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| date | Sun, 08 Mar 2009 13:44:58 +0000 |
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| 5 <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual AquinasQuestion 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</title><style> | |
| 6 h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} | |
| 7 @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm} | |
| 8 </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2> | |
| 9 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13" next="FP_Q13_A1" prev="FP_Q12_A13" progress="1.92%" n="xii" title="Question. 13 - THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)"> | |
| 10 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p0.1">Question 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 11 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9" next="FP_Q13_A10" prev="FP_Q13_A8" progress="2.21%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether this name “God” is communicable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4> | |
| 12 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Pet.1.4" parsed="vul|2Pet|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" passage="2 Pet. 1:4">2 Pet. 1:4</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to | |
| 13 others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28859" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28859] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 14 proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile. | |
| 15 Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur | |
| 16 et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat | |
| 17 divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II | |
| 18 Pet. I, <i>magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc | |
| 19 efficiamur divinae consortes naturae</i>. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est | |
| 20 communicabile.</p></div></div> | |
| 21 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> | |
| 22 Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" | |
| 23 is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact | |
| 24 that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are | |
| 25 gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" is | |
| 26 communicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28860" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28860] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sola | |
| 27 nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est | |
| 28 nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet | |
| 29 plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>. | |
| 30 Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div> | |
| 31 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> | |
| 32 Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other | |
| 33 names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as | |
| 34 "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is | |
| 35 communicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28861" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28861] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc | |
| 36 nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina | |
| 37 quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt | |
| 38 communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen | |
| 39 Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div> | |
| 40 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the | |
| 41 contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to | |
| 42 wood and stones" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.21" parsed="vul|Wis|14|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" passage="Wis. 14:21">Wis. 14:21</scripRef>), in reference to the | |
| 43 divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28862" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28862] Iª q. 13 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 44 quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus | |
| 45 imposuerunt</i>; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen | |
| 46 Deus est nomen incommunicabile.</p></div></div> | |
| 47 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 48 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or | |
| 49 strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the | |
| 50 reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing | |
| 51 cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be | |
| 52 communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound | |
| 53 things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7" shownumber="no"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who | |
| 54 by nature are not gods," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gal.4.8" parsed="vul|Gal|4|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" passage="Gal. 4:8">Gal. 4:8</scripRef>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p8" shownumber="no"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.</p> | |
| 55 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28863" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28863] Iª q. 13 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 56 quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo, | |
| 57 proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile | |
| 58 est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile | |
| 59 multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est | |
| 60 communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis | |
| 61 significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus | |
| 62 illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per | |
| 63 similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid | |
| 64 leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones | |
| 65 dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt | |
| 66 communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito | |
| 67 singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel | |
| 68 secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana | |
| 69 communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis | |
| 70 non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; | |
| 71 potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis | |
| 72 existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam | |
| 73 cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno | |
| 74 supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum | |
| 75 naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest | |
| 76 intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod | |
| 77 est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen | |
| 78 impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile | |
| 79 et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere | |
| 80 pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod | |
| 81 individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum | |
| 82 similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, | |
| 83 inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet | |
| 84 fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod | |
| 85 suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae | |
| 86 subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis, | |
| 87 non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per | |
| 88 similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas | |
| 89 simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum | |
| 90 quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum | |
| 91 habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis | |
| 92 nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde, | |
| 93 quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus | |
| 94 quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum | |
| 95 compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad | |
| 96 significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen | |
| 97 Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est; | |
| 98 natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est, | |
| 99 sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum | |
| 100 rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc | |
| 101 nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos | |
| 102 soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, <i>his qui natura non sunt | |
| 103 dii, serviebatis</i>; Glossa, <i>non sunt dii natura, sed opinione | |
| 104 hominum</i>. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non | |
| 105 secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per | |
| 106 quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid | |
| 107 divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, <i>ego dixi, dii | |
| 108 estis</i>. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum | |
| 109 Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod | |
| 110 consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis | |
| 111 incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud | |
| 112 Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc | |
| 113 individuum.</p></div></div> | |
| 114 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 115 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the | |
| 116 participation of some similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28864" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28864] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 117 dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum | |
| 118 similitudinis participationem.</p></div></div> | |
| 119 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 120 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, | |
| 121 for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God | |
| 122 Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do | |
| 123 not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of | |
| 124 being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to | |
| 125 the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name | |
| 126 "sun."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28865" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28865] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 127 dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non | |
| 128 proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse | |
| 129 Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis. | |
| 130 Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum | |
| 131 essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum | |
| 132 rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc | |
| 133 nomine sol.</p></div></div> | |
| 134 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 135 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the | |
| 136 perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify | |
| 137 the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves | |
| 138 absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But | |
| 139 this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which | |
| 140 we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28866" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28866] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 141 dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita | |
| 142 quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non | |
| 143 tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad | |
| 144 significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum | |
| 145 rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus | |
| 146 impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue, | |
| 147 ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div> | |
| 148 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10" next="FP_Q13_A11" prev="FP_Q13_A9" progress="2.25%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4> | |
| 149 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> | |
| 150 It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, | |
| 151 by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse | |
| 152 signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and | |
| 153 negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who | |
| 154 says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is | |
| 155 God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28867" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28867] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic | |
| 156 proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per | |
| 157 naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim | |
| 158 est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et | |
| 159 negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed Catholicus | |
| 160 dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est | |
| 161 Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.</p></div></div> | |
| 162 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> | |
| 163 Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the | |
| 164 enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not | |
| 165 in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this | |
| 166 supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this | |
| 167 name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in | |
| 168 opinion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28868" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28868] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 169 sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem, | |
| 170 ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum | |
| 171 opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo | |
| 172 univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine | |
| 173 vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum | |
| 174 veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div> | |
| 175 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> | |
| 176 Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now | |
| 177 when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name | |
| 178 God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the | |
| 179 heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore | |
| 180 this name "God" is applied univocally to both.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28869" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28869] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 181 univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit | |
| 182 unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super | |
| 183 omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum | |
| 184 esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.</p></div></div> | |
| 185 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 186 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p6" shownumber="no"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.</p> | |
| 187 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><div xml:lang="la"> | |
| 188 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28870" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28870] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 189 illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re, | |
| 190 ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de | |
| 191 animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de | |
| 192 Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.</p> | |
| 193 <p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28871" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28871] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 194 nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non | |
| 195 cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non | |
| 196 significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens | |
| 197 unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed | |
| 198 aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p> | |
| 199 </div></div></div> | |
| 200 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 201 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition | |
| 202 of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p8" shownumber="no"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is | |
| 203 comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.</p> | |
| 204 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28872" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28872] Iª q. 13 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 205 quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non | |
| 206 accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc | |
| 207 patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est | |
| 208 omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen | |
| 209 secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione | |
| 210 eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens | |
| 211 de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de | |
| 212 accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in | |
| 213 definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina; | |
| 214 huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et | |
| 215 medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus, | |
| 216 secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum | |
| 217 quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim | |
| 218 aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus | |
| 219 nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum | |
| 220 idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari | |
| 221 aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum | |
| 222 est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum | |
| 223 significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde | |
| 224 manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.</p></div></div> | |
| 225 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 226 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it | |
| 227 is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.95.5" parsed="vul|Ps|95|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" passage="Ps. 95:5">Ps. 95:5</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p10" shownumber="no"> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.</p> | |
| 228 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><div xml:lang="la"> | |
| 229 <p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28873" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28873] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 230 dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis | |
| 231 praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo, | |
| 232 de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo. | |
| 233 Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo | |
| 234 intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet | |
| 235 significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius | |
| 236 intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud. | |
| 237 Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit | |
| 238 Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad | |
| 239 significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum, | |
| 240 non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic | |
| 241 enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali | |
| 242 significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, <i>omnes dii | |
| 243 gentium Daemonia</i>.</p> | |
| 244 <p title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28874" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28874] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter | |
| 245 dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt | |
| 246 secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum | |
| 247 diversam significationem.</p> | |
| 248 </div></div></div> | |
| 249 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to | |
| 250 Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured | |
| 251 animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal | |
| 252 names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, | |
| 253 which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated | |
| 254 equivocally of different predicaments.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 4" shownumber="no"><a name="28875" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28875] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 255 dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non | |
| 256 dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit | |
| 257 aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod | |
| 258 analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de | |
| 259 diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div> | |
| 260 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use | |
| 261 names the meaning of which we know not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5" shownumber="no"><a name="28876" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 262 dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus | |
| 263 neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam | |
| 264 rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra | |
| 265 dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere | |
| 266 potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua | |
| 267 accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero | |
| 268 aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec | |
| 269 ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum | |
| 270 significationem ignoramus.</p></div></div> | |
| 271 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11" next="FP_Q13_A12" prev="FP_Q13_A10" progress="2.29%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4> | |
| 272 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> | |
| 273 It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of | |
| 274 God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE | |
| 275 WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS | |
| 276 is not the most proper name of God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28877" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28877] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum | |
| 277 sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime | |
| 278 proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile, | |
| 279 ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile. | |
| 280 Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div> | |
| 281 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> | |
