Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_iv.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,1267 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.iv" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-49)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q44" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q44-p0.1">THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q44-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44-p2"> After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration + will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and + government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode + of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q44-p4"> (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?</p> + <p id="FP_Q44-p5"> (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?</p> + <p id="FP_Q44-p6"> (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?</p> + <p id="FP_Q44-p7"> (4) Whether He is the final cause of things?</p> + <div id="FP_Q44_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being + without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing + caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they + can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by + God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient + cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are + many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by + the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from + their efficient cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.36" target="asv">Rom. 11:36</a>): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must + be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown ( + <a id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], AA[3]</a>,4) that subsisting being must be + one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all + beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which + are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who + possesses being most perfectly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p7"> Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever + is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest + in heat is the cause of all heat. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on + what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused. + Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since + to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible + for us to find a being uncaused. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false + in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle + says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an + efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but + because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and + consequent be possible or impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract + in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although + the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under + the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that + object from its efficient cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q44_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Whether primary matter is created by God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else + (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive + principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from + the other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that + everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore + it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh + unto nothing"---viz. primary matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser + mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did + not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and + separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, + they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of + that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, + which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential + forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according + to + Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its + form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to + a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some + particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others + there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as + "such," but as "beings." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p7"> Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are + "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs + to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause + of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental + or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from + which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first + active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle + says (Metaph. xii, text 40). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything + created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if + all that belongs to its being is created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q44_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures + are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated + above + <a id="FP_Q44_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in + all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles + of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit + self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. + Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because + there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing + in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting + life, and before self-subsisting wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are + contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an + exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate + form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily + conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive + determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom + devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine + wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind ( + <a id="FP_Q44_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html">Q[15], A[1]</a>). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not + apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this + manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar + of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like + to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material + house is like to the house in the architect's mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man + is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior + species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the + same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active + intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars + in order to be their exemplars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes + the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q44_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q44_A4-p0.1">Whether God is the final cause of all things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God + needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70), + because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore + He is not the final cause of all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not + the end of all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows + that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord has made all things for Himself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless + it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. + For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some + things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect + agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the + First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which + is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection + and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong + to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for + His own goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, + which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, + since the end is more noble than the means to the end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or + natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness + to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows + that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things + in Him, some of which come into our mind before others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q45" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q45-p0.1">THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q45-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p2"> The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and + includes eight points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p3"> (1) What is creation?</p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p4"> (2) Whether God can create anything?</p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p5"> (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p6"> (4) To what things it belongs to be created?</p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p7"> (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p8"> (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?</p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p9"> (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q45-p10"> (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?</p> + <div id="FP_Q45_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Whether to create is to make something from nothing?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To + make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, + and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among + all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say + that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create + is not to make something from nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As said above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being + from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular + emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," + and white from "not-white." + Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being + should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is + from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is + "nothing." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when + we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more + perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding + to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because + the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the + privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which + is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because + the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only + order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition + "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first + sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and + its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It + is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does + not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the + first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the + material + cause, which is denied. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q45_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Whether God can create anything?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers + considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the + contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation + and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from + nothing, or create. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore + creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the + act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same + time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already + is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming + precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which + the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not + happen that something is made from nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Not only is it impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created + by God, as appears from what has been said ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is + not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action + of art, + but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If + therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. + Now it has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that + God brings things into being from nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ancient philosophers, as is said above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their + action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation + from the universal principle of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different + now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in + motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial + change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole + substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, + so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide + as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that + when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of + signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. + And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" + and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the + term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is + not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being + made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was + not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is + plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q45_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Whether creation is anything in the creature?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the + creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in + the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively + is not anything in the creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: + since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for + the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the + creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident + is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and + also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while + the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action + and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental + form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental + form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole + substance, something in the thing created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, + or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in + the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all + beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when + movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the + creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, + is implied a relation to the principle of motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God + relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God + is a real relation, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html">Q[13], A[7]</a>) in treating of the divine names. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover + and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive + creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, + or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other + relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html">Q[42], A[1]</a>, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and + is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the + part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the + creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature + to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q45_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) + it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly + speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own + component parts. Therefore composite things are not created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the + natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore + matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation + belongs to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever + being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate + substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has + being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they + themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. + Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being." + Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they + ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but + to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because + it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible + thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite" + is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation + is the production of the whole being, and not only matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q45_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), + what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless + can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance + like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it + has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. + But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which + nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we + proved above when treating of the infinity of God ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary + to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other + creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes + <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and + prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first + and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither + intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely, + not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p7"> It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, + inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that + although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, + can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after + itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. + And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that + the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p8"> But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, + except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore + it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain + instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its + own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating + is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally + to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. + So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that + is, ministerially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p9"> And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it + requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying + it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause + of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate + matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man + participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own + being, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it + is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in + an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything + whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore + an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards + some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). + In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.15" target="asv">Eph. 3:15</a>): "From whom all + paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless + something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. + And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, + as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, + whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act; + and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a + much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of + much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made; + for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite + power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater + power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the + potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is + infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural + agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any + more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), it follows that no creature can + create. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q45_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q45_A6-p0.1">Whether to create is proper to any person?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect + is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and + is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds + in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of + the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever + difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons. + But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed + that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by + Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation + of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, + this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power, + goodness and wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought + not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished + in creating according to relations and processions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle + of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create + belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not + proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of + things. For as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman + is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the + love of + his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through + His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch + as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son + receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common + to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from + both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not + receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through" + usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, + is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for + this particular + appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html">Q[39], A[8]</a>, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to + be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through + Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which + belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior + movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally + connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" + poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q45_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q45_A7-p0.1">Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through + its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some + of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity + in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to + the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of + the Trinity but of the unity of essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause, + but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has + passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents + fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the + representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was + said above + <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27.html">(Q[27])</a>. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational + creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there + is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p7"> But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are + necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, + whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents + the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle + from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is + from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He + is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De + Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according + "as it + is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three, + "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing + limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the + other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, + qu. + 18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct + by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge + of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said ( + <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor + is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being + is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above + <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q45_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q45_A8-p0.1">Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is + produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and + thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which + is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it + must be produced by creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident + in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason + applies to other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow + that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but + previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from + not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they + asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or + caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this + opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, + but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, + as shown above + <a id="FP_Q45_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be + "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p8"> Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.</p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its + like according to quality, but according to species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which + they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are + created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper + agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are + called creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q46" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q46-p0.1">OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q46-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q46-p2"> Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment:</p> + <p id="FP_Q46-p3"> (1) Whether creatures always existed?</p> + <p id="FP_Q46-p4"> (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?</p> + <p id="FP_Q46-p5"> (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?</p> + <div id="FP_Q46_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Whether the universe of creatures always existed?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything + which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore + the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality + to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from + privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist + without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist: + which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing + extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate + time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time + is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there + are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did + not begin to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and + also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body + where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world + there was a vacuum; which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. + But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement. + Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For + nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable + thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being + changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change, + at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, + but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because + time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so + the same conclusion follows as before. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is + not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no + time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently + neither can movement, the measure of what is time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, + therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior + in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, + requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by + reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears + from the above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Since therefore God is + eternal, the world is also eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore + the world is eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p12"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.5" target="asv">Jn. 17:5</a>), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p13"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will + them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that, absolutely + speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will + that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world + depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot + be proved by demonstration. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p14"> Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons + of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three + ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, + Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this + subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is + probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing + to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, + but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to + any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed + to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before + it received that power, it did not exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p17"> Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never + began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive + its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from + which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin + by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and + heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p18.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>, ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which + there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before + the world was. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas + hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p20.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], A[2]</a>, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the + existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal + movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things + began to exist movement also existed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce + an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must + take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, + and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the + form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. + Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different + kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say + of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it + presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary + succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as + acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His + action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was + fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it + was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is + not so manifest of what always was. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning + and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that + any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same + applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as + being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward + this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p23"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. + Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above + heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other + dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from + the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">Q[41], A[2]</a>). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced + by Him, + except as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare + its author. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents + acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore + from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which + has being after not being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p26"></p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p27"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q46_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that + is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; + indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from + something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which + are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world + was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have + begun. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts + by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some + fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always + exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. + Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to + pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite + series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be + an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: + therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with + certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p10"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in + one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God + created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated. + Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p11"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above + of the mystery of the Trinity ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle + of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence + it is said + that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. + Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot + be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures + is not among these, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>). But the divine will can be manifested by + revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. + And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that + are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of + faith. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For + some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by + proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world + has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible + way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in + the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the + world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts + by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent + must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker + to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily + if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced + the world, is not a successive change, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made + after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some + of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except + as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human + intellect, but not the divine intellect ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">Q[14], AA[7]</a>,12). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable + to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, + were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular + changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because + the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there + is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there + is an infinite number of mean terms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes + that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and + so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance, + if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one + cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after + the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise + it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as + the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a particular + generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if + the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to + be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. + But this was disproved above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html">Q[7], A[4]</a>). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as + Augustine says + [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls---viz. + that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters + will be given later ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A6.html">Q[118], A[6]</a>). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or + least some creature, as an + angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p20"></p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p21"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q46_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q46_A3-p0.1">Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part + of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and + time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning + of time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies + a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, + since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the + beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude + three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the + beginning" are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and + the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son." + For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated + to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning---that is, in the + Son; according to the word of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv">Col. 1:16</a>), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But others said that corporeal + things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e. + before all things---"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean + heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because + together with time heaven and earth were created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since + in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in + the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement + or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the + term of movement, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q46_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], AA[2]</a>,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according + to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file