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 dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed anima sensitiva in equo et leone et
 aliis brutis animalibus est corruptibilis. Si igitur in homine sit
 incorruptibilis, non erit eiusdem generis anima sensitiva in homine
 et bruto. Animal autem dicitur ex eo quod habet animam sensitivam.
 Neque ergo animal erit unum genus commune hominis et aliorum
-animalium. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div
+animalium. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p3a"><!-- Added by HST, missing
-	    class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p3a"><!-- Added by HST, missing
 in original, copied from
 	http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques76.pdf --><b>Objection 3:</b> In <i>De Generatione Animalium</i> the Philosopher claims that the embryo is an animal
 before being a man.  But this cannot be the case if the same essence belongs to both the sentient soul and
 the intellective soul, since something is an animal through the sentient soul and a man through the
 intellective soul.  Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the sentient and intellective souls have a
 intellectum; secundo, de potentiis intellectivis; tertio, de
 potentiis appetitivis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de
 generibus potentiarum animae. Secundo, de speciebus vegetativae
 partis. Tertio, de sensibus exterioribus. Quarto, de sensibus
 interioribus.</p></div></div></div>
-<div id="FP_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p2">
+<div id="FP_Q78_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A1-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 1. Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul---namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive,
+locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly
+assigned---namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of
+powers in the soul, and not five.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31672] Iª q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quinque genera potentiarum animae
+distinguenda, scilicet vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum,
+motivum secundum locum, et intellectivum. Potentiae enim animae
+dicuntur partes ipsius. Sed tantum tres partes animae communiter ab
+omnibus assignantur, scilicet anima vegetabilis, anima sensibilis,
+et anima rationalis. Ergo tantum tria sunt genera potentiarum
+animae, et non quinque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For
+the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only one of these is present,
+the thing is said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement of decrease and increase
+due to nourishment." Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the
+appetitive is excluded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31673] Iª q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+potentiae animae sunt principia operum vitae. Sed quatuor modis
+dicitur aliquid vivere. Dicit enim philosophus, in II de anima,
+<i>multipliciter ipso vivere dicto, etsi unum aliquod horum insit
+solum, aliquid dicimus vivere; ut intellectus, et sensus, motus et
+status secundum locum, adhuc autem motus secundum alimentum, et
+decrementum et augmentum</i>. Ergo tantum quatuor sunt genera
+potentiarum animae, appetitivo excluso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common
+to each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we read (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q78_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.40.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 40:22</a>): "The eye desireth favor and beauty, but more than these green sown fields." In the same way every other power desires its
+appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive power should not be made a special genus of
+the powers of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31674] Iª q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
+illud quod est commune omnibus potentiis, non debet deputari
+aliquod speciale animae genus. Sed appetere convenit cuilibet
+potentiae animae. Visus enim appetit visibile conveniens, unde
+dicitur Eccli. XL, <i>gratiam et speciem desiderabit oculus, et
+super hoc virides sationes</i>. Et eadem ratione, quaelibet alia
+potentia desiderat obiectum sibi conveniens. Ergo non debet poni
+appetitivum unum speciale genus potentiarum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the moving principle in animals is sense, intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore
+the motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31675] Iª q. 78 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+principium movens in animalibus est sensus, aut intellectus, aut
+appetitus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Non ergo motivum debet poni
+speciale genus animae praeter praedicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and
+the intellectual."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31676] Iª q. 78 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, <i>potentias autem dicimus
+vegetativum sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, et
+intellectivum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes
+of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the
+soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul,
+and is related to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation
+of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the
+operation of the "rational soul." Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a
+corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the "sensitive soul"; for though hot and
+cold, wet and dry, and other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not required in
+such
+a way that the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition of the
+organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal
+quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic
+principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul;
+since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what
+follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 co."><a name="31677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31677] Iª q. 78 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod quinque sunt genera potentiarum animae, quae numerata sunt.
+Tres vero dicuntur animae. Quatuor vero dicuntur modi vivendi. Et
+huius diversitatis ratio est, quia diversae animae distinguuntur
+secundum quod diversimode operatio animae supergreditur operationem
+naturae corporalis, tota enim natura corporalis subiacet animae, et
+comparatur ad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum. Est ergo quaedam
+operatio animae, quae intantum excedit naturam corpoream, quod
+neque etiam exercetur per organum corporale. Et talis est operatio
+animae rationalis. Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae
+quidem fit per organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream
+qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilis, quia etsi
+calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, et aliae huiusmodi
+qualitates corporeae requirantur ad operationem sensus; non tamen
+ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae
+sensibilis procedat; sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem
+organi. Infima autem operationum animae est, quae fit per organum
+corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur tamen
+operationem naturae corporeae, quia motiones corporum sunt ab
+exteriori principio, huiusmodi autem operationes sunt a principio
+intrinseco; hoc enim commune est omnibus operationibus animae; omne
+enim animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum. Et talis est operatio
+animae vegetabilis, digestio enim, et ea quae consequuntur, fit
+instrumentaliter per actionem caloris, ut dicitur in II de anima.
+</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p8"> Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal
+is the object to which it extends, as we have said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q78_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>, ad 4). But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul there is a power the
+object of which is only the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called "vegetative" for the vegetative
+power acts only
+on the body to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal
+object---namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the
+powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object---namely, not only the sensible body, but all being
+in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely
+to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united
+to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's
+operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude
+to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers ---namely, the
+"sensitive" in regard to the less common object---the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard to the most common
+object---universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic.
+And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one---the "appetitive"---in respect of which the soul is
+referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other---the "locomotive" power---in respect
+of
+which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved
+for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions.
+<p id="FP_Q78_A1-p9"> The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there
+exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive,
+but not the locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive
+powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek
+necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power---namely, men.
+But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite
+(De Anima ii, 3).</p>
+<p id="FP_Q78_A1-p10"> Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.</p>
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31678] Iª q. 78 a. 1 ad 1</span></a>Genera vero potentiarum animae distinguuntur secundum obiecta.
+Quanto enim potentia est altior, tanto respicit universalius
+obiectum, ut supra dictum est. Obiectum autem operationis animae in
+triplici ordine potest considerari. Alicuius enim potentiae animae
+obiectum est solum corpus animae unitum. Et hoc genus potentiarum
+animae dicitur vegetativum, non enim vegetativa potentia agit nisi
+in corpus cui anima unitur. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum
+animae, quod respicit universalius obiectum, scilicet omne corpus
+sensibile; et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud genus
+potentiarum animae, quod respicit adhuc universalius obiectum,
+scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed universaliter omne ens. Ex
+quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent
+operationem non solum respectu rei coniunctae, sed etiam respectu
+rei extrinsecae. Cum autem operans oporteat aliquo modo coniungi
+suo obiecto circa quod operatur, necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae
+est obiectum operationis animae, secundum duplicem rationem ad
+animam comparari. Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae coniungi
+et in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt
+duo genera potentiarum, scilicet sensitivum, respectu obiecti minus
+communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum, respectu
+obiecti communissimi, quod est ens universale. Alio vero modo,
+secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem. Et
+secundum hanc etiam comparationem, sunt duo genera potentiarum
+animae, unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima
+comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in
+intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima
+comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et
+motus; ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum, omne
+animal movetur. Modi vero vivendi distinguuntur secundum gradus
+viventium. Quaedam enim viventia sunt, in quibus est tantum
+vegetativum, sicut in plantis. Quaedam vero, in quibus cum
+vegetativo est etiam sensitivum, non tamen motivum secundum locum;
+sicut sunt immobilia animalia, ut conchilia. Quaedam vero sunt,
+quae supra hoc habent motivum secundum locum; ut perfecta animalia,
+quae multis indigent ad suam vitam, et ideo indigent motu, ut vitae
+necessaria procul posita quaerere possint. Quaedam vero viventia
+sunt, in quibus cum his est intellectivum, scilicet in hominibus.
+Appetitivum autem non constituit aliquem gradum viventium, quia in
+quibuscumque est sensus, est etiam appetitus, ut dicitur in II
+libro de anima.<br clear="none"/> Et per hoc
+solvuntur duo prima obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "natural appetite" is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural
+appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the "animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this
+sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul---mere apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists
+in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to
+its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the purpose
+of its act only---namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely
+for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses,
+except on account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them; there would be no need for a
+special genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31679] Iª q. 78 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cuiuslibet rei in
+aliquid, ex natura sua, unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia
+desiderat sibi conveniens. Sed appetitus animalis consequitur
+formam apprehensam. Et ad huiusmodi appetitum requiritur specialis
+animae potentia, et non sufficit sola apprehensio. Res enim
+appetitur prout est in sua natura, non est autem secundum suam
+naturam in virtute apprehensiva, sed secundum suam similitudinem.
