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+<h2 id="FP.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q44">Q. 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q45">Q. 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q46">Q. 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
+<div id="FP_Q44" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FP_Q44-p0.1">Q. 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FP_Q44-p2"> After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration
+will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and
+government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode
+of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.
+</p><p id="FP_Q44-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q44-p4"><a href="#FP_Q44_A1"> (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p5"><a href="#FP_Q44_A2"> (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p6"><a href="#FP_Q44_A3"> (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p7"><a href="#FP_Q44_A4"> (4) Whether He is the final cause of things?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 pr."><a name="30282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30282]
+Iª q. 44 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinarum
+personarum, considerandum restat de processione creaturarum a Deo.
+Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut primo consideretur de
+productione creaturarum; secundo, de earum distinctione; tertio, de
+conservatione et gubernatione. Circa primum tria sunt consideranda,
+primo quidem, quae sit prima causa entium; secundo, de modo
+procedendi creaturarum a prima causa; tertio vero, de principio
+durationis rerum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
+Deus sit causa efficiens omnium entium. Secundo, utrum materia
+prima sit creata a Deo, vel sit principium ex aequo coordinatum ei.
+Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa exemplaris rerum, vel sint alia
+exemplaria praeter ipsum. Quarto, utrum ipse sit causa finalis
+rerum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP_Q44_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 1. Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
+without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing
+caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they
+can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
+God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30283] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium omne ens esse creatum
+a Deo. Nihil enim prohibet inveniri rem sine eo quod non est de
+ratione rei, sicut hominem sine albedine. Sed habitudo causati ad
+causam non videtur esse de ratione entium quia sine hac possunt
+aliqua entia intelligi. Ergo sine hac possunt esse. Ergo nihil
+prohibet esse aliqua entia non creata a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient
+cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are
+many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30284] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
+hoc aliquid indiget causa efficiente, ut sit. Ergo quod non potest
+non esse, non indiget causa efficiente. Sed nullum necessarium
+potest non esse, quia quod necesse est esse, non potest non esse.
+Cum igitur multa sint necessaria in rebus, videtur quod non omnia
+entia sint a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by
+the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from
+their efficient cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30285] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quorumcumque est aliqua causa, in his potest fieri demonstratio per
+causam illam. Sed in mathematicis non fit demonstratio per causam
+agentem, ut per philosophum patet, in III Metaphys. Non igitur
+omnia entia sunt a Deo sicut a causa agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.36" target="asv">Rom. 11:36</a>): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30286] Iª q. 44 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Rom. XI, <i>ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt
+omnia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q44_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must
+be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[11], AA[3]</a>,4) that subsisting being must be
+one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all
+beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which
+are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who
+possesses being most perfectly.
+</p><p id="FP_Q44_A1-p7"> Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever
+is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest
+in heat is the cause of all heat.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 co."><a name="30287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30287] Iª q. 44 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse.
+Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse
+est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut
+ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina
+simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens.
+Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi
+unum, sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una,
+cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo
+quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse.
+Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam
+participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte,
+causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est. Unde et Plato
+dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et
+Aristoteles dicit, in II Metaphys., quod id quod est maxime ens et
+maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri, sicut id quod
+maxime calidum est, est causa omnis caliditatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on
+what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused.
+Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since
+to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible
+for us to find a being uncaused.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30288] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem
+entis quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius
+ratione, quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens,
+sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest
+esse, quin sit causatum; sicut nec homo, quin sit risibile. Sed
+quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter
+hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false
+in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle
+says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an
+efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but
+because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and
+consequent be possible or impossible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30289] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ex hac ratione quidam moti fuerunt ad ponendum quod
+id quod est necessarium non habeat causam, ut dicitur in VIII
+Physic. Sed hoc manifeste falsum apparet in scientiis
+demonstrativis, in quibus principia necessaria sunt causae
+conclusionum necessariarum. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, in V
+Metaphys., quod sunt quaedam necessaria quae habent causam suae
+necessitatis. Non ergo propter hoc solum requiritur causa agens,
+quia effectus potest non esse, sed quia effectus non esset, si
+causa non esset. Haec enim conditionalis est vera, sive antecedens
+et consequens sint possibilia, sive impossibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract
+in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although
+the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under
+the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that
+object from its efficient cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30290] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod mathematica accipiuntur ut abstracta secundum
+rationem, cum tamen non sint abstracta secundum esse. Unicuique
+autem competit habere causam agentem, secundum quod habet esse.
+Licet igitur ea quae sunt mathematica habeant causam agentem, non
+tamen secundum habitudinem quam habent ad causam agentem, cadunt
+sub consideratione mathematici. Et ideo in scientiis mathematicis
+non demonstratur aliquid per causam agentem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 2. Whether primary matter is created by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
+(Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30291] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod materia prima non sit creata a Deo. Omne
+enim quod fit, componitur ex subiecto et ex aliquo alio, ut dicitur
+in I Physic. Sed materiae primae non est aliquod subiectum. Ergo
+materia prima non potest esse facta a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive
+principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from
+the other.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30292] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actio
+et passio dividuntur contra se invicem. Sed sicut primum principium
+activum est Deus, ita primum principium passivum est materia. Ergo
+Deus et materia prima sunt duo principia contra se invicem divisa,
+quorum neutrum est ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
+everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore
+it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30293] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+agens agit sibi simile, et sic, cum omne agens agat inquantum est
+actu, sequitur quod omne factum aliquo modo sit in actu. Sed
+materia prima est tantum in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi. Ergo
+contra rationem materiae primae est, quod sit facta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh
+unto nothing"---viz. primary matter.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30294] Iª q. 44 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., duo fecisti, domine, unum
+prope te, scilicet Angelum, aliud prope nihil, scilicet materiam
+primam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q44_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
+mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did
+not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and
+separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated,
+they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of
+that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter,
+which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential
+forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according
+to
+Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its
+form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to
+a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some
+particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others
+there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as
+"such," but as "beings."
+</p><p id="FP_Q44_A2-p7"> Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are
+"such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs
+to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause
+of things.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 co."><a name="30295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30295] Iª q. 44 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt
+in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores
+existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia.
+Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi
+secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et
+densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam
+substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas
+huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem,
+intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes,
+distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et
+materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem
+fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum
+transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum
+circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem. Sed
+considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad
+determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per
+accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut
+homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens
+particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel
+inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares
+assignaverunt. Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens
+inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum
+secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia.
+Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse
+causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas
+accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales,
+sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum
+quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam
+ab universali causa entium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental
+or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from
+which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30296] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod philosophus in I Physic. loquitur de fieri
+particulari, quod est de forma in formam, sive accidentalem sive
+substantialem nunc autem loquimur de rebus secundum emanationem
+earum ab universali principio essendi. A qua quidem emanatione nec
+materia excluditur, licet a primo modo factionis excludatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first
+active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
+says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30297] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod passio est effectus actionis. Unde et rationabile est
+quod primum principium passivum sit effectus primi principii
+activi, nam omne imperfectum causatur a perfecto. Oportet enim
+primum principium esse perfectissimum, ut dicit Aristoteles, in XII
+Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything
+created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if
+all that belongs to its being is created.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30298] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa non ostendit quod materia non sit creata,
+sed quod non sit creata sine forma. Licet enim omne creatum sit in
+actu, non tamen est actus purus. Unde oportet quod etiam illud quod
+se habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse
+ipsius pertinet, creatum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 3. Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures
+are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30299] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod causa exemplaris sit aliquid praeter Deum.
+Exemplatum enim habet similitudinem exemplaris. Sed creaturae longe
+sunt a divina similitudine. Non ergo Deus est causa exemplaris
+earum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated
+above
+<a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q44_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in
+all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles
+of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit
+self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars.
+Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30300] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+quod est per participationem, reducitur ad aliquid per se existens,
+ut ignitum ad ignem, sicut iam dictum est. Sed quaecumque sunt in
+sensibilibus rebus, sunt solum per participationem alicuius
+speciei, quod ex hoc patet, quod in nullo sensibilium invenitur
+solum id quod ad rationem speciei pertinet, sed adiunguntur
+principiis speciei principia individuantia. Oportet ergo ponere
+ipsas species per se existentes, ut per se hominem, et per se
+equum, et huiusmodi. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Sunt igitur
+exemplaria res quaedam extra Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because
+there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing
+in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30301] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+scientiae et definitiones sunt de ipsis speciebus, non secundum
+quod sunt in particularibus, quia particularium non est scientia
+nec definitio. Ergo sunt quaedam entia, quae sunt entia vel species
+non in singularibus. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Ergo idem quod
+prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting
+life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="30302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30302] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
+idem videtur per Dionysium, qui dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod
+<i>ipsum secundum se esse, prius est eo quod est per se vitam esse,
+et eo quod est per se sapientiam esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are
+contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30303] Iª q. 44 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod exemplar est idem quod idea. Sed ideae, secundum quod
+Augustinus libro octoginta trium quaest. dicit, <i>sunt formae
+principales, quae divina intelligentia continentur</i>. Ergo
+exemplaria rerum non sunt extra Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
+exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate
+form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily
+conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive
+determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom
+devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine
+wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A1" id="FP_Q44_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[1]</a>). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not
+apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this
+manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar
+of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 co."><a name="30304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30304] Iª q. 44 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum. Ad cuius
+evidentiam, considerandum est quod ad productionem alicuius rei
+ideo necessarium est exemplar, ut effectus determinatam formam
+consequatur, artifex enim producit determinatam formam in materia,
+propter exemplar ad quod inspicit, sive illud sit exemplar ad quod
+extra intuetur, sive sit exemplar interius mente conceptum.
+Manifestum est autem quod ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatas
+formas consequuntur. Haec autem formarum determinatio oportet quod
+reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, quae
+ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit.
+Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes
+omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in
+mente divina existentes. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum
+respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia,
+prout eius similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode.
+Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. Possunt etiam in
+rebus creatis quaedam aliorum exemplaria dici, secundum quod
+quaedam sunt ad similitudinem aliorum, vel secundum eandem speciem,
+vel secundum analogiam alicuius imitationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like
+to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material
+house is like to the house in the architect's mind.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30305] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet creaturae non pertingant ad hoc quod sint
+similes Deo secundum suam naturam, similitudine speciei, ut homo
+genitus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad eius similitudinem
+secundum repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus
+quae est in materia, domui quae est in mente artificis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man
+is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior
+species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30306] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod de ratione hominis est quod sit in materia, et sic
+non potest inveniri homo sine materia. Licet igitur hic homo sit
+per participationem speciei, non tamen potest reduci ad aliquid
+existens per se in eadem specie; sed ad speciem superexcedentem,
+sicut sunt substantiae separatae. Et eadem ratio est de aliis
+sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the
+same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active
+intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars
+in order to be their exemplars.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30307] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, licet quaelibet scientia et definitio sit solum
+entium, non tamen oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo,
+quem intellectus habet in intelligendo. Nos enim, per virtutem
+intellectus agentis, abstrahimus species universales a
+particularibus conditionibus, non tamen oportet quod universalia
+praeter particularia subsistant, ut particularium exemplaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes
+the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="30308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30308] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius, XI cap. de Div. Nom., per se
+vitam et per se sapientiam quandoque nominat ipsum Deum, quandoque
+virtutes ipsis rebus datas, non autem quasdam subsistentes res,
+sicut antiqui posuerunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A4-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 4. Whether God is the final cause of all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
+needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="30309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30309] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa finalis omnium. Agere
+enim propter finem videtur esse alicuius indigentis fine. Sed Deus
+nullo est indigens. Ergo non competit sibi agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
+because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore
+He is not the final cause of all things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="30310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30310] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, finis
+generationis et forma generati et agens non incidunt in idem
+numero, ut dicitur in II Physic., quia finis generationis est forma
+generati. Sed Deus est primum agens omnium. Non ergo est causa
+finalis omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not
+the end of all things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="30311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30311] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, finem
+omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia neque omnia ipsum
+cognoscunt. Deus ergo non est omnium finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows
+that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="30312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30312] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+finalis causa est prima causarum. Si igitur Deus sit causa agens et
+causa finalis, sequitur quod in eo sit prius et posterius. Quod est
+impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord has made all things for Himself."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 s. c."><a name="30313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30313] Iª q. 44 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>universa propter semetipsum operatus est
+dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless
+it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively.
+For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some
+things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect
+agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the
+First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which
+is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection
+and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 co."><a name="30314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30314] Iª q. 44 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod omne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non
+magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. Est autem idem finis
+agentis et patientis, inquantum huiusmodi, sed aliter et aliter,
+unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod
+patiens intendit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et
+patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta, et his convenit quod etiam
+in agendo intendant aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est
+agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicuius
+finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est
+eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam
+perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis
+divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong
+to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for
+His own goodness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="30315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30315] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod agere propter indigentiam non est nisi agentis
+imperfecti, quod natum est agere et pati. Sed hoc Deo non competit.
+Et ideo ipse solus est maxime liberalis, quia non agit propter suam
+utilitatem, sed solum propter suam bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator,
+which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
+since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="30316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30316] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod forma generati non est finis generationis nisi
+inquantum est similitudo formae generantis, quod suam similitudinem
+communicare intendit. Alioquin forma generati esset nobilior
+generante, cum finis sit nobilior his quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or
+natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness
+to God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="30317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30317] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod omnia appetunt Deum ut finem, appetendo quodcumque
+bonum, sive appetitu intelligibili, sive sensibili, sive naturali,
+qui est sine cognitione, quia nihil habet rationem boni et
+appetibilis, nisi secundum quod participat Dei similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows
+that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things
+in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="30318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30318] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis
+omnium rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod primum
+principium omnium rerum sit unum tantum secundum rem. Nihil tamen
+prohibet in eo considerari multa secundum rationem, quorum quaedam
+prius cadunt in intellectu nostro quam alia.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP_Q45" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FP_Q45-p0.1">Q. 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FP_Q45-p2"> The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and
+includes eight points of inquiry:
+</p><p id="FP_Q45-p3"><a href="#FP_Q45_A1"> (1) What is creation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p4"><a href="#FP_Q45_A2"> (2) Whether God can create anything?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p5"><a href="#FP_Q45_A3"> (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p6"><a href="#FP_Q45_A4"> (4) To what things it belongs to be created?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p7"><a href="#FP_Q45_A5"> (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p8"><a href="#FP_Q45_A6"> (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p9"><a href="#FP_Q45_A7"> (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p10"><a href="#FP_Q45_A8"> (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 pr."><a name="30319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30319]
+Iª q. 45 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de modo emanationis
+rerum a primo principio, qui dicitur creatio. De qua quaeruntur
+octo. Primo, quid sit creatio. Secundo, utrum Deus possit aliquid
+creare. Tertio, utrum creatio sit aliquod ens in rerum natura.
+Quarto, cui competit creari. Quinto, utrum solius Dei sit creare.
+Sexto, utrum commune sit toti Trinitati, aut proprium alicuius
+personae. Septimo, utrum vestigium aliquod Trinitatis sit in rebus
+creatis. Octavo, utrum opus creationis admisceatur in operibus
+naturae et voluntatis.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP_Q45_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 1. Whether to create is to make something from nothing?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To
+make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30320] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod creare non sit ex nihilo aliquid facere.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, contra adversarium legis et prophetarum,
+<i>facere est quod omnino non erat, creare vero est ex eo quod iam
+erat educendo aliquid constituere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good,
+and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among
+all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30321] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nobilitas actionis et motus ex terminis consideratur. Nobilior
+igitur est actio quae ex bono in bonum est, et ex ente in ens, quam
+quae est ex nihilo in aliquid. Sed creatio videtur esse nobilissima
+actio, et prima inter omnes actiones. Ergo non est ex nihilo in
+aliquid, sed magis ex ente in ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say
+that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create
+is not to make something from nothing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30322] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, haec
+praepositio ex importat habitudinem alicuius causae, et maxime
+materialis; sicut cum dicimus quod statua fit ex aere. Sed nihil
+non potest esse materia entis, nec aliquo modo causa eius. Ergo
+creare non est ex nihilo aliquid facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> On the text of
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30323] Iª q. 45 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod super illud Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum</i>
+etc., dicit Glossa quod creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being
+from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular
+emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man,"
+and white from "not-white."
+Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being
+should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is
+from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is
+"nothing."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 co."><a name="30324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30324] Iª q. 45 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut supra dictum est, non solum oportet considerare
+emanationem alicuius entis particularis ab aliquo particulari
+agente, sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae
+est Deus, et hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis.
+Quod autem procedit secundum emanationem particularem, non
+praesupponitur emanationi, sicut, si generatur homo, non fuit prius
+homo, sed homo fit ex non homine, et album ex non albo. Unde, si
+consideretur emanatio totius entis universalis a primo principio,
+impossibile est quod aliquod ens praesupponatur huic emanationi.
+Idem autem est nihil quod nullum ens. Sicut igitur generatio
+hominis est ex non ente quod est non homo, ita creatio, quae est
+emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when
+we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30325] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Augustinus aequivoce utitur nomine creationis,
+secundum quod creari dicuntur ea quae in melius reformantur, ut cum
+dicitur aliquis creari in episcopum. Sic autem non loquimur hic de
+creatione, sed sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more
+perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding
+to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because
+the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the
+privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which
+is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because
+the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30326] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod mutationes accipiunt speciem et dignitatem non a
+termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem. Tanto ergo perfectior et
+prior est aliqua mutatio, quanto terminus ad quem illius mutationis
+est nobilior et prior; licet terminus a quo, qui opponitur termino
+ad quem, sit imperfectior. Sicut generatio simpliciter est nobilior
+et prior quam alteratio, propter hoc quod forma substantialis est
+nobilior quam forma accidentalis, tamen privatio substantialis
+formae, quae est terminus a quo in generatione, est imperfectior
+quam contrarium, quod est terminus a quo in alteratione. Et
+similiter creatio est perfectior et prior quam generatio et
+alteratio, quia terminus ad quem est tota substantia rei. Id autem
+quod intelligitur ut terminus a quo, est simpliciter non ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only
+order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition
+"from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first
+sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and
+its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It
+is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does
+not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the
+first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the
+material
+cause, which is denied.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30327] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, haec
+praepositio ex non designat causam materialem, sed ordinem tantum;
+sicut cum dicitur, ex mane fit meridies, idest, post mane fit
+meridies. Sed intelligendum est quod haec praepositio ex potest
+includere negationem importatam in hoc quod dico nihil, vel includi
+ab ea. Si primo modo, tunc ordo remanet affirmatus, et ostenditur
+ordo eius, quod est ad non esse praecedens. Si vero negatio
+includat praepositionem, tunc ordo negatur, et est sensus, fit ex
+nihilo, idest non fit ex aliquo; sicut si dicatur, iste loquitur de
+nihilo, quia non loquitur de aliquo. Et utroque modo verificatur,
+cum dicitur ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Sed primo modo, haec
+praepositio ex importat ordinem, ut dictum est, secundo modo,
+importat habitudinem causae materialis, quae negatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 2. Whether God can create anything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers
+considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the
+contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation
+and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from
+nothing, or create.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30328] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid creare. Quia
+secundum philosophum, I Physic., antiqui philosophi acceperunt ut
+communem conceptionem animi, ex nihilo nihil fieri. Sed potentia
+Dei non se extendit ad contraria primorum principiorum; utpote quod
+Deus faciat quod totum non sit maius sua parte, vel quod affirmatio
+et negatio sint simul vera. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid ex nihilo
+facere, vel creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
+creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the
+act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30329] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
+creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere, ergo creari est aliquid fieri.
