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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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| 1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.iv" class="div2"> | |
| 2 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a> | |
| 3 <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a> | |
| 4 <h2 id="FP.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-49)</h2> | |
| 5 <div id="FP_Q44" class="div3"> | |
| 6 <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a> | |
| 7 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a> | |
| 8 <h3 id="FP_Q44-p0.1">THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 9 <p id="FP_Q44-p1"></p> | |
| 10 <p id="FP_Q44-p2"> After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration | |
| 11 will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and | |
| 12 government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode | |
| 13 of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things. | |
| 14 </p> | |
| 15 <p id="FP_Q44-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> | |
| 16 <p id="FP_Q44-p4"> (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?</p> | |
| 17 <p id="FP_Q44-p5"> (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?</p> | |
| 18 <p id="FP_Q44-p6"> (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?</p> | |
| 19 <p id="FP_Q44-p7"> (4) Whether He is the final cause of things?</p> | |
| 20 <div id="FP_Q44_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 21 <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a> | |
| 22 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a> | |
| 23 <h4 id="FP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?</h4> | |
| 24 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 25 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p2"> | |
| 26 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being | |
| 27 without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing | |
| 28 caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they | |
| 29 can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by | |
| 30 God. | |
| 31 </p> | |
| 32 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p3"> | |
| 33 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient | |
| 34 cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are | |
| 35 many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God. | |
| 36 </p> | |
| 37 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p4"> | |
| 38 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by | |
| 39 the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from | |
| 40 their efficient cause. | |
| 41 </p> | |
| 42 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p5"> | |
| 43 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 44 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.36" target="asv">Rom. 11:36</a>): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things." | |
| 45 </p> | |
| 46 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p6"> | |
| 47 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must | |
| 48 be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above ( | |
| 49 <a id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown ( | |
| 50 <a id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], AA[3]</a>,4) that subsisting being must be | |
| 51 one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all | |
| 52 beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which | |
| 53 are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who | |
| 54 possesses being most perfectly. | |
| 55 </p> | |
| 56 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p7"> Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever | |
| 57 is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest | |
| 58 in heat is the cause of all heat. | |
| 59 </p> | |
| 60 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p8"> | |
| 61 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on | |
| 62 what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused. | |
| 63 Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since | |
| 64 to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible | |
| 65 for us to find a being uncaused. | |
| 66 </p> | |
| 67 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p9"> | |
| 68 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false | |
| 69 in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle | |
| 70 says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an | |
| 71 efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but | |
| 72 because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and | |
| 73 consequent be possible or impossible. | |
| 74 </p> | |
| 75 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p10"> | |
| 76 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract | |
| 77 in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although | |
| 78 the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under | |
| 79 the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that | |
| 80 object from its efficient cause. | |
| 81 </p> | |
| 82 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 83 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p12"></p> | |
| 84 <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a> | |
| 85 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a> | |
| 86 </div> | |
| 87 <div id="FP_Q44_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 88 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a> | |
| 89 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a> | |
| 90 <h4 id="FP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Whether primary matter is created by God?</h4> | |
| 91 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 92 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p2"> | |
| 93 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else | |
| 94 (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God. | |
| 95 </p> | |
| 96 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p3"> | |
| 97 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive | |
| 98 principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from | |
| 99 the other. | |
| 100 </p> | |
| 101 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p4"> | |
| 102 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that | |
| 103 everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore | |
| 104 it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made. | |
| 105 </p> | |
| 106 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p5"> | |
| 107 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh | |
| 108 unto nothing"---viz. primary matter. | |
| 109 </p> | |
| 110 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p6"> | |
| 111 <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser | |
| 112 mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did | |
| 113 not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and | |
| 114 separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, | |
| 115 they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of | |
| 116 that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, | |
| 117 which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential | |
| 118 forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according | |
| 119 to | |
| 120 Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its | |
| 121 form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to | |
| 122 a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some | |
| 123 particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others | |
| 124 there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as | |
| 125 "such," but as "beings." | |
| 126 </p> | |
| 127 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p7"> Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are | |
| 128 "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs | |
| 129 to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause | |
| 130 of things. | |
| 131 </p> | |
| 132 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p8"> | |
| 133 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental | |
| 134 or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from | |
| 135 which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made. | |
| 136 </p> | |
| 137 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p9"> | |
| 138 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first | |
| 139 active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle | |
| 140 says (Metaph. xii, text 40). | |
| 141 </p> | |
| 142 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p10"> | |
| 143 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything | |
| 144 created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if | |
| 145 all that belongs to its being is created. | |
| 146 </p> | |
| 147 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p11"></p> | |
| 148 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 149 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a> | |
| 150 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a> | |
| 151 </div> | |
| 152 <div id="FP_Q44_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 153 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a> | |
| 154 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a> | |
| 155 <h4 id="FP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?</h4> | |
| 156 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 157 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p2"> | |
| 158 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures | |
| 159 are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause. | |
| 160 </p> | |
| 161 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p3"> | |
| 162 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated | |
| 163 above | |
| 164 <a id="FP_Q44_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in | |
| 165 all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles | |
| 166 of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit | |
| 167 self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. | |
| 168 Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God. | |
| 169 </p> | |
| 170 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p4"> | |
| 171 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because | |
| 172 there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing | |
| 173 in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above. | |
| 174 </p> | |
| 175 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p5"> | |
| 176 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting | |
| 177 life, and before self-subsisting wisdom. | |
| 178 </p> | |
| 179 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p6"> | |
| 180 <b>On the contrary,</b> The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are | |
| 181 contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God. | |
| 182 </p> | |
| 183 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p7"> | |
| 184 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an | |
| 185 exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate | |
| 186 form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily | |
| 187 conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive | |
| 188 determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom | |
| 189 devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine | |
| 190 wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind ( | |
| 191 <a id="FP_Q44_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html">Q[15], A[1]</a>). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not | |
| 192 apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this | |
| 193 manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar | |
| 194 of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation. | |
| 195 </p> | |
| 196 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p8"> | |
| 197 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like | |
| 198 to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material | |
| 199 house is like to the house in the architect's mind. | |
| 200 </p> | |
| 201 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p9"> | |
| 202 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man | |
| 203 is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior | |
| 204 species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things. | |
| 205 </p> | |
| 206 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p10"> | |
| 207 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the | |
| 208 same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active | |
| 209 intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars | |
| 210 in order to be their exemplars. | |
| 211 </p> | |
| 212 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p11"> | |
| 213 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes | |
| 214 the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted. | |
| 215 </p> | |
| 216 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p12"></p> | |
| 217 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p13"></p> | |
| 218 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a> | |
| 219 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a> | |
| 220 </div> | |
| 221 <div id="FP_Q44_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 222 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a> | |
| 223 <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a> | |
| 224 <h4 id="FP_Q44_A4-p0.1">Whether God is the final cause of all things?</h4> | |
| 225 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 226 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p2"> | |
| 227 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God | |
| 228 needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end. | |
| 229 </p> | |
| 230 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p3"> | |
| 231 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70), | |
| 232 because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore | |
| 233 He is not the final cause of all things. | |
| 234 </p> | |
| 235 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p4"> | |
| 236 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not | |
| 237 the end of all things. | |
| 238 </p> | |
| 239 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p5"> | |
| 240 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows | |
| 241 that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible. | |
| 242 </p> | |
| 243 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p6"> | |
| 244 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 245 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord has made all things for Himself." | |
| 246 </p> | |
| 247 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p7"> | |
| 248 <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless | |
| 249 it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. | |
| 250 For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some | |
| 251 things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect | |
| 252 agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the | |
| 253 First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which | |
| 254 is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection | |
| 255 and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things. | |
| 256 </p> | |
| 257 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p8"> | |
| 258 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong | |
| 259 to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for | |
| 260 His own goodness. | |
| 261 </p> | |
| 262 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p9"> | |
| 263 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, | |
| 264 which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, | |
| 265 since the end is more noble than the means to the end. | |
| 266 </p> | |
| 267 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p10"> | |
| 268 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or | |
| 269 natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness | |
| 270 to God. | |
| 271 </p> | |
| 272 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p11"> | |
| 273 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows | |
| 274 that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things | |
| 275 in Him, some of which come into our mind before others. | |
| 276 </p> | |
| 277 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p12"></p> | |
| 278 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p13"></p> | |
| 279 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a> | |
| 280 <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a> | |
| 281 </div> | |
| 282 <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a> | |
| 283 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a> | |
| 284 </div> | |
| 285 <div id="FP_Q45" class="div3"> | |
| 286 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a> | |
| 287 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a> | |
| 288 <h3 id="FP_Q45-p0.1">THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 289 <p id="FP_Q45-p1"></p> | |
| 290 <p id="FP_Q45-p2"> The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and | |
| 291 includes eight points of inquiry: | |
| 292 </p> | |
| 293 <p id="FP_Q45-p3"> (1) What is creation?</p> | |
| 294 <p id="FP_Q45-p4"> (2) Whether God can create anything?</p> | |
| 295 <p id="FP_Q45-p5"> (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?</p> | |
| 296 <p id="FP_Q45-p6"> (4) To what things it belongs to be created?</p> | |
| 297 <p id="FP_Q45-p7"> (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</p> | |
| 298 <p id="FP_Q45-p8"> (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?</p> | |
| 299 <p id="FP_Q45-p9"> (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?</p> | |
| 300 <p id="FP_Q45-p10"> (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?</p> | |
| 301 <div id="FP_Q45_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 302 <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a> | |
| 303 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a> | |
| 304 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Whether to create is to make something from nothing?</h4> | |
| 305 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 306 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p2"> | |
| 307 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To | |
| 308 make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already." | |
| 309 </p> | |
| 310 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p3"> | |
| 311 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, | |
| 312 and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among | |
| 313 all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being. | |
| 314 </p> | |
| 315 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p4"> | |
| 316 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say | |
| 317 that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create | |
| 318 is not to make something from nothing. | |
| 319 </p> | |
| 320 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p5"> | |
