Aquinas: summa/english/FS_iii.html comparison

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author	ht
date	Sat, 17 Nov 2018 15:42:30 +0000
parents	11682db9b870
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 a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is
 called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope
 and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and
 fear).
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q23_A2-p9"> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q23_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p10"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p11"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A3.html"></a>
 </div>
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p8"> Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement
 is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety
 but of negation or privation.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q23_A3-p9"> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q23_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p10"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p11"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html"></a>
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 and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p10"> Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
 irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q23_A4-p11"> From this the replies to the objections are evident.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q23_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From this the replies to the objections are evident.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p12"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p13"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A3.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q24.html"></a>
 </div>
 that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when
 he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately
 ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called "diseases"
 or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q24_A2-p8"> Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q24_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1</b> Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more
 or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion
 to deviate always from the order of natural reason.
 </p>
 is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p11">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related
 to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
-Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object
+Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest.
-leads to the same conclusion.
+</p>
-</p>
+<p id="FS_Q25_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>The third object
+leads to the same conclusion.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p12"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p13"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q25.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html"></a>
 </div>
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p8">
 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend
 is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q26_A4-p9"> Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q26_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p10">
 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the
 character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that
 friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true
 friendship.
 him from gaining the good that he loves, he
 becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel
 among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder
 one another in attaining the position they covet.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q27_A3-p10"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q27_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p11">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the
 latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer
 love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect
 of his art.
 <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p7"> And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect
 of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of
 this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through
 the change of some bodily organ.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q28_A5-p8"> In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment,
+<p id="FS_Q28_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment,
 languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely
 bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is
 loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above
 <a id="FS_Q28_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
 Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening
 the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account
 themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves
 according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to
 reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q29_A4-p8"> Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q29_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves,
 apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p10">
 subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is
 viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And
 therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of
 all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q35_A4-p11"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary
+<p id="FS_Q35_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary
 to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening
 the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p12"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p13"></p>
 said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural
 inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary
 evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate
 beings.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q41_A3-p9"> Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q41_A3-p9"><b>Reply to the Objections</b> are evident.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p10"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p11"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html"></a>
 </div>
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p6">
 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads
 to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q41_A4-p7"> On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).</p>
+<p id="FS_Q41_A4-p7"><b>On the contrary,</b> suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).</p>
 <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p8">
 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
 <a id="FS_Q41_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like
 his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First,
 there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much
 of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p9"> In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus
 a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q42_A1-p10"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q42_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to objections</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p11"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p12"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q42.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A2.html"></a>
 </div>
 <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p7"> Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion
 makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really
 are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing
 to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q44_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q44_A2-p8">  <b>Reply to objections</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense,
 man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear
 be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for
 him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive
 parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels,
 and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles,
 as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11).
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q44_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q44_A3-p8">  <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles,
 as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially
 in their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through
 their connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For
 of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much
 disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take
 counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even
 on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q44_A4-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q44_A4-p7">  <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p8">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured
 to his imagination.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p9">
 of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the
 objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable
 to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged.
 Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q46_A2-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q46_A2-p9">  <b>Reply to objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p10"></p>
 <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p11"></p>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html"></a>
 <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A3.html"></a>
 </div>
 <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p7"> Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by
 the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors
 of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who
 are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q47_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q47_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and
 therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly
 despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt
 but through ignorance, or some other like cause.
 this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon,
 mitigate anger, according to
 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.1" target="asv">Prov. 15:1</a>: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom
 they humble themselves.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q47_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q47_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation;
 and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have
 attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses
 the measure of just retaliation.
 </p>
 <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p7">
 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to
 paralyze the tongue and other outward members.
 </p>
-<p id="FS_Q48_A4-p8"> And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+<p id="FS_Q48_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
 <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p9">
 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered
 by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even
 death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds
 to speak.

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