+Sed omne fieri est mutari. Ergo creatio est mutatio. Sed omnis
+mutatio est ex subiecto aliquo, ut patet per definitionem motus,
+nam motus est actus existentis in potentia. Ergo est impossibile
+aliquid a Deo ex nihilo fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same
+time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already
+is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming
+precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which
+the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30330] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+factum est, necesse est aliquando fieri. Sed non potest dici quod
+illud quod creatur, simul fiat et factum sit, quia in
+permanentibus, quod fit, non est, quod autem factum est, iam est;
+simul ergo aliquid esset et non esset. Ergo, si aliquid fit, fieri
+eius praecedit factum esse. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi
+praeexistat subiectum in quo sustentetur ipsum fieri. Ergo
+impossibile est aliquid fieri ex nihilo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not
+happen that something is made from nothing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="30331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30331] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+infinitam distantiam non est pertransire. Sed infinita distantia
+est inter ens et nihil. Ergo non contingit ex nihilo aliquid
+fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30332] Iª q. 45 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
+terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Not only is it impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created
+by God, as appears from what has been said (
+<a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is
+not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action
+of art,
+but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If
+therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him.
+Now it has been shown above (
+<a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that
+God brings things into being from nothing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 co."><a name="30333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30333] Iª q. 45 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod non solum non est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari, sed
+necesse est ponere a Deo omnia creata esse, ut ex praemissis
+habetur. Quicumque enim facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit
+praesupponitur actioni eius, et non producitur per ipsam actionem,
+sicut artifex operatur ex rebus naturalibus, ut ex ligno et aere,
+quae per artis actionem non causantur, sed causantur per actionem
+naturae. Sed et ipsa natura causat res naturales quantum ad formam,
+sed praesupponit materiam. Si ergo Deus non ageret nisi ex aliquo
+praesupposito, sequeretur quod illud praesuppositum non esset
+causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra quod nihil potest esse
+in entibus quod non sit a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius
+esse. Unde necesse est dicere quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse
+producit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ancient philosophers, as is said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their
+action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation
+from the universal principle of things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30334] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod antiqui philosophi, sicut supra dictum est, non
+consideraverunt nisi emanationem effectuum particularium a causis
+particularibus, quas necesse est praesupponere aliquid in sua
+actione, et secundum hoc erat eorum communis opinio, ex nihilo
+nihil fieri. Sed tamen hoc locum non habet in prima emanatione ab
+universali rerum principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different
+now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
+motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial
+change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
+substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding,
+so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide
+as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that
+when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of
+signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing.
+And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make"
+and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30335] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum
+intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est, quod aliquid
+idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius, nam quandoque est idem ens
+actu, aliter se habens nunc et prius, sicut in motibus secundum
+quantitatem et qualitatem et ubi; quandoque vero est idem ens in
+potentia tantum, sicut in mutatione secundum substantiam, cuius
+subiectum est materia. Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota
+substantia rerum, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens
+nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si
+intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse.
+Sed cum actio et passio conveniant in substantia motus, et
+differant solum secundum habitudines diversas, ut dicitur in III
+Physic., oportet quod, subtracto motu, non remaneant nisi diversae
+habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia modus significandi
+sequitur modum intelligendi, ut dictum est, creatio significatur
+per modum mutationis, et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex
+nihilo aliquid facere. Quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc
+conveniant quam mutare et mutari, quia facere et fieri important
+habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed
+mutationem ex consequenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the
+term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is
+not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being
+made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was
+not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30336] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in his quae fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et
+factum esse, sive talis factio sit terminus motus, sicut
+illuminatio (nam simul aliquid illuminatur et illuminatum est);
+sive non sit terminus motus, sicut simul formatur verbum in corde
+et formatum est. Et in his, quod fit, est, sed cum dicitur fieri,
+significatur ab alio esse, et prius non fuisse. Unde, cum creatio
+sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
+plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="30337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30337] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit ex falsa imaginatione, ac si
+sit aliquod infinitum medium inter nihilum et ens, quod patet esse
+falsum. Procedit autem falsa haec imaginatio ex eo quod creatio
+significatur ut quaedam mutatio inter duos terminos existens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 3. Whether creation is anything in the creature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the
+creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in
+the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively
+is not anything in the creature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30338] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod creatio non sit aliquid in creatura. Sicut
+enim creatio passive accepta attribuitur creaturae, ita creatio
+active accepta attribuitur creatori. Sed creatio active accepta non
+est aliquid in creatore, quia sic sequeretur quod in Deo esset
+aliquid temporale. Ergo creatio passive accepta non est aliquid in
+creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
+since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for
+the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the
+creature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30339] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+est medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed creatio significatur
+ut medium inter utrumque, non enim est creator, cum non sit
+aeterna; neque creatura, quia oporteret eadem ratione aliam ponere
+creationem qua ipsa crearetur, et sic in infinitum. Creatio ergo
+non est aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
+is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and
+also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while
+the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
+and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30340] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+creatio est aliquid praeter substantiam creatam, oportet quod sit
+accidens eius. Omne autem accidens est in subiecto. Ergo res creata
+esset subiectum creationis. Et sic idem esset subiectum creationis
+et terminus. Quod est impossibile, quia subiectum prius est
+accidente, et conservat accidens; terminus autem posterius est
+actione et passione cuius est terminus, et eo existente cessat
+actio et passio. Igitur ipsa creatio non est aliqua res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental
+form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental
+form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole
+substance, something in the thing created.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30341] Iª q. 45 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, maius
+est fieri aliquid secundum totam substantiam, quam secundum formam
+substantialem vel accidentalem. Sed generatio simpliciter vel
+secundum quid, qua fit aliquid secundum formam substantialem vel
+accidentalem, est aliquid in generato. Ergo multo magis creatio,
+qua fit aliquid secundum totam substantiam, est aliquid in
+creato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement,
+or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in
+the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all
+beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when
+movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the
+creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement,
+is implied a relation to the principle of motion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 co."><a name="30342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30342] Iª q. 45 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod creatio ponit aliquid in creato secundum relationem tantum.
+Quia quod creatur, non fit per motum vel per mutationem. Quod enim
+fit per motum vel mutationem, fit ex aliquo praeexistenti, quod
+quidem contingit in productionibus particularibus aliquorum entium;
+non autem potest hoc contingere in productione totius esse a causa
+universali omnium entium, quae est Deus. Unde Deus, creando,
+producit res sine motu. Subtracto autem motu ab actione et
+passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde
+relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam
+ad creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in passione quae est
+cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God
+relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God
+is a real relation, as was said above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A7" id="FP_Q45_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[7]</a>) in treating of the divine names.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30343] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod creatio active significata significat actionem
+divinam, quae est eius essentia cum relatione ad creaturam. Sed
+relatio in Deo ad creaturam non est realis, sed secundum rationem
+tantum. Relatio vero creaturae ad Deum est relatio realis, ut supra
+dictum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover
+and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive
+creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations,
+or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other
+relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above (
+<a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q42_A1" id="FP_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[1]</a>, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30344] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quia creatio significatur ut mutatio, sicut dictum
+est; mutatio autem media quodammodo est inter movens et motum, ideo
+etiam creatio significatur ut media inter creatorem et creaturam.
+Tamen creatio passive accepta est in creatura, et est creatura.
+Neque tamen oportet quod alia creatione creetur, quia relationes,
+cum hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid dicantur, non referuntur per
+aliquas alias relationes, sed per seipsas; sicut etiam supra dictum
+est, cum de aequalitate personarum ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and
+is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the
+part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the
+creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature
+to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30345] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod creationis, secundum quod significatur ut mutatio,
+creatura est terminus, sed secundum quod vere est relatio, creatura
+est eius subiectum, et prius ea in esse, sicut subiectum accidente.
+Sed habet quandam rationem prioritatis ex parte obiecti ad quod
+dicitur, quod est principium creaturae. Neque tamen oportet quod,
+quandiu creatura sit, dicatur creari, quia creatio importat
+habitudinem creaturae ad creatorem cum quadam novitate seu
+incoeptione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 4. Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv)
+it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly
+speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="30346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30346] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod creari non sit proprium compositorum et
+subsistentium. Dicitur enim in libro de causis, prima rerum
+creatarum est esse. Sed esse rei creatae non est subsistens. Ergo
+creatio proprie non est subsistentis et compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
+component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="30347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30347] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+creatur est ex nihilo. Composita autem non sunt ex nihilo, sed ex
+suis componentibus. Ergo compositis non convenit creari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
+natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore
+matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="30348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30348] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
+proprie producitur per primam emanationem, quod supponitur in
+secunda, sicut res naturalis per generationem naturalem, quae
+supponitur in operatione artis. Sed illud quod supponitur in
+generatione naturali, est materia. Ergo materia est quae proprie
+creatur, et non compositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation
+belongs to them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 s. c."><a name="30349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30349] Iª q. 45 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
+terram</i>. Caelum autem et terra sunt res compositae subsistentes.
+Ergo horum proprie est creatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (
+<a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever
+being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate
+substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has
+being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they
+themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it.
+Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being."
+Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they
+ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 co."><a name="30350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30350] Iª q. 45 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod creari est quoddam fieri, ut dictum est. Fieri autem ordinatur
+ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus
+convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus, sive
+sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separatae; sive sint composita,
+sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim proprie convenit esse, quod
+habet esse; et hoc est subsistens in suo esse. Formae autem et
+accidentia, et alia huiusmodi, non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint,
+sed quia eis aliquid est; ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ea
+subiectum est album. Unde, secundum philosophum, accidens magis
+proprie dicitur entis quam ens. Sicut igitur accidentia et formae,
+et huiusmodi, quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam
+entia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprie vero
+creata sunt subsistentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but
+to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because
+it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above
+<a href="#FP_Q45_A1" id="FP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible
+thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="30351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30351] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, cum dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, ly esse
+non importat subiectum creatum; sed importat propriam rationem
+obiecti creationis. Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum, quod est
+ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creatio sit emanatio totius
+esse ab ente universali, ut dictum est. Et est similis modus
+loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum visibile est color,
+quamvis illud quod proprie videtur, sit coloratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite"
+is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="30352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30352] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositae ex
+principiis praeexistentibus, sed compositum sic dicitur creari,
+quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation
+is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="30353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30353] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa non probat quod sola materia creetur; sed
+quod materia non sit nisi ex creatione. Nam creatio est productio
+totius esse, et non solum materiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 5. Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
+what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless
+can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance
+like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it
+has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="30354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30354] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod non solius Dei sit creare. Quia secundum
+philosophum, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere. Sed
+creaturae immateriales sunt perfectiores creaturis materialibus,
+quae faciunt sibi simile, ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat
+hominem. Ergo substantia immaterialis potest facere substantiam
+sibi similem. Sed substantia immaterialis non potest fieri nisi per
+creationem, cum non habeat materiam ex qua fiat. Ergo aliqua
+creatura potest creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker.
+But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which
+nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="30355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30355] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quanto maior est resistentia ex parte facti, tanto maior virtus
+requiritur in faciente. Sed plus resistit contrarium quam nihil.
+Ergo maioris virtutis est aliquid facere ex contrario, quod tamen
+creatura facit; quam aliquid facere ex nihilo. Multo magis igitur
+creatura hoc facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we
+proved above when treating of the infinity of God (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q45_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary
+to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="30356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30356] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus facientis consideratur secundum mensuram eius quod fit. Sed
+ens creatum est finitum, ut supra probatum est, cum de Dei
+infinitate ageretur. Ergo ad producendum per creationem aliquid
+creatum, non requiritur nisi virtus finita. Sed habere virtutem
+finitam non est contra rationem creaturae. Ergo non est impossibile
+creaturam creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
+creatures.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 s. c."><a name="30357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30357] Iª q. 45 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quod neque boni neque mali
+Angeli possunt esse creatores alicuius rei. Multo minus igitur
+aliae creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes
+<a href="#FP_Q45_A1" id="FP_Q45_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and
+prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first
+and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither
+intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely,
+not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
+</p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p7"> It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally,
+inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that
+although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause,
+can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after
+itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies.
+And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that
+the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power.
+</p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p8"> But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause,
+except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore
+it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain
+instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its
+own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating
+is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally
+to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent.
+So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that
+is, ministerially.
+</p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p9"> And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it
+requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 co."><a name="30358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30358] Iª q. 45 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod satis apparet in primo aspectu, secundum praemissa, quod
+creare non potest esse propria actio nisi solius Dei. Oportet enim
+universaliores effectus in universaliores et priores causas
+reducere. Inter omnes autem effectus, universalissimum est ipsum
+esse. Unde oportet quod sit proprius effectus primae et
+universalissimae causae, quae est Deus. Unde etiam dicitur libro de
+causis, quod neque intelligentia vel anima nobilis dat esse, nisi
+inquantum operatur operatione divina. Producere autem esse
+absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem
+creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio
+ipsius Dei. Contingit autem quod aliquid participet actionem
+propriam alicuius alterius, non virtute propria, sed
+instrumentaliter, inquantum agit in virtute alterius; sicut aer per
+virtutem ignis habet calefacere et ignire. Et secundum hoc, aliqui
+opinati sunt quod, licet creatio sit propria actio universalis
+causae, tamen aliqua inferiorum causarum inquantum agit in virtute
+primae causae, potest creare. Et sic posuit Avicenna quod prima
+substantia separata, creata a Deo, creat aliam post se, et
+substantiam orbis, et animam eius; et quod substantia orbis creat
+materiam inferiorum corporum. Et secundum hunc etiam modum Magister
+dicit, in V dist. IV Sent., quod Deus potest creaturae communicare
+potentiam creandi, ut creet per ministerium, non propria
+auctoritate. Sed hoc esse non potest. Quia causa secunda
+instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi
+inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad
+effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret secundum
+illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra adhiberetur ad agendum, nec
+oporteret esse determinata instrumenta determinatarum actionum. Sic
+enim videmus quod securis, scindendo lignum, quod habet ex
+proprietate suae formae, producit scamni formam, quae est effectus
+proprius principalis agentis. Illud autem quod est proprius
+effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis,
+scilicet esse absolute. Unde non potest aliquid operari dispositive
+et instrumentaliter ad hunc effectum, cum creatio non sit ex aliquo
+praesupposito, quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis
+agentis. Sic igitur impossibile est quod alicui creaturae conveniat
+creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter sive per
+ministerium. Et hoc praecipue inconveniens est dici de aliquo
+corpore, quod creet, cum nullum corpus agat nisi tangendo vel
+movendo; et sic requirit in sua actione aliquid praeexistens, quod
+possit tangi et moveri; quod est contra rationem creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying
+it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause
+of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate
+matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man
+participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own
+being, as we have said above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it
+is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in
+an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything
+whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore
+an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards
+some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x).
+In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.15" target="asv">Eph. 3:15</a>): "From whom all
+paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless
+something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="30359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30359] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod aliquod perfectum participans aliquam naturam, facit
+sibi simile, non quidem producendo absolute illam naturam, sed
+applicando eam ad aliquid. Non enim hic homo potest esse causa
+naturae humanae absolute, quia sic esset causa sui ipsius, sed est
+causa quod natura humana sit in hoc homine generato. Et sic
+praesupponit in sua actione determinatam materiam per quam est hic
+homo. Sed sicut hic homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque
+ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi, quia solus
+Deus est suum esse, ut supra dictum est. Nullum igitur ens creatum
+potest producere aliquod ens absolute, nisi inquantum esse causat
+in hoc, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur id per quod aliquid
+est hoc, actioni qua facit sibi simile. In substantia autem
+immateriali non potest praeintelligi aliquid per quod sit haec,
+quia est haec per suam formam, per quam habet esse, cum sint formae
+subsistentes. Igitur substantia immaterialis non potest producere
+aliam substantiam immaterialem sibi similem, quantum ad esse eius;
+sed quantum ad perfectionem aliquam superadditam; sicut si dicamus
+quod superior Angelus illuminat inferiorem, ut Dionysius dicit.
+Secundum quem modum etiam in caelestibus est paternitas, ut ex
+verbis apostoli patet, Ephes. III, <i>ex quo omnis paternitas in
+caelo et in terra nominatur</i>. Et ex hoc etiam evidenter apparet
+quod nullum ens creatum potest causare aliquid, nisi praesupposito
+aliquo. Quod repugnat rationi creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality.
+And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce,
+as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions,
+whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act;
+and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a
+much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of
+much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="30360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30360] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ex contrario fit aliquid per accidens, ut dicitur in
+I Physic., per se autem fit aliquid ex subiecto, quod est in
+potentia. Contrarium igitur resistit agenti, inquantum impedit
+potentiam ab actu in quem intendit reducere agens, sicut ignis
+intendit reducere materiam aquae in actum sibi similem, sed
+impeditur per formam et dispositiones contrarias, quibus quasi
+ligatur potentia ne reducatur in actum. Et quanto magis fuerit
+potentia ligata, tanto requiritur maior virtus in agente ad
+reducendam materiam in actum. Unde multo maior potentia requiritur
+in agente, si nulla potentia praeexistat. Sic ergo patet quod multo
+maioris virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex
+contrario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made;
+for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite
+power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater
+power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the
+potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is
+infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural
+agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any
+more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q45_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>), it follows that no creature can
+create.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="30361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30361] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod virtus facientis non solum consideratur ex substantia
+facti, sed etiam ex modo faciendi, maior enim calor non solum
+magis, sed etiam citius calefacit. Quamvis igitur creare aliquem
+effectum finitum non demonstret potentiam infinitam, tamen creare
+ipsum ex nihilo demonstrat potentiam infinitam. Quod ex praedictis
+patet. Si enim tanto maior virtus requiritur in agente, quanto
+potentia est magis remota ab actu, oportet quod virtus agentis ex
+nulla praesupposita potentia, quale agens est creans, sit infinita,
+quia nulla proportio est nullius potentiae ad aliquam potentiam,
+quam praesupponit virtus agentis naturalis, sicut et non entis ad
+ens. Et quia nulla creatura habet simpliciter potentiam infinitam,
+sicut neque esse infinitum, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod
+nulla creatura possit creare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A6-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 6. Whether to create is proper to any person?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect
+is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and
+is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds
+in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of
+the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="30362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30362] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod creare sit proprium alicuius personae.
+Quod enim est prius, est causa eius quod est post; et perfectum
+imperfecti. Sed processio divinae personae est prior quam processio
+creaturae, et magis perfecta, quia divina persona procedit in
+perfecta similitudine sui principii, creatura vero in imperfecta.
+Ergo processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa processionis
+rerum. Et sic creare est proprium personae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
+difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons.