+Unde patet quod visus appetit naturaliter visibile solum ad suum
+actum, scilicet ad videndum, animal autem appetit rem visam per vim
+appetitivam, non solum ad videndum, sed etiam ad alios usus. Si
+autem non indigeret anima rebus perceptis a sensu, nisi propter
+actiones sensuum, scilicet ut eas sentiret; non oporteret
+appetitivum ponere speciale genus inter potentias animae, quia
+sufficeret appetitus naturalis potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A1-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although sense and appetite are principles of movement in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not sufficient
+to cause movement, unless another power be added to them; for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have
+not the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also
+in the parts of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves
+them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move
+in obedience to the appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31680] Iª q. 78 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, quamvis sensus et appetitus sint principia moventia
+in animalibus perfectis, non tamen sensus et appetitus, inquantum
+huiusmodi, sufficiunt ad movendum, nisi superadderetur eis aliqua
+virtus, nam in immobilibus animalibus est sensus et appetitus, non
+tamen habent vim motivam. Haec autem vis motiva non solum est in
+appetitu et sensu ut imperante motum; sed etiam est in ipsis
+partibus corporis, ut sint habilia ad obediendum appetitui animae
+moventis. Cuius signum est, quod quando membra removentur a sua
+dispositione naturali, non obediunt appetitui ad motum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described---namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and
 generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should
 not class the above forces as powers of the soul.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31681] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes vegetativae
 natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde
 unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu.
 Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo
 appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius
 vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad
-audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.</p></div></div></div></div>
+audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q80_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q80_A2-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 2. Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by
+accidental differences, as we have seen above (
+<a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q80_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>). But it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the
+sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31837] Iª q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus sensitivus et intellectivus non
+sint diversae potentiae. Potentiae enim non diversificantur per
+accidentales differentias, ut supra dictum est. Sed accidit
+appetibili quod sit apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum. Ergo
+appetitus sensitivus et intellectivus non sunt diversae
+potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual
+things. But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part: for since the appetite is a movement of the soul
+to individual things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite
+is not distinguished from the sensitive.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31838] Iª q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+cognitio intellectiva est universalium, et secundum hoc
+distinguitur a sensitiva, quae est singularium. Sed ista distinctio
+non habet locum ex parte appetitivae, cum enim appetitus sit motus
+ab anima ad res, quae sunt singulares, omnis appetitus videtur esse
+rei singularis. Non ergo appetitus intellectivus debet distingui a
+sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But
+the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense.
+Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31839] Iª q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+sub apprehensivo ordinatur appetitivum ut inferior potentia, ita et
+motivum. Sed non est aliud motivum in homine consequens
+intellectum, quam in aliis animalibus consequens sensum. Ergo, pari
+ratione, neque est aliud appetitivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves
+the lower.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31840] Iª q. 80 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod philosophus, in III de anima, distinguit duplicem appetitum,
+et dicit quod appetitus superior movet inferiorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power
+is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which
+is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7).
+Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the
+corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the
+passive: indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since
+what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual
+appetite is distinct from the sensitive.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 2 co."><a name="31841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31841] Iª q. 80 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod necesse est dicere appetitum intellectivum esse aliam
+potentiam a sensitivo. Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia
+passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso, unde appetibile
+apprehensum est movens non motum, appetitus autem movens motum, ut
+dicitur in III de anima, et XII Metaphys. Passiva autem et mobilia
+distinguuntur secundum distinctionem activorum et motivorum, quia
+oportet motivum esse proportionatum mobili, et activum passivo; et
+ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum
+activum. Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per
+intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod
+appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs
+to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the
+thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the
+distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31842] Iª q. 80 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum
+vel intellectum, sed per se ei convenit, nam appetibile non movet
+appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum. Unde differentiae
+apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae
+appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum,
+sicut secundum propria obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing
+under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that
+hatred can regard a universal, as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the same way by the intellectual appetite we may
+desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge,
+virtue, and suchlike.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31843] Iª q. 80 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae
+sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam
+rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum.
+Unde philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica, quod odium potest esse de
+aliquo universali, puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus.
+Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus
+immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit; sicut scientiam,
+virtutes, et alia huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A2-p9"><!-- Added by HST, missing
+in original, copied from
+	http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques80.pdf --><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As is explained in De Anima 3, a general opinion (opinio universalis) does
+not effect movement except by the mediation of a particular case (mediante particulari).  Similarly, a
+higher appetite effects movement by the mediation of a lower appetite.  This is why the power to effect
+movement that follows upon the intellect is not distinct from the power to effect movement that follows
+upon the sensory power.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31844] Iª q. 80 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, opinio universalis
+non movet nisi mediante particulari, et similiter appetitus
+superior movet mediante inferiori. Et ideo non est alia vis motiva
+consequens intellectum et sensum.</p></div></div></div></div>
 <div id="FP_Q81" class="div3">
 <h3 id="FP_Q81-p0.1">Q. 81. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
 <p id="FP_Q81-p2"> Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q81-p3"><a href="#FP_Q81_A1"> (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q81-p4"><a href="#FP_Q81_A2"> (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q81-p5"><a href="#FP_Q81_A3"> (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?</a></p>
 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 pr."><a name="31845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31845]
 ratione communi contentas. Sicut quia visus respicit visibile
 secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae
 secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia
 quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est
 coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum
-est nigrum. Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem
+est nigrum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p7"> Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal.
+And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the
+concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas
+the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the
+will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there
+is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from
+a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they
+are on the part of the senses.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem
 rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo
 secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur
 partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam
 rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et
 conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni,
 nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni.
 Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus
 intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu
 intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis,
 sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires
-apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p7"> Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal.
+apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p8">
-And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising, that is,
-concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas
+with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive
-the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the
+appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of
-will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there
+the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are
-is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from
+attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power,
-a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they
+which is called the will.
-are on the part of the senses.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31908] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter
 accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones,
 cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic
 communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu
 sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque
 passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et
 hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic
 accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam
-tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p8">
+tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p9">
-<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising, that is,
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but
-with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive
+from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good.
-appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of
+And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this
-the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are
+way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the
-attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power,
+irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature,
-which is called the will.
+and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31909] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
-</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31909] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult
 impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis.
 Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni.
 Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest
 in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus. Sic
 etiam potest intelligi quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima,
 quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt animae antequam uniatur
 corpori (ut tamen intelligatur ordo naturae, et non temporis),
-licet non sit necessarium verbis illius libri fidem adhibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p9">
+licet non sit necessarium verbis illius libri fidem adhibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whence the answer to the third objection
-<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but
+is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31910] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio
-from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good.
-And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this
-way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the
-irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature,
-and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection
-is clear.
-</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31910] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio
 ad tertium.</p></div></div></div></div>
 <div id="FP_Q83" class="div3">
 <h3 id="FP_Q83-p0.1">Q. 83. OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
 <p id="FP_Q83-p2"> We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q83-p3"><a href="#FP_Q83_A1"> (1) Whether man has free-will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p4"><a href="#FP_Q83_A2"> (2) What is free-will---a power, an act, or a habit?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p5"><a href="#FP_Q83_A3"> (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p6"><a href="#FP_Q83_A4"> (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?</a></p>
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31980] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia
 ad actum per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui
 est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est, non autem per
 aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte
-sicut per causam remotam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A6-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 6. Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p2">
+sicut per causam remotam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A5-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 5. Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is
+known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know
+the eternal types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is "united to God as to the unknown," as
+Dionysius says (Myst. Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal
+types.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31981] Iª q. 84 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva non cognoscat res
+materiales in rationibus aeternis. Id enim in quo aliquid
+cognoscitur, ipsum magis et per prius cognoscitur. Sed anima
+intellectiva hominis, in statu praesentis vitae, non cognoscit
+rationes aeternas, quia non cognoscit ipsum Deum, in quo rationes
+aeternae existunt, sed ei sicut ignoto coniungitur, ut Dionysius
+dicit in I cap. mysticae theologiae. Ergo anima non cognoscit omnia
+in rationibus aeternis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q84_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>) that "the invisible things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made." But among the invisible things of
+God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31982] Iª q. 84 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Rom.
