Aquinas: summa/bilingual/FS_ii.html comparison

comparison summa/bilingual/FS_ii.html @ 107:3858f013e8cb

on to FS_ii

author	ht
date	Mon, 25 Jan 2016 10:03:35 +0000
parents
children	a576afa4a039

comparison

equal deleted inserted replaced

-:1b7fbe3c7baf
+:3858f013e8cb
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+<head>
+<title>Bilingual Aquinas</title>
+<style>
+h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both}
+.bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em}
+div.eng {width: 45%; float: left}
+div.lat {width: 45%; float: right}
+@page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm;
+orphans: 2; widows: 2;
+}
+@media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}}
+</style>
+</head>
+<body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.ii" class="div2">
+<h2 id="FS.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q6">Q. 6. OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q7">Q. 7. OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q8">Q. 8. OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q9">Q. 9. OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q10">Q. 10. OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q11">Q. 11. OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q12">Q. 12. OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q13">Q. 13. OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q14">Q. 14. OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q15">Q. 15. OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q16">Q. 16. OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q17">Q. 17. OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q18">Q. 18. OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q19">Q. 19. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q20">Q. 20. OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q21">Q. 21. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
+<div id="FS_Q6" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q6-p0.1">Q. 6. OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q6-p2"> Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order
+to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations
+and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of
+things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general
+principles; and secondly matters of detail.
+</p><p id="FS_Q6-p3"> In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves;
+(2) their principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals. And since Happiness
+is man's proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are
+common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly,
+those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold
+consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?
+</p><p id="FS_Q6-p4"> And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper
+to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
+</p><p id="FS_Q6-p5"> First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being
+elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded
+by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.
+</p><p id="FS_Q6-p6"> And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first
+consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary
+or involuntary. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q6-p7"><a href="#FS_Q6_A1"> (1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p8"><a href="#FS_Q6_A2"> (2) Whether in irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p9"><a href="#FS_Q6_A3"> (3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p10"><a href="#FS_Q6_A4"> (4) Whether violence can be done to the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p11"><a href="#FS_Q6_A5"> (5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p12"><a href="#FS_Q6_A6"> (6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p13"><a href="#FS_Q6_A7"> (7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p14"><a href="#FS_Q6_A8"> (8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 pr."><a name="33741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33741]
+Iª-IIae q. 6 pr.</span></a> Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per
+actus aliquos necesse est pervenire, oportet consequenter de
+humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur
+ad beatitudinem, vel impediatur beatitudinis via. Sed quia
+operationes et actus circa singularia sunt, ideo omnis operativa
+scientia in particulari consideratione perficitur. Moralis igitur
+consideratio quia est humanorum actuum, primo quidem tradenda est
+in universali secundo vero, in particulari. Circa universalem autem
+considerationem humanorum actuum, primo quidem considerandum
+occurrit de ipsis actibus humanis; secundo, de principiis eorum.
+Humanorum autem actuum quidam sunt hominis proprii; quidam autem
+sunt homini et aliis animalibus communes. Et quia beatitudo est
+proprium hominis bonum, propinquius se habent ad beatitudinem actus
+qui sunt proprie humani, quam actus qui sunt homini aliisque
+animalibus communes. Primo ergo considerandum est de actibus qui
+sunt proprii hominis; secundo, de actibus qui sunt homini aliisque
+animalibus communes, qui dicuntur animae passiones. Circa primum
+duo consideranda occurrunt, primo, de conditione humanorum actuum;
+secundo, de distinctione eorum. Cum autem actus humani proprie
+dicantur qui sunt voluntarii, eo quod voluntas est rationalis
+appetitus, qui est proprius hominis; oportet considerare de actibus
+inquantum sunt voluntarii. Primo ergo considerandum est de
+voluntario et involuntario in communi; secundo, de actibus qui sunt
+voluntarii quasi ab ipsa voluntate eliciti, ut immediate ipsius
+voluntatis existentes; tertio, de actibus qui sunt voluntarii quasi
+a voluntate imperati, qui sunt ipsius voluntatis mediantibus aliis
+potentiis. Et quia actus voluntarii habent quasdam circumstantias,
+secundum quas diiudicantur, primo considerandum est de voluntario
+et involuntario; et consequenter de circumstantiis ipsorum actuum
+in quibus voluntarium et involuntarium invenitur. Circa primum
+quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum in humanis actibus inveniatur
+voluntarium. Secundo, utrum inveniatur in animalibus brutis.
+Tertio, utrum voluntarium esse possit absque omni actu. Quarto,
+utrum violentia voluntati possit inferri. Quinto, utrum violentia
+causet involuntarium. Sexto, utrum metus causet involuntarium.
+Septimo, utrum concupiscentia involuntarium causet. Octavo, utrum
+ignorantia.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q6_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A1-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 1. Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself."
+as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare.
+But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's appetite is moved to act, by the appetible
+object which is outside him, and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10).
+Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33742] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod in humanis actibus non inveniatur
+voluntarium. Voluntarium enim est cuius principium est in ipso; ut
+patet per Gregorium Nyssenum, et Damascenum, et Aristotelem. Sed
+principium humanorum actuum non est in ipso homine, sed est extra,
+nam appetitus hominis movetur ad agendum ab appetibili quod est
+extra quod est sicut movens non motum, ut dicitur in III de anima.
+Ergo in humanis actibus non invenitur voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
+without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without:
+and therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33743] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus in VIII Physic. probat quod non invenitur in animalibus
+aliquis motus novus, qui non praeveniatur ab alio motu exteriori.
+Sed omnes actus hominis sunt novi, nullus enim actus hominis
+aeternus est. Ergo principium omnium humanorum actuum est ab extra.
+Non igitur in eis invenitur voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.5" target="asv">Jn. 15:5</a>): "Without Me you can do nothing." Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33744] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+qui voluntarie agit, per se agere potest. Sed hoc homini non
+convenit, dicitur enim Ioan. XV, <i>sine me nihil potestis
+facere</i>. Ergo voluntarium in humanis actibus non invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation." Now such are human acts.
+Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33745] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, quod <i>voluntarium est
+actus qui est operatio rationalis</i>. Tales autem sunt actus
+humani. Ergo in actibus humanis invenitur voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle
+of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is
+outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved
+downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by
+an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end,
+as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q6_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement
+for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so
+acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of
+the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if
+a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle
+of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards
+an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on
+it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge
+of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an
+end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the
+movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word "voluntary" implies that their movements and acts are from
+their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [*See
+Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge."
+Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be
+found.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 co."><a name="33746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33746] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod oportet in actibus humanis voluntarium esse. Ad cuius
+evidentiam, considerandum est quod quorundam actuum seu motuum
+principium est in agente, seu in eo quod movetur; quorundam autem
+motuum vel actuum principium est extra. Cum enim lapis movetur
+sursum, principium huius motionis est extra lapidem, sed cum
+movetur deorsum, principium huius motionis est in ipso lapide.
+Eorum autem quae a principio intrinseco moventur, quaedam movent
+seipsa, quaedam autem non. Cum enim omne agens seu motum agat seu
+moveatur propter finem, ut supra habitum est; illa perfecte
+moventur a principio intrinseco, in quibus est aliquod intrinsecum
+principium non solum ut moveantur, sed ut moveantur in finem. Ad
+hoc autem quod fiat aliquid propter finem, requiritur cognitio
+finis aliqualis. Quodcumque igitur sic agit vel movetur a principio
+intrinseco, quod habet aliquam notitiam finis, habet in seipso
+principium sui actus non solum ut agat, sed etiam ut agat propter
+finem. Quod autem nullam notitiam finis habet, etsi in eo sit
+principium actionis vel motus; non tamen eius quod est agere vel
+moveri propter finem est principium in ipso, sed in alio, a quo ei
+imprimitur principium suae motionis in finem. Unde huiusmodi non
+dicuntur movere seipsa, sed ab aliis moveri. Quae vero habent
+notitiam finis dicuntur seipsa movere, quia in eis est principium
+non solum ut agant, sed etiam ut agant propter finem. Et ideo, cum
+utrumque sit ab intrinseco principio, scilicet quod agunt, et quod
+propter finem agunt, horum motus et actus dicuntur voluntarii, hoc
+enim importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria
+inclinatione. Et inde est quod voluntarium dicitur esse, secundum
+definitionem Aristotelis et Gregorii Nysseni et Damasceni, non
+solum cuius principium est intra, sed cum additione scientiae.
+Unde, cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis et moveat seipsum,
+in eius actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be
+within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused
+or moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first
+principle. Yet again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to
+be first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration
+is a heavenly body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is moved locally by a higher mover. And so the
+intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus of
+appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33747] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod non omne principium est principium primum. Licet ergo
+de ratione voluntarii sit quod principium eius sit intra, non tamen
+est contra rationem voluntarii quod principium intrinsecum causetur
+vel moveatur ab exteriori principio, quia non est de ratione
+voluntarii quod principium intrinsecum sit principium primum. Sed
+tamen sciendum quod contingit aliquod principium motus esse primum
+in genere, quod tamen non est primum simpliciter sicut in genere
+alterabilium primum alterans est corpus caeleste, quod tamen non
+est primum movens simpliciter, sed movetur motu locali a superiori
+movente. Sic igitur principium intrinsecum voluntarii actus, quod
+est vis cognoscitiva et appetitiva, est primum principium in genere
+appetitivi motus, quamvis moveatur ab aliquo exteriori secundum
+alias species motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by means
+of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.
+Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him, begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far
+as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as
+in the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite
+which is the power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through some alteration in the body the
+appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as stated above (ad
+1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33748] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod motus animalis novus praevenitur quidem ab aliquo
+exteriori motu quantum ad duo. Uno modo, inquantum per motum
+exteriorem praesentatur sensui animalis aliquod sensibile, quod
+apprehensum movet appetitum, sicut leo videns cervum per eius motum
+appropinquantem, incipit moveri ad ipsum. Alio modo, inquantum per
+exteriorem motum incipit aliqualiter immutari naturali immutatione
+corpus animalis, puta per frigus vel calorem; corpore autem
+immutato per motum exterioris corporis, immutatur etiam per
+accidens appetitus sensitivus, qui est virtus organi corporei;
+sicut cum ex aliqua alteratione corporis commovetur appetitus ad
+concupiscentiam alicuius rei. Sed hoc non est contra rationem
+voluntarii, ut dictum est huiusmodi enim motiones ab exteriori
+principio sunt alterius generis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by
+moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And
+just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is
+an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary
+act, that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have
+this in common, that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33749] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Deus movet hominem ad agendum non solum sicut
+proponens sensui appetibile, vel sicut immutans corpus, sed etiam
+sicut movens ipsam voluntatem, quia omnis motus tam voluntatis quam
+naturae, ab eo procedit sicut a primo movente. Et sicut non est
+contra rationem naturae quod motus naturae sit a Deo sicut a primo
+movente, inquantum natura est quoddam instrumentum Dei moventis;
+ita non est contra rationem actus voluntarii quod sit a Deo,
+inquantum voluntas a Deo movetur. Est tamen communiter de ratione
+naturalis et voluntarii motus, quod sint a principio
+intrinseco.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A2-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 2. Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "voluntas" [will].
+Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything
+voluntary in them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33750] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntarium non sit in brutis
+animalibus. Voluntarium enim a voluntate dicitur. Voluntas autem,
+cum sit in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima, non potest esse in
+brutis animalibus. Ergo neque voluntarium in eis invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters
+of their actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted upon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there
+is no such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33751] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum hoc quod actus humani sunt voluntarii, homo dicitur esse
+dominus suorum actuum. Sed bruta animalia non habent dominium sui
+actus, <i>non enim agunt, sed magis aguntur</i>, ut Damascenus
+dicit. Ergo in brutis animalibus non est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary acts lead to praise and blame." But neither praise nor blame is
+due to the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33752] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Damascenus dicit quod <i>actus voluntarios sequitur laus et
+vituperium</i>. Sed actibus brutorum animalium non debetur neque
+laus neque vituperium. Ergo in eis non est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary." The same is
+said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.].
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33753] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicit philosophus, in III Ethic., quod <i>pueri et bruta
+animalia communicant voluntario</i>. Et idem dicunt Damascenus et
+Gregorius Nyssenus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q6_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge of the end. Now
+knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the
+thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And
+such knowledge belongs to none but the
+rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the
+aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through
+their senses and their natural estimative power.
+</p><p id="FS_Q6_A2-p7"> Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man
+can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of
+the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved
+to the end at once. Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: whereas the
+imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="33754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33754] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem voluntarii requiritur
+quod principium actus sit intra, cum aliqua cognitione finis. Est
+autem duplex cognitio finis, perfecta scilicet, et imperfecta.
+Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur
+res quae est finis sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio
+eius quod ordinatur in finem ad ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis
+competit soli rationali naturae. Imperfecta autem cognitio finis
+est quae in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod
+cognoscatur ratio finis, et proportio actus ad finem. Et talis
+cognitio finis invenitur in brutis animalibus, per sensum et
+aestimationem naturalem. Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis
+sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, prout scilicet,
+apprehenso fine, aliquis potest, deliberans de fine et de his quae
+sunt ad finem, moveri in finem vel non moveri. Imperfectam autem
+cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem
+imperfectam, prout scilicet apprehendens finem non deliberat, sed
+subito movetur in ipsum. Unde soli rationali naturae competit
+voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, sed secundum rationem
+imperfectam, competit etiam brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word "voluntary"
+is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way
+of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to
+an end, through some kind of knowledge.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33755] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod voluntas nominat rationalem appetitum, et ideo non
+potest esse in his quae ratione carent. Voluntarium autem
+denominative dicitur a voluntate, et potest trahi ad ea in quibus
+est aliqua participatio voluntatis, secundum aliquam convenientiam
+ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo voluntarium attribuitur animalibus
+brutis, inquantum scilicet per cognitionem aliquam moventur in
+finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating
+reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness
+is in irrational animals, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33756] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ex hoc contingit quod homo est dominus sui actus,
+quod habet deliberationem de suis actibus, ex hoc enim quod ratio
+deliberans se habet ad opposita, voluntas in utrumque potest. Sed
+secundum hoc voluntarium non est in brutis animalibus, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in irrational
+animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33757] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod laus et vituperium consequuntur actum voluntarium
+secundum perfectam voluntarii rationem; qualis non invenitur in
+brutis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A3-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 3. Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing
+can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without
+act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33758] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntarium non possit esse sine actu.
+Voluntarium enim dicitur quod est a voluntate. Sed nihil potest
+esse a voluntate nisi per aliquem actum, ad minus ipsius
+voluntatis. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse sine actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish.
+But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when
+the act of the will ceases.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33759] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut per actum voluntatis dicitur aliquis velle, ita cessante actu
+voluntatis dicitur non velle. Sed non velle involuntarium causat,
+quod opponitur voluntario. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse, actu
+voluntatis cessante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q6_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33760] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+de ratione voluntarii est cognitio, ut dictum est. Sed cognitio est
+per aliquem actum. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse absque aliquo
+actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act,
+to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33761] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+illud cuius domini sumus, dicitur esse voluntarium. Sed nos domini
+sumus eius quod est agere et non agere, velle et non velle. Ergo
+sicut agere et velle est voluntarium, ita et non agere et non
+velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q6_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense
+something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which
+sense something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman,
+from his having ceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows
+from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman
+were unable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be set down
+to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm.
+</p><p id="FS_Q6_A3-p7"> Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing
+and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an
+act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without
+even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="33762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33762] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur quod est a voluntate. Ab aliquo
+autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, directe, quod
+scilicet procedit ab aliquo inquantum est agens, sicut calefactio a
+calore. Alio modo, indirecte, ex hoc ipso quod non agit, sicut
+submersio navis dicitur esse a gubernatore, inquantum desistit a
+gubernando. Sed sciendum quod non semper id quod sequitur ad
+defectum actionis, reducitur sicut in causam in agens, ex eo quod
+non agit, sed solum tunc cum potest et debet agere. Si enim
+gubernator non posset navem dirigere, vel non esset ei commissa
+gubernatio navis, non imputaretur ei navis submersio, quae per
+absentiam gubernatoris contingeret. Quia igitur voluntas, volendo
+et agendo, potest impedire hoc quod est non velle et non agere, et
+aliquando debet; hoc quod est non velle et non agere, imputatur ei,
+quasi ab ipsa existens. Et sic voluntarium potest esse absque actu,
+quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori, cum actu interiori, sicut
+cum vult non agere; aliquando autem et absque actu interiori, sicut
+cum non vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that
+which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33763] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur non solum quod procedit a
+voluntate directe, sicut ab agente; sed etiam quod est ab ea
+indirecte, sicut a non agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish." Consequently
+just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is, "I wish not to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to
+wish not to read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness. Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no
+act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply
+involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33764] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non velle dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, prout sumitur
+in vi unius dictionis, secundum quod est infinitivum huius verbi
+nolo. Unde sicut cum dico nolo legere, sensus est, volo non legere;
+ita hoc quod est non velle legere, significat velle non legere. Et
+sic non velle causat involuntarium. Alio modo sumitur in vi
+orationis. Et tunc non affirmatur actus voluntatis. Et huiusmodi
+non velle non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in
+one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to
+act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33765] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod eo modo requiritur ad voluntarium actus cognitionis,
+sicut et actus voluntatis; ut scilicet sit in potestate alicuius
+considerare et velle et agere. Et tunc sicut non velle et non
+agere, cum tempus fuerit, est voluntarium, ita etiam non
+considerare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A4-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 4. Whether violence can be done to the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But
+there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33766] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntati possit violentia inferri.
+Unumquodque enim potest cogi a potentiori. Sed aliquid est humana
+voluntate potentius, scilicet Deus. Ergo saltem ab eo cogi
+potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive
+force: for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems
+that sometimes it is compelled.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33767] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne passivum cogitur a suo activo, quando immutatur ab eo. Sed
+voluntas est vis passiva, est enim movens motum, ut dicitur in III
+de anima. Cum ergo aliquando moveatur a suo activo, videtur quod
+aliquando cogatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
+as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore
+the movement of the will can be compelled.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33768] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+motus violentus est qui est contra naturam. Sed motus voluntatis
+aliquando est contra naturam; ut patet de motu voluntatis ad
+peccandum, qui est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo motus
+voluntatis potest esse coactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under compulsion
+is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to
+act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33769] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid fit
+voluntate, non fit ex necessitate. Omne autem coactum fit ex
+necessitate. Ergo quod fit ex voluntate, non potest esse coactum.
+Ergo voluntas non potest cogi ad agendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q6_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an
+act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which
+are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
+</p><p id="FS_Q6_A4-p7"> As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior
+members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.
+</p><p id="FS_Q6_A4-p8"> The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle
+of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge. Now
+what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act,
+that it should be subject to compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural
+inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its
+natural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of
+violence, that he be dragged of his own will.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="33770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33770] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod duplex est actus voluntatis, unus quidem qui est eius
+immediate, velut ab ipsa elicitus, scilicet velle; alius autem est
+actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potentia
+exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui, qui a voluntate imperantur
+mediante potentia motiva. Quantum igitur ad actus a voluntate
+imperatos, voluntas violentiam pati potest, inquantum per
+violentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne imperium voluntatis
+exequantur. Sed quantum ad ipsum proprium actum voluntatis, non
+potest ei violentia inferri. Et huius ratio est quia actus
+voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab
+interiori principio cognoscente, sicut appetitus naturalis est
+quaedam inclinatio ab interiori principio et sine cognitione. Quod
+autem est coactum vel violentum, est ab exteriori principio. Unde
+contra rationem ipsius actus voluntatis est quod sit coactus vel
+violentus, sicut etiam est contra rationem naturalis inclinationis
+vel motus. Potest enim lapis per violentiam sursum ferri, sed quod
+iste motus violentus sit ex eius naturali inclinatione, esse non
+potest. Similiter etiam potest homo per violentiam trahi, sed quod
+hoc sit ex eius voluntate, repugnat rationi violentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But if this were by compulsion,
+it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33771] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest
+voluntatem humanam movere; secundum illud Prov. XXI, <i>cor regis
+in manu Dei est, et quocumque voluerit, vertet illud</i>. Sed si
+hoc esset per violentiam, iam non esset cum actu voluntatis nec
+ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not always a violent movement, when a passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done
+against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration and generation of simply bodies would
+be unnatural and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to
+such a disposition. In like manner when the will is moved, according to its own
+inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33772] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non semper est motus violentus, quando passivum
+immutatur a suo activo, sed quando hoc fit contra interiorem
+inclinationem passivi. Alioquin omnes alterationes et generationes
+simplicium corporum essent innaturales et violentae. Sunt autem
+naturales, propter naturalem aptitudinem interiorem materiae vel
+subiecti ad talem dispositionem. Et similiter quando voluntas
+movetur ab appetibili secundum propriam inclinationem, non est
+motus violentus, sed voluntarius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless
+is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable
+sensation or some vicious habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33773] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod id in quod voluntas tendit peccando, etsi sit malum
+et contra rationalem naturam secundum rei veritatem, apprehenditur
+tamen ut bonum et conveniens naturae, inquantum est conveniens
+homini secundum aliquam passionem sensus, vel secundum aliquem
+habitum corruptum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A5-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 5. Whether violence causes involuntariness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in respect
+of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as shown above
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q6_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33774] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod violentia non causet involuntarium.
+Voluntarium enim et involuntarium secundum voluntatem dicuntur. Sed
+voluntati violentia inferri non potest, ut ostensum est. Ergo
+violentia involuntarium causare non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic.
+iii, 5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33775] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+id quod est involuntarium, est cum tristitia, ut Damascenus et
+philosophus dicunt. Sed aliquando patitur aliquis violentiam, nec
+tamen inde tristatur. Ergo violentia non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when
+a man with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore
+violence does not cause involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33776] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+id quod est a voluntate, non potest esse involuntarium. Sed aliqua
+violenta sunt a voluntate, sicut cum aliquis cum corpore gravi
+sursum ascendit; et sicut cum aliquis inflectit membra contra
+naturalem eorum flexibilitatem. Ergo violentia non causat
+involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33777] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus et Damascenus dicunt, quod <i>aliquid est
+involuntarium per violentiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in
+common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just
+as in things devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in things endowed with knowledge, it effects
+something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be "unnatural";
+and in like manner that which is against the will is said to be "involuntary." Therefore violence causes involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 co."><a name="33778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33778] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod violentia directe opponitur voluntario, sicut etiam
+et naturali. Commune est enim voluntario et naturali quod utrumque
+sit a principio intrinseco, violentum autem est a principio
+extrinseco. Et propter hoc, sicut in rebus quae cognitione carent,
+violentia aliquid facit contra naturam; ita in rebus cognoscentibus
+facit aliquid esse contra voluntatem. Quod autem est contra
+naturam, dicitur esse innaturale, et similiter quod est contra
+voluntatem, dicitur esse involuntarium. Unde violentia
+involuntarium causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q6_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that not only the act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will.
+Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q6_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded
+act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33779] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod involuntarium voluntario opponitur. Dictum est autem
+supra quod voluntarium dicitur non solum actus qui est immediate
+ipsius voluntatis, sed etiam actus a voluntate imperatus. Quantum
+igitur ad actum qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, ut supra
+dictum est, violentia voluntati inferri non potest, unde talem
+actum violentia involuntarium facere non potest. Sed quantum ad
+actum imperatum, voluntas potest pati violentiam. Et quantum ad
+hunc actum, violentia involuntarium facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As that is said to be natural, which is according to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is
+according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature
+as from an active principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle; because,
+to wit, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic
+principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to
+receive such movement; although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act is said to be voluntary
+in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action is brought
+to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject,
+there is not violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to
+suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33780] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut naturale dicitur quod est secundum
+inclinationem naturae, ita voluntarium dicitur quod est secundum
+inclinationem voluntatis. Dicitur autem aliquid naturale
+dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est a natura sicut a principio activo,
+sicut calefacere est naturale igni. Alio modo, secundum principium
+passivum, quia scilicet est in natura inclinatio ad recipiendum
+actionem a principio extrinseco, sicut motus caeli dicitur esse
+naturalis, propter aptitudinem naturalem caelestis corporis ad
+talem motum, licet movens sit voluntarium. Et similiter voluntarium
+potest aliquid dici dupliciter, uno modo, secundum actionem, puta
+cum aliquis vult aliquid agere; alio modo, secundum passionem,
+scilicet cum aliquis vult pati ab alio. Unde cum actio infertur ab
+aliquo exteriori, manente in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi, non
+est simpliciter violentum, quia licet ille qui patitur non conferat
+agendo, confert tamen volendo pati. Unde non potest dici
+involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural
+inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which
+it is natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The
+same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary
+to their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e.
+as to the man himself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33781] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in VIII Physic., motus
+animalis quo interdum movetur animal contra naturalem inclinationem
+corporis, etsi non sit naturalis corpori, est tamen quodammodo
+naturalis animali, cui naturale est quod secundum appetitum
+moveatur. Et ideo hoc non est violentum simpliciter, sed secundum
+quid. Et similiter est dicendum cum aliquis inflectit membra contra
+naturalem dispositionem. Hoc enim est violentum secundum quid,
+scilicet quantum ad membrum particulare non tamen simpliciter,
+quantum ad ipsum hominem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A6-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 6. Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at
+the time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore
+fear too causes involuntariness simply.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33782] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod metus causet involuntarium
+simpliciter. Sicut enim violentia est respectu eius quod
+contrariatur praesentialiter voluntati, ita metus est respectu mali
+futuri quod repugnat voluntati. Sed violentia causat involuntarium
+simpliciter. Ergo et metus involuntarium simpliciter causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it remains,
+is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with
+the addition of fear, it is involuntary.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33783] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quod est secundum se tale, quolibet addito remanet tale, sicut quod
+secundum se est calidum, cuicumque coniungatur, nihilominus est
+calidum, ipso manente. Sed illud quod per metum agitur, secundum se
+est involuntarium. Ergo etiam adveniente metu est
+involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition,
+is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary absolutely,
+is necessary simply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condition,
+namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is
+done through fear, is involuntary simply.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33784] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quod sub conditione est tale, secundum quid est tale; quod autem
+absque conditione est tale, simpliciter est tale, sicut quod est
+necessarium ex conditione, est necessarium secundum quid; quod
+autem est necessarium absolute, est necessarium simpliciter. Sed id
+quod per metum agitur, est involuntarium absolute, non est autem
+voluntarium nisi sub conditione, scilicet ut vitetur malum quod
+timetur. Ergo id quod per metum agitur, est simpliciter
+involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through
+fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33785] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, et etiam philosophus quod
+huiusmodi quae per metum aguntur, sunt magis voluntaria quam
+involuntaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q6_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such
+things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is
+done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely,
+to avoid the evil feared.
+</p><p id="FS_Q6_A6-p7"> But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply,
+but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is
+only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act in so far
+as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that which
+is done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that which is done through
+fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater
+evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the
+danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially
+voluntary, because its principle is within. But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case,
+and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through
+fear is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 co."><a name="33786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33786] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., et idem dicit
+Gregorius Nyssenus in libro suo de homine, huiusmodi quae per metum
+aguntur, <i>mixta sunt ex voluntario et involuntario</i>. Id enim
+quod per metum agitur, in se consideratum, non est voluntarium, sed
+fit voluntarium in casu, scilicet ad vitandum malum quod timetur.
+Sed si quis recte consideret, magis sunt huiusmodi voluntaria quam
+involuntaria, sunt enim voluntaria simpliciter, involuntaria autem
+secundum quid. Unumquodque enim simpliciter esse dicitur secundum
+quod est in actu, secundum autem quod est in sola apprehensione,
+non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Hoc autem quod per metum
+agitur, secundum hoc est in actu, secundum quod fit, cum enim actus
+in singularibus sint, singulare autem, inquantum huiusmodi, est hic
+et nunc; secundum hoc id quod fit est in actu, secundum quod est
+hic et nunc et sub aliis conditionibus individualibus. Sic autem
+hoc quod fit per metum, est voluntarium, inquantum scilicet est hic
+et nunc, prout scilicet in hoc casu est impedimentum maioris mali
+quod timebatur, sicut proiectio mercium in mare fit voluntarium
+tempore tempestatis, propter timorem periculi. Unde manifestum est
+quod simpliciter voluntarium est. Unde et competit ei ratio
+voluntarii, quia principium eius est intra. Sed quod accipiatur id
+quod per metum fit, ut extra hunc casum existens, prout repugnat
+voluntati, hoc non est nisi secundum considerationem tantum. Et
+ideo est involuntarium secundum quid, idest prout consideratur
+extra hunc casum existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that the
+will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion: whereas what is done through
+fear, becomes voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own sake, but on account of something else,
+that is, in order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a
+voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not only what we
+wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. It is clear therefore
+that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does
+something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear,
+a
+violent action is defined as not only one, "the principal whereof is from without," but with the addition, "in which he that
+suffers violence concurs not at all"; because the will of him that is in fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does
+through fear.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33787] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ea quae aguntur per metum et per vim, non solum
+differunt secundum praesens et futurum, sed etiam secundum hoc,
+quod in eo quod agitur per vim, voluntas non consentit, sed omnino
+est contra motum voluntatis, sed id quod per metum agitur, fit
+voluntarium, ideo quia motus voluntatis fertur in id, licet non
+propter seipsum, sed propter aliud, scilicet ad repellendum malum
+quod timetur. Sufficit enim ad rationem voluntarii quod sit propter
+aliud voluntarium, voluntarium enim est non solum quod propter
+seipsum volumus ut finem, sed etiam quod propter aliud volumus ut
+propter finem. Patet ergo quod in eo quod per vim agitur, voluntas
+interior nihil agit, sed in eo quod per metum agitur, voluntas
+aliquid agit. Et ideo, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, ad excludendum
+ea quae per metum aguntur, in definitione violenti non solum
+dicitur quod violentum est cuius principium est extra, sed additur,
+nihil conferente vim passo, quia ad id quod agitur per metum,
+voluntas timentis aliquid confert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but
+things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared with different things. For what is big in comparison
+with one thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it
+were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were relatively.
+Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared
+with another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33788] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ea quae absolute dicuntur, quolibet addito remanent
+talia, sicut calidum et album, sed ea quae relative dicuntur,
+variantur secundum comparationem ad diversa; quod enim est magnum
+comparatum huic, est parvum comparatum alteri. Voluntarium autem
+dicitur aliquid non solum propter seipsum, quasi absolute, sed
+etiam propter aliud, quasi relative. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquid
+quod non esset voluntarium alteri comparatum fieri voluntarium per
+comparationem ad aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is done through fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but
+it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument
+proves rather the opposite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33789] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illud quod per metum agitur, absque conditione est
+voluntarium, idest secundum quod actu agitur, sed involuntarium est
+sub conditione, idest si talis metus non immineret. Unde secundum
+illam rationem magis potest concludi oppositum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A7-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 7. Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes
+involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33790] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia causet involuntarium.
+Sicut enim metus est quaedam passio, ita et concupiscentia. Sed
+metus causat quodammodo involuntarium. Ergo etiam
+concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence.
+But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33791] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut per timorem timidus agit contra id quod proponebat, ita
+incontinens propter concupiscentiam. Sed timor aliquo modo causat
+involuntarium. Ergo et concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+vi, 5) that "delight," or the lust of pleasure, "destroys the judgment of prudence." Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33792] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad voluntarium requiritur cognitio. Sed concupiscentia corrumpit
+cognitionem, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod delectatio,
+sive concupiscentia delectationis, corrumpit aestimationem
+prudentiae. Ergo concupiscentia causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): "The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret." But neither
+of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33793] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Damascenus dicit, <i>involuntarium est misericordia vel
+indulgentia dignum, et cum tristitia agitur</i>. Sed neutrum horum
+competit ei quod per concupiscentiam agitur. Ergo concupiscentia
+non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to
+be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.
+Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 co."><a name="33794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33794] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod concupiscentia non causat involuntarium, sed magis
+facit aliquid voluntarium. Dicitur enim aliquid voluntarium ex eo
+quod voluntas in id fertur. Per concupiscentiam autem voluntas
+inclinatur ad volendum id quod concupiscitur. Et ideo
+concupiscentia magis facit ad hoc quod aliquid sit voluntarium,
+quam quod sit involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with
+the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33795] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod timor est de malo, concupiscentia autem respicit
+bonum. Malum autem secundum se contrariatur voluntati, sed bonum
+est voluntati consonum. Unde magis se habet timor ad causandum
+involuntarium quam concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from
+concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence;
+for his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear
+is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence
+is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter
+to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33796] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in eo qui per metum aliquid agit, manet repugnantia
+voluntatis ad id quod agitur, secundum quod in se consideratur. Sed
+in eo qui agit aliquid per concupiscentiam, sicut est incontinens,
+non manet prior voluntas, qua repudiabat illud quod concupiscitur,
+sed mutatur ad volendum id quod prius repudiabat. Et ideo quod per
+metum agitur, quodammodo est involuntarium, sed quod per
+concupiscentiam agitur, nullo modo. Nam incontinens concupiscentiae
+agit contra id quod prius proponebat, non autem contra id quod nunc
+vult, sed timidus agit contra id quod etiam nunc secundum se
+vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would
+follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary,
+because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done
+from concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the
+power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless,
+this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example "not to act"
+or "not to will," and in like manner "not to consider"; for the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on (
+<a href="#FS_Q10_A3" id="FS_Q6_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[3]</a>;
+<a href="unknown.html#FS_Q77_A7" id="FS_Q6_A7-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[77], A[7]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33797] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, si concupiscentia totaliter cognitionem auferret,
+sicut contingit in illis qui propter concupiscentiam fiunt amentes,
+sequeretur quod concupiscentia voluntarium tolleret. Nec tamen
+proprie esset ibi involuntarium, quia in his quae usum rationis non
+habent, neque voluntarium est neque involuntarium. Sed quandoque in
+his quae per concupiscentiam aguntur, non totaliter tollitur
+cognitio, quia non tollitur potestas cognoscendi; sed solum
+consideratio actualis in particulari agibili. Et tamen hoc ipsum
+est voluntarium, secundum quod voluntarium dicitur quod est in
+potestate voluntatis, ut non agere et non velle, similiter autem et
+non considerare, potest enim voluntas passioni resistere, ut infra
+dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A8-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 8. Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntariness. For "the involuntary act deserves pardon," as Damascene says
+(De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33798] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non causet involuntarium.
+Involuntarium enim veniam meretur, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed
+interdum quod per ignorantiam agitur, veniam non meretur; secundum
+illud I ad Cor. XIV, <i>si quis ignorat, ignorabitur</i>. Ergo
+ignorantia non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv"> Prov. 14: 22</a>: "They err, that work evil." If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary:
+which is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that "every sin is voluntary" (De Vera Relig. xiv).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33799] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne peccatum est cum ignorantia; secundum illud Prov. XIV,
+<i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Si igitur ignorantia
+involuntarium causet, sequeretur quod omne peccatum esset
+involuntarium. Quod est contra Augustinum dicentem quod omne
+peccatum est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out
+of ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he
+is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33800] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+involuntarium cum tristitia est, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed quaedam
+ignoranter aguntur, et sine tristitia, puta si aliquis occidit
+hostem quem quaerit occidere, putans occidere cervum. Ergo
+ignorantia non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance is involuntary."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33801] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Damascenus et philosophus dicunt, quod <i>involuntarium
+quoddam est per ignorantiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness,
+as was declared above
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold
+relationship to the act of the will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in a third way, "antecedently."
+"Concomitantly,"
+when there is ignorance of what is done; but, so that even if it were known, it would be done. For then, ignorance does not
+induce one to wish this to be done, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus in the
+example given (OBJ 3) a man did indeed wish to kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance
+of this kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause of
+anything that is repugnant to the will: but it causes "non-voluntariness," since that which is unknown cannot be actually
+willed. Ignorance is "consequent" to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary: and this happens in
+two ways, in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A3" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know, that he may have
+an excuse for sin, or that he may
+not be withheld from sin; according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Job.21.14" target="asv"> Job 21:14</a>: "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." And this is called "affected ignorance." Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary,
+when it regards that which one can and ought to know: for in this sense "not to act" and "not to will" are said to be voluntary,
+as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A3" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.4" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. And ignorance of this kind happens, either when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider; this
+is
+called "ignorance of evil choice," and arises from some passion or habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire
+the knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of law, which one to know, is voluntary,
+as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness
+simply. Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will
+towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowledge. Ignorance is "antecedent" to the act of the will, when
+it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of
+some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result being that he does that which he would not do, if
+he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along
+the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 co."><a name="33802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33802] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ignorantia habet causare involuntarium ea ratione qua
+privat cognitionem, quae praeexigitur ad voluntarium, ut supra
+dictum est. Non tamen quaelibet ignorantia huiusmodi cognitionem
+privat. Et ideo sciendum quod ignorantia tripliciter se habet ad
+actum voluntatis, uno modo, concomitanter; alio modo, consequenter;
+tertio modo, antecedenter. Concomitanter quidem, quando ignorantia
+est de eo quod agitur, tamen, etiam si sciretur, nihilominus
+ageretur. Tunc enim ignorantia non inducit ad volendum ut hoc fiat,
+sed accidit simul esse aliquid factum et ignoratum, sicut, in
+exemplo posito, cum aliquis vellet quidem occidere hostem, sed
+ignorans occidit eum, putans occidere cervum. Et talis ignorantia
+non facit involuntarium, ut philosophus dicit, quia non causat
+aliquid quod sit repugnans voluntati, sed facit non voluntarium,
+quia non potest esse actu volitum quod ignoratum est. Consequenter
+autem se habet ignorantia ad voluntatem, inquantum ipsa ignorantia
+est voluntaria. Et hoc contingit dupliciter, secundum duos modos
+voluntarii supra positos. Uno modo, quia actus voluntatis fertur in
+ignorantiam, sicut cum aliquis ignorare vult ut excusationem
+peccati habeat, vel ut non retrahatur a peccando, secundum illud
+Iob XXI, <i>scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus</i>. Et haec dicitur
+ignorantia affectata. Alio modo dicitur ignorantia voluntaria eius
+quod quis potest scire et debet, sic enim non agere et non velle
+voluntarium dicitur, ut supra dictum est. Hoc igitur modo dicitur
+ignorantia, sive cum aliquis actu non considerat quod considerare
+potest et debet, quae est ignorantia malae electionis, vel ex
+passione vel ex habitu proveniens, sive cum aliquis notitiam quam
+debet habere, non curat acquirere; et secundum hunc modum,
+ignorantia universalium iuris, quae quis scire tenetur, voluntaria
+dicitur, quasi per negligentiam proveniens. Cum autem ipsa
+ignorantia sit voluntaria aliquo istorum modorum, non potest
+causare simpliciter involuntarium. Causat tamen secundum quid
+involuntarium, inquantum praecedit motum voluntatis ad aliquid
+agendum, qui non esset scientia praesente. Antecedenter autem se
+habet ad voluntatem ignorantia, quando non est voluntaria, et tamen
+est causa volendi quod alias homo non vellet. Sicut cum homo
+ignorat aliquam circumstantiam actus quam non tenebatur scire, et
+ex hoc aliquid agit, quod non faceret si sciret, puta cum aliquis,
+diligentia adhibita, nesciens aliquem transire per viam, proiicit
+sagittam, qua interficit transeuntem. Et talis ignorantia causat
+involuntarium simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p7"> From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound
+to know. The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as stated above. The third, with that
+ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33803] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam prima ratio procedebat de
+ignorantia eorum quae quis tenetur scire. Secunda autem, de
+ignorantia electionis, quae quodammodo est voluntaria, ut dictum
+est. Tertia vero, de ignorantia quae concomitanter se habet ad
+voluntatem.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q7" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q7-p0.1">Q. 7. OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q7-p2"> We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q7-p3"><a href="#FS_Q7_A1"> (1) What is a circumstance?</a></p><p id="FS_Q7-p4"><a href="#FS_Q7_A2"> (2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q7-p5"><a href="#FS_Q7_A3"> (3) How many circumstances are there?</a></p><p id="FS_Q7-p6"><a href="#FS_Q7_A4"> (4) Which are the most important of them?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 pr."><a name="33804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33804]
+Iª-IIae q. 7 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+circumstantiis humanorum actuum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
+Primo, quid sit circumstantia. Secundo, utrum circumstantiae sint
+circa humanos actus attendendae a theologo. Tertio, quot sunt
+circumstantiae. Quarto, quae sunt in eis principaliores.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q7_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q7_A1-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 1. Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circumstance
+is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived principally
+from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which
+also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circumstance is
+not an accident of a human act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33805] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non sit accidens actus
+humani. Dicit enim Tullius, in rhetoricis, quod <i>circumstantia
+est per quam argumentationi auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit
+oratio</i>. Sed oratio dat firmamentum argumentationi praecipue ab
+his quae sunt de substantia rei, ut definitio, genus, species, et
+alia huiusmodi; a quibus etiam Tullius oratorem argumentari docet.
+Ergo circumstantia non est accidens humani actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But that which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out than in. Therefore the
+circumstances are not accidents of human acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33806] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+accidentis proprium est inesse. Quod autem circumstat, non inest,
+sed magis est extra. Ergo circumstantiae non sunt accidentia
+humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents
+of acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33807] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+accidentis non est accidens. Sed ipsi humani actus sunt quaedam
+accidentia. Non ergo circumstantiae sunt accidentia actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
+1) calls the circumstances particular things [*{ta kath' ekasta}], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the
+circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33808] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+particulares conditiones cuiuslibet rei singularis dicuntur
+accidentia individuantia ipsam. Sed philosophus, in III Ethic.,
+circumstantias nominat particularia, idest particulares singulorum
+actuum conditiones. Ergo circumstantiae sunt accidentia
+individualia humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q7_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words are the signs of what we understand," it must needs be that in
+naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known
+to the less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious:
+and hence it is that, as stated in Metaph. x, 4, "the notion of distance has been
+transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition": and in like manner words that signify local movement
+are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And
+hence it is that the word "circumstance" has passed from located things to human acts.
+</p><p id="FS_Q7_A1-p7"> Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly,
+whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances.
+Now what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Wherefore the circumstances
+of human acts should be called their accidents.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="33809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33809] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, quia nomina, secundum philosophum, sunt signa
+intellectuum, necesse est quod secundum processum intellectivae
+cognitionis, sit etiam nominationis processus. Procedit autem
+nostra cognitio intellectualis a notioribus ad minus nota. Et ideo
+apud nos a notioribus nomina transferuntur ad significandum res
+minus notas. Et inde est quod, sicut dicitur in X Metaphys., <i>ab
+his quae sunt secundum locum, processit nomen distantiae ad omnia
+contraria</i>, et similiter nominibus pertinentibus ad motum
+localem, utimur ad significandum alios motus, eo quod corpora, quae
+loco circumscribuntur, sunt maxime nobis nota. Et inde est quod
+nomen circumstantiae ab his quae in loco sunt, derivatur ad actus
+humanos. Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid circumstare, quod est
+quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropinquat ei
+secundum locum. Et ideo quaecumque conditiones sunt extra
+substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum,
+circumstantiae dicuntur. Quod autem est extra substantiam rei ad
+rem ipsam pertinens, accidens eius dicitur. Unde circumstantiae
+actuum humanorum accidentia eorum dicenda sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the circumstances
+of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently,
+or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that
+the orator "adds strength to his argument," as though this were
+something secondary.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33810] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod oratio quidem dat firmamentum argumentationi, primo
+ex substantia actus, secundario vero, ex his quae circumstant
+actum. Sicut primo accusabilis redditur aliquis ex hoc quod
+homicidium fecit, secundario vero, ex hoc quod dolo fecit, vel
+propter lucrum, vel in tempore aut loco sacro, aut aliquid aliud
+huiusmodi. Et ideo signanter dicit quod per circumstantiam oratio
+argumentationi firmamentum adiungit, quasi secundario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be
+an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident
+of the art of music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. And in this sense
+circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33811] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod aliquid dicitur accidens alicuius dupliciter. Uno
+modo, quia inest ei, sicut album dicitur accidens Socratis. Alio
+modo quia est simul cum eo in eodem subiecto, sicut dicitur quod
+album accidit musico, inquantum conveniunt, et quodammodo se
+contingunt, in uno subiecto. Et per hunc modum dicuntur
+circumstantiae accidentia actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q7_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the same subject.