+But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed
+that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
+Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation
+of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="30363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30363] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+personae divinae non distinguuntur ab invicem nisi per suas
+processiones et relationes. Quidquid igitur differenter attribuitur
+divinis personis, hoc convenit eis secundum processiones et
+relationes personarum. Sed causalitas creaturarum diversimode
+attribuitur divinis personis, nam in symbolo fidei patri
+attribuitur quod sit creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium;
+filio autem attribuitur quod per eum omnia facta sunt; sed spiritui
+sancto, quod sit dominus et vivificator. Causalitas ergo
+creaturarum convenit personis secundum processiones et
+relationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
+this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power,
+goodness and wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought
+not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished
+in creating according to relations and processions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="30364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30364] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+dicatur quod causalitas creaturae attenditur secundum aliquod
+attributum essentiale quod appropriatur alicui personae, hoc non
+videtur sufficiens. Quia quilibet effectus divinus causatur a
+quolibet attributo essentiali, scilicet potentia, bonitate et
+sapientia, et sic non magis pertinet ad unum quam ad aliud. Non
+deberet ergo aliquis determinatus modus causalitatis attribui uni
+personae magis quam alii, nisi distinguerentur in creando secundum
+relationes et processiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 s. c."><a name="30365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30365] Iª q. 45 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod communia totius
+divinitatis sunt omnia causalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle
+of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create
+belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not
+proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.
+</p><p id="FP_Q45_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of
+things. For as was said above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>;
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman
+is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the
+love of
+his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through
+His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch
+as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 co."><a name="30366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30366] Iª q. 45 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse rerum. Cum
+autem omne agens agat sibi simile, principium actionis considerari
+potest ex actionis effectu, ignis enim est qui generat ignem. Et
+ideo creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse, quod est eius
+essentia, quae est communis tribus personis. Unde creare non est
+proprium alicui personae, sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed tamen
+divinae personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent
+causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. Ut enim supra ostensum est,
+cum de Dei scientia et voluntate ageretur, Deus est causa rerum per
+suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum.
+Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum, et per amorem
+suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum, operatur. Unde et Deus pater
+operatus est creaturam per suum verbum, quod est filius; et per
+suum amorem, qui est spiritus sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones
+personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum
+includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et
+voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="30367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30367] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa
+creationis sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son
+receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common
+to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from
+both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not
+receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through"
+usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both,
+is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for
+this particular
+appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (
+<a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q39_A8" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[39], A[8]</a>, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to
+be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through
+Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which
+belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior
+movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="30368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30368] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus
+personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, inquantum filius
+accipit naturam divinam a patre, et spiritus sanctus ab utroque;
+ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus personis,
+ordine tamen quodam eis convenit; nam filius habet eam a patre, et
+spiritus sanctus ab utroque. Unde creatorem esse attribuitur patri,
+ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De filio autem
+dicitur per quem omnia facta sunt, inquantum habet eandem virtutem,
+sed ab alio, nam haec praepositio per solet denotare causam mediam,
+sive principium de principio. Sed spiritui sancto, qui habet eandem
+virtutem ab utroque, attribuitur quod dominando gubernet, et
+vivificet quae sunt creata a patre per filium. Potest etiam huius
+attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium
+attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, patri appropriatur
+potentia, quae maxime manifestatur in creatione, et ideo
+attribuitur patri creatorem esse. Filio autem appropriatur
+sapientia, per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur
+de filio, per quem omnia facta sunt. Spiritui sancto autem
+appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in
+debitos fines, et vivificatio, nam vita in interiori quodam motu
+consistit, primum autem movens est finis et bonitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally
+connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness"
+poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="30369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30369] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, licet quilibet effectus Dei procedat ex quolibet
+attributorum, tamen reducitur unusquisque effectus ad illud
+attributum, cum quo habet convenientiam secundum propriam rationem,
+sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam, et iustificatio impii ad
+misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio
+vero, quae est productio ipsius substantiae rei, reducitur ad
+potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A7-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 7. Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through
+its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated (
+<a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q45_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="30370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30370] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod in creaturis non sit necesse inveniri
+vestigium Trinitatis. Per sua enim vestigia unumquodque investigari
+potest. Sed Trinitas personarum non potest investigari ex
+creaturis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo vestigia Trinitatis non sunt
+in creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some
+of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity
+in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="30371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30371] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid in creatura est, creatum est. Si igitur vestigium
+Trinitatis invenitur in creatura secundum aliquas proprietates
+suas, et omne creatum habet vestigium Trinitatis, oportet in
+unaquaque illarum inveniri etiam vestigium Trinitatis, et sic in
+infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to
+the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of
+the Trinity but of the unity of essence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="30372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30372] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+effectus non repraesentat nisi suam causam. Sed causalitas
+creaturarum pertinet ad naturam communem, non autem ad relationes,
+quibus personae distinguuntur et numerantur. Ergo in creatura non
+invenitur vestigium Trinitatis, sed solum unitatis essentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 s. c."><a name="30373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30373] Iª q. 45 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod <i>Trinitatis vestigium in
+creatura apparet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause,
+but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has
+passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents
+fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the
+representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was
+said above
+<a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27" id="FP_Q45_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(Q[27])</a>. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational
+creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there
+is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.
+</p><p id="FP_Q45_A7-p7"> But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are
+necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form,
+whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents
+the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle
+from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is
+from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He
+is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De
+Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according
+"as it
+is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three,
+"number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing
+limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the
+other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83,
+qu.
+18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct
+by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 co."><a name="30374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30374] Iª q. 45 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod omnis effectus aliqualiter repraesentat suam causam, sed
+diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam causalitatem
+causae, non autem formam eius, sicut fumus repraesentat ignem, et
+talis repraesentatio dicitur esse repraesentatio vestigii;
+vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicuius transeuntis, sed non
+qualis sit. Aliquis autem effectus repraesentat causam quantum ad
+similitudinem formae eius, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem,
+et statua Mercurii Mercurium, et haec est repraesentatio imaginis.
+Processiones autem divinarum personarum attenduntur secundum actus
+intellectus et voluntatis, sicut supra dictum est, nam filius
+procedit ut verbum intellectus, spiritus sanctus ut amor
+voluntatis. In creaturis igitur rationalibus, in quibus est
+intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per
+modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor
+procedens. Sed in creaturis omnibus invenitur repraesentatio
+Trinitatis per modum vestigii, inquantum in qualibet creatura
+inveniuntur aliqua quae necesse est reducere in divinas personas
+sicut in causam. Quaelibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et
+habet formam per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad
+aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quaedam substantia creata,
+repraesentat causam et principium, et sic demonstrat personam
+patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod
+habet quandam formam et speciem, repraesentat verbum; secundum quod
+forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod
+habet ordinem, repraesentat spiritum sanctum, inquantum est amor,
+quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et
+ideo dicit Augustinus, in VI Lib. de Trin., quod vestigium
+Trinitatis invenitur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum
+aliquid est, et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur, et secundum
+quod quendam ordinem tenet. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur illa tria,
+numerus, pondus et mensura, quae ponuntur Sap. XI, nam mensura
+refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis, numerus ad
+speciem, pondus ad ordinem. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur alia tria
+quae ponit Augustinus, modus species et ordo. Et ea quae ponit in
+libro octoginta trium quaest. quod constat, quod discernitur, quod
+congruit, constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur
+per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci
+possunt quaecumque sic dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge
+of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (
+<a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q45_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="30375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30375] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod repraesentatio vestigii attenditur secundum
+appropriata, per quem modum ex creaturis in Trinitatem divinarum
+personarum veniri potest, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor
+is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being
+is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="30376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30376] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod creatura est res proprie subsistens, in qua est
+praedicta tria invenire. Neque oportet quod in quolibet eorum quae
+ei insunt, haec tria inveniantur, sed secundum ea vestigium rei
+subsistenti attribuitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above
+<a href="#FP_Q45_A6" id="FP_Q45_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="30377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30377] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod etiam processiones personarum sunt causa et ratio
+creationis aliquo modo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A8-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 8. Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is
+produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and
+thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="30378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30378] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod creatio admisceatur in operibus naturae et
+artis. In qualibet enim operatione naturae et artis producitur
+aliqua forma. Sed non producitur ex aliquo, cum non habeat materiam
+partem sui. Ergo producitur ex nihilo. Et sic in qualibet
+operatione naturae et artis est creatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which
+is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it
+must be produced by creation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="30379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30379] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+effectus non est potior sua causa. Sed in rebus naturalibus non
+invenitur aliquid agens nisi forma accidentalis, quae est forma
+activa vel passiva. Non ergo per operationem naturae producitur
+forma substantialis. Relinquitur igitur quod sit per
+creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident
+in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason
+applies to other things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="30380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30380] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+natura facit sibi simile. Sed quaedam inveniuntur generata in
+natura non ab aliquo sibi simili, sicut patet in animalibus
+generatis per putrefactionem. Ergo eorum forma non est a natura,
+sed a creatione. Et eadem ratio est de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow
+that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="30381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30381] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+non creatur, non est creatura. Si igitur in his quae sunt a natura
+non adiungatur creatio, sequitur quod ea quae sunt a natura, non
+sunt creaturae. Quod est haereticum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 s. c."><a name="30382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30382] Iª q. 45 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Augustinus, super Gen. ad Lit., distinguit opus propagationis,
+quod est opus naturae, ab opere creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A8-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but
+previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from
+not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they
+asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or
+caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this
+opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting,
+but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone,
+as shown above
+<a href="#FP_Q45_A4" id="FP_Q45_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be
+"concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.