| 321 <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text of | |
| 322 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing." | |
| 323 </p> | |
| 324 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p6"> | |
| 325 <b>I answer that,</b> As said above ( | |
| 326 <a id="FP_Q45_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being | |
| 327 from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular | |
| 328 emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," | |
| 329 and white from "not-white." | |
| 330 Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being | |
| 331 should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is | |
| 332 from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is | |
| 333 "nothing." | |
| 334 </p> | |
| 335 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p7"> | |
| 336 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when | |
| 337 we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above. | |
| 338 </p> | |
| 339 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p8"> | |
| 340 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more | |
| 341 perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding | |
| 342 to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because | |
| 343 the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the | |
| 344 privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which | |
| 345 is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because | |
| 346 the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being. | |
| 347 </p> | |
| 348 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p9"> | |
| 349 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only | |
| 350 order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition | |
| 351 "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first | |
| 352 sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and | |
| 353 its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It | |
| 354 is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does | |
| 355 not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the | |
| 356 first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the | |
| 357 material | |
| 358 cause, which is denied. | |
| 359 </p> | |
| 360 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p10"></p> | |
| 361 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p11"></p> | |
| 362 <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a> | |
| 363 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a> | |
| 364 </div> | |
| 365 <div id="FP_Q45_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 366 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a> | |
| 367 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a> | |
| 368 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Whether God can create anything?</h4> | |
| 369 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 370 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p2"> | |
| 371 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers | |
| 372 considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the | |
| 373 contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation | |
| 374 and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from | |
| 375 nothing, or create. | |
| 376 </p> | |
| 377 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p3"> | |
| 378 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore | |
| 379 creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the | |
| 380 act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God. | |
| 381 </p> | |
| 382 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p4"> | |
| 383 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same | |
| 384 time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already | |
| 385 is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming | |
| 386 precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which | |
| 387 the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing. | |
| 388 </p> | |
| 389 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p5"> | |
| 390 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not | |
| 391 happen that something is made from nothing. | |
| 392 </p> | |
| 393 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p6"> | |
| 394 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 395 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." | |
| 396 </p> | |
| 397 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p7"> | |
| 398 <b>I answer that,</b> Not only is it impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created | |
| 399 by God, as appears from what has been said ( | |
| 400 <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is | |
| 401 not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action | |
| 402 of art, | |
| 403 but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If | |
| 404 therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. | |
| 405 Now it has been shown above ( | |
| 406 <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that | |
| 407 God brings things into being from nothing. | |
| 408 </p> | |
| 409 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p8"> | |
| 410 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ancient philosophers, as is said above ( | |
| 411 <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their | |
| 412 action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation | |
| 413 from the universal principle of things. | |
| 414 </p> | |
| 415 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p9"> | |
| 416 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different | |
| 417 now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in | |
| 418 motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial | |
| 419 change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole | |
| 420 substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, | |
| 421 so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide | |
| 422 as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that | |
| 423 when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of | |
| 424 signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above ( | |
| 425 <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. | |
| 426 And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" | |
| 427 and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence. | |
| 428 </p> | |
| 429 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p10"> | |
| 430 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the | |
| 431 term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is | |
| 432 not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being | |
| 433 made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was | |
| 434 not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time. | |
| 435 </p> | |
| 436 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p11"> | |
| 437 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is | |
| 438 plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms. | |
| 439 </p> | |
| 440 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p12"></p> | |
| 441 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p13"></p> | |
| 442 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a> | |
| 443 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a> | |
| 444 </div> | |
| 445 <div id="FP_Q45_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 446 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a> | |
| 447 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a> | |
| 448 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Whether creation is anything in the creature?</h4> | |
| 449 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 450 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p2"> | |
| 451 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the | |
| 452 creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in | |
| 453 the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively | |
| 454 is not anything in the creature. | |
| 455 </p> | |
| 456 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p3"> | |
| 457 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: | |
| 458 since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for | |
| 459 the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the | |
| 460 creature. | |
| 461 </p> | |
| 462 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p4"> | |
| 463 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident | |
| 464 is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and | |
| 465 also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while | |
| 466 the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action | |
| 467 and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing. | |
| 468 </p> | |
| 469 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p5"> | |
| 470 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental | |
| 471 form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental | |
| 472 form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole | |
| 473 substance, something in the thing created. | |
| 474 </p> | |
| 475 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p6"> | |
| 476 <b>I answer that,</b> Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, | |
| 477 or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in | |
| 478 the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all | |
| 479 beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when | |
| 480 movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the | |
| 481 creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, | |