+I, dicitur quod <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt,
+conspiciuntur</i>. Sed inter invisibilia Dei numerantur rationes
+aeternae. Ergo rationes aeternae per creaturas materiales
+cognoscuntur, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that "ideas are permanent types
+existing in the Divine mind." If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come
+back to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31983] Iª q. 84 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+rationes aeternae nihil aliud sunt quam ideae, dicit enim
+Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>ideae sunt
+rationes stabiles rerum in mente divina existentes</i>. Si ergo
+dicatur quod anima intellectiva cognoscit omnia in rationibus
+aeternis, redibit opinio Platonis, qui posuit omnem scientiam ab
+ideis derivari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true,
+where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable
+truth which is above our minds." Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual
+soul knows all true things in the eternal types.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31984] Iª q. 84 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., <i>si ambo videmus verum esse
+quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi quaeso id
+videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me sed ambo in ipsa, quae
+supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate</i>. Veritas autem
+incommutabilis in aeternis rationibus continetur. Ergo anima
+intellectiva omnia vera cognoscit in rationibus aeternis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true
+and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens
+are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the
+heathens." Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the
+Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary
+to faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above
+<a href="#FP_Q84_A4" id="FP_Q84_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and these he called ideas, by participation of which he
+said that our intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes a
+stone, so our intellect, by
+participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves,
+outside the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held, asserting that "per se" life or "per se" wisdom
+are creative substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended
+by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to which types all things are made
+in
+themselves, and are known to the human soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 5 co."><a name="31985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31985] Iª q. 84 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in II de Doctr. Christ., <i>philosophi
+qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accommoda
+dixerunt, ab eis tanquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum
+vindicanda sunt. Habent enim doctrinae gentilium quaedam simulata
+et superstitiosa figmenta, quae unusquisque nostrum de societate
+gentilium exiens, debet evitare</i>. Et ideo Augustinus, qui
+doctrinis Platonicorum imbutus fuerat, si qua invenit fidei
+accommoda in eorum dictis, assumpsit; quae vero invenit fidei
+nostrae adversa, in melius commutavit. Posuit autem Plato, sicut
+supra dictum est, formas rerum per se subsistere a materia
+separatas, quas ideas vocabat, per quarum participationem dicebat
+intellectum nostrum omnia cognoscere; ut sicut materia corporalis
+per participationem ideae lapidis fit lapis, ita intellectus noster
+per participationem eiusdem ideae cognosceret lapidem. Sed quia
+videtur esse alienum a fide quod formae rerum extra res per se
+subsistant absque materia, sicut Platonici posuerunt, dicentes per
+se vitam aut per se sapientiam esse quasdam substantias creatrices,
+ut Dionysius dicit XI cap. de Div. Nom.; ideo Augustinus, in libro
+octoginta trium quaest., posuit loco harum idearum quas Plato
+ponebat, rationes omnium creaturarum in mente divina existere,
+secundum quas omnia formantur, et secundum quas etiam anima humana
+omnia cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p7"> When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all things in the eternal types? we must reply that one
+thing is said to be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one may see in a mirror the images
+of things reflected therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types;
+but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types. Secondly, on
+thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see
+by the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of
+these types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness
+of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q84_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.6" target="asv">Ps. 4:6,7</a>), "Many
+say: Who showeth us good things?" which question the Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon
+us," as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Cum ergo quaeritur utrum anima humana in
+rationibus aeternis omnia cognoscat, dicendum est quod aliquid in
+aliquo dicitur cognosci dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut in obiecto
+cognito; sicut aliquis videt in speculo ea quorum imagines in
+speculo resultant. Et hoc modo anima, in statu praesentis vitae,
+non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sic in
+rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deum vident et
+omnia in ipso. Alio modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut
+in cognitionis principio; sicut si dicamus quod in sole videntur ea
+quae videntur per solem. Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima
+humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum
+participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale
+quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata
+similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae.
+Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, <i>multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis
+bona?</i> Cui quaestioni Psalmista respondet, dicens, <i>signatum
+est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine</i>. Quasi dicat, per ipsam
+sigillationem divini luminis in nobis, omnia nobis demonstrantur.
+</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p8"> But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required
+in order for us to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of
+the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore
+Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): "Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things
+occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many
+kinds of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places?"
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">
+Quia tamen praeter lumen intellectuale in nobis, exiguntur species
+intelligibiles a rebus acceptae, ad scientiam de rebus materialibus
+habendam; ideo non per solam participationem rationum aeternarum de
+rebus materialibus notitiam habemus, sicut Platonici posuerunt quod
+sola idearum participatio sufficit ad scientiam habendam. Unde
+Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., <i>numquid quia philosophi
+documentis certissimis persuadent aeternis rationibus omnia
+temporalia fieri, propterea potuerunt in ipsis rationibus
+perspicere, vel ex ipsis colligere quot sint animalium genera, quae
+semina singulorum? Nonne ista omnia per locorum ac temporum
+historiam quaesierunt?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p9"> But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their "eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as
+though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu. 46)---viz. that "not each and every
+rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those that are holy and pure,"
+such as the souls of the blessed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Quod autem Augustinus non sic
+intellexerit omnia cognosci in rationibus aeternis, vel in
+incommutabili veritate, quasi ipsae rationes aeternae videantur,
+patet per hoc quod ipse dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
+quod <i>rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et
+pura fuerit, asseritur illi visioni</i>, scilicet rationum
+aeternarum, esse idonea; sicut sunt animae beatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A5-p10"> From what has been said the objections are easily solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 5 ad arg."><a name="31986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31986] Iª q. 84 a. 5 ad arg.</span></a> Et per haec
+patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A6-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 6. Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we
 cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever
 the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be perceived." Secondly, because,
 "whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to
 the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible
 homo, et quod est habens albedinem. Et simile est de compositione
 formae et materiae, nam animal significat id quod habet naturam
 sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet naturam intellectivam, homo
 vero quod habet utrumque, Socrates vero quod habet omnia haec cum
 materia individuali; et secundum hanc identitatis rationem,
-intellectus noster unum componit alteri praedicando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A8-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p2">
+intellectus noster unum componit alteri praedicando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A6-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 6. Whether the intellect can be false?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood
+are in the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same, as is shown above (
+<a href="#FP_Q79_A1" id="FP_Q85_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[1]</a>). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32058] Iª q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus possit esse falsus. Dicit enim
+philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod <i>verum et falsum sunt in
+mente</i>. Mens autem et intellectus idem sunt, ut supra dictum
+est. Ergo falsitas est in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32059] Iª q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+opinio et ratiocinatio ad intellectum pertinent. Sed in utraque
+istarum invenitur falsitas. Ergo potest esse falsitas in
+intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q85_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32060] Iª q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum in parte intellectiva est. Sed peccatum cum falsitate est,
+errant enim qui operantur malum, ut dicitur Prov. XIV. Ergo
+falsitas potest esse in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived."
+And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the intellect is always true."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32061] Iª q. 85 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod
+<i>omnis qui fallitur, id in quo fallitur non intelligit</i>. Et
+philosophus dicit, in libro de anima, quod <i>intellectus semper
+est rectus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper object,
+as sight in regard to color; has accidentally through some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ---for example, the taste
+of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however,
+may be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when, for
+example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense
+deceived concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the
+same. The reason of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is "per se" directed to its proper object; and things of
+this kind are always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not
+fail.
+Now the proper object of the intellect is the "quiddity" of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect
+is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence
+or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning. Therefore,
+also in regard to those propositions, which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles
+from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions.
+</p><p id="FP_Q85_A6-p7"> The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of its organ,
+for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the composition affecting the definition,
+when, for instance, the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a circle applied
+to a triangle; or when a definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible; as,
+for instance, to describe anything as "a rational winged animal." Hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite
+definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii,
+10.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 6 co."><a name="32062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32062] Iª q. 85 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod philosophus, in III de anima, comparat, quantum ad hoc,
+intellectum sensui. Sensus enim circa proprium obiectum non
+decipitur, sicut visus circa colorem; nisi forte per accidens, ex
+impedimento circa organum contingente, sicut cum gustus febrientium
+dulcia iudicat amara, propter hoc quod lingua malis humoribus est
+repleta. Circa sensibilia vero communia decipitur sensus, sicut in
+diiudicando de magnitudine vel figura; ut cum iudicat solem esse
+pedalem, qui tamen est maior terra. Et multo magis decipitur circa
+sensibilia per accidens; ut cum iudicat fel esse mel, propter
+coloris similitudinem. Et huius ratio est in evidenti. Quia ad
+proprium obiectum unaquaeque potentia per se ordinatur, secundum
+quod ipsa. Quae autem sunt huiusmodi, semper eodem modo se habent.
+Unde manente potentia, non deficit eius iudicium circa proprium
+obiectum. Obiectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei.