+</p><p id="FP_Q45_A8-p8"> Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 co."><a name="30383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30383] Iª q. 45 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod haec dubitatio inducitur propter formas. Quas quidam posuerunt
+non incipere per actionem naturae, sed prius in materia extitisse,
+ponentes latitationem formarum. Et hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia
+materiae, quia nesciebant distinguere inter potentiam et actum,
+quia enim formae praeexistunt in materia in potentia, posuerunt eas
+simpliciter praeexistere. Alii vero posuerunt formas dari vel
+causari ab agente separato, per modum creationis. Et secundum hoc
+cuilibet operationi naturae adiungitur creatio. Sed hoc accidit eis
+ex ignorantia formae. Non enim considerabant quod forma naturalis
+corporis non est subsistens, sed quo aliquid est, et ideo, cum
+fieri et creari non conveniat proprie nisi rei subsistenti, sicut
+supra dictum est, formarum non est fieri neque creari, sed
+concreata esse. Quod autem proprie fit ab agente naturali, est
+compositum, quod fit ex materia. Unde in operibus naturae non
+admiscetur creatio, sed praesupponitur ad operationem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="30384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30384] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod formae incipiunt esse in actu, compositis factis, non
+quod ipsae fiant per se, sed per accidens tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its
+like according to quality, but according to species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="30385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30385] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod qualitates activae in natura agunt in virtute
+formarum substantialium. Et ideo agens naturale non solum producit
+sibi simile secundum qualitatem, sed secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which
+they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are
+created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper
+agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="30386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30386] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ad generationem animalium imperfectorum sufficit
+agens universale, quod est virtus caelestis, cui assimilantur non
+secundum speciem, sed secundum analogiam quandam, neque oportet
+dicere quod eorum formae creantur ab agente separato. Ad
+generationem vero animalium perfectorum non sufficit agens
+universale, sed requiritur agens proprium, quod est generans
+univocum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are
+called creatures.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="30387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30387] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod operatio naturae non est nisi ex praesuppositione
+principiorum creatorum, et sic ea quae per naturam fiunt, creaturae
+dicuntur.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP_Q46" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FP_Q46-p0.1">Q. 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FP_Q46-p2"> Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment:</p><p id="FP_Q46-p3"><a href="#FP_Q46_A1"> (1) Whether creatures always existed?</a></p><p id="FP_Q46-p4"><a href="#FP_Q46_A2"> (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?</a></p><p id="FP_Q46-p5"><a href="#FP_Q46_A3"> (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 pr."><a name="30388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30388]
+Iª q. 46 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
+principio durationis rerum creatarum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
+Primo, utrum creaturae semper fuerint. Secundo, utrum eas
+incoepisse sit articulus fidei. Tertio, quomodo Deus dicatur in
+principio caelum et terram creasse.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP_Q46_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 1. Whether the universe of creatures always existed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything
+which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore
+the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality
+to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from
+privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist
+without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist:
+which is impossible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30389] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod universitas creaturarum, quae mundi nomine
+nuncupatur, non incoeperit, sed fuerit ab aeterno. Omne enim quod
+incoepit esse, antequam fuerit, possibile fuit ipsum esse, alioquin
+impossibile fuisset ipsum fieri. Si ergo mundus incoepit esse,
+antequam inciperet, possibile fuit ipsum esse. Sed quod possibile
+est esse, est materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, quod est per
+formam, et ad non esse, quod est per privationem. Si ergo mundus
+incoepit esse, ante mundum fuit materia. Sed non potest esse
+materia sine forma, materia autem mundi cum forma, est mundus. Fuit
+ergo mundus antequam esse inciperet, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing
+extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate
+time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time
+is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there
+are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did
+not begin to exist.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30390] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, quandoque est et quandoque non
+est, quia ad quantum se extendit virtus alicuius rei, tandiu est.
+Sed omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut sit semper, non enim
+virtutem habet ad determinatum durationis tempus. Nullum ergo
+incorruptibile quandoque est et quandoque non est. Sed omne quod
+incipit esse, quandoque est et quandoque non est. Nullum ergo
+incorruptibile incipit esse. Sed multa sunt in mundo
+incorruptibilia, ut corpora caelestia, et omnes substantiae
+intellectuales. Ergo mundus non incoepit esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and
+also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30391] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullum ingenitum incoepit esse. Sed philosophus probat in I
+Physic., quod materia est ingenita; et in I de caelo et mundo, quod
+caelum est ingenitum. Non ergo universitas rerum incoepit esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body
+where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world
+there was a vacuum; which is impossible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="30392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30392] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+vacuum est ubi non est corpus, sed possibile est esse. Sed si
+mundus incoepit esse, ubi nunc est corpus mundi, prius non fuit
+aliquod corpus, et tamen poterat ibi esse, alioquin nunc ibi non
+esset. Ergo ante mundum fuit vacuum, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before.
+But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement.
+Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="30393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30393] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+de novo incipit moveri, nisi per hoc quod movens vel mobile aliter
+se habet nunc quam prius. Sed quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius,
+movetur. Ergo ante omnem motum de novo incipientem, fuit aliquis
+motus. Motus ergo semper fuit. Ergo et mobile, quia motus non est
+nisi in mobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p7">
+<b>Objection 6:</b> Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For
+nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable
+thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being
+changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change,
+at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow,
+but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because
+time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so
+the same conclusion follows as before.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="30394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30394] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+movens aut est naturale, aut est voluntarium. Sed neutrum incipit
+movere, nisi aliquo motu praeexistente. Natura enim semper eodem
+modo operatur. Unde, nisi praecedat aliqua immutatio vel in natura
+moventis vel in mobili, non incipiet a movente naturali esse motus,
+qui non fuit prius. Voluntas autem absque sui immutatione retardat
+facere quod proponit, sed hoc non est nisi per aliquam immutationem
+quam imaginatur, ad minus ex parte ipsius temporis. Sicut qui vult
+facere domum cras, et non hodie, expectat aliquid futurum cras,
+quod hodie non est; et ad minus expectat quod dies hodiernus
+transeat, et crastinus adveniat; quod sine mutatione non est, quia
+tempus est numerus motus. Relinquitur ergo quod ante omnem motum de
+novo incipientem, fuit alius motus. Et sic idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p8">
+<b>Objection 7:</b> Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is
+not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no
+time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently
+neither can movement, the measure of what is time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7"><a name="30395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30395] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid est semper in principio et semper in fine, nec incipere
+nec desinere potest, quia quod incipit, non est in suo fine; quod
+autem desinit, non est in suo principio. Sed tempus semper est in
+suo principio et fine, quia nihil est temporis nisi nunc, quod est
+finis praeteriti, et principium futuri. Ergo tempus nec incipere
+nec desinere potest. Et per consequens nec motus, cuius numerus
+tempus est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p9">
+<b>Objection 8:</b> Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,
+therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior
+in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8"><a name="30396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30396] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+aut est prior mundo natura tantum, aut duratione. Si natura tantum,
+ergo, cum Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus est ab aeterno. Si autem
+est prior duratione; prius autem et posterius in duratione
+constituunt tempus, ergo ante mundum fuit tempus; quod est
+impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p10">
+<b>Objection 9:</b> Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,
+requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by
+reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears
+from the above (
+<a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Since therefore God is
+eternal, the world is also eternal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9"><a name="30397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30397] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea,
+posita causa sufficienti, ponitur effectus, causa enim ad quam non
+sequitur effectus, est causa imperfecta, indigens alio ad hoc quod
+effectus sequatur. Sed Deus est sufficiens causa mundi; et finalis,
+ratione suae bonitatis; et exemplaris, ratione suae sapientiae; et
+effectiva, ratione suae potentiae; ut ex superioribus patet. Cum
+ergo Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus fuit ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p11">
+<b>Objection 10:</b> Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore
+the world is eternal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10"><a name="30398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30398] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10</span></a> Praeterea,
+cuius actio est aeterna, et effectus aeternus. Sed actio Dei est
+eius substantia, quae est aeterna. Ergo et mundus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.5" target="asv">Jn. 17:5</a>), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30399] Iª q. 46 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, <i>clarifica me, pater, apud temetipsum,
+claritate quam habui priusquam mundus fieret</i>; et Proverb. VIII,
+<i>dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam
+faceret a principio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p13">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will
+them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above
+(
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that, absolutely
+speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will
+that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world
+depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot
+be proved by demonstration.
+</p><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p14"> Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons
+of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three
+ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras,
+Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this
+subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is
+probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing
+to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 co."><a name="30400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30400] Iª q. 46 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc quidem ponere non est
+impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quod voluntas Dei est causa
+rerum. Sic ergo aliqua necesse est esse, sicut necesse est Deum
+velle illa, cum necessitas effectus ex necessitate causae
+dependeat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ostensum est autem supra quod,
+absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum.
+Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed
+eatenus mundus est, quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi
+ex voluntate Dei dependeat sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur
+necessarium mundum semper esse. Unde nec demonstrative probari
+potest. Nec rationes quas ad hoc Aristoteles inducit, sunt
+demonstrativae simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet ad
+contradicendum rationibus antiquorum, ponentium mundum incipere
+secundum quosdam modos in veritate impossibiles. Et hoc apparet ex
+tribus. Primo quidem, quia tam in VIII Physic. quam in I de caelo,
+praemittit quasdam opiniones, ut Anaxagorae et Empedoclis et
+Platonis, contra quos rationes contradictorias inducit. Secundo,
+quia, ubicumque de hac materia loquitur, inducit testimonia
+antiquorum, quod non est demonstratoris, sed probabiliter
+persuadentis. Tertio, quia expresse dicit in I Lib. Topic., quod
+quaedam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus rationes non habemus,
+ut utrum mundus sit aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter,
+but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to
+any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed
+to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30401] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, antequam mundus esset, possibile fuit mundum esse,
+non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quae est materia; sed
+secundum potentiam activam Dei. Et etiam secundum quod dicitur
+aliquid absolute possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam sed ex
+sola habitudine terminorum, qui sibi non repugnant; secundum quod
+possibile opponitur impossibili, ut patet per philosophum, in V
+Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before
+it received that power, it did not exist.