| 282 Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good | |
| 283 excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially | |
| 284 belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore | |
| 285 this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO | |
| 286 IS.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28878" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28878] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 287 Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>boni nominatio est | |
| 288 manifestativa omnium Dei processionum</i>. Sed hoc maxime Deo | |
| 289 convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen | |
| 290 bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div> | |
| 291 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> | |
| 292 Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for | |
| 293 God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS | |
| 294 imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not | |
| 295 the most applicable to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28879" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28879] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 296 nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus | |
| 297 non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est | |
| 298 nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est | |
| 299 non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div> | |
| 300 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the | |
| 301 contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say | |
| 302 to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered | |
| 303 him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" | |
| 304 (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.13-Exod.3.14" parsed="vul|Exod|3|13|3|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" passage="Ex. 3:13,14">Ex. 3:13,14</scripRef>). Therefor this name HE | |
| 305 WHO IS most properly belongs to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28880" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28880] Iª q. 13 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 306 quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, <i>si dixerint mihi, | |
| 307 quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?</i> Et respondit ei dominus, | |
| 308 <i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui | |
| 309 est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div> | |
| 310 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 311 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7" shownumber="no"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p8" shownumber="no"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the | |
| 312 more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of | |
| 313 substance."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p9" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).</p> | |
| 314 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28881" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28881] Iª q. 13 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 315 quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen | |
| 316 Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat | |
| 317 formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius | |
| 318 essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est, | |
| 319 manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat | |
| 320 Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. Secundo, propter | |
| 321 eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus | |
| 322 communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra | |
| 323 ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant | |
| 324 ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam | |
| 325 cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque | |
| 326 modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo | |
| 327 quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus | |
| 328 determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie | |
| 329 dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod | |
| 330 <i>principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui | |
| 331 est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut | |
| 332 quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum</i>. | |
| 333 Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae | |
| 334 rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se | |
| 335 habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum <i>pelagus | |
| 336 substantiae infinitum</i>. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione. | |
| 337 Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo | |
| 338 dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit | |
| 339 Augustinus in V de Trin.</p></div></div> | |
| 340 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, | |
| 341 singular.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28882" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28882] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 342 dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam | |
| 343 hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et | |
| 344 quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. | |
| 345 Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est | |
| 346 magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum | |
| 347 naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton, | |
| 348 quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam | |
| 349 incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.</p></div></div> | |
| 350 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to | |
| 351 Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so | |
| 352 far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered | |
| 353 absolutely comes before the idea of cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28883" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28883] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 354 dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum | |
| 355 est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute | |
| 356 praeintelligitur causae.</p></div></div> | |
| 357 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to | |
| 358 Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should | |
| 359 import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed | |
| 360 from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the | |
| 361 first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28884" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28884] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 362 dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina | |
| 363 importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab | |
| 364 aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter | |
| 365 quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div> | |
| 366 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12" next="FP_Q14" prev="FP_Q13_A11" progress="2.31%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4> | |
| 367 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> | |
| 368 It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For | |
| 369 Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true; | |
| 370 but affirmations are vague."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28885" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28885] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum | |
| 371 sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt | |
| 372 formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod | |
| 373 <i>negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem | |
| 374 incompactae</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 375 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> | |
| 376 Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a | |
| 377 subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q[3] | |
| 378 ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an | |
| 379 affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an | |
| 380 affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28886" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28886] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 381 Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod <i>forma simplex subiectum | |
| 382 esse non potest</i>. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra | |
| 383 ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo | |
| 384 propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de | |
| 385 Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div> | |
| 386 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> | |
| 387 Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise | |
| 388 than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown | |
| 389 above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every | |
| 390 affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows | |
| 391 that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28887" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 392 omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed | |
| 393 Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est. | |
| 394 Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum | |
| 395 compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo | |
| 396 formari non possit.</p></div></div> | |
| 397 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the | |
| 398 contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative | |
| 399 propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He | |
| 400 is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed | |
| 401 about God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28888" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28888] Iª q. 13 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 402 quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam | |
| 403 affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus, | |
| 404 et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt | |
| 405 vere formari de Deo.</p></div></div> | |
| 406 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 407 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for | |
| 408 the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in | |
| 409 some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.</p> | |
| 410 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28889" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28889] Iª q. 13 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 411 quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad | |
| 412 cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione | |
| 413 affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent | |
| 414 idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et | |
| 415 hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato | |
| 416 accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali. | |
| 417 Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et | |
| 418 differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. | |
| 419 Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est | |
| 420 homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura | |
| 421 sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur | |
| 422 homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito, | |
| 423 sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem | |
| 424 praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum | |
| 425 intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem | |
| 426 suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam | |
| 427 formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod | |
| 428 praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero | |
| 429 diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas | |
| 430 praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus | |
| 431 per ipsam compositionem. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino | |
| 432 unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas | |
| 433 conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso | |
| 434 est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis | |
| 435 conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus | |
| 436 respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae | |
| 437 est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et | |
| 438 subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per | |
| 439 compositionem.</p></div></div> | |
| 440 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 441 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, | |
| 442 according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name | |
| 443 can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28890" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28890] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 444 dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse | |
| 445 incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem, | |
| 446 inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut | |
| 447 supra dictum est.</p></div></div> | |
| 448 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 449 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as | |
| 450 they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound | |
| 451 things in which there is something taken as subject and something that | |
| 452 is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and | |
| 453 attributes something else to it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28891" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28891] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 454 dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices | |
| 455 subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed | |
| 456 apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid | |
| 457 quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit | |
| 458 formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.</p></div></div> | |
| 459 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this | |
| 460 does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but | |
| 461 its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it | |
| 462 understands simple things above itself, it understands them according | |
| 463 to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to | |
| 464 understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not | |
| 465 false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28892" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28892] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 466 dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter | |
| 467 quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter | |
| 468 potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel | |
| 469 ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera | |
| 470 est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse | |
| 471 aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito, | |
| 472 quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit | |
| 473 eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis, | |
| 474 sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in | |
| 475 intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod | |
| 476 intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit | |
| 477 immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed | |
| 478 habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum | |
| 479 intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum | |
| 480 modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea | |
| 481 esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans | |
| 482 compositionem de Deo.</p></div></div> | |
| 483 </div></div> | |
| 484 | |
| 485 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14" next="FP_Q14_A1" prev="FP_Q13_A12" progress="2.35%" n="xiii" title="Question. 14 - OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)"> | |
| 486 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p0.1">Question 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 487 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" next="FP_Q14_A6" prev="FP_Q14_A4" progress="2.46%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God knows things other than Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4> | |
| 488 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 489 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p2" | |
| 490 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know | |
| 491 things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of | |
| 492 God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does | |
| 493 not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things | |
| 494 other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 495 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28924"><span class= | |
| 496 "ref">[28924] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 497 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque | |
| 498 enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in | |
| 499 libro octoginta trium qu., quod <i>neque quidquam Deus extra | |
| 500 seipsum intuetur</i>. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se.</p></div></div> | |
| 501 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 502 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p3" | |
| 503 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is | |
| 504 the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God | |
| 505 understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the | |
| 506 perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is | |
| 507 impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 508 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28925"><span class= | |
| 509 "ref">[28925] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 510 intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat | |
| 511 alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod | |
| 512 est impossibile.</p></div></div> | |
| 513 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 514 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p4" | |
| 515 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding | |
| 516 is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from | |
| 517 its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the | |
| 518 nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If | |
| 519 therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God | |
| 520 Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot | |
| 521 be. Therefore He does not understand things other than | |
| 522 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 523 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28926"><span class= | |
| 524 "ref">[28926] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum | |
| 525 intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius | |
| 526 actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius, | |
| 527 quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est | |
| 528 ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus | |
| 529 intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid | |
| 530 aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a | |
| 531 se.</p></div></div> | |
| 532 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 533 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5" | |
| 534 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are | |
| 535 naked and open to His eyes" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.13" | |
| 536 parsed="vul|Heb|4|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5.1" | |
| 537 passage="Heb. 4:13">Heb. 4:13</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: | |
| 538 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28927"><span class= | |
| 539 "ref">[28927] Iª q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 540 quod dicitur Hebr. IV, <i>omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis | |
| 541 eius</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 542 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 543 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact | |
| 544 that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for | |
| 545 everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.</p> | |
| 546 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="28928"><span class= | |
| 547 "ref">[28928] Iª q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 548 quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim | |
| 549 quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset | |
| 550 perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte | |
| 551 aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte | |
| 552 cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non | |
| 553 potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum | |
| 554 virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa | |
| 555 effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod | |
| 556 Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si | |
| 557 adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est | |
| 558 eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut | |
| 559 in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et | |
| 560 quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod | |
| 561 est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est.</p></div></div> | |
| 562 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 563 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the | |
| 564 mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p8" shownumber="no"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.</p> | |
| 565 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p>Ad | |
| 566 sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod | |
| 567 dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in | |
| 568 altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur | |
| 569 per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus | |
| 570 videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod | |
| 571 videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per | |
| 572 speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem | |
| 573 speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri.</p> | |
| 574 <p>Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia | |
| 575 seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in | |
| 576 ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem | |
| 577 aliorum ab ipso.</p></div></div> | |