+But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation
+to one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly, when such accidents are related to one another; as
+when the subject receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a
+body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in another; for we speak of color as
+being in the surface.
+</p><p id="FS_Q7_A1-p11"> Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong
+to the agent otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason
+of the act, as the manner in which the act is done.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33812] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, accidens dicitur accidenti
+accidere propter convenientiam in subiecto. Sed hoc contingit
+dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod duo accidentia comparantur ad
+unum subiectum absque aliquo ordine, sicut album et musicum ad
+Socratem. Alio modo, cum aliquo ordine, puta quia subiectum recipit
+unum accidens alio mediante, sicut corpus recipit colorem mediante
+superficie. Et sic unum accidens dicitur etiam alteri inesse,
+dicimus enim colorem esse in superficie. Utroque autem modo
+circumstantiae se habent ad actus. Nam aliquae circumstantiae
+ordinatae ad actum, pertinent ad agentem non mediante actu, puta
+locus et conditio personae, aliquae vero mediante ipso actu, sicut
+modus agendi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q7_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q7_A2-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 2. Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theologians should not take note of the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider
+human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality
+to human acts; for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but by that which is in it.
+Therefore theologians should not take note of the circumstances of acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33813] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantiae humanorum actuum non
+sint considerandae a theologo. Non enim considerantur a theologo
+actus humani, nisi secundum quod sunt aliquales, idest boni vel
+mali. Sed circumstantiae non videntur posse facere actus aliquales,
+quia nihil qualificatur, formaliter loquendo, ab eo quod est extra
+ipsum, sed ab eo quod in ipso est. Ergo circumstantiae actuum non
+sunt a theologo considerandae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher
+says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophistry." Therefore the
+theologian has not to consider circumstances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33814] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+circumstantiae sunt accidentia actuum. Sed uni infinita accidunt,
+et ideo, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys., <i>nulla ars vel scientia est
+circa ens per accidens, nisi sola sophistica</i>. Ergo theologos
+non habet considerare circumstantias humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is
+not a theologian's business to consider circumstances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33815] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+circumstantiarum consideratio pertinet ad rhetorem. Rhetorica autem
+non est pars theologiae. Ergo consideratio circumstantiarum non
+pertinet ad theologum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of
+Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
+Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33816] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+ignorantia circumstantiarum causat involuntarium, ut Damascenus et
+Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt. Sed involuntarium excusat a culpa, cuius
+consideratio pertinet ad theologum. Ergo et consideratio
+circumstantiarum ad theologum pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Circumstances come under the consideration of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian considers
+human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate
+to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due
+circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly,
+because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity
+depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[10]</a>,11;
+<a href="unknown.html#FS_Q73_A7" id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[73], A[7]</a>). Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts;
+and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,
+according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 co."><a name="33817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33817] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod circumstantiae pertinent ad considerationem theologi
+triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia theologus considerat actus
+humanos secundum quod per eos homo ad beatitudinem ordinatur. Omne
+autem quod ordinatur ad finem, oportet esse proportionatum fini.
+Actus autem proportionantur fini secundum commensurationem quandam,
+quae fit per debitas circumstantias. Unde consideratio
+circumstantiarum ad theologum pertinet. Secundo, quia theologus
+considerat actus humanos secundum quod in eis invenitur bonum et
+malum, et melius et peius, et hoc diversificatur secundum
+circumstantias, ut infra patebit. Tertio, quia theologus considerat
+actus humanos secundum quod sunt meritorii vel demeritorii, quod
+convenit actibus humanis; ad quod requiritur quod sint voluntarii.
+Actus autem humanus iudicatur voluntarius vel involuntarius,
+secundum cognitionem vel ignorantiam circumstantiarum, ut dictum
+est. Et ideo consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad
+theologum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only
+according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the
+expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly,
+since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according
+to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33818] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod bonum ordinatum ad finem dicitur utile, quod importat
+relationem quandam, unde philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>in
+ad aliquid bonum est utile</i>. In his autem quae ad aliquid
+dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam
+ab eo quod extrinsecus adiacet, ut patet in dextro et sinistro,
+aequali et inaequali, et similibus. Et ideo, cum bonitas actuum sit
+inquantum sunt utiles ad finem, nihil prohibet eos bonos vel malos
+dici secundum proportionem ad aliqua quae exterius adiacent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such
+like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q7_A1" id="FS_Q7_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents,
+however, come under the consideration of art.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33819] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod accidentia quae omnino per accidens se habent,
+relinquuntur ab omni arte, propter eorum incertitudinem et
+infinitatem. Sed talia accidentia non habent rationem
+circumstantiae, quia, ut dictum est, sic circumstantiae sunt extra
+actum, quod tamen actum aliquo modo contingunt, ordinatae ad ipsum.
+Accidentia autem per se cadunt sub arte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as
+with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the
+orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways,
+however: because where the orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian
+this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider
+virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts according as they
+are deserving of reward or punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33820] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad moralem, et
+politicum, et ad rhetorem. Ad moralem quidem, prout secundum eas
+invenitur vel praetermittitur medium virtutis in humanis actibus et
+passionibus. Ad politicum autem et rhetorem, secundum quod ex
+circumstantiis actus redduntur laudabiles vel vituperabiles,
+excusabiles vel accusabiles. Diversimode tamen, nam quod rhetor
+persuadet, politicus diiudicat. Ad theologum autem, cui omnes aliae
+artes deserviunt, pertinent omnibus modis praedictis, nam ipse
+habet considerationem de actibus virtuosis et vitiosis, cum morali;
+et considerat actus secundum quod merentur poenam vel praemium, cum
+rhetore et politico.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q7_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q7_A3-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 3. Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described
+as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to
+wit, "when" and "where."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33821] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circumstantiae
+numerentur in III Ethic. Circumstantia enim actus dicitur quod
+exterius se habet ad actum. Huiusmodi autem sunt tempus et locus.
+Ergo solae duae sunt circumstantiae, scilicet quando et ubi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore
+all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of acting."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33822] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ex circumstantiis accipitur quid bene vel male fiat. Sed hoc
+pertinet ad modum actus. Ergo omnes circumstantiae concluduntur sub
+una, quae est modus agendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
+Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about
+what," are circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the final cause, and "about what" to the material
+cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33823] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+circumstantiae non sunt de substantia actus. Sed ad substantiam
+actus pertinere videntur causae ipsius actus. Ergo nulla
+circumstantia debet sumi ex causa ipsius actus. Sic ergo neque
+quis, neque propter quid, neque circa quid, sunt circumstantiae,
+nam quis pertinet ad causam efficientem, propter quid ad finalem,
+circa quid ad materialem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33824] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est auctoritas philosophi in III Ethicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:
+</p><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p7"> "Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando---</p><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p8"> Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when."</p><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p9">For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or "instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it,
+"why" he did it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, "about what," which
+Tully includes in the circumstance "what."
+</p><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p10"> The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a circumstance is described as something outside the substance
+of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly,
+inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either
+by way of measure, as "time" and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting." It touches
+the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why";
+as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what"; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance
+"who"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 co."><a name="33825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33825] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, assignat septem
+circumstantias, quae hoc versu continentur, <i>quis, quid, ubi,
+quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando</i>. Considerandum est enim
+in actibus quis fecit, quibus auxiliis vel instrumentis fecerit,
+quid fecerit, ubi fecerit, cur fecerit, quomodo fecerit, et quando
+fecerit. Sed Aristoteles, in III Ethic., addit aliam, scilicet
+circa quid, quae a Tullio comprehenditur sub quid. Et ratio huius
+annumerationis sic accipi potest. Nam circumstantia dicitur quod,
+extra substantiam actus existens, aliquo modo attingit ipsum.
+Contingit autem hoc fieri tripliciter, uno modo, inquantum attingit
+ipsum actum; alio modo, inquantum attingit causam actus; tertio
+modo, inquantum attingit effectum. Ipsum autem actum attingit, vel
+per modum mensurae, sicut tempus et locus; vel per modum qualitatis
+actus, sicut modus agendi. Ex parte autem effectus, ut cum
+consideratur quid aliquis fecerit. Ex parte vero causae actus,
+quantum ad causam finalem, accipitur propter quid; ex parte autem
+causae materialis, sive obiecti, accipitur circa quid; ex parte
+vero causae agentis principalis, accipitur quis egerit; ex parte
+vero causae agentis instrumentalis, accipitur quibus auxiliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other
+way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33826] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod tempus et locus circumstant actum per modum mensurae,
+sed alia circumstant actum inquantum attingunt ipsum quocumque alio
+modo, extra substantiam eius existentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a quality
+of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so
+forth.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33827] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod iste modus qui est bene vel male, non ponitur
+circumstantia, sed consequens ad omnes circumstantias. Sed
+specialis circumstantia ponitur modus qui pertinet ad qualitatem
+actus, puta quod aliquis ambulet velociter vel tarde, et quod
+aliquis percutit fortiter vel remisse, et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional condition.
+Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to
+the substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other circumstances which are considered
+in reference to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a
+circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act "valiantly for the sake of" the good of the virtue or
+fortitude, is not a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or
+some such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a man by pouring water on someone
+should happen to wash him, is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him; heal
+him
+or harm him, these are circumstances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33828] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illa conditio causae ex qua substantia actus
+dependet, non dicitur circumstantia; sed aliqua conditio adiuncta.
+Sicut in obiecto non dicitur circumstantia furti quod sit alienum,
+hoc enim pertinet ad substantiam furti; sed quod sit magnum vel
+parvum. Et similiter est de aliis circumstantiis quae accipiuntur
+ex parte aliarum causarum. Non enim finis qui dat speciem actus,
+est circumstantia; sed aliquis finis adiunctus. Sicut quod fortis
+fortiter agat propter bonum fortitudinis, non est circumstantia;
+sed si fortiter agat propter liberationem civitatis, vel populi
+Christiani, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Similiter etiam ex parte eius
+quod est quid, nam quod aliquis perfundens aliquem aqua, abluat
+ipsum, non est circumstantia ablutionis; sed quod abluendo
+infrigidet vel calefaciat, et sanet vel noceat, hoc est
+circumstantia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q7_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q7_A4-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 4. Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act consists"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these are not the most important circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois
+e praxis]" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be
+the most important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things
+in which the act is are not the most important circumstances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33829] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint principales circumstantiae
+propter quid, et ea in quibus est operatio, ut dicitur in III
+Ethic. Ea enim in quibus est operatio, videntur esse locus et
+tempus, quae non videntur esse principalia inter circumstantias,
+cum sint maxime extrinseca ab actu. Ea ergo in quibus est operatio
+non sunt principalissimae circumstantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33830] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+finis est extrinsecus rei. Non ergo videtur esse principalissima
+circumstantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act
+is the person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. Therefore these two circumstances
+seem to be of the greatest importance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33831] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+principalissimum in unoquoque est causa eius et forma ipsius. Sed
+causa ipsius actus est persona agens; forma autem actus est modus
+ipsius. Ergo istae duae circumstantiae videntur esse
+principalissimae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.] says that "the most important circumstances" are "why it is done" and "what
+is done."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33832] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>principalissimae
+circumstantiae sunt cuius gratia agitur, et quid est quod
+agitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q7_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>), acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore
+that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance "why":
+and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did." As
+to the other circumstances, they are
+more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 co."><a name="33833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33833] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod actus proprie dicuntur humani, sicut supra dictum
+est, prout sunt voluntarii. Voluntatis autem motivum et obiectum
+est finis. Et ideo principalissima est omnium circumstantiarum illa
+quae attingit actum ex parte finis, scilicet cuius gratia,
+secundaria vero, quae attingit ipsam substantiam actus, idest quid
+fecit. Aliae vero circumstantiae sunt magis vel minus principales,
+secundum quod magis vel minus ad has appropinquant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By those things "in which the act is" the Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are affixed
+to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the
+Philosopher, instead of the latter's term---"in which the act is"---said, "what is done."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33834] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod per ea in quibus est operatio, philosophus non
+intelligit tempus et locum, sed ea quae adiunguntur ipsi actui.
+Unde Gregorius Nyssenus, quasi exponens dictum philosophi, loco
+eius quod philosophus dixit, in quibus est operatio, dicit quid
+agitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves
+the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33835] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod finis, etsi non sit de substantia actus, est tamen
+causa actus principalissima, inquantum movet ad agendum. Unde et
+maxime actus moralis speciem habet ex fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The person that does the act is the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this
+respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act.
+As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term
+or end; but it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33836] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod persona agens causa est actus secundum quod movetur a
+fine; et secundum hoc principaliter ordinatur ad actum. Aliae vero
+conditiones personae non ita principaliter ordinantur ad actum.
+Modus etiam non est substantialis forma actus, hoc enim attenditur
+in actu secundum obiectum et terminum vel finem, sed est quasi
+quaedam qualitas accidentalis.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q8" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q8-p0.1">Q. 8. OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q8-p2"> We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately,
+as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.
+</p><p id="FS_Q8-p3"> Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby
+it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it seems that there are three acts of the
+will in reference to the end; viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1) volition; (2) enjoyment;
+(3) intention. Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By
+what is the will moved? (3) How is it moved?
+</p><p id="FS_Q8-p4"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q8-p5"><a href="#FS_Q8_A1"> (1) Whether the will is of good only?</a></p><p id="FS_Q8-p6"><a href="#FS_Q8_A2"> (2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?</a></p><p id="FS_Q8-p7"><a href="#FS_Q8_A3"> (3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means, by the same movement?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 pr."><a name="33837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33837]
+Iª-IIae q. 8 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ipsis
+actibus voluntariis in speciali. Et primo, de actibus qui sunt
+immediate ipsius voluntatis velut ab ipsa voluntate eliciti;
+secundo de actibus imperatis a voluntate. Voluntas autem movetur et
+in finem, et in ea quae sunt ad finem. Primo igitur considerandum
+est de actibus voluntatis quibus movetur in finem; et deinde de
+actibus eius quibus movetur in ea quae sunt ad finem. Actus autem
+voluntatis in finem videntur esse tres, scilicet velle, frui et
+intendere. Primo ergo considerabimus de voluntate; secundo, de
+fruitione; tertio, de intentione. Circa primum consideranda sunt
+tria, primo quidem, quorum voluntas sit; secundo, a quo moveatur;
+tertio, quomodo moveatur. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo,
+utrum voluntas sit tantum boni. Secundum, utrum sit tantum finis,
+an etiam eorum quae sunt ad finem. Tertio, si est aliquo modo eorum
+quae sunt ad finem, utrum uno motu moveatur in finem et in ea quae
+sunt ad finem.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q8_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q8_A1-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 1. Whether the will is of good only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white
+and black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33838] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non tantum sit boni. Eadem
+enim est potentia oppositorum, sicut visus albi et nigri. Sed bonum
+et malum sunt opposita. Ergo voluntas non solum est boni, sed etiam
+mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will
+is a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites;
+and consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33839] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita prosequenda, secundum
+philosophum. Sed voluntas est potentia rationalis, est enim in
+ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo voluntas se habet ad
+opposita. Non ergo tantum ad volendum bonum, sed etiam ad volendum
+malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes
+we wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore
+the will is not of good only.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33840] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum et ens convertuntur. Sed voluntas non solum est entium, sed
+etiam non entium, volumus enim quandoque non ambulare et non loqui.
+Volumus etiam interdum quaedam futura, quae non sunt entia in actu.
+Ergo voluntas non tantum est boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33841] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>malum est
+praeter voluntatem, et quod omnia bonum appetunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q8_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
+nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something
+like and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it
+must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire."
+</p><p id="FS_Q8_A1-p7"> But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing
+in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will,
+follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so the animal
+or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to
+anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher
+says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="33842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33842] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod voluntas est appetitus quidam rationalis. Omnis autem
+appetitus non est nisi boni. Cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil
+aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid. Nihil autem
+inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile et conveniens. Cum igitur omnis
+res, inquantum est ens et substantia, sit quoddam bonum, necesse
+est ut omnis inclinatio sit in bonum. Et inde est quod philosophus
+dicit, in I Ethic., quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Sed
+considerandum est quod, cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam
+formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura
+existentem, appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu
+rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam.
+Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum
+existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel
+voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum. Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in
+aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed
+quod apprehendatur in ratione boni. Et propter hoc philosophus
+dicit, in II Physic., quod <i>finis est bonum, vel apparens
+bonum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same power regards opposites, but it is not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both
+to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called "volition"
+[*In Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the
+translation may appear superfluous], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is
+in this sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better described as "nolition":
+wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33843] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod eadem potentia est oppositorum, sed non eodem modo se
+habet ad utrumque. Voluntas igitur se habet et ad bonum et ad
+malum, sed ad bonum, appetendo ipsum; ad malum vero, fugiendo
+illud. Ipse ergo actualis appetitus boni vocatur voluntas, secundum
+quod nominat actum voluntatis, sic enim nunc loquimur de voluntate.
+Fuga autem mali magis dicitur noluntas. Unde sicut voluntas est
+boni, ita noluntas est mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object;
+for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to
+such opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such
+like: for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33844] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod potentia rationalis non se habet ad quaelibet
+opposita prosequenda, sed ad ea quae sub suo obiecto convenienti
+continentur, nam nulla potentia prosequitur nisi suum conveniens
+obiectum. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum. Unde ad illa
+opposita prosequenda se habet voluntas, quae sub bono
+comprehenduntur, sicut moveri et quiescere, loqui et tacere, et
+alia huiusmodi, in utrumque enim horum fertur voluntas sub ratione
+boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said
+to be "beings of reason." In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in
+so far as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to
+them. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a
+good."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33845] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illud quod non est ens in rerum natura, accipitur ut
+ens in ratione, unde negationes et privationes dicuntur entia
+rationis. Per quem etiam modum futura, prout apprehenduntur, sunt
+entia. Inquantum igitur sunt huiusmodi entia, apprehenduntur sub
+ratione boni, et sic voluntas in ea tendit. Unde philosophus dicit,
+in V Ethic., quod <i>carere malo habet rationem boni</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q8_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q8_A2-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 2. Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition
+is of the end, while choice is of the means."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33846] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non sit eorum quae sunt ad
+finem, sed tantum finis. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Ethic.,
+quod <i>voluntas est finis, electio autem eorum quae sunt ad
+finem.</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the end
+and the means are in different genera of good: because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in
+the genus "quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus
+"relation" (Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33847] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad ea quae sunt diversa genere, diversae potentiae animae
+ordinantur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed finis et ea quae sunt ad
+finem sunt in diverso genere boni, nam finis, qui est bonum
+honestum vel delectabile, est in genere qualitatis, vel actionis
+aut passionis; bonum autem quod dicitur utile, quod est ad finem,
+est in ad aliquid, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo, si voluntas est
+finis, non erit eorum quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical
+arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art
+of the) helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore,
+since volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33848] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+habitus proportionantur potentis, cum sint earum perfectiones. Sed
+in habitibus qui dicuntur artes operativae, ad aliud pertinet
+finis, et ad aliud quod est ad finem, sicut ad gubernatorem
+pertinet usus navis, qui est finis eius; ad navifactivam vero
+constructio navis, quae est propter finem. Ergo, cum voluntas sit
+finis, non erit eorum quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But
+the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end,
+it is also of the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33849] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est, quia in rebus naturalibus per eandem potentiam aliquid
+pertransit media, et pertingit ad terminum. Sed ea quae sunt ad
+finem, sunt quaedam media per quae pervenitur ad finem sicut ad
+terminum. Ergo, si voluntas est finis, ipsa etiam est eorum quae
+sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q8_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
+Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends
+to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends
+to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the
+object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.
+</p><p id="FS_Q8_A2-p7"> If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every
+act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the
+understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which
+is good and willed in itself is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the
+other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to
+them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly
+directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to
+things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in morals the end is
+what principles are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 co."><a name="33850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33850] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod voluntas quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus;
+quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus. Si ergo loquamur de
+voluntate secundum quod nominat potentiam, sic se extendit et ad
+finem, et ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Ad ea enim se extendit
+unaquaeque potentia, in quibus inveniri potest quocumque modo ratio
+sui obiecti, sicut visus se extendit ad omnia quaecumque
+participant quocumque modo colorem. Ratio autem boni, quod est
+obiectum potentiae voluntatis, invenitur non solum in fine, sed
+etiam in his quae sunt ad finem. Si autem loquamur de voluntate
+secundum quod nominat proprie actum, sic, proprie loquendo, est
+finis tantum. Omnis enim actus denominatus a potentia, nominat
+simplicem actum illius potentiae, sicut intelligere nominat
+simplicem actum intellectus. Simplex autem actus potentiae est in
+id quod est secundum se obiectum potentiae. Id autem quod est
+propter se bonum et volitum, est finis. Unde voluntas proprie est
+ipsius finis. Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non sunt bona vel volita
+propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in ea non
+fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem, unde hoc ipsum quod in eis
+vult, est finis. Sicut et intelligere proprie est eorum quae
+secundum se cognoscuntur, scilicet principiorum, eorum autem quae
+cognoscuntur per principia, non dicitur esse intelligentia, nisi
+inquantum in eis ipsa principia considerantur, <i>sic enim se habet
+finis in appetibilibus, sicut se habet principium in
+intelligibilibus</i>, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the
+will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33851] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de voluntate, secundum quod
+proprie nominat simplicem actum voluntatis, non autem secundum quod
+nominat potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color are different
+genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but
+are as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now such like objects are always referred to the
+same power; for instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by
+which color is seen.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33852] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ad ea quae sunt diversa genere ex aequo se habentia,
+ordinantur diversae potentiae, sicut sonus et color sunt diversa
+genera sensibilium, ad quae ordinantur auditus et visus. Sed utile
+et honestum non ex aequo se habent, sed sicut quod est secundum se
+et secundum alterum. Huiusmodi autem semper referuntur ad eandem
+potentiam, sicut per potentiam visivam sentitur et color, et lux,
+per quam color videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain
+special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed
+consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building
+art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
+end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and means
+that belong properly to that art.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33853] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non quidquid diversificat habitum, diversificat
+potentiam, habitus enim sunt quaedam determinationes potentiarum ad
+aliquos speciales actus. Et tamen quaelibet ars operativa
+considerat et finem et id quod est ad finem. Nam ars gubernativa
+considerat quidem finem, ut quem operatur, id autem quod est ad
+finem, ut quod imperat. E contra vero navifactiva considerat id
+quod est ad finem, ut quod operatur, id vero quod est finis, ut ad
+quod ordinat id quod operatur. Et iterum in unaquaque arte
+operativa est aliquis finis proprius, et aliquid quod est ad finem,
+quod proprie ad illam artem pertinet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q8_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q8_A3-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 3. Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.
+iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one." But the will does not will the means save on account
+of the end. Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33854] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod eodem actu voluntas feratur in finem,
+et in id quod est ad finem. Quia secundum philosophum, <i>ubi est
+unum propter alterum, ibi est unum tantum</i>. Sed voluntas non
+vult id quod est ad finem, nisi propter finem. Ergo eodem actu
+movetur in utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors
+are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby it wills the end and the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33855] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+finis est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut lumen est
+ratio visionis colorum. Sed eodem actu videtur lumen et color. Ergo
+idem est motus voluntatis quo vult finem, et ea quae sunt ad
+finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are
+in comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it
+is directed to the end and to the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33856] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+idem numero motus naturalis est qui per media tendit ad ultimum.
+Sed ea quae sunt ad finem, comparantur ad finem sicut media ad
+ultimum. Ergo idem motus voluntatis est quo voluntas fertur in
+finem, et in ea quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Acts are diversified according to their objects. But the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful
+good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33857] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+actus diversificantur secundum obiecta. Sed diversae species boni
+sunt finis, et id quod est ad finem, quod dicitur utile. Ergo non
+eodem actu voluntas fertur in utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can
+be moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved
+to the end. Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as
+the reason for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the
+same movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby
+the will is moved to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills
+to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The same
+happens in regard to the intellect: for at first a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he understands
+them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the principles.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="33858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33858] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum finis sit secundum se volitus, id autem quod est
+ad finem, inquantum huiusmodi, non sit volitum nisi propter finem;
+manifestum est quod voluntas potest ferri in finem sine hoc quod
+feratur in ea quae sunt ad finem; sed in ea quae sunt ad finem,
+inquantum huiusmodi, non potest ferri, nisi feratur in ipsum finem.
+Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupliciter fertur, uno modo,
+absolute secundum se; alio modo, sicut in rationem volendi ea quae
+sunt ad finem. Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus
+voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi
+ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius
+actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute. Et quandoque
+praecedit tempore, sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et
+postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut
+sanetur. Sicut etiam et circa intellectum accidit, nam primo
+aliquis intelligit ipsa principia secundum se; postmodum autem
+intelligit ea in ipsis conclusionibus, secundum quod assentit
+conclusionibus propter principia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument holds in respect of the will being moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33859] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod voluntas fertur in
+finem, ut est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like
+manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not the conversely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33860] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod quandocumque videtur color, eodem actu videtur lumen,
+potest tamen videri lumen sine hoc quod videatur color. Et
+similiter quandocumque quis vult ea quae sunt ad finem, vult eodem
+actu finem, non tamen e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural movement
+sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus; so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the
+end. But in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives
+at the conclusions through the principles which are called "means." Hence
+it is that sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the conclusion. And in like manner the
+will sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33861] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in executione operis, ea quae sunt ad finem se habent
+ut media, et finis ut terminus. Unde sicut motus naturalis interdum
+sistit in medio, et non pertingit ad terminum; ita quandoque
+operatur aliquis id quod est ad finem, et tamen non consequitur
+finem. Sed in volendo est e converso, nam voluntas per finem
+devenit ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem; sicut et intellectus
+devenit in conclusiones per principia, quae media dicuntur. Unde
+intellectus aliquando intelligit medium, et ex eo non procedit ad
+conclusionem. Et similiter voluntas aliquando vult finem, et tamen
+non procedit ad volendum id quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p10"> The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and
+the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for
+the sake of something else: wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not conversely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33862] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad illud vero
+quod in contrarium obiicitur, patet solutio per ea quae supra dicta
+sunt. Nam utile et honestum non sunt species boni ex aequo divisae,
+sed se habent sicut propter se et propter alterum. Unde actus
+voluntatis in unum potest ferri sine hoc quod feratur in alterum,
+sed non e converso.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q9" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q9-p0.1">Q. 9. OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q9-p2"> We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q9-p3"><a href="#FS_Q9_A1"> (1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p4"><a href="#FS_Q9_A2"> (2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p5"><a href="#FS_Q9_A3"> (3) Whether the will moves itself?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p6"><a href="#FS_Q9_A4"> (4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p7"><a href="#FS_Q9_A5"> (5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p8"><a href="#FS_Q9_A6"> (6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 pr."><a name="33863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33863]
+Iª-IIae q. 9 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de motivo
+voluntatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum voluntas
+moveatur ab intellectu. Secundo, utrum moveatur ab appetitu
+sensitivo. Tertio, utrum voluntas moveat seipsam. Quarto, utrum
+moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio. Quinto, utrum moveatur a
+corpore caelesti. Sexto, utrum voluntas moveatur a solo Deo, sicut
+ab exteriori principio.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q9_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A1-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 1. Whether the will is moved by the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.20" target="asv"> Ps. 118:20</a>: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at
+all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because
+movement of the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the
+will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33864] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ab intellectu.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, <i>concupivit anima mea
+desiderare iustificationes tuas, praevolat intellectus, sequitur
+tardus aut nullus affectus, scimus bonum, nec delectat agere</i>.
+Hoc autem non esset, si voluntas ab intellectu moveretur, quia
+motus mobilis sequitur motionem moventis. Ergo intellectus non
+movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination
+in representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite:
+indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima
+ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33865] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+intellectus se habet ad voluntatem ut demonstrans appetibile, sicut
+imaginatio demonstrat appetibile appetitui sensitivo. Sed
+imaginatio demonstrans appetibile non movet appetitum sensitivum,
+immo quandoque ita nos habemus ad ea quae imaginamur, sicut ad ea
+quae in pictura nobis ostenduntur, ex quibus non movemur, ut
+dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo neque etiam intellectus movet
+voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise
+the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33866] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+idem respectu eiusdem non est movens et motum. Sed voluntas movet
+intellectum, intelligimus enim quando volumus. Ergo intellectus non
+movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33867] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>appetibile
+intellectum est movens non motum, voluntas autem est movens
+motum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality
+needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality
+to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action.
+Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes
+it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act,
+and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes
+not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
+</p><p id="FS_Q9_A1-p7"> The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q9_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command
+moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii,
+2). Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will.
+Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers
+when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular
+good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong
+the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good---i.e. the order
+of the whole army---by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
+</p><p id="FS_Q9_A1-p8"> On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things
+actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object
+of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 co."><a name="33868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33868] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod intantum aliquid indiget moveri ab aliquo, inquantum
+est in potentia ad plura, oportet enim ut id quod est in potentia,
+reducatur in actum per aliquid quod est actu; et hoc est movere.
+Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad
+diversa, uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio modo,
+quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu,
+et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque
+videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet
+quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem
+actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque
+invenitur agens, quandoque non agens, aliud autem est ex parte
+obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus. Motio autem ipsius
+subiecti est ex agente aliquo. Et cum omne agens agat propter
+finem, ut supra ostensum est, principium huius motionis est ex
+fine. Et inde est quod ars ad quam pertinet finis, movet suo
+imperio artem ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem, sicut
+gubernatoria ars imperat navifactivae, ut in II Physic. dicitur.
+Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum
+voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias
+animae ad suos actus, utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam
+fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur
+sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper
+autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad
+agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub
+illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit
+bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio
+aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei. Sed obiectum
+movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo in
+rebus naturalibus actio specificatur, sicut calefactio a calore.
+Primum autem principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod
+est obiectum intellectus. Et ideo isto modo motionis intellectus
+movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33869] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate non habetur quod intellectus non
+moveat, sed quod non moveat ex necessitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so
+neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative
+intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33870] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut imaginatio formae sine aestimatione
+convenientis vel nocivi, non movet appetitum sensitivum; ita nec
+apprehensio veri sine ratione boni et appetibilis. Unde intellectus
+speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus, ut dicitur in
+III de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect,
+is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from
+the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the
+universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in
+the same respect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33871] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium
+actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus,
+continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed
+quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte obiecti,
+intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur
+secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali
+ratione veri. Et sic patet quod non est idem movens et motum
+secundum idem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A2-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 2. Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
+be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is
+the intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move
+the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33872] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ab appetitu sensitivo moveri
+non possit. <i>Movens enim et agens est praestantius patiente</i>,
+ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Sed appetitus
+sensitivus est inferior voluntate, quae est appetitus
+intellectivus; sicut sensus est inferior intellectu. Ergo appetitus
+sensitivus non movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
+follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal,
+as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33873] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nulla virtus particularis potest facere effectum universalem. Sed
+appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis, consequitur enim
+particularem sensus apprehensionem. Ergo non potest causare motum
+voluntatis, qui est universalis, velut consequens apprehensionem
+universalem intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
+motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive
+appetite does not move the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33874] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ut probatur in VIII Physic., movens non movetur ab eo quod movet,
+ut sit motio reciproca. Sed voluntas movet appetitum sensitivum,
+inquantum appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi. Ergo appetitus
+sensitivus non movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.14" target="asv">James 1:14</a>): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence,
+unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves
+the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33875] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Iac. I, <i>unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia
+sua abstractus et illectus</i>. Non autem abstraheretur quis a
+concupiscentia, nisi voluntas eius moveretur ab appetitu sensitivo,
+in quo est concupiscentia. Ergo appetitus sensitivus movet
+voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q9_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that which is apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and
+fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed.
+For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
+is variously disposed, takes to a thing
+in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is,
+such does the end seem to him."
+</p><p id="FS_Q9_A2-p7"> Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore
+according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected:
+thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite
+moves the will, on the part of the object.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 co."><a name="33876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33876] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod apprehenditur sub
+ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti.
+Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus
+contingit, scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui
+proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex
+utroque extremorum dependet. Et inde est quod gustus diversimode
+dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non
+conveniens. Unde, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., <i>qualis
+unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei</i>. Manifestum est autem
+quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad
+aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione
+aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra
+passionem existenti, sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur
+quieto. Et per hunc modum, ex parte obiecti, appetitus sensitivus
+movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the
+will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in
+so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33877] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est simpliciter et secundum se
+praestantius, quoad aliquid esse debilius. Voluntas igitur
+simpliciter praestantior est quam appetitus sensitivus, sed quoad
+istum in quo passio dominatur, inquantum subiacet passioni,
+praeeminet appetitus sensitivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular
+power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33878] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod actus et electiones hominum sunt circa singularia.
+Unde ex hoc ipso quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis,
+habet magnam virtutem ad hoc quod per ipsum sic disponatur homo, ut
+ei aliquid videatur sic vel aliter, circa singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible
+powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty,"
+as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible
+can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the
+will from being moved by them at times.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33879] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit., ratio, in qua
+est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non
+quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed
+principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a
+gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et
+concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic
+nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A3-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 3. Whether the will moves itself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality;
+since "movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not in potentiality
+and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33880] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat seipsam. Omne enim
+movens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu, quod autem movetur, est
+in potentia, nam motus est actus existentis in potentia, inquantum
+huiusmodi. Sed non est idem in potentia et in actu respectu
+eiusdem. Ergo nihil movet seipsum. Neque ergo voluntas seipsam
+movere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved
+itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33881] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+mobile movetur ad praesentiam moventis. Sed voluntas semper sibi
+est praesens. Si ergo ipsa seipsam moveret, semper moveretur. Quod
+patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q9_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which
+seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33882] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas movetur ab intellectu, ut dictum est. Si igitur voluntas
+movet seipsam, sequitur quod idem simul moveatur a duobus motoribus
+immediate, quod videtur inconveniens. Non ergo voluntas movet
+seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the
+power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33883] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quia voluntas domina est sui actus, et in ipsa est velle et non
+velle. Quod non esset, si non haberet in potestate movere seipsam
+ad volendum. Ergo ipsa movet seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q9_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (Q[8],
+A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect,
+through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and
+thus it moves itself. And, in like
+manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 co."><a name="33884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33884] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad voluntatem pertinet
+movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis
+obiectum. Sed sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in
+appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus. Manifestum est
+autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit
+seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum,
+et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult
+finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality
+in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect
+of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33885] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod voluntas non secundum idem movet et movetur. Unde nec
+secundum idem est in actu et in potentia. Sed inquantum actu vult
+finem, reducit se de potentia in actum respectu eorum quae sunt ad
+finem, ut scilicet actu ea velit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always
+in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33886] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi praesens,
+sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquem, non semper est in
+ipsa voluntate. Per hunc autem movet seipsam. Unde non sequitur
+quod semper seipsam moveat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas
+it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33887] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non eodem modo voluntas movetur ab intellectu, et a
+seipsa. Sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem obiecti,
+a seipsa vero, quantum ad exercitium actus, secundum rationem
+finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A4-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 4. Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential
+to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement
+of the will is not from anything exterior.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33888] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ab aliquo
+exteriori. Motus enim voluntatis est voluntarius. Sed de ratione
+voluntarii est quod sit a principio intrinseco, sicut et de ratione
+naturalis. Non ergo motus voluntatis est ab aliquo extrinseco.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q9_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the will
+cannot be moved by anything exterior.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33889] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas violentiam pati non potest, ut supra ostensum est. Sed
+violentum est cuius principium est extra. Ergo voluntas non potest
+ab aliquo exteriori moveri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently.
+Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33890] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quod sufficienter movetur ab uno motore, non indiget moveri ab
+alio. Sed voluntas sufficienter movet seipsam. Non ergo movetur ab
+aliquo exteriori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1] ). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to
+the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33891] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+voluntas movetur ab obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum voluntatis
+potest esse aliqua exterior res sensui proposita. Ergo voluntas
+potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it
+is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.
+</p><p id="FS_Q9_A4-p7"> For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by
+a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must,
+of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q9_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this
+without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through
+this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always
+actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if
+the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous
+volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to
+its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian
+Ethics (vii, 14).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 co."><a name="33892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33892] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, secundum quod voluntas movetur ab obiecto,
+manifestum est quod moveri potest ab aliquo exteriori. Sed eo modo
+quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, adhuc necesse est ponere
+voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori moveri. Omne enim quod
+quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget
+moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas
+incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo
+quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum. Et quidem, sicut dictum est,
+ipsa movet seipsam, inquantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit
+seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem. Hoc autem non potest
+facere nisi consilio mediante, cum enim aliquis vult sanari,
+incipit cogitare quomodo hoc consequi possit, et per talem
+cogitationem pervenit ad hoc quod potest sanari per medicum, et hoc
+vult. Sed quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit, necesse est quod
+inciperet velle sanari, aliquo movente. Et si quidem ipsa moveret
+seipsam ad volendum, oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret,
+ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita. Hoc autem non est procedere in
+infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis
+voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut
+Aristoteles concludit in quodam capitulo Ethicae Eudemicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle
+be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless
+its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, to wit,
+which moves nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33893] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod de ratione voluntarii est quod principium eius sit
+intra, sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum
+principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius etsi habeat
+principium proximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab
+extra. Sicut et primum principium motus naturalis est ab extra,
+quod scilicet movet naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of him
+that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills,
+though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the
+present case is impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same
+thing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33894] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti, quod
+principium sit extra, sed oportet addere quod nil conferat vim
+patiens. Quod non contingit, dum voluntas ab exteriori movetur, nam
+ipsa est quae vult, ab alio tamen mota. Esset autem motus iste
+violentus, si esset contrarius motui voluntatis. Quod in proposito
+esse non potest, quia sic idem vellet et non vellet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot
+move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33895] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod voluntas quantum ad aliquid sufficienter se movet, et
+in suo ordine, scilicet sicut agens proximum, sed non potest
+seipsam movere quantum ad omnia, ut ostensum est. Unde indiget
+moveri ab alio sicut a primo movente.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A5-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 5. Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to
+their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various
+and multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to
+the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33896] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas humana a corpore caelesti
+moveatur. Omnes enim motus varii et multiformes reducuntur, sicut
+in causam, in motum uniformem, qui est motus caeli ut probatur VIII
+Physic. Sed motus humani sunt varii et multiformes, incipientes
+postquam prius non fuerant. Ergo reducuntur in motum caeli sicut in
+causam, qui est uniformis secundum naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the lower bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human
+body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will
+too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33897] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum Augustinum, in III de Trin., <i>corpora inferiora moventur
+per corpora superiora</i>. Sed motus humani corporis, qui causantur
+a voluntate, non possent reduci in motum caeli sicut in causam,
+nisi etiam voluntas a caelo moveretur. Ergo caelum movet voluntatem
+humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
+will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly
+body.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33898] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+per observationem caelestium corporum astrologi quaedam vera
+praenuntiant de humanis actibus futuris, qui sunt a voluntate. Quod
+non esset, si corpora caelestia voluntatem hominis movere non
+possent. Movetur ergo voluntas humana a caelesti corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would be, if the
+will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
+bodies.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33899] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod <i>corpora caelestia
+non sunt causae nostrorum actuum</i>. Essent autem, si voluntas,
+quae est humanorum actuum principium, a corporibus caelestibus
+moveretur. Non ergo movetur voluntas a corporibus caelestibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to
+say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves
+of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
+</p><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p7"> But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent
+moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in
+the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power
+absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but
+rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal
+things whatever. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will. For this reason
+Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the
+will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom
+they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally,
+by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.
+</p><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p8"> But since it has been stated
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A2" id="FS_Q9_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have
+an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 co."><a name="33900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33900] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod eo modo quo voluntas movetur ab exteriori obiecto,
+manifestum est quod voluntas potest moveri a corporibus
+caelestibus, inquantum scilicet corpora exteriora, quae sensui
+proposita movent voluntatem, et etiam ipsa organa potentiarum
+sensitivarum, subiacent motibus caelestium corporum. Sed eo modo
+quo voluntas movetur, quantum ad exercitium actus, ab aliquo
+exteriori agente, adhuc quidam posuerunt corpora caelestia directe
+imprimere in voluntatem humanam. Sed hoc est impossibile. Voluntas
+enim, ut dicitur in III de anima, est in ratione. Ratio autem est
+potentia animae non alligata organo corporali. Unde relinquitur
+quod voluntas sit potentia omnino immaterialis et incorporea.
+Manifestum est autem quod nullum corpus agere potest in rem
+incorpoream, sed potius e converso, eo quod res incorporeae et
+immateriales sunt formalioris et universalioris virtutis quam
+quaecumque res corporales. Unde impossibile est quod corpus
+caeleste imprimat directe in intellectum aut voluntatem. Et propter
+hoc Aristoteles, in libro de anima, opinionem dicentium quod talis
+est voluntas in hominibus, <i>qualem in diem ducit pater deorum
+virorumque</i> (scilicet Iupiter, per quem totum caelum
+intelligunt), attribuit eis qui ponebant intellectum non differre a
+sensu. Omnes enim vires sensitivae, cum sint actus organorum
+corporalium, per accidens moveri possunt a caelestibus corporibus,
+motis scilicet corporibus quorum sunt actus. Sed quia dictum est
+quod appetitus intellectivus quodammodo movetur ab appetitu
+sensitivo, indirecte redundat motus caelestium corporum in
+voluntatem, inquantum scilicet per passiones appetitus sensitivi
+voluntatem moveri contingit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will.
+This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement
+of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33901] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod multiformes motus voluntatis humanae reducuntur in
+aliquam causam uniformem, quae tamen est intellectu et voluntate
+superior. Quod non potest dici de aliquo corpore, sed de aliqua
+superiori substantia immateriali. Unde non oportet quod motus
+voluntatis in motum caeli reducatur sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition
+suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite
+is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement
+of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or
+not to will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the
+will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33902] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod motus corporales humani reducuntur in motum caelestis
+corporis sicut in causam, inquantum ipsa dispositio organorum
+congrua ad motum, est aliqualiter ex impressione caelestium
+corporum; et inquantum etiam appetitus sensitivus commovetur ex
+impressione caelestium corporum; et ulterius inquantum corpora
+exteriora moventur secundum motum caelestium corporum, ex quorum
+occursu voluntas incipit aliquid velle vel non velle, sicut
+adveniente frigore incipit aliquis velle facere ignem. Sed ista
+motio voluntatis est ex parte obiecti exterius praesentati, non ex
+parte interioris instinctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (Cf.
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A6" id="FS_Q9_A5-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger
+or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion.
+But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions
+about
+human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v),
+"the wise man governs the stars"; which is a though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free
+and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
+</p><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p12"> Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due
+to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to
+deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33903] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, appetitus sensitivus est actus
+organi corporalis. Unde nihil prohibet ex impressione corporum
+caelestium aliquos esse habiles ad irascendum vel concupiscendum,
+vel aliquam huiusmodi passionem, sicut et ex complexione naturali.
