
1552 </p>
1553 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p9">
1554 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination,
1555 which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter,
1556 and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently,
1557 however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms
1558 to an intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since
1559 the angel has no imagination, as was said above (
1560 <a id="FP_Q55_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html">Q[54], A[5]</a>). Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so; because he would
1561 not need them, for he has connatural intelligible species.
1562 </p>
1563 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p10">
1564 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless
1565 on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
1566 </p>
1567 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p11"></p>
1568 <p id="FP_Q55_A2-p12"></p>
1569 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
1570 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
1571 </div>
1572 <div id="FP_Q55_A3" class="div4">
1573 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
1574 <a href="summa.FP_Q56.html"></a>
1575 <h4 id="FP_Q55_A3-p0.1">Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower angels?</h4>
1576 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p1"></p>
1577 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p2">
1578 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,
1579 seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore
1580 it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal.
1581 </p>
1582 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p3">
1583 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically; because to know anything generically
1584 is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than
1585 the lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower; which is not befitting.
1586 </p>
1587 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p4">
1588 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form,
1589 which the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses one universal form for knowing
1590 various things. Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which seems unbecoming.
1591 </p>
1592 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p5">
1593 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis
1594 it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.
1595 </p>
1596 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p6">
1597 <b>I answer that,</b> For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which
1598 is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine
1599 essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and
1600 less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what
1601 God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower.
1602 </p>
1603 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p7"> Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects.
1604 Therefore his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more things. An example of this can
1605 in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained
1606 to them in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others
1607 of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.
1608 </p>
1609 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p8">
1610 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge
1611 from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will
1612 not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them; either according to the order of causality,
1613 as the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the
1614 order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.
1615 </p>
1616 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p9">
1617 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To know anything universally can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only the
1618 universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect
1619 knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In this
1620 way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by
1621 one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.
1622 </p>
1623 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p10">
1624 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the proper
1625 type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which
1626 can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox
1627 to acts of wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of Its
1628 eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according
1629 to its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence,
1630 many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.
1631 </p>
1632 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p11"></p>
1633 <p id="FP_Q55_A3-p12"></p>
1634 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
1635 <a href="summa.FP_Q56.html"></a>
1636 </div>
1637 <a href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html"></a>
1638 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
1639 </div>
1640 <div id="FP_Q56" class="div3">
1641 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
1642 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
1643 <h3 id="FP_Q56-p0.1">OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
1644 <p id="FP_Q56-p1"></p>
1645 <p id="FP_Q56-p2"> We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge,
1646 first, of immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:
1647 </p>
1648 <p id="FP_Q56-p3"> (1) Does an angel know himself?</p>
1649 <p id="FP_Q56-p4"> (2) Does one angel know another?</p>
1650 <p id="FP_Q56-p5"> (3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?</p>
1651 <div id="FP_Q56_A1" class="div4">
1652 <a href="summa.FP_Q56.html"></a>
1653 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
1654 <h4 id="FP_Q56_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel knows himself?</h4>
1655 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p1"></p>
1656 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p2">
1657 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel.
1658 Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.
1659 </p>
1660 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p3">
1661 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing
1662 single is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.
1663 </p>
1664 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p4">
1665 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 understanding is a kind
1666 of passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand
1667 himself.
1668 </p>
1669 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p5">
1670 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth."
1671 </p>
1672 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p6">
1673 <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been previously said (
1674 <a id="FP_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
1675 <a id="FP_Q56_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>), the object is on a different footing in an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the object or matter
1676 into which the action passes is something separate from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and the
1677 building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the action to proceed, the
1678 object must be united with the agent; just as the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that sense may actually
1679 perceive. And the object which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the form which
1680 is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species
1681 of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.
1682 </p>
1683 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p7"> It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty;
1684 and then there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may be actual knowledge, it is required that the
1685 faculty of knowledge be actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it can thereby have actual
1686 knowledge without any preceding change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of
1687 knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the
1688 action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth
1689 heat none the less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something else. So therefore, if in the order of
1690 intelligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since an angel is immaterial,
1691 he
1692 is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his
1693 form, which is his substance.
1694 </p>
1695 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p8">
1696 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That is the text of the old translation, which is amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is to say
1697 the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the old translation read---"and furthermore they do not know their own
1698 powers." Although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their
1699 own power perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine Wisdom,
1700 Which to the angels is incomprehensible.
1701 </p>
1702 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p9">
1703 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which
1704 is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are,
1705 there is nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.
1706 </p>
1707 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p10">
1708 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to the intellect, in so far as if is in potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not happen
1709 in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect
1710 is not of the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes into some other matter.
1711 </p>
1712 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p11"></p>
1713 <p id="FP_Q56_A1-p12"></p>
1714 <a href="summa.FP_Q56.html"></a>
1715 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
1716 </div>
1717 <div id="FP_Q56_A2" class="div4">
1718 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
1719 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
1720 <h4 id="FP_Q56_A2-p0.1">Whether one angel knows another?</h4>
1721 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p1"></p>
1722 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p2">
1723 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not know another. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human intellect
1724 were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending
1725 external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored with some particular color, it could not see every color.
1726 But as the human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is
1727 the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate
1728 nature from the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot understand other natures.
1729 </p>
1730 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p3">
1731 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in De Causis that "every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and
1732 what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause." But one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not
1733 know another.
1734 </p>
1735 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p4">
1736 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected
1737 by way of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the angel known, except generically;
1738 as is clear from what has been said before (
1739 <a id="FP_Q56_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>;
1740 <a id="FP_Q56_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>, ad 3). Hence, it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of another, but only a
1741 general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known; because
1742 that whereby the intellect understands is something within the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind.
1743 Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species; because that species would not differ from the angel
1744 understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can understand another.
1745 </p>
1746 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p5">
1747 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if
1748 God were now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing angels; or else he would have to be
1749 known by a species drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower, from whom they
1750 receive nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows another.
1751 </p>
1752 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p6">
1753 <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in De Causis that "every intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted."
1754 </p>
1755 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p7">
1756 <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him
1757 in two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic
1758 mind in such a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things which He produced in their own natural
1759 being. Now in the Word of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of
1760 corporeal things, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of these spiritual creatures, the forms
1761 of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in every angel there was impressed
1762 the form of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist in the
1763 nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed
1764 in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual
1765 creatures.
1766 </p>
1767 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p8">
1768 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order, as was already observed (
1769 <a id="FP_Q56_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>, ad 1,2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and
1770 lower bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to their various degrees of perfection.
1771 </p>
1772 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p9">
1773 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and
1774 effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.
1775 </p>
1776 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p10">
1777 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One angel knows another by the species of such angel existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image
1778 it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself
1779 a subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses
1780 only an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall has a natural
1781 existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has only intentional existence.
1782 </p>
1783 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p11">
1784 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> God made every creature proportionate to the universe which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more
1785 angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who,
1786 if he had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the
1787 universe, means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.
1788 </p>
1789 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p12"></p>
1790 <p id="FP_Q56_A2-p13"></p>
1791 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
1792 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
1793 </div>
1794 <div id="FP_Q56_A3" class="div4">
1795 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
1796 <a href="summa.FP_Q57.html"></a>
1797 <h4 id="FP_Q56_A3-p0.1">Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles?</h4>
1798 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p1"></p>
1799 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p2">
1800 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by
1801 His incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards he adds that, "since He is above all substances,
1802 He is remote from all knowledge."
1803 </p>
1804 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p3">
1805 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it
1806 appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.
1807 </p>
1808 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p4">
1809 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
1810 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q56_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." From this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge
1811 of God; the one, whereby He is seen in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the other whereby
1812 He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already shown (
1813 <a id="FP_Q56_A3-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his
1814 natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God
1815 from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers.
1816 </p>
1817 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p5">
1818 <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet men can know God through their natural principles; according to
1819 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q56_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv"> Rom. 1:19</a>: "what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more so can the angels.
1820 </p>
1821 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p6">
1822 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing
1823 is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have
1824 said that an angel knows himself---secondly, by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is
1825 seen by the eye from its image being in the eye---thirdly, when the image of the object
1826 known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold
1827 a man in a mirror.
1828 </p>
1829 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p7"> To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as
1830 this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above (
1831 <a id="FP_Q56_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures,
1832 according to
1833 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q56_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20</a>: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the
1834 things that are made." Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to his natural
1835 principles the angel knows God, stands midway between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen
1836 through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence,
1837 the angel knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold God's essence; because no created likeness
1838 is
1839 sufficient to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind; because the angelic
1840 nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Divine image.
1841 </p>
1842 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p8">
1843 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not known by any
1844 created intellect.
1845 </p>
1846 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p9">
1847 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can
1848 he see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at
1849 all: because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above the
1850 knowledge which an angel has of Him.
1851 </p>
1852 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p10">
1853 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more to
1854 one of them, as was said above.
1855 </p>
1856 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p11"></p>
1857 <p id="FP_Q56_A3-p12"></p>
1858 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
1859 <a href="summa.FP_Q57.html"></a>
1860 </div>
1861 <a href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
1862 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
1863 </div>
1864 <div id="FP_Q57" class="div3">
1865 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
1866 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
1867 <h3 id="FP_Q57-p0.1">OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
1868 <p id="FP_Q57-p1"></p>
1869 <p id="FP_Q57-p2"> We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:</p>
1870 <p id="FP_Q57-p3"> (1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?</p>
1871 <p id="FP_Q57-p4"> (2) Whether they know single things?</p>
1872 <p id="FP_Q57-p5"> (3) Whether they know the future?</p>
1873 <p id="FP_Q57-p6"> (4) Whether they know secret thoughts?</p>
1874 <p id="FP_Q57-p7"> (5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?</p>
1875 <div id="FP_Q57_A1" class="div4">
1876 <a href="summa.FP_Q57.html"></a>
1877 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
1878 <h4 id="FP_Q57_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels know material things?</h4>
1879 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p1"></p>
1880 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p2">
1881 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands
1882 it. But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know
1883 material things.
1884 </p>
1885 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p3">
1886 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On
1887
1888 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor
1889 into the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images
1890 of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in
1891 themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels
1892 cannot know material things.
1893 </p>
1894 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p4">
1895 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which
1896 does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.
1897 </p>
1898 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p5">
1899 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior
1900 to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the mind of an angel.
1901 </p>
1902 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p6">
1903 <b>I answer that,</b> The established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained
1904 deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain
1905 degree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially
1906 in respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among
1907 other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the
1908 Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply
1909 and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God.
1910 </p>
1911 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p7"> Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual
1912 beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch
1913 as they are in the angels by their intelligible species.
1914 </p>
1915 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p8">
1916 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in
1917 his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard
1918 to that intellect.
1919 </p>
1920 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p9">
1921 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination;
1922 for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima
1923 iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense
1924 regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material
1925 things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their
1926 real natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual
1927 vision.
1928 </p>
1929 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p10">
1930 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would require to make them
1931 actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves;
1932 he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him; just
1933 as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by
1934 abstraction.
1935 </p>
1936 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p11"></p>
1937 <p id="FP_Q57_A1-p12"></p>
1938 <a href="summa.FP_Q57.html"></a>
1939 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
1940 </div>
1941 <div id="FP_Q57_A2" class="div4">
1942 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
1943 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
1944 <h4 id="FP_Q57_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel knows singulars?</h4>
1945 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p1"></p>
1946 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p2">
1947 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object
1948 singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power,
1949 as is evident from what was said above (
1950 <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q54_A5.html">Q[54], A[5]</a>). Consequently they do not know singulars.
1951 </p>
1952 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p3">
1953 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any
1954 assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; because, as was observed above
1955 (
1956 <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], A[2]</a>), an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.
1957 </p>
1958 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p4">
1959 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species;
1960 because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal
1961 is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are not known in the universal except
1962 potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars.
1963 </p>
1964 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p5">
1965 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to
1966 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.11" target="asv"> Ps. 90:11</a>: "He hath given His angels charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars.
1967 </p>
1968 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p6">
1969 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith, which
1970 asserts that these lower things are administered by angels, according to
1971 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv"> Heb. 1:14</a>: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what
1972 is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is against the text of
1973 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.5" target="asv"> Eccles.
1974 5:5
1975 </a>: "Say not before the angel: There is no providence." Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, according
1976 to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and
1977 will.
1978 </p>
1979 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p7"> Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all
1980 particular effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements
1981 of the heavens. This opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in its universal
1982 causes, is not to know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from
1983 computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know
1984 it as taking place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here
1985 and now existing.
1986 </p>
1987 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p8"> Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending
1988 universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both
1989 by his one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power
1990 united and far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than
1991 the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other
1992 things which no outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in other
1993 cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any
1994 one of his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle
1995 pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph.
1996 text. 15).
1997 </p>
1998 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p9"> The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from God in order
1999 that they may subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind. Now
2000 it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but likewise all that goes
2001 to make up their principles of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to
2002 both its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was
2003 shown above (
2004 <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not
2005 only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the angels
2006 know things, not only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their
2007 individual conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence.
2008 </p>
2009 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p10">
2010 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction
2011 from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the
2012 nature of the angels, as was said above (
2013 <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>, A[3] ad 1), and consequently there is no comparison.
2014 </p>
2015 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p11">
2016 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement
2017 in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way
2018 there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause
2019 whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the
2020 angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but
2021 also as to their matter.