+Unde circa quidditatem rei, per se loquendo, intellectus non
+fallitur. Sed circa ea quae circumstant rei essentiam vel
+quidditatem, intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinat ad aliud,
+vel componendo vel dividendo vel etiam ratiocinando. Et propter hoc
+etiam circa illas propositiones errare non potest, quae statim
+cognoscuntur cognita terminorum quidditate, sicut accidit circa
+prima principia, ex quibus etiam accidit infallibilitas veritatis,
+secundum certitudinem scientiae, circa conclusiones. Per accidens
+tamen contingit intellectum decipi circa quod quid est in rebus
+compositis; non ex parte organi, quia intellectus non est virtus
+utens organo; sed ex parte compositionis intervenientis circa
+definitionem, dum vel definitio unius rei est falsa de alia, sicut
+definitio circuli de triangulo, vel dum aliqua definitio in seipsa
+est falsa, implicans compositionem impossibilium, ut si accipiatur
+hoc ut definitio alicuius rei, animal rationale alatum. Unde in
+rebus simplicibus, in quarum definitionibus compositio intervenire
+non potest, non possumus decipi; sed deficimus in totaliter non
+attingendo, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher says
+	that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition
+	and division.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32063] Iª q. 85 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod falsitatem dicit esse philosophus in mente secundum
+compositionem et divisionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same answer applies to
+the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning,</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32064] Iª q. 85 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum est ad secundum, de opinione et ratiocinatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> and to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who
+errs in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and
+of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense
+are to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32065] Iª q. 85 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Et ad tertium, de
+errore peccantium, qui consistit in applicatione ad appetibile. Sed
+in absoluta consideratione quidditatis rei, et eorum quae per eam
+cognoscuntur, intellectus nunquam decipitur. Et sic loquuntur
+auctoritates in contrarium inductae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A7-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 7. Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83,
+qu. 32), "Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there
+is a perfect understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding
+a thing: nor can one person understand a thing better than another can."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32066] Iª q. 85 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod unam et eandem rem unus alio melius
+intelligere non possit. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta
+trium quaest., <i>quisquis ullam rem aliter quam est intelligit non
+eam intelligit. Quare non est dubitandum esse perfectam
+intelligentiam, qua praestantior esse non possit; et ideo non per
+infinitum ire quod quaelibet res intelligitur; nec eam posse alium
+alio plus intelligere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding. But truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing,
+is not subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less
+understood.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32067] Iª q. 85 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+intellectus intelligendo verus est. Veritas autem, cum sit
+aequalitas quaedam intellectus et rei, non recipit magis et minus,
+non enim proprie dicitur aliquid magis et minus aequale. Ergo neque
+magis et minus aliquid intelligi dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if
+one man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not belong to the same species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32068] Iª q. 85 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+intellectus est id quod est formalissimum in homine. Sed
+differentia formae causat differentiam speciei. Si igitur unus homo
+magis alio intelligit, videtur quod non sint unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles
+and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate causes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32069] Iª q. 85 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod per experimentum inveniuntur aliqui aliis profundius
+intelligentes; sicut profundius intelligit qui conclusionem aliquam
+potest reducere in prima principia et causas primas, quam qui
+potest reducere solum in causas proximas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A thing being understood more by one than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word "more" be taken
+as determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood; and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more
+than another, because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or worse, would entail being deceived, and such
+a one would not understand it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense the
+word "more" can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who understands; and so one may understand
+the same thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding: just as a man may see a thing better
+with his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two ways.
+First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a
+body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason thereof is
+that act and form are received into matter according to matter's capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better disposition,
+their souls have a greater power of understanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that "it is to be observed that
+those who have soft flesh are of apt mind." Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has
+need in its operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative powers are of better disposition, are
+better disposed to understand.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 7 co."><a name="32070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32070] Iª q. 85 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod aliquem intelligere unam et eandem rem magis quam alium,
+potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod ly magis determinet
+actum intelligendi ex parte rei intellectae. Et sic non potest unus
+eandem rem magis intelligere quam alius, quia si intelligeret eam
+aliter esse quam sit, vel melius vel peius, falleretur, et non
+intelligeret ut arguit Augustinus. Alio modo potest intelligi ut
+determinet actum intelligendi ex parte intelligentis. Et sic unus
+alio potest eandem rem melius intelligere, quia est melioris
+virtutis in intelligendo; sicut melius videt visione corporali rem
+aliquam qui est perfectioris virtutis, et in quo virtus visiva est
+perfectior. Hoc autem circa intellectum contingit dupliciter. Uno
+quidem modo, ex parte ipsius intellectus, qui est perfectior.
+Manifestum est enim quod quanto corpus est melius dispositum, tanto
+meliorem sortitur animam, quod manifeste apparet in his quae sunt
+secundum speciem diversa. Cuius ratio est, quia actus et forma
+recipitur in materia secundum materiae capacitatem. Unde cum etiam
+in hominibus quidam habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur
+animam maioris virtutis in intelligendo, unde dicitur in II de
+anima quod <i>molles carne bene aptos mente videmus</i>. Alio modo
+contingit hoc ex parte inferiorum virtutum, quibus intellectus
+indiget ad sui operationem, illi enim in quibus virtus imaginativa
+et cogitativa et memorativa est melius disposita, sunt melius
+dispositi ad intelligendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A7-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b>
+	The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above;</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32071] Iª q. 85 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+patet solutio ex dictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> likewise the reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect
+consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32072] Iª q. 85 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter ad
+secundum, veritas enim intellectus in hoc consistit, quod
+intelligatur res esse sicuti est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numerical
+difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to the difference of matter.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32073] Iª q. 85 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod differentia formae quae non provenit nisi ex diversa
+dispositione materiae, non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed
+solum secundum numerum; sunt enim diversorum individuorum diversae
+formae, secundum materiam diversificatae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A8-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1)
 that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements
 are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32074] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster per prius cognoscat
 Iª q. 86 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quid
 intellectus noster in rebus materialibus cognoscat. Et circa hoc
 quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cognoscat singularia. Secundo,
 utrum cognoscat infinita. Tertio, utrum cognoscat contingentia.
 Quarto, utrum cognoscat futura.</p></div></div></div>
-<div id="FP_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether our intellect can know the infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2">
+<div id="FP_Q86_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A1-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 1. Whether our intellect knows singulars?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our
+intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our
+intellect knows this singular, Socrates.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32083] Iª q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat singularia.
+Quicumque enim cognoscit compositionem, cognoscit extrema
+compositionis. Sed intellectus noster cognoscit hanc compositionem.
+Socrates est homo, eius enim est propositionem formare. Ergo
+intellectus noster cognoscit hoc singulare quod est Socrates.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows
+the singular.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32084] Iª q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+intellectus practicus dirigit ad agendum. Sed actus sunt circa
+singularia. Ergo cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own;
+for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32085] Iª q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+intellectus noster intelligit seipsum. Ipse autem est quoddam
+singulare, alioquin non haberet aliquem actum; actus enim
+singularium sunt. Ergo intellectus noster cognoscit singulare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore,
+can the intellect know it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32086] Iª q. 86 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest superior. Sed sensus
+cognoscit singulare. Ergo multo magis intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32087] Iª q. 86 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit philosophus, in I Physic., quod <i>universale secundum
+rationem est notum, singulare autem secundum sensum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle
+of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as have said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q86_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[1]</a>), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is
+the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only. But
+indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we have said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q85_A7" id="FP_Q86_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[85], A[7]</a>), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms
+in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the
+intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the
+proposition "Socrates is a man."</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 co."><a name="32088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32088] Iª q. 86 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et
+primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium
+singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis,
+intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit
+abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem
+a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus
+noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte
+autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere
+singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species
+intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere
+nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species
+intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sic igitur
+ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit;
+indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo
+format hanc propositionem, Socrates est homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32089] Iª q. 86 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet solutio
+ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is
+said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the
+medium of a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through
+the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said De Anima
+iii, 11.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32090] Iª q. 86 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod electio particularis operabilis est quasi conclusio
+syllogismi intellectus practici, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ex
+universali autem propositione directe non potest concludi
+singularis, nisi mediante aliqua singulari propositione assumpta.
+Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediante
+particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis, ut dicitur in III de
+anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than
+immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be
+intelligible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32091] Iª q. 86 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod singulare non repugnat intelligibilitati inquantum
+est singulare, sed inquantum est materiale, quia nihil intelligitur
+nisi immaterialiter. Et ideo si sit aliquod singulare immateriale,
+sicut est intellectus, hoc non repugnat intelligibilitati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and
+concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know
+the universal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32092] Iª q. 86 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod virtus superior potest illud quod potest virtus
+inferior, sed eminentiori modo. Unde id quod cognoscit sensus
+materialiter et concrete, quod est cognoscere singulare directe,
+hoc cognoscit intellectus immaterialiter et abstracte, quod est
+cognoscere universale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether our intellect can know the infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God,
 as we have said above (
 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[1]</a>). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32093] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster possit cognoscere
 Quarto, utrum cognoscat singularia. Quinto, utrum habitus scientiae
 hic acquisitae remaneat in anima separata. Sexto, utrum possit uti
 habitu scientiae hic acquisitae. Septimo, utrum distantia localis
 impediat cognitionem animae separatae. Octavo, utrum animae
 separatae a corporibus cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur.</p></div></div></div>
-<div id="FP_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2">
+<div id="FP_Q89_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A1-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 1. Whether the separated soul can understand anything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i,
+4) that "the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle." But by death all human interior principles
+are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32181] Iª q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata nihil omnino intelligere
+possit. Dicit enim philosophus, in I de anima, quod <i>intelligere
+corrumpitur, interius quodam corrupto</i>. Sed omnia interiora
+hominis corrumpuntur per mortem. Ergo et ipsum intelligere
+corrumpitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained
+above (
+<a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q89_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[84], AA[7]</a>,8). But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have shown above (
+<a href="#FP_Q77_A8" id="FP_Q89_A1-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[77], A[8]</a>). Therefore after death the soul understands nothing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32182] Iª q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima
+humana impeditur ab intelligendo per ligamentum sensus, et
+perturbata imaginatione, sicut supra dictum est. Sed morte
+totaliter sensus et imaginatio corrumpuntur, ut ex supra dictis
+patet. Ergo anima post mortem nihil intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means
+of innate species, because it has none such; being at first "like a tablet on which nothing is written": nor does it understand
+by species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the
+abstraction of species: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted
+and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child's soul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it understand
+by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the
+effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32183] Iª q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+anima separata intelligit, oportet quod per aliquas species
+intelligat. Sed non intelligit per species innatas, quia a
+principio est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum. Neque per
+species quas abstrahat a rebus, quia non habet organa sensus et
+imaginationis, quibus mediantibus species intelligibiles
+abstrahuntur a rebus. Neque etiam per species prius abstractas, et
+in anima conservatas, quia sic anima pueri nihil intelligeret post
+mortem. Neque etiam per species intelligibiles divinitus influxas,
+haec enim cognitio non esset naturalis, de qua nunc agitur, sed
+gratiae. Ergo anima separata a corpore nihil intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body." But
+the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation and above all, that which consists in intelligence.
+Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32184] Iª q. 89 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod philosophus dicit, in I de anima, quod <i>si non est aliqua
+operationum animae propria, non contingit ipsam separari</i>.
+Contingit autem ipsam separari. Ergo habet aliquam operationem
+propriam; et maxime eam quae est intelligere. Intelligit ergo sine
+corpore existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q89_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning
+to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being
+bound up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed,
+the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible
+things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case,
+however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it would understand worse in the body
+than out of it; but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and
+not the form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the
+phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms
+are wanting to which it may turn.
+</p><p id="FP_Q89_A1-p7"> To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every
+agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from
+it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for,
+on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when
+it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore,
+when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms,
+which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply
+intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand
+by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in accordance
+with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united
+to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises.
+For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible
+objects than by turning to the phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler way of understanding
+would have been natural to it, and it would not have needed the body for that purpose.
+</p><p id="FP_Q89_A1-p8"> In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning
+to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect
+as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective
+power by the influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the
+farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified, as
+is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands all things;
+while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more
+universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such
+natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow
+a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore,
+the inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality as the superior substances, since they are not
+so strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through them would be imperfect, and of a general and
+confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect
+knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are explained to them
+singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances.
+But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in
+the
+same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general.
+Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature
+required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible
+things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples.
+</p><p id="FP_Q89_A1-p9"> It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the
+phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 1 co."><a name="32185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32185] Iª q. 89 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod ista quaestio difficultatem habet ex hoc quod anima, quandiu
+est corpori coniuncta, non potest aliquid intelligere nisi
+convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per experimentum patet. Si autem
+hoc non est ex natura animae, sed per accidens hoc convenit ei ex
+eo quod corpori alligatur, sicut Platonici posuerunt, de facili
+quaestio solvi posset. Nam remoto impedimento corporis, rediret
+anima ad suam naturam, ut intelligeret intelligibilia simpliciter,
+non convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut est de aliis substantiis
+separatis. Sed secundum hoc, non esset anima corpori unita propter
+melius animae, si peius intelligeret corpori unita quam separata;
+sed hoc esset solum propter melius corporis, quod est
+irrationabile, cum materia sit propter formam, et non e converso.
+Si autem ponamus quod anima ex sua natura habeat ut intelligat
+convertendo se ad phantasmata, cum natura animae per mortem
+corporis non mutetur, videtur quod anima naturaliter nihil possit
+intelligere, cum non sint ei praesto phantasmata ad quae
+convertatur. Et ideo ad hanc difficultatem tollendam, considerandum
+est quod, cum nihil operetur nisi inquantum est actu, modus
+operandi uniuscuiusque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius. Habet
+autem anima alium modum essendi cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a
+corpore separata, manente tamen eadem animae natura; non ita quod
+uniri corpori sit ei accidentale, sed per rationem suae naturae
+corpori unitur; sicut nec levis natura mutatur cum est in loco
+proprio, quod est ei naturale, et cum est extra proprium locum,
+quod est ei praeter naturam. Animae igitur secundum illum modum
+essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per
+conversionem ad phantasmata corporum, quae in corporeis organis
+sunt, cum autem fuerit a corpore separata, competit ei modus
+intelligendi per conversionem ad ea quae sunt intelligibilia
+simpliciter, sicut et aliis substantiis separatis. Unde modus
+intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis,
+sicut et corpori uniri, sed esse separatum a corpore est praeter
+rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad
+phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. Et ideo ad hoc unitur corpori,
+ut sit et operetur secundum naturam suam. Sed hoc rursus habet
+dubitationem. Cum enim natura semper ordinetur ad id quod melius
+est; est autem melior modus intelligendi per conversionem ad
+intelligibilia simpliciter, quam per conversionem ad phantasmata,
+debuit sic a Deo institui animae natura, ut modus intelligendi
+nobilior ei esset naturalis, et non indigeret corpori propter hoc
+uniri. Considerandum est igitur quod, etsi intelligere per
+conversionem ad superiora sit simpliciter nobilius quam intelligere
+per conversionem ad phantasmata; tamen ille modus intelligendi,
+prout erat possibilis animae, erat imperfectior. Quod sic patet. In
+omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus invenitur virtus
+intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis. Quod quidem in primo
+principio est unum et simplex; et quanto magis creaturae
+intellectuales distant a primo principio, tanto magis dividitur
+illud lumen et diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro
+egredientibus. Et inde est quod Deus per unam suam essentiam omnia
+intelligit; superiores autem intellectualium substantiarum, etsi
+per plures formas intelligant, tamen intelligunt per pauciores, et
+magis universales, et virtuosiores ad comprehensionem rerum,
+propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivae quae est in eis; in
+inferioribus autem sunt formae plures, et minus universales, et
+minus efficaces ad comprehensionem rerum, inquantum deficiunt a
+virtute intellectiva superiorum. Si ergo inferiores substantiae
+haberent formas in illa universalitate in qua habent superiores,
+quia non sunt tantae efficaciae in intelligendo, non acciperent per
+eas perfectam cognitionem de rebus, sed in quadam communitate et
+confusione. Quod aliqualiter apparet in hominibus, nam qui sunt
+debilioris intellectus, per universales conceptiones magis
+intelligentium non accipiunt perfectam cognitionem, nisi eis
+singula in speciali explicentur. Manifestum est autem inter
+substantias intellectuales, secundum naturae ordinem, infimas esse
+animas humanas. Hoc autem perfectio universi exigebat, ut diversi
+gradus in rebus essent. Si igitur animae humanae sic essent
+institutae a Deo ut intelligerent per modum qui competit
+substantiis separatis, non haberent cognitionem perfectam, sed
+confusam in communi. Ad hoc ergo quod perfectam et propriam
+cognitionem de rebus habere possent, sic naturaliter sunt
+institutae ut corporibus uniantur, et sic ab ipsis rebus
+sensibilibus propriam de eis cognitionem accipiant; sicut homines
+rudes ad scientiam induci non possunt nisi per sensibilia exempla.
+Sic ergo patet quod propter melius animae est ut corpori uniatur,
+et intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata; et tamen esse potest
+separata, et alium modum intelligendi habere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is
+a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect
+and sense. We may also say that he is referring
+	to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms.
+	</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32186] Iª q. 89 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, si diligenter verba philosophi discutiantur,
+philosophus hoc dixit ex quadam suppositione prius facta, scilicet
+quod intelligere sit quidam motus coniuncti, sicut et sentire,
+nondum enim differentiam ostenderat inter intellectum et sensum.
+Vel potest dici quod loquitur de illo modo intelligendi qui est per
+conversionem ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A1-p10a">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is also the meaning
+of the second objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32187] Iª q. 89 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> De quo etiam
+procedit secunda ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained,
+and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence
+of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases
+to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to
+the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace
+and of the light of nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32188] Iª q. 89 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod anima separata non intelligit per species innatas;
+nec per species quas tunc abstrahit; nec solum per species
+conservatas, ut obiectio probat, sed per species ex influentia
+divini luminis participatas, quarum anima fit particeps sicut et
+aliae substantiae separatae, quamvis inferiori modo. Unde tam cito
+cessante conversione ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur. Nec tamen
+propter hoc cognitio non est naturalis, quia Deus est auctor non
+solum influentiae gratuiti luminis, sed etiam naturalis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to
 the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect
 when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above (
 <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[1]</a>). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the
 body.
 argument does not prove.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32335] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod ex naturali generatione contrahitur quaedam
 propinquitas quae matrimonium impedit. Sed mulier non est producta
 a viro per naturalem generationem, sed sola virtute divina, unde
-Eva non dicitur filia Adae. Et propter hoc, ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A4-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 4. Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p2">
+Eva non dicitur filia Adae. Et propter hoc, ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A3-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 3. Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's
+body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only---either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been
+described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)---or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine
+says (Gen. ad lit. x): "A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." But the
+woman's body is not more rarefied than man's---at least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not
+formed from a rib of Adam.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32336] Iª q. 92 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuerit formari de costa viri.