| 578 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 579 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p9" | |
| 580 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine | |
| 581 in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to | |
| 582 be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in | |
| 583 the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in | |
| 584 Himself, as above explained.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 585 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28929"><span class= | |
| 586 "ref">[28929] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 587 dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se | |
| 588 intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se | |
| 589 intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in | |
| 590 seipso, ut dictum est.</p></div></div> | |
| 591 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the | |
| 592 divine intellect other than the divine essence.</p></div><div | |
| 593 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28930"><span class= | |
| 594 "ref">[28930] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 595 dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem | |
| 596 secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam | |
| 597 est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, <i>lapis enim non | |
| 598 est in anima, sed species eius</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ea | |
| 599 vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia | |
| 600 Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod | |
| 601 aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia | |
| 602 Dei.</p></div></div> | |
| 603 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible | |
| 604 form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the | |
| 605 principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own | |
| 606 essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does | |
| 607 not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is | |
| 608 specified by anything else than the divine essence | |
| 609 itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 610 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28931"><span class= | |
| 611 "ref">[28931] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 612 dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in | |
| 613 alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia | |
| 614 intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per | |
| 615 obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium | |
| 616 intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per | |
| 617 formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per | |
| 618 calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur | |
| 619 intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec | |
| 620 est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud | |
| 621 quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde | |
| 622 non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus, | |
| 623 specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div> | |
| 624 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6" next="FP_Q14_A7" prev="FP_Q14_A5" progress="2.50%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4> | |
| 625 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper | |
| 626 knowledge.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 627 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932"><span class= | |
| 628 "ref">[28932] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 629 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria | |
| 630 cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum | |
| 631 quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in | |
| 632 prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo, | |
| 633 sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in | |
| 634 universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus | |
| 635 cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam | |
| 636 cognitionem.</p></div></div> | |
| 637 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge | |
| 638 of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 639 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28933"><span class= | |
| 640 "ref">[28933] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 641 quantum distat essentia creaturae ab essentia divina, tantum distat | |
| 642 essentia divina ab essentia creaturae. Sed per essentiam creaturae | |
| 643 non potest cognosci essentia divina, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec | |
| 644 per essentiam divinam potest cognosci essentia creaturae. Et sic, | |
| 645 cum Deus nihil cognoscat nisi per essentiam suam, sequitur quod non | |
| 646 cognoscat creaturam secundum eius essentiam, ut cognoscat de ea | |
| 647 quid est, quod est propriam cognitionem de re habere.</p></div></div> | |
| 648 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 649 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p4" | |
| 650 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a | |
| 651 thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all | |
| 652 things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by | |
| 653 its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and | |
| 654 diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, | |
| 655 but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their | |
| 656 proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of | |
| 657 them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28934"><span class= | |
| 658 "ref">[28934] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 659 propria cognitio non habetur de re, nisi per propriam eius | |
| 660 rationem. Sed cum Deus cognoscat omnia per essentiam suam, non | |
| 661 videtur quod unumquodque per propriam rationem cognoscat, idem enim | |
| 662 non potest esse propria ratio multorum et diversorum. Non ergo | |
| 663 habet propriam cognitionem Deus de rebus, sed communem, nam | |
| 664 cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res | |
| 665 solum in communi.</p></div></div> | |
| 666 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 667 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5" | |
| 668 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of | |
| 669 things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct | |
| 670 from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is | |
| 671 written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the | |
| 672 spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of | |
| 673 thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature | |
| 674 invisible in His sight" (<scripRef | |
| 675 osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.12-Heb.4.13" parsed="vul|Heb|4|12|4|13" | |
| 676 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5.1" | |
| 677 passage="Heb. 4:12,13">Heb. 4:12,13</scripRef>).</p></div><div | |
| 678 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28935"><span class= | |
| 679 "ref">[28935] Iª q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 680 habere propriam cognitionem de rebus, est cognoscere res non solum | |
| 681 in communi, sed secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. Sic autem | |
| 682 Deus cognoscit res. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, quod <i>pertingit usque | |
| 683 ad divisionem spiritus et animae, compagum quoque et medullarum; et | |
| 684 discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis; et non est ulla | |
| 685 creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 686 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 687 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7" shownumber="no"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His | |
| 688 understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for | |
| 689 instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity | |
| 690 of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes | |
| 691 them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God | |
| 692 is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; | |
| 693 and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p9" shownumber="no"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, | |
| 694 unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.</p> | |
| 695 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="28936"><span class= | |
| 696 "ref">[28936] Iª q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 697 quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt, dicentes quod Deus alia a se non | |
| 698 cognoscit nisi in communi, scilicet inquantum sunt entia. Sicut | |
| 699 enim ignis, si cognosceret seipsum ut est principium caloris, | |
| 700 cognosceret naturam caloris, et omnia alia inquantum sunt calida; | |
| 701 ita Deus, inquantum cognoscit se ut principium essendi, cognoscit | |
| 702 naturam entis, et omnia alia inquantum sunt entia. Sed hoc non | |
| 703 potest esse. Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in | |
| 704 speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus | |
| 705 noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad | |
| 706 cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam | |
| 707 rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut | |
| 708 patet in I Physic. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se, | |
| 709 esset in universali tantum, et non in speciali, sequeretur quod | |
| 710 eius intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per | |
| 711 consequens nec eius esse, quod est contra ea quae superius ostensa | |
| 712 sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria | |
| 713 cognitione; non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis, | |
| 714 sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad huius | |
| 715 evidentiam, considerandum est quod quidam, volentes ostendere quod | |
| 716 Deus per unum cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis, ut puta | |
| 717 quod, si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas | |
| 718 progredientes a centro; vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam, | |
| 719 cognosceret omnes colores. Sed haec exempla, licet quantum ad | |
| 720 aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem; | |
| 721 tamen deficiunt quantum ad hoc, quod multitudo et diversitas non | |
| 722 causantur ab illo uno principio universali, quantum ad id quod | |
| 723 principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo | |
| 724 communicant. Non enim diversitas colorum causatur ex luce solum, | |
| 725 sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis, et similiter | |
| 726 diversitas linearum ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod huiusmodi | |
| 727 diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio | |
| 728 secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non | |
| 729 sic est. Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in | |
| 730 quacumque creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum | |
| 731 modum excellentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant, | |
| 732 scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per | |
| 733 quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et | |
| 734 intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et | |
| 735 intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma, | |
| 736 per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio | |
| 737 quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad | |
| 738 id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae | |
| 739 res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones | |
| 740 contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non | |
| 741 sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad | |
| 742 lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos, ut si dicerem, | |
| 743 homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad numeros | |
| 744 imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum | |
| 745 perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti, non solum in communi, | |
| 746 sed etiam propria cognitione. Sicut qui cognoscit hominem, | |
| 747 cognoscit animal propria cognitione, et qui cognoscit senarium, | |
| 748 cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, cum essentia | |
| 749 Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cuiuscumque | |
| 750 rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria | |
| 751 cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit, | |
| 752 secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat. | |
| 753 Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret | |
| 754 quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio, nec etiam | |
| 755 ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos | |
| 756 essendi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria | |
| 757 cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur.</p></div></div> | |
| 758 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 759 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone | |
| 760 according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to | |
| 761 import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p11" shownumber="no"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.</p> | |
| 762 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28937"><span class= | |
| 763 "ref">[28937] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 764 dicendum quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est, | |
| 765 potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium | |
| 766 sic importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. Et sic falsum | |
| 767 est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud | |
| 768 esse quod habet in cognoscente, oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem | |
| 769 secundum esse quod habet in oculo; sed per speciem lapidis quam | |
| 770 habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra | |
| 771 oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse | |
| 772 quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum | |
| 773 esse quod habet extra cognoscentem, sicut intellectus cognoscit | |
| 774 lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu, | |
| 775 inquantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse | |
| 776 lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod hoc | |
| 777 adverbium sic importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod | |
| 778 sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in | |
| 779 cognoscente, quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente, | |
| 780 tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est | |
| 781 quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod | |
| 782 in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto | |
| 783 perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso.</p></div></div> | |
| 784 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 785 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p12" | |
| 786 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is | |
| 787 compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect | |
| 788 act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the | |
| 789 knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the | |
| 790 converse.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 791 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28938"><span class= | |
| 792 "ref">[28938] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 793 dicendum quod essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut | |
| 794 actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non | |
| 795 sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e | |
| 796 converso.</p></div></div> | |
| 797 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 798 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p13" | |
| 799 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be | |
| 800 taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the | |
| 801 divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the | |
| 802 proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which | |
| 803 diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.</p></div><div | |
| 804 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28939"><span class= | |
| 805 "ref">[28939] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 806 dicendum quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum | |
| 807 adaequationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid excedens omnes | |
| 808 creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscuiusque, | |
| 809 secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a | |
| 810 diversis creaturis.</p></div></div> | |
| 811 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" next="FP_Q14_A8" | |
| 812 prev="FP_Q14_A6" progress="2.55%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether | |
| 813 the knowledge of God is discursive?"><h4 xml:lang="en" | |
| 814 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is | |
| 815 discursive?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div | |
| 816 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 817 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It | |
| 818 seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of | |
| 819 God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the | |
| 820 Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many | |
| 821 things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a | |
| 822 time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as | |
| 823 shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at | |
| 824 once, but discourses from one to another.</p></div><div style="width: | |
| 825 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28940"><span class= | |
| 826 "ref">[28940] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 827 proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim | |
| 828 Dei non est secundum scire in habitu, sed secundum intelligere in | |
| 829 actu. Sed secundum philosophum, in II Topic., scire in habitu | |
| 830 contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. Cum ergo | |
| 831 Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur | |
| 832 quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud | |
| 833 discurrat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: | |
| 834 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 835 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> | |
| 836 Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its | |
| 837 cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known) | |
| 838 through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is | |
| 839 discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 840 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28941"><span class= | |
| 841 "ref">[28941] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 842 cognoscere effectum per causam est scire discurrentis. Sed Deus | |
| 843 cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo | |
| 844 cognitio sua est discursiva.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; | |
| 845 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 846 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p4" | |
| 847 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature | |
| 848 more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their | |
| 849 created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things | |
| 850 caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.</p></div><div | |
| 851 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28942"><span class= | |
| 852 "ref">[28942] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 853 perfectius Deus scit unamquamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed | |
| 854 nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus, et sic de causis | |
| 855 ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in | |
| 856 Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div | |
| 857 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 858 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> | |
| 859 Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their | |
| 860 particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; | |
| 861 but He sees all things together at once."</p></div><div style="width: | |
| 862 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28943"><span class= | |
| 863 "ref">[28943] Iª q. 14 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 864 quod Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quod <i>Deus non | |
| 865 particulatim vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternante | |
| 866 conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc; sed omnia videt simul</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, | |
| 867 which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever | |
| 868 proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in | |
| 869 Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not | |
| 870 discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 871 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 co."><a name="28944"><span class= | |
| 872 "ref">[28944] Iª q. 14 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 873 quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus. Quod sic patet. In | |
| 874 scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum | |
| 875 successionem tantum, sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in | |
| 876 actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est | |
| 877 secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in | |
| 878 cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non | |
| 879 potest. Multa enim, quae successive intelligimus si unumquodque | |
| 880 eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus si in aliquo | |
| 881 uno ea intelligamus, puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si | |
| 882 diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno, | |
| 883 quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul, et non successive omnia | |
| 884 videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non | |
| 885 potest. Primo quidem, quia secundus discursus praesupponit primum, | |
| 886 procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque | |
| 887 considerant. Deinde, quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto | |
| 888 ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur primum, | |
| 889 adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo, | |