2022 </p>
2023 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p12">
2024 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as
2025 to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the same species, has been already stated above (
2026 <a id="FP_Q57_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
2027 </p>
2028 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p13"></p>
2029 <p id="FP_Q57_A2-p14"></p>
2030 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
2031 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
2032 </div>
2033 <div id="FP_Q57_A3" class="div4">
2034 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
2035 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A4.html"></a>
2036 <h4 id="FP_Q57_A3-p0.1">Whether angels know the future?</h4>
2037 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p1"></p>
2038 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p2">
2039 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future
2040 events. Therefore much more do the angels.
2041 </p>
2042 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p3">
2043 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said
2044 in De Causis, "an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is, aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future
2045 are not different, but he knows each indifferently.
2046 </p>
2047 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p4">
2048 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel does not understand by species derived from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species
2049 refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past, present,
2050 and future.
2051 </p>
2052 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p5">
2053 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which
2054 are distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time.
2055 </p>
2056 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p6">
2057 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive
2058 sign of the Divinity, according to
2059 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.41.23" target="asv"> Is. 41:23</a>: "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore the angels do not know future
2060 events.
2061 </p>
2062 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p7">
2063 <b>I answer that,</b> The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily
2064 from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their
2065 causes in the majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus the doctor knows beforehand the health
2066 of the patient. This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the
2067 more than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who
2068 penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the future issue thereof. But events
2069 which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance events.
2070 </p>
2071 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p8"> In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely
2072 to know those events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance events; for God sees
2073 all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And therefore God's one glance
2074 is cast over all things which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are
2075 in themselves, as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge (
2076 <a id="FP_Q57_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>). But the mind of an angel, and every created intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the future as it is in itself
2077 cannot be known by any created intellect.
2078 </p>
2079 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p9">
2080 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Men cannot know future things except in their causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way,
2081 but much more distinctly.
2082 </p>
2083 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p10">
2084 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the angel's intellect is above that time according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a time
2085 in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves
2086 the spiritual creature according to time." And thus, since there is succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that
2087 happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind.
2088 </p>
2089 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p11">
2090 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past,
2091 and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same relations
2092 to the species. Present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so
2093 they can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature
2094 whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they cannot be known by those species.
2095 </p>
2096 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p12">
2097 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Things distant according to place are already existing in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel;
2098 whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently there is no comparison.
2099 </p>
2100 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p13"></p>
2101 <p id="FP_Q57_A3-p14"></p>
2102 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
2103 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A4.html"></a>
2104 </div>
2105 <div id="FP_Q57_A4" class="div4">
2106 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
2107 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A5.html"></a>
2108 <h4 id="FP_Q57_A4-p0.1">Whether angels know secret thoughts?</h4>
2109 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p1"></p>
2110 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p2">
2111 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining
2112 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.28.17" target="asv"> Job 28:17</a>: "Gold or crystal cannot equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, "one shall be as
2113 evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same time be penetrated."
2114 But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is stated (
2115 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat.
2116 22:30
2117 </a>). Therefore an angel can see what is in another's conscience.
2118 </p>
2119 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p3">
2120 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its
2121 shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently,
2122 when one angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the thoughts of both.
2123 </p>
2124 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p4">
2125 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than do the images in our imagination; because the former are
2126 actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an
2127 angel as corporeal things are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can
2128 know the thoughts of the intellect.
2129 </p>
2130 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p5">
2131 <b>On the contrary,</b> What is proper to God does not belong to the angels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according to
2132
2133 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.9" target="asv">Jer. 17:9</a>: "The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart." Therefore
2134 angels do not know the secrets of hearts.
2135 </p>
2136 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p6">
2137 <b>I answer that,</b> A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also
2138 by man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered
2139 not merely by outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse.
2140 Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those
2141 occult bodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons "sometimes with the greatest faculty learn
2142 man's dispositions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by
2143 certain signs in the body"; although (Retract. ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done."
2144 </p>
2145 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p7"> In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone
2146 can know the thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational creature is subject to
2147 God only, and He alone can work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be developed later (
2148 <a id="FP_Q57_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html">Q[63], A[1]</a>;
2149 <a id="FP_Q57_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html">Q[105], A[5]</a>). Consequently all that is in the will, and all
2150 things that depend only on the will, are known to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone
2151 actually to consider anything; because a man who has a habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will.
2152 Hence the Apostle says (
2153 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>): "For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?"
2154 </p>
2155 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p8">
2156 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness
2157 of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not
2158 exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body
2159 will show forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of
2160 glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another.
2161 </p>
2162 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p9">
2163 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although one angel sees the intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of
2164 these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes
2165 use of them by actual consideration.
2166 </p>
2167 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p10">
2168 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause.
2169 Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite
2170 or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through
2171 following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens
2172 in brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension
2173 of man in so far as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason,
2174 as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through
2175 man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject
2176 to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses of them.
2177 </p>
2178 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p11"></p>
2179 <p id="FP_Q57_A4-p12"></p>
2180 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
2181 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A5.html"></a>
2182 </div>
2183 <div id="FP_Q57_A5" class="div4">
2184 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A4.html"></a>
2185 <a href="summa.FP_Q58.html"></a>
2186 <h4 id="FP_Q57_A5-p0.1">Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?</h4>
2187 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p1"></p>
2188 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p2">
2189 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries.
2190 But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through
2191 the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places." And the Apostle says (
2192 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.16" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:16</a>): "That great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels*." [*Vulg.:
2193 'Great is the mystery of godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.
2194 </p>
2195 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p3">
2196 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which
2197 is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.
2198 </p>
2199 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p4">
2200 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries
2201 of grace; for it is said (
2202 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.7" target="asv">Amos 3:7</a>): "For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Therefore angels know the mysteries
2203 of grace.
2204 </p>
2205 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p5">
2206 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated
2207 (Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the
2208 knowledge of His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is evident in
2209 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.1" target="asv">Is. 63:1</a>, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice."
2210 Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace.
2211 </p>
2212 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p6">
2213 <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by
2214 his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend
2215 upon the pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such
2216 angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons
2217 in this fashion (
2218 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>): "No one knoweth the things of a man [*Vulg.: 'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ?'], but the spirit of a
2219 man that is in him." So, "the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God."
2220 </p>
2221 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p7"> There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things
2222 in the Word. By such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do they all know them equally; but just
2223 as God wills them to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says (
2224 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>): "But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly,
2225 learn
2226 more and deeper mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them.
2227 Some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as befits
2228 their ministrations.
2229 </p>
2230 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p8">
2231 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to
2232 all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all
2233 their duties are ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall
2234 receive the inheritance of salvation (
2235 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>)"; and this is
2236 brought by the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the
2237 very beginning.
2238 </p>
2239 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p9"> We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were
2240 instructed on all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as appears from the passage
2241 of Dionysius already quoted.
2242 </p>
2243 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p10">
2244 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to
2245 know everything hidden in it.
2246 </p>
2247 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p11">
2248 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And
2249 although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still
2250 the apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we read (
2251 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.4" target="asv">Eph. 3:4,5</a>): "As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which
2252 in other generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." Among the prophets also,
2253 the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to
2254 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q57_A5-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.100" target="asv">Ps. 118:100</a>: "I have had understanding above ancients," and Gregory says: "The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on"
2255 (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).
2256 </p>
2257 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p12"></p>
2258 <p id="FP_Q57_A5-p13"></p>
2259 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A4.html"></a>
2260 <a href="summa.FP_Q58.html"></a>
2261 </div>
2262 <a href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
2263 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
2264 </div>
2265 <div id="FP_Q58" class="div3">
2266 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A5.html"></a>
2267 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
2268 <h3 id="FP_Q58-p0.1">OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
2269 <p id="FP_Q58-p1"></p>
2270 <p id="FP_Q58-p2"> After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of
2271 inquiry:
2272 </p>
2273 <p id="FP_Q58-p3"> (1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act?</p>
2274 <p id="FP_Q58-p4"> (2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?</p>
2275 <p id="FP_Q58-p5"> (3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive?</p>
2276 <p id="FP_Q58-p6"> (4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?</p>
2277 <p id="FP_Q58-p7"> (5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect?</p>
2278 <p id="FP_Q58-p8"> (6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?</p>
2279 <p id="FP_Q58-p9"> (7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they differ?</p>
2280 <div id="FP_Q58_A1" class="div4">
2281 <a href="summa.FP_Q58.html"></a>
2282 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
2283 <h4 id="FP_Q58_A1-p0.1">Whether the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in act?</h4>
2284 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p1"></p>
2285 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p2">
2286 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what
2287 is in potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels' minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
2288 iv). Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.
2289 </p>
2290 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p3">
2291 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality
2292 thereto. But it is said (
2293 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>): "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.
2294 </p>
2295 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p4">
2296 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that "an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance." But
2297 the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes understands potentially.
2298 </p>
2299 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p5">
2300 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout
2301 contemplation." Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not
2302 in potentiality.
2303 </p>
2304 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p6">
2305 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, "as
2306 before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit
2307 of knowledge, but does not actually consider." In the first way an angel's intellect is never in potentiality with regard
2308 to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the
2309 heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects,
2310 the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard
2311 to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the heavenly
2312 bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun.
2313 </p>
2314 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p7"> In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is
2315 not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of
2316 the things he beholds in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always actually beholding the Word,
2317 and the things he sees in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not
2318 consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).
2319 </p>
2320 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p8">
2321 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the
2322 act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as
2323 stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.
2324 </p>
2325 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p9">
2326 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire
2327 the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have
2328 to perform.
2329 </p>
2330 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p10">
2331 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the angel's substance there is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so in
2332 potentiality as to be without act.
2333 </p>
2334 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p11"></p>
2335 <p id="FP_Q58_A1-p12"></p>
2336 <a href="summa.FP_Q58.html"></a>
2337 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
2338 </div>
2339 <div id="FP_Q58_A2" class="div4">
2340 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
2341 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
2342 <h4 id="FP_Q58_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?</h4>
2343 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p1"></p>
2344 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p2">
2345 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that
2346 "it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one."
2347 </p>
2348 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p3">
2349 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by
2350 shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various
2351 intelligible things.
2352 </p>
2353 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p4">
2354 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be
2355 understood altogether.
2356 </p>
2357 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p5">
2358 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time
2359 all things that it wills."
2360 </p>
2361 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p6">
2362 <b>I answer that,</b> As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens
2363 that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered
2364 severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once.
2365 In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped
2366 both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is
2367 stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming
2368 parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From
2369 this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are
2370 comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according
2371 as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible
2372 object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as
2373 different intelligible objects.
2374 </p>
2375 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p7"> Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all things under one intelligible
2376 species, which is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all things at once: just as in heaven
2377 "our thoughts will not be fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all our knowledge at
2378 the same time by one glance," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels
2379 know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species; but not such
2380 as are under various species.
2381 </p>
2382 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p8">
2383 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand many things as one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing.
2384 </p>
2385 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p9">
2386 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many intelligible
2387 objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies.
2388 </p>
2389 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p10"> To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.</p>
2390 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p11"></p>
2391 <p id="FP_Q58_A2-p12"></p>
2392 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
2393 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
2394 </div>
2395 <div id="FP_Q58_A3" class="div4">
2396 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
2397 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
2398 <h4 id="FP_Q58_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel's knowledge is discursive?</h4>
2399 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p1"></p>
2400 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p2">
2401 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing
2402 being known through another. But the angels know one thing through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore
2403 the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method.
2404 </p>
2405 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p3">
2406 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do. But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects;
2407 all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with
2408 greater reason do this.
2409 </p>
2410 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p4">
2411 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that "demons learn more things by experience." But experimental knowledge is discursive:
2412 for, "one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from many experiences," as Aristotle observes (Poster.
2413 ii; Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.
2414 </p>
2415 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p5">
2416 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led
2417 to something particular from something common."
2418 </p>
2419 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p6">
2420 <b>I answer that,</b> As has often been stated
2421 <a id="FP_Q58_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
2422 <a id="FP_Q58_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>), the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius
2423 calls them "heavenly minds"
2424 <a id="FP_Q58_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
2425 <a id="FP_Q58_A3-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>). Now, the difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by chance
2426 and movement:
2427 while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the
2428 human, intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation;
2429 that is to say, as they advance from one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known principle they were
2430 straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is
2431 the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that
2432 can be known in them.
2433 </p>
2434 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p7"> Therefore they are called "intellectual beings": because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the
2435 mind are said to be understood [intelligi]; hence "intellect" is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls
2436 which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called "rational"; and this comes of the feebleness of their
2437 intellectual light. For if they possessed the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first
2438 aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.
2439 </p>
2440 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p8">
2441 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all movement is from something before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge
2442 comes about according as from something previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which
2443 was previously unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and its image
2444 are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in
2445 this way the angels know things in the Word.
2446 </p>
2447 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p9">
2448 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet
2449 they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.
2450 </p>
2451 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p10">
2452 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are
2453 present, yet without any discursion withal.
2454 </p>
2455 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p11"></p>
2456 <p id="FP_Q58_A3-p12"></p>
2457 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
2458 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
2459 </div>
2460 <div id="FP_Q58_A4" class="div4">
2461 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
2462 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
2463 <h4 id="FP_Q58_A4-p0.1">Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?</h4>
2464 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p1"></p>
2465 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p2">
2466 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels understand by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood,
2467 there is composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there is a multitude of things understood in the
2468 angelic mind; because angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at one time. Therefore there is composition
2469 and division in the angel's mind.