+Costa enim viri fuit multo minor quam corpus mulieris. Sed ex
+minori non potest fieri maius, nisi vel per additionem, quod si
+fuisset, magis ex illo addito mulier formata diceretur quam de
+costa; vel etiam per rarefactionem, quia, ut dicit Augustinus,
+super Gen. ad Litt., <i>non est possibile ut aliquod corpus
+crescat, nisi rarescat</i>. Non autem invenitur corpus mulieris
+rarius quam viri, ad minus in ea proportione quam habet costa ad
+corpus Evae. Ergo Eva non fuit formata de costa Adae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the
+integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32337] Iª q. 92 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
+operibus primo creatis non fuit aliquid superfluum. Costa ergo Adae
+fuit de perfectione corporis eius. Ergo, ea subtracta, remansit
+imperfectum. Quod videtur inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for
+a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32338] Iª q. 92 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, costa
+non potest separari ab homine sine dolore. Sed dolor non fuit ante
+peccatum. Ergo costa non debuit separari a viro, ut ex ea mulier
+formaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.22" target="asv">Gn. 2:22</a>): "God built the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32339] Iª q. 92 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>aedificavit dominus Deus costam quam
+tulerat de Adam, in mulierem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman
+should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to
+man's contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from
+the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed---namely, blood and water---on
+which the Church was established.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 3 co."><a name="32340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32340] Iª q. 92 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod conveniens fuit mulierem formari de costa viri. Primo quidem,
+ad significandum quod inter virum et mulierem debet esse socialis
+coniunctio. Neque enim mulier debet dominari in virum, et ideo non
+est formata de capite. Neque debet a viro despici, tanquam
+serviliter subiecta, et ideo non est formata de pedibus. Secundo,
+propter sacramentum, quia de latere Christi dormientis in cruce
+fluxerunt sacramenta, idest sanguis et aqua, quibus est Ecclesia
+instituta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q92_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord
+multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the
+very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both
+because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential
+existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter
+itself. Wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without
+anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive
+greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being
+rarefied, is to combine contradictories ---viz. the definition with the absence of the thing defined.
+</p><p id="FP_Q92_A3-p8"> Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by
+creation, or which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand
+men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn"---that is, by transformation of
+the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from
+the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32341] Iª q. 92 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod quidam dicunt per multiplicationem materiae absque
+alterius additione, formatum fuisse corpus mulieris; ad modum quo
+dominus quinque panes multiplicavit. Sed hoc est omnino
+impossibile. Multiplicatio enim praedicta aut accidit secundum
+transmutationem substantiae ipsius materiae; aut secundum
+transmutationem dimensionum eius. Non autem secundum
+transmutationem substantiae ipsius materiae, tum quia materia in se
+considerata, est omnino intransmutabilis, utpote existens in
+potentia, et habens solum rationem subiecti; tum etiam quia
+multitudo et magnitudo sunt praeter essentiam ipsius materiae. Et
+ideo nullo modo potest multiplicatio materiae intelligi, eadem
+materia manente absque additione, nisi per hoc quod maiores
+dimensiones accipiat. Hoc autem est rarefieri, scilicet materiam
+eandem accipere maiores dimensiones, ut philosophus dicit in IV
+Physic. Dicere ergo materiam multiplicari absque rarefactione, est
+ponere contradictoria simul, scilicet definitionem absque definito.
+Unde, cum non appareat rarefactio in talibus multiplicationibus,
+necesse est ponere additionem materiae, vel per creationem; vel,
+quod probabilius est, per conversionem. Unde Augustinus dicit,
+super Ioan., quod <i>hoc modo Christus ex quinque panibus satiavit
+quinque millia hominum, quomodo ex paucis granis producit
+multitudinem segetum</i>; quod fit per conversionem alimenti.
+Dicitur tamen vel ex quinque panibus turbas pavisse, vel ex costa
+mulierem formasse, quia additio facta est ad materiam
+praeexistentem costae vel panum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as
+the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore,
+was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man's rib.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32342] Iª q. 92 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod costa illa fuit de perfectione Adae, non prout erat
+individuum quoddam, sed prout erat principium speciei, sicut semen
+est de perfectione generantis, quod operatione naturali cum
+delectatione resolvitur. Unde multo magis virtute divina corpus
+mulieris potuit de costa viri formari absque dolore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32343] Iª q. 92 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+solutio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A4-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 4. Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another
 individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately
 by God.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32344] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non fuerit immediate formata a Deo.
 creatura est quoddam obscurum, si comparetur ad immensitatem
 divinae claritatis, et sic Adam videbat Deum in aenigmate, quia
 videbat Deum per effectum creatum. Alio modo potest accipi
 obscuritas quae consecuta est ex peccato, prout scilicet impeditur
 homo a consideratione intelligibilium per sensibilium occupationem,
-et secundum hoc, non vidit Deum in aenigmate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A3-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 3. Whether the first man knew all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p2">
+et secundum hoc, non vidit Deum in aenigmate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A2-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 2. Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1):
+"In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company
+of the good angels."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32444] Iª q. 94 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiae Angelos per
+essentiam viderit. Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog., <i>in
+Paradiso quippe assueverat homo verbis Dei perfrui, beatorum
+Angelorum spiritibus cordis munditia et celsitudine visionis
+interesse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body
+which "is a load upon the soul," as is written
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv"> Wis. 9:15.</a> Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained (
+<a href="#FP_Q89_A2" id="FP_Q94_A2-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[89], A[2]</a>). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to
+see separate
+substances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32445] Iª q. 94 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima
+in statu praesenti impeditur a cognitione substantiarum
+separatarum, ex hoc quod est unita corpori corruptibili, quod
+aggravat animam, ut dicitur Sap. IX. Unde et anima separata
+substantias separatas videre potest, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima
+primi hominis non aggravabatur a corpore, cum non esset
+corruptibile. Ergo poterat videre substantias separatas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one separate substance knows another separate substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the
+first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32446] Iª q. 94 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, una
+substantia separata cognoscit aliam cognoscendo seipsam, ut dicitur
+in libro de causis. Sed anima primi hominis cognoscebat seipsam.
+Ergo cognoscebat substantias separatas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither
+could Adam's soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32447] Iª q. 94 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, anima
+Adae fuit eiusdem naturae cum animabus nostris. Sed animae nostrae
+non possunt nunc intelligere substantias separatas. Ergo nec anima
+primi hominis potuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and
+in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the
+state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same:
+and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's
+soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been
+made into a "living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body---namely animal life. But he was endowed with integrity
+as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above
+<a href="#FP_Q94_A1" id="FP_Q94_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now it is clear from what has been already said (
+<a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q94_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>;
+<a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q94_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[85], A[1]</a>;
+<a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q94_A2-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[89], A[1]</a>) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have
+that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul
+of the first man also.
+</p><p id="FP_Q94_A2-p7"> Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+iv). The first is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself"; the second is by the soul
+ascending "so as to be associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the soul is "led
+on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to God.
+</p><p id="FP_Q94_A2-p8"> In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because
+the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q87_A3" id="FP_Q94_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[87], A[3]</a>): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through
+the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power
+through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand
+by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (
+<a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q94_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of
+an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they
+know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence.
+Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of
+knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and
+fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company
+of the angelic spirits."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 2 co."><a name="32448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32448] Iª q. 94 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod status animae hominis distingui potest dupliciter. Uno modo,
+secundum diversum modum naturalis esse, et hoc modo distinguitur
+status animae separatae, a statu animae coniunctae corpori. Alio
+modo distinguitur status animae secundum integritatem et
+corruptionem, servato eodem modo essendi secundum naturam, et sic
+status innocentiae distinguitur a statu hominis post peccatum.
+Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiae erat corpori perficiendo et
+gubernando accommodata, sicut et nunc, unde dicitur primus homo
+factus fuisse in animam viventem, idest corpori vitam dantem,
+scilicet animalem. Sed huius vitae integritatem habebat, inquantum
+corpus erat totaliter animae subditum, in nullo ipsam impediens, ut
+supra dictum est. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod ex hoc
+quod anima est accommodata ad corporis gubernationem et
+perfectionem secundum animalem vitam, competit animae nostrae talis
+modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. Unde
+et hic modus intelligendi etiam animae primi hominis competebat.