| 890 sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur | |
| 891 in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus. | |
| 892 Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius | |
| 893 cognitio non est discursiva.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; | |
| 894 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 895 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply | |
| 896 to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding | |
| 897 in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), | |
| 898 as shown above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 899 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28945"><span class= | |
| 900 "ref">[28945] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 901 dicendum quod, licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen | |
| 902 contingit multa intelligere in aliquo uno, ut dictum | |
| 903 est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div | |
| 904 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 905 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 906 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, | |
| 907 effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His | |
| 908 knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.</p></div><div | |
| 909 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28946"><span class= | |
| 910 "ref">[28946] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 911 dicendum quod Deus non cognoscit per causam quasi prius cognitam, | |
| 912 effectus incognitos, sed eos cognoscit in causa. Unde eius cognitio | |
| 913 est sine discursu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: | |
| 914 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 915 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply | |
| 916 to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the | |
| 917 causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a | |
| 918 manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the | |
| 919 knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His | |
| 920 knowledge is not discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 921 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28947"><span class= | |
| 922 "ref">[28947] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 923 dicendum quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in | |
| 924 ipsis causis, multo melius quam nos, non tamen ita quod cognitio | |
| 925 effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut | |
| 926 in nobis. Unde eius scientia non est discursiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" next="FP_Q14_A9" prev="FP_Q14_A7" progress="2.57%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4> | |
| 927 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 928 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2" | |
| 929 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God | |
| 930 is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on<scripRef | |
| 931 osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0" | |
| 932 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" passage=" Rom. 8:30, "> Rom. 8:30, | |
| 933 </scripRef> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing | |
| 934 will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is | |
| 935 future, it is on that account known by God, before it | |
| 936 exists."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 937 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28948"><span class= | |
| 938 "ref">[28948] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 939 proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit | |
| 940 enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., <i>non propterea aliquid | |
| 941 erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur | |
| 942 a Deo antequam fiat</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 943 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 944 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p3" | |
| 945 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the | |
| 946 effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the | |
| 947 knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that | |
| 948 creatures are eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 949 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28949"><span class= | |
| 950 "ref">[28949] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 951 posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si | |
| 952 ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae | |
| 953 sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div> | |
| 954 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 955 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p4" | |
| 956 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior | |
| 957 to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says | |
| 958 (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a | |
| 959 cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of | |
| 960 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 961 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28950"><span class= | |
| 962 "ref">[28950] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 963 scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X | |
| 964 Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse | |
| 965 causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum.</p></div></div> | |
| 966 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 967 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p5" | |
| 968 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), | |
| 969 "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and | |
| 970 temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they | |
| 971 are."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28951"><span class= | |
| 972 "ref">[28951] Iª q. 14 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 973 quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., <i>universas creaturas, et | |
| 974 spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo | |
| 975 sunt, quia novit</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 976 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that | |
| 977 remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a | |
| 978 determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the | |
| 979 appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest | |
| 980 that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of | |
| 981 understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in | |
| 982 so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the | |
| 983 cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of | |
| 984 approbation."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 985 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 co."><a name="28952"><span class= | |
| 986 "ref">[28952] Iª q. 14 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 987 quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet | |
| 988 ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad | |
| 989 artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo | |
| 990 quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma | |
| 991 intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium | |
| 992 calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis, | |
| 993 inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat | |
| 994 principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad | |
| 995 effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium | |
| 996 actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur | |
| 997 ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma | |
| 998 intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia | |
| 999 oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi | |
| 1000 determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. | |
| 1001 Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum | |
| 1002 suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia | |
| 1003 sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde | |
| 1004 scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari | |
| 1005 scientia approbationis.</p></div></div> | |
| 1006 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 1007 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p8" shownumber="no"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.</p> | |
| 1008 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28953"><span class= | |
| 1009 "ref">[28953] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1010 dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae, | |
| 1011 cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut | |
| 1012 dictum est. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt | |
| 1013 futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non | |
| 1014 secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod | |
| 1015 Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus | |
| 1016 sciat.</p></div></div> | |
| 1017 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1018 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p9" | |
| 1019 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is | |
| 1020 the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that | |
| 1021 things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence | |
| 1022 although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that | |
| 1023 creatures are eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1024 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28954"><span class= | |
| 1025 "ref">[28954] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1026 dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt | |
| 1027 in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab | |
| 1028 aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen | |
| 1029 quod creaturae sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div> | |
| 1030 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who | |
| 1031 gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already | |
| 1032 built.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" | |
| 1033 title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28955"><span class= | |
| 1034 "ref">[28955] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1035 dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et | |
| 1036 scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus | |
| 1037 naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut | |
| 1038 scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura | |
| 1039 eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura | |
| 1040 ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui | |
| 1041 eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam | |
| 1042 facta capit.</p></div></div> | |
| 1043 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" next="FP_Q14_A10" prev="FP_Q14_A8" progress="2.60%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4> | |
| 1044 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1045 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p2" | |
| 1046 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not | |
| 1047 knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true | |
| 1048 things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the | |
| 1049 knowledge of God is not of things that are not.</p></div><div | |
| 1050 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28956"><span class= | |
| 1051 "ref">[28956] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 1052 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium. | |
| 1053 Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens | |
| 1054 convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium.</p></div></div> | |
| 1055 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1056 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p3" | |
| 1057 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires | |
| 1058 likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that | |
| 1059 are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore | |
| 1060 what is not, cannot be known by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1061 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28957"><span class= | |
| 1062 "ref">[28957] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1063 scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea | |
| 1064 quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum, | |
| 1065 qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a | |
| 1066 Deo.</p></div></div> | |
| 1067 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1068 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p4" | |
| 1069 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is | |
| 1070 the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things | |
| 1071 that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God | |
| 1072 has no knowledge of things that are not.</p></div><div style="width: | |
| 1073 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28958"><span class= | |
| 1074 "ref">[28958] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1075 scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non | |
| 1076 entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet | |
| 1077 scientiam de non entibus.</p></div></div> | |
| 1078 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1079 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5" | |
| 1080 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who | |
| 1081 . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (<scripRef | |
| 1082 osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.4.17" parsed="vul|Rom|4|17|0|0" | |
| 1083 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5.1" | |
| 1084 passage="Rom. 4:17">Rom. 4:17</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: | |
| 1085 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28959"><span class= | |
| 1086 "ref">[28959] Iª q. 14 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1087 quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt, | |
| 1088 tanquam ea quae sunt</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 1089 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 1090 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by | |
| 1091 the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p7" shownumber="no"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, | |
| 1092 as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.</p> | |
| 1093 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 co."><a name="28960"><span class= | |
| 1094 "ref">[28960] Iª q. 14 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1095 quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem | |
| 1096 prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. | |
| 1097 Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu, | |
| 1098 sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia | |
| 1099 activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi, | |
| 1100 vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per | |
| 1101 creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse | |
| 1102 facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro | |
| 1103 tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum | |
| 1104 quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam | |
| 1105 enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et | |
| 1106 omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum | |
| 1107 intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae | |
| 1108 sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens | |
| 1109 intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in | |
| 1110 quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam | |
| 1111 vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec | |
| 1112 sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere | |
| 1113 scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo | |
| 1114 dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum | |
| 1115 extra videntem.</p></div></div> | |
| 1116 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1117 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p8" | |
| 1118 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not | |
| 1119 actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true | |
| 1120 that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by | |
| 1121 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28961"><span class= | |
| 1122 "ref">[28961] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1123 dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem | |
| 1124 ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic | |
| 1125 sciuntur a Deo.</p></div></div> | |
| 1126 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1127 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p9" | |
| 1128 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being | |
| 1129 everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as | |
| 1130 everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in | |
| 1131 potentiality are known by God, although they are not in | |
| 1132 act.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28962"><span class= | |
| 1133 "ref">[28962] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1134 dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est, | |
| 1135 inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque | |
| 1136 intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae | |
| 1137 sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a | |
| 1138 Deo.</p></div></div> | |
| 1139 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1140 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p10" | |
| 1141 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God, | |
| 1142 joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary | |
| 1143 that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this | |
| 1144 necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, | |
| 1145 it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be | |
| 1146 possible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1147 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28963"><span class= | |
| 1148 "ref">[28963] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1149 dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta. | |
| 1150 Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel | |
| 1151 futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et | |
| 1152 iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse | |
| 1153 possint.</p></div></div> | |
| 1154 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10" next="FP_Q14_A11" | |
| 1155 prev="FP_Q14_A9" progress="2.62%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether | |
| 1156 God knows evil things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" | |
| 1157 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil | |
| 1158 things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div | |
| 1159 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1160 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It | |
| 1161 seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De | |
| 1162 Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does | |
| 1163 not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine | |
| 1164 says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in | |
| 1165 potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing | |
| 1166 (A[2] ), it seems that God does not know evil things.</p></div><div | |
| 1167 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28964"><span class= | |
| 1168 "ref">[28964] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic | |
| 1169 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim | |
| 1170 philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus qui non est in | |
| 1171 potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni, | |
| 1172 ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in | |
| 1173 potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus | |
| 1174 non cognoscat mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; | |
| 1175 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 1176 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p3" | |
| 1177 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either | |
| 1178 the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of | |
| 1179 God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God | |
| 1180 does not know evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1181 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28965"><span class= | |
| 1182 "ref">[28965] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1183 omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed | |
| 1184 scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia | |
| 1185 Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; | |
| 1186 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 1187 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4" | |
| 1188 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known | |
| 1189 either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He | |
| 1190 knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing <a | |
| 1191 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" | |
| 1192 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence | |
| 1193 neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to | |
| 1194 the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De | |
| 1195 Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.</p></div><div | |
| 1196 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966"><span class= | |
| 1197 "ref">[28966] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 1198 quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum | |
| 1199 oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam | |
| 1200 essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est | |
| 1201 similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae | |
| 1202 nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo | |
| 1203 Deus non cognoscit mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; | |
| 1204 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 1205 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p5" | |
| 1206 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through | |
| 1207 another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not | |
| 1208 known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if | |
| 1209 evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known | |
| 1210 by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not | |