| 482 is implied a relation to the principle of motion. | |
| 483 </p> | |
| 484 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p7"> | |
| 485 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God | |
| 486 relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God | |
| 487 is a real relation, as was said above ( | |
| 488 <a id="FP_Q45_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html">Q[13], A[7]</a>) in treating of the divine names. | |
| 489 </p> | |
| 490 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p8"> | |
| 491 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover | |
| 492 and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive | |
| 493 creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, | |
| 494 or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other | |
| 495 relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above ( | |
| 496 <a id="FP_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html">Q[42], A[1]</a>, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons. | |
| 497 </p> | |
| 498 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p9"> | |
| 499 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and | |
| 500 is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the | |
| 501 part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the | |
| 502 creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature | |
| 503 to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning. | |
| 504 </p> | |
| 505 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p10"></p> | |
| 506 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 507 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a> | |
| 508 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a> | |
| 509 </div> | |
| 510 <div id="FP_Q45_A4" class="div4"> | |
| 511 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a> | |
| 512 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a> | |
| 513 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?</h4> | |
| 514 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p1"></p> | |
| 515 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p2"> | |
| 516 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) | |
| 517 it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly | |
| 518 speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things. | |
| 519 </p> | |
| 520 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p3"> | |
| 521 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own | |
| 522 component parts. Therefore composite things are not created. | |
| 523 </p> | |
| 524 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p4"> | |
| 525 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the | |
| 526 natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore | |
| 527 matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created. | |
| 528 </p> | |
| 529 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p5"> | |
| 530 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 531 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation | |
| 532 belongs to them. | |
| 533 </p> | |
| 534 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p6"> | |
| 535 <b>I answer that,</b> To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above ( | |
| 536 <a id="FP_Q45_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever | |
| 537 being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate | |
| 538 substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has | |
| 539 being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they | |
| 540 themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. | |
| 541 Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being." | |
| 542 Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they | |
| 543 ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings. | |
| 544 </p> | |
| 545 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p7"> | |
| 546 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but | |
| 547 to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because | |
| 548 it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above | |
| 549 <a id="FP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible | |
| 550 thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen. | |
| 551 </p> | |
| 552 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p8"> | |
| 553 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite" | |
| 554 is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles. | |
| 555 </p> | |
| 556 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p9"> | |
| 557 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation | |
| 558 is the production of the whole being, and not only matter. | |
| 559 </p> | |
| 560 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p10"></p> | |
| 561 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p11"></p> | |
| 562 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a> | |
| 563 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a> | |
| 564 </div> | |
| 565 <div id="FP_Q45_A5" class="div4"> | |
| 566 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a> | |
| 567 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a> | |
| 568 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</h4> | |
| 569 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p1"></p> | |
| 570 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p2"> | |
| 571 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), | |
| 572 what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless | |
| 573 can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance | |
| 574 like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it | |
| 575 has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create. | |
| 576 </p> | |
| 577 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p3"> | |
| 578 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. | |
| 579 But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which | |
| 580 nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this. | |
| 581 </p> | |
| 582 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p4"> | |
| 583 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we | |
| 584 proved above when treating of the infinity of God ( | |
| 585 <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary | |
| 586 to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create. | |
| 587 </p> | |
| 588 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p5"> | |
| 589 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other | |
| 590 creatures. | |
| 591 </p> | |
| 592 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p6"> | |
| 593 <b>I answer that,</b> It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes | |
| 594 <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and | |
| 595 prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first | |
| 596 and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither | |
| 597 intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely, | |
| 598 not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone. | |
| 599 </p> | |
| 600 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p7"> It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, | |
| 601 inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that | |
| 602 although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, | |
| 603 can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after | |
| 604 itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. | |
| 605 And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that | |
| 606 the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power. | |
| 607 </p> | |
| 608 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p8"> But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, | |
| 609 except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore | |
| 610 it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain | |
| 611 instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its | |
| 612 own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating | |
| 613 is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally | |
| 614 to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. | |
| 615 So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that | |
| 616 is, ministerially. | |
| 617 </p> | |
| 618 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p9"> And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it | |
| 619 requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation. | |
| 620 </p> | |
| 621 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p10"> | |
| 622 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying | |
| 623 it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause | |
| 624 of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate | |
| 625 matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man | |
| 626 participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own | |
| 627 being, as we have said above ( | |
| 628 <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it | |
| 629 is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in | |
| 630 an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything | |
| 631 whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore | |
| 632 an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards | |
| 633 some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). | |
| 634 In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says ( | |
| 635 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.15" target="asv">Eph. 3:15</a>): "From whom all | |
| 636 paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless | |
| 637 something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation. | |
| 638 </p> | |
| 639 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p11"> | |
| 640 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. | |
| 641 And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, | |
| 642 as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, | |
| 643 whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act; | |
| 644 and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a | |
| 645 much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of | |
| 646 much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary. | |
| 647 </p> | |
| 648 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p12"> | |
| 649 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made; | |
| 650 for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite | |
| 651 power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater | |
| 652 power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the | |
| 653 potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is | |
| 654 infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural | |
| 655 agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any | |
| 656 more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above ( | |
| 657 <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), it follows that no creature can | |
| 658 create. | |
| 659 </p> | |
| 660 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p13"></p> | |
| 661 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p14"></p> | |
| 662 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a> | |
| 663 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a> | |
| 664 </div> | |
| 665 <div id="FP_Q45_A6" class="div4"> | |
| 666 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a> | |
| 667 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a> | |
| 668 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A6-p0.1">Whether to create is proper to any person?</h4> | |
| 669 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p1"></p> | |
| 670 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p2"> | |
| 671 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect | |
| 672 is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and | |
| 673 is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds | |
| 674 in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of | |
| 675 the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person. | |
| 676 </p> | |
| 677 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p3"> | |
| 678 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever | |
| 679 difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons. | |
| 680 But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed | |
| 681 that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by | |
| 682 Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation | |
| 683 of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations. | |
| 684 </p> | |
| 685 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p4"> | |
| 686 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, | |
| 687 this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power, | |
| 688 goodness and wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought | |
| 689 not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished | |
| 690 in creating according to relations and processions. | |
| 691 </p> | |
| 692 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p5"> | |
| 693 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead. | |
| 694 </p> | |
| 695 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p6"> | |
| 696 <b>I answer that,</b> To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle | |
| 697 of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create | |
| 698 belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not | |
| 699 proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. | |
| 700 </p> | |
| 701 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of | |
| 702 things. For as was said above ( | |
| 703 <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; | |
| 704 <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman | |
| 705 is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the | |
| 706 love of | |
| 707 his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through | |
| 708 His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch | |
| 709 as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will. | |
| 710 </p> | |
| 711 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p8"> | |
| 712 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained. | |
| 713 </p> | |
| 714 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p9"> | |
| 715 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son | |
| 716 receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common | |
| 717 to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from | |
| 718 both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not | |
| 719 receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said ( | |
| 720 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through" | |
| 721 usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, | |
| 722 is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for | |
| 723 this particular | |
| 724 appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated ( | |
| 725 <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html">Q[39], A[8]</a>, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to | |
| 726 be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through | |
| 727 Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which | |
| 728 belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior | |
| 729 movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness. | |
| 730 </p> | |
| 731 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p10"> | |
| 732 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally | |
| 733 connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" | |
| 734 poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power." | |
| 735 </p> | |
| 736 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p11"></p> | |
| 737 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p12"></p> | |
| 738 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a> | |
| 739 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a> | |
| 740 </div> | |
| 741 <div id="FP_Q45_A7" class="div4"> | |
| 742 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a> | |
| 743 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a> | |
| 744 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A7-p0.1">Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?</h4> | |
| 745 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p1"></p> | |
| 746 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p2"> | |
| 747 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through | |
| 748 its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated ( | |
| 749 <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures. | |
| 750 </p> | |
| 751 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p3"> | |
| 752 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some | |
| 753 of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity | |
| 754 in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude. | |
| 755 </p> | |
| 756 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p4"> | |
| 757 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to | |
| 758 the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of | |
| 759 the Trinity but of the unity of essence. | |
| 760 </p> | |
| 761 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p5"> | |
| 762 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures." | |
| 763 </p> | |
| 764 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p6"> | |
| 765 <b>I answer that,</b> Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause, | |
| 766 but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has | |
| 767 passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents | |
| 768 fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the | |
| 769 representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was | |
| 770 said above | |
| 771 <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27.html">(Q[27])</a>. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational | |
| 772 creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there | |
| 773 is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding. | |
| 774 </p> | |
| 775 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p7"> But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are | |
| 776 necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, | |
| 777 whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents | |
| 778 the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle | |
| 779 from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is | |
| 780 from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He | |
| 781 is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De | |
| 782 Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according | |
| 783 "as it | |
| 784 is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three, | |
| 785 "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing | |
| 786 limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the | |
| 787 other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, | |
| 788 qu. | |
| 789 18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct | |
| 790 by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above. | |
| 791 </p> | |