2470 </p>
2471 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p3">
2472 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions
2473 is that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is
2474 evident from what was said
2475 <a id="FP_Q58_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and
2476 dividing.
2477 </p>
2478 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p4">
2479 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which
2480 are signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore
2481 it seems that the angel understands by composing and dividing.
2482 </p>
2483 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p5">
2484 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine
2485 concepts." But a simple intelligence is without composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without composition
2486 or division.
2487 </p>
2488 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p6">
2489 <b>I answer that,</b> As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing,
2490 the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle,
2491 it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the
2492 subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or
2493 removed from, the subject, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus
2494 it is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely,
2495 that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in
2496 it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said
2497 <a id="FP_Q58_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">(A[3])</a>.
2498 Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (Div.
2499 Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.
2500 </p>
2501 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p7"> Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms:
2502 for he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable immovably, and material things immaterially.
2503 </p>
2504 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p8">
2505 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every multitude of things understood causes composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of them is
2506 attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever
2507 can be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that
2508 we can learn by composing and dividing.
2509 </p>
2510 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p9">
2511 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The various natures of things differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way
2512 in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation
2513 is known, the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also.
2514 </p>
2515 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p10">
2516 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet
2517 not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply the nature of a thing.
2518 </p>
2519 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p11"></p>
2520 <p id="FP_Q58_A4-p12"></p>
2521 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
2522 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
2523 </div>
2524 <div id="FP_Q58_A5" class="div4">
2525 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
2526 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html"></a>
2527 <h4 id="FP_Q58_A5-p0.1">Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel?</h4>
2528 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p1"></p>
2529 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p2">
2530 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius
2531 says (Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect
2532 of the angels.
2533 </p>
2534 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p3">
2535 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in
2536 the angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.
2537 </p>
2538 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p4">
2539 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in
2540 its intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be error in the
2541 minds of the angels.
2542 </p>
2543 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p5">
2544 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that "the intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83, qu.
2545 32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence" Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood
2546 in the angel's knowledge.
2547 </p>
2548 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p6">
2549 <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of this question depends partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said
2550 <a id="FP_Q58_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html">(A[4])</a> that an angel understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the intellect is always
2551 true as regards what a thing is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 26. But
2552 by accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by
2553 some kind of composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or when the parts
2554 of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature, "a four-footed flying beast,"
2555 for there is no such animal. And this comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements,
2556 one of which is as matter to the other. But there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is stated in
2557 Metaph. ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known
2558 precisely as they exist.
2559 </p>
2560 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p7"> So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally;
2561 but very differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing
2562 process, as when, by division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such is not the method of the angels;
2563 but through the (knowledge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding
2564 it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging
2565 to such thing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing
2566 to their upright will, from their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form no judgments as to the nature
2567 of the qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the
2568 minds of
2569 demons are utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the natural
2570 conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with regard
2571 to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man, they may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding
2572 Christ, they may judge Him not to be God.
2573 </p>
2574 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p8"> From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes
2575 of their not being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as regards things knowable, not naturally
2576 but supernaturally. It is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing is, is always true, save accidentally,
2577 according as it is, in an undue manner, referred to some composition or division.
2578 </p>
2579 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p9"></p>
2580 <p id="FP_Q58_A5-p10"></p>
2581 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
2582 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html"></a>
2583 </div>
2584 <div id="FP_Q58_A6" class="div4">
2585 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
2586 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A7.html"></a>
2587 <h4 id="FP_Q58_A6-p0.1">Whether there is a "morning" and an "evening" knowledge in the angels?</h4>
2588 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p1"></p>
2589 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p2">
2590 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an
2591 admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore
2592 the angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge.
2593 </p>
2594 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p3">
2595 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes; while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently,
2596 if there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday
2597 and a night knowledge.
2598 </p>
2599 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p4">
2600 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference of the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima
2601 iii, text. 38), "The sciences are divided just as things are." But there is a threefold existence of things: to wit, in the
2602 Word; in their own natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning
2603 and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in
2604 the Word, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge, on account of the existence
2605 of things in the angelic mind.
2606 </p>
2607 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p5">
2608 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,31; De Civ. Dei xii, 7,20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening knowledge.
2609 </p>
2610 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p6">
2611 <b>I answer that,</b> The expression "morning" and "evening" knowledge was devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all
2612 things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day,
2613 namely, the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the ordinary day, morning is the beginning,
2614 and evening the close of day, so, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is
2615 called morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their knowledge of the very being of the
2616 thing created, as it stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the being of things flows from the Word,
2617 as from a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in themselves.
2618 </p>
2619 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p7">
2620 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as compared
2621 to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent
2622 us from calling something light in comparison with one thing, and darkness with respect to another. In the same way the life
2623 of the faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked,
2624 according to
2625 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.8" target="asv"> Eph. 5:8</a>: "You were heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord": yet this very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to
2626 the life of glory, is termed darkness, according to
2627 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:19</a>: "You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place." So the
2628 angel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark
2629 in
2630 comparison with the vision of the Word.
2631 </p>
2632 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p8">
2633 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness,
2634 that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn
2635 to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things.
2636 Consequently after "evening" there is no night, but "morning"; so that
2637 morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the angels refer to God's praise
2638 their knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day, as the middle between the two extremes.
2639 Or else the noon can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither beginning nor end.
2640 </p>
2641 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p9">
2642 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under
2643 evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own nature.
2644 </p>
2645 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p10"></p>
2646 <p id="FP_Q58_A6-p11"></p>
2647 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
2648 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A7.html"></a>
2649 </div>
2650 <div id="FP_Q58_A7" class="div4">
2651 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html"></a>
2652 <a href="summa.FP_Q59.html"></a>
2653 <h4 id="FP_Q58_A7-p0.1">Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one?</h4>
2654 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p1"></p>
2655 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p2">
2656 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge are one. For it is said (
2657 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.5" target="asv">Gn. 1:5</a>): "There was evening and morning, one day." But by the expression "day" the knowledge of the angels is to be understood,
2658 as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.
2659 </p>
2660 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p3">
2661 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their
2662 morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in God, according to
2663 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv"> Mat. 18:10.</a> Therefore, if the evening knowledge were different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge.
2664 </p>
2665 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p4">
2666 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
2667 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q58_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>): "When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But, if the evening knowledge be different
2668 from the morning, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together
2669 with the morning knowledge.
2670 </p>
2671 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p5">
2672 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): "There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God, and
2673 as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the evening."
2674 </p>
2675 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p6">
2676 <b>I answer that,</b> As was observed
2677 <a id="FP_Q58_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This cannot be understood as if they
2678 drew their knowledge from the proper nature of things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the form of a principle; because,
2679 as has been already stated (
2680 <a id="FP_Q58_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>), the angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that when we say "in their
2681 proper nature" we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say, that the
2682 evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things have in their own nature.
2683 </p>
2684 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p7"> Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas, or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For
2685 by beholding the Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but the being as possessed by the
2686 things themselves; as God by contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own nature. It, therefore, it
2687 be called evening knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have
2688 in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, and only differ as to
2689 the things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have
2690 in their own natures, then the morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns
2691 one as inferior to the other.
2692 </p>
2693 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p8">
2694 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day's
2695 unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing
2696 it.
2697 </p>
2698 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p9">
2699 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There can be two operations of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when
2700 the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles
2701 and conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24),
2702 the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence
2703 there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels.
2704 </p>
2705 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p10">
2706 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that are not
2707 seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of
2708 the morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is
2709 there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is more
2710 perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion.
2711 In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.
2712 </p>
2713 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p11"></p>
2714 <p id="FP_Q58_A7-p12"></p>
2715 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html"></a>
2716 <a href="summa.FP_Q59.html"></a>
2717 </div>
2718 <a href="summa.FP_Q57_A5.html"></a>
2719 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
2720 </div>
2721 <div id="FP_Q59" class="div3">
2722 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A7.html"></a>
2723 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
2724 <h3 id="FP_Q59-p0.1">THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
2725 <p id="FP_Q59-p1"></p>
2726 <p id="FP_Q59-p2"> In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will
2727 itself; secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
2728 </p>
2729 <p id="FP_Q59-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in the angels?</p>
2730 <p id="FP_Q59-p4"> (2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?</p>
2731 <p id="FP_Q59-p5"> (3) Is there free-will in the angels?</p>
2732 <p id="FP_Q59-p6"> (4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?</p>
2733 <div id="FP_Q59_A1" class="div4">
2734 <a href="summa.FP_Q59.html"></a>
2735 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
2736 <h4 id="FP_Q59_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in the angels?</h4>
2737 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p1"></p>
2738 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p2">
2739 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in
2740 the reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels,
2741 but something higher than the will.
2742 </p>
2743 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p3">
2744 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite
2745 argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection
2746 in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them.
2747 </p>
2748 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p4">
2749 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible
2750 object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.
2751 </p>
2752 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p5">
2753 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding,
2754 and will. But God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of
2755 knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.
2756 </p>
2757 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p6">
2758 <b>I answer that,</b> We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow
2759 from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined
2760 to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is
2761 called "a natural appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some
2762 knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which
2763 knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other
2764 things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs
2765 to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by
2766 another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things
2767 which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly,
2768 since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.
2769 </p>
2770 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p7">
2771 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according
2772 to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore
2773 there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency
2774 towards particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason
2775 differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of
2776 discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it,
2777 namely, the universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of
2778 intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will.
2779 </p>
2780 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p8">
2781 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the name of the appetitive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches
2782 out not to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the
2783 foot [laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from
2784 anger [ira]; though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as
2785 hope, daring, and the rest.
2786 </p>
2787 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p9">
2788 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there
2789 is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent,
2790 as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.
2791 </p>
2792 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p10"></p>
2793 <p id="FP_Q59_A1-p11"></p>
2794 <a href="summa.FP_Q59.html"></a>
2795 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
2796 </div>
2797 <div id="FP_Q59_A2" class="div4">
2798 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
2799 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
2800 <h4 id="FP_Q59_A2-p0.1">Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect?</h4>
2801 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p1"></p>
2802 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p2">
2803 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple
2804 than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more
2805 so is the angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect.
2806 Therefore the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an
2807 intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not
2808 differ from his nature or his intellect.
2809 </p>
2810 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p3">
2811 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ,
2812 not really but only logically [*Cf.
2813 <a id="FP_Q59_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html">Q[16], A[4]</a>]. Therefore will and intellect are not really different.
2814 </p>
2815 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p4">
2816 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives
2817 color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular; for the true is a particular
2818 good, to wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object
2819 is the true.
2820 </p>
2821 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p5">
2822 <b>On the contrary,</b> The will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both.
2823 Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect.
2824 </p>
2825 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p6">
2826 <b>I answer that,</b> In the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their
2827 nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends
2828 to anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from
2829 anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before
2830 possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic
2831 comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination
2832 to make something like itself comes from the active qualities.
2833 </p>
2834 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p7"> Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good
2835 is contained within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing beyond Himself except on account
2836 of His goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created
2837 thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its
2838 essence.
2839 </p>
2840 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p8"> In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in
2841 so far as the object known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it, according
2842 as what, in its essence, is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is
2843 beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to
2844 one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently
2845 intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God, for He has within Himself
2846 universal being, and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
2847 </p>
2848 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p9">
2849 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by something
2850 additional, as has been said.
2851 </p>
2852 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p10">
2853 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction,
2854 which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true
2855 suffices for the difference of intellect from will.
2856 </p>
2857 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p11">
2858 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the good and the true are really convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something
2859 true; while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient
2860 for diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
2861 </p>
2862 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p12"></p>
2863 <p id="FP_Q59_A2-p13"></p>
2864 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
2865 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
2866 </div>
2867 <div id="FP_Q59_A3" class="div4">
2868 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
2869 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
2870 <h4 id="FP_Q59_A3-p0.1">Whether there is free-will in the angels?</h4>
2871 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p1"></p>
2872 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p2">
2873 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice
2874 with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as
2875 stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness
2876 of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.
2877 </p>
2878 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p3">
2879 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such
2880 indifference; because, as was observed already (
2881 <a id="FP_Q59_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A5.html">Q[58], A[5]</a>), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of
2882 their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
2883 </p>
2884 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p4">
2885 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher
2886 angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there
2887 is no free-will in them.
2888 </p>
2889 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p5">
2890 <b>On the contrary,</b> Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men,
2891 with much more reason is it in the angels.
2892 </p>
2893 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p6">
2894 <b>I answer that,</b> Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as
2895 the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as
2896 irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself:
2897 such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an
2898 intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can
2899 judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest
2900 that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man.
2901 </p>
2902 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p7">
2903 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's
2904 in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice
2905 in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth.
2906 </p>
2907 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p8">
2908 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As was observed already
2909 <a id="FP_Q59_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to
2910 have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were
2911 not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection
2912 is directed to
2913 something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something
2914 which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to
2915 things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
2916 </p>
2917 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p9">
2918 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect.
2919 Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less
2920 degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or
2921 through the addition of some qualification.