+Plures autem hominum sequuntur passiones, quibus soli sapientes
+resistunt. Et ideo ut in pluribus verificantur ea quae
+praenuntiantur de actibus hominum secundum considerationem
+caelestium corporum. Sed tamen, ut Ptolomaeus dicit in Centiloquio,
+<i>sapiens dominatur astris</i>, scilicet quia, resistens
+passionibus, impedit per voluntatem liberam, et nequaquam motui
+caelesti subiectam, huiusmodi corporum caelestium effectus. Vel, ut
+Augustinus dicit II super Gen. ad Litt., <i>fatendum est, quando ab
+astrologis vera dicuntur, instinctu quodam occultissimo dici, quem
+nescientes humanae mentes patiuntur. Quod cum ad decipiendum
+homines fit, spirituum seductorum operatio est</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A6-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 6. Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved
+by its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will
+of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33904] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non a solo Deo moveatur sicut
+ab exteriori principio. Inferius enim natum est moveri a suo
+superiori, sicut corpora inferiora a corporibus caelestibus. Sed
+voluntas hominis habet aliquid superius post Deum; scilicet
+Angelum. Ergo voluntas hominis potest moveri, sicut ab exteriori
+principio, etiam ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but
+also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is
+moved by an angel.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33905] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus. Sed intellectus
+hominis reducitur in suum actum non solum a Deo, sed etiam ab
+Angelo per illuminationes, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo eadem ratione
+et voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God is not the cause of other than good things, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv"> Gn. 1:31</a>: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone, it
+would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract.
+i, 9).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33906] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Deus non est causa nisi bonorum; secundum illud Gen. I, <i>vidit
+Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona</i>. Si ergo a solo
+Deo voluntas hominis moveretur, nunquam moveretur ad malum, cum
+tamen voluntas sit qua peccatur et recte vivitur, ut Augustinus
+dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God Who worketh in us" [Vulg.'you'] "both to will and to accomplish."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33907] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, <i>Deus est qui operatur
+in nobis velle et perficere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the will is from within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to
+move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's
+nature, can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone's
+nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the
+stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys. vii, 4, that the generator moves locally
+heavy and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that
+his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
+</p><p id="FS_Q9_A6-p7"> Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power
+of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q9_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[2]</a>. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the
+cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by
+participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can
+primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 co."><a name="33908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33908] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod motus voluntatis est ab intrinseco, sicut et motus
+naturalis. Quamvis autem rem naturalem possit aliquid movere quod
+non est causa naturae rei motae, tamen motum naturalem causare non
+potest nisi quod est aliqualiter causa naturae. Movetur enim lapis
+sursum ab homine, qui naturam lapidis non causat, sed hic motus non
+est lapidi naturalis, naturalis autem motus eius non causatur nisi
+ab eo quod causat naturam. Unde dicitur in VIII Physic. quod
+generans movet secundum locum gravia et levia. Sic ergo hominem,
+voluntatem habentem, contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa
+eius, sed quod motus voluntarius eius sit ab aliquo principio
+extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile.
+Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc
+patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia
+animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in
+primo dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet
+ordinem ad universale bonum. Unde nihil aliud potest esse
+voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne
+autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam
+particulare bonum, particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem
+universalem. Unde nec materia prima, quae est in potentia ad omnes
+formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural
+forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33909] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Angelus non sic est supra hominem, quod sit causa
+voluntatis eius; sicut corpora caelestia sunt causa formarum
+naturalium, ad quas consequuntur naturales motus corporum
+naturalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man's
+knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A4" id="FS_Q9_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33910] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intellectus hominis movetur ab Angelo ex parte
+obiecti, quod sibi proponitur virtute angelici luminis ad
+cognoscendum. Et sic etiam voluntas ab exteriori creatura potest
+moveri, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal
+motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent
+good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case
+of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (
+<a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q109_A2" id="FS_Q9_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[109], A[2]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33911] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis
+motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum. Et sine
+hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle. Sed homo per
+rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere
+bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet
+aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in
+his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q10" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q10-p0.1">Q. 10. OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q10-p3"><a href="#FS_Q10_A1"> (1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?</a></p><p id="FS_Q10-p4"><a href="#FS_Q10_A2"> (2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?</a></p><p id="FS_Q10-p5"><a href="#FS_Q10_A3"> (3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?</a></p><p id="FS_Q10-p6"><a href="#FS_Q10_A4"> (4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 pr."><a name="33912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33912]
+Iª-IIae q. 10 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de modo
+quo voluntas movetur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
+voluntas ad aliquid naturaliter moveatur. Secundo, utrum de
+necessitate moveatur a suo obiecto. Tertio, utrum de necessitate
+moveatur ab appetitu inferiori. Quarto, utrum de necessitate
+moveatur ab exteriori motivo quod est Deus.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q10_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q10_A1-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 1. Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent,
+as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33913] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ad aliquid
+naturaliter. Agens enim naturale dividitur contra agens
+voluntarium, ut patet in principio II Physic. Non ergo voluntas ad
+aliquid naturaliter movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as "being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore
+no movement is natural to the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33914] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+id quod est naturale, inest alicui semper; sicut igni esse calidum.
+Sed nullus motus inest voluntati semper. Ergo nullus motus est
+naturalis voluntati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing
+naturally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33915] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+natura est determinata ad unum. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita.
+Ergo voluntas nihil naturaliter vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore
+the will, too, wills some things naturally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33916] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod motus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus. Sed
+intellectus aliqua intelligit naturaliter. Ergo et voluntas aliqua
+vult naturaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q10_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense.
+For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material
+form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense,
+that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this
+is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are
+reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense,
+it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the
+intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements
+must be something naturally willed.
+</p><p id="FS_Q10_A1-p7"> Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is the last
+end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible:
+and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it is not only things
+pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire
+man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other
+powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard
+the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 co."><a name="33917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33917] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, et
+philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque
+enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis
+natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II
+Physic. Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam
+quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei,
+quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se
+inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur
+in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse
+est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his
+quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in
+intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt
+naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum
+oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in
+communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet
+potentia in suum obiectum, et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc
+modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia
+demonstrationum in intelligibilibus, et universaliter omnia illa
+quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam. Non enim per
+voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam
+voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et
+ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum
+voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis, ut
+cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et
+alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia
+comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia
+bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are done
+voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides
+the manner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary
+that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as
+what belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, being itself, which is from nature,
+precedes volition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33918] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una
+causa contra aliam, quaedam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam
+fiunt voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius
+voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit
+naturae, quae est determinata ad unum. Sed quia voluntas in aliqua
+natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum
+ad aliquid, participetur in voluntate, sicut quod est prioris
+causae, participatur a posteriori. Est enim prius in unaquaque re
+ipsum esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per
+voluntatem. Et inde est quod voluntas naturaliter aliquid vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is
+in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality:
+because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is "the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle,
+Phys. iii, 1). Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in
+regard to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when it is outside its own
+place. [*The Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner
+it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in
+the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always
+in
+the act of volition.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33919] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi
+consequens formam tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni.
+Quod autem est naturale sicut consequens materiam, non semper actu
+inest, sed quandoque secundum potentiam tantum. Nam forma est
+actus, materia vero potentia. Motus autem est actus existentis in
+potentia. Et ideo illa quae pertinent ad motum, vel quae
+consequuntur motum, in rebus naturalibus, non semper insunt, sicut
+ignis non semper movetur sursum, sed quando est extra locum suum.
+Et similiter non oportet quod voluntas, quae de potentia in actum
+reducitur dum aliquid vult, semper actu velit, sed solum quando est
+in aliqua dispositione determinata. Voluntas autem Dei, quae est
+actus purus, semper est in actu volendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To every nature there is one thing corresponding, proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a genus,
+there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as species there corresponds something one specifically; and to
+the individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the
+intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good;
+just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And
+under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33920] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod naturae semper respondet unum, proportionatum tamen
+naturae. Naturae enim in genere, respondet aliquid unum in genere;
+et naturae in specie acceptae, respondet unum in specie; naturae
+autem individuatae respondet aliquid unum individuale. Cum igitur
+voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis sicut et intellectus,
+respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum,
+sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel
+ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia
+bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q10_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q10_A2-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 2. Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover
+to movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the
+will can be moved of necessity by its object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33921] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas de necessitate moveatur a suo
+obiecto. Obiectum enim voluntatis comparatur ad ipsam sicut motivum
+ad mobile, ut patet in III de anima. Sed motivum, si sit
+sufficiens, ex necessitate movet mobile. Ergo voluntas ex
+necessitate potest moveri a suo obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object,
+as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33922] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut voluntas est vis immaterialis, ita et intellectus, et utraque
+potentia ad obiectum universale ordinatur, ut dictum est. Sed
+intellectus ex necessitate movetur a suo obiecto. Ergo et voluntas
+a suo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily:
+because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason
+for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by
+its object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33923] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne quod quis vult, aut est finis, aut aliquid ordinatum ad finem.
+Sed finem aliquis ex necessitate vult, ut videtur, quia est sicut
+principium in speculativis, cui ex necessitate assentimus. Finis
+autem est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et sic videtur quod
+etiam ea quae sunt ad finem, ex necessitate velimus. Voluntas ergo
+ex necessitate movetur a suo obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational power,
+since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not
+moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33924] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod potentiae rationales, secundum philosophum, sunt ad
+opposita. Sed voluntas est potentia rationalis, est enim in
+ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo voluntas se habet ad
+opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate movetur ad alterum
+oppositorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived
+from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's
+power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved
+by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object,
+we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color
+actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes
+away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored
+actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for
+it
+might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually
+colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good
+universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot
+will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will
+not
+tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect
+and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular
+goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be
+set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 co."><a name="33925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33925] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod voluntas movetur dupliciter, uno modo, quantum ad
+exercitium actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae
+est ex obiecto. Primo ergo modo, voluntas a nullo obiecto ex
+necessitate movetur, potest enim aliquis de quocumque obiecto non
+cogitare, et per consequens neque actu velle illud. Sed quantum ad
+secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo obiecto ex necessitate
+movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cuiuslibet potentiae a
+suo obiecto, consideranda est ratio per quam obiectum movet
+potentiam. Visibile enim movet visum sub ratione coloris actu
+visibilis. Unde si color proponatur visui, ex necessitate movet
+visum, nisi aliquis visum avertat, quod pertinet ad exercitium
+actus. Si autem proponeretur aliquid visui quod non omnibus modis
+esset color in actu, sed secundum aliquid esset tale, secundum
+autem aliquid non tale, non ex necessitate visus tale obiectum
+videret, posset enim intendere in ipsum ex ea parte qua non est
+coloratum in actu, et sic ipsum non videret. Sicut autem coloratum
+in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Unde
+si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter
+bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in
+illud tendet, si aliquid velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum.
+Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiectum quod non secundum
+quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas
+feretur in illud. Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem
+non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil
+deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle, quod
+est beatitudo. Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum
+deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum
+hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate,
+quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power.
+If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33926] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod sufficiens motivum alicuius potentiae non est
+nisi obiectum quod totaliter habet rationem motivi. Si autem in
+aliquo deficiat, non ex necessitate movebit, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that which
+may be either true or false---viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said of the good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33927] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intellectus ex necessitate movetur a tali obiecto
+quod est semper et ex necessitate verum, non autem ab eo quod
+potest esse verum et falsum, scilicet a contingenti, sicut et de
+bono dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end,
+and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live," and the like. But other things without which
+the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he who assents to the principle, does
+not necessarily assent to the conclusions, without which the principles can still be
+true.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33928] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod finis ultimus ex necessitate movet voluntatem, quia
+est bonum perfectum. Et similiter illa quae ordinantur ad hunc
+finem, sine quibus finis haberi non potest, sicut esse et vivere et
+huiusmodi. Alia vero, sine quibus finis haberi potest, non ex
+necessitate vult qui vult finem, sicut conclusiones sine quibus
+principia possunt esse vera, non ex necessitate credit qui credit
+principia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q10_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q10_A3-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 3. Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": and this is said by reason of concupiscence,
+which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33929] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate moveatur a
+passione appetitus inferioris. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII,
+<i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud
+facio</i>, quod dicitur propter concupiscentiam, quae est passio
+quaedam. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate movetur a passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's power
+to cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to will that to which the passion inclines him.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33930] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut dicitur in III Ethic., <i>qualis unusquisque est, talis finis
+videtur ei</i>. Sed non est in potestate voluntatis quod statim
+passionem abiiciat. Ergo non est in potestate voluntatis quod non
+velit illud ad quod passio se inclinat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal
+reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason
+is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something
+particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
+happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33931] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+causa universalis non applicatur ad effectum particularem nisi
+mediante causa particulari, unde et ratio universalis non movet
+nisi mediante aestimatione particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima.
+Sed sicut se habet ratio universalis ad aestimationem particularem,
+ita se habet voluntas ad appetitum sensitivum. Ergo ad aliquod
+particulare volendum non movetur voluntas nisi mediante appetitu
+sensitivo. Ergo si appetitus sensitivus sit per aliquam passionem
+ad aliquid dispositus, voluntas non poterit in contrarium
+moveri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b>
+It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>):
+"Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust thereof'] shall be
+under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over
+it." Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33932] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Gen. IV, <i>subter te erit appetitus tuus, et tu
+dominaberis illius</i>. Non ergo voluntas hominis ex necessitate
+movetur ab appetitu inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q10_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A2" id="FS_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[2]</a>), the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit,
+man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not
+judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason
+is wholly bound, so that he has not
+the use of reason: as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane, just
+as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And
+of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in
+them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
+</p><p id="FS_Q10_A3-p7"> Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain
+extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains
+free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto
+the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion
+alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 co."><a name="33933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33933] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passio appetitus sensitivi
+movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto,
+inquantum scilicet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem,
+iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem
+existens non iudicaret. Huiusmodi autem immutatio hominis per
+passionem duobus modis contingit. Uno modo, sic quod totaliter
+ratio ligatur, ita quod homo usum rationis non habet, sicut
+contingit in his qui propter vehementem iram vel concupiscentiam
+furiosi vel amentes fiunt, sicut et propter aliquam aliam
+perturbationem corporalem; huiusmodi enim passiones non sine
+corporali transmutatione accidunt. Et de talibus eadem est ratio
+sicut et de animalibus brutis, quae ex necessitate sequuntur
+impetum passionis, in his enim non est aliquis rationis motus, et
+per consequens nec voluntatis. Aliquando autem ratio non totaliter
+absorbetur a passione, sed remanet quantum ad aliquid iudicium
+rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc remanet aliquid de motu
+voluntatis. Inquantum ergo ratio manet libera et passioni non
+subiecta, intantum voluntatis motus qui manet, non ex necessitate
+tendit ad hoc ad quod passio inclinat. Et sic aut motus voluntatis
+non est in homine, sed sola passio dominatur, aut, si motus
+voluntatis sit, non ex necessitate sequitur passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which I
+will not, that I do---i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence.
+And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33934] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, etsi voluntas non possit facere quin motus
+concupiscentiae insurgat, de quo apostolus dicit Rom. VII, <i>quod
+odi malum, illud facio</i>, idest concupisco; tamen potest voluntas
+non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire. Et sic
+non ex necessitate sequitur concupiscentiae motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of
+his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason
+is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this
+reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion
+entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is
+variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than
+it does according to a passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33935] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum in homine duae sint naturae, intellectualis
+scilicet et sensitiva, quandoque quidem est homo aliqualis
+uniformiter secundum totam animam, quia scilicet vel pars sensitiva
+totaliter subiicitur rationi, sicut contingit in virtuosis; vel e
+converso ratio totaliter absorbetur a passione sicut accidit in
+amentibus. Sed aliquando, etsi ratio obnubiletur a passione,
+remanet tamen aliquid rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc potest
+aliquis vel totaliter passionem repellere; vel saltem se tenere ne
+passionem sequatur. In tali enim dispositione, quia homo secundum
+diversas partes animae diversimode disponitur, aliud ei videtur
+secundum rationem, et aliud secundum passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. Wherefore
+he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
+without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33936] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali
+apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et
+ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum absque passione
+appetitus sensitivi. Multa enim volumus et operamur absque
+passione, per solam electionem, ut maxime patet in his in quibus
+ratio renititur passioni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q10_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q10_A4-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 4. Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But
+God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves the will of necessity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33937] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate moveatur a
+Deo. Omne enim agens cui resisti non potest, ex necessitate movet.
+Sed Deo, cum sit infinitae virtutis, resisti non potest, unde
+dicitur Rom. IX, <i>voluntati eius quis resistit?</i> Ergo Deus ex
+necessitate movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But "whatever God does
+in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything
+to which God moves it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33938] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas ex necessitate movetur in illa quae naturaliter vult, ut
+dictum est. <i>Sed hoc est unicuique rei naturale, quod Deus in ea
+operatur</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum. Ergo
+voluntas ex necessitate vult omne illud ad quod a Deo movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from
+the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual.
+Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33939] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+possibile est quo posito non sequitur impossibile. Sequitur autem
+impossibile, si ponatur quod voluntas non velit hoc ad quod Deus
+eam movet, quia secundum hoc, operatio Dei esset inefficax. Non
+ergo est possibile voluntatem non velle hoc ad quod Deus eam movet.
+Ergo necesse est eam hoc velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore He does not of necessity move
+man's will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33940] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit hominem,
+et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Non ergo ex necessitate
+movet voluntatem eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things."
+Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion,
+effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active
+principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things,
+God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary,
+except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 co."><a name="33941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33941] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>ad
+providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed
+servare</i>. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditionem, ita quod
+ex causis necessariis per motionem divinam consequuntur effectus ex
+necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus sequuntur effectus
+contingenter. Quia igitur voluntas est activum principium non
+determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic
+Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed
+remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad
+quae naturaliter movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way
+which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will
+to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33942] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod voluntas divina non solum se extendit ut aliquid
+fiat per rem quam movet, sed ut etiam eo modo fiat quo congruit
+naturae ipsius. Et ideo magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si
+voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit;
+quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing,
+according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them,
+for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing---that it be subject to the
+Divine power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33943] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod naturale est unicuique quod Deus operatur in ipso ut
+sit ei naturale, sic enim unicuique convenit aliquid, secundum quod
+Deus vult quod ei conveniat. Non autem vult quod quidquid operatur
+in rebus, sit eis naturale, puta quod mortui resurgant. Sed hoc
+vult unicuique esse naturale, quod potestati divinae subdatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is
+not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33944] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid, incompossibile
+est huic positioni quod voluntas ad illud non moveatur. Non tamen
+est impossibile simpliciter. Unde non sequitur quod voluntas a Deo
+ex necessitate moveatur.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q11" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q11-p0.1">Q. 11. OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q11-p2"> We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q11-p3"><a href="#FS_Q11_A1"> (1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q11-p4"><a href="#FS_Q11_A2"> (2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q11-p5"><a href="#FS_Q11_A3"> (3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q11-p6"><a href="#FS_Q11_A4"> (4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 pr."><a name="33945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33945]
+Iª-IIae q. 11 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+fruitione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum frui sit
+actus appetitivae potentiae. Secundo, utrum soli rationali
+creaturae conveniat, an etiam animalibus brutis. Tertio, utrum
+fruitio sit tantum ultimi finis. Quarto, utrum sit solum finis
+habiti.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q11_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q11_A1-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 1. Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the
+fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q11_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but
+of the intellect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33946] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod frui non sit solum appetitivae
+potentiae. Frui enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam fructum capere.
+Sed fructum humanae vitae, qui est beatitudo, capit intellectus, in
+cuius actu beatitudo consistit, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo frui
+non est appetitivae potentiae, sed intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the hearing,
+to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only
+to the appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33947] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quaelibet potentia habet proprium finem, qui est eius perfectio,
+sicut visus finis est cognoscere visibile, auditus percipere sonos,
+et sic de aliis. Sed finis rei est fructus eius. Ergo frui est
+potentiae cuiuslibet, et non solum appetitivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for
+the same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to
+the appetitive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33948] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+fruitio delectationem quandam importat. Sed delectatio sensibilis
+pertinet ad sensum, qui delectatur in suo obiecto, et eadem
+ratione, delectatio intellectualis ad intellectum. Ergo fruitio
+pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam, et non ad appetitivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin. x, 10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own
+sake." But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33949] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, I de Doctr. Christ., et in X de Trin.,
+<i>frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam</i>. Sed
+amor pertinet ad appetitivam potentiam. Ergo et frui est actus
+appetitivae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which,
+matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those
+things are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that the word "fruition" is derived from
+sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last
+place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight
+which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the object of the appetitive
+power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act of the appetitive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 co."><a name="33950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33950] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod fruitio et fructus ad idem pertinere videntur, et
+unum ex altero derivari. Quid autem a quo, nihil ad propositum
+refert; nisi quod hoc probabile videtur, quod id quod magis est
+manifestum, prius etiam fuerit nominatum. Sunt autem nobis primo
+manifesta quae sunt sensibilia magis. Unde a sensibilibus fructibus
+nomen fruitionis derivatum videtur. Fructus autem sensibilis est id
+quod ultimum ex arbore expectatur, et cum quadam suavitate
+percipitur. Unde fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel
+delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est
+finis. Finis autem et bonum est obiectum appetitivae potentiae.
+Unde manifestum est quod fruitio est actus appetitivae
+potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision
+of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition
+thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers)
+towards the end and enjoying the end attained.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33951] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem, secundum diversas
+rationes, ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei,
+inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus, inquantum autem est
+bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum. Et hoc modo est eius
+fruitio. Et sic hunc finem intellectus consequitur tanquam potentia
+agens, voluntas autem tanquam potentia movens ad finem, et fruens
+fine iam adepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained
+in the common, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q11_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Hence the perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive
+power moves the other powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33952] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod perfectio et finis cuiuslibet alterius potentiae,
+continetur sub obiecto appetitivae, sicut proprium sub communi, ut
+dictum est supra. Unde perfectio et finis cuiuslibet potentiae,
+inquantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam. Propter quod
+appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines; et ipsa consequitur
+finem, quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In delight there are two things: perception of what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency
+in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33953] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in delectatione duo sunt, scilicet perceptio
+convenientis, quae pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam; et
+complacentia eius quod offertur ut conveniens. Et hoc pertinet ad
+appetitivam potentiam, in qua ratio delectationis completur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q11_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q11_A2-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 2. Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men
+to enjoy and to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33954] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod frui solummodo sit hominum. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>nos homines sumus qui
+fruimur et utimur</i>. Non ergo alia animalia frui possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them
+to enjoy.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33955] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+frui est ultimi finis. Sed ad ultimum finem non possunt pertingere
+bruta animalia. Ergo eorum non est frui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the sensitive.
+If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural
+appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot
+enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33956] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut appetitus sensitivus est sub intellectivo, ita appetitus
+naturalis est sub sensitivo. Si igitur frui pertinet ad appetitum
+sensitivum, videtur quod pari ratione possit ad naturalem
+pertinere. Quod patet esse falsum, quia eius non est delectari.
+Ergo appetitus sensitivi non est frui. Et ita non convenit brutis
+animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33957] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
+<i>frui quidem cibo et qualibet corporali voluptate, non absurde
+existimantur et bestiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q11_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As was stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q11_A1" id="FS_Q11_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for
+it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way
+of execution, as that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the
+power of command in respect of the end
+is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge,
+the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although they attain
+an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge.
+</p><p id="FS_Q11_A2-p7"> Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that
+known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs
+to the rational nature alone. On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the
+particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are
+moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature,
+in a perfect degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at all.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 co."><a name="33958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33958] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis habetur, frui non est actus
+potentiae pervenientis ad finem sicut exequentis, sed potentiae
+imperantis executionem, dictum est enim quod est appetitivae
+potentiae. In rebus autem cognitione carentibus invenitur quidem
+potentia pertingens ad finem per modum exequentis, sicut qua grave
+tendit deorsum et leve sursum. Sed potentia ad quam pertineat finis
+per modum imperantis, non invenitur in eis; sed in aliqua superiori
+natura, quae sic movet totam naturam per imperium, sicut in
+habentibus cognitionem appetitus movet alias potentias ad suos
+actus. Unde manifestum est quod in his quae cognitione carent,
+quamvis pertingant ad finem, non invenitur fruitio finis; sed solum
+in his quae cognitionem habent. Sed cognitio finis est duplex,
+perfecta, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem, qua non solum cognoscitur
+id quod est finis et bonum, sed universalis ratio finis et boni, et
+talis cognitio est solius rationalis naturae. Imperfecta autem
+cognitio est qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum, et
+talis cognitio est in brutis animalibus. Quorum etiam virtutes
+appetitivae non sunt imperantes libere; sed secundum naturalem
+instinctum ad ea quae apprehenduntur, moventur. Unde rationali
+naturae convenit fruitio secundum rationem perfectam, brutis autem
+animalibus secundum rationem imperfectam, aliis autem creaturis
+nullo modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33959] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de fruitione perfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of that which each one chooses for his last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33960] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non oportet quod fruitio sit ultimi finis
+simpliciter, sed eius quod habetur ab unoquoque pro ultimo
+fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33961] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus consequitur aliquam cognitionem,
+non autem appetitus naturalis, praecipue prout est in his quae
+cognitione carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it is not so
+absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it would be, if one were to say that they "use."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33962] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de fruitione imperfecta.
+Quod ex ipso modo loquendi apparet, dicit enim quod frui non adeo
+absurde existimantur et bestiae, scilicet sicut uti absurdissime
+dicerentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q11_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q11_A3-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 3. Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phlm.1.20" target="asv">Philem. 20</a>): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord." But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a man. Therefore
+to enjoy is not only of the last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33963] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod fruitio non sit tantum ultimi finis.
+Dicit enim apostolus, ad Philem., <i>ita, frater, ego te fruar in
+domino</i>. Sed manifestum est quod Paulus non posuerat ultimum
+suum finem in homine. Ergo frui non tantum est ultimi finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q11_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22</a>): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end. Therefore
+enjoyment is not only of the last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33964] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+fructus est quo aliquis fruitur. Sed apostolus dicit, ad Galat. V,
+fructus spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, et cetera huiusmodi;
+quae non habent rationem ultimi finis. Non ergo fruitio est tantum
+ultimi finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the
+will: since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment.
+But the last end of man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the
+last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33965] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus voluntatis supra seipsos reflectuntur, volo enim me velle, et
+amo me amare. Sed frui est actus voluntatis, voluntas enim est per
+quam fruimur, ut Augustinus dicit X de Trin. Ergo aliquis fruitur
+sua fruitione. Sed fruitio non est ultimus finis hominis, sed solum
+bonum increatum, quod est Deus. Non ergo fruitio est solum ultimi
+finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else." But the last
+end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33966] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>non fruitur si quis id
+quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, propter aliud appetit</i>.
+Sed solum ultimus finis est qui non propter aliud appetitur. Ergo
+solius ultimi finis est fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q11_A1" id="FS_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> the notion of fruit implies two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain
+sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else; relatively,
+if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end,
+is properly called fruit; and this
+it is that one is properly said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only as referred to
+something else, e.g. a bitter potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something delightful
+about it, to which a number of preceding things are referred, may indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot
+be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x,
+10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein." But its rest is not absolute save in the possession
+of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached
+something. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered
+as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="33967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33967] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem fructus duo pertinent,
+scilicet quod sit ultimum; et quod appetitum quietet quadam
+dulcedine vel delectatione. Ultimum autem est simpliciter, et
+secundum quid, simpliciter quidem, quod ad aliud non refertur; sed
+secundum quid, quod est aliquorum ultimum. Quod ergo est
+simpliciter ultimum, in quo aliquid delectatur sicut in ultimo
+fine, hoc proprie dicitur fructus, et eo proprie dicitur aliquis
+frui. Quod autem in seipso non est delectabile, sed tantum
+appetitur in ordine ad aliud, sicut potio amara ad sanitatem; nullo
+modo fructus dici potest. Quod autem in se habet quandam
+delectationem, ad quam quaedam praecedentia referuntur, potest
+quidem aliquo modo dici fructus, sed non proprie, et secundum
+completam rationem fructus, eo dicimur frui. Unde Augustinus, in X
+de Trin., dicit quod <i>fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas
+delectata conquiescit</i>. Non autem quiescit simpliciter nisi in
+ultimo, quia quandiu aliquid expectatur, motus voluntatis remanet
+in suspenso, licet iam ad aliquid pervenerit. Sicut in motu locali,
+licet illud quod est medium in magnitudine, sit principium et
+finis; non tamen accipitur ut finis in actu, nisi quando in eo
+quiescitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if he had said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would
+seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to
+enjoy Him": as if we were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a term but as a means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33968] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I de Doctr. Christ.,
+<i>si dixisset te fruar, et non addidisset in domino, videretur
+finem dilectionis in eo posuisse. Sed quia illud addidit, in domino
+se posuisse finem, atque eo se frui significavit</i>. Ut sic fratre
+se frui dixerit non tanquam termino, sed tanquam medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it
+is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing and the consummation of his delight.
+Accordingly these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us,
+wherefore they are called "fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy
+them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because "we should desire them for their own
+sake": not indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we ought to find pleasure
+in them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33969] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod fructus aliter comparatur ad arborem producentem, et
+aliter ad hominem fruentem. Ad arborem quidem producentem
+comparatur ut effectus ad causam, ad fruentem autem, sicut ultimum
+expectatum et delectans. Dicuntur igitur ea quae enumerat ibi
+apostolus, fructus, quia sunt effectus quidam spiritus sancti in
+nobis, unde et fructus spiritus dicuntur, non autem ita quod eis
+fruamur tanquam ultimo fine. Vel aliter dicendum quod dicuntur
+fructus, secundum Ambrosium, quia propter se petenda sunt, non
+quidem ita quod ad beatitudinem non referantur; sed quia in seipsis
+habent unde nobis placere debeant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q11_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q11_A3-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are
+not, of course, two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly God is the
+last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just
+as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we
+enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to created happiness which consists in enjoyment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33970] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est finis dicitur dupliciter, uno
+modo, ipsa res; alio modo, adeptio rei. Quae quidem non sunt duo
+fines, sed unus finis, in se consideratus, et alteri applicatus.
+Deus igitur est ultimus finis sicut res quae ultimo quaeritur,
+fruitio autem sicut adeptio huius ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non
+est alius finis Deus, et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis
+est qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione. Et eadem
+ratio est de beatitudine creata, quae in fruitione consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q11_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q11_A4-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 4. Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully,
+with the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of
+hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33971] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod fruitio non sit nisi finis habiti.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Trin., quod <i>frui est cum gaudio uti,
+non adhuc spei, sed iam rei</i>. Sed quandiu non habetur, non est
+gaudium rei, sed spei. Ergo fruitio non est nisi finis habiti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q11_A3" id="FS_Q11_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, enjoyment is not properly otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the appetite. But the appetite
+has no rest save in the possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33972] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut dictum est, fruitio non est proprie nisi ultimi finis, quia
+solus ultimus finis quietat appetitum. Sed appetitus non quietatur
+nisi in fine iam habito. Ergo fruitio, proprie loquendo, non est
+nisi finis habiti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.
+Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33973] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+frui est capere fructum. Sed non capitur fructus, nisi quando iam
+finis habetur. Ergo fruitio non est nisi finis habiti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is possible,
+even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not
+possessed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33974] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+<i>frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam</i>, ut
+Augustinus dicit. Sed hoc potest fieri etiam de re non habita. Ergo
+frui potest esse etiam finis non habiti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end.
+Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but
+also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already
+possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in
+intention.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="33975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33975] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod frui importat comparationem quandam voluntatis ad
+ultimum finem, secundum quod voluntas habet aliquid pro ultimo
+fine. Habetur autem finis dupliciter, uno modo, perfecte; et alio
+modo, imperfecte. Perfecte quidem, quando habetur non solum in
+intentione, sed etiam in re, imperfecte autem, quando habetur in
+intentione tantum. Est ergo perfecta fruitio finis iam habiti
+realiter. Sed imperfecta est etiam finis non habiti realiter, sed
+in intentione tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33976] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de fruitione perfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last
+end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in
+possession of it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that the act
+be perfect or imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent.
+Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment.
+But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect
+way in which it is possessed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33977] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur, uno modo, ex
+parte obiecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud
+ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum
+adipiscitur finem. Obiectum autem est quod dat speciem actui, sed
+ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus,
+secundum conditionem agentis. Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus
+finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis.
+Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed
+imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33978] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod finem accipere vel habere dicitur aliquis, non solum
+secundum rem, sed etiam secundum intentionem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q12" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q12-p0.1">Q. 12. OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q12-p2"> We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q12-p3"><a href="#FS_Q12_A1"> (1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q12-p4"><a href="#FS_Q12_A2"> (2) Whether it is only of the last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q12-p5"><a href="#FS_Q12_A3"> (3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?</a></p><p id="FS_Q12-p6"><a href="#FS_Q12_A4"> (4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means?</a></p><p id="FS_Q12-p7"><a href="#FS_Q12_A5"> (5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 pr."><a name="33979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33979]
+Iª-IIae q. 12 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+intentione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum intentio
+sit actus intellectus, vel voluntatis secundo, utrum sit tantum
+finis ultimi. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit simul duo intendere.
+Quarto, utrum intentio finis sit idem actus cum voluntate eius quod
+est ad finem. Quinto, utrum intentio conveniat brutis
+animalibus.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q12_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A1-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 1. Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.22" target="asv">Mat. 6:22</a>): "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13)
+the eye signifies intention. But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore intention
+is not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33980] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod intentio sit actus intellectus, et non
+voluntatis. Dicitur enim Matth. VI, <i>si oculus tuus fuerit
+simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit</i>, ubi per oculum
+significatur intentio, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Serm. Dom.
+in Mont. Sed oculus, cum sit instrumentum visus, significat
+apprehensivam potentiam. Ergo intentio non est actus appetitivae
+potentiae, sed apprehensivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q12_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.23" target="asv">Mat. 6:23</a>): "If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains to knowledge. Therefore intention does too.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33981] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ibidem Augustinus dicit quod intentio lumen vocatur a domino, ubi
+dicit, si lumen quod in te est, tenebrae sunt, et cetera. Sed lumen
+ad cognitionem pertinet. Ergo et intentio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs
+not to the will but to the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33982] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+intentio designat ordinationem quandam in finem. Sed ordinare est
+rationis. Ergo intentio non pertinet ad voluntatem, sed ad
+rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called
+volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act
+of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33983] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus voluntatis non est nisi vel finis, vel eorum quae sunt ad
+finem. Sed actus voluntatis respectu finis, vocatur voluntas seu
+fruitio, respectu autem eorum quae sunt ad finem, est electio, a
+quibus differt intentio. Ergo intentio non est actus
+voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained
+in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought." Therefore intention is an act of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33984] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in XI de Trin., quod <i>voluntatis
+intentio copulat corpus visum visui, et similiter speciem in
+memoria existentem ad aciem animi interius cogitantis</i>. Est
+igitur intentio actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to tend to something." Now both the action of the mover and the movement
+of thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the
+mover. Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end: hence we say that an architect
+or anyone who is in authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now the
+will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q12_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 co."><a name="33985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33985] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in
+aliquid tendere. In aliquid autem tendit et actio moventis, et
+motus mobilis. Sed hoc quod motus mobilis in aliquid tendit, ab
+actione moventis procedit. Unde intentio primo et principaliter
+pertinet ad id quod movet ad finem, unde dicimus architectorem, et
+omnem praecipientem, movere suo imperio alios ad id quod ipse
+intendit. Voluntas autem movet omnes alias vires animae ad finem,
+ut supra habitum est. Unde manifestum est quod intentio proprie est
+actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The eye designates intention figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes knowledge,
+which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our
+bodies.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33986] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod intentio nominatur oculus metaphorice, non quia
+ad cognitionem pertineat; sed quia cognitionem praesupponit, per
+quam proponitur voluntati finis ad quem movet; sicut oculo
+praevidemus quo tendere corporaliter debeamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man
+knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33987] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intentio dicitur lumen, quia manifesta est
+intendenti. Unde et opera dicuntur tenebrae, quia homo scit quid
+intendit, sed nescit quid ex opere sequatur, sicut Augustinus
+ibidem exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention" indicates
+an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders something to the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33988] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod voluntas quidem non ordinat, sed tamen in aliquid
+tendit secundum ordinem rationis. Unde hoc nomen intentio nominat
+actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis
+aliquid in finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely;
+and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its
+place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is
+ordained; and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending
+to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33989] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod intentio est actus voluntatis respectu finis. Sed
+voluntas respicit finem tripliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et sic
+dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem, vel si quid
+aliud est huiusmodi. Alio modo consideratur finis secundum quod in
+eo quiescitur, et hoc modo fruitio respicit finem. Tertio modo
+consideratur finis secundum quod est terminus alicuius quod in
+ipsum ordinatur, et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex
+hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam, sed quia volumus
+ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q12_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A2-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 2. Whether intention is only of the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The
+intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards
+the last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33990] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod intentio sit tantum ultimi finis.
+Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, <i>clamor ad Deum est
+intentio cordis</i>. Sed Deus est ultimus finis humani cordis. Ergo
+intentio semper respicit ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated above (A[1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore
+intention always regards the last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33991] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+intentio respicit finem secundum quod est terminus, ut dictum est.
+Sed terminus habet rationem ultimi. Ergo intentio semper respicit
+ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as intention regards the end, so does enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention
+is too.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33992] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut intentio respicit finem, ita et fruitio. Sed fruitio semper
+est ultimi finis. Ergo et intentio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> There is but one last end of human wills, viz. Happiness, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A7" id="FS_Q12_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[7]</a>). If, therefore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions: which is evidently false.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33993] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+ultimus finis humanarum voluntatum est unus, scilicet beatitudo, ut
+supra dictum est. Si igitur intentio esset tantum ultimi finis, non
+essent diversae hominum intentiones. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 4), intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement
+may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole
+movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the
+other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a
+terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both. Consequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be
+always of the last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 co."><a name="33994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33994] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, intentio respicit finem secundum
+quod est terminus motus voluntatis. In motu autem potest accipi
+terminus dupliciter, uno modo, ipse terminus ultimus, in quo
+quiescitur, qui est terminus totius motus; alio modo, aliquod
+medium, quod est principium unius partis motus, et finis vel
+terminus alterius. Sicut in motu quo itur de a in c per b, c est
+terminus ultimus, b autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et
+utriusque potest esse intentio. Unde etsi semper sit finis, non
+tamen oportet quod semper sit ultimi finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our
+intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33995] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod intentio cordis dicitur clamor ad Deum, non quod
+Deus sit obiectum intentionis semper, sed quia est intentionis
+cognitor. Vel quia, cum oramus, intentionem nostram ad Deum
+dirigimus, quae quidem intentio vim clamoris habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33996] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod terminus habet rationem ultimi; sed non semper ultimi
+respectu totius, sed quandoque respectu alicuius partis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end,
+not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33997] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod fruitio importat quietem in fine, quod pertinet solum
+ad ultimum finem. Sed intentio importat motum in finem, non autem
+quietem. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q12_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A3-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 3. Whether one can intend two things at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17)
+that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither
+to any other two things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33998] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possit aliquis simul plura
+intendere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte,
+quod non potest homo simul intendere Deum et commodum corporale.
+Ergo pari ratione, neque aliqua alia duo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same
+direction of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33999] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+intentio nominat motum voluntatis ad terminum. Sed unius motus non
+possunt esse plures termini ex una parte. Ergo voluntas non potest
+simul multa intendere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things
+at the same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things
+at the same time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34000] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+intentio praesupponit actum rationis sive intellectus. Sed non
+contingit simul plura intelligere, secundum philosophum. Ergo etiam
+neque contingit simul plura intendere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two purposes by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the purpose of taste
+and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to two ends:
+so that one can intend several ends at the same time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34001] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+ars imitatur naturam. Sed natura ex uno instrumento intendit duas
+utilitates, <i>sicut lingua ordinatur et ad gustum et ad
+locutionem</i>, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo, pari ratione ars
+vel ratio potest simul aliquid unum ad duos fines ordinare. Et ita
+potest aliquis simul plura intendere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q12_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they
+be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend several things at the same time.
+For intention is not only of the last end, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q12_A2" id="FS_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, but also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing
+of a
+medicine and the giving of health.
+</p><p id="FS_Q12_A3-p7"> But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus also a man can intend several things at the same time.
+This is evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the better of the two. Now one of the
+reasons for which one thing is better than another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen
+in preference to another, because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available: so that
+evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="34002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34002] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliqua duo possunt accipi dupliciter, vel ordinata ad
+invicem, vel ad invicem non ordinata. Et si quidem ad invicem
+fuerint ordinata, manifestum est ex praemissis quod homo potest
+simul multa intendere. Est enim intentio non solum finis ultimi, ut
+dictum est, sed etiam finis medii. Simul autem intendit aliquis et
+finem proximum, et ultimum; sicut confectionem medicinae, et
+sanitatem. Si autem accipiantur duo ad invicem non ordinata, sic
+etiam simul homo potest plura intendere. Quod patet ex hoc, quod
+homo unum alteri praeeligit, quia melius est altero, inter alias
+autem conditiones quibus aliquid est melius altero, una est quod ad
+plura valet, unde potest aliquid praeeligi alteri, ex hoc quod ad
+plura valet. Et sic manifeste homo simul plura intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last
+ends: since, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q12_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[5]</a>), one man cannot have several last ends.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34003] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus intelligit hominem non posse simul
+Deum et commodum temporale intendere, sicut ultimos fines, quia, ut
+supra ostensum est, non possunt esse plures fines ultimi unius
+hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There can be several termini ordained to one another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they
+be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the
+reason. Now intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).
+Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of
+intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole, as a
+proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one which may be intended. For instance,
+the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man
+who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34004] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod unius motus possunt ex una parte esse plures termini,
+si unus ad alium ordinetur, sed duo termini ad invicem non
+ordinati, ex una parte, unius motus esse non possunt. Sed tamen
+considerandum est quod id quod non est unum secundum rem, potest
+accipi ut unum secundum rationem. Intentio autem est motus
+voluntatis in aliquid praeordinatum in ratione, sicut dictum est.
+Et ideo ea quae sunt plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus
+terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem, vel quia
+aliqua duo concurrunt ad integrandum aliquid unum, sicut ad
+sanitatem concurrunt calor et frigus commensurata; vel quia aliqua
+duo sub uno communi continentur, quod potest esse intentum. Puta
+acquisitio vini et vestis continetur sub lucro, sicut sub quodam
+communi, unde nihil prohibet quin ille qui intendit lucrum, simul
+haec duo intendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A10" id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[10]</a>;
+<a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A2" id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q85_A4" id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[85], A[4]</a> it is possible to understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34005] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, contingit simul plura
+intelligere, inquantum sunt aliquo modo unum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q12_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A4-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 4. Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intention of the end and the volition of the means are not one and the same movement. For Augustine
+says (De Trin. xi, 6) that "the will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from
+the will to see, through the window, the passersby." But that I should will to see the passersby, through the window, belongs
+to intention; whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the means.
+Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34006] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit unus et idem motus intentio
+finis, et voluntas eius quod est ad finem. Dicit enim Augustinus,
+in XI de Trin., quod <i>voluntas videndi fenestram, finem habet
+fenestrae visionem; et altera est voluntas per fenestram videndi
+transeuntes</i>. Sed hoc pertinet ad intentionem, quod velim videre
+transeuntes per fenestram, hoc autem ad voluntatem eius quod est ad
+finem, quod velim videre fenestram. Ergo alius est motus voluntatis
+intentio finis, et alius voluntas eius quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention
+of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34007] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed finis, et id quod est ad
+finem, sunt diversa obiecta. Ergo alius motus voluntatis est
+intentio finis, et voluntas eius quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But choice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the
+end and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34008] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas eius quod est ad finem, dicitur electio. Sed non est idem
+electio et intentio. Ergo non est idem motus intentio finis, cum
+voluntate eius quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The means in relation to the end, are as the mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that passes through
+the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is
+the same movement as the willing of the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34009] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+id quod est ad finem, se habet ad finem ut medium ad terminum. Sed
+idem motus est qui per medium transit ad terminum, in rebus
+naturalibus. Ergo et in rebus voluntariis idem motus est intentio
+finis, et voluntas eius quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the will to the end and to the means can be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved
+to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are really two movements of the will to them. Secondly,
+it may be considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end: and thus the movement of the will
+to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: "I wish
+to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the
+reason for willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it
+is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q8_A3" id="FS_Q12_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[8], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each
+by a distinct act;
+but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 co."><a name="34010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34010] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod motus voluntatis in finem et in id quod est ad finem,
+potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod voluntas in
+utrumque fertur absolute et secundum se. Et sic sunt simpliciter
+duo motus voluntatis in utrumque. Alio modo potest considerari
+secundum quod voluntas fertur in id quod est ad finem, propter
+finem. Et sic unus et idem subiecto motus voluntatis est tendens ad
+finem, et in id quod est ad finem. Cum enim dico, volo medicinam
+propter sanitatem, non designo nisi unum motum voluntatis. Cuius
+ratio est quia finis ratio est volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Idem
+autem actus cadit super obiectum, et super rationem obiecti, sicut
+eadem visio est coloris et luminis, ut supra dictum est. Et est
+simile de intellectu, quia si absolute principium et conclusionem
+consideret, diversa est consideratio utriusque; in hoc autem quod
+conclusioni propter principia assentit, est unus actus intellectus
+tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is moved
+to either absolutely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34011] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de visione fenestrae, et
+visione transeuntium per fenestram, secundum quod voluntas in
+utrumque absolute fertur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is
+the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34012] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod finis, inquantum est res quaedam, est aliud
+voluntatis obiectum quam id quod est ad finem. Sed inquantum est
+ratio volendi id quod est ad finem, est unum et idem obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ, according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end,
+as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as
+ordained to the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the end as acquired by the means, it is called
+"intention." A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having
+determined the means which are the object of choice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34013] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod motus qui est unus subiecto, potest ratione differre
+secundum principium et finem, ut ascensio et descensio, sicut
+dicitur in III Physic. Sic igitur inquantum motus voluntatis fertur
+in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio.
+Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod
+acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio. Cuius
+signum est quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam nondum
+determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q12_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A5-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 5. Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational
+nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as
+is proved in Phys. ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34014] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bruta animalia intendant finem. Natura
+enim in his quae cognitione carent, magis distat a rationali
+natura, quam natura sensitiva, quae est in animalibus brutis. Sed
+natura intendit finem etiam in his quae cognitione carent, ut
+probatur in II Physic. Ergo multo magis bruta animalia intendunt
+finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q11_A2" id="FS_Q12_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[11], A[2]</a>). Therefore intention is too.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34015] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut intentio est finis, ita et fruitio. Sed fruitio convenit
+brutis animalibus, ut dictum est. Ergo et intentio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end; since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something.
+But irrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore
+irrational animals intend an end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34016] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+eius est intendere finem, cuius est agere propter finem, cum
+intendere nihil sit nisi in aliud tendere. Sed bruta animalia agunt
+propter finem, movetur enim animal vel ad cibum quaerendum, vel ad
+aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo bruta animalia intendunt finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Intention of an end implies ordaining something to an end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals are
+void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34017] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+intentio finis importat ordinationem alicuius in finem quod est
+rationis. Cum igitur bruta animalia non habeant rationem, videtur
+quod non intendant finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q12_A1" id="FS_Q12_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, to intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is
+moved to an end by another is said to intend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God,
+as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something
+by natural instinct. The other way of
+intending an end belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of something, either his own or another's, to
+an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend properly
+and principally, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q12_A1" id="FS_Q12_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 co."><a name="34018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34018] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, intendere est in aliud
+tendere; quod quidem est et moventis, et moti. Secundum quidem
+igitur quod dicitur intendere finem id quod movetur ad finem ab
+alio, sic natura dicitur intendere finem, quasi mota ad suum finem
+a Deo, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Et hoc modo etiam bruta animalia
+intendunt finem, inquantum moventur instinctu naturali ad aliquid.
+Alio modo intendere finem est moventis, prout scilicet ordinat
+motum alicuius, vel sui vel alterius, in finem. Quod est rationis
+tantum. Unde per hunc modum bruta non intendunt finem, quod est
+proprie et principaliter intendere, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes intention in the sense of being moved to an end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34019] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod intendere est
+eius quod movetur ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34020] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod fruitio non importat ordinationem alicuius in
+aliquid, sicut intentio; sed absolutam quietem in fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this belongs
+to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural instinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another,
+like other things that are moved naturally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34021] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod bruta animalia moventur ad finem, non quasi
+considerantia quod per motum suum possunt consequi finem, quod est
+proprie intendentis, sed concupiscentia finem naturali instinctu,
+moventur ad finem quasi ab alio mota, sicut et cetera quae moventur
+naturaliter.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q13" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q13-p0.1">Q. 13. OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q13-p2"> We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means. There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to
+use. And choice is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice: secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent;
+fourthly, use.
+</p><p id="FS_Q13-p3"> Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q13-p4"><a href="#FS_Q13_A1"> (1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p5"><a href="#FS_Q13_A2"> (2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p6"><a href="#FS_Q13_A3"> (3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p7"><a href="#FS_Q13_A4"> (4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p8"><a href="#FS_Q13_A5"> (5) Whether choice is only of possible things?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p9"><a href="#FS_Q13_A6"> (6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 pr."><a name="34022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34022]
+Iª-IIae q. 13 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
+actibus voluntatis qui sunt in comparatione ad ea quae sunt ad
+finem. Et sunt tres, eligere, consentire, et uti. Electionem autem
+praecedit consilium. Primo ergo considerandum est de electione;
+secundo, de consilio; tertio, de consensu; quarto, de usu. Circa
+electionem quaeruntur sex. Primo, cuius potentiae sit actus, utrum
+voluntatis vel rationis. Secundo, utrum electio conveniat brutis
+animalibus. Tertio, utrum electio sit solum eorum quae sunt ad
+finem, vel etiam quandoque finis. Quarto, utrum electio sit tantum
+eorum quae per nos aguntur. Quinto, utrum electio sit solum
+possibilium. Sexto, utrum homo ex necessitate eligat, vel
+libere.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q13_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A1-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 1. Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of reason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference
+to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34023] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio non sit actus voluntatis, sed
+rationis. Electio enim collationem quandam importat, qua unum
+alteri praefertur. Sed conferre est rationis. Ergo electio est
+rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism, and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the
+reason that forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, as stated in Ethic. vii,
+3, it seems that it is an act of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34024] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+eiusdem est syllogizare et concludere. Sed syllogizare in
+operabilibus est rationis. Cum igitur electio sit quasi conclusio
+in operabilibus, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., videtur quod sit actus
+rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the cognitive power. Now there is an "ignorance of choice," as is stated
+in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34025] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ignorantia non pertinet ad voluntatem, sed ad vim cognitivam. Est
+autem quaedam ignorantia electionis, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo
+videtur quod electio non pertineat ad voluntatem, sed ad
+rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of things in our power." But desire is an act of will. Therefore
+choice is too.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34026] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio est
+desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis</i>. Desiderium autem est actus
+voluntatis. Ergo et electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q13_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The word choice implies something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will: for the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice is either "intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect." Now whenever
+two things concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
+xxxiii.] says that choice "is neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a
+combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body,
+nor a mere soul, but both; so is it with choice."
+</p><p id="FS_Q13_A1-p7"> Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives
+a form or species from a higher power or habit, according as an inferior is ordained by a superior: for if a man were to perform
+an act of fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally, an act of charity. Now
+it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as the will tends to
+its object, according to the order of reason, since the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite. Accordingly,
+that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason,
+is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is
+as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice is substantially not an act of the
+reason
+but of the will: for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently
+it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 co."><a name="34027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34027] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in nomine electionis importatur aliquid pertinens ad
+rationem sive intellectum, et aliquid pertinens ad voluntatem,
+dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod <i>electio est
+appetitivus intellectus, vel appetitus intellectivus</i>.
+Quandocumque autem duo concurrunt ad aliquid unum constituendum,
+unum eorum est ut formale respectu alterius. Unde Gregorius
+Nyssenus dicit quod <i>electio neque est appetitus secundum
+seipsam, neque consilium solum, sed ex his aliquid compositum.
+Sicut enim dicimus animal ex anima et corpore compositum esse,
+neque vero corpus esse secundum seipsum, neque animam solam, sed
+utrumque; ita et electionem</i>. Est autem considerandum in actibus
+animae, quod actus qui est essentialiter unius potentiae vel
+habitus, recipit formam et speciem a superiori potentia vel habitu,
+secundum quod ordinatur inferius a superiori, si enim aliquis actum
+fortitudinis exerceat propter Dei amorem, actus quidem ille
+materialiter est fortitudinis, formaliter vero caritatis.
+Manifestum est autem quod ratio quodammodo voluntatem praecedit, et
+ordinat actum eius, inquantum scilicet voluntas in suum obiectum
+tendit secundum ordinem rationis, eo quod vis apprehensiva
+appetitivae suum obiectum repraesentat. Sic igitur ille actus quo
+voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per
+rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est
+voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis. In huiusmodi autem
+substantia actus materialiter se habet ad ordinem qui imponitur a
+superiori potentia. Et ideo electio substantialiter non est actus
+rationis, sed voluntatis, perficitur enim electio in motu quodam
+animae ad bonum quod eligitur. Unde manifeste actus est appetitivae
+potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it consists in the comparison itself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34028] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod electio importat collationem quandam
+praecedentem, non quod essentialiter sit ipsa collatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called "a decision"
+or "judgment," to be followed by "choice." And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to
+that which results from it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34029] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod conclusio etiam syllogismi qui fit in operabilibus,
+ad rationem pertinet; et dicitur sententia vel iudicium, quam
+sequitur electio. Et ob hoc ipsa conclusio pertinere videtur ad
+electionem, tanquam ad consequens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what
+ought to be chosen.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34030] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ignorantia dicitur esse electionis, non quod ipsa
+electio sit scientia, sed quia ignoratur quid sit eligendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A2-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 2. Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose. For choice "is the desire of certain things on account of an end,"
+as stated in Ethic. iii, 2,3. But irrational animals desire something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and
+from desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34031] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio brutis animalibus conveniat.
+Electio enim est appetitus aliquorum propter finem, ut dicitur in
+III Ethic. Sed bruta animalia appetunt aliquid propter finem, agunt
+enim propter finem, et ex appetitu. Ergo in brutis animalibus est
+electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the very word "electio" [choice] seems to signify the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational
+animals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse
+another. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34032] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ipsum nomen electionis significare videtur quod aliquid prae aliis
+accipiatur. Sed bruta animalia accipiunt aliquid prae aliis, sicut
+manifeste apparet quod ovis unam herbam comedit, et aliam refutat.
+Ergo in brutis animalibus est electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, "it is from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means." But prudence is found
+in irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that "those animals which, like bees, cannot hear
+sounds, are prudent by instinct." We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals,
+such as bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a
+crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not
+passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of
+exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no other
+road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34033] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ut dicitur in VI Ethic., <i>ad prudentiam pertinet quod aliquis
+bene eligat ea quae sunt ad finem</i>. Sed prudentia convenit
+brutis animalibus, unde dicitur in principio Metaphys., quod
+<i>prudentia sunt sine disciplina quaecumque sonos audire non
+potentia sunt, ut apes</i>. Et hoc etiam sensui manifestum videtur,
+apparent enim mirabiles sagacitates in operibus animalium, ut apum
+et aranearum et canum. Canis enim insequens cervum, si ad trivium
+venerit, odoratu quidem explorat an cervus per primam vel secundam
+viam transiverit, quod si invenerit non transisse, iam securus per
+tertiam viam incedit non explorando, quasi utens syllogismo
+divisivo, quo concludi posset cervum per illam viam incedere, ex
+quo non incedit per alias duas, cum non sint plures. Ergo videtur
+quod electio brutis animalibus conveniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from
+choice." Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34034] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>pueri et irrationalia
+voluntarie quidem faciunt, non tamen eligentia</i>. Ergo in brutis
+animalibus non est electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that
+can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the
+difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q13_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of
+nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is
+nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the
+sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 co."><a name="34035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34035] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum electio sit praeacceptio unius respectu
+alterius, necesse est quod electio sit respectu plurium quae eligi
+possunt. Et ideo in his quae sunt penitus determinata ad unum,
+electio locum non habet. Est autem differentia inter appetitum
+sensitivum et voluntatem, quia, ut ex praedictis patet, appetitus
+sensitivus est determinatus ad unum aliquid particulare secundum
+ordinem naturae; voluntas autem est quidem, secundum naturae
+ordinem, determinata ad unum commune, quod est bonum, sed
+indeterminate se habet respectu particularium bonorum. Et ideo
+proprie voluntatis est eligere, non autem appetitus sensitivi, qui
+solus est in brutis animalibus. Et propter hoc brutis animalibus
+electio non convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing
+from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to several things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34036] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non omnis appetitus alicuius propter finem,
+vocatur electio, sed cum quadam discretione unius ab altero. Quae
+locum habere non potest, nisi ubi appetitus potest ferri ad
+plura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing.
+Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is
+naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just as fire is moved upwards and not downwards,
+without its making any choice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34037] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod brutum animal accipit unum prae alio, quia appetitus
+eius est naturaliter determinatus ad ipsum. Unde statim quando per
+sensum vel per imaginationem repraesentatur sibi aliquid ad quod
+naturaliter inclinatur eius appetitus, absque electione in illud
+solum movetur. Sicut etiam absque electione ignis movetur sursum,
+et non deorsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Phys. iii, 3 "movement is the act of the movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover appears
+in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is
+evident, although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight towards
+the target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The
+same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in
+comparison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in
+things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason, as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus it is that in the works of irrational
+animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in
+a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent
+or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share
+in one nature, invariably act in the same way.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34038] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III Physic., <i>motus est actus
+mobilis a movente</i>. Et ideo virtus moventis apparet in motu
+mobilis. Et propter hoc in omnibus quae moventur a ratione, apparet
+ordo rationis moventis, licet ipsa rationem non habeant, sic enim
+sagitta directe tendit ad signum ex motione sagittantis, ac si ipsa
+rationem haberet dirigentem. Et idem apparet in motibus
+horologiorum, et omnium ingeniorum humanorum, quae arte fiunt.
+Sicut autem comparantur artificialia ad artem humanam, ita
+comparantur omnia naturalia ad artem divinam. Et ideo ordo apparet
+in his quae moventur secundum naturam, sicut et in his quae
+moventur per rationem, ut dicitur in II Physic. Et ex hoc contingit
+quod in operibus brutorum animalium apparent quaedam sagacitates,
+inquantum habent inclinationem naturalem ad quosdam ordinatissimos
+processus, utpote a summa arte ordinatos. Et propter hoc etiam
+quaedam animalia dicuntur prudentia vel sagacia, non quod in eis
+sit aliqua ratio vel electio. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod omnia quae
+sunt unius naturae, similiter operantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A3-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 3. Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "virtue makes us choose
+aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright those things which are to be done for its
+sake." But that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is of the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34039] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio non sit tantum eorum quae sunt
+ad finem. Dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod <i>electionem
+rectam facit virtus, quaecumque autem illius gratia nata sunt
+fieri, non sunt virtutis, sed alterius potentiae</i>. Illud autem
+cuius gratia fit aliquid, est finis. Ergo electio est finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another. But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be
+preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34040] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+electio importat praeacceptionem unius respectu alterius. Sed sicut
+eorum quae sunt ad finem unum potest praeaccipi alteri, ita etiam
+et diversorum finium. Ergo electio potest esse finis, sicut et
+eorum quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p4">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition is of the end, but choice of the means."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34041] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>voluntas est
+finis, electio autem eorum quae sunt ad finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q13_A3-p5">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As already stated (A[1], ad 2), choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical
+syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the
+end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end,
+as such, is not a matter of choice.
+</p><p id="FS_Q13_A3-p6"> But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science, from being the
+conclusion of another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration
+or science; so too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to something as an end. And in this way it is a
+matter of choice. Thus in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a matter of
+choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently
+with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q13_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:10</a>): "For when I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 co."><a name="34042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34042] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, electio consequitur sententiam
+vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi. Unde
+illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio in syllogismo
+operabilium. Finis autem in operabilibus se habet ut principium, et
+non ut conclusio, ut philosophus dicit in II Physic. Unde finis,
+inquantum est huiusmodi, non cadit sub electione. Sed sicut in
+speculativis nihil prohibet id quod est unius demonstrationis vel
+scientiae principium, esse conclusionem alterius demonstrationis
+vel scientiae; primum tamen principium indemonstrabile non potest
+esse conclusio alicuius demonstrationis vel scientiae; ita etiam
+contingit id quod est in una operatione ut finis, ordinari ad
+aliquid ut ad finem. Et hoc modo sub electione cadit. Sicut in
+operatione medici, sanitas se habet ut finis, unde hoc non cadit
+sub electione medici, sed hoc supponit tanquam principium. Sed
+sanitas corporis ordinatur ad bonum animae, unde apud eum qui habet
+curam de animae salute, potest sub electione cadere esse sanum vel
+esse infirmum; nam apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. XII, <i>cum enim
+infirmor, tunc potens sum</i>. Sed ultimus finis nullo modo sub
+electione cadit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34043] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod fines proprii virtutum ordinantur ad
+beatitudinem sicut ad ultimum finem. Et hoc modo potest esse eorum
+electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q13_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[5]</a>), there is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as
+they are ordained to a further end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34044] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, ultimus finis est unus
+tantum. Unde ubicumque occurrunt plures fines, inter eos potest
+esse electio, secundum quod ordinantur ad ulteriorem finem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A4-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 4. Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but also
+the organs, are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned with human acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34045] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio non sit solum respectu
+humanorum actuum. Electio enim est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed ea
+quae sunt ad finem non solum sunt actus, sed etiam organa, ut
+dicitur in II Physic. Ergo electiones non sunt tantum humanorum
+actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice has a place even in contemplation; in so far as one opinion is
+preferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34046] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+actio a contemplatione distinguitur. Sed electio etiam in
+contemplatione locum habet; prout scilicet una opinio alteri
+praeeligitur. Ergo electio non est solum humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard.
+Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34047] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+eliguntur homines ad aliqua officia, vel saecularia vel
+ecclesiastica, ab his qui nihil erga eos agunt. Ergo electio non
+solum est humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man chooses save what he can do himself."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34048] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>nullus eligit
+nisi ea quae existimat fieri per ipsum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when
+the end is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end, as the
+physician produces health (wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the physician); or in so far as man,
+in some fashion, uses or enjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the
+possession of money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. For the means must needs be either an action; or a thing,
+with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or puts it to some use. And thus it is
+that choice is always in regard to human acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 co."><a name="34049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34049] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut intentio est finis, ita electio est eorum quae
+sunt ad finem. Finis autem vel est actio, vel res aliqua. Et cum
+res aliqua fuerit finis, necesse est quod aliqua humana actio
+interveniat, vel inquantum homo facit rem illam quae est finis,
+sicut medicus facit sanitatem, quae est finis eius (unde et facere
+sanitatem dicitur finis medici); vel inquantum homo aliquo modo
+utitur vel fruitur re quae est finis, sicut avaro est finis
+pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae. Et eodem modo dicendum est de eo
+quod est ad finem. Quia necesse est ut id quod est ad finem, vel
+sit actio; vel res aliqua, interveniente aliqua actione, per quam
+facit id quod est ad finem, vel utitur eo. Et per hunc modum
+electio semper est humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as man makes use of them for the sake of the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34050] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod organa ordinantur ad finem, inquantum homo
+utitur eis propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that is
+put in contradistinction to contemplation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34051] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in ipsa contemplatione est aliquis actus intellectus
+assentientis huic opinioni vel illi. Actio vero exterior est quae
+contra contemplationem dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post.
+Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official, he would have no right to choose. Likewise,
+whenever we speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34052] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod homo qui eligit episcopum vel principem civitatis,
+eligit nominare ipsum in talem dignitatem. Alioquin, si nulla esset
+eius actio ad constitutionem episcopi vel principis, non competeret
+ei electio. Et similiter dicendum est quod quandocumque dicitur
+aliqua res praeeligi alteri, adiungitur ibi aliqua operatio
+eligentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A5-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 5. Whether choice is only of possible things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice in not only of possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q13_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now there is "a willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore there is also a choice of impossibilities.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34053] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio non sit solum possibilium.
+Electio enim est actus voluntatis, ut dictum est. Sed voluntas est
+impossibilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo et electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q13_A4" id="FS_Q13_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself,
+or that which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we are unable to accomplish what we choose: so that
+this proves to be impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34054] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+electio est eorum quae per nos aguntur, sicut dictum est. Nihil
+ergo refert, quantum ad electionem, utrum eligatur id quod est
+impossibile simpliciter, vel id quod est impossibile eligenti. Sed
+frequenter ea quae eligimus, perficere non possumus, et sic sunt
+impossibilia nobis. Ergo electio est impossibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command
+what is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be of the impossible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34055] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nihil homo tentat agere nisi eligendo. Sed beatus Benedictus dicit
+quod, si praelatus aliquid impossibile praeceperit, tentandum est.
+Ergo electio potest esse impossibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "there is no choice of impossibilities."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34056] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio non est
+impossibilium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q13_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q13_A4" id="FS_Q13_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, our choice is always concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible to us. Therefore we must needs
+say that choice is only of possible things.
+</p><p id="FS_Q13_A5-p7"> Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end.
+A sign of this is that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is impossible to them, they depart, as being
+unable to proceed with the business.
+</p><p id="FS_Q13_A5-p8"> Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are
+to the end, as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible
+principle. Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently
+no one would tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible. Therefore the
+impossible is not the object of choice.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 co."><a name="34057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34057] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, electiones nostrae referuntur
+semper ad nostras actiones. Ea autem quae per nos aguntur, sunt
+nobis possibilia. Unde necesse est dicere quod electio non sit nisi
+possibilium. Similiter etiam ratio eligendi aliquid est ex hoc quod
+ducit ad finem. Per id autem quod est impossibile, non potest
+aliquis consequi finem. Cuius signum est quia, cum in consiliando
+perveniunt homines ad id quod est eis impossibile, discedunt, quasi
+non valentes ulterius procedere. Apparet etiam hoc manifeste ex
+processu rationis praecedente. Sic enim se habet id quod est ad
+finem, de quo electio est, ad finem, sicut conclusio ad principium.
+Manifestum est autem quod conclusio impossibilis non sequitur ex
+principio possibili. Unde non potest esse quod finis sit
+possibilis, nisi id quod est ad finem fuerit possibile. Ad id autem
+quod est impossibile, nullus movetur. Unde nullus tenderet in
+finem, nisi per hoc quod apparet id quod est ad finem esse
+possibile. Unde id quod est impossibile sub electione non
+cadit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will stands between the intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the
+will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends
+something under the universal notion of good: but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation
+to the action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the
+movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that
+is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect
+of what is possible and good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and by
+some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of
+the
+will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34058] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod voluntas media est inter intellectum et
+exteriorem operationem, nam intellectus proponit voluntati suum
+obiectum, et ipsa voluntas causat exteriorem actionem. Sic igitur
+principium motus voluntatis consideratur ex parte intellectus, qui
+apprehendit aliquid ut bonum in universali, sed terminatio, seu
+perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum ordinem ad
+operationem, per quam aliquis tendit ad consecutionem rei; nam
+motus voluntatis est ab anima ad rem. Et ideo perfectio actus
+voluntatis attenditur secundum hoc quod est aliquid bonum alicui ad
+agendum. Hoc autem est possibile. Et ideo voluntas completa non est
+nisi de possibili, quod est bonum volenti. Sed voluntas incompleta
+est de impossibili, quae secundum quosdam velleitas dicitur, quia
+scilicet aliquis vellet illud, si esset possibile. Electio autem
+nominat actum voluntatis iam determinatum ad id quod est huic
+agendum. Et ideo nullo modo est nisi possibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended.
+And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice
+sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34059] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum, hoc
+modo iudicandum est de obiecto voluntatis, secundum quod cadit sub
+apprehensione. Et ideo sicut quandoque voluntas est alicuius quod
+apprehenditur ut bonum, et tamen non est vere bonum; ita quandoque
+est electio eius quod apprehenditur ut possibile eligenti, quod
+tamen non est ei possibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for this is that the subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible;
+but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34060] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod hoc ideo dicitur, quia an aliquid sit possibile,
+subditus non debet suo iudicio definire; sed in unoquoque, iudicio
+superioris stare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A6-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 6. Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of
+that which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But conclusions follow of necessity from their principles.
+Therefore man is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34061] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo ex necessitate eligat. Sic enim
+se habet finis ad eligibilia, ut principia ad ea quae ex principiis
+consequuntur, ut patet in VII Ethic. Sed ex principiis ex
+necessitate deducuntur conclusiones. Ergo ex fine de necessitate
+movetur aliquis ad eligendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), choice follows the reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of necessity
+about some things: on account of the necessity of the premises. Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34062] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut dictum est, electio consequitur iudicium rationis de agendis.
+Sed ratio ex necessitate iudicat de aliquibus, propter necessitatem
+praemissarum. Ergo videtur quod etiam electio ex necessitate
+sequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato
+says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance,
+he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the
+middle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot
+be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of
+which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears to hold
+the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better.
+Therefore every choice is made necessarily.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34063] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si aliqua duo sunt penitus aequalia, non magis movetur homo ad unum
+quam ad aliud, sicut famelicus, si habet cibum aequaliter
+appetibilem in diversis partibus, et secundum aequalem distantiam,
+non magis movetur ad unum quam ad alterum, ut Plato dixit,
+assignans rationem quietis terrae in medio, sicut dicitur in II de
+caelo. Sed multo minus potest eligi quod accipitur ut minus, quam
+quod accipitur ut aequale. Ergo si proponantur duo vel plura, inter
+quae unum maius appareat, impossibile est aliquod aliorum eligere.
+Ergo ex necessitate eligitur illud quod eminentius apparet. Sed
+omnis electio est de omni eo quod videtur aliquo modo melius. Ergo
+omnis electio est ex necessitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Choice is an act of a rational power; which according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34064] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod electio est actus potentiae rationalis; quae se habet ad
+opposita, secundum philosophum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason
+why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will,
+act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the
+reason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the
+reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act."
+Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect
+of evil: and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect
+good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man
+wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but of
+the means, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q13_A3" id="FS_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>; it is not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity,
+but freely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="34065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34065] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod homo non ex necessitate eligit. Et hoc ideo, quia
+quod possibile est non esse, non necesse est esse. Quod autem
+possibile sit non eligere vel eligere, huius ratio ex duplici
+hominis potestate accipi potest. Potest enim homo velle et non
+velle, agere et non agere, potest etiam velle hoc aut illud, et
+agere hoc aut illud. Cuius ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis
+accipitur. Quidquid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum, in hoc
+voluntas tendere potest. Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum
+non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere; sed hoc etiam quod est non
+velle et non agere. Et rursum in omnibus particularibus bonis
+potest considerare rationem boni alicuius, et defectum alicuius
+boni, quod habet rationem mali, et secundum hoc, potest unumquodque
+huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile. Solum
+autem perfectum bonum, quod est beatitudo, non potest ratio
+apprehendere sub ratione mali, aut alicuius defectus. Et ideo ex
+necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest velle non esse
+beatus, aut miser. Electio autem, cum non sit de fine, sed de his
+quae sunt ad finem, ut iam dictum est; non est perfecti boni, quod
+est beatitudo, sed aliorum particularium bonorum. Et ideo homo non
+ex necessitate, sed libere eligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the
+conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the
+means are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be such, they are not always considered
+in that light.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34066] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non semper ex principiis ex necessitate procedit
+conclusio, sed tunc solum quando principia non possunt esse vera si
+conclusio non sit vera. Et similiter non oportet quod semper ex
+fine insit homini necessitas ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem,
+quia non omne quod est ad finem, tale est ut sine eo finis haberi
+non possit; aut, si tale sit, non semper sub tali ratione
+consideratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason's decision or judgment of what is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such matters
+the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally;
+as, for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34067] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod sententia sive iudicium rationis de rebus agendis est
+circa contingentia, quae a nobis fieri possunt, in quibus
+conclusiones non ex necessitate sequuntur ex principiis necessariis
+absoluta necessitate, sed necessariis solum ex conditione, ut, si
+currit, movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point
+of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34068] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet, si aliqua duo aequalia proponantur
+secundum unam considerationem, quin circa alterum consideretur
+aliqua conditio per quam emineat, et magis flectatur voluntas in
+ipsum quam in aliud.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q14" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q14-p0.1">Q. 14. OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q14-p2"> We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q14-p3"><a href="#FS_Q14_A1"> (1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p4"><a href="#FS_Q14_A2"> (2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p5"><a href="#FS_Q14_A3"> (3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p6"><a href="#FS_Q14_A4"> (4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p7"><a href="#FS_Q14_A5"> (5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p8"><a href="#FS_Q14_A6"> (6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 pr."><a name="34069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34069]
+Iª-IIae q. 14 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+consilio. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum consilium sit
+inquisitio. Secundo, utrum consilium sit de fine, vel solum de his
+quae sunt ad finem. Tertio, utrum consilium sit solum de his quae a
+nobis aguntur. Quarto, utrum consilium sit de omnibus quae a nobis
+aguntur. Quinto, utrum consilium procedat ordine resolutorio.
+Sexto, utrum consilium procedat in infinitum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q14_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A1-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 1. Whether counsel is an inquiry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act of the appetite."
+But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34070] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non sit inquisitio. Dicit
+enim Damascenus quod <i>consilium est appetitus</i>. Sed ad
+appetitum non pertinet inquirere. Ergo consilium non est
+inquisitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive,
+as we have shown in the
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A7" id="FS_Q14_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[14], A[7]</a>. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q14_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>) that "He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore counsel is not inquiry.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34071] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+inquirere intellectus discurrentis est; et sic Deo non convenit,
+cuius cognitio non est discursiva, ut in primo habitum est. Sed
+consilium Deo attribuitur, dicitur enim ad Ephes. I, quod
+<i>operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Ergo
+consilium non est inquisitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q14_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:25</a>): "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34072] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+inquisitio est de rebus dubiis. Sed consilium datur de his quae
+sunt certa bona; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. VII, <i>de
+virginibus autem praeceptum domini non habeo, consilium autem
+do</i>. Ergo consilium non est inquisitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34073] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, <i>omne quidem consilium
+quaestio est; non autem omnis quaestio consilium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Choice, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>, ad 2; A[3]), follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things that have
+to be done; because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain.
+Now in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore the reason
+must of necessity institute
+an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has been already counselled."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 co."><a name="34074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34074] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod electio, sicut dictum est, consequitur iudicium
+rationis de rebus agendis. In rebus autem agendis multa incertitudo
+invenitur, quia actiones sunt circa singularia contingentia, quae
+propter sui variabilitatem incerta sunt. In rebus autem dubiis et
+incertis ratio non profert iudicium absque inquisitione
+praecedente. Et ideo necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante
+iudicium de eligendis, et haec inquisitio consilium vocatur.
+Propter quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio est
+appetitus praeconsiliati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the acts of two powers are ordained to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other power:
+consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction
+as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason's direction, are ordained to one another.
+Consequently there is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that
+act of the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of the will---both as matter (since
+counsel is of what man wills to do)---and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel
+in regard to the means). And therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice "is intellect influenced by
+appetite," thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel
+is
+"appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose
+impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34075] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, quando actus duarum potentiarum ad invicem
+ordinantur, in utroque est aliquid quod est alterius potentiae, et
+ideo uterque actus ab utraque potentia denominari potest.
+Manifestum est autem quod actus rationis dirigentis in his quae
+sunt ad finem, et actus voluntatis secundum regimen rationis in ea
+tendentis, ad se invicem ordinantur. Unde et in actu voluntatis,
+quae est electio, apparet aliquid rationis, scilicet ordo, et in
+consilio, quod est actus rationis, apparet aliquid voluntatis sicut
+materia, quia consilium est de his quae homo vult facere; et etiam
+sicut motivum, quia ex hoc quod homo vult finem, movetur ad
+consiliandum de his quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo sicut philosophus
+dicit, in VI Ethic., quod electio est intellectus appetitivus, ut
+ad electionem utrumque concurrere ostendat; ita Damascenus dicit
+quod consilium est appetitus inquisitivus, ut consilium aliquo modo
+pertinere ostendat et ad voluntatem, circa quam et ex qua fit
+inquisitio, et ad rationem inquirentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The things that we say of God must be understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us science
+is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects
+in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge
+or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel.
+But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De
+Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34076] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo, accipienda sunt absque omni
+defectu qui invenitur in nobis, sicut in nobis scientia est
+conclusionum per discursum a causis in effectus; sed scientia dicta
+de Deo, significat certitudinem de omnibus effectibus in prima
+causa, absque omni discursu. Et similiter consilium attribuitur Deo
+quantum ad certitudinem sententiae vel iudicii, quae in nobis
+provenit ex inquisitione consilii. Sed huiusmodi inquisitio in Deo
+locum non habet, et ideo consilium secundum hoc Deo non
+attribuitur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod <i>Deus non
+consiliatur, ignorantis enim est consiliari</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It may happen that things which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in
+the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34077] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse certissima bona secundum
+sententiam sapientum et spiritualium virorum, quae tamen non sunt
+certa bona secundum sententiam plurium, vel carnalium hominum. Et
+ideo de talibus consilia dantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A2-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 2. Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of
+inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since
+therefore inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34078] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non solum sit de his quae
+sunt ad finem, sed etiam de fine. Quaecumque enim dubitationem
+habent, de his potest inquiri. Sed circa operabilia humana
+contingit esse dubitationem de fine, et non solum de his quae sunt
+ad finem. Cum igitur inquisitio circa operabilia sit consilium,
+videtur quod consilium possit esse de fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel
+can be of the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34079] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+materia consilii sunt operationes humanae. Sed quaedam operationes
+humanae sunt fines, ut dicitur in I Ethic. ergo consilium potest
+esse de fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p4">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that "counsel is not of the end, but of the means."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34080] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>non de fine, sed de his
+quae sunt ad finem, est consilium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p5">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The end is the principle in practical matters: because the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle
+cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry. Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of
+the end, but only of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something
+else; just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of
+another: and consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may be looked upon as the means in another;
+and thus it will become an object of counsel.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 co."><a name="34081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34081] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod finis in operabilibus habet rationem principii, eo
+quod rationes eorum quae sunt ad finem, ex fine sumuntur.
+Principium autem non cadit sub quaestione, sed principia oportet
+supponere in omni inquisitione. Unde cum consilium sit quaestio, de
+fine non est consilium, sed solum de his quae sunt ad finem. Tamen
+contingit id quod est finis respectu quorundam, ordinari ad alium
+finem, sicut etiam id quod est principium unius demonstrationis,
+est conclusio alterius. Et ideo id quod accipitur ut finis in una
+inquisitione, potest accipi ut ad finem in alia inquisitione. Et
+sic de eo erit consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p6">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is looked upon as an end, is already fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked
+upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel not about the end, but about the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34082] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod id quod accipitur ut finis, est iam
+determinatum. Unde quandiu habetur ut dubium, non habetur ut finis.
+Et ideo si de eo consilium habetur, non erit consilium de fine, sed
+de eo quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Counsel is about operations, in so far as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will
+not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34083] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod de operationibus est consilium, inquantum ordinantur
+ad aliquem finem. Unde si aliqua operatio humana sit finis, de ea,
+inquantum huiusmodi, non est consilium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A3-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 3. Whether counsel is only of things that we do?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible
+for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are not the result of our actions, such as the nature
+of various things. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34084] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non sit solum de his quae
+aguntur a nobis. Consilium enim collationem quandam importat. Sed
+collatio inter multos potest fieri etiam de rebus immobilibus, quae
+non fiunt a nobis, puta de naturis rerum. Ergo consilium non solum
+est de his quae aguntur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those
+who seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34085] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+homines interdum consilium quaerunt de his quae sunt lege statuta,
+unde et iurisconsulti dicuntur. Et tamen eorum qui quaerunt
+huiusmodi consilium, non est leges facere. Ergo consilium non solum
+est de his quae a nobis aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are said to take consultation about future events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel
+is not only of things that we do.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34086] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+dicuntur etiam quidam consultationes facere de futuris eventibus;
+qui tamen non sunt in potestate nostra. Ergo consilium non solum
+est de his quae a nobis fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue.
+Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="34087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34087] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+si consilium esset solum de his quae a nobis fiunt, nullus
+consiliaretur de his quae sunt per alium agenda. Sed hoc patet esse
+falsum. Ergo consilium non solum est de his quae a nobis fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and that
+we are able to do."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34088] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, <i>consiliamur de his quae sunt
+in nobis, et per nos fieri possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting
+together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that
+in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or
+circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are
+considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary
+and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may
+be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent
+singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the
+knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things
+singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 co."><a name="34089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34089] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod consilium proprie importat collationem inter plures
+habitam. Quod et ipsum nomen designat, dicitur enim consilium quasi
+Considium, eo quod multi consident ad simul conferendum. Est autem
+considerandum quod in particularibus contingentibus, ad hoc quod
+aliquid certum cognoscatur, plures conditiones seu circumstantias
+considerare oportet, quas ab uno non facile est considerari, sed a
+pluribus certius percipiuntur, dum quod unus considerat, alii non
+occurrit, in necessariis autem et universalibus est absolutior et
+simplicior consideratio, ita quod magis ad huiusmodi
+considerationem unus per se sufficere potest. Et ideo inquisitio
+consilii proprie pertinet ad contingentia singularia. Cognitio
+autem veritatis in talibus non habet aliquid magnum, ut per se sit
+appetibilis, sicut cognitio universalium et necessariorum, sed
+appetitur secundum quod est utilis ad operationem, quia actiones
+sunt circa contingentia singularia. Et ideo dicendum est quod
+proprie consilium est circa ea quae aguntur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the reason given above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34090] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod consilium importat collationem non quamcumque,
+sed collationem de rebus agendis, ratione iam dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him
+in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34091] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod id quod est lege positum, quamvis non sit ex
+operatione quaerentis consilium, tamen est directivum eius ad
+operandum, quia ista est una ratio aliquid operandi, mandatum
+legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak
+of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34092] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod consilium non solum est de his quae aguntur, sed de
+his quae ordinantur ad operationes. Et propter hoc consultatio
+dicitur fieri de futuris eventibus, inquantum homo per futuros
+eventus cognitos dirigitur ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of affection---thus
+a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument,
+for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes
+counsel about what he would do through his servant.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="34093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34093] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod de aliorum factis consilium quaerimus, inquantum sunt
+quodammodo unum nobiscum, vel per unionem affectus, sicut amicus
+sollicitus est de his quae ad amicum spectant, sicut de suis; vel
+per modum instrumenti, nam agens principale et instrumentale sunt
+quasi una causa, cum unum agat per alterum; et sic dominus
+consiliatur de his quae sunt agenda per servum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A4-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 4. Whether counsel is about all things that we do?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as stated
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q14_A1" id="FS_Q14_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But choice is about all things that we do. Therefore counsel is too.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34094] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium sit de omnibus quae sunt per
+nos agenda. Electio enim est appetitus praeconsiliati, ut dictum
+est. Sed electio est de omnibus quae per nos aguntur. Ergo et
+consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue
+of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we do.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34095] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+consilium importat inquisitionem rationis. Sed in omnibus quae non
+per impetum passionis agimus, procedimus ex inquisitione rationis.
+Ergo de omnibus quae aguntur a nobis, est consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take
+counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be
+done by this." But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in all things that
+we do.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34096] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>si per plura aliquid
+fieri potest, consilio inquiritur per quod facillime et optime
+fiat; si autem per unum, qualiter per illud fiat</i>. Sed omne quod
+fit, fit per unum vel per multa. Ergo de omnibus quae fiunt a
+nobis, est consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science
+or art."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34097] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>de his quae secundum
+disciplinam vel artem sunt operibus, non est consilium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q14_A1" id="FS_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument,
+"is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation
+to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain
+determinate
+means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how
+to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this
+or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks
+upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce
+to
+the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as
+in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like,
+as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 co."><a name="34098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34098] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod consilium est inquisitio quaedam, ut dictum est. De
+illis autem inquirere solemus, quae in dubium veniunt, unde et
+ratio inquisitiva, quae dicitur argumentum, est rei dubiae faciens
+fidem. Quod autem aliquid in operabilibus humanis non sit
+dubitabile, ex duobus contingit. Uno modo, quia per determinatas
+vias proceditur ad determinatos fines, sicut contingit in artibus
+quae habent certas vias operandi; sicut scriptor non consiliatur
+quomodo debeat trahere litteras, hoc enim determinatum est per
+artem. Alio modo, quia non multum refert utrum sic vel sic fiat, et
+ista sunt minima, quae parum adiuvant vel impediunt respectu finis
+consequendi; quod autem parum est, quasi nihil accipit ratio. Et
+ideo de duobus non consiliamur, quamvis ordinentur ad finem, ut
+philosophus dicit, scilicet de rebus parvis; et de his quae sunt
+determinata qualiter fieri debent, sicut est in operibus artium,
+praeter quasdam coniecturales, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, ut puta
+medicinalis, negotiativa, et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without
+inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34099] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod electio praesupponit consilium ratione iudicii
+vel sententiae. Unde quando iudicium vel sententia manifesta est
+absque inquisitione, non requiritur consilii inquisitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel in
+all that is done by reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34100] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio in rebus manifestis non inquirit, sed statim
+iudicat. Et ideo non oportet in omnibus quae ratione aguntur, esse
+inquisitionem consilii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished
+by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then
+there is no need of counsel.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34101] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod quando aliquid per unum potest fieri, sed diversis
+modis, potest dubitationem habere, sicut et quando fit per plura,
+et ideo opus est consilio. Sed quando determinatur non solum res,
+sed modus, tunc non est opus consilio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A5-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 5. Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process
+of our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel
+does not always proceed by way of analysis.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34102] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non procedat modo
+resolutorio. Consilium enim est de his quae a nobis aguntur. Sed
+operationes nostrae non procedunt modo resolutorio, sed magis modo
+compositivo, scilicet de simplicibus ad composita. Ergo consilium
+non semper procedit modo resolutorio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according
+to the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems that
+in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an analytical process. Therefore
+the process of counsel is not one of analysis.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34103] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+consilium est inquisitio rationis. Sed ratio a prioribus incipit,
+et ad posteriora devenit, secundum convenientiorem ordinem cum
+igitur praeterita sint priora praesentibus, et praesentia priora
+futuris, in consiliando videtur esse procedendum a praesentibus et
+praeteritis in futura. Quod non pertinet ad ordinem resolutorium.