| 792 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p8"> | |
| 793 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge | |
| 794 of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said ( | |
| 795 <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). | |
| 796 </p> | |
| 797 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p9"> | |
| 798 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor | |
| 799 is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being | |
| 800 is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things. | |
| 801 </p> | |
| 802 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p10"> | |
| 803 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above | |
| 804 <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. | |
| 805 </p> | |
| 806 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p11"></p> | |
| 807 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p12"></p> | |
| 808 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a> | |
| 809 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a> | |
| 810 </div> | |
| 811 <div id="FP_Q45_A8" class="div4"> | |
| 812 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a> | |
| 813 <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a> | |
| 814 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A8-p0.1">Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?</h4> | |
| 815 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p1"></p> | |
| 816 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p2"> | |
| 817 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is | |
| 818 produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and | |
| 819 thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation. | |
| 820 </p> | |
| 821 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p3"> | |
| 822 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which | |
| 823 is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it | |
| 824 must be produced by creation. | |
| 825 </p> | |
| 826 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p4"> | |
| 827 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident | |
| 828 in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason | |
| 829 applies to other things. | |
| 830 </p> | |
| 831 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p5"> | |
| 832 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow | |
| 833 that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical. | |
| 834 </p> | |
| 835 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p6"> | |
| 836 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation. | |
| 837 </p> | |
| 838 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p7"> | |
| 839 <b>I answer that,</b> The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but | |
| 840 previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from | |
| 841 not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they | |
| 842 asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or | |
| 843 caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this | |
| 844 opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, | |
| 845 but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, | |
| 846 as shown above | |
| 847 <a id="FP_Q45_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be | |
| 848 "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter. | |
| 849 </p> | |
| 850 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p8"> Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.</p> | |
| 851 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p9"> | |
| 852 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly." | |
| 853 </p> | |
| 854 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p10"> | |
| 855 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its | |
| 856 like according to quality, but according to species. | |
| 857 </p> | |
| 858 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p11"> | |
| 859 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which | |
| 860 they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are | |
| 861 created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper | |
| 862 agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator. | |
| 863 </p> | |
| 864 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p12"> | |
| 865 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are | |
| 866 called creatures. | |
| 867 </p> | |
| 868 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p13"></p> | |
| 869 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p14"></p> | |
| 870 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a> | |
| 871 <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a> | |
| 872 </div> | |
| 873 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a> | |
| 874 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a> | |
| 875 </div> | |
| 876 <div id="FP_Q46" class="div3"> | |
| 877 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a> | |
| 878 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a> | |
| 879 <h3 id="FP_Q46-p0.1">OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 880 <p id="FP_Q46-p1"></p> | |
| 881 <p id="FP_Q46-p2"> Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment:</p> | |
| 882 <p id="FP_Q46-p3"> (1) Whether creatures always existed?</p> | |
| 883 <p id="FP_Q46-p4"> (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?</p> | |
| 884 <p id="FP_Q46-p5"> (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?</p> | |
| 885 <div id="FP_Q46_A1" class="div4"> | |
| 886 <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a> | |
| 887 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a> | |
| 888 <h4 id="FP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Whether the universe of creatures always existed?</h4> | |
| 889 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p1"></p> | |
| 890 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p2"> | |
| 891 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything | |
| 892 which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore | |
| 893 the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality | |
| 894 to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from | |
| 895 privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist | |
| 896 without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist: | |
| 897 which is impossible. | |
| 898 </p> | |
| 899 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p3"> | |
| 900 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing | |
| 901 extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate | |
| 902 time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time | |
| 903 is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there | |
| 904 are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did | |
| 905 not begin to exist. | |
| 906 </p> | |
| 907 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p4"> | |
| 908 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and | |
| 909 also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist. | |
| 910 </p> | |
| 911 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p5"> | |
| 912 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body | |
| 913 where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world | |
| 914 there was a vacuum; which is impossible. | |
| 915 </p> | |
| 916 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p6"> | |
| 917 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. | |
| 918 But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement. | |
| 919 Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing. | |
| 920 </p> | |
| 921 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p7"> | |
| 922 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For | |
| 923 nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable | |
| 924 thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being | |
| 925 changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change, | |
| 926 at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, | |
| 927 but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because | |
| 928 time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so | |
| 929 the same conclusion follows as before. | |
| 930 </p> | |
| 931 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p8"> | |
| 932 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is | |
| 933 not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no | |
| 934 time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently | |
| 935 neither can movement, the measure of what is time. | |
| 936 </p> | |
| 937 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p9"> | |
| 938 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, | |
| 939 therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior | |
| 940 in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible. | |
| 941 </p> | |
| 942 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p10"> | |
| 943 <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, | |
| 944 requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by | |
| 945 reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears | |
| 946 from the above ( | |
| 947 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Since therefore God is | |
| 948 eternal, the world is also eternal. | |
| 949 </p> | |
| 950 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p11"> | |
| 951 <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore | |
| 952 the world is eternal. | |
| 953 </p> | |
| 954 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p12"> | |