| 1211 imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.</p></div><div | |
| 1212 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4"><a name="28967"><span class= | |
| 1213 "ref">[28967] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 1214 cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur. | |
| 1215 Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret | |
| 1216 quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente. | |
| 1217 Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte | |
| 1218 cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei | |
| 1219 est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div | |
| 1220 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1221 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6" | |
| 1222 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef | |
| 1223 osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.15.11" parsed="vul|Prov|15|11|0|0" | |
| 1224 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6.1" | |
| 1225 passage="Prov. 15:11">Prov. 15:11</scripRef>), "Hell and destruction | |
| 1226 are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1227 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28968"><span class= | |
| 1228 "ref">[28968] Iª q. 14 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1229 quod dicitur Proverb. XV, <i>Infernus et perditio coram | |
| 1230 Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. | |
| 1231 Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives | |
| 1232 the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through | |
| 1233 light."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1234 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 co."><a name="28969"><span class= | |
| 1235 "ref">[28969] Iª q. 14 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1236 quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat | |
| 1237 omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus | |
| 1238 accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte | |
| 1239 cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est | |
| 1240 cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse | |
| 1241 mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit | |
| 1242 bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae. | |
| 1243 Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus per | |
| 1244 semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras | |
| 1245 quam a lumine</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by | |
| 1246 privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate | |
| 1247 substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in | |
| 1248 Himself, but by the opposite good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1249 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28970"><span class= | |
| 1250 "ref">[28970] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1251 dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod | |
| 1252 intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per | |
| 1253 privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra | |
| 1254 dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem | |
| 1255 divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae | |
| 1256 simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed | |
| 1257 in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non | |
| 1258 per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a | |
| 1259 substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per | |
| 1260 privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum | |
| 1261 oppositum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: | |
| 1262 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1263 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 1264 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause | |
| 1265 of the good whereby evil is known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1266 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28971"><span class= | |
| 1267 "ref">[28971] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1268 dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni, | |
| 1269 per quod cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; | |
| 1270 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 1271 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p10" | |
| 1272 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not | |
| 1273 opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is | |
| 1274 opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and | |
| 1275 knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.</p></div><div style="width: | |
| 1276 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="28972"><span class= | |
| 1277 "ref">[28972] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1278 dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae | |
| 1279 non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei; | |
| 1280 quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita | |
| 1281 cognoscit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: | |
| 1282 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1283 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 1284 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect | |
| 1285 knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of | |
| 1286 itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the | |
| 1287 privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known | |
| 1288 except by good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1289 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28973"><span class= | |
| 1290 "ref">[28973] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1291 dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae | |
| 1292 cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est | |
| 1293 per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio | |
| 1294 boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per | |
| 1295 bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11" next="FP_Q14_A12" prev="FP_Q14_A10" progress="2.64%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether God knows singular things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4> | |
| 1296 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1297 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p2" | |
| 1298 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know | |
| 1299 singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the | |
| 1300 human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its | |
| 1301 immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher | |
| 1302 says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with | |
| 1303 singular things." Therefore God does not know singular | |
| 1304 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1305 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28974"><span class= | |
| 1306 "ref">[28974] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum | |
| 1307 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia. | |
| 1308 Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus | |
| 1309 humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem, | |
| 1310 non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima, | |
| 1311 <i>ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium</i>. Ergo Deus | |
| 1312 non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div> | |
| 1313 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1314 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p3" | |
| 1315 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties | |
| 1316 alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from | |
| 1317 material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree | |
| 1318 abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular | |
| 1319 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1320 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28975"><span class= | |
| 1321 "ref">[28975] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1322 illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae | |
| 1323 recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed | |
| 1324 res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus | |
| 1325 non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div> | |
| 1326 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1327 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p4" | |
| 1328 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about | |
| 1329 through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular | |
| 1330 things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for | |
| 1331 the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in | |
| 1332 potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure | |
| 1333 act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.</p></div><div | |
| 1334 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28976"><span class= | |
| 1335 "ref">[28976] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1336 omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo | |
| 1337 singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo, | |
| 1338 quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in | |
| 1339 potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus. | |
| 1340 Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia.</p></div></div> | |
| 1341 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1342 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5" | |
| 1343 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef | |
| 1344 osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0" | |
| 1345 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5.1" | |
| 1346 passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>), "All the ways of a man | |
| 1347 are open to His eyes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1348 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977"><span class= | |
| 1349 "ref">[28977] Iª q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1350 quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis | |
| 1351 eius</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 1352 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 1353 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if | |
| 1354 He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p7" shownumber="no"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined | |
| 1355 together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p8" shownumber="no"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p9" shownumber="no"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10" shownumber="no"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q44.FP_Q44_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since | |
| 1356 He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.</p> | |
| 1357 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978"><span class= | |
| 1358 "ref">[28978] Iª q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1359 quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in | |
| 1360 creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut | |
| 1361 ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad | |
| 1362 perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia | |
| 1363 cognoscat. Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid | |
| 1364 cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra | |
| 1365 Empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III Metaphys., quod | |
| 1366 accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed | |
| 1367 perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et | |
| 1368 unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus | |
| 1369 universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia; | |
| 1370 Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed | |
| 1371 qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt | |
| 1372 quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil | |
| 1373 est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur | |
| 1374 universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus | |
| 1375 cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare | |
| 1376 omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex | |
| 1377 causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae, | |
| 1378 quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per | |
| 1379 materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod | |
| 1380 est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur, | |
| 1381 non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum | |
| 1382 praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate. | |
| 1383 Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando | |
| 1384 causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est. | |
| 1385 Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud | |
| 1386 praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio | |
| 1387 cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit. | |
| 1388 Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per | |
| 1389 suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei, | |
| 1390 inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei | |
| 1391 se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio | |
| 1392 universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur; | |
| 1393 necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae | |
| 1394 per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam | |
| 1395 suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum | |
| 1396 earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens | |
| 1397 cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali, | |
| 1398 sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si | |
| 1399 esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum.</p></div></div> | |
| 1400 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition | |
| 1401 of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the | |
| 1402 individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also | |
| 1403 singular things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1404 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28979"><span class= | |
| 1405 "ref">[28979] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1406 dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a | |
| 1407 principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri | |
| 1408 intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium. | |
| 1409 Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed | |
| 1410 species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia, | |
| 1411 non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium | |
| 1412 existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive | |
| 1413 sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus | |
| 1414 cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.</p></div></div> | |
| 1415 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1416 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p12" | |
| 1417 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the | |
| 1418 species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions | |
| 1419 like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power | |
| 1420 extends to both immaterial and material things.</p></div><div | |
| 1421 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28980"><span class= | |
| 1422 "ref">[28980] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1423 dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse | |
| 1424 suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in | |
| 1425 imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et | |
| 1426 materialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div> | |
| 1427 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1428 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p13" | |
| 1429 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as | |
| 1430 regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so | |
| 1431 far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the | |
| 1432 divine being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1433 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28981"><span class= | |
| 1434 "ref">[28981] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1435 dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum | |
| 1436 suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet, | |
| 1437 similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse.</p></div></div> | |
| 1438 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12" next="FP_Q14_A13" prev="FP_Q14_A11" progress="2.68%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether God can know infinite things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4> | |
| 1439 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of | |
| 1440 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" | |
| 1441 title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28982"><span class= | |
| 1442 "ref">[28982] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum | |
| 1443 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita. | |
| 1444 Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, quia | |
| 1445 infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid | |
| 1446 extra assumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Augustinus etiam dicit, | |
| 1447 XII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis | |
| 1448 comprehensione finitur</i>. Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo | |
| 1449 non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi.</p></div></div> | |
| 1450 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in | |
| 1451 God's knowledge, which is infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1452 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28983"><span class= | |
| 1453 "ref">[28983] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod | |
| 1454 ea quae in se sunt infinita, scientiae Dei finita sunt, contra, | |
| 1455 ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile; et finiti quod sit | |
| 1456 pertransibile, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed infinitum non potest | |
| 1457 transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Physic. | |
| 1458 Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam | |
| 1459 infinito. Et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiae Dei, quae est | |
| 1460 infinita.</p></div></div> | |
| 1461 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1462 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p4" | |
| 1463 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is | |
| 1464 the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the | |
| 1465 infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be | |
| 1466 known by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1467 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28984"><span class= | |
| 1468 "ref">[28984] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1469 scientia Dei est mensura scitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti | |
| 1470 est, quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a | |
| 1471 Deo.</p></div></div> | |
| 1472 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1473 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p5" | |
| 1474 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei | |
| 1475 xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be | |
| 1476 comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds."</p></div><div | |
| 1477 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985"><span class= | |
| 1478 "ref">[28985] Iª q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1479 quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum | |
| 1480 numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, | |
| 1481 cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 1482 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 1483 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so | |
| 1484 that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible | |
| 1485 species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal | |
| 1486 principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.</p> | |
| 1487 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 co."><a name="28986"><span class= | |
| 1488 "ref">[28986] Iª q. 14 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1489 quod, cum Deus sciat non solum ea quae sunt actu, sed etiam ea quae | |
| 1490 sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae, ut ostensum est; haec autem | |
| 1491 constat esse infinita; necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita. | |
| 1492 Et licet scientia visionis, quae est tantum eorum quae sunt vel | |
| 1493 erunt vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non | |
| 1494 ponamus mundum ab aeterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in | |
| 1495 aeternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur, tamen, | |
| 1496 si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam | |
| 1497 scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes | |
| 1498 et affectiones cordium, quae in infinitum multiplicabuntur, | |
| 1499 creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo | |
| 1500 est, quia cognitio cuiuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum | |
| 1501 modum formae quae est principium cognitionis. Species enim | |
| 1502 sensibilis, quae est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius | |
| 1503 individui, unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest. | |
| 1504 Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei | |
| 1505 quantum ad naturam speciei, quae est participabilis a | |
| 1506 particularibus infinitis, unde intellectus noster per speciem | |
| 1507 intelligibilem hominis, cognoscit quodammodo homines infinitos. Sed | |
| 1508 tamen non inquantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod | |
| 1509 communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species | |
| 1510 intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum | |
| 1511 quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia | |
| 1512 speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus | |
| 1513 intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quae sunt vel esse | |
| 1514 possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum | |
| 1515 ad principia propria uniuscuiusque, ut ostensum est. Unde sequitur | |
| 1516 quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita, etiam secundum quod sunt | |
| 1517 ab invicem distincta.</p></div></div> | |