2922 </p>
2923 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p10"></p>
2924 <p id="FP_Q59_A3-p11"></p>
2925 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
2926 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
2927 </div>
2928 <div id="FP_Q59_A4" class="div4">
2929 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
2930 <a href="summa.FP_Q60.html"></a>
2931 <h4 id="FP_Q59_A4-p0.1">Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?</h4>
2932 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p1"></p>
2933 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p2">
2934 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
2935 in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has
2936 not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.
2937 </p>
2938 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p3">
2939 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred
2940 Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
2941 appetite in the angels.
2942 </p>
2943 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p4">
2944 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance
2945 appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore
2946 there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
2947 </p>
2948 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p5">
2949 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does
2950 not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in the angels.
2951 </p>
2952 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p6">
2953 <b>I answer that,</b> The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The
2954 reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by
2955 the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea, there will be
2956 no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained
2957 under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers
2958 of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white,
2959 as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black.
2960 </p>
2961 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p7"> Now it is quite evident from what has been said
2962 <a id="FP_Q59_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
2963 <a id="FP_Q59_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness;
2964 nor can there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appetite is not divided according
2965 to the distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does not crave
2966 for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the
2967 angels only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided;
2968 and it is called the will.
2969 </p>
2970 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p8">
2971 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;---on account
2972 of the resemblance in the effect.
2973 </p>
2974 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p9">
2975 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act
2976 of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the
2977 will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions;
2978 as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix).
2979 </p>
2980 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p10">
2981 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appetite
2982 is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind.
2983 For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible
2984 appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of
2985 hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals
2986 with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and
2987 fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible
2988 part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no
2989 passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated
2990 of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed
2991 to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or
2992 concupiscible appetite.
2993 </p>
2994 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p11"></p>
2995 <p id="FP_Q59_A4-p12"></p>
2996 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
2997 <a href="summa.FP_Q60.html"></a>
2998 </div>
2999 <a href="summa.FP_Q58_A7.html"></a>
3000 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
3001 </div>
3002 <div id="FP_Q60" class="div3">
3003 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
3004 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
3005 <h3 id="FP_Q60-p0.1">OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
3006 <p id="FP_Q60-p1"></p>
3007 <p id="FP_Q60-p2"> The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive
3008 faculty comes of love.
3009 </p>
3010 <p id="FP_Q60-p3"> Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:</p>
3011 <p id="FP_Q60-p4"> (1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?</p>
3012 <p id="FP_Q60-p5"> (2) Whether there is in them love of choice?</p>
3013 <p id="FP_Q60-p6"> (3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice?</p>
3014 <p id="FP_Q60-p7"> (4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?</p>
3015 <p id="FP_Q60-p8"> (5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?</p>
3016 <div id="FP_Q60_A1" class="div4">
3017 <a href="summa.FP_Q60.html"></a>
3018 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
3019 <h4 id="FP_Q60_A1-p0.1">Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?</h4>
3020 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p1"></p>
3021 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p2">
3022 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual
3023 love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
3024 </p>
3025 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p3">
3026 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its
3027 own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess free-will, as was shown above (
3028 <a id="FP_Q60_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html">Q[59], A[3]</a>). Consequently there is no natural love in them.
3029 </p>
3030 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p4">
3031 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs
3032 to wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature.
3033 Therefore there is no natural love in the angels.
3034 </p>
3035 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p5">
3036 <b>On the contrary,</b> Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there
3037 is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love.
3038 </p>
3039 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p6">
3040 <b>I answer that,</b> We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always
3041 sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently
3042 whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature
3043 to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This
3044 inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual
3045 nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive
3046 appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since
3047 an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.
3048 </p>
3049 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p7">
3050 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature
3051 which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect.
3052 </p>
3053 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p8">
3054 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in
3055 no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being
3056 moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved
3057 to act that he does not act himself, because he has free-will.
3058 </p>
3059 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p9">
3060 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination
3061 implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author
3062 of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude
3063 perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind,
3064 and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.
3065 </p>
3066 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p10"></p>
3067 <p id="FP_Q60_A1-p11"></p>
3068 <a href="summa.FP_Q60.html"></a>
3069 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
3070 </div>
3071 <div id="FP_Q60_A2" class="div4">
3072 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
3073 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html"></a>
3074 <h4 id="FP_Q60_A2-p0.1">Whether there is love of choice in the angels?</h4>
3075 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p1"></p>
3076 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p2">
3077 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice
3078 follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which
3079 is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels.
3080 </p>
3081 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p3">
3082 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to
3083 acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards
3084 first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated
3085 <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
3086 <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Consequently, besides their infused love,
3087 there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them.
3088 </p>
3089 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p4">
3090 <b>On the contrary,</b> We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love
3091 of choice in them.
3092 </p>
3093 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p5">
3094 <b>I answer that,</b> There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice;
3095 because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything,
3096 what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.
3097 </p>
3098 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p6"> This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally;
3099 and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery,
3100 or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid
3101 down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally
3102 wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of
3103 the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes
3104 of this, which is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.
3105 </p>
3106 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p7"> There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated already (
3107 <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html">Q[59], A[2]</a>), the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection
3108 of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only
3109 a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The
3110 act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves,
3111 and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on
3112 account of something else. Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally
3113 as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of
3114 the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both
3115 natural love and love of choice.
3116 </p>
3117 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p8"> In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient
3118 principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on
3119 <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62.html">(Q[62])</a>.
3120 </p>
3121 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p9">
3122 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love
3123 is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (
3124 <a id="FP_Q60_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A3.html">Q[59], A[3]</a>, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. Consequently
3125 the conclusion does not follow.
3126 </p>
3127 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p10"> The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.</p>
3128 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p11"></p>
3129 <p id="FP_Q60_A2-p12"></p>
3130 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
3131 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html"></a>
3132 </div>
3133 <div id="FP_Q60_A3" class="div4">
3134 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
3135 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html"></a>
3136 <h4 id="FP_Q60_A3-p0.1">Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice?</h4>
3137 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p1"></p>
3138 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p2">
3139 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said
3140 <a id="FP_Q60_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard
3141 to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the
3142 same object.
3143 </p>
3144 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p3">
3145 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various
3146 things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
3147 </p>
3148 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p4">
3149 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot
3150 love himself with either natural or elective love.
3151 </p>
3152 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p5">
3153 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others comes of love for oneself."
3154 </p>
3155 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p6">
3156 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6,
3157 a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That
3158 is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as
3159 an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but
3160 that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name "concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship."
3161 </p>
3162 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p7"> Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as
3163 fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection. This is to love
3164 self. Hence angel and man naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self. On the
3165 other hand, each loves self with the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will
3166 benefit himself.
3167 </p>
3168 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p8">
3169 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective
3170 love, as was observed above.
3171 </p>
3172 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p9">
3173 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites
3174 one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and "binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things
3175 outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.
3176 </p>
3177 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p10">
3178 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As love is an action which remains within the agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not
3179 of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge
3180 is reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
3181 </p>
3182 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p11"></p>
3183 <p id="FP_Q60_A3-p12"></p>
3184 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
3185 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html"></a>
3186 </div>
3187 <div id="FP_Q60_A4" class="div4">
3188 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html"></a>
3189 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html"></a>
3190 <h4 id="FP_Q60_A4-p0.1">Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?</h4>
3191 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p1"></p>
3192 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p2">
3193 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But
3194 an angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows himself by his essence, while he knows another by his
3195 similitude, as was said above (
3196 <a id="FP_Q60_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A1.html">Q[56], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
3197 </p>
3198 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p3">
3199 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another
3200 comes of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but
3201 loves himself more.
3202 </p>
3203 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p4">
3204 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such
3205 love can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does
3206 not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
3207 </p>
3208 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p5">
3209 <b>On the contrary,</b> That seems to be a natural property which is found in all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its
3210 like," as is said,
3211 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q60_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19.</a> Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he loves himself.
3212 </p>
3213 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p6">
3214 <b>I answer that,</b> As was observed
3215 <a id="FP_Q60_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, both angel and man naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself: consequently every thing loves
3216 what is one with itself. So, if this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with
3217 it by non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love,
3218 while he loves a blood relation with natural
3219 affection, in so far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.
3220 </p>
3221 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p7"> Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with another, is the one according to nature. And so everything
3222 loves another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest
3223 even in things devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another thing, wherein consists
3224 this other thing's good; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne
3225 upwards.
3226 </p>
3227 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p8"> So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature.
3228 But so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from him in other respects, he does not
3229 love him with natural love.
3230 </p>
3231 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p9">
3232 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and
3233 thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the
3234 expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another
3235 as himself, because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the
3236 other's essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but
3237 he does not love another by the other's will.
3238 </p>
3239 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p10">
3240 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The expression "as" does not denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the angel
3241 naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what
3242 is one only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself, in this
3243 respect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in
3244 wishing well to him.
3245 </p>
3246 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p11">
3247 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills
3248 for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels,
3249 without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them.
3250 But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to
3251 righteousness and unrighteousness.
3252 </p>
3253 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p12"></p>
3254 <p id="FP_Q60_A4-p13"></p>
3255 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A3.html"></a>
3256 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html"></a>
3257 </div>
3258 <div id="FP_Q60_A5" class="div4">
3259 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html"></a>
3260 <a href="summa.FP_Q61.html"></a>
3261 <h4 id="FP_Q60_A5-p0.1">Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?</h4>
3262 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p1"></p>
3263 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p2">
3264 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated
3265 <a id="FP_Q60_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural
3266 love, the angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.
3267 </p>
3268 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p3">
3269 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so." But every one loves another with natural love for his
3270 own sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than self with natural
3271 love.
3272 </p>
3273 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p4">
3274 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But
3275 nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore
3276 the angel does not love God more than himself from natural love.
3277 </p>
3278 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p5">
3279 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it
3280 is poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore
3281 the angels do not love God more than themselves by natural love.
3282 </p>
3283 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p6">
3284 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man
3285 who sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of
3286 God has made the earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city." Therefore it is not
3287 natural to love God more than self.
3288 </p>
3289 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p7">
3290 <b>On the contrary,</b> All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept
3291 of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.
3292 </p>
3293 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p8">
3294 <b>I answer that,</b> There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence,
3295 through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship,
3296 in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while
3297 as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of
3298 the natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.
3299 </p>
3300 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p9"> The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider whither natural movement tends in the natural order
3301 of things; because the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in
3302 the will of an intellectual nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to another, is principally,
3303 and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural
3304 tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because "according as a thing is moved naturally, it
3305 has an inborn aptitude to be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that the part naturally exposes
3306 itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole
3307 body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the
3308 virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part
3309 of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him.
3310 </p>
3311 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p10"> Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because
3312 every creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angel and man alike
3313 love God before themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than God, it would follow
3314 that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
3315 </p>
3316 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p11">
3317 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the
3318 other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself
3319 than it is with the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally
3320 more loved than self; because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole
3321 more than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good. Now God is
3322 not only the good of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything in its own way naturally loves God
3323 more than itself.
3324 </p>
3325 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p12">
3326 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far" denotes
3327 an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature
3328 of love on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love God, except from this---that
3329 everything is dependent on that good which is God.
3330 </p>
3331 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p13">
3332 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
3333 everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but likewise its species. And much more has everything a
3334 natural inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
3335 </p>
3336 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p14">
3337 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love.
3338 So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
3339 </p>
3340 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p15">
3341 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's substance and universal goodness are one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement
3342 of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other things, and according as it is the universal good. And
3343 because He is naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence
3344 should not love Him. But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some
3345 particular effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless,
3346 so far as He is the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.
3347 </p>
3348 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p16"></p>
3349 <p id="FP_Q60_A5-p17"></p>
3350 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A4.html"></a>
3351 <a href="summa.FP_Q61.html"></a>
3352 </div>
3353 <a href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
3354 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
3355 </div>
3356 <div id="FP_Q61" class="div3">
3357 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html"></a>
3358 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
3359 <h3 id="FP_Q61-p0.1">OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
3360 <p id="FP_Q61-p1"></p>
3361 <p id="FP_Q61-p2"> After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation,
3362 or, speaking in a general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the first place we must see how they were
3363 brought into natural existence; secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly, how some of them became
3364 wicked.
3365 </p>
3366 <p id="FP_Q61-p3"> Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:</p>
3367 <p id="FP_Q61-p4"> (1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?</p>
3368 <p id="FP_Q61-p5"> (2) Whether he has existed from eternity?</p>
3369 <p id="FP_Q61-p6"> (3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?</p>
3370 <p id="FP_Q61-p7"> (4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?</p>
3371 <div id="FP_Q61_A1" class="div4">
3372 <a href="summa.FP_Q61.html"></a>
3373 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
3374 <h4 id="FP_Q61_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?</h4>
3375 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p1"></p>
3376 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p2">
3377 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels have no cause of their existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created
3378 by God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God.
3379 </p>
3380 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p3">
3381 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has
3382 being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity." But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above
3383 (
3384 <a id="FP_Q61_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], A[2]</a>). Therefore they have no cause of their being.
3385 </p>
3386 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p4">
3387 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the
3388 angels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels have no active cause.
3389 </p>
3390 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p5">
3391 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
3392 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.2" target="asv">Ps. 148:2</a>): "Praise ye Him, all His angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made."
3393 </p>
3394 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p6">
3395 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while
3396 in everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown above (
3397 <a id="FP_Q61_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). From this it is clear that God alone exists of His own essence: while all other things have their existence by participation.