+Secundum autem hunc modum intelligendi, motus quidam invenitur in
+anima, ut Dionysius dicit IV cap. de Div. Nom., secundum tres
+gradus. Quorum primus est, secundum quod a rebus exterioribus
+congregatur anima ad seipsam; secundus autem est, prout anima
+ascendit ad hoc quod uniatur virtutibus superioribus unitis,
+scilicet Angelis; tertius autem gradus est, secundum quod ulterius
+manuducitur ad bonum quod est supra omnia, scilicet Deum. Secundum
+igitur primum processum animae, qui est a rebus exterioribus ad
+seipsam, perficitur animae cognitio. Quia scilicet intellectualis
+operatio animae naturalem ordinem habet ad ea quae sunt extra, ut
+supra dictum est, et ita per eorum cognitionem perfecte cognosci
+potest nostra intellectualis operatio, sicut actus per obiectum. Et
+per ipsam intellectualem operationem perfecte potest cognosci
+humanus intellectus, sicut potentia per proprium actum. Sed in
+secundo processu non invenitur perfecta cognitio. Quia, cum Angelus
+non intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed longe
+eminentiori modo, ut supra dictum est; praedictus modus
+cognoscendi, quo anima cognoscit seipsam, non sufficienter ducit in
+Angeli cognitionem. Multo autem minus tertius processus ad
+perfectam notitiam terminatur, quia etiam ipsi Angeli, per hoc quod
+cognoscunt seipsos, non possunt pertingere ad cognitionem divinae
+substantiae propter eius excessum. Sic igitur anima primi hominis
+non poterat videre Angelos per essentiam. Sed tamen excellentiorem
+modum cognitionis habebat de eis, quam nos habeamus, quia eius
+cognitio erat magis certa et fixa circa interiora intelligibilia,
+quam cognitio nostra. Et propter tantam eminentiam dicit Gregorius
+quod intererat Angelorum spiritibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This makes clear the reply to the first objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32449] Iª q. 94 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet solutio
+ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that
+the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances.
+We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32450] Iª q. 94 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu
+substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravatione corporis; sed
+ex hoc quod obiectum ei connaturale erat deficiens ab excellentia
+substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem deficimus propter
+utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we
+have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32451] Iª q. 94 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod anima primi hominis non poterat per cognitionem sui
+ipsius pertingere ad cognoscendas substantias separatas, ut supra
+dictum est, quia etiam unaquaeque substantia separata cognoscit
+aliam per modum sui ipsius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A3-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 3. Whether the first man knew all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species,
 or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired
 by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural
 species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says
 (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it
 dicendum quod causa disparitatis poterat esse et ex parte Dei, non
 quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam praemiaret; sed ut quosdam
 plus, quosdam minus sublimaret, ut pulchritudo ordinis magis in
 hominibus reluceret. Et etiam ex parte naturae poterat disparitas
 causari secundum praedictum modum, absque aliquo defectu
-naturae.</p></div></div></div></div>
+naturae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q96_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A4-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 4. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
+15): "God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures;
+not over men, but over cattle."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32540] Iª q. 96 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae homini non
+dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>hominem
+rationalem, ad imaginem suam factum, non voluit Deus nisi
+irrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem
+pecori</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made
+subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>): "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power." Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32541] Iª q. 96 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud
+quod est introductum in poenam peccati, non fuisset in statu
+innocentiae. Sed hominem subesse homini, introductum est in poenam
+peccati, dictum est enim mulieri post peccatum, sub potestate viri
+eris, ut dicitur Gen. III. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erat homo
+homini subiectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in
+the state of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
+10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32542] Iª q. 96 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+subiectio libertati opponitur. Sed libertas est unum de praecipuis
+bonis, quod in statu innocentiae non defuisset, quando nihil aberat
+quod bona voluntas cupere posset, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ.
+Dei. Ergo homo homini in statu innocentiae non dominabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels
+some rule over others; and so one order is called that of "Dominations." Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state
+of innocence that one man should be subject to another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32543] Iª q. 96 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+conditio hominum in statu innocentiae non erat dignior quam
+conditio Angelorum. Sed inter Angelos quidam aliis dominantur, unde
+et unus ordo dominationum vocatur. Ergo non est contra dignitatem
+status innocentiae, quod homo homini dominaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject
+as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who
+has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been
+a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on
+the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning
+of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers
+the one whose master he is, to his own---namely the master's use. And since every man's proper good is desirable to himself,
+and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion
+implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not
+have existed between man and man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 4 co."><a name="32544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32544] Iª q. 96 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod dominium accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod
+opponitur servituti, et sic dominus dicitur cui aliquis subditur ut
+servus. Alio modo accipitur dominium, secundum quod communiter
+refertur ad subiectum qualitercumque, et sic etiam ille qui habet
+officium gubernandi et dirigendi liberos, dominus dici potest.
+Primo ergo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiae homo homini
+non dominaretur, sed secundo modo accepto dominio, in statu
+innocentiae homo homini dominari potuisset. Cuius ratio est, quia
+servus in hoc differt a libero, quod liber est causa sui, ut
+dicitur in principio Metaphys.; servus autem ordinatur ad alium.
+Tunc ergo aliquis dominatur alicui ut servo, quando eum cui
+dominatur ad propriam utilitatem sui, scilicet dominantis, refert.
+Et quia unicuique est appetibile proprium bonum, et per consequens
+contristabile est unicuique quod illud bonum quod deberet esse
+suum, cedat alteri tantum; ideo tale dominium non potest esse sine
+poena subiectorum. Propter quod, in statu innocentiae non fuisset
+tale dominium hominis ad hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A4-p7"> But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such
+a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man
+is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist
+among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such,
+seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that
+wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed
+another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according
+to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10, </a> "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another." Wherefore
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel": and
+(De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Tunc vero dominatur aliquis
+alteri ut libero, quando dirigit ipsum ad proprium bonum eius qui
+dirigitur, vel ad bonum commune. Et tale dominium hominis, ad
+hominem in statu innocentiae fuisset, propter duo. Primo quidem,
+quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, unde homines in statu
+innocentiae socialiter vixissent. Socialis autem vita multorum esse
+non posset, nisi aliquis praesideret, qui ad bonum commune
+intenderet, multi enim per se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad
+unum. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in principio Politic., quod
+quandocumque multa ordinantur ad unum, semper invenitur unum ut
+principale et dirigens. Secundo quia, si unus homo habuisset super
+alium supereminentiam scientiae et iustitiae, inconveniens fuisset
+nisi hoc exequeretur in utilitatem aliorum; secundum quod dicitur I
+Petr. IV, <i>unusquisque gratiam quam accepit, in alterutrum illam
+administrantes</i>. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod
+<i>iusti non dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi,
+hoc naturalis ordo praescribit, ita Deus hominem condidit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A4-p8"> From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="32545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32545] Iª q. 96 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad omnia obiecta, quae procedunt de primo modo
+dominii.</p></div></div></div></div>
 <div id="FP_Q97" class="div3">
 <h3 id="FP_Q97-p0.1">Q. 97. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
 <p id="FP_Q97-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual;
 secondly, as regards the preservation of the species.
 assumpsisset de cibo nisi quantum fuisset ei necessarium, unde non
 fuisset ibi superfluitatum emissio. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur,
 quod in cibo assumpto non esset aliqua faeculentia, quae non esset
 apta ut converteretur in hominis nutrimentum. Unde oportebat
 superfluitates emitti. Tamen fuisset divinitus provisum ut nulla ex
-hoc indecentia esset.</p></div></div></div></div>
+hoc indecentia esset.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q97_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A4-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 4. Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as
+an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since
+food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32575] Iª q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod lignum vitae non poterat esse causa
+immortalitatis. Nihil enim potest agere ultra suam speciem,
+effectus enim non excedit causam. Sed lignum vitae erat
+corruptibile, alioquin non potuisset in nutrimentum assumi, quia
+alimentum convertitur in substantiam nutriti, ut dictum est. Ergo
+lignum vitae incorruptibilitatem seu immortalitatem conferre non
+poterat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused
+immortality, this would have been natural immortality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32576] Iª q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+effectus qui causantur a virtutibus plantarum et aliarum naturalium
+rerum, sunt naturales. Si ergo lignum vitae immortalitatem
+causasset, fuisset illa immortalitas naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which
+the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32577] Iª q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
+videtur redire in fabulas antiquorum, qui dixerunt quod dii qui
+comedebant de quodam cibo, facti sunt immortales, quos irridet
+philosophus in III Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.22" target="asv">Gn. 3:22</a>): "Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever." Further, Augustine says
+(QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "A taste
+of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed
+to eat of the tree of life."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 97 a. 4 s. c. 1"><a name="32578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32578] Iª q. 97 a. 4 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Gen. III, <i>ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat de
+ligno vitae, et comedat et vivat in aeternum</i>.</p><p title="I q. 97 a. 4 s. c. 2"><a name="32579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32579] Iª q. 97 a. 4 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., dicit, <i>gustus
+arboris vitae corruptionem corporis inhibebat, denique etiam post
+peccatum potuit insolubilis manere, si permissum esset illi edere
+de arbore vitae</i>.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe
+that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects
+was the lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss
+man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are
+provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises
+from the fact that the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor already existing, lessens the
+specific active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength
+of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of
+the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well
+as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is
+lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from
+natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the
+force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking
+up of old age"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine])
+"The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 4 co."><a name="32580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32580] Iª q. 97 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod lignum vitae quodammodo immortalitatem causabat, non autem
+simpliciter. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duo
+remedia ad conservationem vitae habebat homo in primo statu, contra
+duos defectus. Primus enim defectus est deperditio humidi per
+actionem caloris naturalis, qui est animae instrumentum. Et contra
+hunc defectum subveniebatur homini per esum aliorum lignorum
+Paradisi, sicut et nunc subvenitur nobis, per cibos quos sumimus.