+Ergo in consiliis non servatur ordo resolutorius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether
+a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore
+the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34104] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+consilium non est nisi de his quae sunt nobis possibilia, ut
+dicitur in III Ethic. Sed an sit nobis aliquid possibile,
+perpenditur ex eo quod possumus facere, vel non possumus facere, ut
+perveniamus in illud. Ergo in inquisitione consilii a praesentibus
+incipere oportet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34105] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>ille qui
+consiliatur, videtur quaerere et resolvere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process
+is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more
+simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of analysis,
+as when our judgment deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple
+causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into
+execution. Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended
+in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="34106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34106] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in omni inquisitione oportet incipere ab aliquo
+principio. Quod quidem si, sicut est prius in cognitione, ita etiam
+sit prius in esse, non est processus resolutorius, sed magis
+compositivus, procedere enim a causis in effectus, est processus
+compositivus, nam causae sunt simpliciores effectibus. Si autem id
+quod est prius in cognitione, sit posterius in esse, est processus
+resolutorius, utpote cum de effectibus manifestis iudicamus,
+resolvendo in causas simplices. Principium autem in inquisitione
+consilii est finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, posterior
+tamen in esse. Et secundum hoc, oportet quod inquisitio consilii
+sit resolutiva, incipiendo scilicet ab eo quod in futuro
+intenditur, quousque perveniatur ad id quod statim agendum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about
+actions is contrary to the order of actions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34107] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod consilium est quidem de operationibus. Sed ratio
+operationum accipitur ex fine, et ideo ordo ratiocinandi de
+operationibus, est contrarius ordini operandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason begins with that which is first according to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34108] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio incipit ab eo quod est prius secundum rationem,
+non autem semper ab eo quod est prius tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We should not want to know whether something to be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that
+end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before considering whether it be possible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34109] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod de eo quod est agendum propter finem, non quaereremus
+scire an sit possibile, si non esset congruum fini. Et ideo prius
+oportet inquirere an conveniat ad ducendum in finem, quam
+consideretur an sit possibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A6-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 6. Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite. For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which
+action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34110] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inquisitio consilii procedat in
+infinitum. Consilium enim est inquisitio de particularibus, in
+quibus est operatio. Sed singularia sunt infinita. Ergo inquisitio
+consilii est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human
+action can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason. Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles
+can go on indefinitely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34111] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sub inquisitione consilii cadit considerare non solum quid agendum
+sit, sed etiam quomodo impedimenta tollantur. Sed quaelibet humana
+actio potest impediri, et impedimentum tolli potest per aliquam
+rationem humanam. Ergo in infinitum remanet quaerere de
+impedimentis tollendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are self-evident,
+which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and uncertain.
+Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34112] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+inquisitio scientiae demonstrativae non procedit in infinitum, quia
+est devenire in aliqua principia per se nota, quae omnimodam
+certitudinem habent. Sed talis certitudo non potest inveniri in
+singularibus contingentibus, quae sunt variabilia et incerta. Ergo
+inquisitio consilii procedit in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the infinite.
+If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34113] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> <i>Sed
+contra, nullus movetur ad id ad quod impossibile est quod
+perveniat</i>, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed infinitum impossibile
+est transire. Si igitur inquisitio consilii sit infinita, nullus
+consiliari inciperet. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold
+principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining
+to operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q14_A2" id="FS_Q14_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. The other principle is taken from another genus, so to speak;
+thus in demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring into them. Now these
+principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses---for instance,
+that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements known either through speculative or through practical science;
+for instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel
+makes
+no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in the light
+of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done
+first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel
+from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by
+means
+of counsel.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="34114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34114] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod inquisitio consilii est finita in actu ex duplici
+parte, scilicet ex parte principii, et ex parte termini. Accipitur
+enim in inquisitione consilii duplex principium. Unum proprium, ex
+ipso genere operabilium, et hoc est finis, de quo non est
+consilium, sed supponitur in consilio ut principium, ut dictum est.
+Aliud quasi ex alio genere assumptum sicut et in scientiis
+demonstrativis una scientia supponit aliqua ab alia, de quibus non
+inquirit. Huiusmodi autem principia quae in inquisitione consilii
+supponuntur, sunt quaecumque sunt per sensum accepta, utpote quod
+hoc sit panis vel ferrum; et quaecumque sunt per aliquam scientiam
+speculativam vel practicam in universali cognita, sicut quod
+moechari est a Deo prohibitum, et quod homo non potest vivere nisi
+nutriatur nutrimento convenienti. Et de istis non inquirit
+consiliator. Terminus autem inquisitionis est id quod statim est in
+potestate nostra ut faciamus. Sicut enim finis habet rationem
+principii, ita id quod agitur propter finem, habet rationem
+conclusionis. Unde id quod primo agendum occurrit, habet rationem
+ultimae conclusionis, ad quam inquisitio terminatur. Nihil autem
+prohibet consilium potentia infinitum esse, secundum quod in
+infinitum possunt aliqua occurrere consilio inquirenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34115] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod singularia non sunt infinita actu, sed in
+potentia tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take
+counsel about removing the obstacle.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34116] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, licet humana actio possit impediri, non tamen semper
+habet impedimentum paratum. Et ideo non semper oportet consiliari
+de impedimento tollendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In contingent singulars, something may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it
+concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long
+as he continues to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34117] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in singularibus contingentibus potest aliquid accipi
+certum, etsi non simpliciter, tamen ut nunc, prout assumitur in
+operatione. Socratem enim sedere non est necessarium, sed eum
+sedere, dum sedet, est necessarium. Et hoc per certitudinem accipi
+potest.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q15" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q15-p0.1">Q. 15. OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q15-p2"> We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q15-p3"><a href="#FS_Q15_A1"> (1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q15-p4"><a href="#FS_Q15_A2"> (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q15-p5"><a href="#FS_Q15_A3"> (3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?</a></p><p id="FS_Q15-p6"><a href="#FS_Q15_A4"> (4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 pr."><a name="34118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34118]
+Iª-IIae q. 15 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+consensu. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum consensus
+sit actus appetitivae, vel apprehensivae virtutis. Secundo, utrum
+conveniat brutis animalibus. Tertio, utrum sit de fine, vel de his
+quae sunt ad finem. Quarto, utrum consensus in actum pertineat
+solum ad superiorem animae partem.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q15_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q15_A1-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 1. Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent
+to the higher reason. But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34119] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consentire pertineat solum ad partem
+animae apprehensivam. Augustinus enim, XII de Trin., consensum
+attribuit superiori rationi. Sed ratio nominat apprehensivam
+virtutem. Ergo consentire pertinet ad apprehensivam virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent is "co-sense." But sense is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34120] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+consentire est simul sentire. Sed sentire est apprehensivae
+potentiae. Ergo et consentire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect,
+which is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34121] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut assentire dicit applicationem intellectus ad aliquid, ita et
+consentire. Sed assentire pertinet ad intellectum, qui est vis
+apprehensiva. Ergo et consentire ad vim apprehensivam pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no sentence,"
+i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore consent does also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34122] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod <i>si aliquis iudicet,
+et non diligat, non est sententia</i>, idest consensus. Sed
+diligere ad appetitivam virtutem pertinet. Ergo et consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies application of sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the
+imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness;
+while the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or
+absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing
+itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude,
+the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes
+complacency in it. Hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q15_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.1" target="asv">Wis. 1:1</a>): "Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness." And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 co."><a name="34123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34123] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod consentire importat applicationem sensus ad aliquid.
+Est autem proprium sensus quod cognoscitivus est rerum praesentium,
+vis enim imaginativa est apprehensiva similitudinum corporalium,
+etiam rebus absentibus quarum sunt similitudines; intellectus autem
+apprehensivus est universalium rationum, quas potest apprehendere
+indifferenter et praesentibus et absentibus singularibus. Et quia
+actus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio ad rem ipsam,
+secundum quandam similitudinem ipsa applicatio appetitivae virtutis
+ad rem, secundum quod ei inhaeret, accipit nomen sensus, quasi
+experientiam quandam sumens de re cui inhaeret, inquantum complacet
+sibi in ea. Unde et Sap. I, dicitur, <i>sentite de domino in
+bonitate</i>. Et secundum hoc, consentire est actus appetitivae
+virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in De Anima iii, 9, "the will is in the reason." Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes
+reason as including the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34124] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, voluntas in
+ratione est. Unde cum Augustinus attribuit consensum rationi,
+accipit rationem secundum quod in ea includitur voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking
+acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34125] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum, quod sentire proprie dictum ad apprehensivam potentiam
+pertinet, sed secundum similitudinem cuiusdam experientiae,
+pertinet ad appetitivam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Assentire" [to assent] is, to speak, "ad aliud sentire" [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain distance
+from that to which assent is given. But "consentire" [to consent] is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the
+object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas
+the intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but
+rather the reverse, as we have stated in the
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A1" id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[16], A[1]</a>;
+<a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[27], A[4]</a>;
+<a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A2" id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[59], A[2]</a>, is more properly said to assent: although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin rather than in English.].
+We may also say that the intellect assents, in so far as it is moved by the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34126] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod assentire est quasi ad aliud sentire, et sic importat
+quandam distantiam ad id cui assentitur. Sed consentire est simul
+sentire, et sic importat quandam coniunctionem ad id cui
+consentitur. Et ideo voluntas, cuius est tendere ad ipsam rem,
+magis proprie dicitur consentire, intellectus autem, cuius operatio
+non est secundum motum ad rem, sed potius e converso, ut in primo
+dictum est, magis proprie dicitur assentire, quamvis unum pro alio
+poni soleat. Potest etiam dici quod intellectus assentit, inquantum
+a voluntate movetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q15_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q15_A2-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 2. Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one
+thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational
+animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34127] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus conveniat brutis animalibus.
+Consensus enim importat determinationem appetitus ad unum. Sed
+appetitus brutorum animalium sunt determinati ad unum. Ergo
+consensus in brutis animalibus invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there
+were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act accomplished; which is clearly false.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34128] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+remoto priori, removetur posterius. Sed consensus praecedit operis
+executionem. Si ergo in brutis non esset consensus, non esset in
+eis operis executio. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational
+animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34129] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+homines interdum consentire dicuntur in aliquid agendum ex aliqua
+passione, puta concupiscentia vel ira. Sed bruta animalia ex
+passione agunt. Ergo in eis est consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and
+this is called the sentence," i.e. consent. But counsel is not in irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34130] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Damascenus dicit quod <i>post iudicium, homo disponit et
+amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est, quod vocatur sententia</i>,
+idest consensus. Sed consilium non est in brutis animalibus. Ergo
+nec consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of the
+appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to
+the subject in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an action suitable to a stick, but to apply
+the stick so that it touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick.
+But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for this is in them through natural instinct. Hence
+in the irrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not apply that movement to some particular
+thing. And hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to the rational nature,
+which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 co."><a name="34131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34131] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod consensus, proprie loquendo, non est in brutis
+animalibus. Cuius ratio est quia consensus importat applicationem
+appetitivi motus ad aliquid agendum. Eius autem est applicare
+appetitivum motum ad aliquid agendum, in cuius potestate est
+appetitivus motus, sicut tangere lapidem convenit quidem baculo,
+sed applicare baculum ad tactum lapidis, est eius qui habet in
+potestate movere baculum. Bruta autem animalia non habent in sui
+potestate appetitivum motum, sed talis motus in eis est ex
+instinctu naturae. Unde brutum animal appetit quidem, sed non
+applicat appetitivum motum ad aliquid. Et propter hoc non proprie
+dicitur consentire, sed solum rationalis natura, quae habet in
+potestate sua appetitivum motum, et potest ipsum applicare vel non
+applicare ad hoc vel ad illud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies
+a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34132] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod in brutis animalibus invenitur determinatio
+appetitus ad aliquid passive tantum. Consensus vero importat
+determinationem appetitus non solum passivam, sed magis
+activam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the first be removed, then what follows is removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if
+something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is
+the effect of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen water is hardened by the cold), then by
+removing heat it does not follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an
+act follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34133] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, remoto priori, removetur posterius quod proprie ex
+eo tantum sequitur. Si autem aliquid ex pluribus sequi possit, non
+propter hoc posterius removetur, uno priorum remoto, sicut si
+induratio possit fieri et a calido et frigido (nam lateres
+indurantur ab igne, et aqua congelata induratur ex frigore), non
+oportet quod, remoto calore, removeatur induratio. Executio autem
+operis non solum sequitur ex consensu, sed etiam ex impetuoso
+appetitu, qualis est in brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence
+the comparison fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34134] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod homines qui ex passione agunt, possunt passionem non
+sequi. Non autem bruta animalia. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q15_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q15_A3-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 3. Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But
+it is on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still more do we consent to the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34135] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus sit de fine. Quia propter
+quod unumquodque, illud magis. Sed his quae sunt ad finem
+consentimus propter finem. Ergo fini consentimus magis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man
+consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34136] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+actio intemperati est finis eius, sicut et actio virtuosi est finis
+eius. Sed intemperatus consentit in proprium actum. Ergo consensus
+potest esse de fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q15_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false
+by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes
+the choice." Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34137] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, est electio, ut supra dictum
+est. Si igitur consensus esset solum de his quae sunt ad finem, in
+nullo ab electione differre videretur. Quod patet esse falsum per
+Damascenum, qui dicit quod post dispositionem, quam vocaverat
+sententiam, fit electio. Non ergo consensus est solum de his quae
+sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the "sentence," i.e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and embraces
+the judgment of his counsel." But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the same applies to consent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34138] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Damascenus ibidem dicit, quod <i>sententia, sive
+consensus, est quando homo disponit et amat quod ex consilio
+iudicatum est</i>. Sed consilium non est nisi de his quae sunt ad
+finem. Ergo nec consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.
+Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel
+about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end naturally: wherefore the application
+of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but
+of simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration after the last end, in so far as they are directed
+to the end, they come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive movement is applied
+to the judgment resulting from counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to counsel: rather is counsel
+applied to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means presupposes the
+decision of counsel. And therefore the application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly speaking.
+Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 co."><a name="34139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34139] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad
+aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis in ordine autem
+agibilium, primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde
+appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde
+appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Appetitus autem in ultimum
+finem tendit naturaliter, unde et applicatio motus appetitivi in
+finem apprehensum, non habet rationem consensus, sed simplicis
+voluntatis. De his autem quae sunt post ultimum finem, inquantum
+sunt ad finem, sub consilio cadunt, et sic potest esse de eis
+consensus, inquantum motus appetitivus applicatur ad id quod ex
+consilio iudicatum est. Motus vero appetitivus in finem, non
+applicatur consilio, sed magis consilium ipsi, quia consilium
+praesupponit appetitum finis. Sed appetitus eorum quae sunt ad
+finem, praesupponit determinationem consilii. Et ideo applicatio
+appetitivi motus ad determinationem consilii, proprie est
+consensus. Unde, cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad
+finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt
+ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science,
+but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our
+act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34140] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut conclusiones scimus per principia, horum
+tamen non est scientia, sed quod maius est, scilicet intellectus;
+ita consentimus his quae sunt ad finem propter finem, cuius tamen
+non est consensus, sed quod maius est, scilicet voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he consents
+to that act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34141] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intemperatus habet pro fine delectationem operis,
+propter quam consentit in opus, magis quam ipsam operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred:
+and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been
+found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving
+of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one
+meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we
+call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet
+with our approval.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34142] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod electio addit supra consensum quandam relationem
+respectu eius cui aliquid praeeligitur, et ideo post consensum,
+adhuc remanet electio. Potest enim contingere quod per consilium
+inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet placet,
+in quodlibet eorum consentitur, sed ex multis quae placent,
+praeaccipimus unum eligendo. Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod
+placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum,
+ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placet ad agendum; electio
+autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q15_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q15_A4-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 4. Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects
+it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*oion tois akmaiois he hora}--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x,
+4). But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act
+does not belong only to the higher reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34143] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus ad agendum non semper
+pertineat ad superiorem rationem. <i>Delectatio enim consequitur
+operationem, et perficit eam, sicut decor iuventutem</i>, sicut
+dicitur in X Ethic. Sed consensus in delectationem pertinet ad
+inferiorem rationem, ut dicit Augustinus in XII de Trin. Ergo
+consensus in actum non pertinet ad solam superiorem rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore
+the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34144] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+actio in quam consentimus, dicitur esse voluntaria. Sed multarum
+potentiarum est producere actiones voluntarias. Ergo non sola
+superior ratio consentit in actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine
+says (De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even on account of
+some passion of the soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34145] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+superior ratio intendit aeternis inspiciendis ac consulendis, ut
+Augustinus dicit in XII de Trin. Sed multoties homo consentit in
+actum non propter rationes aeternas, sed propter aliquas rationes
+temporales, vel etiam propter aliquas animae passiones. Non ergo
+consentire in actum pertinet ad solam superiorem rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty
+which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its
+slave."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34146] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>non potest peccatum
+efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio
+penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere
+cohibendi, malae actioni cedat et serviat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long
+as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs
+to the higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining
+to human principles we judge according to Divine principles, which is the function of
+the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles, no judgment
+of the reason can be considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent
+to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason includes the
+will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 co."><a name="34147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34147] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod finalis sententia semper pertinet ad eum qui superior
+est, ad quem pertinet de aliis iudicare, quandiu enim iudicandum
+restat quod proponitur, nondum datur finalis sententia. Manifestum
+est autem quod superior ratio est quae habet de omnibus iudicare,
+quia de sensibilibus per rationem iudicamus; de his vero quae ad
+rationes humanas pertinent, iudicamus secundum rationes divinas,
+quae pertinent ad rationem superiorem. Et ideo quandiu incertum est
+an secundum rationes divinas resistatur vel non, nullum iudicium
+rationis habet rationem finalis sententiae. Finalis autem sententia
+de agendis est consensus in actum. Et ideo consensus in actum
+pertinet ad rationem superiorem, secundum tamen quod in ratione
+voluntas includitur, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight
+in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises
+judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action; and in like manner on the delight that results.
+But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further
+act, it belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does
+the end to which it is ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the master or principal art.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34148] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod consensus in delectationem operis pertinet ad
+superiorem rationem, sicut et consensus in opus, sed consensus in
+delectationem cogitationis, pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, sicut
+ad ipsam pertinet cogitare. Et tamen de hoc ipso quod est cogitare
+vel non cogitare, inquantum consideratur ut actio quaedam, habet
+iudicium superior ratio, et similiter de delectatione consequente.
+Sed inquantum accipitur ut ad actionem aliam ordinatum, sic
+pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Quod enim ad aliud ordinatur, ad
+inferiorem artem vel potentiam pertinet quam finis ad quem
+ordinatur, unde ars quae est de fine, architectonica, seu
+principalis, vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each
+power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34149] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quia actiones dicuntur voluntariae ex hoc quod eis
+consentimus, non oportet quod consensus sit cuiuslibet potentiae,
+sed voluntatis, a qua dicitur voluntarium; quae est in ratione,
+sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also
+because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34150] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio superior dicitur consentire, non solum quia
+secundum rationes aeternas semper moveat ad agendum; sed etiam quia
+secundum rationes aeternas non dissentit.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q16" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q16-p0.1">Q. 16. OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q16-p2"> We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q16-p3"><a href="#FS_Q16_A1"> (1) Whether use is an act of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q16-p4"><a href="#FS_Q16_A2"> (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q16-p5"><a href="#FS_Q16_A3"> (3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?</a></p><p id="FS_Q16-p6"><a href="#FS_Q16_A4"> (4) Of the relation of use to choice.</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 pr."><a name="34151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34151]
+Iª-IIae q. 16 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de usu.
+Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum uti sit actus
+voluntatis. Secundo, utrum conveniat brutis animalibus. Tertio,
+utrum sit tantum eorum quae sunt ad finem, vel etiam finis. Quarto,
+de ordine usus ad electionem.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q16_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q16_A1-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 1. Whether use is an act of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that "to use is to refer that
+which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else." But "to refer" something to another is an act of the reason
+to which it belongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason and not of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34152] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod uti non sit actus voluntatis. Dicit
+enim Augustinus, in I de Doctr. Christ., quod <i>uti est id quod in
+usum venerit, ad aliud obtinendum referre</i>. Sed referre aliquid
+ad aliud est rationis, cuius est conferre et ordinare. Ergo uti est
+actus rationis. Non ergo voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man "goes forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then
+he makes use (of the powers) and this is called use." But operation belongs to the executive power; and the act of the will
+does not follow the act of the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last. Therefore use is not an act of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34153] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Damascenus dicit quod <i>homo impetum facit ad operationem, et
+dicitur impetus, deinde utitur, et dicitur usus</i>. Sed operatio
+pertinet ad potentiam executivam. Actus autem voluntatis non
+sequitur actum executivae potentiae, sed executio est ultimum. Ergo
+usus non est actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "All things that were made were made for man's use, because reason with which man
+is endowed uses all things by its judgment of them." But judgment of things created by God belongs to the speculative reason;
+which seems to be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle of human acts. Therefore use is not an act of
+the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34154] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnia quae
+facta sunt, in usum hominis facta sunt, quia omnibus utitur
+iudicando ratio quae hominibus data est</i>. Sed iudicare de rebus
+a Deo creatis pertinet ad rationem speculativam; quae omnino
+separata videtur a voluntate, quae est principium humanorum actuum.
+Ergo uti non est actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "To use is to apply to something to purpose of the will."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34155] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>uti est assumere
+aliquid in facultatem voluntatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The use of a thing implies the application of that thing to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is
+called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not
+only the interior principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the body; as the intellect, to understand;
+and the eye, to see; but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident
+that we do not apply external things to an operation save through the interior principles which are either the powers of the
+soul, or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q16_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>) that it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation. Hence it is evident
+that first and principally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to
+the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the instruments
+are compared to the principal agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as
+building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 co."><a name="34156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34156] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod usus rei alicuius importat applicationem rei illius
+ad aliquam operationem, unde et operatio ad quam applicamus rem
+aliquam, dicitur usus eius; sicut equitare est usus equi, et
+percutere est usus baculi. Ad operationem autem applicamus et
+principia interiora agendi, scilicet ipsas potentias animae vel
+membra corporis, ut intellectum ad intelligendum, et oculum ad
+videndum; et etiam res exteriores, sicut baculum ad percutiendum.
+Sed manifestum est quod res exteriores non applicamus ad aliquam
+operationem nisi per principia intrinseca, quae sunt potentiae
+animae, aut habitus potentiarum, aut organa, quae sunt corporis
+membra. Ostensum est autem supra quod voluntas est quae movet
+potentias animae ad suos actus; et hoc est applicare eas ad
+operationem. Unde manifestum est quod uti primo et principaliter
+est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis; rationis autem tanquam
+dirigentis; sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium, quae
+comparantur ad voluntatem, a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut
+instrumenta ad principale agens. Actio autem proprie non
+attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut aedificatio
+aedificatori, non autem instrumentis. Unde manifestum est quod uti
+proprie est actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else.
+And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34157] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio quidem in aliud refert, sed voluntas
+tendit in id quod est in aliud relatum per rationem. Et secundum
+hoc dicitur quod uti est referre aliquid in alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the executive powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34158] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Damascenus loquitur de usu, secundum quod pertinet ad
+executivas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason
+is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34159] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod etiam ipsa ratio speculativa applicatur ad opus
+intelligendi vel iudicandi, a voluntate. Et ideo intellectus
+speculativus uti dicitur tanquam a voluntate motus, sicut aliae
+executivae potentiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q16_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q16_A2-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 2. Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine
+says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found
+in irrational animals, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q11_A2" id="FS_Q16_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[11], A[2]</a>). Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to use.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34160] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod uti conveniat brutis animalibus. Frui
+enim est nobilius quam uti, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in X de
+Trin., <i>utimur eis quae ad aliud referimus, quo fruendum est</i>.
+Sed frui convenit brutis animalibus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
+multo magis convenit eis uti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance,
+their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for irrational animals to use.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34161] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+applicare membra ad agendum est uti membris. Sed bruta animalia
+applicant membra ad aliquid agendum; sicut pedes ad ambulandum,
+cornua ad percutiendum. Ergo brutis animalibus convenit uti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p4">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational animal can make use of a thing."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34162] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>uti
+aliqua re non potest nisi animal quod rationis est
+particeps</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p5">
+<b>I answer that,</b> as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q16_A1" id="FS_Q16_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, to use is to apply an active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement to the desire of something,
+as stated above (Q[15], AA[1],2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this
+belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none but a
+rational animal consents and uses.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 co."><a name="34163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34163] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, uti est applicare aliquod
+principium actionis ad actionem, sicut consentire est applicare
+motum appetitivum ad aliquid appetendum, ut dictum est. Applicare
+autem aliquid ad alterum non est nisi eius quod habet arbitrium
+super illud, quod non est nisi eius qui scit referre aliquid in
+alterum, quod ad rationem pertinet. Et ideo solum animal rationale
+et consentit, et utitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p6">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite
+to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment
+is better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to
+something else. But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that
+precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct one thing to another is an act of reason;
+whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34164] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in
+appetibile, sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine
+ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad obiecta, sic
+frui est nobilius quam uti, quia id quod est absolute appetibile,
+est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud.
+Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam praecedentem, maior
+nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus, quia ordinare aliquid in
+alterum est rationis; absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest
+etiam sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Animals by means of their members do something from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members to
+these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their members to action, nor do they use them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34165] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod animalia per sua membra aliquid agunt instinctu
+naturae, non per hoc quod cognoscant ordinem membrorum ad illas
+operationes. Unde non dicuntur proprie applicare membra ad agendum,
+nec uti membris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q16_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q16_A3-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 3. Whether use regards also the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses." But man
+enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34166] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus possit esse etiam ultimi finis.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, in X de Trin., <i>omnis qui fruitur,
+utitur</i>. Sed ultimo fine fruitur aliquis. Ergo ultimo fine
+aliquis utitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose of the will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything
+else, is the object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object of use.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34167] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a>
+<i>Praeterea, uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem
+voluntatis</i>, ut ibidem dicitur. Sed nihil magis assumitur a
+voluntate quam ultimus finis. Ergo usus potest esse ultimi
+finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "Eternity is in the Father, Likeness in the Image," i.e. in the Son, "Use in the
+Gift," i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end. Therefore the last end can be the object
+of use.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34168] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Hilarius dicit, in II de Trin., quod aeternitas est in patre,
+species in imagine, idest in filio, usus in munere, idest in
+spiritu sancto. Sed spiritus sanctus, cum sit Deus, est ultimus
+finis. Ergo ultimo fine contingit uti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him." But God alone is the last end. Therefore
+we cannot use the last end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34169] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>Deo
+nullus recte utitur, sed fruitur</i>. Sed solus Deus est ultimus
+finis. Ergo ultimo fine non est utendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q16_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Use, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q16_A1" id="FS_Q16_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, implies the application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to another is regarded in the light of means
+to an end; and consequently use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said
+to be "useful"; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes called use.
+</p><p id="FS_Q16_A3-p7"> It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual.
+For since the end, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus the miser's end is
+either money or the possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the
+possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual, the obtaining of
+money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for money, save that he might have it. Therefore, simply and properly
+speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said
+to use it.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 co."><a name="34170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34170] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod uti, sicut dictum est, importat applicationem
+alicuius ad aliquid. Quod autem applicatur ad aliud, se habet in
+ratione eius quod est ad finem. Et ideo uti semper est eius quod
+est ad finem. Propter quod et ea quae sunt ad finem accommoda,
+utilia dicuntur; et ipsa utilitas interdum usus nominatur. Sed
+considerandum est quod ultimus finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo,
+simpliciter; et alio modo, quoad aliquem. Cum enim finis, ut supra
+dictum est, dicatur quandoque quidem res, quandoque autem adeptio
+rei vel possessio eius, sicut avaro finis est vel pecunia vel
+possessio pecuniae; manifestum est quod, simpliciter loquendo,
+ultimus finis est ipsa res, non enim possessio pecuniae est bona,
+nisi propter bonum pecuniae. Sed quoad hunc, adeptio pecuniae est
+finis ultimus, non enim quaereret pecuniam avarus, nisi ut haberet
+eam. Ergo, simpliciter loquendo et proprie, pecunia homo aliquis
+fruitur, quia in ea ultimum finem constituit, sed inquantum refert
+eam ad possessionem, dicitur uti ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks
+in that end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34171] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de usu communiter, secundum
+quod importat ordinem finis ad ipsam finis fruitionem, quam aliquis
+quaerit de fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which
+is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only
+in being used as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34172] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod finis assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, ut voluntas
+in illo quiescat. Unde ipsa requies in fine, quae fruitio est,
+dicitur hoc modo usus finis. Sed id quod est ad finem, assumitur in
+facultatem voluntatis non solum in ordine ad usum eius quod est ad
+finem, sed in ordine ad aliam rem, in qua voluntas quiescit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be
+said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love,
+delight, felicity, or happiness, is called use by him."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34173] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod usus accipitur in verbis Hilarii pro quiete in ultimo
+fine, eo modo quo aliquis, communiter loquendo, dicitur uti fine ad
+obtinendum ipsum, sicut dictum est. Unde Augustinus, in VI de
+Trin., dicit quod <i>illa dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel
+beatitudo usus ab eo appellatur</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q16_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q16_A4-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 4. Whether use precedes choice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to
+the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34174] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus praecedat electionem. Post
+electionem enim nihil sequitur nisi executio. Sed usus, cum
+pertineat ad voluntatem, praecedit executionem. Ergo praecedit
+etiam electionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two
+relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it
+is preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34175] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+absolutum est ante relatum. Ergo minus relatum est ante magis
+relatum. Sed electio importat duas relationes, unam eius quod
+eligitur ad finem, aliam vero ad id cui praeeligitur, usus autem
+importat solam relationem ad finem. Ergo usus est prior
+electione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q16_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[3]</a>). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent.
+But consent precedes choice as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q15_A3" id="FS_Q16_A4-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[15], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Therefore use does also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34176] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas utitur aliis potentiis inquantum movet eas. Sed voluntas
+movet etiam seipsam ut dictum est. Ergo etiam utitur seipsa,
+applicando se ad agendum. Sed hoc facit cum consentit. Ergo in ipso
+consensu est usus. Sed consensus praecedit electionem ut dictum
+est. Ergo et usus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses
+(the powers)." Therefore use follows choice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34177] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>voluntas post electionem impetum
+facit ad operationem, et postea utitur</i>. Ergo usus sequitur
+electionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q16_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed. One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing subject,
+by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed. Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain
+end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends
+to perfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have
+the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. This is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.
+</p><p id="FS_Q16_A4-p7"> Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the last act that belongs to the first relation of the
+will to the means, is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing the means fully. Use, on the other
+hand, belongs to the second relation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed. Wherefore
+it is evident that use follows choice; provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in
+moving it. But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting
+in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 co."><a name="34178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34178] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod voluntas duplicem habitudinem habet ad volitum. Unam
+quidem, secundum quod volitum est quodammodo in volente, per
+quandam proportionem vel ordinem ad volitum. Unde et res quae
+naturaliter sunt proportionatae ad aliquem finem, dicuntur appetere
+illum naturaliter. Sed sic habere finem, est imperfecte habere
+ipsum. Omne autem imperfectum tendit in perfectionem. Et ideo tam
+appetitus naturalis, quam voluntarius, tendit ut habeat ipsum finem
+realiter, quod est perfecte habere ipsum. Et haec est secunda
+habitudo voluntatis ad volitum. Volitum autem non solum est finis,
+sed id quod est ad finem. Ultimum autem quod pertinet ad primam
+habitudinem voluntatis, respectu eius quod est ad finem, est
+electio, ibi enim completur proportio voluntatis, ut complete velit
+id quod est ad finem. Sed usus iam pertinet ad secundam habitudinem
+voluntatis, qua tendit ad consequendum rem volitam. Unde manifestum
+est quod usus sequitur electionem, si tamen accipiatur usus,
+secundum quod voluntas utitur executiva potentia movendo ipsam. Sed
+quia voluntas etiam quodammodo rationem movet, et utitur ea, potest
+intelligi usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in
+consideratione rationis referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus
+praecedit electionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The motion of the will to the execution of the work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs to
+that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34179] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ipsam executionem operis praecedit motio qua
+voluntas movet ad exequendum, sequitur autem electionem. Et sic,
+cum usus pertineat ad praedictam motionem voluntatis, medium est
+inter electionem et executionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is essentially relative is after the absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come after. Indeed,
+the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has relation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34180] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod id quod est per essentiam suam relatum, posterius est
+absoluto, sed id cui attribuuntur relationes, non oportet quod sit
+posterius. Immo quanto causa est prior, tanto habet relationem ad
+plures effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice
+of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice
+and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing.
+And such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34181] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod electio praecedit usum, si referantur ad idem. Nihil
+autem prohibet quod usus unius praecedat electionem alterius. Et
+quia actus voluntatis reflectuntur supra seipsos, in quolibet actu
+voluntatis potest accipi et consensus, et electio, et usus, ut si
+dicatur quod voluntas consentit se eligere, et consentit se
+consentire, et utitur se ad consentiendum et eligendum. Et semper
+isti actus ordinati ad id quod est prius, sunt priores.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q17" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q17-p0.1">Q. 17. OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q17-p2"> We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q17-p3"><a href="#FS_Q17_A1"> (1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p4"><a href="#FS_Q17_A2"> (2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p5"><a href="#FS_Q17_A3"> (3) Of the order between command and use</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p6"><a href="#FS_Q17_A4"> (4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p7"><a href="#FS_Q17_A5"> (5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p8"><a href="#FS_Q17_A6"> (6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p9"><a href="#FS_Q17_A7"> (7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p10"><a href="#FS_Q17_A8"> (8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p11"><a href="#FS_Q17_A9"> (9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 pr."><a name="34182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34182]
+Iª-IIae q. 17 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+actibus imperatis a voluntate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem.
+Primo, utrum imperare sit actus voluntatis, vel rationis. Secundo,
+utrum imperare pertineat ad bruta animalia. Tertio, de ordine
+imperii ad usum. Quarto, utrum imperium et actus imperatus sint
+unus actus, vel diversi. Quinto, utrum actus voluntatis imperetur.
+Sexto, utrum actus rationis. Septimo, utrum actus appetitus
+sensitivi. Octavo, utrum actus animae vegetabilis. Nono, utrum
+actus exteriorum membrorum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q17_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A1-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 1. Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna
+says that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs
+to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q17_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore command is an act of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34183] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod imperare non sit actus rationis, sed
+voluntatis. Imperare enim est movere quoddam, dicit enim Avicenna
+quod quadruplex est movens, scilicet perficiens, disponens,
+imperans et consilians. Sed ad voluntatem pertinet movere omnes
+alias vires animae, ut dictum est supra. Ergo imperare est actus
+voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most
+free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs to the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34184] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut imperari pertinet ad id quod est subiectum, ita imperare
+pertinere videtur ad id quod est maxime liberum. Sed radix
+libertatis est maxime in voluntate. Ergo voluntatis est
+imperare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges
+that a thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34185] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad imperium statim sequitur actus. Sed ad actum rationis non statim
+sequitur actus, non enim qui iudicat aliquid esse faciendum, statim
+illud operatur. Ergo imperare non est actus rationis, sed
+voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys reason."
+Therefore command is an act of the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34186] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, et etiam philosophus quod
+appetitivum obedit rationi. Ergo rationis est imperare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q17_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since
+the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing,
+and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since
+the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes
+that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in
+reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something
+of an act of the will.
+</p><p id="FS_Q17_A1-p7"> Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way
+of intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate
+or declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as
+when one person says to another: "This is what you should do." Sometimes, however, the reason intimates
+something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is
+said to someone: "Do this." Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated
+above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q17_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that the
+reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows
+that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves
+(the power) to the execution of the act.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 co."><a name="34187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34187] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod imperare est actus rationis, praesupposito tamen actu
+voluntatis. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, quia actus
+voluntatis et rationis supra se invicem possunt ferri, prout
+scilicet ratio ratiocinatur de volendo, et voluntas vult
+ratiocinari; contingit actum voluntatis praeveniri ab actu
+rationis, et e converso. Et quia virtus prioris actus remanet in
+actu sequenti, contingit quandoque quod est aliquis actus
+voluntatis, secundum quod manet virtute in ipso aliquid de actu
+rationis, ut dictum est de usu et de electione; et e converso
+aliquis est actus rationis, secundum quod virtute manet in ipso
+aliquid de actu voluntatis. Imperare autem est quidem essentialiter
+actus rationis, imperans enim ordinat eum cui imperat, ad aliquid
+agendum, intimando vel denuntiando; sic autem ordinare per modum
+cuiusdam intimationis, est rationis. Sed ratio potest aliquid
+intimare vel denuntiare dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute, quae quidem
+intimatio exprimitur per verbum indicativi modi; sicut si aliquis
+alicui dicat, hoc est tibi faciendum. Aliquando autem ratio intimat
+aliquid alicui, movendo ipsum ad hoc, et talis intimatio exprimitur
+per verbum imperativi modi; puta cum alicui dicitur, fac hoc.
+Primum autem movens in viribus animae ad exercitium actus, est
+voluntas, ut supra dictum est. Cum ergo secundum movens non moveat
+nisi in virtute primi moventis, sequitur quod hoc ipsum quod ratio
+movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis. Unde relinquitur
+quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupposito actu voluntatis, in
+cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34188] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod imperare non est movere quocumque modo, sed cum
+quadam intimatione denuntiativa ad alterum. Quod est rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards
+various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will
+as being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is the root of liberty.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34189] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum, sed
+sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad
+diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni.
+Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de
+ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34190] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod imperium non sit actus
+rationis absolute, sed cum quadam motione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A2-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 2. Whether command belongs to irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement
+is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals.
+Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34191] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod imperare conveniat brutis animalibus.
+Quia secundum Avicennam, <i>virtus imperans motum est appetitiva,
+et virtus exequens motum est in musculis et in nervis</i>. Sed
+utraque virtus est in brutis animalibus. Ergo imperium invenitur in
+brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to
+his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals,
+since they are composed of soul and body.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34192] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+de ratione servi est quod ei imperetur. Sed corpus comparatur ad
+animam sicut servus ad dominum, sicut dicit philosophus in I Polit.
+Ergo corpori imperatur ab anima, etiam in brutis, quae sunt
+composita ex anima et corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals,
+as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34193] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+per imperium homo facit impetum ad opus. Sed impetus in opus
+invenitur in brutis animalibus, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo in brutis
+animalibus invenitur imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Command is an act of reason, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, is there command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34194] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+imperium est actus rationis, ut dictum est. Sed in brutis non est
+ratio. Ergo neque imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the
+proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational animals should command in any way, since they are devoid
+of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 co."><a name="34195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34195] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod imperare nihil aliud est quam ordinare aliquem ad
+aliquid agendum, cum quadam intimativa motione. Ordinare autem est
+proprius actus rationis. Unde impossibile est quod in brutis
+animalibus, in quibus non est ratio, sit aliquo modo imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In
+irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for
+motion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34196] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur imperare motum, inquantum
+movet rationem imperantem. Sed hoc est solum in hominibus. In
+brutis autem animalibus virtus appetitiva non est proprie
+imperativa, nisi imperativum sumatur large pro motivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent
+to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34197] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in brutis animalibus corpus quidem habet unde
+obediat, sed anima non habet unde imperet, quia non habet unde
+ordinet. Et ideo non est ibi ratio imperantis et imperati; sed
+solum moventis et moti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the directing
+reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural
+instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to
+avoid. Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not
+direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34198] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aliter invenitur impetus ad opus in brutis
+animalibus, et aliter in hominibus. Homines enim faciunt impetum ad
+opus per ordinationem rationis, unde habet in eis impetus rationem
+imperii. In brutis autem fit impetus ad opus per instinctum
+naturae, quia scilicet appetitus eorum statim apprehenso
+convenienti vel inconvenienti, naturaliter movetur ad prosecutionem
+vel fugam. Unde ordinantur ab alio ad agendum, non autem ipsa
+seipsa ordinant ad actionem. Et ideo in eis est impetus, sed non
+imperium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A3-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 3. Whether use precedes command?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But, as we have already shown (Q[16], A[1]), use is an act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34199] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus praecedat imperium. Imperium enim
+est actus rationis praesupponens actum voluntatis, ut supra dictum
+est. Sed usus est actus voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo usus
+praecedit imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the
+end. Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34200] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+imperium est aliquid eorum quae ad finem ordinantur. Eorum autem
+quae sunt ad finem, est usus. Ergo videtur quod usus sit prius quam
+imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q[16],
+A[1]). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34201] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis actus potentiae motae a voluntate, usus dicitur, quia
+voluntas utitur aliis potentiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed imperium
+est actus rationis prout mota est a voluntate, sicut dictum est.
+Ergo imperium est quidam usus. Commune autem est prius proprio.
+Ergo usus est prius quam imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
+Therefore command precedes use.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34202] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Damascenus dicit, quod impetus ad operationem praecedit
+usum. Sed impetus ad operationem fit per imperium. Ergo imperium
+praecedit usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as
+stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q16_A4" id="FS_Q17_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[4]</a>). Wherefore still more does it precede command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as
+it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for
+one does not use a stick before doing
+something with the stick. But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given: for it
+naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident that command precedes
+use.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 co."><a name="34203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34203] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in
+ratione referente ipsum in finem, praecedit electionem, ut supra
+dictum est. Unde multo magis praecedit imperium. Sed usus eius quod
+est ad finem, secundum quod subditur potentiae executivae, sequitur
+imperium, eo quod usus utentis coniunctus est cum actu eius quo
+quis utitur; non enim utitur aliquis baculo, antequam aliquo modo
+per baculum operetur. Imperium autem non est simul cum actu eius
+cui imperatur, sed naturaliter prius est imperium quam imperio
+obediatur, et aliquando etiam est prius tempore. Unde manifestum
+est quod imperium est prius quam usus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every act of the will precedes this act of the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice;
+and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses;
+and after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins
+to use, by executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when one
+commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34204] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non omnis actus voluntatis praecedit hunc actum
+rationis qui est imperium, sed aliquis praecedit, scilicet electio;
+et aliquis sequitur, scilicet usus. Quia post determinationem
+consilii, quae est iudicium rationis, voluntas eligit; et post
+electionem, ratio imperat ei per quod agendum est quod eligitur; et
+tunc demum voluntas alicuius incipit uti, exequendo imperium
+rationis; quandoque quidem voluntas alterius, cum aliquis imperat
+alteri; quandoque autem voluntas ipsius imperantis, cum aliquis
+imperat sibi ipsi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to
+the end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes, rather than that it follows use.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34205] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut actus sunt praevii potentiis, ita obiecta
+actibus. Obiectum autem usus est id quod est ad finem. Ex hoc ergo
+quod ipsum imperium est ad finem, magis potest concludi quod
+imperium sit prius usu, quam quod sit posterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that
+this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one
+another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34206] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut actus voluntatis utentis ratione ad
+imperandum, praecedit ipsum imperium; ita etiam potest dici quod et
+istum usum voluntatis praecedit aliquod imperium rationis, eo quod
+actus harum potentiarum supra seipsos invicem reflectuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A4-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 4. Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves
+distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another; since one is the power that commands, and
+the other is the power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one with the command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34207] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus imperatus non sit unus actus cum
+ipso imperio. Diversarum enim potentiarum diversi sunt actus. Sed
+alterius potentiae est actus imperatus, et alterius ipsum imperium,
+quia alia est potentia quae imperat, et alia cui imperatur. Ergo
+non est idem actus imperatus cum imperio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever things can be separate from one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes
+the commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore
+command is a distinct act from the act commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34208] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quaecumque possunt ab invicem separari, sunt diversa, nihil enim
+separatur a seipso. Sed aliquando actus imperatus separatur ab
+imperio, praecedit enim quandoque imperium, et non sequitur actus
+imperatus. Ergo alius actus est imperium ab actu imperato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things are related to one another as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes
+the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34209] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quaecumque se habent secundum prius et posterius, sunt diversa. Sed
+imperium naturaliter praecedit actum imperatum. Ergo sunt
+diversa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no commanded
+act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34210] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, quod <i>ubi est unum propter alterum,
+ibi est unum tantum</i>. Sed actus imperatus non est nisi propter
+imperium. Ergo sunt unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q17_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one
+in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many,
+and one in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is predicated in the same way as "being." And
+substance is being simply, whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only in a
+certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus,
+in the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply: because the whole is being and
+substance simply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct in substance, and
+one according to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones
+are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species
+are many simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration
+of the reason.