3398 Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what exists essentially; as everything
3399 ignited is caused by fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
3400 </p>
3401 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p7">
3402 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things,
3403 but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light." And they were either passed over, or else designated by the names
3404 of corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature;
3405 and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal
3406 nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and from which Moses especially
3407 meant to safeguard them.
3408 </p>
3409 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p8">
3410 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal' cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as produces
3411 its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire
3412 substance.
3413 </p>
3414 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p9"> From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.</p>
3415 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p10"></p>
3416 <p id="FP_Q61_A1-p11"></p>
3417 <a href="summa.FP_Q61.html"></a>
3418 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
3419 </div>
3420 <div id="FP_Q61_A2" class="div4">
3421 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
3422 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
3423 <h4 id="FP_Q61_A2-p0.1">Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?</h4>
3424 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p1"></p>
3425 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p2">
3426 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel was produced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does
3427 not act through something besides His essence. But His being is eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
3428 </p>
3429 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p3">
3430 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything which exists at one period and not at another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is
3431 laid down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.
3432 </p>
3433 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p4">
3434 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But
3435 as truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible,
3436 but likewise eternal.
3437 </p>
3438 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p5">
3439 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
3440 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), in the person of begotten Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the
3441 beginning." But, as was shown above
3442 <a id="FP_Q61_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
3443 </p>
3444 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p6">
3445 <b>I answer that,</b> God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary
3446 must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not
3447 been.
3448 </p>
3449 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p7">
3450 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's being is His will. So the fact that God produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude that
3451 He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above (
3452 <a id="FP_Q61_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>;
3453 <a id="FP_Q61_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a> ), God's will does not act by necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He willed.
3454 </p>
3455 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p8">
3456 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel is above that time which is the measure of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
3457 corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence,
3458 and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21)
3459 that "God moves the spiritual creature according to time."
3460 </p>
3461 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p9">
3462 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth.
3463 But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it
3464 does not follow that the angels existed from eternity.
3465 </p>
3466 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p10"></p>
3467 <p id="FP_Q61_A2-p11"></p>
3468 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
3469 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
3470 </div>
3471 <div id="FP_Q61_A3" class="div4">
3472 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
3473 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A4.html"></a>
3474 <h4 id="FP_Q61_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?</h4>
3475 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p1"></p>
3476 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p2">
3477 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand
3478 years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels,
3479 Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God?" Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels
3480 were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all
3481 devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof."
3482 </p>
3483 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p3">
3484 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity;
3485 while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.
3486 </p>
3487 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p4">
3488 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal
3489 nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much
3490 more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.
3491 </p>
3492 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p5">
3493 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
3494 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Now, this would not be true if anything had been created previously. Consequently
3495 the angels were not created before corporeal nature.
3496 </p>
3497 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p6">
3498 <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the
3499 angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute
3500 a universe of themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe. This stands in evidence
3501 from the relationship of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures
3502 makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God,
3503 Whose "works are perfect," as it is said
3504 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>, should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous;
3505 especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no
3506 one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the case with
3507 the doctrine of Athanasius," as Jerome says.
3508 </p>
3509 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p7">
3510 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken
3511 place previously to that of the corporeal world.
3512 </p>
3513 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p8">
3514 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is not a part of, but far above, the whole universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe
3515 in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the comparison does not hold.
3516 </p>
3517 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p9">
3518 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation of
3519 the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does
3520 not involve creation of the universe.
3521 </p>
3522 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p10"> If the contrary view be held, then in the text of
3523 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning," must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In
3524 the beginning of time": but not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say "Before which there was
3525 nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures."
3526 </p>
3527 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p11"></p>
3528 <p id="FP_Q61_A3-p12"></p>
3529 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
3530 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A4.html"></a>
3531 </div>
3532 <div id="FP_Q61_A4" class="div4">
3533 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
3534 <a href="summa.FP_Q62.html"></a>
3535 <h4 id="FP_Q61_A4-p0.1">Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?</h4>
3536 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p1"></p>
3537 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p2">
3538 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a substance
3539 which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.
3540 Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.
3541 </p>
3542 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p3">
3543 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in
3544 the empyrean heaven.
3545 </p>
3546 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p4">
3547 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven,
3548 it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in
3549 the person of the sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (
3550 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.14.13" target="asv">Is. 14:13</a>).
3551 </p>
3552 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p5">
3553 <b>On the contrary,</b> Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the visible
3554 firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from
3555 its splendor; and which was filled with angels directly it was made."
3556 </p>
3557 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p6">
3558 <b>I answer that,</b> As was observed
3559 <a id="FP_Q61_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear
3560 some relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the angels
3561 to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven,
3562 or whatever else it be called. So
3563 Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of
3564 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q61_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.14" target="asv"> Dt. 10:14</a>: "Behold heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven."
3565 </p>
3566 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p7">
3567 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their
3568 being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in
3569 a corporeal place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that they are by their power in touch with
3570 bodies.
3571 </p>
3572 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p8">
3573 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity
3574 owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in
3575 the opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels,
3576 as having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created
3577 in the highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as having more restricted powers, were created among
3578 the inferior bodies.
3579 </p>
3580 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p9">
3581 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning angel
3582 wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as will appear later on (
3583 <a id="FP_Q61_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html">Q[63], A[3]</a>).
3584 </p>
3585 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p10"></p>
3586 <p id="FP_Q61_A4-p11"></p>
3587 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
3588 <a href="summa.FP_Q62.html"></a>
3589 </div>
3590 <a href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html"></a>
3591 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
3592 </div>
3593 <div id="FP_Q62" class="div3">
3594 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A4.html"></a>
3595 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
3596 <h3 id="FP_Q62-p0.1">OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE ARTICLES)</h3>
3597 <p id="FP_Q62-p1"></p>
3598 <p id="FP_Q62-p2"> In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the order of grace and of glory; under which heading there
3599 are nine points of inquiry:
3600 </p>
3601 <p id="FP_Q62-p3"> (1) Were the angels created in beatitude?</p>
3602 <p id="FP_Q62-p4"> (2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?</p>
3603 <p id="FP_Q62-p5"> (3) Were they created in grace?</p>
3604 <p id="FP_Q62-p6"> (4) Did they merit their beatitude?</p>
3605 <p id="FP_Q62-p7"> (5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?</p>
3606 <p id="FP_Q62-p8"> (6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural capacities?</p>
3607 <p id="FP_Q62-p9"> (7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?</p>
3608 <p id="FP_Q62-p10"> (8) Could they have sinned afterwards?</p>
3609 <p id="FP_Q62-p11"> (9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?</p>
3610 <div id="FP_Q62_A1" class="div4">
3611 <a href="summa.FP_Q62.html"></a>
3612 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
3613 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels were created in beatitude?</h4>
3614 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p1"></p>
3615 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p2">
3616 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude. For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue
3617 in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess the excellence they have." Therefore the angels
3618 were created in beatitude.
3619 </p>
3620 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p3">
3621 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation
3622 was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen.
3623 ad lit. i, 15). Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and incomplete. But its formation and perfection
3624 are derived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in
3625 beatitude.
3626 </p>
3627 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p4">
3628 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5), the things which we read of as being made in the works of the
3629 six days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation.
3630 But, according to his exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic knowledge, according to which they knew
3631 the Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew the
3632 Word, and things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude
3633 straightway from the very beginning of their creation.
3634 </p>
3635 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p5">
3636 <b>On the contrary,</b> To be established or confirmed in good is of the nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as soon as
3637 they were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.
3638 </p>
3639 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p6">
3640 <b>I answer that,</b> By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that
3641 it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection
3642 of rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure
3643 called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's ultimate
3644 happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and
3645 that is God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby "we shall see God
3646 as He is." This is beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above (
3647 <a id="FP_Q62_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>).
3648 </p>
3649 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p7"> So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural power,
3650 he was created already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action, as man does,
3651 but, as was observed above (
3652 <a id="FP_Q62_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], AA[3]</a> ,4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of
3653 their creation that ultimate beatitude which is
3654 beyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not
3655 to have it immediately from the beginning.
3656 </p>
3657 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p8">
3658 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.
3659 </p>
3660 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p9">
3661 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by
3662 its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v, 4,23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth
3663 did not take place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the
3664 earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the
3665 perfection of its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation.
3666 </p>
3667 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p10">
3668 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural
3669 knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby
3670 he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural
3671 knowledge, and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first
3672 knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only
3673 when the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge.
3674 </p>
3675 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p11"></p>
3676 <p id="FP_Q62_A1-p12"></p>
3677 <a href="summa.FP_Q62.html"></a>
3678 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
3679 </div>
3680 <div id="FP_Q62_A2" class="div4">
3681 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
3682 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
3683 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A2-p0.1">Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?</h4>
3684 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p1"></p>
3685 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p2">
3686 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can
3687 accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been
3688 said (
3689 <a id="FP_Q62_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html">Q[60], A[5]</a>). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.
3690 </p>
3691 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p3">
3692 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because
3693 there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God.
3694 </p>
3695 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p4">
3696 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace; hence it is said (
3697 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you." But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace:
3698 for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God.
3699 </p>
3700 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p5">
3701 <b>On the contrary,</b> It was by turning to God that the angel reached to beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it
3702 would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the
3703 Apostle (
3704 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>): "The grace of God is life everlasting."
3705 </p>
3706 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p6">
3707 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above (
3708 <a id="FP_Q62_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html">Q[60], A[2]</a>) the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is directed
3709 towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined
3710 towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural
3711 principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate fire; whereas to generate
3712 flesh is beyond the natural power of fire; consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally
3713 by the nutritive soul.
3714 </p>
3715 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p7"> Now it was shown above (
3716 <a id="FP_Q62_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], AA[4]</a>,5), when we were treating of God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the rational
3717 creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the movement
3718 of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the
3719 help of grace. Therefore it must be said that an
3720 angel could not of his own will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.
3721 </p>
3722 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p8">
3723 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God,
3724 so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.
3725 </p>
3726 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p9">
3727 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural
3728 capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be
3729 attained, then it is "impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power,
3730 not according to the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening
3731 hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered
3732 in itself, can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult
3733 for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man, both because it is beyond his nature,
3734 and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But it is difficult for an
3735 angel, only because it is supernatural.
3736 </p>
3737 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p10">
3738 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The
3739 first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion,
3740 consummate grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits beatitude; and for this there is required habitual
3741 grace, which is the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man
3742 disposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is required; but the operation of God, Who draws the
3743 soul towards Himself, according to
3744 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv"> Lam 5:21</a>: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity.
3745 </p>
3746 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p11"></p>
3747 <p id="FP_Q62_A2-p12"></p>
3748 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
3749 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
3750 </div>
3751 <div id="FP_Q62_A3" class="div4">
3752 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
3753 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
3754 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels were created in grace?</h4>
3755 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p1"></p>
3756 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p2">
3757 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels were not created in grace. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature
3758 was first made without form, and was called "heaven": but afterwards it received its form, and was then called "light." But
3759 such formation comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.
3760 </p>
3761 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p3">
3762 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would
3763 ever have turned away from God.
3764 </p>
3765 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p4">
3766 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems
3767 that they were not created in grace; but that they were first created in nature only, and then received grace, and that last
3768 of all they were beatified.
3769 </p>
3770 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p5">
3771 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), "Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will,
3772 that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on
3773 them?"
3774 </p>
3775 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p6">
3776 <b>I answer that,</b> Although there are conflicting opinions on this point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state,
3777 while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of
3778 holy men, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of time, being created
3779 by the work of Divine Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were created in
3780 the first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals,
3781 and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature
3782 does to the natural effect; hence (
3783 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>) grace is called the "seed" of God. As, then, in Augustine's opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural
3784 effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally
3785 created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in grace.
3786 </p>
3787 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p7">
3788 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the absence
3789 of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and
3790 so it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as Augustine holds with regard to the formation of
3791 corporeal things (Gen. ad lit. i, 15).
3792 </p>
3793 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p8">
3794 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be
3795 inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has
3796 grace can fail to make use of it, and can sin.
3797 </p>
3798 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p9">
3799 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in created
3800 nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace
3801 stands not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the principle of right operation. Therefore it was
3802 fitting for grace to be given straightway with nature.
3803 </p>
3804 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p10"></p>
3805 <p id="FP_Q62_A3-p11"></p>
3806 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
3807 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
3808 </div>
3809 <div id="FP_Q62_A4" class="div4">
3810 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
3811 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
3812 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A4-p0.1">Whether an angel merits his beatitude?</h4>
3813 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p1"></p>
3814 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p2">
3815 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But
3816 the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action was not meritorious for him.
3817 </p>
3818 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p3">
3819 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he
3820 did not thereby merit beatitude.
3821 </p>
3822 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p4">
3823 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not
3824 before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because
3825 thus he would be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to
3826 the rank of a higher, and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not
3827 admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.
3828 </p>
3829 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p5">
3830 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (
3831 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.17" target="asv">Apoc. 21:17</a>) that the "measure of the angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man." Therefore the same is the case with
3832 the angel.
3833 </p>
3834 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p6">
3835 <b>I answer that,</b> Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude, however,
3836 is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation
3837 leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end,
3838 as the healing art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when
3839 such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it; wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now
3840 it is evident from what has gone before (
3841 <a id="FP_Q62_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2;
3842 <a id="FP_Q62_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], AA[4]</a>,5), ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains, then, that both man and angel merited their
3843 beatitude.