| 955 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 956 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.5" target="asv">Jn. 17:5</a>), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and ( | |
| 957 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning." | |
| 958 </p> | |
| 959 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p13"> | |
| 960 <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above ( | |
| 961 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will | |
| 962 them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above | |
| 963 ( | |
| 964 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that, absolutely | |
| 965 speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will | |
| 966 that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world | |
| 967 depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot | |
| 968 be proved by demonstration. | |
| 969 </p> | |
| 970 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p14"> Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons | |
| 971 of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three | |
| 972 ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, | |
| 973 Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this | |
| 974 subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is | |
| 975 probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing | |
| 976 to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal." | |
| 977 </p> | |
| 978 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p15"> | |
| 979 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, | |
| 980 but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to | |
| 981 any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed | |
| 982 to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17). | |
| 983 </p> | |
| 984 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p16"> | |
| 985 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before | |
| 986 it received that power, it did not exist. | |
| 987 </p> | |
| 988 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p17"> Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never | |
| 989 began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin. | |
| 990 </p> | |
| 991 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p18"> | |
| 992 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive | |
| 993 its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from | |
| 994 which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin | |
| 995 by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and | |
| 996 heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above ( | |
| 997 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p18.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>, ad 2). | |
| 998 </p> | |
| 999 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p19"> | |
| 1000 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which | |
| 1001 there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before | |
| 1002 the world was. | |
| 1003 </p> | |
| 1004 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p20"> | |
| 1005 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas | |
| 1006 hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above ( | |
| 1007 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p20.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], A[2]</a>, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the | |
| 1008 existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal | |
| 1009 movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things | |
| 1010 began to exist movement also existed. | |
| 1011 </p> | |
| 1012 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p21"> | |
| 1013 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce | |
| 1014 an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must | |
| 1015 take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, | |
| 1016 and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the | |
| 1017 form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. | |
| 1018 Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different | |
| 1019 kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say | |
| 1020 of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it | |
| 1021 presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary | |
| 1022 succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as | |
| 1023 acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His | |
| 1024 action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was | |
| 1025 fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it | |
| 1026 was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is | |
| 1027 not so manifest of what always was. | |
| 1028 </p> | |
| 1029 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p22"> | |
| 1030 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning | |
| 1031 and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that | |
| 1032 any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same | |
| 1033 applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as | |
| 1034 being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward | |
| 1035 this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement. | |
| 1036 </p> | |
| 1037 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p23"> | |
| 1038 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. | |
| 1039 Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above | |
| 1040 heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other | |
| 1041 dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body. | |
| 1042 </p> | |
| 1043 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p24"> | |
| 1044 <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from | |
| 1045 the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above ( | |
| 1046 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>; | |
| 1047 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">Q[41], A[2]</a>). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced | |
| 1048 by Him, | |
| 1049 except as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare | |
| 1050 its author. | |
| 1051 </p> | |
| 1052 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p25"> | |
| 1053 <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents | |
| 1054 acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore | |
| 1055 from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which | |
| 1056 has being after not being. | |
| 1057 </p> | |
| 1058 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p26"></p> | |
| 1059 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p27"></p> | |
| 1060 <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a> | |
| 1061 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1062 </div> | |
| 1063 <div id="FP_Q46_A2" class="div4"> | |
| 1064 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1065 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1066 <h4 id="FP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?</h4> | |
| 1067 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p1"></p> | |
| 1068 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p2"> | |
| 1069 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that | |
| 1070 is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; | |
| 1071 indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began. | |
| 1072 </p> | |
| 1073 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p3"> | |
| 1074 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from | |
| 1075 something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which | |
| 1076 are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world | |
| 1077 was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have | |
| 1078 begun. | |
| 1079 </p> | |
| 1080 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p4"> | |
| 1081 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts | |
| 1082 by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist. | |
| 1083 </p> | |
| 1084 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p5"> | |
| 1085 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some | |
| 1086 fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always | |
| 1087 exist. | |
| 1088 </p> | |
| 1089 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p6"> | |
| 1090 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. | |
| 1091 Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist. | |
| 1092 </p> | |
| 1093 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p7"> | |
| 1094 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to | |
| 1095 pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false. | |
| 1096 </p> | |
| 1097 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p8"> | |
| 1098 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite | |
| 1099 series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be | |
| 1100 an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5). | |
| 1101 </p> | |
| 1102 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p9"> | |
| 1103 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: | |
| 1104 therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with | |
| 1105 certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith. | |
| 1106 </p> | |
| 1107 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p10"> | |
| 1108 <b>On the contrary,</b> The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" ( | |
| 1109 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in | |
| 1110 one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God | |
| 1111 created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated. | |