| 1518 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after | |
| 1519 part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not | |
| 1520 successively, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" | |
| 1521 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" shape="rect" | |
| 1522 xml:link="simple">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him | |
| 1523 from knowing infinite things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1524 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987"><span class= | |
| 1525 "ref">[28987] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1526 dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum | |
| 1527 philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo | |
| 1528 partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est | |
| 1529 cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci | |
| 1530 infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper | |
| 1531 remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit | |
| 1532 infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum | |
| 1533 cognoscat omnia simul, non successive, ut supra dictum est. Unde | |
| 1534 nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div> | |
| 1535 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not | |
| 1536 as if it were traversable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1537 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28988"><span class= | |
| 1538 "ref">[28988] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1539 dicendum quod transitio importat quandam successionem in partibus, | |
| 1540 et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest, neque a finito | |
| 1541 neque ab infinito. Sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit | |
| 1542 adaequatio, quia id comprehendi dicitur, cuius nihil est extra | |
| 1543 comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti, quod | |
| 1544 comprehendatur ab infinito. Et sic, quod in se est infinitum, | |
| 1545 potest dici finitum scientiae Dei, tanquam comprehensum, non tamen | |
| 1546 tanquam pertransibile.</p></div></div> | |
| 1547 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous | |
| 1548 quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet | |
| 1549 it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, | |
| 1550 because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence | |
| 1551 they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of | |
| 1552 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28989"><span class= | |
| 1553 "ref">[28989] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1554 dicendum quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua | |
| 1555 quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et | |
| 1556 veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae | |
| 1557 naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam; sicut artificiatum | |
| 1558 inquantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita | |
| 1559 actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines; vel secundum | |
| 1560 quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui | |
| 1561 dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et | |
| 1562 finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas | |
| 1563 naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div> | |
| 1564 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13" next="FP_Q14_A14" prev="FP_Q14_A12" progress="2.71%" n="xiii" title="Article. 13 - Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4> | |
| 1565 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1566 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2" | |
| 1567 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God | |
| 1568 is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause | |
| 1569 proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of | |
| 1570 things known, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" | |
| 1571 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" | |
| 1572 xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is | |
| 1573 necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the | |
| 1574 knowledge of God is not of contingent things.</p></div><div | |
| 1575 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990"><span class= | |
| 1576 "ref">[28990] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 1577 decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit | |
| 1578 futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus | |
| 1579 necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum | |
| 1580 est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse | |
| 1581 necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium.</p></div></div> | |
| 1582 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the | |
| 1583 antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it | |
| 1584 is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the | |
| 1585 consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, | |
| 1586 is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent | |
| 1587 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1588 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28991"><span class= | |
| 1589 "ref">[28991] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1590 omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute, | |
| 1591 consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens | |
| 1592 ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem | |
| 1593 necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster. | |
| 1594 probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit | |
| 1595 hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum. | |
| 1596 Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum | |
| 1597 quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et | |
| 1598 consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo, | |
| 1599 est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium.</p></div></div> | |
| 1600 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1601 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p4" | |
| 1602 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God | |
| 1603 must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must | |
| 1604 necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more | |
| 1605 certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily | |
| 1606 be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by | |
| 1607 God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28992"><span class= | |
| 1608 "ref">[28992] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 1609 scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis | |
| 1610 necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia | |
| 1611 nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum | |
| 1612 contingens futurum est scitum a Deo.</p></div></div> | |
| 1613 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1614 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5" | |
| 1615 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef | |
| 1616 osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.32.15" parsed="vul|Ps|32|15|0|0" | |
| 1617 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5.1" | |
| 1618 passage="Ps. 32:15">Ps. 32:15</scripRef>), "He Who hath made the | |
| 1619 hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," | |
| 1620 i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to | |
| 1621 free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.</p></div><div | |
| 1622 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28993"><span class= | |
| 1623 "ref">[28993] Iª q. 14 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1624 quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda | |
| 1625 eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed | |
| 1626 opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta. | |
| 1627 Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div> | |
| 1628 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 1629 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7" shownumber="no"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In | |
| 1630 another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as | |
| 1631 each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only | |
| 1632 because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.</p> | |
| 1633 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994"><span class= | |
| 1634 "ref">[28994] Iª q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1635 quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae | |
| 1636 actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum | |
| 1637 autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus | |
| 1638 contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum | |
| 1639 est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno | |
| 1640 modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non | |
| 1641 consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet | |
| 1642 contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic | |
| 1643 infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus, | |
| 1644 sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari | |
| 1645 contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et | |
| 1646 ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se | |
| 1647 habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem | |
| 1648 alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem | |
| 1649 in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem | |
| 1650 cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum | |
| 1651 prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est | |
| 1652 actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non | |
| 1653 tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo | |
| 1654 esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur | |
| 1655 aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul | |
| 1656 existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae | |
| 1657 sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea | |
| 1658 ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam | |
| 1659 dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout | |
| 1660 sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia | |
| 1661 et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino | |
| 1662 conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura | |
| 1663 contingentia, suis causis comparata.</p></div></div> | |
| 1664 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1665 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p8" | |
| 1666 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme | |
| 1667 cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the | |
| 1668 proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is | |
| 1669 contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the | |
| 1670 movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So | |
| 1671 likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their | |
| 1672 proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first | |
| 1673 cause, is necessary.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1674 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28995"><span class= | |
| 1675 "ref">[28995] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1676 dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus | |
| 1677 potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut | |
| 1678 germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam | |
| 1679 contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit | |
| 1680 necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter | |
| 1681 causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit | |
| 1682 necessaria.</p></div></div> | |
| 1683 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 1684 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as | |
| 1685 this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies | |
| 1686 to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass | |
| 1687 will grow."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p10" shownumber="no"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew | |
| 1688 anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.</p> | |
| 1689 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28996"><span class= | |
| 1690 "ref">[28996] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1691 dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc | |
| 1692 contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia, | |
| 1693 licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc | |
| 1694 non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad | |
| 1695 futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur | |
| 1696 quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia | |
| 1697 est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est | |
| 1698 contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est. | |
| 1699 Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens, | |
| 1700 contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut | |
| 1701 principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel | |
| 1702 necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel | |
| 1703 contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse | |
| 1704 hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum | |
| 1705 esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde | |
| 1706 dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec | |
| 1707 tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium | |
| 1708 absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod | |
| 1709 propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset | |
| 1710 enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota | |
| 1711 necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem, | |
| 1712 si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod | |
| 1713 quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae, | |
| 1714 consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed | |
| 1715 secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et | |
| 1716 esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid, | |
| 1717 illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale | |
| 1718 secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso. | |
| 1719 Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit, | |
| 1720 consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae, | |
| 1721 scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est, | |
| 1722 sicut et antecedens, <i>quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est | |
| 1723 esse</i>, ut dicitur in I Periherm.</p></div></div> | |
| 1724 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 1725 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling | |
| 1726 by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it | |
| 1727 refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p12" shownumber="no"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, | |
| 1728 "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus | |
| 1729 material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.</p> | |
| 1730 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28997"><span class= | |
| 1731 "ref">[28997] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1732 dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis | |
| 1733 successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae | |
| 1734 est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia | |
| 1735 inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius | |
| 1736 intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit | |
| 1737 per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab | |
| 1738 aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes | |
| 1739 transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet | |
| 1740 esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se | |
| 1741 sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae | |
| 1742 sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo | |
| 1743 subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute, | |
| 1744 secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec | |
| 1745 propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit | |
| 1746 distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de | |
| 1747 re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit, | |
| 1748 est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita | |
| 1749 et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est | |
| 1750 necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio | |
| 1751 habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album | |
| 1752 possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re | |
| 1753 est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc | |
| 1754 dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis | |
| 1755 autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta | |
| 1756 distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album, | |
| 1757 quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est | |
| 1758 inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non | |
| 1759 scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico | |
| 1760 scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed | |
| 1761 cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur, | |
| 1762 potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei | |
| 1763 inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur | |
| 1764 lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est | |
| 1765 intelligibile.</p></div></div> | |
| 1766 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14" next="FP_Q14_A15" prev="FP_Q14_A13" progress="2.77%" n="xiv" title="Article. 14 - Whether God knows enunciable things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4> | |
| 1767 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1768 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p2" | |
| 1769 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know | |
| 1770 enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our | |
| 1771 intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, | |
| 1772 there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable | |
| 1773 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1774 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1"><a name="28998"><span class= | |
| 1775 "ref">[28998] Iª q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 1776 decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat | |
| 1777 enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui | |
| 1778 nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino | |
| 1779 nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div> | |
| 1780 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1781 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p3" | |
| 1782 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge | |
| 1783 is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of | |
| 1784 enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does | |
| 1785 not know enunciable things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1786 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2"><a name="28999"><span class= | |
| 1787 "ref">[28999] Iª q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1788 omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est | |
| 1789 similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non | |
| 1790 cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div> | |
| 1791 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1792 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4" | |
| 1793 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord | |
| 1794 knoweth the thoughts of men" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.93.11" | |
| 1795 parsed="vul|Ps|93|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4.1" | |
| 1796 passage="Ps. 93:11">Ps. 93:11</scripRef>). But enunciable things are | |
| 1797 contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable | |
| 1798 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1799 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 s. c."><a name="29000"><span class= | |
| 1800 "ref">[29000] Iª q. 14 a. 14 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1801 quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes | |
| 1802 hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus | |
| 1803 hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div> | |
| 1804 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 1805 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p6" shownumber="no"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our | |
| 1806 intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine | |
| 1807 intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.</p> | |
| 1808 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 co."><a name="29001"><span class= | |
| 1809 "ref">[29001] Iª q. 14 a. 14 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1810 quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri; | |
| 1811 Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut | |
| 1812 supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia | |
| 1813 quae formari possunt. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et | |
| 1814 composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum | |
| 1815 enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel | |
| 1816 divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem | |
| 1817 intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos | |
| 1818 in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia | |
| 1819 quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro | |
| 1820 non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod | |
| 1821 species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat | |
| 1822 aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae | |
| 1823 ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam | |
| 1824 successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet | |
| 1825 nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, | |
| 1826 enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet | |
| 1827 eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo | |
| 1828 essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis | |
| 1829 accidere possunt.</p></div></div> | |
| 1830 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1831 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p7" | |