3844 </p>
3845 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p7"> And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited
3846 beatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory.
3847 </p>
3848 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p8"> But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then have to be said that he had beatitude without merit,
3849 even as we have grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which conveys the notion of an end, and is
3850 the reward of virtue, as even the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as some others have maintained,
3851 that the angels merit beatitude by their present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite
3852 contrary, again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end; while what is already in its end
3853 cannot, properly speaking, be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he already enjoys. Or else it will
3854 have to be said that one and the same act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious; and so far as
3855 it attains the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even this view will not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient
3856 cause of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free-will, except in so far as it is informed
3857 by grace; but it cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect
3858 grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the
3859 same time to merit it.
3860 </p>
3861 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p9"> Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited
3862 beatitude.
3863 </p>
3864 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p10">
3865 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel's difficulty of working righteously does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but from
3866 the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.
3867 </p>
3868 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p11">
3869 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of grace.
3870 </p>
3871 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p12"> The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.</p>
3872 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p13"></p>
3873 <p id="FP_Q62_A4-p14"></p>
3874 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
3875 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
3876 </div>
3877 <div id="FP_Q62_A5" class="div4">
3878 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
3879 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
3880 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A5-p0.1">Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?</h4>
3881 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p1"></p>
3882 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p2">
3883 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man
3884 to do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.
3885 </p>
3886 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p3">
3887 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant, from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin
3888 to be moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of a body could be instantaneous, like operations of
3889 mind and will, it would have movement in the first instant of its generation. Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude
3890 by one act of his will, he merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their
3891 beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the first instant.
3892 </p>
3893 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p4">
3894 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there must be many intervals between things which are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far
3895 remote from their natural condition: while merit comes midway between. Therefore the angel would have to pass through many
3896 stages of merit in order to reach beatitude.
3897 </p>
3898 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p5">
3899 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints. Now
3900 the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some
3901 obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore,
3902 since there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by only one
3903 meritorious act.
3904 </p>
3905 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p6">
3906 <b>I answer that,</b> The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because
3907 grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection,
3908 according to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage
3909 to another; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above
3910
3911 <a id="FP_Q62_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
3912 <a id="FP_Q62_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], AA[3]</a>,4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly
3913 after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act; because
3914 man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one
3915 act of charity.
3916 </p>
3917 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p7">
3918 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to man than
3919 to the angel for securing beatitude.
3920 </p>
3921 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p8">
3922 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angel is above the time of corporeal things; hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except
3923 as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with
3924 the act of beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently,
3925 it remains for different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel
3926 merited beatitude, and in another was beatified.
3927 </p>
3928 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p9">
3929 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one meritorious
3930 act is required; which act can so far be called an interval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.
3931 </p>
3932 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p10"></p>
3933 <p id="FP_Q62_A5-p11"></p>
3934 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
3935 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
3936 </div>
3937 <div id="FP_Q62_A6" class="div4">
3938 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
3939 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html"></a>
3940 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A6-p0.1">Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts?</h4>
3941 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p1"></p>
3942 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p2">
3943 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is
3944 bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural
3945 gifts.
3946 </p>
3947 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p3">
3948 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace.
3949 But grace does not come "of works," as is said
3950 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.6" target="asv"> Rom. 11:6.</a> Therefore much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural gifts.
3951 </p>
3952 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p4">
3953 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree
3954 of his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.
3955 </p>
3956 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p5">
3957 <b>On the contrary,</b> Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent. ii, D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle natures
3958 and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with greater gifts of grace."
3959 </p>
3960 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p6">
3961 <b>I answer that,</b> It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the
3962 degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in
3963 the order of His wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the angelic nature was made by God for
3964 attaining grace and beatitude, so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be
3965 ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the builder chisels the stones for building
3966 a house, from the fact that he prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is clear that he is setting
3967 them apart for the more ornate part of the house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and
3968 fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.
3969 </p>
3970 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p7"> Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination
3971 of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in whom the movement of his intellective part
3972 is either retarded or thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is nothing to retard or thwart it,
3973 nature is moved with its whole energy. So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher
3974 nature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in men, since greater grace and glory are
3975 bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that the angels who had the greater
3976 natural powers, had the more grace and glory.
3977 </p>
3978 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p8">
3979 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise does the nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for grace,
3980 so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace.
3981 </p>
3982 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p9">
3983 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The acts of the rational creature are from the creature itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems
3984 rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than according to works.
3985 </p>
3986 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p10">
3987 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way
3988 in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on account of the end; while numerical difference is because
3989 of the matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or impede the movement of his intellective nature;
3990 but not in the angels. Consequently the argument is not the same for both.
3991 </p>
3992 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p11"></p>
3993 <p id="FP_Q62_A6-p12"></p>
3994 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
3995 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html"></a>
3996 </div>
3997 <div id="FP_Q62_A7" class="div4">
3998 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
3999 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A8.html"></a>
4000 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A7-p0.1">Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?</h4>
4001 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p1"></p>
4002 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p2">
4003 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (
4004 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>): "When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But natural love and knowledge are
4005 imperfect in comparison with beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural knowledge and love cease.
4006 </p>
4007 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p3">
4008 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels.
4009 Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love to remain.
4010 </p>
4011 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p4">
4012 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points.
4013 But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified knowledge and love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness
4014 consists not in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge and love in the angels.
4015 </p>
4016 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p5">
4017 <b>On the contrary,</b> So long as a nature endures, its operation remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection. Therefore
4018 it does not take away natural knowledge and love.
4019 </p>
4020 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p6">
4021 <b>I answer that,</b> Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations
4022 themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second; because beatitude is superadded to nature.
4023 But the first must ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved in beatitude: and in like manner
4024 the act of nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude.
4025 </p>
4026 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p7">
4027 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The advent of a perfection removes the opposite imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection
4028 of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not
4029 taken away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge
4030 is not opposed to the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing
4031 hinders us from knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the one time through a probable medium
4032 and through a demonstrative one. In like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains to his knowledge
4033 of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.
4034 </p>
4035 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p8">
4036 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural
4037 gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beatitude.
4038 </p>
4039 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p9">
4040 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural knowledge
4041 and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love
4042 from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
4043 </p>
4044 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p10"></p>
4045 <p id="FP_Q62_A7-p11"></p>
4046 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
4047 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A8.html"></a>
4048 </div>
4049 <div id="FP_Q62_A8" class="div4">
4050 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html"></a>
4051 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A9.html"></a>
4052 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A8-p0.1">Whether a beatified angel can sin?</h4>
4053 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p1"></p>
4054 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p2">
4055 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was said above
4056 <a id="FP_Q62_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html">(A[7])</a>, beatitude does not do away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified
4057 angel can sin.
4058 </p>
4059 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p3">
4060 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of
4061 the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil.
4062 </p>
4063 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p4">
4064 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not
4065 lessened in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.
4066 </p>
4067 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p5">
4068 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin." Therefore the holy angels
4069 cannot sin.
4070 </p>
4071 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p6">
4072 <b>I answer that,</b> The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence.
4073 Now, God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same
4074 way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to
4075 do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good
4076 precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills
4077 or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin.
4078 </p>
4079 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p7">
4080 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of
4081 beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already alleged.
4082 </p>
4083 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p8">
4084 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the things
4085 whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally
4086 known principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good; because the will is naturally
4087 ordained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is
4088 referred to opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites with regard to God
4089 Himself, Whom they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards God, which ever alternative
4090 they choose, that is not sinful.
4091 </p>
4092 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p9">
4093 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident that it
4094 belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, according to given principles; but for
4095 it to proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs
4096 to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between
4097 opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by
4098 turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot
4099 sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin.
4100 </p>
4101 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p10"></p>
4102 <p id="FP_Q62_A8-p11"></p>
4103 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A7.html"></a>
4104 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A9.html"></a>
4105 </div>
4106 <div id="FP_Q62_A9" class="div4">
4107 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A8.html"></a>
4108 <a href="summa.FP_Q63.html"></a>
4109 <h4 id="FP_Q62_A9-p0.1">Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?</h4>
4110 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p1"></p>
4111 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p2">
4112 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect
4113 charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases.
4114 Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude.
4115 </p>
4116 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p3">
4117 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "God makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same
4118 thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations"; since "they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . .
4119 . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (
4120 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It
4121 remains, then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beatitude.
4122 </p>
4123 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p4">
4124 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are
4125 not in the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and
4126 defect in them; which is not admissible.
4127 </p>
4128 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p5">
4129 <b>On the contrary,</b> Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they
4130 are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.
4131 </p>
4132 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p6">
4133 <b>I answer that,</b> In every movement the mover's intention is centered upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject;
4134 because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature
4135 cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before
4136 (
4137 <a id="FP_Q62_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>), that it needs to be moved by God towards its
4138 beatitude. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end.
4139 </p>
4140 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p7"> Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth
4141 is seen by all the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand
4142 by the intention of Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision
4143 of the Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which
4144 is comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from what was said above (
4145 <a id="FP_Q62_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">Q[12], A[7]</a>;
4146 <a id="FP_Q62_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html">Q[14], A[3]</a>). But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite;
4147 and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that the rational creature
4148 understands God more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beatitude
4149 consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.
4150 </p>
4151 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p8"> Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought
4152 even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.
4153 </p>
4154 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p9">
4155 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely
4156 passively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said
4157 to procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another,
4158 then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the
4159 ultimate term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of
4160 this life; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in acquired habits, the operation
4161 preceding the habit is productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In
4162 the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward.
4163 </p>
4164 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p10">
4165 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is useful.
4166 Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for
4167 the beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of
4168 the nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect.
4169 </p>
4170 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p11">
4171 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the highest
4172 degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation
4173 of such as are saved by their ministrations, according to
4174 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q62_A9-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.10" target="asv"> Lk. 15:10</a>: "There is [Vulg.'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance." Such joy belongs to their
4175 accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental
4176 reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor;
4177 like Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude, rather than merit it.
4178 </p>
4179 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p12"></p>
4180 <p id="FP_Q62_A9-p13"></p>
4181 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A8.html"></a>
4182 <a href="summa.FP_Q63.html"></a>
4183 </div>
4184 <a href="summa.FP_Q61_A4.html"></a>
4185 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
4186 </div>
4187 <div id="FP_Q63" class="div3">
4188 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A9.html"></a>
4189 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
4190 <h3 id="FP_Q63-p0.1">THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN (NINE ARTICLES)</h3>
4191 <p id="FP_Q63-p1"></p>
4192 <p id="FP_Q63-p2"> In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as
4193 to the evil of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration:
4194 </p>
4195 <p id="FP_Q63-p3"> (1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?</p>
4196 <p id="FP_Q63-p4"> (2) What kind of sins can be in them?</p>
4197 <p id="FP_Q63-p5"> (3) What did the angel seek in sinning?</p>
4198 <p id="FP_Q63-p6"> (4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are any of them naturally evil?</p>
4199 <p id="FP_Q63-p7"> (5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his
4200 own will?
4201 </p>
4202 <p id="FP_Q63-p8"> (6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his creation and fall?</p>
4203 <p id="FP_Q63-p9"> (7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the angels?</p>
4204 <p id="FP_Q63-p10"> (8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?</p>
4205 <p id="FP_Q63-p11"> (9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?</p>
4206 <div id="FP_Q63_A1" class="div4">
4207 <a href="summa.FP_Q63.html"></a>
4208 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
4209 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A1-p0.1">Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?</h4>
4210 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p1"></p>
4211 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p2">
4212 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality,
4213 as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the
4214 angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.
4215 </p>
4216 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p3">
4217 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.
4218 Therefore neither can there by in the angels.
4219 </p>
4220 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p4">
4221 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love
4222 towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels
4223 cannot sin.
4224 </p>
4225 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p5">
4226 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not
4227 a true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire
4228 only what it truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.
4229 </p>
4230 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p6">
4231 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
4232 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.18" target="asv">Job 4:18</a>): "In His angels He found wickedness."
4233 </p>
4234 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p7">
4235 <b>I answer that,</b> An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to
4236 sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning
4237 is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or
4238 morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall
4239 short of rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly;
4240 but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will
4241 is the sole rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so
4242 far only as it is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of a
4243 subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of
4244 his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature;
4245 considering the condition of its nature.
4246 </p>
4247 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p8">
4248 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as regards
4249 their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them.
4250 </p>
4251 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p9">
4252 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so
4253 neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natural action there is the action of free-will
4254 in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.
4255 </p>
4256 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p10">
4257 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being.
4258 But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away
4259 by sinning.
4260 </p>
4261 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p11">
4262 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery,
4263 which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good.
4264 The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from
4265 the inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his
4266 universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there
4267 are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above (
4268 <a id="FP_Q63_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html">Q[59], A[4]</a>); nor, again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin comes of free-will by choosing
4269 something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces sin
4270 is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were
4271 to pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence
4272 of consideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his
4273 own free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.
4274 </p>
4275 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p12"></p>
4276 <p id="FP_Q63_A1-p13"></p>
4277 <a href="summa.FP_Q63.html"></a>
4278 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
4279 </div>
4280 <div id="FP_Q63_A2" class="div4">
4281 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
4282 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html"></a>
4283 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A2-p0.1">Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?</h4>
4284 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p1"></p>
4285 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p2">
4286 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in
4287 any kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine
4288 says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.