+Secundus autem defectus est quia, ut philosophus dicit I de
+Generat., illud quod generatur ex aliquo extraneo, adiunctum ei
+quod prius erat humido praeexistenti, imminuit virtutem activam
+speciei, sicut aqua adiuncta vino, primo quidem convertitur in
+saporem vini, sed secundum quod magis et magis additur, diminuit
+vini fortitudinem, et tandem vinum fit aquosum. Sic igitur videmus
+quod in principio virtus activa speciei est adeo fortis, quod
+potest convertere de alimento non solum quod sufficit ad
+restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam quod sufficit ad augmentum.
+Postmodum vero quod aggeneratur non sufficit ad augmentum, sed
+solum ad restaurationem deperditi. Tandem vero, in statu
+senectutis, nec ad hoc sufficit, unde sequitur decrementum, et
+finaliter naturalis dissolutio corporis. Et contra hunc defectum
+subveniebatur homini per lignum vitae, habebat enim virtutem
+fortificandi virtutem speciei contra debilitatem provenientem ex
+admixtione extranei. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei,
+quod <i>cibus aderat homini ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, et
+lignum vitae ne senectus eum dissolveret</i>. Et in libro de
+quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., dicit quod <i>vitae arbor medicinae
+modo corruptionem hominum prohibebat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A4-p7"> Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the
+tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble;
+which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to
+give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is
+manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite,
+man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be
+either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Non tamen simpliciter
+immortalitatem causabat. Quia neque virtus quae inerat animae ad
+conservandum corpus, causabatur ex ligno vitae, neque etiam poterat
+immortalitatis dispositionem corpori praestare, ut nunquam dissolvi
+posset. Quod ex hoc patet, quia virtus cuiuscumque corporis est
+finita. Unde non poterat virtus ligni vitae ad hoc se extendere ut
+daret corpori virtutem Durandi tempore infinito, sed usque ad
+determinatum tempus. Manifestum est enim quod, quanto aliqua virtus
+est maior, tanto imprimit durabiliorem effectum. Unde cum virtus
+ligni vitae esset finita, semel sumptum praeservabat a corruptione
+usque ad determinatum tempus; quo finito, vel homo translatus
+fuisset ad spiritualem vitam, vel indiguisset iterum sumere de
+ligno vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A4-p8"> From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause
+immortality; while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the explanation above
+given.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32581] Iª q. 97 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+responsio ab obiecta. Nam primae rationes concludunt quod non
+causabat incorruptibilitatem simpliciter. Aliae vero concludunt
+quod causabat incorruptibilitatem impediendo corruptionem, secundum
+modum praedictum.</p></div></div></div></div>
 <div id="FP_Q98" class="div3">
 <h3 id="FP_Q98-p0.1">Q. 98. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
 <p id="FP_Q98-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the
 offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
 prolis generandae. Et primo, quantum ad corpus; secundo, quantum ad
 iustitiam; tertio, quantum ad scientiam. Circa primum quaeruntur
 duo. Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae pueri mox geniti habuissent
 perfectam virtutem corpoream. Secundo, utrum omnes fuissent nati in
 sexu masculino.</p></div></div></div>
-<div id="FP_Q99_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q99_A2-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 2. Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p2">
+<div id="FP_Q99_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q99_A1-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately
+after birth?
+</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members,
+immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits their weakness
+of mind." But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been
+weakness of body in infants.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32603] Iª q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae, mox nati,
+virtutem perfectam habuissent ad motum membrorum. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in libro de Bapt. Parvul., quod <i>infirmitati mentis
+congruit haec infirmitas corporis</i>, quae scilicet in pueris
+apparet. Sed in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset infirmitas mentis.
+Ergo neque talis infirmitas corporis fuisset in parvulis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore
+much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin
+that he has not that strength.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32604] Iª q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quaedam animalia statim cum nascuntur, habent virtutem sufficientem
+ad usum membrorum. Sed homo est nobilior aliis animalibus. Ergo
+multo magis est naturale homini quod statim natus virtutem habeat
+ad usum membrorum. Et ita videtur esse poena ex peccato
+consequens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of
+their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been
+afflicted, which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have been deprived
+of the use of their limbs.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32605] Iª q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, non
+posse consequi delectabile propositum, afflictionem inducit. Sed si
+pueri non habuissent virtutem ad movendum membra, frequenter
+accidisset quod non possent consequi aliquod delectabile eis
+propositum. Ergo fuisset in eis afflictio; quae non poterat esse
+ante peccatum. Non ergo in statu innocentiae defuisset pueris
+virtus ad movendum membra.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been
+no weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32606] Iª q. 99 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+defectus senectutis videtur correspondere defectui pueritiae. Sed
+in statu innocentiae non fuisset defectus senectutis. Ergo neque
+etiam defectus pueritiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. Therefore
+from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32607] Iª q. 99 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod omne generatum prius est imperfectum quam perficiatur. Sed
+pueri in statu innocentiae fuissent per generationem producti. Ergo
+a principio imperfecti fuissent et quantitate et virtute
+corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any
+assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to
+us by Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children
+should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth.
+Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable
+humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs.
+On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after
+birth.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 co."><a name="32608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32608] Iª q. 99 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod ea quae sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus; quod autem
+credimus, auctoritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi
+debemus naturam rerum, praeter ea quae auctoritate divina
+traduntur, quae sunt supra naturam. Manifestum est autem naturale
+hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod
+pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum
+membra. Quia homo naturaliter habet cerebrum maius in quantitate,
+secundum proportionem sui corporis, quam cetera animalia. Unde
+naturale est quod, propter maximam humiditatem cerebri in pueris,
+nervi, qui sunt instrumenta motus, non sunt idonei ad movendum
+membra. Ex alia vero parte nulli Catholico dubium est quin divina
+virtute fieri possit, ut pueri mox nati perfectam virtutem habeant
+ad motum membrorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p8"> Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that "God made man right" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As,
+therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will,
+so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it
+tends
+to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, therefore,
+conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every
+kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Constat autem per auctoritatem Scripturae, quod
+Deus fecit hominem rectum, et haec rectitudo consistit, ut
+Augustinus dicit, in perfecta subiectione corporis ad animam. Sicut
+ergo in primo statu non poterat esse in membris hominis aliquid
+quod repugnaret ordinatae hominis voluntati, ita membra hominis
+deficere non poterant humanae voluntati. Voluntas autem hominis
+ordinata est quae tendit in actus sibi convenientes. Non sunt autem
+iidem actus convenientes homini secundum quamlibet aetatem.
+Dicendum est ergo quod pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem
+virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus; sed ad actus
+pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia
+huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy;
+as is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than
+to suckle."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32609] Iª q. 99 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de ista infirmitate quae nunc in
+pueris apparet etiam quantum ad actus eorum pueritiae convenientes;
+ut patet per ea quae praemittit, quod <i>iuxta se iacentibus
+mammis, magis possunt esurientes flere quam sugere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more
+perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect,
+so that a small amount of strength suffices them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32610] Iª q. 99 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc quod quaedam animalia statim nata habent usum
+membrorum, non est ex eorum nobilitate, cum quaedam animalia
+perfectiora hoc non habeant, sed hoc eis contingit ex siccitate
+cerebri, et quia actus proprii talium animalium sunt imperfecti, ad
+quos etiam parva virtus sufficere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p11"> Reply OBJ 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate
+will; and only what was befitting to their state of life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32611] Iª q. 99 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium patet
+solutio per ea quae dicta sunt in corpore. Vel potest dici quod
+nihil appetivissent, nisi ordinata voluntate convenisset res
+secundum statum suum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A1-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have
+been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32612] Iª q. 99 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae generatus fuisset, sed non
+fuisset corruptus. Et ideo in statu illo potuissent esse aliqui
+defectus pueriles, qui consequuntur generationem; non autem
+defectus seniles, qui ordinantur ad corruptionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q99_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q99_A2-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 2. Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,
 3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing
 would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32613] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in primo statu feminae natae non fuissent.

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