| 1832 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would | |
| 1833 avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable | |
| 1834 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1835 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 1"><a name="29002"><span class= | |
| 1836 "ref">[29002] Iª q. 14 a. 14 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1837 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret | |
| 1838 enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium.</p></div></div> | |
| 1839 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1840 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p8" | |
| 1841 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition | |
| 1842 signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, | |
| 1843 which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are | |
| 1844 signified by enunciation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1845 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 2"><a name="29003"><span class= | |
| 1846 "ref">[29003] Iª q. 14 a. 14 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1847 dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei, | |
| 1848 et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo | |
| 1849 omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.</p></div></div> | |
| 1850 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" next="FP_Q14_A16" | |
| 1851 prev="FP_Q14_A14" progress="2.79%" n="xv" title="Article. 15 - Whether | |
| 1852 the knowledge of God is variable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" | |
| 1853 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is | |
| 1854 variable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div | |
| 1855 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1856 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It | |
| 1857 seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related | |
| 1858 to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is | |
| 1859 applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of | |
| 1860 creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the | |
| 1861 variation of creatures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1862 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1"><a name="29004"><span class= | |
| 1863 "ref">[29004] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 1864 decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit | |
| 1865 variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae | |
| 1866 important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et | |
| 1867 variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est | |
| 1868 variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum.</p></div></div><div | |
| 1869 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1870 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p3" | |
| 1871 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He | |
| 1872 can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know | |
| 1873 more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase | |
| 1874 and diminution.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1875 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2"><a name="29005"><span class= | |
| 1876 "ref">[29005] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1877 quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura | |
| 1878 facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic | |
| 1879 scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et | |
| 1880 diminutionem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: | |
| 1881 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1882 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> | |
| 1883 Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now | |
| 1884 that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the | |
| 1885 future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus | |
| 1886 the knowledge of God is variable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1887 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3"><a name="29006"><span class= | |
| 1888 "ref">[29006] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 1889 scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum, | |
| 1890 quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit, | |
| 1891 scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis.</p></div></div><div | |
| 1892 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1893 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5" | |
| 1894 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there | |
| 1895 is no change nor shadow of alteration" (<scripRef | |
| 1896 osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.1.17" parsed="vul|Jas|1|17|0|0" | |
| 1897 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" passage="James 1:17">James | |
| 1898 1:17</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1899 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007"><span class= | |
| 1900 "ref">[29007] Iª q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1901 quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque | |
| 1902 vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; | |
| 1903 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 1904 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I | |
| 1905 answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is | |
| 1906 clear from the foregoing <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" | |
| 1907 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4" shape="rect" | |
| 1908 xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether | |
| 1909 immutable, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" | |
| 1910 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], | |
| 1911 A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether | |
| 1912 invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1913 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008"><span class= | |
| 1914 "ref">[29008] Iª q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1915 quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet; | |
| 1916 sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum | |
| 1917 est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent | |
| 1918 upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures | |
| 1919 themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are | |
| 1920 attributed to God variously, according to the variation of | |
| 1921 creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations | |
| 1922 consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and | |
| 1923 therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable | |
| 1924 manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1925 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 1"><a name="29009"><span class= | |
| 1926 "ref">[29009] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1927 dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important | |
| 1928 relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia | |
| 1929 Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo, | |
| 1930 quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in | |
| 1931 intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in | |
| 1932 seipsis autem variabiliter. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus | |
| 1933 et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur | |
| 1934 actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod | |
| 1935 in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo | |
| 1936 dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor, | |
| 1937 et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui | |
| 1938 intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de | |
| 1939 Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His | |
| 1940 knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because | |
| 1941 such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and | |
| 1942 then afterwards knew.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1943 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 2"><a name="29010"><span class= | |
| 1944 "ref">[29010] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1945 dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit. | |
| 1946 Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod | |
| 1947 possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam | |
| 1948 visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum | |
| 1949 aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse | |
| 1950 quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia | |
| 1951 sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si | |
| 1952 tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret, | |
| 1953 esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia | |
| 1954 quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in | |
| 1955 aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse | |
| 1956 secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum | |
| 1957 a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam | |
| 1958 sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea | |
| 1959 sciat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes | |
| 1960 a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is | |
| 1961 variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for | |
| 1962 example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, | |
| 1963 if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; | |
| 1964 or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was | |
| 1965 sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of | |
| 1966 which can be in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1967 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 3"><a name="29011"><span class= | |
| 1968 "ref">[29011] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1969 dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile, | |
| 1970 Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res | |
| 1971 significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum | |
| 1972 hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit | |
| 1973 Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse | |
| 1974 nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium | |
| 1975 orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia | |
| 1976 sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera, | |
| 1977 quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates | |
| 1978 sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et | |
| 1979 ideo concedendum est quod haec non est vera, quidquid Deus scivit, | |
| 1980 scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod | |
| 1981 scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinae | |
| 1982 scientiae est, quod sciat unam et eandem rem quandoque esse et | |
| 1983 quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinae scientiae est, | |
| 1984 quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque | |
| 1985 esse falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si | |
| 1986 enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et | |
| 1987 dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra | |
| 1988 variatur, vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta si, mutata re, | |
| 1989 eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas | |
| 1990 opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur | |
| 1991 eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16" next="FP_Q15" prev="FP_Q14_A15" progress="2.82%" n="xvi" title="Article. 16 - Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4> | |
| 1992 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1993 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2" | |
| 1994 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a | |
| 1995 speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause | |
| 1996 of things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" | |
| 1997 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" | |
| 1998 xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the | |
| 1999 cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not | |
| 2000 speculative.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 2001 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012"><span class= | |
| 2002 "ref">[29012] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 2003 decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat | |
| 2004 scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra | |
| 2005 ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum | |
| 2006 scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div> | |
| 2007 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 2008 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p3" | |
| 2009 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge | |
| 2010 comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine | |
| 2011 knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not | |
| 2012 speculative.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 2013 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2"><a name="29013"><span class= | |
| 2014 "ref">[29013] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea. | |
| 2015 Scientia speculativa est per abstractionem a rebus, quod divinae | |
| 2016 scientiae non competit. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div> | |
| 2017 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 2018 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p4" | |
| 2019 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent | |
| 2020 must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent | |
| 2021 than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of | |
| 2022 Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of | |
| 2023 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 2024 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 s. c."><a name="29014"><span class= | |
| 2025 "ref">[29014] Iª q. 14 a. 16 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne | |
| 2026 quod est nobilius, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia speculativa | |
| 2027 est nobilior quam practica, ut patet per philosophum, in principio | |
| 2028 Metaphys. Ergo Deus habet de rebus scientiam speculativam.</p></div></div> | |
| 2029 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2030 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, | |
| 2031 and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the | |
| 2032 end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative | |
| 2033 and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p6" shownumber="no"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p7" shownumber="no"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the | |
| 2034 physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.</p> | |
| 2035 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 co."><a name="29015"><span class= | |
| 2036 "ref">[29015] Iª q. 14 a. 16 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2037 quod aliqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica | |
| 2038 tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum | |
| 2039 aliquid practica. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliqua | |
| 2040 scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter. Primo, ex parte rerum | |
| 2041 scitarum, quae non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia | |
| 2042 hominis de rebus naturalibus vel divinis. Secundo, quantum ad modum | |
| 2043 sciendi, ut puta si aedificator consideret domum definiendo et | |
| 2044 dividendo et considerando universalia praedicata ipsius. Hoc | |
| 2045 siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare, et non | |
| 2046 secundum quod operabilia sunt, operabile enim est aliquid per | |
| 2047 applicationem formae ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in | |
| 2048 principia universalia formalia. Tertio, quantum ad finem, <i>nam | |
| 2049 intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo</i>, sicut dicitur | |
| 2050 in III de anima. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem | |
| 2051 operationis, finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio | |
| 2052 veritatis. Unde, si quis aedificator consideret qualiter posset | |
| 2053 fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis, sed ad | |
| 2054 cognoscendum tantum, erit, quantum ad finem, speculativa | |
| 2055 consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quae est | |
| 2056 speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae | |
| 2057 vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est | |
| 2058 secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero | |
| 2059 ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. Secundum | |
| 2060 hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus de seipso habet scientiam | |
| 2061 speculativam tantum, ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero | |
| 2062 aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam. Speculativam | |
| 2063 quidem, quantum ad modum, quidquid enim in rebus nos speculative | |
| 2064 cognoscimus definiendo et dividendo, hoc totum Deus multo | |
| 2065 perfectius novit. Sed de his quae potest quidem facere, sed | |
| 2066 secundum nullum tempus facit, non habet practicam scientiam, | |
| 2067 secundum quod practica scientia dicitur a fine. Sic autem habet | |
| 2068 practicam scientiam de his quae secundum aliquod tempus facit. Mala | |
| 2069 vero, licet ab eo non sint operabilia, tamen sub cognitione | |
| 2070 practica ipsius cadunt, sicut et bona, inquantum permittit vel | |
| 2071 impedit vel ordinat ea, sicut et aegritudines cadunt sub practica | |
| 2072 scientia medici, inquantum per artem suam curat eas.</p></div></div> | |
| 2073 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 2074 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p8" | |
| 2075 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is | |
| 2076 the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually | |
| 2077 the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period | |
| 2078 of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things | |
| 2079 which He can make, and which nevertheless are never | |
| 2080 made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 1"><a name="29016"><span class= | |
| 2081 "ref">[29016] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2082 dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa, non quidem sui ipsius, sed | |
| 2083 aliorum, quorundam quidem actu, scilicet eorum quae secundum | |
| 2084 aliquod tempus fiunt; quorundam vero virtute, scilicet eorum quae | |
| 2085 potest facere, et tamen nunquam fiunt.</p></div></div> | |
| 2086 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2087 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p10" shownumber="no"> In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He | |
| 2088 knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.</p> | |
| 2089 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 2"><a name="29017"><span class= | |
| 2090 "ref">[29017] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2091 dicendum quod scientiam esse acceptam a rebus scitis, non per se | |
| 2092 convenit scientiae speculativae, sed per accidens, inquantum est | |
| 2093 humana.</p><p title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 3"><a name="29018"><span class= | |
| 2094 "ref">[29018] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 3</span></a> Ad id vero quod | |
| 2095 in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod de operabilibus perfecta | |
| 2096 scientia non habetur, nisi sciantur inquantum operabilia sunt. Et | |
| 2097 ideo, cum scientia Dei sit omnibus modis perfecta, oportet quod | |
| 2098 sciat ea quae sunt a se operabilia, inquantum huiusmodi, et non | |
| 2099 solum secundum quod sunt speculabilia. Sed tamen non receditur a | |
| 2100 nobilitate speculativae scientiae, quia omnia alia a se videt in | |
| 2101 seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognoscit; et sic in speculativa | |
| 2102 sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam | |
| 2103 omnium aliorum.</p></div></div> | |
| 2104 </div></div> | |
| 2105 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15" next="FP_Q15_A1" prev="FP_Q14_A16" progress="2.85%" n="xiv" title="Question. 15 - OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)"> | |
| 2106 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p0.1">Question 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2107 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2108 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p> | |
| 2109 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2110 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1" next="FP_Q15_A2" prev="FP_Q15" progress="2.86%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there are ideas?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4> | |
| 2111 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2112 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2113 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2114 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2115 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2116 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in | |
| 2117 him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made | |
| 2118 pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q46.FP_Q46_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the | |
| 2119 world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.</p> | |
| 2120 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2121 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2122 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2123 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2124 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2" next="FP_Q15_A3" prev="FP_Q15_A1" progress="2.88%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether ideas are many?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, | |
| 2125 except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the | |
| 2126 accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot | |
| 2127 be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily | |
| 2128 be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it | |
| 2129 would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to | |
| 2130 which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, | |
| 2131 as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3" next="FP_Q16" prev="FP_Q15_A2" progress="2.92%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" href="#FP_Q15_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to | |