4289 </p>
4290 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p3">
4291 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the
4292 spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise
4293 sloth and avarice.
4294 </p>
4295 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p4">
4296 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause
4297 is granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise
4298 be other vices in them.
4299 </p>
4300 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p5">
4301 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil "is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet
4302 he is proud and envious."
4303 </p>
4304 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p6">
4305 <b>I answer that,</b> Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are
4306 in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in
4307 the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain
4308 to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is
4309 affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is
4310 incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the
4311 sin of pride---not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none
4312 other than pride.
4313 </p>
4314 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p7"> Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something
4315 involves on its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another, inasmuch
4316 as he deems his neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good
4317 coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be
4318 singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning
4319 angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil's will God
4320 makes use of man for the Divine glory.
4321 </p>
4322 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p8">
4323 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures:
4324 it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.
4325 </p>
4326 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p9">
4327 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human
4328 life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal
4329 pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created
4330 good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which
4331 is in the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the
4332 demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which
4333 does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons;
4334 yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.
4335 </p>
4336 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p10">
4337 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them.
4338 </p>
4339 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p11"></p>
4340 <p id="FP_Q63_A2-p12"></p>
4341 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
4342 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html"></a>
4343 </div>
4344 <div id="FP_Q63_A3" class="div4">
4345 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
4346 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html"></a>
4347 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A3-p0.1">Whether the devil desired to be as God?</h4>
4348 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p1"></p>
4349 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p2">
4350 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under
4351 desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists
4352 only in such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction;
4353 for it the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an
4354 angel could not desire to be as God.
4355 </p>
4356 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p3">
4357 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature
4358 naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did
4359 not thereby sin.
4360 </p>
4361 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p4">
4362 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being
4363 the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes
4364 deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.
4365 </p>
4366 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p5">
4367 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, in the person of the devil (
4368 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.14.13" target="asv">Is. 14:13,14</a>), "I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High." And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being
4369 "inflated with pride, he wished to be called God."
4370 </p>
4371 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p6">
4372 <b>I answer that,</b> Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly,
4373 by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible:
4374 and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what
4375 was impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And
4376 even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural desire
4377 of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature
4378 of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to
4379 be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that,
4380 because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject,
4381 he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident
4382 that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently
4383 it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God.
4384 </p>
4385 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p7"> To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is
4386 made to be likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he desires
4387 such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like
4388 unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like
4389 unto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper
4390 to God; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to
4391 resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since no creature
4392 can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect---by desiring, as
4393 his
4394 last end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural
4395 beatitude, which is attained by God's grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace,
4396 he sought to have it by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering. This harmonizes
4397 with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli, iv.] that "he sought that to which he would have come had
4398 he stood fast." These two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his
4399 own power, whereas this is proper to God alone.
4400 </p>
4401 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p8"> Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought
4402 to have dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God.
4403 </p>
4404 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p9"> From this we have the answer to all the objections.</p>
4405 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p10"></p>
4406 <p id="FP_Q63_A3-p11"></p>
4407 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
4408 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html"></a>
4409 </div>
4410 <div id="FP_Q63_A4" class="div4">
4411 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html"></a>
4412 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html"></a>
4413 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A4-p0.1">Whether any demons are naturally wicked?</h4>
4414 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p1"></p>
4415 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p2">
4416 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There
4417 is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to
4418 be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked.
4419 </p>
4420 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p3">
4421 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (
4422 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.12.10" target="asv">Wis. 12:10</a>): "Their malice is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.
4423 </p>
4424 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p4">
4425 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally
4426 rapacious; yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.
4427 </p>
4428 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p5">
4429 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons are not naturally wicked."
4430 </p>
4431 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p6">
4432 <b>I answer that,</b> Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes
4433 from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil
4434 connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but with the universal good no
4435 evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some
4436 particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything
4437 of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that
4438 every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will.
4439 Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil
4440 whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.
4441 </p>
4442 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p7">
4443 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally
4444 so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons
4445 are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may
4446 be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil;
4447 yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.
4448 </p>
4449 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p8">
4450 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural
4451 proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful
4452 or lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.
4453 </p>
4454 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p9">
4455 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils
4456 are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit.
4457 Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius
4458 observes (De Div. Nom. iv).
4459 </p>
4460 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p10"></p>
4461 <p id="FP_Q63_A4-p11"></p>
4462 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A3.html"></a>
4463 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html"></a>
4464 </div>
4465 <div id="FP_Q63_A5" class="div4">
4466 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html"></a>
4467 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A6.html"></a>
4468 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A5-p0.1">Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation?</h4>
4469 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p1"></p>
4470 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p2">
4471 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said
4472 of the devil (
4473 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>): "He was a murderer from the beginning."
4474 </p>
4475 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p3">
4476 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order
4477 of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8), the "heaven," which is said to have been
4478 created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said that God said: "Be
4479 light made: and light was made," we are to understand the full formation of the angel by
4480 turning to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant. But at the
4481 same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from "darkness," whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore
4482 in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned.
4483 </p>
4484 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p4">
4485 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul
4486 of Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation.
4487 </p>
4488 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p5">
4489 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation
4490 in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel
4491 could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate.
4492 It ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the
4493 reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above (
4494 <a id="FP_Q63_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html">Q[62], A[5]</a>). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then,
4495 that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant.
4496 </p>
4497 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p6">
4498 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4499 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>): "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also the demons. Therefore the
4500 demons were at some time good.
4501 </p>
4502 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p7">
4503 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature,
4504 but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine
4505 says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's
4506 nature is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the
4507 authority of Scripture---for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon (
4508 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.14.12" target="asv">Is. 14:12</a>): "How art thou fallen . . . O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning!" and it is said to the devil in the person of the
4509 King of Tyre (
4510 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.13" target="asv">Ezech. 28:13</a>): "Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God," ---consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters
4511 as erroneous.
4512 </p>
4513 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p8"> Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this
4514 view also is repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation
4515 to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to his creation. But the term
4516 of the creative act is the angel's very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems,
4517 then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence.
4518 </p>
4519 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p9"> This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time, and take place
4520 successively; thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the
4521 same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first
4522 and the second change; thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit
4523 up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels; for,
4524 as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning (
4525 <a id="FP_Q63_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a> ). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant.
4526 </p>
4527 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p10"> We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate
4528 act of free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that operation
4529 which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward movement in fire comes of
4530 its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause, which can
4531 be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg,
4532 which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which
4533 brought the angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently it cannot be said that the devil
4534 was wicked in the first instant of his creation.
4535 </p>
4536 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p11">
4537 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is stated that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be thought
4538 of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning of sin": that is to say, because he never
4539 went back from his sin.
4540 </p>
4541 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p12">
4542 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken
4543 as according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness,
4544 Who also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall."
4545 </p>
4546 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p13">
4547 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason
4548 does not hold good of sin; as has been said.
4549 </p>
4550 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p14">
4551 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself,
4552 as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some
4553 of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were
4554 deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.
4555 </p>
4556 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p15"></p>
4557 <p id="FP_Q63_A5-p16"></p>
4558 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html"></a>
4559 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A6.html"></a>
4560 </div>
4561 <div id="FP_Q63_A6" class="div4">
4562 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html"></a>
4563 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A7.html"></a>
4564 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A6-p0.1">Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel? </h4>
4565 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p1"></p>
4566 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p2">
4567 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was some interval between the angel's creation and his fall. For, it is said (
4568 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.15" target="asv">Ezech. 28:15</a>): "Thou didst walk perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire; thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy
4569 ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is continuous movement, it requires
4570 an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the devil's creation and
4571 his fall.
4572 </p>
4573 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p3">
4574 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly";
4575 which refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation.
4576 </p>
4577 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p4">
4578 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his
4579 sin. Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation and his sin.
4580 </p>
4581 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p5">
4582 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle
4583 time between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall.
4584 </p>
4585 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p6">
4586 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of the devil (
4587 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>): "He stood not in the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must understand this in the sense, that he
4588 was in the truth, but did not remain in it."
4589 </p>
4590 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p7">
4591 <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of
4592 the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held
4593 that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace; as we have said
4594 (
4595 <a id="FP_Q63_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). For since the angels attain beatitude by one
4596 meritorious act, as was said above (
4597 <a id="FP_Q63_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A5.html">Q[62], A[5]</a>), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that first
4598 instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.
4599 </p>
4600 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p8"> If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in
4601 the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his creation and fall.
4602 </p>
4603 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p9">
4604 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured by
4605 time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the movement of free-will tending towards good.
4606 </p>
4607 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p10">
4608 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in
4609 which he was not wicked.
4610 </p>
4611 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p11">
4612 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a natural
4613 movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with
4614 man; and therefore the argument does not hold good.
4615 </p>
4616 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p12">
4617 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is true to say that there is a middle time between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved Phys.
4618 vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time,
4619 time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood
4620 to respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects
4621 itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in
4622 them all. From such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge while others,
4623 absorbed in themselves, became night, "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act
4624 was common to them all; but in their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the first instant;
4625 but in the second the good were set apart from the wicked.
4626 </p>
4627 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p13"></p>
4628 <p id="FP_Q63_A6-p14"></p>
4629 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html"></a>
4630 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A7.html"></a>
4631 </div>
4632 <div id="FP_Q63_A7" class="div4">
4633 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A6.html"></a>
4634 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html"></a>
4635 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A7-p0.1">Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?</h4>
4636 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p1"></p>
4637 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p2">
4638 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (
4639 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.14" target="asv">Ezech. 28:14</a>): "Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God." Now the order of the Cherubim
4640 is under the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore, the highest angel among those who
4641 sinned was not the highest of all.
4642 </p>
4643 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p3">
4644 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels
4645 sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature which is unfitting.
4646 </p>
4647 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p4">
4648 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel
4649 is, so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it
4650 seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.
4651 </p>
4652 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p5">
4653 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them
4654 in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them."
4655 </p>
4656 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p6">
4657 <b>I answer that,</b> Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels
4658 we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account
4659 Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems
4660 to agree with the view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x,
4661 9,10,11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods'
4662 the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons" the intellectual substances
4663 which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith;
4664 because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently
4665 there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies,
4666 the higher over the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii)
4667 that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.
4668 </p>
4669 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p7"> But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as
4670 has been said
4671 <a id="FP_Q63_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory
4672 says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view: because the angels' sin did
4673 not come of any proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that
4674 argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the
4675 other view; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.
4676 </p>
4677 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p8">
4678 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," while "Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire." Consequently
4679 Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity,
4680 which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.
4681 </p>
4682 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p9">
4683 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end
4684 of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual
4685 creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual
4686 creature was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its
4687 end.
4688 </p>
4689 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p10">
4690 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> However great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently
4691 it was in his power not to follow it.
4692 </p>
4693 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p11"></p>
4694 <p id="FP_Q63_A7-p12"></p>
4695 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A6.html"></a>
4696 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html"></a>
4697 </div>
4698 <div id="FP_Q63_A8" class="div4">
4699 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A7.html"></a>
4700 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A9.html"></a>
4701 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A8-p0.1">Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?</h4>
4702 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p1"></p>
4703 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p2">
4704 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect.
4705 But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of
4706 the others' sinning.
4707 </p>
4708 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p3">
4709 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown above
4710 <a id="FP_Q63_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior;
4711 and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin
4712 of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them to be his subjects.
4713 Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.
4714 </p>
4715 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p4">
4716 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against God, than to wish to be over another against God; because
4717 there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that
4718 he induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which
4719 is contrary to a gloss on
4720 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.26" target="asv"> Ps. 103:26</a>: "This dragon which Thou
4721 hast formed---He who was the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice." Therefore the sin of the
4722 highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning.
4723 </p>
4724 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p5">
4725 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
4726 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.12.4" target="asv">Apoc. 12:4</a>) that the dragon "drew" with him "the third part of the stars of heaven."
4727 </p>
4728 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p6">
4729 <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind
4730 of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that highest one; as is evident from
4731 our Lord's words: "Go [Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his
4732 angels" (
4733 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>). For the order of Divine justice exacts that whosoever
4734 consents to another's evil suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to (
4735 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:19</a>): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave."
4736 </p>
4737 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p7">
4738 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel
4739 needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent,
4740 and vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in
4741 the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech,
4742 another who catches his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, "which
4743 everyone accepts directly they are heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].
4744 </p>
4745 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p8"> Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us; in the same instant in which the highest
4746 angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto.
4747 </p>
4748 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p9">
4749 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be
4750 subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior.
4751 Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they
4752 wanted to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their
4753 ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in the order of nature they were even then subject to the
4754 highest angel.
4755 </p>
4756 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p10">
4757 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As was observed above (
4758 <a id="FP_Q63_A8-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html">Q[62], A[6]</a>), an angel has nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it
4759 good or bad. Consequently since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin with
4760 intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater in malice.
4761 </p>
4762 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p11"></p>
4763 <p id="FP_Q63_A8-p12"></p>
4764 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A7.html"></a>
4765 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A9.html"></a>
4766 </div>
4767 <div id="FP_Q63_A9" class="div4">
4768 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html"></a>
4769 <a href="summa.FP_Q64.html"></a>
4770 <h4 id="FP_Q63_A9-p0.1">Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?</h4>
4771 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p1"></p>
4772 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p2">
4773 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but
4774 good is in few."
