Aquinas: summa/bilingual/FS_ii.html comparison

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 unum numero, sicut a sano quod est in corpore animalis, derivatur
 sanum ad medicinam et urinam; nec alia sanitas est medicinae et
 urinae, quam sanitas animalis, quam medicina facit, et urina
 significat. Et hoc modo a bonitate voluntatis derivatur bonitas
 actus exterioris, et e converso, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad
-alterum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A5-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 5. Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p2">
+alterum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A4-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 4. Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the external action does not add any goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom
+says (Hom. xix in Mat.): "It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or punished for doing evil." Now works are the witnesses
+of the will. Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order to know how to judge; but for the sake of others,
+that all may understand how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated according
+to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment of man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to
+that of the interior act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34456] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod exterior actus non addat in bonitate
+vel malitia supra actum interiorem. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, super
+Matth., <i>voluntas est quae aut remuneratur pro bono, aut
+condemnatur pro malo</i>. Opera autem testimonia sunt voluntatis.
+Non ergo quaerit Deus opera propter se, ut sciat quomodo iudicet;
+sed propter alios, ut omnes intelligant quia iustus est Deus. Sed
+malum vel bonum magis est aestimandum secundum iudicium Dei, quam
+secundum iudicium hominum. Ergo actus exterior nihil addit ad
+bonitatem vel malitiam super actum interiorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external acts are one and the same, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q20_A3" id="FS_Q20_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But increase is the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the external action does not add to the goodness or malice
+of the interior act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34457] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+una et eadem est bonitas interioris et exterioris actus, ut dictum
+est. Sed augmentum fit per additionem unius ad alterum. Ergo actus
+exterior non addit in bonitate vel malitia super actum
+interiorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom.
+But sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely,
+as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or malice of the other.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34458] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+tota bonitas creaturae nihil addit supra bonitatem divinam, quia
+tota derivatur a bonitate divina. Sed bonitas actus exterioris
+quandoque tota derivatur ex bonitate actus interioris, quandoque
+autem e converso, ut dictum est. Non ergo unum eorum addit in
+bonitate vel malitia super alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be added,
+it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34459] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+omne agens intendit consequi bonum et vitare malum. Si ergo per
+actum exteriorem nihil additur de bonitate vel malitia, frustra qui
+habet bonam voluntatem vel malam, facit opus bonum, aut desistit a
+malo opere. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q20_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the goodness which the external action derives from the will tending to the end, then the external action
+adds nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is made better in good things, or worse in evil things.
+This, seemingly, may happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for instance, a man wishes to do something with a
+good or an evil end in view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does it,
+the act of his will is doubled and a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly, in point of extension: when, for
+instance, a man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres
+in the movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed; it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting in good
+or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in point of intensity: for these are certain external
+actions, which, in so far as they are pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to make the will more intense or more
+remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.
+</p><p id="FS_Q20_A4-p7"> On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus
+it stands in relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will; because
+every inclination or movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term. Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless
+it be such that, given the opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible, as long
+as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it could; the lack of perfection derived from the external action,
+is simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or
+evil deeds, so neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 4 co."><a name="34460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34460] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, si loquamur de bonitate exterioris actus quam habet
+ex voluntate finis, tunc actus exterior nihil addit ad bonitatem,
+nisi contingat ipsam voluntatem secundum se fieri meliorem in
+bonis, vel peiorem in malis. Quod quidem videtur posse contingere
+tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum numerum. Puta, cum aliquis vult
+aliquid facere bono fine vel malo, et tunc quidem non facit,
+postmodum autem vult et facit; duplicatur actus voluntatis, et sic
+fit duplex bonum vel duplex malum. Alio modo, quantum ad
+extensionem. Puta, cum aliquis vult facere aliquid bono fine vel
+malo et propter aliquod impedimentum desistit; alius autem
+continuat motum voluntatis quousque opere perficiat; manifestum est
+quod huiusmodi voluntas est diuturnior in bono vel malo, et
+secundum hoc est peior vel melior. Tertio, secundum intensionem.
+Sunt enim quidam actus exteriores qui, inquantum sunt delectabiles
+vel poenosi, nati sunt intendere voluntatem vel remittere. Constat
+autem quod quanto voluntas intensius tendit in bonum vel malum,
+tanto est melior vel peior. Si autem loquamur de bonitate actus
+exterioris quam habet secundum materiam et debitas circumstantias,
+sic comparatur ad voluntatem ut terminus et finis. Et hoc modo
+addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam voluntatis, quia omnis inclinatio
+vel motus perficitur in hoc quod consequitur finem, vel attingit
+terminum. Unde non est perfecta voluntas, nisi sit talis quae,
+opportunitate data, operetur. Si vero possibilitas desit, voluntate
+existente perfecta, ut operaretur si posset; defectus perfectionis
+quae est ex actu exteriori, est simpliciter involuntarium.
+Involuntarium autem, sicut non meretur poenam vel praemium in
+operando bonum aut malum, ita non tollit aliquid de praemio vel de
+poena, si homo involuntarie simpliciter deficiat ad faciendum bonum
+vel malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's will is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the impossibility
+of achievement.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34461] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Chrysostomus loquitur, quando voluntas hominis
+est consummata, et non cessatur ab actu nisi propter impotentiam
+faciendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument applies to that goodness which the external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But the goodness
+which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end; but
+it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause,
+as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34462] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de bonitate actus exterioris quam
+habet a voluntate finis. Sed bonitas actus exterioris quam habet ex
+materia et circumstantiis, est alia a bonitate voluntatis quae est
+ex fine, non autem alia a bonitate voluntatis quam habet ex ipso
+actu volito, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut ratio et causa eius, sicut
+supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34463] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc
+etiam patet solutio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A5-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 5. Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually
 in its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually
 in actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue "makes that which has it to be
 good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an
 action.