+</p><p id="FS_Q17_A4-p7"> Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though
+he has many parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter
+in regard to the act of a higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it: for thus
+also the act of the first mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident
+that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 co."><a name="34211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34211] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse secundum quid multa, et
+secundum quid unum. Quinimmo omnia multa sunt secundum aliquid
+unum, ut Dionysius dicit, ult. cap. de Div. Nom. Est tamen
+differentia attendenda in hoc, quod quaedam sunt simpliciter multa,
+et secundum quid unum, quaedam vero e converso. Unum autem hoc modo
+dicitur sicut et ens. Ens autem simpliciter est substantia, sed ens
+secundum quid est accidens, vel etiam ens rationis. Et ideo
+quaecumque sunt unum secundum substantiam, sunt unum simpliciter,
+et multa secundum quid. Sicut totum in genere substantiae,
+compositum ex suis partibus vel integralibus vel essentialibus, est
+unum simpliciter, nam totum est ens et substantia simpliciter,
+partes vero sunt entia et substantiae in toto. Quae vero sunt
+diversa secundum substantiam, et unum secundum accidens, sunt
+diversa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid, sicut multi homines
+sunt unus populus, et multi lapides sunt unus acervus; quae est
+unitas compositionis, aut ordinis. Similiter etiam multa individua,
+quae sunt unum genere vel specie, sunt simpliciter multa, et
+secundum quid unum, nam esse unum genere vel specie, est esse unum
+secundum rationem. Sicut autem in genere rerum naturalium, aliquod
+totum componitur ex materia et forma, ut homo ex anima et corpore,
+qui est unum ens naturale, licet habeat multitudinem partium; ita
+etiam in actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter
+se habet ad actum superioris, inquantum inferior potentia agit in
+virtute superioris moventis ipsam, sic enim et actus moventis primi
+formaliter se habet ad actum instrumenti. Unde patet quod imperium
+et actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus, sicut quoddam totum est
+unum, sed est secundum partes multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of
+the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys.
+iii, 3).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34212] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, si essent potentiae diversae ad invicem non
+ordinatae, actus earum essent simpliciter diversi. Sed quando una
+potentia est movens alteram, tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus,
+nam idem est actus moventis et moti, ut dicitur in III Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that command and the commanded act can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts. Because
+the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet they form one whole.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34213] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ex hoc quod imperium et actus imperatus possunt ab
+invicem separari, habetur quod sunt multa partibus. Nam partes
+hominis possunt ab invicem separari, quae tamen sunt unum toto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In those things that are many in parts, but one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the soul,
+in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34214] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae sunt multa partibus et
+unum toto, unum esse prius alio. Sicut anima quodammodo est prius
+corpore, et cor est prius aliis membris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A5-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 5. Whether the act of the will is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded. For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind
+to will, and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34215] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus voluntatis non sit imperatus.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, in VIII Confess., <i>imperat animus ut velit
+animus, nec tamen facit</i>. Velle autem est actus voluntatis. Ergo
+actus voluntatis non imperatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command;
+for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34216] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ei convenit imperari, cui convenit imperium intelligere. Sed
+voluntatis non est intelligere imperium, differt enim voluntas ab
+intellectu, cuius est intelligere. Ergo actus voluntatis non
+imperatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are
+commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to
+infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible.
+Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34217] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si aliquis actus voluntatis imperatur, pari ratione omnes
+imperantur. Sed si omnes actus voluntatis imperantur, necesse est
+in infinitum procedere, quia actus voluntatis praecedit actum
+imperantis rationis, ut dictum est; qui voluntatis actus si iterum
+imperatur, illud iterum imperium praecedet alius rationis actus, et
+sic in infinitum. Hoc autem est inconveniens, quod procedatur in
+infinitum. Non ergo actus voluntatis imperatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our
+acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34218] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+omne quod est in potestate nostra, subiacet imperio nostro. Sed
+actus voluntatis sunt maxime in potestate nostra, nam omnes actus
+nostri intantum dicuntur in potestate nostra esse, inquantum
+voluntarii sunt. Ergo actus voluntatis imperantur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, command is nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident
+that the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct
+by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of the will can be commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 co."><a name="34219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34219] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, imperium nihil aliud est quam
+actus rationis ordinantis, cum quadam motione, aliquid ad agendum.
+Manifestum est autem quod ratio potest ordinare de actu voluntatis,
+sicut enim potest iudicare quod bonum sit aliquid velle, ita potest
+ordinare imperando quod homo velit. Ex quo patet quod actus
+voluntatis potest esse imperatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that sometimes
+it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that
+the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to
+command perfectly.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34220] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, animus, quando
+perfecte imperat sibi ut velit, tunc iam vult, sed quod aliquando
+imperet et non velit, hoc contingit ex hoc quod non perfecte
+imperat. Imperfectum autem imperium contingit ex hoc, quod ratio ex
+diversis partibus movetur ad imperandum vel non imperandum, unde
+fluctuat inter duo, et non perfecte imperat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body
+that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all
+the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed
+with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34221] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut in membris corporalibus quodlibet membrum
+operatur non sibi soli, sed toti corpori, ut oculus videt toti
+corpori; ita etiam est in potentiis animae. Nam intellectus
+intelligit non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis; et voluntas vult
+non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis. Et ideo homo imperat sibi
+ipsi actum voluntatis, inquantum est intelligens et volens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is not
+due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A4" id="FS_Q17_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34222] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, cum imperium sit actus rationis, ille actus
+imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non
+est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut
+superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in
+infinitum procedatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A7-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 7. Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q17_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.15" target="asv">Rom. 7:15</a>): "For I do not that good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although he wills not to lust.
+But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34231] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus sensitivi appetitus non sit
+imperatus. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo
+bonum, hoc ago</i>, et Glossa exponit quod homo vult non
+concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit. Sed concupiscere est actus
+appetitus sensitivi. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi non subditur
+imperio nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of formal transmutation, as was shown in the
+<a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A4" id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[65], A[4]</a>;
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[91], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>. But the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold.
+Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34232] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+materia corporalis soli Deo obedit, quantum ad transmutationem
+formalem, ut in primo habitum est. Sed actus appetitus sensitivi
+habet quandam formalem transmutationem corporis, scilicet calorem
+vel frigus. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi non subditur imperio
+humano.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is
+not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not
+subject to our command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34233] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+proprium motivum appetitus sensitivi est apprehensum secundum
+sensum vel imaginationem. Sed non est in potestate nostra semper
+quod aliquid apprehendamus sensu vel imaginatione. Ergo actus
+appetitus sensitivi non subiacet imperio nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the irascible,"
+which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34234] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>obediens rationi
+dividitur in duo, in desiderativum et irascitivum</i>, quae
+pertinent ad appetitum sensitivum. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi
+subiacet imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q17_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in our power, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A5" id="FS_Q17_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Consequently in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason,
+we must consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the intellective
+appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of
+a corporeal organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a
+power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight,
+and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive
+appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body.
+</p><p id="FS_Q17_A7-p7"> Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination,
+being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a particular active
+power is regulated by a universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject
+to the command of reason. On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of
+reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to
+the command of reason.
+</p><p id="FS_Q17_A7-p8"> Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension
+of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented
+it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not
+by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal
+supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 co."><a name="34235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34235] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod secundum hoc aliquis actus imperio nostro subiacet,
+prout est in potestate nostra, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ad
+intelligendum qualiter actus appetitus sensitivi subdatur imperio
+rationis, oportet considerare qualiter sit in potestate nostra. Est
+autem sciendum quod appetitus sensitivus in hoc differt ab appetitu
+intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas, quod appetitus sensitivus est
+virtus organi corporalis, non autem voluntas. Omnis autem actus
+virtutis utentis organo corporali, dependet non solum ex potentia
+animae, sed etiam ex corporalis organi dispositione, sicut visio ex
+potentia visiva, et qualitate oculi, per quam iuvatur vel
+impeditur. Unde et actus appetitus sensitivi non solum dependet ex
+vi appetitiva, sed etiam ex dispositione corporis. Illud autem quod
+est ex parte potentiae animae, sequitur apprehensionem. Apprehensio
+autem imaginationis, cum sit particularis, regulatur ab
+apprehensione rationis, quae est universalis, sicut virtus activa
+particularis a virtute activa universali. Et ideo ex ista parte,
+actus appetitus sensitivi subiacet imperio rationis. Qualitas autem
+et dispositio corporis non subiacet imperio rationis. Et ideo ex
+hac parte, impeditur quin motus sensitivi appetitus totaliter
+subdatur imperio rationis. Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus
+appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem
+imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium
+rationis, quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset.
+Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio praeest irascibili
+et concupiscibili non principatu despotico, qui est domini ad
+servum; sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, qui
+non totaliter subduntur imperio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered
+from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the Apostle adds (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q17_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.15" target="asv">Rom. 7:15</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement
+of concupiscence, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34236] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod hoc quod homo vult non concupiscere, et tamen
+concupiscit, contingit ex dispositione corporis, per quam impeditur
+appetitus sensitivus ne totaliter sequatur imperium rationis. Unde
+et apostolus ibidem subdit, <i>video aliam legem in membris meis,
+repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Hoc etiam contingit propter
+subitum motum concupiscentiae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus
+a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it:
+thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it
+is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once.
+But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart,
+which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34237] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod qualitas corporalis dupliciter se habet ad actum
+appetitus sensitivi. Uno modo, ut praecedens, prout aliquis est
+aliqualiter dispositus secundum corpus, ad hanc vel illam
+passionem. Alio modo, ut consequens, sicut cum ex ira aliquis
+incalescit. Qualitas igitur praecedens non subiacet imperio
+rationis, quia vel est ex natura, vel ex aliqua praecedenti
+motione, quae non statim quiescere potest. Sed qualitas consequens
+sequitur imperium rationis, quia sequitur motum localem cordis,
+quod diversimode movetur secundum diversos actus sensitivi
+appetitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the external sensible is necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything
+by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that
+man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the
+apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion
+to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers,
+is either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power,
+due to some organic indisposition.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34238] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, quia ad apprehensionem sensus requiritur sensibile
+exterius, non est in potestate nostra apprehendere aliquid sensu,
+nisi sensibili praesente; cuius praesentia non semper est in
+potestate nostra. Tunc enim homo potest uti sensu cum voluerit,
+nisi sit impedimentum ex parte organi. Apprehensio autem
+imaginationis subiacet ordinationi rationis, secundum modum
+virtutis vel debilitatis imaginativae potentiae. Quod enim homo non
+possit imaginari quae ratio considerat, contingit vel ex hoc quod
+non sunt imaginabilia, sicut incorporalia; vel propter debilitatem
+virtutis imaginativae, quae est ex aliqua indispositione
+organi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A8-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 8. Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher
+rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore,
+are the powers of the vegetal soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34239] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus vegetabilis animae imperio
+rationis subdantur. Vires enim sensitivae nobiliores sunt viribus
+animae vegetabilis. Sed vires animae sensitivae subduntur imperio
+rationis. Ergo multo magis vires animae vegetabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is called a "little world" [*Aristotle, Phys. viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world.
+But God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, even
+the powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34240] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+homo dicitur minor mundus, quia sic est anima in corpore, sicut
+Deus in mundo. Sed Deus sic est in mundo, quod omnia quae sunt in
+mundo, obediunt eius imperio. Ergo et omnia quae sunt in homine,
+obediunt imperio rationis, etiam vires vegetabilis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive
+and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their
+contrary virtues. Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34241] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+laus et vituperium non contingit nisi in actibus qui subduntur
+imperio rationis. Sed in actibus nutritivae et generativae
+potentiae, contingit esse laudem et vituperium, et virtutem et
+vitium, sicut patet in gula et luxuria, et virtutibus oppositis.
+Ergo actus harum potentiarum subduntur imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] sats that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason
+has no control."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34242] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>id quod non persuadetur
+a ratione, est nutritivum et generativum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires
+an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual
+appetite. But the reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or
+the animal appetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those acts that proceed from
+the natural appetite. And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii)
+says "that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers." Consequently the acts of the vegetal soul are
+not subject to the command of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 co."><a name="34243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34243] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod actuum quidam procedunt ex appetitu naturali, quidam
+autem ex appetitu animali vel intellectuali, omne enim agens aliquo
+modo appetit finem. Appetitus autem naturalis non consequitur
+aliquam apprehensionem, sicut sequitur appetitus animalis et
+intellectualis. Ratio autem imperat per modum apprehensivae
+virtutis. Et ideo actus illi qui procedunt ab appetitu intellectivo
+vel animali, possunt a ratione imperari, non autem actus illi qui
+procedunt ex appetitu naturali. Huiusmodi autem sunt actus
+vegetabilis animae, unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod vocatur
+naturale quod generativum et nutritivum. Et propter hoc, actus
+vegetabilis animae non subduntur imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very
+fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank lowest.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34244] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, quanto aliquis actus est immaterialior, tanto
+est nobilior, et magis subditus imperio rationis. Unde ex hoc ipso
+quod vires animae vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, apparet has
+vires infimas esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does
+not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason
+the world is wholly subject to His command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34245] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod similitudo attenditur quantum ad aliquid, quia
+scilicet, sicut Deus movet mundum, ita anima movet corpus. Non
+autem quantum ad omnia, non enim anima creavit corpus ex nihilo,
+sicut Deus mundum; propter quod totaliter subditur eius
+imperio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e. digestion,
+and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation
+and nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the act of generation, and the right or
+wrong use thereof.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34246] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod virtus et vitium, laus et vituperium, non debentur
+ipsis actibus nutritivae vel generativae potentiae, qui sunt
+digestio et formatio corporis humani; sed actibus sensitivae partis
+ordinatis ad actus generativae vel nutritivae; puta in
+concupiscendo delectationem cibi et venereorum, et utendo, secundum
+quod oportet, vel non secundum quod oportet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A9-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 9. Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the
+body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey
+reason, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A8" id="FS_Q17_A9-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="34247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34247] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod membra corporis non obediant rationi
+quantum ad actus suos. Constat enim quod membra corporis magis
+distant a ratione quam vires animae vegetabilis. Sed vires animae
+vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, ut dictum est. Ergo multo minus
+membra corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason:
+for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that "the pulse is not controlled by reason." Therefore the movement
+of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="34248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34248] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+cor est principium motus animalis. Sed motus cordis non subditur
+imperio rationis, dicit enim Gregorius Nyssenus quod <i>pulsativum
+non est persuasibile ratione</i>. Ergo motus membrorum corporalium
+non subiacet imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not
+desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold." Therefore the
+movements of the members are not obedient to reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="34249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34249] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>motus membrorum
+genitalium aliquando importunus est, nullo poscente, aliquando
+autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferveat,
+friget in corpore</i>. Ergo motus membrorum non obediunt
+rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely
+can one discern obedience from command."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 s. c."><a name="34250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34250] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., <i>imperat animus ut
+moveatur manus, et tanta est facilitas, ut vix a servitio
+discernatur imperium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect
+of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject
+to the command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive
+powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members,
+that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 co."><a name="34251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34251] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod membra corporis sunt organa quaedam potentiarum
+animae. Unde eo modo quo potentiae animae se habent ad hoc quod
+obediant rationi, hoc modo se habent etiam corporis membra. Quia
+igitur vires sensitivae subduntur imperio rationis, non autem vires
+naturales; ideo omnes motus membrorum quae moventur a potentiis
+sensitivis, subduntur imperio rationis; motus autem membrorum qui
+consequuntur vires naturales, non subduntur imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact
+with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="34252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34252] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod membra non movent seipsa, sed moventur per
+potentias animae; quarum quaedam sunt rationi viciniores quam vires
+animae vegetabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived:
+thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition
+of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to
+nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the
+heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident,
+it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from
+their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii,
+4). Wherefore this movement is called "vital." For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says
+that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement.
+By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="34253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34253] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in his quae ad intellectum et voluntatem pertinent,
+primum invenitur id quod est secundum naturam, ex quo alia
+derivantur, ut a cognitione principiorum naturaliter notorum,
+cognitio conclusionum; et a voluntate finis naturaliter desiderati,
+derivatur electio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Ita etiam in
+corporalibus motibus principium est secundum naturam. Principium
+autem corporalis motus est a motu cordis. Unde motus cordis est
+secundum naturam, et non secundum voluntatem, consequitur enim
+sicut per se accidens vitam, quae est ex unione animae et corporis.
+Sicut motus gravium et levium consequitur formam substantialem
+ipsorum, unde et a generante moveri dicuntur, secundum philosophum
+in VIII Physic. Et propter hoc motus iste vitalis dicitur. Unde
+Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod sicut generativum et nutritivum non
+obedit rationi, ita nec pulsativum, quod est vitale. Pulsativum
+autem appellat motum cordis, qui manifestatur per venas
+pulsatiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q17_A9-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason:
+in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original
+sin is transmitted to posterity.
+</p><p id="FS_Q17_A9-p10"> But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself,
+through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural cause of this
+particular member's insubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that "the movements
+of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary," and that the reason of this is as follows. These
+members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things
+as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command
+of the reason or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which change
+is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were
+a separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is
+the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal.
+Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply
+OBJ 2).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="34254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34254] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIV de Civ. Dei, hoc quod
+motus genitalium membrorum rationi non obedit, est ex poena
+peccati, ut scilicet anima suae inobedientiae ad Deum in illo
+praecipue membro poenam inobedientiae patiatur, per quod peccatum
+originale ad posteros traducitur. Sed quia per peccatum primi
+parentis, ut infra dicetur, natura est sibi relicta, subtracto
+supernaturali dono quod homini divinitus erat collatum; ideo
+consideranda est ratio naturalis quare motus huiusmodi membrorum
+specialiter rationi non obedit. Cuius causam assignat Aristoteles
+in libro de causis motus animalium, dicens involuntarios esse motus
+cordis et membri pudendi, quia scilicet ex aliqua apprehensione
+huiusmodi membra commoventur, inquantum scilicet intellectus et
+phantasia repraesentant aliqua ex quibus consequuntur passiones
+animae, ad quas consequitur motus horum membrorum. Non tamen
+moventur secundum iussum rationis aut intellectus, quia scilicet ad
+motum horum membrorum requiritur aliqua alteratio naturalis,
+scilicet caliditatis et frigiditatis, quae quidem alteratio non
+subiacet imperio rationis. Specialiter autem hoc accidit in his
+duobus membris, quia utrumque istorum membrorum est quasi quoddam
+animal separatum, inquantum est principium vitae, principium autem
+est virtute totum. Cor enim principium est sensuum, et ex membro
+genitali virtus exit seminalis, quae est virtute totum animal. Et
+ideo habent proprios motus naturaliter, quia principia oportet esse
+naturalia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q18" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q18-p0.1">Q. 18. OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q18-p2"> We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from
+the good or evil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.
+</p><p id="FS_Q18-p3"> Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general;
+the second, of the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good and evil of external acts.
+</p><p id="FS_Q18-p4"> Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q18-p5"><a href="#FS_Q18_A1"> (1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p6"><a href="#FS_Q18_A2"> (2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its object?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p7"><a href="#FS_Q18_A3"> (3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p8"><a href="#FS_Q18_A4"> (4) Whether it is derived from the end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p9"><a href="#FS_Q18_A5"> (5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p10"><a href="#FS_Q18_A6"> (6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p11"><a href="#FS_Q18_A7"> (7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus,
+or conversely?
+</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p12"><a href="#FS_Q18_A8"> (8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p13"><a href="#FS_Q18_A9"> (9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p14"><a href="#FS_Q18_A10"> (10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p15"><a href="#FS_Q18_A11"> (11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places the moral action in the species of good or evil?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 pr."><a name="34255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34255]
+Iª-IIae q. 18 pr.</span></a> Post hoc considerandum est de
+bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum. Et primo, quomodo actio
+humana sit bona vel mala; secundo, de his quae consequuntur ad
+bonitatem vel malitiam humanorum actuum, puta meritum vel
+demeritum, peccatum et culpa. Circa primum occurrit triplex
+consideratio, prima est de bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum in
+generali; secunda, de bonitate et malitia interiorum actuum;
+tertia, de bonitate et malitia exteriorum actuum. Circa primum
+quaeruntur undecim. Primo, utrum omnis actio sit bona, vel aliqua
+sit mala. Secundo, utrum actio hominis habeat quod sit bona vel
+mala, ex obiecto. Tertio, utrum hoc habeat ex circumstantia.
+Quarto, utrum hoc habeat ex fine. Quinto, utrum aliqua actio
+hominis sit bona vel mala in sua specie. Sexto, utrum actus habeat
+speciem boni vel mali ex fine. Septimo, utrum species quae est ex
+fine, contineatur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut sub genere,
+aut e converso. Octavo, utrum sit aliquis actus indifferens
+secundum suam speciem. Nono, utrum aliquis actus sit indifferens
+secundum individuum. Decimo, utrum aliqua circumstantia constituat
+actum moralem in specie boni vel mali. Undecimo, utrum omnis
+circumstantia augens bonitatem vel malitiam, constituat actum
+moralem in specie boni vel mali.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q18_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A1-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 1. Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every human action is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not,
+save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action is evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34256] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis actio hominis sit bona, et nulla
+sit mala. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum
+non agit nisi virtute boni. Sed virtute boni non fit malum. Ergo
+nulla actio est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according
+as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph.
+ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every action is good, and
+none is evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34257] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Non est autem aliquid malum
+secundum quod est actu, sed secundum quod potentia privatur actu,
+inquantum autem potentia perficitur per actum, est bonum, ut
+dicitur in IX Metaphys. Nihil ergo agit inquantum est malum, sed
+solum inquantum est bonum. Omnis ergo actio est bona, et nulla
+mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect
+which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34258] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+malum non potest esse causa nisi per accidens, ut patet per
+Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed omnis actionis est aliquis per
+se effectus. Nulla ergo actio est mala, sed omnis actio est
+bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.20" target="asv">Jn. 3:20</a>): "Every one that doth evil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34259] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. III, <i>omnis qui male agit, odit
+lucem</i>. Est ergo aliqua actio hominis mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that
+it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated
+in the
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A1" id="FS_Q18_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], AA[1]</a>,3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper fulness
+of being in a certain multiplicity.
+Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being
+due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of
+knowledge and movement: wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fulness of
+his being. So that as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness, and
+is
+said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight.
+That, however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or good. But since this same fulness
+of being is of the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being, it is not said to be good simply,
+but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a certain
+respect, as was stated in the
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A1" id="FS_Q18_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[1]</a>, ad 1. We must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness,
+in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance
+if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 co."><a name="34260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34260] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod de bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de
+bono et malo in rebus, eo quod unaquaeque res talem actionem
+producit, qualis est ipsa. In rebus autem unumquodque tantum habet
+de bono, quantum habet de esse, bonum enim et ens convertuntur, ut
+in primo dictum est. Solus autem Deus habet totam plenitudinem sui
+esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex, unaquaeque vero res alia
+habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa. Unde
+in aliquibus contingit quod quantum ad aliquid habent esse, et
+tamen eis aliquid deficit ad plenitudinem essendi eis debitam.
+Sicut ad plenitudinem esse humani requiritur quod sit quoddam
+compositum ex anima et corpore, habens omnes potentias et
+instrumenta cognitionis et motus, unde si aliquid horum deficiat
+alicui homini deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine sui esse. Quantum
+igitur habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate, inquantum vero
+aliquid ei deficit de plenitudine essendi, intantum deficit a
+bonitate, et dicitur malum, sicut homo caecus habet de bonitate
+quod vivit, et malum est ei quod caret visu. Si vero nihil haberet
+de entitate vel bonitate, neque malum neque bonum dici posset. Sed
+quia de ratione boni est ipsa plenitudo essendi, si quidem alicui
+aliquid defuerit de debita essendi plenitudine, non dicetur
+simpliciter bonum, sed secundum quid, inquantum est ens, poterit
+tamen dici simpliciter ens et secundum quid non ens, ut in primo
+dictum est. Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnis actio, inquantum
+habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate, inquantum vero
+deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni
+humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala, puta si
+deficiat ei vel determinata quantitas secundum rationem, vel
+debitus locus, vel aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility
+of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient
+good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34261] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod malum agit in virtute boni deficientis. Si enim
+nihil esset ibi de bono, neque esset ens, neque agere posset. Si
+autem non esset deficiens, non esset malum. Unde et actio causata
+est quoddam bonum deficiens, quod secundum quid est bonum,
+simpliciter autem malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in
+act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch
+as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34262] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid in actu,
+unde agere possit; et secundum aliud privari actu, unde causet
+deficientem actionem. Sicut homo caecus actu habet virtutem
+gressivam, per quam ambulare potest, sed inquantum caret visu, qui
+dirigit in ambulando, patitur defectum in ambulando, dum ambulat
+cespitando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human
+generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34263] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod actio mala potest habere aliquem effectum per se,
+secundum id quod habet de bonitate et entitate. Sicut adulterium
+est causa generationis humanae, inquantum habet commixtionem maris
+et feminae, non autem inquantum caret ordine rationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A2-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 2. Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing.
+But "evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the
+good or evil of a human action is not derived from their object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34264] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actio non habeat bonitatem vel
+malitiam ex obiecto. Obiectum enim actionis est res. In rebus autem
+non est malum, sed in usu peccantium, ut Augustinus dicit in libro
+III de Doct. Christ. Ergo actio humana non habet bonitatem vel
+malitiam ex obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather
+from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from their object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34265] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+obiectum comparatur ad actionem ut materia. Bonitas autem rei non
+est ex materia, sed magis ex forma, quae est actus. Ergo bonum et
+malum non est in actibus ex obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the object of an active power is compared to the action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not
+depend on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not derived from their object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34266] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+obiectum potentiae activae comparatur ad actionem sicut effectus ad
+causam. Sed bonitas causae non dependet ex effectu, sed magis e
+converso. Ergo actio humana non habet bonitatem vel malitiam ex
+obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv">Osee 9:10</a>): "They became abominable as those things which they loved." Now man becomes abominable to God on account of the malice of
+his action. Therefore the malice of his action is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies to the
+goodness of his action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34267] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Osee IX, <i>facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae
+dilexerunt</i>. Fit autem homo Deo abominabilis propter malitiam
+suae operationis. Ergo malitia operationis est secundum obiecta
+mala quae homo diligit. Et eadem ratio est de bonitate
+actionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A1" id="FS_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> the good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack of that fulness. Now the first
+thing that belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has
+its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as
+the primary goodness of a natural thing
+is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable
+object: hence some call such an action "good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own." And just as,
+in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead
+of a man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance,
+"to
+take what belongs to another." And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus here standing for species, just as
+we apply the term "mankind" to the whole human species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 co."><a name="34268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34268] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum et malum actionis, sicut et
+ceterarum rerum, attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu
+ipsius. Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere
+videtur, est id quod dat rei speciem. Sicut autem res naturalis
+habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciem ex obiecto;
+sicut et motus ex termino. Et ideo sicut prima bonitas rei
+naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et
+prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti; unde
+et a quibusdam vocatur bonum ex genere; puta, uti re sua. Et sicut
+in rebus naturalibus primum malum est, si res generata non
+consequitur formam specificam, puta si non generetur homo, sed
+aliquid loco hominis; ita primum malum in actionibus moralibus est
+quod est ex obiecto, sicut accipere aliena. Et dicitur malum ex
+genere, genere pro specie accepto, eo modo loquendi quo dicimus
+humanum genus totam humanam speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although external things are good in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that action.
+And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the quality of goodness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34269] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, licet res exteriores sint in seipsis bonae,
+tamen non semper habent debitam proportionem ad hanc vel illam
+actionem. Et ideo inquantum considerantur ut obiecta talium
+actionum, non habent rationem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing is made), but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands in
+relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34270] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod obiectum non est materia ex qua, sed materia circa
+quam, et habet quodammodo rationem formae, inquantum dat
+speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the human action is not always the object of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive;
+in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of
+the active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are already transformed: thus food when transformed is
+the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in
+relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way
+the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and
+species, since movement derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the
+goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the
+very
+proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its goodness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34271] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non semper obiectum actionis humanae est obiectum
+activae potentiae. Nam appetitiva potentia est quodammodo passiva,
+inquantum movetur ab appetibili, et tamen est principium humanorum
+actuum. Neque etiam potentiarum activarum obiecta semper habent
+rationem effectus, sed quando iam sunt transmutata, sicut alimentum
+transmutatum est effectus nutritivae potentiae, sed alimentum
+nondum transmutatum comparatur ad potentiam nutritivam sicut
+materia circa quam operatur. Ex hoc autem quod obiectum est aliquo
+modo effectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus
+actionis eius, et per consequens quod det ei formam et speciem,
+motus enim habet speciem a terminis. Et quamvis etiam bonitas
+actionis non causetur ex bonitate effectus, tamen ex hoc dicitur
+actio bona, quod bonum effectum inducere potest. Et ita ipsa
+proportio actionis ad effectum, est ratio bonitatis ipsius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A3-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 3. Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action,
+as being outside it, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q7_A1" id="FS_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). But "good and evil are in things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an action does not derive goodness
+or malice from a circumstance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34272] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actio non sit bona vel mala ex
+circumstantia. Circumstantiae enim circumstant actum sicut extra
+ipsum existentes, ut dictum est. Sed bonum et malum sunt in ipsis
+rebus, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Ergo actio non habet bonitatem
+vel malitiam ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances
+are accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art: because "no art takes notice of what is accidental"
+(Metaph. vi, 2). Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a circumstance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34273] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonitas vel malitia actus maxime consideratur in doctrina morum.
+Sed circumstantiae, cum sint quaedam accidentia actuum, videntur
+esse praeter considerationem artis, quia nulla ars considerat id
+quod est per accidens, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Ergo bonitas vel
+malitia actionis non est ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But
+good and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an action can be good or evil in its genus as stated
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q18_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34274] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+id quod convenit alicui secundum suam substantiam, non attribuitur
+ei per aliquod accidens. Sed bonum et malum convenit actioni
+secundum suam substantiam, quia actio ex suo genere potest esse
+bona vel mala, ut dictum est. Ergo non convenit actioni ex
+circumstantia quod sit bona vel mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the
+other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or
+where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34275] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in libro Ethic., quod <i>virtuosus
+operatur secundum quod oportet, et quando oportet, et secundum
+alias circumstantias</i>. Ergo ex contrario vitiosus, secundum
+unumquodque vitium, operatur quando non oportet, ubi non oportet,
+et sic de aliis circumstantiis. Ergo actiones humanae secundum
+circumstantias sunt bonae vel malae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial
+form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and
+the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude
+of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions
+which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that
+is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 co."><a name="34276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34276] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus non invenitur tota plenitudo
+perfectionis quae debetur rei, ex forma substantiali, quae dat
+speciem; sed multum superadditur ex supervenientibus accidentibus,
+sicut in homine ex figura, ex colore, et huiusmodi; quorum si
+aliquod desit ad decentem habitudinem, consequitur malum. Ita etiam
+est in actione. Nam plenitudo bonitatis eius non tota consistit in
+sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam
+accidentia quaedam. Et huiusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae. Unde
+si aliquid desit quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias, erit
+actio mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents
+thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34277] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod circumstantiae sunt extra actionem, inquantum
+non sunt de essentia actionis, sunt tamen in ipsa actione velut
+quaedam accidentia eius. Sicut et accidentia quae sunt in
+substantiis naturalibus, sunt extra essentias earum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And
+thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34278] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non omnia accidentia per accidens se habent ad sua
+subiecta, sed quaedam sunt per se accidentia; quae in unaquaque
+arte considerantur. Et per hunc modum considerantur circumstantiae
+actuum in doctrina morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since good and being are convertible; according as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good predicated
+of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things
+and in moral actions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34279] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, cum bonum convertatur cum ente, sicut ens dicitur
+secundum substantiam et secundum accidens, ita et bonum attribuitur
+alicui et secundum esse suum essentiale, et secundum esse
+accidentale, tam in rebus naturalibus, quam in actionibus
+moralibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A4-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 4. Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing
+acts with a view to evil." If therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly
+false.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34280] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum et malum in actibus humanis non
+sint ex fine. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod
+<i>nihil respiciens ad malum operatur</i>. Si igitur ex fine
+derivaretur operatio bona vel mala, nulla actio esset mala. Quod
+patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness of an action is something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is
+not said to be good or bad according to its end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34281] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonitas actus est aliquid in ipso existens. Finis autem est causa
+extrinseca. Non ergo secundum finem dicitur actio bona vel
+mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely,
+an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore
+an action is not good or evil from its end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34282] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+contingit aliquam bonam operationem ad malum finem ordinari, sicut
+cum aliquis dat eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam, et e converso
+aliquam malam operationem ordinari ad bonum finem, sicut cum quis
+furatur ut det pauperi. Non ergo est ex fine actio bona vel
+mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also
+is evil."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34283] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Boetius dicit, in Topic., quod <i>cuius finis bonus est,
+ipsum quoque bonum est, et cuius finis malus est, ipsum quoque
+malum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does
+not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which
+depends on something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it
+depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness
+of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness
+is not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have
+a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.
+</p><p id="FS_Q18_A4-p7"> Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its
+genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A1" id="FS_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness
+from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to
+which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="34284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34284] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod eadem est dispositio rerum in bonitate, et in esse.
+Sunt enim quaedam quorum esse ex alio non dependet, et in his
+sufficit considerare ipsum eorum esse absolute. Quaedam vero sunt
+quorum esse dependet ab alio, unde oportet quod consideretur per
+considerationem ad causam a qua dependet. Sicut autem esse rei
+dependet ab agente et forma, ita bonitas rei dependet a fine. Unde
+in personis divinis, quae non habent bonitatem dependentem ab alio,
+non consideratur aliqua ratio bonitatis ex fine. Actiones autem
+humanae, et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio, habent rationem
+bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent, praeter bonitatem absolutam quae
+in eis existit. Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex
+considerari potest. Una quidem secundum genus, prout scilicet est
+actio, quia quantum habet de actione et entitate, tantum habet de
+bonitate, ut dictum est. Alia vero secundum speciem, quae accipitur
+secundum obiectum conveniens. Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi
+secundum accidentia quaedam. Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi
+secundum habitudinem ad causam bonitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good.
+And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34285] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod bonum ad quod aliquis respiciens operatur, non
+semper est verum bonum; sed quandoque verum bonum, et quandoque
+apparens. Et secundum hoc, ex fine sequitur actio mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to
+the action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34286] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quamvis finis sit causa extrinseca, tamen debita
+proportio ad finem et relatio in ipsum, inhaeret actioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus
+it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa.
+However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since "evil results from any single defect, but
+good from the complete cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34287] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictarum
+bonitatum, deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae
+est bona secundum speciem suam vel secundum circumstantias,
+ordinari ad finem malum, et e converso. Non tamen est actio bona
+simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates concurrant, quia <i>quilibet
+singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra
+causa</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A5-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 5. Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil
+in actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A1" id="FS_Q18_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But good and evil do not make a specific difference in things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore
+neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34288] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus morales non differant specie
+secundum bonum et malum. Bonum enim et malum in actibus invenitur
+conformiter rebus, ut dictum est. Sed in rebus bonum et malum non
+diversificant speciem, idem enim specie est homo bonus et malus.
+Ergo neque etiam bonum et malum in actibus diversificant
+speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher
+(Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it seems that an action is not constituted in a
+species through being evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human actions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34289] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+malum, cum sit privatio, est quoddam non ens. Sed non ens non
+potest esse differentia, secundum philosophum, in III Metaphys. Cum
+ergo differentia constituat speciem, videtur quod aliquis actus, ex
+hoc quod est malus, non constituatur in aliqua specie. Et ita bonum
+et malum non diversificant speciem humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acts that differ in species produce different effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from
+an evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34290] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+diversorum actuum secundum speciem, diversi sunt effectus. Sed idem
+specie effectus potest consequi ex actu bono et malo, sicut homo
+generatur ex adulterio, et ex matrimoniali concubitu. Ergo actus
+bonus et malus non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a circumstance, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q18_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human actions do not differ in
+species on account of their goodness or malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="34291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34291] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum et malum dicitur in actibus quandoque secundum
+circumstantiam, ut dictum est. Sed circumstantia, cum sit accidens,
+non dat speciem actui. Ergo actus humani non differunt specie
+propter bonitatem et malitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like habits produce like actions." But a good and a bad habit differ in species,
+as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad actions differ in species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34292] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., <i>similes habitus similes
+actus reddunt</i>. Sed habitus bonus et malus differunt specie, ut
+liberalitas et prodigalitas. Ergo et actus bonus et malus differunt
+specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A5-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Every action derives its species from its object, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q18_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Hence it follows that a difference of object causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed that a
+difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions, according as the latter are referred to one active principle,
+which does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred to another active principle. Because
+nothing accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object may be essential in
+reference to one active principle, and accidental in reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ essentially
+in reference to sense, but not in reference to the intellect.
+</p><p id="FS_Q18_A5-p8"> Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
+"the good of man is to be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against reason." For that is good for a thing which
+suits it in regard to its form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that the difference
+of good and evil considered in reference to the object is an essential difference in relation to reason;
+that is to say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral,
+inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the species in human actions;
+since essential differences cause a difference of species.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 co."><a name="34293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34293] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod omnis actus speciem habet ex suo obiecto, sicut supra
+dictum est. Unde oportet quod aliqua differentia obiecti faciat
+diversitatem speciei in actibus. Est autem considerandum quod
+aliqua differentia obiecti facit differentiam speciei in actibus,
+secundum quod referuntur ad unum principium activum, quod non facit
+differentiam in actibus, secundum quod referuntur ad aliud
+principium activum. Quia nihil quod est per accidens, constituit
+speciem, sed solum quod est per se, potest autem aliqua differentia
+obiecti esse per se in comparatione ad unum activum principium, et
+per accidens in comparatione ad aliud; sicut cognoscere colorem et
+sonum, per se differunt per comparationem ad sensum, non autem per
+comparationem ad intellectum. In actibus autem humanis bonum et
+malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem, quia, ut Dionysius
+dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., bonum hominis est secundum rationem
+esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem. Unicuique enim rei est
+bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei
+praeter ordinem suae formae. Patet ergo quod differentia boni et
+mali circa obiectum considerata, comparatur per se ad rationem,
+scilicet secundum quod obiectum est ei conveniens vel non
+conveniens. Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani, vel morales,
+secundum quod sunt a ratione. Unde manifestum est quod bonum et
+malum diversificant speciem in actibus moralibus, differentiae enim
+per se diversificant speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify
+the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is
+in accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34294] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod etiam in rebus naturalibus bonum et malum, quod
+est secundum naturam et contra naturam, diversificant speciem
+naturae, corpus enim mortuum et corpus vivum non sunt eiusdem
+speciei. Et similiter bonum, inquantum est secundum rationem, et
+malum, inquantum est praeter rationem, diversificant speciem
+moris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species, not
+because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's
+property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it can constitute the species of an evil act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34295] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod malum importat privationem non absolutam, sed
+consequentem talem potentiam. Dicitur enim malus actus secundum
+suam speciem, non ex eo quod nullum habeat obiectum; sed quia habet
+obiectum non conveniens rationi, sicut tollere aliena. Unde
+inquantum obiectum est aliquid positive, potest constituere speciem
+mali actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because
+the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not
+differ in species; and thus they have one specific effect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34296] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod actus coniugalis et adulterium, secundum quod
+comparantur ad rationem, differunt specie, et habent effectus
+specie differentes, quia unum eorum meretur laudem et praemium,
+aliud vituperium et poenam. Sed secundum quod comparantur ad
+potentiam generativam, non differunt specie. Et sic habent unum
+effectum secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify
+a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would
+not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="34297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34297] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod circumstantia quandoque sumitur ut differentia
+essentialis obiecti, secundum quod ad rationem comparatur, et tunc
+potest dare speciem actui morali. Et hoc oportet esse, quandocumque
+circumstantia transmutat actum de bonitate in malitiam, non enim
+circumstantia faceret actum malum, nisi per hoc quod rationi
+repugnat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A6-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 6. Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their
+species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end
+do not diversify the species of an action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34298] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum et malum quod est ex fine, non
+diversificent speciem in actibus. Actus enim habent speciem ex
+obiecto. Sed finis est praeter rationem obiecti. Ergo bonum et
+malum quod est ex fine, non diversificant speciem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the species, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q18_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But it is accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore
+actions are not diversified as to species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34299] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+id quod est per accidens, non constituit speciem, ut dictum est.
+Sed accidit alicui actui quod ordinetur ad aliquem finem; sicut
+quod aliquis det eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam. Ergo secundum
+bonum et malum quod est ex fine, non diversificantur actus secundum
+speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues
+and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34300] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+diversi actus secundum speciem, ad unum finem ordinari possunt,
+sicut ad finem inanis gloriae ordinari possunt actus diversarum
+virtutum, et diversorum vitiorum. Non ergo bonum et malum quod
+accipitur secundum finem, diversificat speciem actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It has been shown above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q18_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>) that human actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species
+of actions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34301] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod supra ostensum est, quod actus humani habent speciem a
+fine. Ergo bonum et malum quod accipitur secundum finem,
+diversificat speciem actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q18_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the will, and the external action: and
+each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of
+the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the
+external action takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the will takes its species from
+the end, as from its own proper object.
+</p><p id="FS_Q18_A6-p7"> Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action: because
+the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of morality, save in so far as they are
+voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard
+to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may
+commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 co."><a name="34302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34302] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliqui actus dicuntur humani, inquantum sunt
+voluntarii, sicut supra dictum est. In actu autem voluntario
+invenitur duplex actus, scilicet actus interior voluntatis, et
+actus exterior, et uterque horum actuum habet suum obiectum. Finis
+autem proprie est obiectum interioris actus voluntarii, id autem
+circa quod est actio exterior, est obiectum eius. Sicut igitur
+actus exterior accipit speciem ab obiecto circa quod est; ita actus
+interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine, sicut a proprio
+obiecto. Ita autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut
+formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas
+utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis; neque actus
+exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt
+voluntarii. Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur
+secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris
+actus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod <i>ille qui
+furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per se loquendo, magis
+adulter quam fur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end also has the character of an object, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34303] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod etiam finis habet rationem obiecti, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior
+act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form to matter.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34304] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ordinari ad talem finem, etsi accidat exteriori
+actui, non tamen accidit actui interiori voluntatis, qui comparatur
+ad exteriorem sicut formale ad materiale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part
+of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the internal action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34305] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod quando multi actus specie differentes ordinantur ad
+unum finem, est quidem diversitas speciei ex parte exteriorum
+actuum; sed unitas speciei ex parte actus interioris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A7-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 7. Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the
+object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an
+action takes its species from its object, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q18_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,6). But it is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this species be not contained under the proper
+species of that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that are not subordinate to one another.
+Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from the object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34306] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod species bonitatis quae est ex fine,
+contineatur sub specie bonitatis quae est ex obiecto, sicut species
+sub genere, puta cum aliquis vult furari ut det eleemosynam. Actus
+enim habet speciem ex obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed impossibile est
+quod aliquid contineatur in aliqua alia specie, quae sub propria
+specie non continetur, quia idem non potest esse in diversis
+speciebus non subalternis. Ergo species quae est ex fine,
+continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last difference always constitutes the most specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems
+to come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is something last. Therefore the species derived from
+the end, is contained under the species derived from the object, as its most specific species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34307] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+semper ultima differentia constituit speciem specialissimam. Sed
+differentia quae est ex fine, videtur esse posterior quam
+differentia quae est ex obiecto, quia finis habet rationem ultimi.
+Ergo species quae est ex fine, continetur sub specie quae est ex
+obiecto, sicut species specialissima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more formal a difference is compared to genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more
+formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q18_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as the most specific
+species is contained under the subaltern genus.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34308] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quanto aliqua differentia est magis formalis, tanto magis est
+specialis, quia differentia comparatur ad genus ut forma ad
+materiam. Sed species quae est ex fine, est formalior ea quae est
+ex obiecto, ut dictum est. Ergo species quae est ex fine,
+continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut species
+specialissima sub genere subalterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Each genus has its determinate differences. But an action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained
+to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the
+species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34309] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+cuiuslibet generis sunt determinatae differentiae. Sed actus
+eiusdem speciei ex parte obiecti, potest ad infinitos fines
+ordinari, puta furtum ad infinita bona vel mala. Ergo species quae
+est ex fine, non continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut
+sub genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained
+thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take
+what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute
+the species of that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that
+genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided
+into rational and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless"
+are not essential determinations of the irrational being. But the following division would be correct: "Some animals have
+feet, some have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many": because the latter
+division is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the
+specific difference derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is
+the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under
+two species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty
+of a
+twofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the end, one of these differences
+is an essential determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the other.
