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comparison summa/english/FP_ix.html @ 81:43c19dd71b45

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added Q76A3O3, missing in original
author ht
date Sun, 20 Mar 2011 14:00:20 +0000
parents 11682db9b870
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694 organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act 694 organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act
695 which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, 695 which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself,
696 to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima 696 to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima
697 iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. 697 iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.
698 </p> 698 </p>
699 <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p18"> From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all 699 <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p18"> <b>Reply to Objections 2
700 &amp; 3:</b> From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all
700 things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient 701 things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient
701 that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. 702 that the intellectual power be not the act of the body.
702 </p> 703 </p>
703 <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p19"> 704 <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p19">
704 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there 705 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there
878 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ 879 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ
879 generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute 880 generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute
880 animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be 881 animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be
881 of the same "genus." Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, 882 of the same "genus." Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and,
882 therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd. 883 therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd.
883 </p> 884 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p3a"><!-- Added by HST, missing
884 <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p4"> 885 in original, copied from
885 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the 886 http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques76.pdf --><b>Objection 3:</b> In <i>De Generatione Animalium</i> the Philosopher claims that the embryo is an animal
887 before being a man. But this cannot be the case if the same essence belongs to both the sentient soul and
888 the intellective soul, since something is an animal through the sentient soul and a man through the
889 intellective soul. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the sentient and intellective souls have a
890 single essence.</p>
891 <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p4"><!-- labelled Objection 3 in
892 the original -->
893 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the
886 form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" 894 form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal"
887 by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated 895 by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated
888 by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is 896 by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is
889 not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject. 897 not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject.
890 </p> 898 </p>