 eventus sequens non facit actum malum qui erat bonus, nec bonum qui
 erat malus. Puta si aliquis det eleemosynam pauperi, qua ille
 abutatur ad peccatum, nihil deperit ei qui eleemosynam fecit, et
 similiter si aliquis patienter ferat iniuriam sibi factam, non
 propter hoc excusatur ille qui fecit. Ergo eventus sequens non
-addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q20_A5-p7">
+addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p7">
 <b>I answer that,</b> The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness
 or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom,
 this shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
-</p><p id="FS_Q20_A5-p8"> But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 co."><a name="34469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34469] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod eventus sequens aut est praecogitatus, aut non. Si
+est praecogitatus, manifestum est quod addit ad bonitatem vel
+malitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p8"> But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action
 and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is
 evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a
 nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do
 not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it
 by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
-</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 co."><a name="34469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34469] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Cum enim aliquis cogitans quod ex opere suo multa mala
-dicendum quod eventus sequens aut est praecogitatus, aut non. Si
-est praecogitatus, manifestum est quod addit ad bonitatem vel
-malitiam. Cum enim aliquis cogitans quod ex opere suo multa mala
 possunt sequi, nec propter hoc dimittit, ex hoc apparet voluntas
 eius esse magis inordinata. Si autem eventus sequens non sit
 praecogitatus, tunc distinguendum est. Quia si per se sequitur ex
 tali actu, et ut in pluribus, secundum hoc eventus sequens addit ad
 bonitatem vel malitiam actus, manifestum est enim meliorem actum
 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument would prove if irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of the
 fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="34473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34473] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si irregularitas sequeretur
 culpam. Non autem sequitur culpam, sed factum, propter aliquem
-defectum sacramenti.</p></div></div></div></div>
+defectum sacramenti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A6-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 6. Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one and the same external action can be both good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the
+same" (Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and bad: for instance, a man may go to church continuously,
+intending at first vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and the same action can be both good and bad.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34474] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus actus possit esse bonus et malus.
+Motus enim est unus qui est continuus, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed
+unus motus continuus potest esse bonus et malus, puta si aliquis,
+continue ad Ecclesiam vadens, primo quidem intendat inanem gloriam,
+postea intendat Deo servire. Ergo unus actus potest esse bonus et
+malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3), action and passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as Christ's
+was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one and the same act can be both good and evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34475] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum philosophum, in III Physic., actio et passio sunt unus
+actus. Sed potest esse passio bona, sicut Christi; et actio mala,
+sicut Iudaeorum. Ergo unus actus potest esse bonus et malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of his master, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action
+of a tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's action result from his master's good will, and is
+therefore good: and from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the same action can be both good and
+evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34476] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+cum servus sit quasi instrumentum domini, actio servi est actio
+domini, sicut actio instrumenti est actio artificis. Sed potest
+contingere quod actio servi procedat ex bona voluntate domini, et
+sic sit bona, et ex mala voluntate servi, et sic sit mala. Ergo
+idem actus potest esse bonus et malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
+both good and evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34477] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+contraria non possunt esse in eodem. Sed bonum et malum sunt
+contraria. Ergo unus actus non potest esse bonus et malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A6-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to another
+genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the genus of quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to
+the genus of color, if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing hinders an action from being one, considered
+in the natural order; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and
+vice versa, as we have stated above (A[3], ad 1;
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A7" id="FS_Q20_A6-p7.1" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[7]</a>, ad 1). For continuous walking is one action, considered in the natural order: but it may resolve itself into many actions,
+considered in the moral order, if a change take place in the walker's will, for the will is the principle of moral actions.
+If therefore we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil. Whereas
+if it be one as to natural and not moral
+unity, it can be both good and evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 6 co."><a name="34478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34478] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse unum, secundum quod est
+in uno genere; et esse multiplex, secundum quod refertur ad aliud
+genus. Sicut superficies continua est una, secundum quod
+consideratur in genere quantitatis, tamen est multiplex, secundum
+quod refertur ad genus coloris, si partim sit alba, et partim
+nigra. Et secundum hoc, nihil prohibet aliquem actum esse unum
+secundum quod refertur ad genus naturae, qui tamen non est unus
+secundum quod refertur ad genus moris, sicut et e converso, ut
+dictum est. Ambulatio enim continua est unus actus secundum genus
+naturae, potest tamen contingere quod sint plures secundum genus
+moris, si mutetur ambulantis voluntas, quae est principium actuum
+moralium. Si ergo accipiatur unus actus prout est in genere moris,
+impossibile est quod sit bonus et malus bonitate et malitia morali.
+Si tamen sit unus unitate naturae, et non unitate moris, potest
+esse bonus et malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This continual movement which proceeds from various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one in the
+point of moral unity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34479] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ille motus continuus qui procedit ex diversa
+intentione, licet sit unus unitate naturae, non est tamen unus
+unitate moris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Action and passion belong to the moral order, in so far as they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are voluntary
+in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34480] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod actio et passio pertinent ad genus moris, inquantum
+habent rationem voluntarii. Et ideo secundum quod diversa voluntate
+dicuntur voluntaria, secundum hoc sunt duo moraliter, et potest ex
+una parte inesse bonum, et ex alia malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The action of the servant, in so far as it proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but only in
+so far as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in this
+respect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34481] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod actus servi, inquantum procedit ex voluntate servi,
+non est actus domini, sed solum inquantum procedit ex mandato
+domini. Unde sic non facit ipsum malum mala voluntas servi.</p></div></div></div></div>
 <div id="FS_Q21" class="div3">
 <h3 id="FS_Q21-p0.1">Q. 21. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
 <p id="FS_Q21-p2"> We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there
 are four points of inquiry:

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