+</p><p id="FS_Q18_A7-p7"> It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first of
+all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is the difference. Secondly,
+that the more universal an agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the more remote an end is, the
+more universal the agent to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end
+intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower
+officers. From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference
+derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the
+will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper
+objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 co."><a name="34310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34310] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod obiectum exterioris actus dupliciter potest se habere
+ad finem voluntatis, uno modo, sicut per se ordinatum ad ipsum,
+sicut bene pugnare per se ordinatur ad victoriam; alio modo, per
+accidens, sicut accipere rem alienam per accidens ordinatur ad
+dandum eleemosynam. Oportet autem, ut philosophus dicit in VII
+Metaphys., quod differentiae dividentes aliquod genus, et
+constituentes speciem illius generis, per se dividant illud. Si
+autem per accidens, non recte procedit divisio, puta si quis dicat,
+animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale; et animalium
+irrationalium aliud alatum, aliud non alatum, alatum enim et non
+alatum non sunt per se determinativa eius quod est irrationale.
+Oportet autem sic dividere, animalium aliud habens pedes, aliud non
+habens pedes; et habentium pedes, aliud habet duos, aliud quatuor,
+aliud multos, haec enim per se determinant priorem differentiam.
+Sic igitur quando obiectum non est per se ordinatum ad finem,
+differentia specifica quae est ex obiecto, non est per se
+determinativa eius quae est ex fine, nec e converso. Unde una
+istarum specierum non est sub alia, sed tunc actus moralis est sub
+duabus speciebus quasi disparatis. Unde dicimus quod ille qui
+furatur ut moechetur, committit duas malitias in uno actu. Si vero
+obiectum per se ordinetur ad finem, una dictarum differentiarum est
+per se determinativa alterius. Unde una istarum specierum
+continebitur sub altera. Considerandum autem restat quae sub qua.
+Ad cuius evidentiam, primo considerandum est quod quanto aliqua
+differentia sumitur a forma magis particulari, tanto magis est
+specifica. Secundo, quod quanto agens est magis universale, tanto
+ex eo est forma magis universalis. Tertio, quod quanto aliquis
+finis est posterior, tanto respondet agenti universaliori, sicut
+victoria, quae est ultimus finis exercitus, est finis intentus a
+summo duce; ordinatio autem huius aciei vel illius, est finis
+intentus ab aliquo inferiorum ducum. Et ex istis sequitur quod
+differentia specifica quae est ex fine, est magis generalis; et
+differentia quae est ex obiecto per se ad talem finem ordinato, est
+specifica respectu eius. Voluntas enim, cuius proprium obiectum est
+finis, est universale motivum respectu omnium potentiarum animae,
+quarum propria obiecta sunt obiecta particularium actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One and the same thing, considered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the other.
+But in respect of those things which are superadded to the substance, one thing can be contained under different species.
+Thus one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume,
+under the species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its
+substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two
+species, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q18_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34311] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod secundum substantiam suam non potest aliquid
+esse in duabus speciebus, quarum una sub altera non ordinetur. Sed
+secundum ea quae rei adveniunt, potest aliquid sub diversis
+speciebus contineri. Sicut hoc pomum, secundum colorem, continetur
+sub hac specie, scilicet albi, et secundum odorem, sub specie bene
+redolentis. Et similiter actus qui secundum substantiam suam est in
+una specie naturae, secundum conditiones morales supervenientes, ad
+duas species referri potest, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is last in execution; but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34312] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod finis est postremum in executione; sed est primum in
+intentione rationis, secundum quam accipiuntur moralium actuum
+species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered
+as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of
+a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal
+cause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more
+universal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34313] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod differentia comparatur ad genus ut forma ad materiam,
+inquantum facit esse genus in actu. Sed etiam genus consideratur ut
+formalius specie, secundum quod est absolutius, et minus
+contractum. Unde et partes definitionis reducuntur ad genus causae
+formalis, ut dicitur in libro Physic. Et secundum hoc, genus est
+causa formalis speciei, et tanto erit formalius, quanto
+communius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A8-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 8. Whether any action is indifferent in its species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no action is indifferent in its species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine (Enchiridion
+xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries, according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not
+such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were between good and evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34314] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis actus indifferens
+secundum suam speciem. Malum enim est privatio boni, secundum
+Augustinum. Sed privatio et habitus sunt opposita immediata,
+secundum philosophum. Ergo non est aliquis actus qui secundum
+speciem suam sit indifferens, quasi medium existens inter bonum et
+malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human actions derive their species from their end or object, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q18_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[6];</a> Q[1], A[3]). But every end and every object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is good or evil according
+to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34315] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus humani habent speciem a fine vel obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed
+omne obiectum, et omnis finis habet rationem boni vel mali. Ergo
+omnis actus humanus secundum suam speciem est bonus vel malus.
+Nullus ergo est indifferens secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A1" id="FS_Q18_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, an action is said to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when it lacks that complement. But every
+action must needs either have the entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore every action must
+needs be either good or bad in its species, and none is indifferent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34316] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut dictum est, actus dicitur bonus, qui habet debitam
+perfectionem bonitatis; malus, cui aliquid de hoc deficit. Sed
+necesse est quod omnis actus vel habeat totam plenitudinem suae
+bonitatis, vel aliquid ei deficiat. Ergo necesse est quod omnis
+actus secundum speciem suam sit bonus vel malus, et nullus
+indifferens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that "there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a good
+or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." Therefore some actions are indifferent according to their species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34317] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in Mont., quod
+<i>sunt quaedam facta media, quae possunt bono vel malo animo
+fieri, de quibus est temerarium iudicare</i>. Sunt ergo aliqui
+actus secundum speciem suam indifferentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q18_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,5), every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the
+object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes
+something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms
+to a person in want. On the other hand, if it
+includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal,
+which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does not include something
+pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like:
+and such actions are indifferent according to their species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 co."><a name="34318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34318] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, actus omnis habet speciem ab
+obiecto; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet speciem ab
+obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio. Unde
+si obiectum actus includat aliquid quod conveniat ordini rationis,
+erit actus bonus secundum suam speciem, sicut dare eleemosynam
+indigenti. Si autem includat aliquid quod repugnet ordini rationis,
+erit malus actus secundum speciem, sicut furari, quod est tollere
+aliena. Contingit autem quod obiectum actus non includit aliquid
+pertinens ad ordinem rationis, sicut levare festucam de terra, ire
+ad campum, et huiusmodi, et tales actus secundum speciem suam sunt
+indifferentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus blindness
+takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be
+no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health;
+not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road
+to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the
+immediate contrary of the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on
+the Categories: because it does not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be something between good
+and evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34319] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod duplex est privatio. Quaedam quae consistit in
+privatum esse, et haec nihil relinquit, sed totum aufert; ut
+caecitas totaliter aufert visum, et tenebrae lucem, et mors vitam.
+Et inter hanc privationem et habitum oppositum, non potest esse
+aliquod medium circa proprium susceptibile. Est autem alia privatio
+quae consistit in privari, sicut aegritudo est privatio sanitatis,
+non quod tota sanitas sit sublata, sed quod est quasi quaedam via
+ad totalem ablationem sanitatis, quae fit per mortem. Et ideo talis
+privatio, cum aliquid relinquat, non semper est immediata cum
+opposito habitu. Et hoc modo malum est privatio boni, ut Simplicius
+dicit in commento super librum Praedic., quia non totum bonum
+aufert, sed aliquid relinquit. Unde potest esse aliquod medium
+inter bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or malice,
+which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this that we are here treating.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34320] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod omne obiectum vel finis habet aliquam bonitatem vel
+malitiam, saltem naturalem, non tamen semper importat bonitatem vel
+malitiam moralem, quae consideratur per comparationem ad rationem,
+ut dictum est. Et de hac nunc agitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may not
+contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it
+specifically good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34321] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non quidquid habet actus, pertinet ad speciem eius.
+Unde etsi in ratione suae speciei non contineatur quidquid pertinet
+ad plenitudinem bonitatis ipsius, non propter hoc est ex specie sua
+malus, nec etiam bonus, sicut homo secundum suam speciem neque
+virtuosus, neque vitiosus est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A9-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 9. Whether an individual action can be indifferent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an individual action can be indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an individual.
+But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A8" id="FS_Q18_A9-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="34322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34322] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis actus secundum individuum sit
+indifferens. Nulla enim species est quae sub se non contineat vel
+continere possit aliquod individuum. Sed aliquis actus est
+indifferens secundum suam speciem, ut dictum est. Ergo aliquis
+actus individualis potest esse indifferens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that
+they are not good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect of a habit. Therefore some individual
+actions are indifferent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="34323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34323] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ex individualibus actibus causantur habitus conformes ipsis, ut
+dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliquis habitus est indifferens. Dicit
+enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., de quibusdam, sicut de placidis et
+prodigis, quod non sunt mali, et tamen constat quod non sunt boni,
+cum recedant a virtute, et sic sunt indifferentes secundum habitum.
+Ergo aliqui actus individuales sunt indifferentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain
+a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="34324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34324] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum morale pertinet ad virtutem, malum autem morale pertinet ad
+vitium. Sed contingit quandoque quod homo actum qui ex specie sua
+est indifferens, non ordinat ad aliquem finem vel vitii vel
+virtutis. Ergo contingit aliquem actum individualem esse
+indifferentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive
+of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the
+day of judgment" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.36" target="asv">Mat. 12:36</a>): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good
+or bad. For the same reason every other
+action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 s. c."><a name="34325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34325] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia, <i>otiosum verbum est
+quod utilitate rectitudinis, aut ratione iustae necessitatis aut
+piae utilitatis, caret</i>. Sed verbum otiosum est malum, quia de
+eo reddent homines rationem in die iudicii, ut dicitur Matth. XII.
+Si autem non caret ratione iustae necessitatis aut piae utilitatis,
+est bonum. Ergo omne verbum aut est bonum aut malum. Pari ergo
+ratione, et quilibet alius actus vel est bonus vel malus. Nullus
+ergo individualis actus est indifferens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A9-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And
+the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q18_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
+accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong
+to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad,
+at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds
+from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character
+of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must
+needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason,
+if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.
+</p><p id="FS_Q18_A9-p7"> If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his
+beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason.
+Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 co."><a name="34326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34326] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod contingit quandoque aliquem actum esse indifferentem
+secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo
+consideratus. Et hoc ideo, quia actus moralis, sicut dictum est,
+non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto, a quo habet speciem; sed
+etiam ex circumstantiis, quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia; sicut
+aliquid convenit individuo hominis secundum accidentia
+individualia, quod non convenit homini secundum rationem speciei.
+Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam
+circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex
+parte intentionis finis. Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a
+ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem
+ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali. Si
+vero ordinetur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde
+habet rationem boni. Necesse est autem quod vel ordinetur, vel non
+ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est omnem actum hominis a
+deliberativa ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum
+esse vel malum. Si autem non procedit a ratione deliberativa, sed
+ex quadam imaginatione, sicut cum aliquis fricat barbam, vel movet
+manum aut pedem; talis actus non est, proprie loquendo, moralis vel
+humanus; cum hoc habeat actus a ratione. Et sic erit indifferens,
+quasi extra genus moralium actuum existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For an action to be indifferent in its species can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species demands
+that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus:
+since no object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or evil, either through its end or through a circumstance.
+Secondly, specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact
+that as far as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can be made good or bad by something else.
+Thus man, as far as his species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition of his species that he should
+not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="34327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34327] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum suam
+speciem, potest esse multipliciter. Uno modo, sic quod ex sua
+specie debeatur ei quod sit indifferens. Et sic procedit ratio. Sed
+tamen isto modo nullus actus ex sua specie est indifferens, non
+enim est aliquod obiectum humani actus, quod non possit ordinari
+vel ad bonum vel ad malum, per finem vel circumstantiam. Alio modo
+potest dici indifferens ex sua specie, quia non habet ex sua specie
+quod sit bonus vel malus. Unde per aliquid aliud potest fieri bonus
+vel malus. Sicut homo non habet ex sua specie quod sit albus vel
+niger, nec tamen habet ex sua specie quod non sit albus aut niger,
+potest enim albedo vel nigredo supervenire homini aliunde quam a
+principiis speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because he hurts
+none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in general,
+is all that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual action is either good or bad, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="34328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34328] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod philosophus dicit illum esse malum proprie, qui est
+aliis hominibus nocivus. Et secundum hoc, dicit prodigum non esse
+malum, quia nulli alteri nocet nisi sibi ipsi. Et similiter de
+omnibus aliis qui non sunt proximis nocivi. Nos autem hic dicimus
+malum communiter omne quod est rationi rectae repugnans. Et
+secundum hoc, omnis individualis actus est bonus vel malus, ut
+dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice.
+Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided
+he direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to other actions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="34329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34329] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod omnis finis a ratione deliberativa intentus, pertinet
+ad bonum alicuius virtutis, vel ad malum alicuius vitii. Nam hoc
+ipsum quod aliquis agit ordinate ad sustentationem vel quietem sui
+corporis, ad bonum virtutis ordinatur in eo qui corpus suum ordinat
+ad bonum virtutis. Et idem patet in aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A10-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 10. Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action
+is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="34330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34330] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non possit constituere
+aliquam speciem boni vel mali actus. Species enim actus est ex
+obiecto. Sed circumstantiae differunt ab obiecto. Ergo
+circumstantiae non dant speciem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral action, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q7_A1" id="FS_Q18_A10-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="34331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34331] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+circumstantiae comparantur ad actum moralem sicut accidentia eius,
+ut dictum est. Sed accidens non constituit speciem. Ergo
+circumstantia non constituit aliquam speciem boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not
+place a moral action in a species of good or evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="34332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34332] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+unius rei non sunt plures species. Unius autem actus sunt plures
+circumstantiae. Ergo circumstantia non constituit actum moralem in
+aliqua specie boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy
+place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 s. c."><a name="34333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34333] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+locus est circumstantia quaedam. Sed locus constituit actum moralem
+in quadam specie mali, furari enim aliquid de loco sacro est
+sacrilegium. Ergo circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua
+specie boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted
+by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q18_A10-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate
+form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it
+is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species.
+But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently
+that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by
+the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate
+another's property is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species
+of theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional circumstance.
+But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation
+to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy
+place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which
+was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself
+repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it
+must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 co."><a name="34334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34334] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut species rerum naturalium constituuntur ex
+naturalibus formis, ita species moralium actuum constituuntur ex
+formis prout sunt a ratione conceptae, sicut ex supradictis patet.
+Quia vero natura determinata est ad unum, nec potest esse processus
+naturae in infinitum, necesse est pervenire ad aliquam ultimam
+formam, ex qua sumatur differentia specifica, post quam alia
+differentia specifica esse non possit. Et inde est quod in rebus
+naturalibus, id quod est accidens alicui rei, non potest accipi ut
+differentia constituens speciem. Sed processus rationis non est
+determinatus ad aliquid unum, sed quolibet dato, potest ulterius
+procedere. Et ideo quod in uno actu accipitur ut circumstantia
+superaddita obiecto quod determinat speciem actus, potest iterum
+accipi a ratione ordinante ut principalis conditio obiecti
+determinantis speciem actus. Sicut tollere alienum habet speciem ex
+ratione alieni, ex hoc enim constituitur in specie furti, et si
+consideretur super hoc ratio loci vel temporis, se habebit in
+ratione circumstantiae. Sed quia ratio etiam de loco vel de
+tempore, et aliis huiusmodi, ordinare potest; contingit conditionem
+loci circa obiectum accipi ut contrariam ordini rationis; puta quod
+ratio ordinat non esse iniuriam faciendam loco sacro. Unde tollere
+aliquid alienum de loco sacro addit specialem repugnantiam ad
+ordinem rationis. Et ideo locus, qui prius considerabatur ut
+circumstantia, nunc consideratur ut principalis conditio obiecti
+rationi repugnans. Et per hunc modum, quandocumque aliqua
+circumstantia respicit specialem ordinem rationis vel pro vel
+contra, oportet quod circumstantia det speciem actui morali vel
+bono vel malo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as
+being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="34335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34335] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod circumstantia secundum quod dat speciem actui,
+consideratur ut quaedam conditio obiecti, sicut dictum est, et
+quasi quaedam specifica differentia eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when
+it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="34336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34336] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod circumstantia manens in ratione circumstantiae, cum
+habeat rationem accidentis, non dat speciem, sed inquantum mutatur
+in principalem conditionem obiecti, secundum hoc dat speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance implies
+accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it
+is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species,
+as said above (A[7], ad 1;
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q18_A10-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[1], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="34337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34337] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non omnis circumstantia constituit actum moralem in
+aliqua specie boni vel mali, cum non quaelibet circumstantia
+importet aliquam consonantiam vel dissonantiam ad rationem. Unde
+non oportet, licet sint multae circumstantiae unius actus, quod
+unus actus sit in pluribus speciebus. Licet etiam non sit
+inconveniens quod unus actus moralis sit in pluribus speciebus
+moris etiam disparatis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A11-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 11. Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences
+of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific
+difference, which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it differ
+in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every
+circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="34338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34338] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
+undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis circumstantia
+pertinens ad bonitatem vel malitiam, det speciem actui. Bonum enim
+et malum sunt differentiae specificae moralium actuum. Quod ergo
+facit differentiam in bonitate vel malitia moralis actus, facit
+differre secundum differentiam specificam, quod est differre
+secundum speciem. Sed id quod addit in bonitate vel malitia actus,
+facit differre secundum bonitatem et malitiam. Ergo facit differre
+secundum speciem. Ergo omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel
+malitia actus, constituit speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot
+make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a
+greater evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason it has a certain species of good
+or evil. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a
+new species of good or evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="34339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34339] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+aut circumstantia adveniens habet in se aliquam rationem bonitatis
+vel malitiae, aut non. Si non, non potest addere in bonitate vel
+malitia actus, quia quod non est bonum, non potest facere maius
+bonum; et quod non est malum, non potest facere maius malum. Si
+autem habet in se rationem bonitatis vel malitiae, ex hoc ipso
+habet quandam speciem boni vel mali. Ergo omnis circumstantia
+augens bonitatem vel malitiam, constituit novam speciem boni vel
+mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is caused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increases
+malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every
+circumstance that increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as every unity added to a number makes
+a new species of number; since the good consists in "number, weight, and measure" (
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q18_A11-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="34340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34340] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>malum causatur ex
+singularibus defectibus</i>. Quaelibet autem circumstantia
+aggravans malitiam, habet specialem defectum. Ergo quaelibet
+circumstantia addit novam speciem peccati. Et eadem ratione,
+quaelibet augens bonitatem, videtur addere novam speciem boni,
+sicut quaelibet unitas addita numero, facit novam speciem numeri;
+bonum enim consistit in numero, pondere et mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> More and less do not change a species. But more and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not
+every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it in a species of good or evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 s. c."><a name="34341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34341] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed magis et minus est
+circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia. Ergo non omnis
+circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, constituit actum
+moralem in specie boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q18_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[10])</a>, a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special order of reason. Now
+it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the
+supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take
+something in a large or small quantity,
+does not regard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from which
+the action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant
+with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin.
+Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not
+every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 co."><a name="34342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34342] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, circumstantia dat speciem boni vel
+mali actui morali, inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis.
+Contingit autem quandoque quod circumstantia non respicit ordinem
+rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita alia circumstantia, a
+qua actus moralis habet speciem boni vel mali. Sicut tollere
+aliquid in magna quantitate vel parva, non respicit ordinem
+rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita aliqua alia
+conditione, per quam actus habeat malitiam vel bonitatem, puta hoc
+quod est esse alienum, quod repugnat rationi. Unde tollere alienum
+in magna vel parva quantitate, non diversificat speciem peccati.
+Tamen potest aggravare vel diminuere peccatum. Et similiter est in
+aliis malis vel bonis. Unde non omnis circumstantia addens in
+bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by differing
+in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that
+which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the action differ in species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="34343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34343] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod in his quae intenduntur et remittuntur,
+differentia intensionis et remissionis non diversificat speciem,
+sicut quod differt in albedine secundum magis et minus, non differt
+secundum speciem coloris. Et similiter quod facit diversitatem in
+bono vel malo secundum intensionem et remissionem, non facit
+differentiam moralis actus secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself,
+but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above. Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds
+to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="34344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34344] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod circumstantia aggravans peccatum, vel augens
+bonitatem actus, quandoque non habet bonitatem vel malitiam
+secundum se, sed per ordinem ad aliam conditionem actus, ut dictum
+est. Et ideo non dat novam speciem, sed auget bonitatem vel
+malitiam quae est ex alia conditione actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something
+else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for
+as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="34345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34345] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non quaelibet circumstantia inducit singularem
+defectum secundum seipsam, sed solum secundum ordinem ad aliquid
+aliud. Et similiter non semper addit novam perfectionem, nisi per
+comparationem ad aliquid aliud. Et pro tanto, licet augeat
+bonitatem vel malitiam, non semper variat speciem boni vel
+mali.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q19" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q19-p0.1">Q. 19. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q19-p2"> We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q19-p3"><a href="#FS_Q19_A1"> (1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p4"><a href="#FS_Q19_A2"> (2) Whether it depends on the object alone?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p5"><a href="#FS_Q19_A3"> (3) Whether it depends on reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p6"><a href="#FS_Q19_A4"> (4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p7"><a href="#FS_Q19_A5"> (5) Whether erring reason binds?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p8"><a href="#FS_Q19_A6"> (6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p9"><a href="#FS_Q19_A7"> (7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p10"><a href="#FS_Q19_A8"> (8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p11"><a href="#FS_Q19_A9"> (9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine Will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p12"><a href="#FS_Q19_A10"> (10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the
+thing willed?
+</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 pr."><a name="34346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34346]
+Iª-IIae q. 19 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+bonitate actus interioris voluntatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
+decem. Primo, utrum bonitas voluntatis dependeat ex obiecto.
+Secundo, utrum ex solo obiecto dependeat. Tertio, utrum dependeat
+ex ratione. Quarto, utrum dependeat ex lege aeterna. Quinto, utrum
+ratio errans obliget. Sexto, utrum voluntas contra legem Dei
+sequens rationem errantem, sit mala. Septimo, utrum bonitas
+voluntatis in his quae sunt ad finem, dependeat ex intentione
+finis. Octavo, utrum quantitas bonitatis vel malitiae in voluntate,
+sequatur quantitatem boni vel mali in intentione. Nono, utrum
+bonitas voluntatis dependeat ex conformitate ad voluntatem divinam.
+Decimo, utrum necesse sit voluntatem humanam conformari divinae
+voluntati in volito, ad hoc quod sit bona.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q19_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A1-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 1. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than
+to what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness
+of the will depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is good, and none bad.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34347] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat ex
+obiecto. Voluntas enim non potest esse nisi boni, quia malum est
+praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Si
+igitur bonitas voluntatis iudicaretur ex obiecto, sequeretur quod
+omnis voluntas esset bona, et nulla esset mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the end, but goodness of making is never the end": because
+the latter is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend
+on any object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34348] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum per prius invenitur in fine, unde bonitas finis, inquantum
+huiusmodi, non dependet ab aliquo alio. Sed secundum philosophum,
+in VI Ethic., <i>bona actio est finis, licet factio nunquam sit
+finis</i>, ordinatur enim semper, sicut ad finem, ad aliquid
+factum. Ergo bonitas actus voluntatis non dependet ex aliquo
+obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness
+of nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on
+the object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34349] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+unumquodque quale est, tale alterum facit. Sed obiectum voluntatis
+est bonum bonitate naturae. Non ergo potest praestare voluntati
+bonitatem moralem. Moralis ergo bonitas voluntatis non dependet ex
+obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly, virtue
+is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness
+of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34350] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod iustitia est secundum
+quam aliqui volunt iusta, et eadem ratione, virtus est secundum
+quam aliqui volunt bona. Sed bona voluntas est quae est secundum
+virtutem. Ergo bonitas voluntatis est ex hoc quod aliquis vult
+bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just
+as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for
+as much as an opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing in species. Now the
+specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q19_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>). Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="34351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34351] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod bonum et malum sunt per se differentiae actus
+voluntatis. Nam bonum et malum per se ad voluntatem pertinent;
+sicut verum et falsum ad rationem, cuius actus per se distinguitur
+differentia veri et falsi, prout dicimus opinionem esse veram vel
+falsam. Unde voluntas bona et mala sunt actus differentes secundum
+speciem. Differentia autem speciei in actibus est secundum obiecta,
+ut dictum est. Et ideo bonum et malum in actibus voluntatis proprie
+attenditur secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure
+of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good,
+but sometimes evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34352] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod voluntas non semper est veri boni, sed quandoque
+est apparentis boni, quod quidem habet aliquam rationem boni, non
+tamen simpliciter convenientis ad appetendum. Et propter hoc actus
+voluntatis non est bonus semper, sed aliquando malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although an action can, in a certain way, be man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated
+above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q19_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34353] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quamvis aliquis actus possit esse ultimus finis
+hominis secundum aliquem modum, non tamen talis actus est actus
+voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is presented to the will as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral
+order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated
+above (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q19_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34354] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod bonum per rationem repraesentatur voluntati ut
+obiectum; et inquantum cadit sub ordine rationis, pertinet ad genus
+moris, et causat bonitatem moralem in actu voluntatis. Ratio enim
+principium est humanorum et moralium actuum, ut supra dictum
+est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A2-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 2. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
+the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers derive goodness not only from the object but also from
+the end, as we have shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q19_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[18] , A[4]</a>). Therefore the act also of the will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34355] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat solum
+ex obiecto. Finis enim affinior est voluntati quam alteri
+potentiae. Sed actus aliarum potentiarum recipiunt bonitatem non
+solum ex obiecto, sed etiam ex fine, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo
+etiam actus voluntatis recipit bonitatem non solum ex obiecto, sed
+etiam ex fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q19_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[3]</a>). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will: for
+instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not.
+Therefore the goodness of the will depends not only on
+the object, but also on the circumstances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34356] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonitas actus non solum est ex obiecto, sed etiam ex
+circumstantiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum diversitatem
+circumstantiarum contingit esse diversitatem bonitatis et malitiae
+in actu voluntatis, puta quod aliquis velit quando debet et ubi
+debet, et quantum debet, et quomodo debet, vel prout non debet.
+Ergo bonitas voluntatis non solum dependet ex obiecto, sed etiam ex
+circumstantiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q19_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). But it would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances. Therefore the goodness
+and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and not only on the object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34357] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ignorantia circumstantiarum excusat malitiam voluntatis, ut supra
+habitum est. Sed hoc non esset, nisi bonitas et malitia voluntatis
+a circumstantiis dependeret. Ergo bonitas et malitia voluntatis
+dependet ex circumstantiis, et non a solo obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> An action does not take its species from the circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good and evil
+are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A1" id="FS_Q19_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34358] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+ex circumstantiis, inquantum huiusmodi, actus non habet speciem, ut
+supra dictum est. Sed bonum et malum sunt specificae differentiae
+actus voluntatis, ut dictum est. Ergo bonitas et malitia voluntatis
+non dependet ex circumstantiis, sed ex solo obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
+primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist
+of one principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently
+the goodness and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
+goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A2-p7"> Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but something essential
+thereto: because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to its principle. Therefore the goodness of
+the will's act depends on that one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that one thing is the object,
+and not the circumstances, which are accidents, as it were, of the act.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="34359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34359] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in quolibet genere, quanto aliquid est prius, tanto
+est simplicius et in paucioribus consistens, sicut prima corpora
+sunt simplicia. Et ideo invenimus quod ea quae sunt prima in
+quolibet genere, sunt aliquo modo simplicia, et in uno consistunt.
+Principium autem bonitatis et malitiae humanorum actuum est ex actu
+voluntatis. Et ideo bonitas et malitia voluntatis secundum aliquid
+unum attenditur, aliorum vero actuum bonitas et malitia potest
+secundum diversa attendi. Illud autem unum quod est principium in
+quolibet genere, non est per accidens, sed per se, quia omne quod
+est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se, sicut ad
+principium. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis ex solo uno illo dependet,
+quod per se facit bonitatem in actu, scilicet ex obiecto, et non ex
+circumstantiis, quae sunt quaedam accidentia actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived
+from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers;
+except perhaps accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34360] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod finis est obiectum voluntatis, non autem aliarum
+virium. Unde quantum ad actum voluntatis, non differt bonitas quae
+est ex obiecto, a bonitate quae est ex fine, sicut in actibus
+aliarum virium, nisi forte per accidens, prout finis dependet ex
+fine, et voluntas ex voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said
+that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this
+circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed on something good: since to will to
+do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so
+that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to will something good when one ought
+not to, because one ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particular
+good, is prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time. And then evil results,
+not from his willing that particular good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the other
+circumstances.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34361] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, supposito quod voluntas sit boni, nulla
+circumstantia potest eam facere malam. Quod ergo dicitur quod
+aliquis vult aliquod bonum quando non debet vel ubi non debet,
+potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod ista circumstantia
+referatur ad volitum. Et sic voluntas non est boni, quia velle
+facere aliquid quando non debet fieri, non est velle bonum. Alio
+modo, ita quod referatur ad actum volendi. Et sic impossibile est
+quod aliquis velit bonum quando non debet, quia semper homo debet
+velle bonum, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum aliquis, volendo
+hoc bonum, impeditur ne tunc velit aliquod bonum debitum. Et tunc
+non incidit malum ex eo quod aliquis vult illud bonum; sed ex eo
+quod non vult aliud bonum. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis
+circumstantiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to
+say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34362] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod circumstantiarum ignorantia excusat malitiam
+voluntatis, secundum quod circumstantiae se tenent ex parte voliti,
+inquantum scilicet ignorat circumstantias actus quem vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A3-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 3. Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows.
+But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q19_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34363] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat a
+ratione. Prius enim non dependet a posteriori. Sed bonum per prius
+pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem, ut ex supradictis patet.
+Ergo bonum voluntatis non dependet a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity
+with right desire." But right desire is a good will. Therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness
+of the will, rather than conversely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34364] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod bonitas intellectus practici
+est verum conforme appetitui recto. Appetitus autem rectus est
+voluntas bona. Ergo bonitas rationis practicae magis dependet a
+bonitate voluntatis, quam e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers,
+as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34365] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+movens non dependet ab eo quod movetur, sed e converso. Voluntas
+autem movet rationem et alias vires, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
+bonitas voluntatis non dependet a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the goodness of
+the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34366] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Hilarius dicit, in X de Trin., <i>immoderata est omnis
+susceptarum voluntatum pertinacia, ubi non rationi voluntas
+subiicitur</i>. Sed bonitas voluntatis consistit in hoc quod non
+sit immoderata. Ergo bonitas voluntatis dependet ex hoc quod sit
+subiecta rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A1" id="FS_Q19_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to it by reason. Because the
+good understood is the proportionate object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will
+but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive
+appetite tends only to the particular
+good, apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends
+on the object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="34367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34367] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonitas voluntatis proprie ex
+obiecto dependet. Obiectum autem voluntatis proponitur ei per
+rationem. Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis
+proportionatum ei; bonum autem sensibile, vel imaginarium, non est
+proportionatum voluntati, sed appetitui sensitivo, quia voluntas
+potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit;
+appetitus autem sensitivus non tendit nisi in bonum particulare,
+quod apprehendit vis sensitiva. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis dependet
+a ratione, eo modo quo dependet ab obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered as true
+it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a
+good that is not previously apprehended by reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34368] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod bonum sub ratione boni, idest appetibilis, per
+prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem. Sed tamen per prius
+pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub
+ratione appetibilis, quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de
+bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this
+respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with
+the desire of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension
+of the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34369] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de intellectu practico,
+secundum quod est consiliativus et ratiocinativus eorum quae sunt
+ad finem, sic enim perficitur per prudentiam. In his autem quae
+sunt ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad
+appetitum finis debiti. Sed tamen et ipse appetitus finis debiti
+praesupponit rectam apprehensionem de fine, quae est per
+rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above
+(
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q19_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34370] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod voluntas quodam modo movet rationem; et ratio alio
+modo movet voluntatem, ex parte scilicet obiecti, ut supra dictum
+est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A4-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 4. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule
+and one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of
+the will does not depend on the eternal law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34371] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis humanae non
+dependeat a lege aeterna. Unius enim una est regula et mensura. Sed
+regula humanae voluntatis, ex qua eius bonitas dependet, est ratio
+recta. Ergo non dependet bonitas voluntatis a lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured" (Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the
+human will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the goodness of the human will depends.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34372] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+mensura est homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Sed lex
+aeterna non est homogenea voluntati humanae. Ergo lex aeterna non
+potest esse mensura voluntatis humanae, ut ab ea bonitas eius
+dependeat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which
+the goodness of our will depends.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34373] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+mensura debet esse certissima. Sed lex aeterna est nobis ignota.
+Ergo non potest esse nostrae voluntatis mensura, ut ab ea bonitas
+voluntatis nostrae dependeat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law." But malice of the will
+is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34374] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, XXII libro contra Faustum, quod
+<i>peccatum est factum, dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra
+aeternam legem</i>. Sed malitia voluntatis est radix peccati. Ergo,
+cum malitia bonitati opponatur, bonitas voluntatis dependet a lege
+aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause:
+since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that
+human reason is the rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness. Hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.6" target="asv">Ps. 4:6,7</a>): "Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord,
+is signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide our will, in so far
+as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance." It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends
+on the eternal law much more than on human reason: and when human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="34375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34375] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in omnibus causis ordinatis, effectus plus dependet a
+causa prima quam a causa secunda, quia causa secunda non agit nisi
+in virtute primae causae. Quod autem ratio humana sit regula
+voluntatis humanae, ex qua eius bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege
+aeterna, quae est ratio divina. Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur,
+<i>multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? Signatum est super nos
+lumen vultus tui, domine</i>, quasi diceret, lumen rationis quod in
+nobis est, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona, et nostram
+voluntatem regulare, inquantum est lumen vultus tui, idest a vultu
+tuo derivatum. Unde manifestum est quod multo magis dependet
+bonitas voluntatis humanae a lege aeterna, quam a ratione humana,
+et ubi deficit humana ratio, oportet ad rationem aeternam
+recurrere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To one thing there are not several proximate measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34376] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod unius rei non sunt plures mensurae proximae,
+possunt tamen esse plures mensurae, quarum una sub alia
+ordinetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is not.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34377] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod mensura proxima est homogenea mensurato, non autem
+mensura remota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us somewhat,
+either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34378] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, licet lex aeterna sit nobis ignota secundum quod est
+in mente divina; innotescit tamen nobis aliqualiter vel per
+rationem naturalem, quae ab ea derivatur ut propria eius imago; vel
+per aliqualem revelationem superadditam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A5-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 5. Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the
+human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A4" id="FS_Q19_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But erring reason is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore
+the will is not evil, if it be at variance with erring reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34379] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas discordans a ratione errante,
+non sit mala. Ratio enim est regula voluntatis humanae, inquantum
+derivatur a lege aeterna, ut dictum est. Sed ratio errans non
+derivatur a lege aeterna. Ergo ratio errans non est regula
+voluntatis humanae. Non est ergo voluntas mala, si discordat a
+ratione errante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher
+authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes
+proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring
+reason does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with
+erring reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34380] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum Augustinum, inferioris potestatis praeceptum non obligat,
+si contrarietur praecepto potestatis superioris, sicut si proconsul
+iubeat aliquid quod imperator prohibet. Sed ratio errans quandoque
+proponit aliquid quod est contra praeceptum superioris, scilicet
+Dei, cuius est summa potestas. Ergo dictamen rationis errantis non
+obligat. Non est ergo voluntas mala, si discordet a ratione
+errante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not
+reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in
+not willing to do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is not evil when it is at variance with
+erring reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34381] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis voluntas mala reducitur ad aliquam speciem malitiae. Sed
+voluntas discordans a ratione errante, non potest reduci ad aliquam
+speciem malitiae, puta, si ratio errans errat in hoc, quod dicat
+esse fornicandum, voluntas eius qui fornicari non vult, ad nullam
+malitiam reduci potest. Ergo voluntas discordans a ratione errante,
+non est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> As stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A13" id="FS_Q19_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[13]</a>, conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when
+the will is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>): "All that is not of faith"---i.e. all that is against conscience---"is sin." Therefore the will is evil when it is at
+variance with erring reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34382] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+sicut in primo dictum est, conscientia nihil aliud est quam
+applicatio scientiae ad aliquem actum. Scientia autem in ratione
+est. Voluntas ergo discordans a ratione errante, est contra
+conscientiam. Sed omnis talis voluntas est mala, dicitur enim Rom.
+XIV, <i>omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, idest omne
+quod est contra conscientiam. Ergo voluntas discordans a ratione
+errante, est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A13" id="FS_Q19_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[19], A[13]</a>), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire "whether an erring
+conscience binds." On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent;
+some are evil generically. And they say
+that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it
+tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids
+what is evil. On the other hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in
+itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man's reason
+or
+conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded,
+his reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either
+by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful.
+But they say that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good
+in itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with erring
+reason or conscience is not evil.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A5-p7"> But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience,
+is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of
+the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil
+to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q19_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this
+is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent
+matters can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character
+of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the
+reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good
+except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to
+it as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but
+that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is
+good
+in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason.
+Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were
+evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+vii, 9) that "properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also
+one who does not follow false reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason,
+whether right or erring, is always evil.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="34383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34383] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum conscientia sit quodammodo dictamen rationis
+(est enim quaedam applicatio scientiae ad actum, ut in primo dictum
+est), idem est quaerere utrum voluntas discordans a ratione errante
+sit mala, quod quaerere utrum conscientia errans obliget. Circa
+quod, aliqui distinxerunt tria genera actuum, quidam enim sunt boni
+ex genere; quidam sunt indifferentes; quidam sunt mali ex genere.
+Dicunt ergo quod, si ratio vel conscientia dicat aliquid esse
+faciendum quod sit bonum ex suo genere, non est ibi error.
+Similiter, si dicat aliquid non esse faciendum quod est malum ex
+suo genere, eadem enim ratione praecipiuntur bona, qua prohibentur
+mala. Sed si ratio vel conscientia dicat alicui quod illa quae sunt
+secundum se mala, homo teneatur facere ex praecepto; vel quod illa
+quae sunt secundum se bona, sint prohibita; erit ratio vel
+conscientia errans. Et similiter si ratio vel conscientia dicat
+alicui quod id quod est secundum se indifferens, ut levare festucam
+de terra, sit prohibitum vel praeceptum, erit ratio vel conscientia
+errans. Dicunt ergo quod ratio vel conscientia errans circa
+indifferentia, sive praecipiendo sive prohibendo, obligat, ita quod
+voluntas discordans a tali ratione errante, erit mala et peccatum.
+Sed ratio vel conscientia errans praecipiendo ea quae sunt per se
+mala, vel prohibendo ea quae sunt per se bona et necessaria ad
+salutem, non obligat, unde in talibus voluntas discordans a ratione
+vel conscientia errante, non est mala. Sed hoc irrationabiliter
+dicitur. In indifferentibus enim, voluntas discordans a ratione vel
+conscientia errante, est mala aliquo modo propter obiectum, a quo
+bonitas vel malitia voluntatis dependet, non autem propter obiectum
+secundum sui naturam; sed secundum quod per accidens a ratione
+apprehenditur ut malum ad faciendum vel ad vitandum. Et quia
+obiectum voluntatis est id quod proponitur a ratione, ut dictum
+est, ex quo aliquid proponitur a ratione ut malum, voluntas, dum in
+illud fertur, accipit rationem mali. Hoc autem contingit non solum
+in indifferentibus, sed etiam in per se bonis vel malis. Non solum
+enim id quod est indifferens, potest accipere rationem boni vel
+mali per accidens; sed etiam id quod est bonum, potest accipere
+rationem mali, vel illud quod est malum, rationem boni, propter
+apprehensionem rationis. Puta, abstinere a fornicatione bonum
+quoddam est, tamen in hoc bonum non fertur voluntas, nisi secundum
+quod a ratione proponitur. Si ergo proponatur ut malum a ratione
+errante, feretur in hoc sub ratione mali. Unde voluntas erit mala,
+quia vult malum, non quidem id quod est malum per se, sed id quod
+est malum per accidens, propter apprehensionem rationis. Et
+similiter credere in Christum est per se bonum, et necessarium ad
+salutem, sed voluntas non fertur in hoc, nisi secundum quod a
+ratione proponitur. Unde si a ratione proponatur ut malum, voluntas
+feretur in hoc ut malum, non quia sit malum secundum se, sed quia
+est malum per accidens ex apprehensione rationis. Et ideo
+philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod, per se loquendo,
+<i>incontinens est qui non sequitur rationem rectam, per accidens
+autem, qui non sequitur etiam rationem falsam</i>. Unde dicendum
+est simpliciter quod omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive
+recta sive errante, semper est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being
+true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34384] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod iudicium rationis errantis licet non derivetur a
+Deo, tamen ratio errans iudicium suum proponit ut verum, et per
+consequens ut a Deo derivatum, a quo est omnis veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command
+of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning
+the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason
+was dictating something contrary to God's commandment, he would not be
+bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being
+commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34385] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod verbum Augustini habet locum, quando cognoscitur quod
+inferior potestas praecipit aliquid contra praeceptum superioris
+potestatis. Sed si aliquis crederet quod praeceptum proconsulis
+esset praeceptum imperatoris, contemnendo praeceptum proconsulis,
+contemneret praeceptum imperatoris. Et similiter si aliquis homo
+cognosceret quod ratio humana dictaret aliquid contra praeceptum
+Dei, non teneretur rationem sequi, sed tunc ratio non totaliter
+esset errans. Sed quando ratio errans proponit aliquid ut
+praeceptum Dei, tunc idem est contemnere dictamen rationis, et Dei
+praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being something
+contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species
+of malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34386] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio, quando apprehendit aliquid ut malum, semper
+apprehendit illud sub aliqua ratione mali, puta quia contrariatur
+divino praecepto, vel quia est scandalum, vel propter aliquid
+huiusmodi. Et tunc ad talem speciem malitiae reducitur talis mala
+voluntas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A6-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 6. Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason,
+tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But
+the will is evil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even when it abides by erring reason, the
+will is good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34387] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas concordans rationi erranti,
+sit bona. Sicut enim voluntas discordans a ratione tendit in id
+quod ratio iudicat malum; ita voluntas concordans rationi, tendit
+in id quod ratio iudicat bonum. Sed voluntas discordans a ratione,
+etiam errante, est mala. Ergo voluntas concordans rationi, etiam
+erranti, est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's
+commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when
+it abides by erring reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34388] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas concordans praecepto Dei et legi aeternae, semper est
+bona. Sed lex aeterna et praeceptum Dei proponitur nobis per
+apprehensionem rationis, etiam errantis. Ergo voluntas concordans
+etiam rationi erranti, est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides
+by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man
+would be in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring
+reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34389] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas discordans a ratione errante, est mala. Si ergo voluntas
+concordans rationi erranti sit etiam mala, videtur quod omnis
+voluntas habentis rationem errantem, sit mala. Et sic talis homo
+erit perplexus, et ex necessitate peccabit, quod est inconveniens.
+Ergo voluntas concordans rationi erranti, est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.2" target="asv"> Jn. 16:2</a>: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God." Therefore the will can be evil,
+when it abides by erring reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34390] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+voluntas occidentium apostolos erat mala. Sed tamen concordabat
+rationi erranti ipsorum, secundum illud Ioan. XVI, <i>venit hora,
+ut omnis qui interficit vos, arbitretur obsequium se praestare
+Deo</i>. Ergo voluntas concordans rationi erranti, potest esse
+mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is the same
+as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance.