| 2132 everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; | |
| 2133 whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. | |
| 2134 However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)"> | |
| 2135 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2136 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2137 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p2" shownumber="no"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p> | |
| 2138 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2139 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" next="FP_Q16_A2" prev="FP_Q16" progress="2.95%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4> | |
| 2140 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, | |
| 2141 unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2142 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2143 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2144 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2145 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2146 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, | |
| 2147 namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be | |
| 2148 true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the | |
| 2149 intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera | |
| 2150 Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; | |
| 2151 for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.</p> | |
| 2152 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2153 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2154 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their | |
| 2155 relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2156 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought | |
| 2157 or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2158 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" next="FP_Q16_A3" prev="FP_Q16_A1" progress="2.99%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4> | |
| 2159 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2160 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2161 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2162 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2163 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For | |
| 2164 although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: | |
| 2165 for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the | |
| 2166 thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p6" shownumber="no"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p> | |
| 2167 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2168 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3" next="FP_Q16_A4" prev="FP_Q16_A2" progress="3.01%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the | |
| 2169 intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be | |
| 2170 apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4" next="FP_Q16_A5" prev="FP_Q16_A3" progress="3.03%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether good is logically prior to the true?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident | |
| 2171 from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the | |
| 2172 fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he | |
| 2173 fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" next="FP_Q16_A6" prev="FP_Q16_A4" progress="3.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His | |
| 2174 own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot | |
| 2175 understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6" next="FP_Q16_A7" prev="FP_Q16_A5" progress="3.07%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So | |
| 2176 healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the | |
| 2177 intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" passage=" Ps. 11:2, "> Ps. 11:2, </scripRef> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, | |
| 2178 so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as | |
| 2179 science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7" next="FP_Q16_A8" prev="FP_Q16_A6" progress="3.10%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth is eternal?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is | |
| 2180 eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[3]</a>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but | |
| 2181 from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere | |
| 2182 and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by | |
| 2183 reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8" next="FP_Q17" prev="FP_Q16_A7" progress="3.13%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. | |
| 2184 Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in | |
| 2185 one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said | |
| 2186 before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore | |
| 2187 this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)"> | |
| 2188 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2189 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2190 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p> | |
| 2191 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2192 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1" next="FP_Q17_A2" prev="FP_Q17" progress="3.16%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether falsity exists in things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4> | |
| 2193 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2194 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2195 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2196 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2197 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2198 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when | |
| 2199 compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper | |
| 2200 operation of his art.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love | |
| 2201 vanity, and seek after lying?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.4.3" parsed="vul|Ps|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" passage="Ps. 4:3">Ps. 4:3</scripRef>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.3.21" parsed="vul|John|3|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" passage="Jn. 3:21">Jn. 3:21</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p8" shownumber="no"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the | |
| 2202 Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and | |
| 2203 naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this | |
| 2204 way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.</p> | |
| 2205 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2206 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2207 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2208 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2209 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p12" shownumber="no"> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.</p> | |
| 2210 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2211 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" next="FP_Q17_A3" prev="FP_Q17_A1" progress="3.20%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether there is falsity in the senses?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4> | |
| 2212 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2213 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2214 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2215 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2216 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2217 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really | |
| 2218 are.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, | |
| 2219 neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p8" shownumber="no"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed | |
| 2220 sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.</p> | |
| 2221 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2222 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2223 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason | |
| 2224 the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2225 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2226 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" next="FP_Q17_A4" prev="FP_Q17_A2" progress="3.22%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether falsity is in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4> | |
| 2227 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2228 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2229 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2230 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2231 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail | |
| 2232 with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the | |
| 2233 sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can | |
| 2234 exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p6" shownumber="no"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. | |
| 2235 In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at | |
| 2236 all.</p> | |
| 2237 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2238 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2239 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2240 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4" next="FP_Q18" prev="FP_Q17_A3" progress="3.25%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether true and false are contraries?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are contraries?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.8.5" parsed="vul|Jer|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" passage="Jer. 8:5">Jer. 8:5</scripRef>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said | |
| 2241 except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false | |
| 2242 opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)"> | |
| 2243 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2244 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2245 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p2" shownumber="no"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) What is life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p> | |
| 2246 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2247 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1" next="FP_Q18_A2" prev="FP_Q18" progress="3.28%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether to live belongs to all natural things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal | |
| 2248 begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is | |
| 2249 called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. | |
| 2250 Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from | |
| 2251 such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the | |
| 2252 case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" next="FP_Q18_A3" prev="FP_Q18_A1" progress="3.31%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether life is an operation?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4> | |
| 2253 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2254 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2255 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.18.3" parsed="vul|John|18|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" passage=" Jn. 18:3, "> Jn. 18:3, </scripRef> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2256 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2257 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2258 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the | |
| 2259 dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" | |
| 2260 denotes "to run" in the abstract.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.</p> | |
| 2261 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2262 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in | |
| 2263 this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2264 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2265 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by | |
| 2266 a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p10" shownumber="no"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p> | |
| 2267 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2268 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" next="FP_Q18_A4" prev="FP_Q18_A2" progress="3.34%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether life is properly attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4> | |
| 2269 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2270 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2271 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2272 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.83.3" parsed="vul|Ps|83|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" passage="Ps. 83:3">Ps. 83:3</scripRef>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2273 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2274 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and | |
| 2275 sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their | |
| 2276 inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p7" shownumber="no"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move | |
| 2277 only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of | |
| 2278 their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible | |
| 2279 beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p8" shownumber="no"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect | |
| 2280 degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.</p> | |
| 2281 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2282 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in | |
| 2283 movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself | |
| 2284 is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2285 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2286 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2287 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4" next="FP_Q19" prev="FP_Q18_A3" progress="3.38%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are life in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Acts.17.28" parsed="vul|Acts|17|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" passage="Acts 17:28">Acts 17:28</scripRef>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.3-John.1.4" parsed="vul|John|1|3|1|4" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" passage="Jn. 1:3,4">Jn. 1:3,4</scripRef>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In | |
| 2288 another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, | |
| 2289 as having a divine existence in that mind.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more | |
| 2290 truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the | |
| 2291 mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so | |
| 2292 far as life implies a principle of operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)"> | |
| 2293 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2294 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2295 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p> | |
| 2296 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2297 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19" progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2" parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things | |
| 2298 without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His | |
| 2299 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2" next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1 Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces | |
| 2300 its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other | |
| 2301 things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from | |
| 2302 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its | |
| 2303 own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not | |
| 2304 necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we | |
| 2305 will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship | |
| 2306 in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for | |
| 2307 supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the | |
| 2308 divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute | |
| 2309 necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4> | |
| 2310 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2311 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2312 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2313 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2314 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2315 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2316 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He | |
| 2317 must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself | |
| 2318 the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, | |
| 2319 for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p> | |
| 2320 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2321 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2322 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2323 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2324 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God | |
| 2325 all these things are one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2326 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4> | |
| 2327 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2328 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes | |
| 2329 to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2330 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2331 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2332 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2333 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. | |
| 2334 If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the | |
| 2335 premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the | |
| 2336 cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p> | |
| 2337 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2338 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2339 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly | |
| 2340 unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2341 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this | |
| 2342 cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2343 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4> | |
| 2344 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2345 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2346 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2347 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2348 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence | |
| 2349 the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. | |
| 2350 For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as | |
| 2351 does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2352 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2353 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every | |
| 2354 class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, | |
| 2355 but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or | |
| 2356 dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in | |
| 2357 themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills | |
| 2358 takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p> | |
| 2359 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2360 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2361 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2362 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless | |
| 2363 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; | |
| 2364 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom | |
| 2365 He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not | |
| 2366 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine | |
| 2367 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For | |
| 2368 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4> | |
| 2369 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2370 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2371 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is | |
| 2372 necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2373 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2374 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2375 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be | |
| 2376 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that | |
| 2377 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise | |
| 2378 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p> | |
| 2379 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2380 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2381 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2382 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2383 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and | |
| 2384 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or | |
| 2385 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not | |
| 2386 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in | |
| 2387 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is | |
| 2388 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not | |
| 2389 necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that | |
| 2390 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. | |
| 2391 6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called | |
| 2392 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4> | |
| 2393 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2394 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2395 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2396 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2397 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | |
| 2398 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for | |
| 2399 what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, | |
| 2400 counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p> | |
| 2401 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2402 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2403 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter | |
| 2404 the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2405 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2406 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and | |
| 2407 these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | |
| 2408 </div></div></div></body></html> |