4775 </p>
4776 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p3">
4777 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found
4778 than good; according to
4779 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.15" target="asv"> Eccles. 1:15</a>: "The number of fools is infinite." Therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels.
4780 </p>
4781 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p4">
4782 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would
4783 appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders.
4784 </p>
4785 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p5">
4786 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
4787 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q63_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:16</a>): "There are more with us than with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us to aid us, and the wicked
4788 spirits who are our foes.
4789 </p>
4790 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p6">
4791 <b>I answer that,</b> More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the natural
4792 order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its effects either always, or more often than not.
4793 </p>
4794 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p7">
4795 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are
4796 known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good is known to the few. In the angels there is
4797 only an intellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold.
4798 </p>
4799 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p8"> And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.</p>
4800 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p9">
4801 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to those who hold that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly affairs,
4802 it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but only those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that
4803 the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order; just as men are taken up into every
4804 order to supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is
4805 more established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of
4806 some orders, as of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are derived from the ardor of love and from
4807 God's indwelling, which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities are attributed
4808 to them; because these names are derived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both good and bad.
4809 </p>
4810 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p10"></p>
4811 <p id="FP_Q63_A9-p11"></p>
4812 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html"></a>
4813 <a href="summa.FP_Q64.html"></a>
4814 </div>
4815 <a href="summa.FP_Q62_A9.html"></a>
4816 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
4817 </div>
4818 <div id="FP_Q64" class="div3">
4819 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A9.html"></a>
4820 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
4821 <h3 id="FP_Q64-p0.1">THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
4822 <p id="FP_Q64-p1"></p>
4823 <p id="FP_Q64-p2"> It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons; under which heading there are four points of inquiry:</p>
4824 <p id="FP_Q64-p3"> (1) Of their darkness of intellect;</p>
4825 <p id="FP_Q64-p4"> (2) Of their obstinacy of will;</p>
4826 <p id="FP_Q64-p5"> (3) Of their grief;</p>
4827 <p id="FP_Q64-p6"> (4) Of their place of punishment.</p>
4828 <div id="FP_Q64_A1" class="div4">
4829 <a href="summa.FP_Q64.html"></a>
4830 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
4831 <h4 id="FP_Q64_A1-p0.1">Whether the demons' intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth?</h4>
4832 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p1"></p>
4833 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p2">
4834 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For it they knew any
4835 truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to know separated substances. But this is not in keeping with
4836 their unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as that some writers have assigned as man's last
4837 happiness the knowledge of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all
4838 knowledge of truth.
4839 </p>
4840 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p3">
4841 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the
4842 same is not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms;
4843 as it comes from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the sun. But the demons cannot know God,
4844 Who is most manifest of Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because
4845 they are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know other things.
4846 </p>
4847 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p4">
4848 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and
4849 evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge,
4850 because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the Creator's praise (hence, after "evening" comes "morning" [
4851 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>]). Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things.
4852 </p>
4853 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p5">
4854 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ.
4855 Dei xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord
4856 of glory," as is said
4857 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:8</a>. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of all other knowledge of truth.
4858 </p>
4859 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p6">
4860 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from someone
4861 else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the things we learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the
4862 truth by their own nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33), the good angels are separated from them as light
4863 is from darkness; and every manifestation is made through light, as is said
4864 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv"> Eph.
4865 5:13.
4866 </a> In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from the good angels: because "there is no fellowship of
4867 light with darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath . . . ?']" (
4868 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Nor can they learn by long experience: because experience comes of the senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth
4869 in them.
4870 </p>
4871 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p7">
4872 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at
4873 all, but remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the knowledge of truth stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there
4874 is some knowledge of truth in them.
4875 </p>
4876 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p8">
4877 <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of
4878 grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other
4879 is effective, and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the gift of wisdom.
4880 </p>
4881 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p9"> Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very
4882 nature of the angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on account of the simplicity of his substance,
4883 nothing can be withdrawn from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural powers, as a man is punished
4884 by being deprived of a hand or a foot or of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
4885 the natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge,
4886 however, which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been utterly taken away from them, but lessened; because,
4887 of these Divine secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is done either by means of the angels,
4888 or "through some temporal workings of Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in the same degree as
4889 to the holy angels, to whom many more things are revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third knowledge,
4890 as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.
4891 </p>
4892 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p10">
4893 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness consists in self-application to something higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature;
4894 hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing
4895 the first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one separate substance to know another; as it is natural for
4896 us to know sensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in knowing
4897 sensible natures; so neither does the angel's happiness consist in knowing separated substances.
4898 </p>
4899 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p11">
4900 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because
4901 our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect,
4902 but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the
4903 perfection of his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God
4904 than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although they do not possess the purity which comes with
4905 grace, nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the knowledge of God which belongs to them from their
4906 nature.
4907 </p>
4908 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p12">
4909 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is darkness in comparison with the excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's knowledge in
4910 its own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the
4911 light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of
4912 the Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine light, and can
4913 be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but
4914 "nocturnal" knowledge. Accordingly we read in
4915 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.5" target="asv">Gn. 1:5</a> that the darkness, which God separated from the light, "He called night."
4916 </p>
4917 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p13">
4918 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its completion
4919 in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never
4920 had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence the demons much less fully understood the mystery of
4921 the Incarnation, when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De
4922 Civ. Dei ix, 21), "It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels, who enjoy a participated eternity of the Word;
4923 but it was made known by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them." For had they fully and certainly known
4924 that He was the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory.
4925 </p>
4926 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p14">
4927 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by privation
4928 of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the
4929 holy angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will, they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual
4930 nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by
4931 others: thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it from the senses; but when the similitude of their innate
4932 intelligible species is completed in individual things, they know some things as present, which they previously did not know
4933 would come to pass, as we said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels (
4934 <a id="FP_Q64_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html">Q[57], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
4935 </p>
4936 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p15"></p>
4937 <p id="FP_Q64_A1-p16"></p>
4938 <a href="summa.FP_Q64.html"></a>
4939 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
4940 </div>
4941 <div id="FP_Q64_A2" class="div4">
4942 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
4943 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
4944 <h4 id="FP_Q64_A2-p0.1">Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?</h4>
4945 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p1"></p>
4946 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p2">
4947 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual
4948 being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above
4949 <a id="FP_Q64_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so obstinate
4950 in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.
4951 </p>
4952 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p3">
4953 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the
4954 malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy. Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state
4955 of malice to the state of justice.
4956 </p>
4957 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p4">
4958 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they
4959 fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence.
4960 Therefore the demon is not obstinate in malice.
4961 </p>
4962 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p5">
4963 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed
4964 already (
4965 <a id="FP_Q64_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A8.html">Q[63], A[8]</a>), the lower demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not
4966 obstinate in malice.
4967 </p>
4968 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p6">
4969 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses
4970 the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God" (
4971 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.1.24" target="asv">Mk. 1:24</a>). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" (
4972 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv">Jam. 2:19</a>). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand."
4973 Therefore they are not obstinate in
4974 malice.
4975 </p>
4976 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p7">
4977 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
4978 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.73.23" target="asv">Ps. 73:23</a>): "The pride of them that hate Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the demons. Therefore they remain
4979 ever obstinate in their malice.
4980 </p>
4981 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p8">
4982 <b>I answer that,</b> It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good
4983 and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and
4984 saints of true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude; hence it is termed "life
4985 everlasting." It is also contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that
4986 demons and wicked men shall be sent "into everlasting punishment," and the good brought "into everlasting life." Consequently
4987 such an opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will
4988 of the good angels is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.
4989 </p>
4990 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p9"> We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state.
4991 For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is to the angels." Now it is clear that all the
4992 mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they are without remission and endure
4993 for ever.
4994 </p>
4995 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p10"> To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned
4996 to the apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good;
4997 while the will seeks the universal good, as was said above (
4998 <a id="FP_Q64_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html">Q[59], A[1]</a>); as also the sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers universals. Now the angel's apprehension
4999 differs from
5000 man's in this respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which
5001 are the object of the habit of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration
5002 to another; and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's will adheres to
5003 a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly
5004 and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite
5005 (namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary
5006 to say that man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible
5007 either opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed
5008 therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who are damned
5009 (SP,
5010 <a id="FP_Q64_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q98_A1.html">Q[98], AA[1]</a>, 2).
5011 </p>
5012 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p11">
5013 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good and wicked angels have free-will, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.
5014 </p>
5015 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p12">
5016 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and are
5017 not delivered by the Divine mercy.
5018 </p>
5019 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p13">
5020 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil's first sin still remains in him according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what
5021 he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power
5022 is taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would he had done it, or still would do
5023 it if he could.
5024 </p>
5025 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p14">
5026 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the
5027 argument does not hold good.
5028 </p>
5029 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p15">
5030 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's
5031 part is always wicked; because, although at times he does something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the
5032 truth in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things.
5033 Another kind of act is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to
5034 the goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
5035 </p>
5036 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p16"></p>
5037 <p id="FP_Q64_A2-p17"></p>
5038 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
5039 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
5040 </div>
5041 <div id="FP_Q64_A3" class="div4">
5042 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
5043 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
5044 <h4 id="FP_Q64_A3-p0.1">Whether there is sorrow in the demons?</h4>
5045 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p1"></p>
5046 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p2">
5047 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the
5048 same subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says:
5049 "The devil has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this sinister power." Therefore there
5050 is no sorrow in the demons.
5051 </p>
5052 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p3">
5053 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are
5054 present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to
5055 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv"> Job 41:24, </a> "Who was made to fear no one." Therefore there is no grief in the demons.
5056 </p>
5057 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p4">
5058 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at
5059 least for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.
5060 </p>
5061 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p5">
5062 <b>On the contrary,</b> The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according
5063 to
5064 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.18.7" target="asv"> Apoc. 18:7, </a> "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." Consequently
5065 much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he especially glorified himself.
5066 </p>
5067 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p6">
5068 <b>I answer that,</b> Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
5069 sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they
5070 can be in the demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will,
5071 is nothing else than the resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is
5072 evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they
5073 would wish others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in them: and especially because
5074 it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of happiness, which
5075 they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed in many respects.
5076 </p>
5077 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p7">
5078 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man
5079 from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will;
5080 because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be something that we will, and something
5081 that we will not.
5082 </p>
5083 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p8">
5084 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He was made
5085 to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God which restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the
5086 devils believe and tremble" (
5087 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv">James 2:19</a>).
5088 </p>
5089 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p9">
5090 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
5091 is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, for the evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to
5092 the goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow
5093 for good lost by punishment, is the witness to a good nature." Consequently, since
5094 the demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.
5095 </p>
5096 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p10"></p>
5097 <p id="FP_Q64_A3-p11"></p>
5098 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
5099 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
5100 </div>
5101 <div id="FP_Q64_A4" class="div4">
5102 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
5103 <a href="summa.FP.viii.html"></a>
5104 <h4 id="FP_Q64_A4-p0.1">Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment?</h4>
5105 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p1"></p>
5106 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p2">
5107 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons' place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual
5108 nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of punishment for demons.
5109 </p>
5110 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p3">
5111 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
5112 demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome atmosphere.
5113 </p>
5114 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p4">
5115 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire. But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome
5116 atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.
5117 </p>
5118 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p5">
5119 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day."
5120 </p>
5121 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p6">
5122 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels in their own nature stand midway between God and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
5123 procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two
5124 ways: first of all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil; and this is fittingly done through the
5125 good angels. In another way, indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting
5126 against opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be brought about through the wicked spirits, lest
5127 they should cease to be of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of punishment is due to the demons:
5128 one, by reason of their sin, and this is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the darksome atmosphere
5129 is their due place of punishment.
5130 </p>
5131 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p7"> Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and
5132 wrestling with demons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here; and the demons are in this
5133 dark atmosphere for our trial: although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they have led astray; just
5134 as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men
5135 and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.
5136 </p>
5137 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p8">
5138 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it:
5139 because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will.
5140 </p>
5141 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p9">
5142 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One soul is not set over another in the order of nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently
5143 there is no parallel.
5144 </p>
5145 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p10">
5146 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude
5147 of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle
5148 (
5149 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:1</a>): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have a house in heaven." Others, again, while not admitting the
5150 same of souls, admit it as to demons. But it
5151 is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good souls and good angels.
5152 </p>
5153 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p11"> Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not
5154 lessened by their coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same way as we say that the bishop's
5155 honor is not lessened while he is not actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, that although the demons
5156 are not actually bound within the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their
5157 punishment is none the less; because they know that such confinement is their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon
5158 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.6" target="asv"> James 3:6</a>: "They carry fire of hell with them wherever they go." Nor is this contrary to what is said (
5159 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.8.31" target="asv">Lk. 8:31</a>), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss"; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them
5160 to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, "They [Vulg. 'He'] besought
5161 Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. 'him'] out of the country" (
5162 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q64_A4-p11.3" href="./asv.html#Mark.5.10" target="asv">Mk. 5:10</a>).
5163 </p>
5164 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p12"></p>
5165 <p id="FP_Q64_A4-p13"></p>
5166 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
5167 <a href="summa.FP.viii.html"></a>
5168 </div>
5169 <a href="summa.FP_Q63_A9.html"></a>
5170 <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
5171 </div>
5172 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
5173 <a href="summa.FP_Q50.html"></a>
5174 `
5175 </div>