| 1112 Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively. | |
| 1113 </p> | |
| 1114 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p11"> | |
| 1115 <b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above | |
| 1116 of the mystery of the Trinity ( | |
| 1117 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle | |
| 1118 of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence | |
| 1119 it is said | |
| 1120 that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. | |
| 1121 Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot | |
| 1122 be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures | |
| 1123 is not among these, as was said above ( | |
| 1124 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>). But the divine will can be manifested by | |
| 1125 revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. | |
| 1126 And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that | |
| 1127 are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of | |
| 1128 faith. | |
| 1129 </p> | |
| 1130 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p12"> | |
| 1131 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For | |
| 1132 some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by | |
| 1133 proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world | |
| 1134 has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible | |
| 1135 way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in | |
| 1136 the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the | |
| 1137 world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts | |
| 1138 by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent | |
| 1139 must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker | |
| 1140 to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily | |
| 1141 if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced | |
| 1142 the world, is not a successive change, as was said above ( | |
| 1143 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], A[2]</a>). | |
| 1144 </p> | |
| 1145 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p13"> | |
| 1146 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made | |
| 1147 after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some | |
| 1148 of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4). | |
| 1149 </p> | |
| 1150 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p14"> | |
| 1151 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except | |
| 1152 as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human | |
| 1153 intellect, but not the divine intellect ( | |
| 1154 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">Q[14], AA[7]</a>,12). | |
| 1155 </p> | |
| 1156 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p15"> | |
| 1157 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable | |
| 1158 to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, | |
| 1159 were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular | |
| 1160 changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world. | |
| 1161 </p> | |
| 1162 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p16"> | |
| 1163 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because | |
| 1164 the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise. | |
| 1165 </p> | |
| 1166 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p17"> | |
| 1167 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there | |
| 1168 is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there | |
| 1169 is an infinite number of mean terms. | |
| 1170 </p> | |
| 1171 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p18"> | |
| 1172 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes | |
| 1173 that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and | |
| 1174 so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance, | |
| 1175 if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one | |
| 1176 cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after | |
| 1177 the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise | |
| 1178 it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as | |
| 1179 the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a particular | |
| 1180 generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if | |
| 1181 the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity. | |
| 1182 </p> | |
| 1183 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p19"> | |
| 1184 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to | |
| 1185 be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. | |
| 1186 But this was disproved above ( | |
| 1187 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html">Q[7], A[4]</a>). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as | |
| 1188 Augustine says | |
| 1189 [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls---viz. | |
| 1190 that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters | |
| 1191 will be given later ( | |
| 1192 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>; | |
| 1193 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A6.html">Q[118], A[6]</a>). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or | |
| 1194 least some creature, as an | |
| 1195 angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity. | |
| 1196 </p> | |
| 1197 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p20"></p> | |
| 1198 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p21"></p> | |
| 1199 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1200 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a> | |
| 1201 </div> | |
| 1202 <div id="FP_Q46_A3" class="div4"> | |
| 1203 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1204 <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a> | |
| 1205 <h4 id="FP_Q46_A3-p0.1">Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?</h4> | |
| 1206 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p1"></p> | |
| 1207 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p2"> | |
| 1208 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part | |
| 1209 of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and | |
| 1210 time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning | |
| 1211 of time. | |
| 1212 </p> | |
| 1213 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p3"> | |
| 1214 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies | |
| 1215 a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, | |
| 1216 since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time. | |
| 1217 </p> | |
| 1218 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p4"> | |
| 1219 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the | |
| 1220 beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. | |
| 1221 </p> | |
| 1222 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p5"> | |
| 1223 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 1224 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." | |
| 1225 </p> | |
| 1226 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p6"> | |
| 1227 <b>I answer that,</b> The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude | |
| 1228 three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the | |
| 1229 beginning" are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and | |
| 1230 the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son." | |
| 1231 For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated | |
| 1232 to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said ( | |
| 1233 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning---that is, in the | |
| 1234 Son; according to the word of the Apostle ( | |
| 1235 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv">Col. 1:16</a>), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But others said that corporeal | |
| 1236 things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e. | |
| 1237 before all things---"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean | |
| 1238 heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature. | |
| 1239 </p> | |
| 1240 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p7"> | |
| 1241 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because | |
| 1242 together with time heaven and earth were created. | |
| 1243 </p> | |
| 1244 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p8"> | |
| 1245 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since | |
| 1246 in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in | |
| 1247 the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement | |
| 1248 or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the | |
| 1249 term of movement, as was said above ( | |
| 1250 <a id="FP_Q46_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], AA[2]</a>,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before. | |
| 1251 </p> | |
| 1252 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p9"> | |
| 1253 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according | |
| 1254 to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins. | |
| 1255 </p> | |
| 1256 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p10"></p> | |
| 1257 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p11"></p> | |
| 1258 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a> | |
| 1259 <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a> | |
| 1260 </div> | |
| 1261 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a> | |
| 1262 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a> | |
| 1263 </div> | |
| 1264 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a> | |
| 1265 <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a> | |
| 1266 ` | |
| 1267 </div> |