+</p><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p17"> Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never
+began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30402] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper ex quo habet
+illam virtutem, non quandoque est et quandoque non est, sed
+antequam haberet illam virtutem, non fuit. Unde haec ratio, quae
+ponitur ab Aristotele in I de caelo, non concludit simpliciter quod
+incorruptibilia non incoeperunt esse, sed quod non incoeperunt esse
+per modum naturalem, quo generabilia et corruptibilia incipiunt
+esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p18">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive
+its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from
+which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin
+by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and
+heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (
+<a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q46_A1-p18.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30403] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Aristoteles, in I Physic., probat materiam esse
+ingenitam, per hoc quod non habet subiectum de quo sit. In I autem
+de caelo et mundo, probat caelum ingenitum, quia non habet
+contrarium ex quo generetur. Unde patet quod per utrumque non
+concluditur nisi quod materia et caelum non incoeperunt per
+generationem, ut quidam ponebant, praecipue de caelo. Nos autem
+dicimus quod materia et coelum producta sunt in esse per
+creationem, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p19">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which
+there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before
+the world was.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="30404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30404] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod ad rationem vacui non sufficit in quo nihil est, sed
+requiritur quod sit spatium capax corporis, in quo non sit corpus,
+ut patet per Aristotelem, in IV Physic. Nos autem dicimus non
+fuisse locum aut spatium ante mundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p20">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas
+hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p20.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[2]</a>, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the
+existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal
+movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things
+began to exist movement also existed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="30405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30405] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod primus motor semper eodem modo se habuit primum autem
+mobile non semper eodem modo se habuit, quia incoepit esse, cum
+prius non fuisset. Sed hoc non fuit per mutationem, sed per
+creationem, quae non est mutatio, ut supra dictum est. Unde patet
+quod haec ratio, quam ponit Aristoteles in VIII Physic., procedit
+contra eos qui ponebant mobilia aeterna, sed motum non aeternum; ut
+patet ex opinionibus Anaxagorae et Empedoclis. Nos autem ponimus,
+ex quo mobilia incoeperunt, semper fuisse motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p21">
+<b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce
+an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must
+take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else,
+and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the
+form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter.
+Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different
+kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say
+of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it
+presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary
+succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as
+acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His
+action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was
+fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it
+was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is
+not so manifest of what always was.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="30406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30406] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
+quod primum agens est agens voluntarium. Et quamvis habuit
+voluntatem aeternam producendi aliquem effectum, non tamen produxit
+aeternum effectum. Nec est necesse quod praesupponatur aliqua
+mutatio, nec etiam propter imaginationem temporis. Aliter enim est
+intelligendum de agente particulari, quod praesupponit aliquid, et
+causat alterum, et aliter de agente universali, quod producit
+totum. Sicut agens particulare producit formam, et praesupponit
+materiam, unde oportet quod formam inducat secundum proportionem ad
+debitam materiam. Unde rationabiliter in ipso consideratur quod
+inducit formam in talem materiam et non in aliam, ex differentia
+materiae ad materiam. Sed hoc non rationabiliter consideratur in
+Deo, qui simul producit formam et materiam, sed consideratur
+rationabiliter in eo, quod ipse producit materiam congruam formae
+et fini. Agens autem particulare praesupponit tempus, sicut et
+materiam. Unde rationabiliter consideratur in eo, quod agit in
+tempore posteriori et non in priori, secundum imaginationem
+successionis temporis post tempus. Sed in agente universali, quod
+producit rem et tempus, non est considerare quod agat nunc et non
+prius, secundum imaginationem temporis post tempus, quasi tempus
+praesupponatur eius actioni, sed considerandum est in eo, quod
+dedit effectui suo tempus quantum voluit, et secundum quod
+conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim
+mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus
+non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset, omne enim quod non semper
+fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de
+eo quod semper fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p22">
+<b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning
+and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that
+any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same
+applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as
+being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward
+this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 7"><a name="30407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30407] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum
+dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., prius et posterius est
+in tempore, secundum quod prius et posterius est in motu. Unde
+principium et finis accipienda sunt in tempore, sicut et in motu.
+Supposita autem aeternitate motus, necesse est quod quodlibet
+momentum in motu acceptum sit principium et terminus motus, quod
+non oportet, si motus incipiat. Et eadem ratio est de nunc
+temporis. Et sic patet quod ratio illa instantis nunc, quod semper
+sit principium et finis temporis, praesupponit aeternitatem
+temporis et motus. Unde Aristoteles hanc rationem inducit, in VIII
+Physic., contra eos qui ponebant aeternitatem temporis, sed
+negabant aeternitatem motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p23">
+<b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity.
+Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above
+heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other
+dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 8"><a name="30408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30408] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum
+dicendum quod Deus est prior mundo duratione. Sed ly prius non
+designat prioritatem temporis, sed aeternitatis. Vel dicendum quod
+designat aeternitatem temporis imaginati, et non realiter
+existentis. Sicut, cum dicitur, supra caelum nihil est, ly supra
+designat locum imaginatum tantum, secundum quod possibile est
+imaginari dimensionibus caelestis corporis dimensiones alias
+superaddi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24">
+<b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from
+the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>;
+<a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q41_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.2" shape="rect">Q[41], A[2]</a>). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced
+by Him,
+except as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare
+its author.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 9"><a name="30409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30409] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum dicendum
+quod, sicut effectus sequitur a causa agente naturaliter secundum
+modum suae formae, ita sequitur ab agente per voluntatem secundum
+formam ab eo praeconceptam et definitam, ut ex superioribus patet.
+Licet igitur Deus ab aeterno fuerit sufficiens causa mundi, non
+tamen oportet quod ponatur mundus ab eo productus, nisi secundum
+quod est in praedefinitione suae voluntatis; ut scilicet habeat
+esse post non esse, ut manifestius declaret suum auctorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p25">
+<b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents
+acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore
+from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which
+has being after not being.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 10"><a name="30410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30410] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum
+dicendum quod, posita actione, sequitur effectus secundum
+exigentiam formae quae est principium actionis. In agentibus autem
+per voluntatem, quod conceptum est et praedefinitum, accipitur ut
+forma quae est principium actionis. Ex actione igitur Dei aeterna
+non sequitur effectus aeternus, sed qualem Deus voluit, ut scilicet
+haberet esse post non esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q46_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 2. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that
+is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world;
+indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30411] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod mundum incoepisse non sit articulus fidei,
+sed conclusio demonstrabilis. Omne enim factum habet principium
+suae durationis. Sed demonstrative probari potest quod Deus sit
+causa effectiva mundi, et hoc etiam probabiliores philosophi
+posuerunt. Ergo demonstrative probari potest quod mundus
+incoeperit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from
+something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which
+are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world
+was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have
+begun.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30412] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
+necesse est dicere quod mundus factus est a Deo, aut ergo ex
+nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo, quia sic materia mundi
+praecessisset mundum; contra quod procedunt rationes Aristotelis
+ponentis caelum ingenitum. Ergo oportet dicere quod mundus sit
+factus ex nihilo. Et sic habet esse post non esse. Ergo oportet
+quod esse incoeperit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts
+by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30413] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+quod operatur per intellectum, a quodam principio operatur, ut
+patet in omnibus artificibus. Sed Deus est agens per intellectum.
+Ergo a quodam principio operatur mundus igitur, qui est eius
+effectus, non fuit semper.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
+fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always
+exist.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="30414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30414] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+manifeste apparet artes aliquas, et habitationes regionum, ex
+determinatis temporibus incoepisse. Sed hoc non esset, si mundus
+semper fuisset. Mundum igitur non semper fuisse manifestum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
+Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="30415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30415] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+certum est nihil Deo aequari posse. Sed si mundus semper fuisset,
+aequipararetur Deo in duratione. Ergo certum est non semper mundum
+fuisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p7">
+<b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to
+pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="30416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30416] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, si
+mundus semper fuit, infiniti dies praecesserunt diem istum. Sed
+infinita non est pertransire. Ergo nunquam fuisset perventum ad
+hunc diem, quod est manifeste falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p8">
+<b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
+series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be
+an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7"><a name="30417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30417] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, si
+mundus fuit aeternus, et generatio fuit ab aeterno. Ergo unus homo
+genitus est ab alio in infinitum. Sed pater est causa efficiens
+filii, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo in causis efficientibus est
+procedere in infinitum, quod improbatur in II Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p9">
+<b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal:
+therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with
+certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8"><a name="30418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30418] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, si
+mundus et generatio semper fuit, infiniti homines praecesserunt.
+Sed anima hominis est immortalis. Ergo infinitae animae humanae
+nunc essent actu, quod est impossibile. Ergo ex necessitate sciri
+potest quod mundus incoeperit; et non sola fide tenetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in
+one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God
+created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated.
+Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30419] Iª q. 46 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, fidei
+articuli demonstrative probari non possunt, <i>quia fides de non
+apparentibus est</i>, ut dicitur ad Hebr. XI. Sed Deum esse
+creatorem mundi, sic quod mundus incoeperit esse, est articulus
+fidei, dicimus enim, credo in unum Deum et cetera. Et iterum,
+Gregorius dicit, in Homil. I in Ezech., quod Moyses prophetizavit
+de praeterito, dicens in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram;
+in quo novitas mundi traditur. Ergo novitas mundi habetur tantum
+per revelationem. Et ideo non potest probari demonstrative.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11">
+<b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above
+of the mystery of the Trinity (
+<a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle
+of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence
+it is said
+that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.
+Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot
+be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures
+is not among these, as was said above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>). But the divine will can be manifested by
+revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science.
+And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that
+are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of
+faith.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 co."><a name="30420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30420] Iª q. 46 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative
+probari non potest, sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum
+est. Et huius ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest
+demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi. Demonstrationis
+enim principium est quod quid est. Unumquodque autem, secundum
+rationem suae speciei, abstrahit ab hic et nunc, propter quod
+dicitur quod universalia sunt ubique et semper. Unde demonstrari
+non potest quod homo, aut caelum, aut lapis non semper fuit.
+Similiter etiam neque ex parte causae agentis, quae agit per
+voluntatem. Voluntas enim Dei ratione investigari non potest, nisi
+circa ea quae absolute necesse est Deum velle, talia autem non sunt
+quae circa creaturas vult, ut dictum est. Potest autem voluntas
+divina homini manifestari per revelationem, cui fides innititur.
+Unde mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel
+scibile. Et hoc utile est ut consideretur, ne forte aliquis, quod
+fidei est demonstrare praesumens, rationes non necessarias inducat,
+quae praebeant materiam irridendi infidelibus, existimantibus nos
+propter huiusmodi rationes credere quae fidei sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For
+some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by
+proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world
+has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible
+way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in
+the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the
+world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts
+by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent
+must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker
+to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily
+if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced
+the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[2]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30421] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei,
+philosophorum ponentium aeternitatem mundi, duplex fuit opinio.
+Quidam enim posuerunt quod substantia mundi non sit a Deo. Et horum
+est intollerabilis error; et ideo ex necessitate refellitur. Quidam
+autem sic posuerunt mundum aeternum, quod tamen mundum a Deo factum
+dixerunt. <i>Non enim mundum temporis volunt habere, sed suae
+creationis initium, ut quodam modo vix intelligibili semper sit
+factus. Id autem quomodo intelligant, invenerunt</i>, ut idem dicit
+in X de Civ. Dei. <i>Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate
+semper fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium, quod a
+calcante factum nemo dubitaret; sic et mundus semper fuit, semper
+existente qui fecit</i>. Et ad hoc intelligendum, considerandum est
+quod causa efficiens quae agit per motum, de necessitate praecedit
+tempore suum effectum, quia effectus non est nisi in termino
+actionis, agens autem omne oportet esse principium actionis. Sed si
+actio sit instantanea, et non successiva, non est necessarium
+faciens esse prius facto duratione; sicut patet in illuminatione.
+Unde dicunt quod non sequitur ex necessitate, si Deus est causa
+activa mundi, quod sit prior mundo duratione, quia creatio, qua
+mundum produxit, non est mutatio successiva, ut supra dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made
+after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some
+of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30422] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illi qui ponerent mundum aeternum, dicerent mundum
+factum a Deo ex nihilo, non quod factus sit post nihilum, secundum
+quod nos intelligimus per nomen creationis; sed quia non est factus
+de aliquo. Et sic etiam non recusant aliqui eorum creationis nomen,
+ut patet ex Avicenna in sua metaphysica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except
+as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human
+intellect, but not the divine intellect (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q46_A2-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[14], AA[7]</a>,12).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30423] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illa est ratio Anaxagorae, quae ponitur in III
+Physic. Sed non de necessitate concludit, nisi de intellectu qui
+deliberando investigat quid agendum sit, quod est simile motui.
+Talis autem est intellectus humanus, sed non divinus, ut supra
+patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable
+to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents,
+were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular
+changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="30424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30424] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod ponentes aeternitatem mundi, ponunt aliquam regionem
+infinities esse mutatam de inhabitabili in habitabilem, et e
+converso. Et similiter ponunt quod artes, propter diversas
+corruptiones et accidentia, infinities fuerunt inventae, et iterum
+corruptae. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in libro Meteor., quod ridiculum
+est ex huiusmodi particularibus mutationibus opinionem accipere de
+novitate mundi totius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because
+the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="30425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30425] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod, etsi mundus semper fuisset, non tamen parificaretur
+Deo in aeternitate, ut dicit Boetius, in fine de Consolat., quia
+esse divinum est esse totum simul, absque successione; non autem
+sic est de mundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p17">
+<b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there
+is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there
+is an infinite number of mean terms.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="30426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30426] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
+quod transitus semper intelligitur a termino in terminum.
+Quaecumque autem praeterita dies signetur, ab illa usque ad istam
+sunt finiti dies, qui pertransiri poterunt. Obiectio autem procedit
+ac si, positis extremis, sint media infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p18">
+<b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes
+that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and
+so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance,
+if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
+cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after
+the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise
+it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as
+the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a particular
+generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if
+the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 7"><a name="30427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30427] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum
+dicendum quod in causis efficientibus impossibile est procedere in
+infinitum per se; ut puta si causae quae per se requiruntur ad
+aliquem effectum, multiplicarentur in infinitum; sicut si lapis
+moveretur a baculo, et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed per
+accidens in infinitum procedere in causis agentibus non reputatur
+impossibile; ut puta si omnes causae quae in infinitum
+multiplicantur, non teneant ordinem nisi unius causae, sed earum
+multiplicatio sit per accidens; sicut artifex agit multis martellis
+per accidens, quia unus post unum frangitur. Accidit ergo huic
+martello, quod agat post actionem alterius martelli. Et similiter
+accidit huic homini, inquantum generat, quod sit generatus ab alio,
+generat enim inquantum homo, et non inquantum est filius alterius
+hominis; omnes enim homines generantes habent gradum unum in causis
+efficientibus, scilicet gradum particularis generantis. Unde non
+est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum. Esset
+autem impossibile, si generatio huius hominis dependeret ab hoc
+homine, et a corpore elementari, et a sole, et sic in
+infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19">
+<b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to
+be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity.
+But this was disproved above (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A4" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[4]</a>). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as
+Augustine says
+[*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls---viz.
+that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters
+will be given later (
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.2" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A6" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.3" shape="rect">Q[118], A[6]</a>). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or
+least some creature, as an
+angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 8"><a name="30428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30428] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum
+dicendum quod hanc rationem ponentes aeternitatem mundi
+multipliciter effugiunt quidam enim non reputant impossibile esse
+infinitas animas actu; ut patet in metaphysica Algazelis, dicentis
+hoc esse infinitum per accidens. Sed hoc improbatum est superius.
+Quidam vero dicunt animam corrumpi cum corpore. Quidam vero quod ex
+omnibus animabus remanet una tantum. Alii vero, ut Augustinus
+dicit, posuerunt propter hoc circuitum animarum; ut scilicet animae
+separatae a corporibus, post determinata temporum curricula, iterum
+redirent ad corpora. De quibus omnibus in sequentibus est agendum.
+Considerandum tamen quod haec ratio particularis est. Unde posset
+dicere aliquis quod mundus fuit aeternus, vel saltem aliqua
+creatura, ut Angelus; non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus
+universaliter, an aliqua creatura fuerit ab aeterno.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q46_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A3-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 3. Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part
+of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and
+time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning
+of time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30429] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod creatio rerum non fuit in principio
+temporis. Quod enim non est in tempore, non est in aliquo temporis.
+Sed creatio rerum non fuit in tempore, per creationem enim rerum
+substantia in esse producta est; tempus autem non mensurat
+substantiam rerum, et praecipue incorporalium. Ergo creatio non
+fuit in principio temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies
+a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore,
+since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30430] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus probat quod omne quod fit, fiebat, et sic omne fieri
+habet prius et posterius. In principio autem temporis, cum sit
+indivisibile, non est prius et posterius. Ergo, cum creari sit
+quoddam fieri, videtur quod res non sint creatae in principio
+temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the
+beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30431] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum
+etiam tempus creatum est. Sed non potest creari in principio
+temporis, cum tempus sit divisibile, principium autem temporis
+indivisibile. Non ergo creatio rerum fuit in principio
+temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30432] Iª q. 46 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Gen. I dicitur, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
+terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude
+three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the
+beginning" are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and
+the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son."
+For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated
+to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning---that is, in the
+Son; according to the word of the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv">Col. 1:16</a>), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But others said that corporeal
+things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e.
+before all things---"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean
+heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 co."><a name="30433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30433] Iª q. 46 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod illud verbum Genes. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
+terram</i>, tripliciter exponitur, ad excludendum tres errores.
+Quidam enim posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, et tempus non habere
+principium. Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio,
+scilicet temporis. Quidam vero posuerunt duo esse creationis
+principia, unum bonorum, aliud malorum. Et ad hoc excludendum,
+exponitur, in principio, idest in filio. Sicut enim principium
+effectivum appropriatur patri, propter potentiam, ita principium
+exemplare appropriatur filio, propter sapientiam, ut sicut dicitur,
+omnia in sapientia fecisti, ita intelligatur Deum omnia fecisse in
+principio, idest in filio; secundum illud apostoli ad Coloss. I, in
+ipso, scilicet filio, condita sunt universa. Alii vero dixerunt
+corporalia esse creata a Deo mediantibus creaturis spiritualibus.
+Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum
+et terram, idest ante omnia. Quatuor enim ponuntur simul creata,
+scilicet caelum Empyreum, materia corporalis (quae nomine terrae
+intelligitur), tempus, et natura angelica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because
+together with time heaven and earth were created.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30434] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod non dicuntur in principio temporis res esse creatae,
+quasi principium temporis sit creationis mensura sed quia simul cum
+tempore caelum et terra creata sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since
+in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in
+the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement
+or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the
+term of movement, as was said above (
+<a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[45], AA[2]</a>,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30435] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi intelligitur de fieri quod
+est per motum, vel quod est terminus motus. Quia cum in quolibet
+motu sit accipere prius et posterius, ante quodcumque signum in
+motu signato, dum scilicet aliquid est in moveri et fieri, est
+accipere prius, et etiam aliquid post ipsum, quia quod est in
+principio motus, vel in termino, non est in moveri. Creatio autem
+neque est motus neque terminus motus, ut supra dictum est. Unde sic
+aliquid creatur, quod non prius creabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according
+to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30436] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod nihil fit nisi secundum quod est. Nihil autem est
+temporis nisi nunc. Unde non potest fieri nisi secundum aliquod
+nunc, non quia in ipso primo nunc sit tempus, sed quia ab eo
+incipit tempus.</p></div></div></div></div>
+`
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Mercurial > hg > Aquinas

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