+For it was said (Q[6], A[8]) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral
+good and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q19_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil; but
+not, when it does not cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q[6], A[8]) that when ignorance is
+in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call that ignorance "directly"
+voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, "indirectly" voluntary, which
+is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]).
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A6-p7"> If then reason or conscience err with an error that is involuntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs
+about what one ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that abides by that erring
+reason or conscience, from being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence,
+so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will,
+that abides by that erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another
+man's wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law,
+which he is bound to know. But if a man's reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right
+when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which
+ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="34391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34391] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut praemissa quaestio eadem est cum quaestione
+qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea liget; ita ista quaestio
+eadem est cum illa qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea excuset.
+Haec autem quaestio dependet ab eo quod supra de ignorantia dictum
+est. Dictum est enim supra quod ignorantia quandoque causat
+involuntarium, quandoque autem non. Et quia bonum et malum morale
+consistit in actu inquantum est voluntarius, ut ex praemissis
+patet; manifestum est quod illa ignorantia quae causat
+involuntarium, tollit rationem boni et mali moralis; non autem illa
+quae involuntarium non causat. Dictum est etiam supra quod
+ignorantia quae est aliquo modo volita, sive directe sive
+indirecte, non causat involuntarium. Et dico ignorantiam directe
+voluntariam, in quam actus voluntatis fertur, indirecte autem,
+propter negligentiam, ex eo quod aliquis non vult illud scire quod
+scire tenetur, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur ratio vel conscientia
+erret errore voluntario, vel directe, vel propter negligentiam,
+quia est error circa id quod quis scire tenetur; tunc talis error
+rationis vel conscientiae non excusat quin voluntas concordans
+rationi vel conscientiae sic erranti, sit mala. Si autem sit error
+qui causet involuntarium, proveniens ex ignorantia alicuius
+circumstantiae absque omni negligentia; tunc talis error rationis
+vel conscientiae excusat, ut voluntas concordans rationi erranti
+non sit mala. Puta, si ratio errans dicat quod homo teneatur ad
+uxorem alterius accedere, voluntas concordans huic rationi erranti
+est mala, eo quod error iste provenit ex ignorantia legis Dei, quam
+scire tenetur. Si autem ratio erret in hoc, quod credat aliquam
+mulierem submissam, esse suam uxorem, et, ea petente debitum, velit
+eam cognoscere; excusatur voluntas eius, ut non sit mala, quia
+error iste ex ignorantia circumstantiae provenit, quae excusat, et
+involuntarium causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect." Consequently in
+order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be
+apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34392] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit in IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
+<i>bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus
+defectibus</i>. Et ideo ad hoc quod dicatur malum id in quod fertur
+voluntas, sufficit sive quod secundum suam naturam sit malum, sive
+quod apprehendatur ut malum. Sed ad hoc quod sit bonum, requiritur
+quod utroque modo sit bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can. Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right,
+nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34393] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod lex aeterna errare non potest, sed ratio humana
+potest errare. Et ideo voluntas concordans rationi humanae non
+semper est recta, nec semper est concordans legis aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one absurdity,
+others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether
+he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose
+a man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then evil
+must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible
+and voluntary.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34394] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut in syllogisticis, uno inconvenienti dato,
+necesse est alia sequi; ita in moralibus, uno inconvenienti posito,
+ex necessitate alia sequuntur. Sicut, supposito quod aliquis
+quaerat inanem gloriam, sive propter inanem gloriam faciat quod
+facere tenetur, sive dimittat, peccabit. Nec tamen est perplexus,
+quia potest intentionem malam dimittere. Et similiter, supposito
+errore rationis vel conscientiae qui procedit ex ignorantia non
+excusante, necesse est quod sequatur malum in voluntate. Nec tamen
+est homo perplexus, quia potest ab errore recedere, cum ignorantia
+sit vincibilis et voluntaria.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A7-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 7. Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q19_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing,
+and the end intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the
+end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34395] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat ex
+intentione finis. Dictum est enim supra quod bonitas voluntatis
+dependet ex solo obiecto. Sed in his quae sunt ad finem, aliud est
+obiectum voluntatis, et aliud finis intentus. Ergo in talibus
+bonitas voluntatis non dependet ab intentione finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a good will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance,
+to vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does
+not depend on the intention of the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34396] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+velle servare mandatum Dei, pertinet ad voluntatem bonam. Sed hoc
+potest referri ad malum finem, scilicet ad finem inanis gloriae,
+vel cupiditatis, dum aliquis vult obedire Deo propter temporalia
+consequenda. Ergo bonitas voluntatis non dependet ab intentione
+finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on
+the malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms, has an evil will, although he intends
+a good end. Therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end intended.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34397] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum et malum, sicut diversificant voluntatem, ita diversificant
+finem. Sed malitia voluntatis non dependet a malitia finis intenti,
+qui enim vult furari ut det eleemosynam, voluntatem malam habet,
+licet intendat finem bonum. Ergo etiam bonitas voluntatis non
+dependet a bonitate finis intenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards the intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the
+goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34398] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, IX Confess., quod intentio remuneratur a
+Deo. Sed ex eo aliquid remuneratur a Deo, quia est bonum. Ergo
+bonitas voluntatis ex intentione finis dependet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine
+edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a
+certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance,
+when a man wills to fast for God's sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good
+from the very fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the
+thing willed, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A1" id="FS_Q19_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the end.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A7-p7"> On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will; for instance,
+a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will
+does not depend on the subsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent intention.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="34399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34399] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod intentio dupliciter se potest habere ad voluntatem,
+uno modo, ut praecedens; alio modo, ut concomitans. Praecedit
+quidem causaliter intentio voluntatem, quando aliquid volumus
+propter intentionem alicuius finis. Et tunc ordo ad finem
+consideratur ut ratio quaedam bonitatis ipsius voliti, puta cum
+aliquis vult ieiunare propter Deum, habet enim ieiunium rationem
+boni ex hoc ipso quod fit propter Deum. Unde, cum bonitas
+voluntatis dependeat a bonitate voliti, ut supra dictum est,
+necesse est quod dependeat ex intentione finis. Consequitur autem
+intentio voluntatem, quando accedit voluntati praeexistenti, puta
+si aliquis velit aliquid facere, et postea referat illud in Deum.
+Et tunc primae voluntatis bonitas non dependet ex intentione
+sequenti, nisi quatenus reiteratur actus voluntatis cum sequenti
+intentione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the intention is the cause of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of
+the object, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34400] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, quando intentio est causa volendi, ordo ad
+finem accipitur ut quaedam ratio bonitatis in obiecto, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give
+an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed
+by him, it is evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the act of the will, then the
+latter may be good: and the intention does not spoil that act of the will which
+preceded, but that which is repeated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34401] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod voluntas non potest dici bona, si sit intentio mala
+causa volendi. Qui enim vult dare eleemosynam propter inanem
+gloriam consequendam, vult id quod de se est bonum, sub ratione
+mali, et ideo, prout est volitum ab ipso, est malum. Unde voluntas
+eius est mala. Sed si intentio sit consequens, tunc voluntas potuit
+esse bona, et per intentionem sequentem non depravatur ille actus
+voluntatis qui praecessit, sed actus voluntatis qui iteratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause."
+Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of good; or to the good under the species of
+evil, it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the species of
+good; in other words, it must will the good for the sake of the good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34402] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, malum contingit ex
+singularibus defectibus, bonum vero ex tota et integra causa. Unde
+sive voluntas sit eius quod est secundum se malum, etiam sub
+ratione boni; sive sit boni sub ratione mali; semper voluntas erit
+mala. Sed ad hoc quod sit voluntas bona, requiritur quod sit boni
+sub ratione boni; idest quod velit bonum, et propter bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A8-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 8. Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.35" target="asv"> Mat. 12:35, </a> "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good
+as he intends." But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A7" id="FS_Q19_A8-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Therefore the goodness of a
+man's will is according to the goodness of his intention.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34403] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod quantitas bonitatis in voluntate,
+dependeat ex quantitate bonitatis in intentione. Quia super illud
+Matth. XII, <i>bonus homo de thesauro bono cordis sui profert
+bona</i>, dicit Glossa, tantum boni quis facit, quantum intendit.
+Sed intentio non solum dat bonitatem actui exteriori, sed etiam
+voluntati, ut dictum est. Ergo tantum aliquis habet bonam
+voluntatem, quantum intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
+Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34404] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+augmentata causa, augmentatur effectus. Sed intentionis bonitas est
+causa bonae voluntatis. Ergo quantum quis intendit de bono, tantum
+voluntas est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
+intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to
+the good intended.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34405] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+in malis quantum aliquis intendit, tantum peccat, si enim aliquis
+proiiciens lapidem, intenderet facere homicidium, reus esset
+homicidii. Ergo, pari ratione, in bonis tantum est bona voluntas,
+quantum aliquis bonum intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The intention can be good, while the will is evil. Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the will
+less good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34406] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+potest esse intentio bona, et voluntas mala. Ergo, pari ratione,
+potest esse intentio magis bona, et voluntas minus bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object,
+by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a
+man wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A8-p7"> If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quantity in
+the act does not depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external act this may happen in two ways. First,
+through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man were to
+give ten pounds, he could not realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
+Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to
+remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand,
+with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior acts of the will are in our
+power, whereas the external actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end:
+and thus the will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention
+also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity
+of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good
+for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A8-p8"> But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity
+of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands in relation to
+them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q12_A4" id="FS_Q19_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q19_A8-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior
+act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine
+as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon
+the intense volition of medicine.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A8-p9"> We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object:
+as when a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely;
+because the quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quantity of the good intended, as
+is shown above. And hence it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the
+quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (
+<a href="#FS_Q20_A4" id="FS_Q19_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[20] , A[4]</a>;
+<a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q114_A4" id="FS_Q19_A8-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[114], A[4]</a>).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="34407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34407] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod circa actum et intentionem finis, duplex quantitas
+potest considerari, una ex parte obiecti, quia vult maius bonum,
+vel agit; alia ex intensione actus, quia intense vult vel agit,
+quod est maius ex parte agentis. Si igitur loquamur de quantitate
+utriusque quantum ad obiectum, manifestum est quod quantitas actus
+non sequitur quantitatem intentionis. Quod quidem ex parte actus
+exterioris, contingere potest dupliciter. Uno modo, quia obiectum
+quod ordinatur ad finem intentum, non est proportionatum fini illi,
+sicut si quis daret decem libras, non posset consequi suam
+intentionem, si intenderet emere rem valentem centum libras. Alio
+modo, propter impedimenta quae supervenire possunt circa exteriorem
+actum, quae non est in potestate nostra removere, puta, aliquis
+intendit ire usque Romam, et occurrunt ei impedimenta, quod non
+potest hoc facere. Sed ex parte interioris actus voluntatis, non
+est nisi uno modo, quia interiores actus voluntatis sunt in
+potestate nostra, non autem exteriores actus. Sed voluntas potest
+velle aliquod obiectum non proportionatum fini intento, et sic
+voluntas quae fertur in illud obiectum absolute consideratum, non
+est tantum bona, quantum est intentio. Sed quia etiam ipsa intentio
+quodammodo pertinet ad actum voluntatis, inquantum scilicet est
+ratio eius; propter hoc redundat quantitas bonae intentionis in
+voluntatem, inquantum scilicet voluntas vult aliquod bonum magnum
+ut finem, licet illud per quod vult consequi tantum bonum, non sit
+dignum illo bono. Si vero consideretur quantitas intentionis et
+actus secundum intensionem utriusque, sic intensio intentionis
+redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis, quia ipsa
+intentio quodammodo se habet formaliter ad utrumque, ut ex supra
+dictis patet. Licet materialiter, intentione existente intensa,
+possit esse actus interior vel exterior non ita intensus,
+materialiter loquendo, puta cum aliquis non ita intense vult
+medicinam sumere, sicut vult sanitatem. Tamen hoc ipsum quod est
+intense intendere sanitatem, redundat formaliter in hoc quod est
+intense velle medicinam. Sed tamen hoc est considerandum, quod
+intensio actus interioris vel exterioris potest referri ad
+intentionem ut obiectum, puta cum aliquis intendit intense velle,
+vel aliquid intense operari. Et tamen non propter hoc intense vult
+vel operatur, quia quantitatem boni intenti non sequitur bonitas
+actus interioris vel exterioris, ut dictum est. Et inde est quod
+non quantum aliquis intendit mereri, meretur, quia quantitas meriti
+consistit in intensione actus, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another
+gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart is the intention, according to which God judges our works."
+For the goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes even
+the external act to be meritorious in God's sight.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34408] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur quantum ad reputationem
+Dei, qui praecipue considerat intentionem finis. Unde alia Glossa
+dicit ibidem quod <i>thesaurus cordis intentio est, ex qua Deus
+iudicat opera</i>. Bonitas enim intentionis, ut dictum est,
+redundat quodammodo in bonitatem voluntatis, quae facit etiam
+exteriorem actum meritorium apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34409] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bonitas intentionis non est tota causa bonae
+voluntatis. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention
+is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34410] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod sola malitia intentionis sufficit ad malitiam
+voluntatis, et ideo etiam quantum mala est intentio, tantum mala
+est voluntas. Sed non est eadem ratio de bonitate, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q20" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q20-p0.1">Q. 20. OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q20-p2"> We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q20-p3"><a href="#FS_Q20_A1"> (1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p4"><a href="#FS_Q20_A2"> (2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p5"><a href="#FS_Q20_A3"> (3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p6"><a href="#FS_Q20_A4"> (4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p7"><a href="#FS_Q20_A5"> (5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p8"><a href="#FS_Q20_A6"> (6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 pr."><a name="34431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34431]
+Iª-IIae q. 20 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+bonitate et malitia quantum ad exteriores actus. Et circa hoc
+quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonitas et malitia per prius sit in
+actu voluntatis, vel in actu exteriori secundo, utrum tota bonitas
+vel malitia actus exterioris dependeat ex bonitate voluntatis.
+Tertio, utrum sit eadem bonitas et malitia interioris et exterioris
+actus. Quarto, utrum actus exterior aliquid addat de bonitate vel
+malitia supra actum interiorem. Quinto, utrum eventus sequens
+aliquid addat de bonitate vel malitia ad actum exteriorem. Sexto,
+utrum idem actus exterior possit esse bonus et malus.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q20_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A1-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 1. Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the external action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives goodness
+from its object, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A1" id="FS_Q20_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[1]</a>,2). But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or
+to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34432] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum et malum per prius consistat in
+actu exteriori quam in actu voluntatis. Voluntas enim habet
+bonitatem ex obiecto, ut supra dictum est. Sed actus exterior est
+obiectum interioris actus voluntatis, dicimur enim velle furtum,
+vel velle dare eleemosynam. Ergo malum et bonum per prius est in
+actu exteriori, quam in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from
+its relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q20_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act
+of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34433] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum per prius convenit fini, quia ea quae sunt ad finem, habent
+rationem boni ex ordine ad finem. Actus autem voluntatis non potest
+esse finis, ut supra dictum est, actus alicuius alterius potentiae
+potest esse finis. Ergo per prius consistit bonum in actu potentiae
+alterius, quam in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q20_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[6]</a>). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter. Therefore good and evil are in the external
+action, prior to being in the act of the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34434] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus voluntatis formaliter se habet ad actum exteriorem, ut supra
+dictum est. Sed id quod est formale, est posterius, nam forma
+advenit materiae. Ergo per prius est bonum et malum in actu
+exteriori quam in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright." Therefore moral good and
+evil are first in the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34435] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod <i>voluntas est
+qua peccatur, et recte vivitur</i>. Ergo bonum et malum morale per
+prius consistit in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> External actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected
+with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said
+to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the
+end is the will's proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the
+external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes
+to the external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on account of its
+being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason.
+Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and
+apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution
+of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="34436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34436] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliqui actus exteriores possunt dici boni vel mali
+dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum genus suum, et secundum
+circumstantias in ipsis consideratas, sicut dare eleemosynam,
+servatis debitis circumstantiis, dicitur esse bonum. Alio modo
+dicitur aliquid esse bonum vel malum ex ordine ad finem, sicut dare
+eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam, dicitur esse malum. Cum autem
+finis sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, manifestum est quod ista
+ratio boni vel mali quam habet actus exterior ex ordine ad finem,
+per prius invenitur in actu voluntatis, et ex eo derivatur ad actum
+exteriorem. Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior
+secundum se, propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias,
+non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a ratione. Unde si
+consideretur bonitas exterioris actus secundum quod est in
+ordinatione et apprehensione rationis, prior est quam bonitas actus
+voluntatis, sed si consideretur secundum quod est in executione
+operis, sequitur bonitatem voluntatis, quae est principium
+eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended
+and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution
+of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34437] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod actus exterior est obiectum voluntatis,
+inquantum proponitur voluntati a ratione ut quoddam bonum
+apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem, et sic est prius quam bonum
+actus voluntatis. Inquantum vero consistit in executione operis,
+est effectus voluntatis, et sequitur voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in the order of execution.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34438] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod finis est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in
+executione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order
+of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action,
+as its efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active cause, is the form of the
+exterior action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34439] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod forma, secundum quod est recepta in materia, est
+posterior in via generationis quam materia, licet sit prior natura,
+sed secundum quod est in causa agente, est omnibus modis prior.
+Voluntas autem comparatur ad actum exteriorem sicut causa
+efficiens. Unde bonitas actus voluntatis est forma exterioris
+actus, sicut in causa agente existens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A2-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 2. Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit." But, according to the gloss,
+the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be
+good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34440] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod tota bonitas et malitia actus
+exterioris dependeat ex voluntate. Dicitur enim Matth. VII, <i>non
+potest arbor bona malos fructus facere, nec arbor mala facere
+fructus bonos</i>. Per arborem autem intelligitur voluntas, et per
+fructum opus, secundum Glossam. Ergo non potest esse quod voluntas
+interior sit bona, et actus exterior sit malus; aut e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will,
+there will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34441] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod non nisi voluntate
+peccatur. Si ergo non sit peccatum in voluntate, non erit peccatum
+in exteriori actu. Et ita tota bonitas vel malitia exterioris actus
+ex voluntate dependet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential
+division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary,
+it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34442] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum et malum de quo nunc loquimur, sunt differentiae moralis
+actus. Differentiae autem per se dividunt genus, secundum
+philosophum, in VII Metaphys. Cum igitur actus sit moralis ex eo
+quod est voluntarius, videtur quod bonum et malum accipitur in actu
+solum ex parte voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34443] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quod
+<i>quaedam sunt quae nullo quasi bono fine, aut bona voluntate,
+possunt bene fieri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q20_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, we may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the
+other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will:
+while that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness
+of the will, in so far as the will
+tends towards it.
+</p><p id="FS_Q20_A2-p7"> Now it must be observed, as was noted above (
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A6" id="FS_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[6]</a>, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for
+it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object
+and from its end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this
+is not enough to make the
+external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed,
+it follows that the external action is evil.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 co."><a name="34444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34444] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in actu exteriori potest
+considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia, una secundum debitam
+materiam et circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa
+quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex
+voluntate. Illa autem quae est ex debita materia vel
+circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione, et ex hac dependet bonitas
+voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur. Est autem considerandum
+quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad hoc quod aliquid sit malum,
+sufficit unus singularis defectus, ad hoc autem quod sit
+simpliciter bonum, non sufficit unum singulare bonum, sed
+requiritur integritas bonitatis. Si igitur voluntas sit bona et ex
+obiecto proprio, et ex fine, consequens est actum exteriorem esse
+bonum. Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exterior sit bonus,
+bonitas voluntatis quae est ex intentione finis, sed si voluntas
+sit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive ex actu volito, consequens
+est actum exteriorem esse malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed
+and from the end intended.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34445] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod voluntas bona, prout significatur per arborem
+bonam, est accipienda secundum quod habet bonitatem ex actu volito,
+et ex fine intento.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34446] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non solum aliquis voluntate peccat, quando vult malum
+finem; sed etiam quando vult malum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from
+the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34447] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur non solum actus interior
+voluntatis, sed etiam actus exteriores, prout a voluntate procedunt
+et ratione. Et ideo circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia
+boni et mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A3-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 3. Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those of the interior act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior act of the will are not the same as those of the external action.
+For the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle
+of the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the principles of action are different, the
+actions themselves are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of goodness
+or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the
+same as that of the external action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34448] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non eadem sit bonitas vel malitia
+actus interioris voluntatis, et exterioris actus. Actus enim
+interioris principium est vis animae interior apprehensiva vel
+appetitiva, actus autem exterioris principium est potentia exequens
+motum. Ubi autem sunt diversa principia actionis, ibi sunt diversi
+actus. Actus autem est subiectum bonitatis vel malitiae. Non potest
+autem esse idem accidens in diversis subiectis. Ergo non potest
+esse eadem bonitas interioris et exterioris actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective
+virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore
+the goodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from the goodness of the external action,
+which belongs to the power commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34449] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a>
+<i>Praeterea, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius
+bonum reddit</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed alia est virtus
+intellectualis in potentia imperante, et alia virtus moralis in
+potentia imperata, ut patet ex I Ethic. Ergo alia est bonitas actus
+interioris, qui est potentiae imperantis, et alia est bonitas actus
+exterioris, qui est potentiae imperatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act
+is the cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34450] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+causa et effectus idem esse non possunt, nihil enim est causa sui
+ipsius. Sed bonitas actus interioris est causa bonitatis actus
+exterioris, aut e converso, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest esse
+eadem bonitas utriusque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It was shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q20_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[6]</a>) that the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that which results from the material and formal
+element is one thing. Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34451] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod supra ostensum est quod actus voluntatis se habet ut
+formale ad actum exteriorem. Ex formali autem et materiali fit
+unum. Ergo est una bonitas actus interioris et exterioris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q20_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[17], A[4]), the interior act of the will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now
+it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it
+has but one. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external
+action, and sometimes not. For as we have already said (
+<a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2),
+these two goodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things
+that are subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good
+merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other the goodness
+of the draught; but one and the same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is subordinate to something
+else, has some aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a palatable
+medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health.
+</p><p id="FS_Q20_A3-p7"> We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end only, then there
+is but one and the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end, and of the external action, which
+regards the end through the medium of the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or malice of itself,
+i.e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct from the
+goodness of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the external action, and the goodness
+of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="34452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34452] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus interior voluntatis et
+actus exterior, prout considerantur in genere moris, sunt unus
+actus. Contingit autem quandoque actum qui est unus subiecto,
+habere plures rationes bonitatis vel malitiae; et quandoque unam
+tantum. Sic ergo dicendum quod quandoque est eadem bonitas vel
+malitia interioris et exterioris actus; quandoque alia et alia.
+Sicut enim iam dictum est, praedictae duae bonitates vel malitiae,
+scilicet interioris et exterioris actus, ad invicem ordinantur.
+Contingit autem in his quae ad aliud ordinantur, quod aliquid est
+bonum ex hoc solum quod ad aliud ordinatur, sicut potio amara ex
+hoc solo est bona, quod est sanativa. Unde non est alia bonitas
+sanitatis et potionis, sed una et eadem. Quandoque vero illud quod
+ad aliud ordinatur, habet in se aliquam rationem boni, etiam
+praeter ordinem ad aliud bonum, sicut medicina saporosa habet
+rationem boni delectabilis, praeter hoc quod est sanativa. Sic ergo
+dicendum quod, quando actus exterior est bonus vel malus solum ex
+ordine ad finem, tunc est omnino eadem bonitas vel malitia actus
+voluntatis, qui per se respicit finem, et actus exterioris, qui
+respicit finem mediante actu voluntatis. Quando autem actus
+exterior habet bonitatem vel malitiam secundum se, scilicet
+secundum materiam vel circumstantias, tunc bonitas exterioris actus
+est una, et bonitas voluntatis quae est ex fine, est alia, ita
+tamen quod et bonitas finis ex voluntate redundat in actum
+exteriorem, et bonitas materiae et circumstantiarum redundat in
+actum voluntatis, sicut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that the internal and external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are
+in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A4" id="FS_Q20_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[4]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34453] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod actus interior et
+exterior sunt diversi secundum genus naturae. Sed tamen ex eis sic
+diversis constituitur unum in genere moris, ut supra dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that
+virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues
+are necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue,
+in so far as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34454] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VI Ethic., virtutes morales
+ordinantur ad ipsos actus virtutum, qui sunt quasi fines; prudentia
+autem, quae est in ratione, ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et propter
+hoc requiruntur diversae virtutes. Sed ratio recta de ipso fine
+virtutum non habet aliam bonitatem quam bonitatem virtutis,
+secundum quod bonitas rationis participatur in qualibet
+virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both: thus
+when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically.
+But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in
+both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from
+the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the
+body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of the external
+action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order of one to the other.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34455] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, quando aliquid ex uno derivatur in alterum sicut ex
+causa agente univoca, tunc aliud est quod est in utroque, sicut cum
+calidum calefacit, alius numero est calor calefacientis, et calor
+calefacti, licet idem specie. Sed quando aliquid derivatur ab uno
+in alterum secundum analogiam vel proportionem, tunc est tantum
+unum numero, sicut a sano quod est in corpore animalis, derivatur
+sanum ad medicinam et urinam; nec alia sanitas est medicinae et
+urinae, quam sanitas animalis, quam medicina facit, et urina
+significat. Et hoc modo a bonitate voluntatis derivatur bonitas
+actus exterioris, et e converso, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad
+alterum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A5-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 5. Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually
+in its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually
+in actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue "makes that which has it to be
+good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an
+action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34464] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel
+malitiam actus. Effectus enim virtute praeexistit in causa. Sed
+eventus consequuntur actus sicut effectus causas. Ergo virtute
+praeexistunt in actibus. Sed unumquodque secundum suam virtutem
+iudicatur bonum vel malum, nam virtus est quae bonum facit
+habentem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo eventus addunt ad bonitatem
+vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these
+redound to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.1" target="asv"> Phil. 4:1</a>: "My dearly beloved brethren, my joy and my crown." Therefore the consequences of an action increase its goodness or malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34465] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+bona quae faciunt auditores, sunt effectus quidam consequentes ex
+praedicatione doctoris. Sed huiusmodi bona redundant ad meritum
+praedicatoris, ut patet per id quod dicitur Philipp. IV, <i>fratres
+mei carissimi et desideratissimi, gaudium meum et corona mea</i>.
+Ergo eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault increases: wherefore it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." But the punishment is increased on account
+of the consequences; for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.29" target="asv">Ex. 21:29</a>): "But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not
+shut him up, and he shall
+kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death." But he would not have been
+put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness
+or malice of an action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34466] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+poena non additur nisi crescente culpa, unde dicitur Deut. XXV,
+<i>pro mensura peccati, erit et plagarum modus</i>. Sed ex eventu
+sequente additur ad poenam, dicitur enim Exod. XXI, <i>quod si bos
+fuerit cornupeta ab heri et nudius tertius, et contestati sunt
+dominum eius, nec recluserit eum, occideritque virum aut mulierem;
+et bos lapidibus obruetur, et dominum eius occident</i>. Non autem
+occideretur, si bos non occidisset hominem, etiam non reclusus.
+Ergo eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does
+not contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the consequence of an action increase its goodness
+or malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="34467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34467] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+si aliquis ingerat causam mortis percutiendo vel sententiam dando,
+et mors non sequatur, non contrahitur irregularitas. Contraheretur
+autem si mors sequeretur. Ergo eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem
+vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The consequences do not make an action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man
+give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver;
+and, in like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences
+of an action doe not increase its goodness or malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34468] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+eventus sequens non facit actum malum qui erat bonus, nec bonum qui
+erat malus. Puta si aliquis det eleemosynam pauperi, qua ille
+abutatur ad peccatum, nihil deperit ei qui eleemosynam fecit, et
+similiter si aliquis patienter ferat iniuriam sibi factam, non
+propter hoc excusatur ille qui fecit. Ergo eventus sequens non
+addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q20_A5-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness
+or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom,
+this shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
+</p><p id="FS_Q20_A5-p8"> But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action
+and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is
+evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a
+nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do
+not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it
+by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 co."><a name="34469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34469] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod eventus sequens aut est praecogitatus, aut non. Si
+est praecogitatus, manifestum est quod addit ad bonitatem vel
+malitiam. Cum enim aliquis cogitans quod ex opere suo multa mala
+possunt sequi, nec propter hoc dimittit, ex hoc apparet voluntas
+eius esse magis inordinata. Si autem eventus sequens non sit
+praecogitatus, tunc distinguendum est. Quia si per se sequitur ex
+tali actu, et ut in pluribus, secundum hoc eventus sequens addit ad
+bonitatem vel malitiam actus, manifestum est enim meliorem actum
+esse ex suo genere, ex quo possunt plura bona sequi; et peiorem, ex
+quo nata sunt plura mala sequi. Si vero per accidens, et ut in
+paucioribus, tunc eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel ad
+malitiam actus, non enim datur iudicium de re aliqua secundum illud
+quod est per accidens, sed solum secundum illud quod est per
+se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34470] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtus causae existimatur secundum effectus per
+se, non autem secundum effectus per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good actions done by the hearers, result from the preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature. Hence
+they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such is his intention.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34471] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bona quae auditores faciunt, consequuntur ex
+praedicatione doctoris sicut effectus per se. Unde redundant ad
+praemium praedicatoris, et praecipue quando sunt praeintenta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The consequences for which that man is ordered to be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed
+to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34472] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod eventus ille pro quo illi poena infligenda mandatur,
+et per se sequitur ex tali causa, et iterum ponitur ut
+praecogitatus. Et ideo imputatur ad poenam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument would prove if irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of the
+fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="34473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34473] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si irregularitas sequeretur
+culpam. Non autem sequitur culpam, sed factum, propter aliquem
+defectum sacramenti.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q21" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q21-p0.1">Q. 21. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q21-p2"> We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there
+are four points of inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q21-p3"><a href="#FS_Q21_A1"> (1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q21-p4"><a href="#FS_Q21_A2"> (2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?</a></p><p id="FS_Q21-p5"><a href="#FS_Q21_A3"> (3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?</a></p><p id="FS_Q21-p6"><a href="#FS_Q21_A4"> (4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 pr."><a name="34482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34482]
+Iª-IIae q. 21 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his
+quae consequuntur actus humanos ratione bonitatis vel malitiae. Et
+circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum actus humanus, inquantum
+est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati.
+Secundo, utrum habeat rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis. Tertio,
+utrum habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti. Quarto, utrum habeat
+rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q21_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q21_A1-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 1. Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature"
+(Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced
+according to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not
+sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34483] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus, inquantum est bonus vel
+malus, non habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati. Peccata enim
+sunt monstra in natura, ut dicitur in II Physic. Monstra autem non
+sunt actus, sed sunt quaedam res generatae praeter ordinem naturae.
+Ea autem quae sunt secundum artem et rationem, imitantur ea quae
+sunt secundum naturam, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo actus ex hoc quod
+est inordinatus et malus, non habet rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained.
+But the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore
+it seems that the malice of an action does not make it sinful.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34484] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum, ut dicitur in II Physic., accidit in natura et arte, cum
+non pervenitur ad finem intentum a natura vel arte. Sed bonitas vel
+malitia actus humani maxime consistit in intentione finis, et eius
+prosecutione. Ergo videtur quod malitia actus non inducat rationem
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false:
+since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34485] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si malitia actus induceret rationem peccati, sequeretur quod
+ubicumque esset malum, ibi esset peccatum. Hoc autem est falsum,
+nam poena, licet habeat rationem mali, non tamen habet rationem
+peccati. Non ergo ex hoc quod aliquis actus est malus, habet
+rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> As shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A4" id="FS_Q21_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), the goodness of a human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently its malice consists in its being
+in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin
+is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law." Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34486] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+bonitas actus humani, ut supra ostensum est, principaliter dependet
+a lege aeterna, et per consequens malitia eius in hoc consistit,
+quod discordat a lege aeterna. Sed hoc facit rationem peccati,
+dicit enim Augustinus, XXII contra Faustum, quod <i>peccatum est
+dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum aliquid contra legem
+aeternam</i>. Ergo actus humanus ex hoc quod est malus, habet
+rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q21_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an
+evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order
+to an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is the natural force that inclines them
+to that end. When therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
+natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action
+does not swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an action strays from this rectitude, it comes
+under the notion of sin.
+</p><p id="FS_Q21_A1-p7"> Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal
+Law. When, therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, then that
+action is right: but when it turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is evident from what has
+been said (
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q21_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4) that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order
+of reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence
+it follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 co."><a name="34487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34487] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod malum in plus est quam peccatum, sicut et bonum in
+plus est quam rectum. Quaelibet enim privatio boni in quocumque
+constituit rationem mali, sed peccatum proprie consistit in actu
+qui agitur propter finem aliquem, cum non habet debitum ordinem ad
+finem illum. Debitus autem ordo ad finem secundum aliquam regulam
+mensuratur. Quae quidem regula in his quae secundum naturam agunt,
+est ipsa virtus naturae, quae inclinat in talem finem. Quando ergo
+actus procedit a virtute naturali secundum naturalem inclinationem
+in finem, tunc servatur rectitudo in actu, quia medium non exit ab
+extremis, scilicet actus ab ordine activi principii ad finem.
+Quando autem a rectitudine tali actus aliquis recedit, tunc incidit
+ratio peccati. In his vero quae aguntur per voluntatem, regula
+proxima est ratio humana; regula autem suprema est lex aeterna.
+Quando ergo actus hominis procedit in finem secundum ordinem
+rationis et legis aeternae, tunc actus est rectus, quando autem ab
+hac rectitudine obliquatur, tunc dicitur esse peccatum. Manifestum
+est autem ex praemissis quod omnis actus voluntarius est malus per
+hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis aeternae, et omnis
+actus bonus concordat rationi et legi aeternae. Unde sequitur quod
+actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem
+rectitudinis vel peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from a sin in nature's action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34488] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod monstra dicuntur esse peccata, inquantum
+producta sunt ex peccato in actu naturae existente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is twofold; the last end, and the proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in respect of
+the last end, which is the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end whatever;
+since when nature works it forms something. In like manner, the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended,
+because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is the last
+end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the
+very intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be right or sinful.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34489] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod duplex est finis, scilicet ultimus, et propinquus. In
+peccato autem naturae, deficit quidem actus a fine ultimo, qui est
+perfectio generati; non tamen deficit a quocumque fine proximo;
+operatur enim natura aliquid formando. Similiter in peccato
+voluntatis, semper est defectus ab ultimo fine intento, quia nullus
+actus voluntarius malus est ordinabilis ad beatitudinem, quae est
+ultimus finis, licet non deficiat ab aliquo fine proximo, quem
+voluntas intendit et consequitur. Unde etiam cum ipsa intentio
+huius finis ordinetur ad finem ultimum, in ipsa intentione
+huiusmodi finis potest inveniri ratio rectitudinis et peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each thing is ordained to its end by its action: and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end,
+consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the
+<a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q21_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>, ad 4; A[6], ad 3.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34490] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per actum suum, et
+ideo ratio peccati, quae consistit in deviatione ab ordine ad
+finem, proprie consistit in actu. Sed poena respicit personam
+peccantem, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q21_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q21_A2-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 2. Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens
+even in things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5).
+Therefore a human action does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, consequently, neither does it
+deserve praise, by reason of its being good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34491] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus, ex hoc quod est bonus
+vel malus, non habeat rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis.
+<i>Peccatum enim contingit etiam in his quae aguntur a natura</i>,
+ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed tamen ea quae sunt naturalia, non sunt
+laudabilia nec culpabilia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo actus
+humanus, ex hoc quod est malus vel peccatum, non habet rationem
+culpae, et per consequens nec ex hoc quod est bonus, habet rationem
+laudabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii,
+8 "it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine." But the artist is not blamed for
+making something bad: because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore
+it seems that neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it
+is evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34492] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut contingit peccatum in actibus moralibus, ita et in actibus
+artis, quia, ut dicitur in II Physic., <i>peccat grammaticus non
+recte scribens, et medicus non recte dans potionem</i>. Sed non
+culpatur artifex ex hoc quod aliquod malum facit, quia ad
+industriam artificis pertinet quod possit et bonum opus facere et
+malum, cum voluerit. Ergo videtur quod etiam actus moralis, ex hoc
+quod est malus, non habeat rationem culpabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or
+diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34493] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum est infirmum
+et impotens. Sed infirmitas vel impotentia vel tollit vel diminuit
+rationem culpae. Non ergo actus humanus est culpabilis ex hoc quod
+est malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve
+censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because "virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good"
+(Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being
+good or evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34494] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, quod <i>laudabilia sunt virtutum opera;
+vituperabilia autem, vel culpabilia, opera contraria</i>. Sed actus
+boni sunt actus virtutis, quia <i>virtus est quae bonum facit
+habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic.,
+unde actus oppositi sunt actus mali. Ergo actus humanus ex hoc quod
+est bonus vel malus, habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise
+or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the
+malice or goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over
+it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made
+clear above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q21_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], AA[1]</a>,2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like
+actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 co."><a name="34495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34495] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum
+est in plus quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis actus
+culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti, nihil enim est
+aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel
+bonitatem sui actus. Tunc autem actus imputatur agenti, quando est
+in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus. Hoc autem
+est in omnibus actibus voluntariis, quia per voluntatem homo
+dominium sui actus habet, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde relinquitur
+quod bonum vel malum in solis actibus voluntariis constituit
+rationem laudis vel culpae; in quibus idem est malum, peccatum et
+culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore, although
+there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34496] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod actus naturales non sunt in potestate naturalis
+agentis, cum natura sit determinata ad unum. Et ideo, licet in
+actibus naturalibus sit peccatum, non tamen est ibi culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed
+to a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of
+all human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since therefore sin is a departure from the order
+to the end, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q21_A1" id="FS_Q21_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin may occur in two ways,
+in a production of art. First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper
+to the art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or produce something
+good, while intending to produce something bad. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then he will
+be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin
+is
+not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for
+the latter he is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of reason
+to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of reason to the general end of
+human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
+5)
+that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he
+is the reverse."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34497] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in
+moralibus. In artificialibus enim ratio ordinatur ad finem
+particularem, quod est aliquid per rationem excogitatum. In
+moralibus autem ordinatur ad finem communem totius humanae vitae.
+Finis autem particularis ordinatur ad finem communem. Cum ergo
+peccatum sit per deviationem ab ordine ad finem, ut dictum est, in
+actu artis contingit dupliciter esse peccatum. Uno modo, per
+deviationem a fine particulari intento ab artifice, et hoc peccatum
+erit proprium arti; puta si artifex, intendens facere bonum opus,
+faciat malum, vel intendens facere malum, faciat bonum. Alio modo,
+per deviationem a fine communi humanae vitae, et hoc modo dicetur
+peccare, si intendat facere malum opus, et faciat, per quod alius
+decipiatur. Sed hoc peccatum non est proprium artificis inquantum
+artifex, sed inquantum homo est. Unde ex primo peccato culpatur
+artifex inquantum artifex, sed ex secundo culpatur homo inquantum
+homo. Sed in moralibus, ubi attenditur ordo rationis ad finem
+communem humanae vitae, semper peccatum et malum attenditur per
+deviationem ab ordine rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae. Et
+ideo culpatur ex tali peccato homo et inquantum est homo, et
+inquantum est moralis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod
+<i>in arte volens peccans est eligibilior; circa prudentiam autem
+minus, sicut et in virtutibus moralibus</i>, quarum prudentia est
+directiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34498] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illa infirmitas quae est in malis voluntariis,
+subiacet potestati hominis. Et ideo nec tollit nec diminuit
+rationem culpae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q21_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q21_A3-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 3. Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak
+of merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to another person. But good or
+evil actions are not all related to another person, for some are related to the person of the agent. Therefore not every good
+or evil human action is meritorious or demeritorious.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34499] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus non habeat rationem
+meriti et demeriti, propter suam bonitatem vel malitiam. Meritum
+enim et demeritum dicitur per ordinem ad retributionem, quae locum
+solum habet in his quae ad alterum sunt. Sed non omnes actus humani
+boni vel mali sunt ad alterum, sed quidam sunt ad seipsum. Ergo non
+omnis actus humanus bonus vel malus habet rationem meriti vel
+demeriti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys
+what belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to another. But man is master of his own actions.
+Therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or evil purpose.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34500] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus meretur poenam vel praemium ex hoc quod disponit ut vult de
+eo cuius est dominus, sicut si homo destruat rem suam, non punitur,
+sicut si destrueret rem alterius. Sed homo est dominus suorum
+actuum. Ergo ex hoc quod bene vel male disponit de suo actu, non
+meretur poenam vel praemium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and
+the same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action
+is his evil. Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a good or an evil deed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34501] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ex hoc quod aliquis sibi ipsi acquirit bonum, non meretur ut ei
+bene fiat ab alio, et eadem ratio est de malis. Sed ipse actus
+bonus est quoddam bonum et perfectio agentis, actus autem
+inordinatus est quoddam malum ipsius. Non ergo ex hoc quod homo
+facit malum actum vel bonum, meretur vel demeretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.10" target="asv">Is. 3:10,11</a>): "Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward
+of his hands shall be given him."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34502] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Isaiae III, <i>dicite iusto quoniam bene, quoniam
+fructum adinventionum suarum comedet. Vae impio in malum,
+retributio enim manuum eius fiet ei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q21_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to justice
+is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed
+that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or
+evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts
+the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit
+or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm;
+secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action directly for
+the good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society;
+secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage,
+then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society:
+although retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual, who is identical with
+the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be just
+to
+himself.
+</p><p id="FS_Q21_A3-p7"> It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will:
+that it is right or sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or demerit depends on the recompense
+for justice or injustice towards another.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 co."><a name="34503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34503] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod meritum et demeritum dicuntur in ordine ad
+retributionem quae fit secundum iustitiam. Retributio autem
+secundum iustitiam fit alicui ex eo quod agit in profectum vel
+nocumentum alterius. Est autem considerandum quod unusquisque in
+aliqua societate vivens, est aliquo modo pars et membrum totius
+societatis. Quicumque ergo agit aliquid in bonum vel malum alicuius
+in societate existentis, hoc redundat in totam societatem sicut qui
+laedit manum, per consequens laedit hominem. Cum ergo aliquis agit
+in bonum vel malum alterius singularis personae, cadit ibi
+dupliciter ratio meriti vel demeriti. Uno modo, secundum quod
+debetur ei retributio a singulari persona quam iuvat vel offendit.
+Alio modo, secundum quod debetur ei retributio a toto collegio.
+Quando vero aliquis ordinat actum suum directe in bonum vel malum
+totius collegii, debetur ei retributio primo quidem et
+principaliter a toto collegio, secundario vero, ab omnibus collegii
+partibus. Cum vero aliquis agit quod in bonum proprium vel malum
+vergit, etiam debetur ei retributio, inquantum etiam hoc vergit in
+commune secundum quod ipse est pars collegii, licet non debeatur ei
+retributio inquantum est bonum vel malum singularis personae, quae
+est eadem agenti, nisi forte a seipso secundum quandam
+similitudinem, prout est iustitia hominis ad seipsum. Sic igitur
+patet quod actus bonus vel malus habet rationem laudabilis vel
+culpabilis, secundum quod est in potestate voluntatis; rationem
+vero rectitudinis et peccati, secundum ordinem ad finem; rationem
+vero meriti et demeriti, secundum retributionem iustitiae ad
+alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained
+to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34504] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod quandoque actus hominis boni vel mali, etsi non
+ordinantur ad bonum vel malum alterius singularis personae, tamen
+ordinantur ad bonum vel ad malum alterius quod est ipsa
+communitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part, he
+merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings
+of his, in respect of which he is bound to serve the community.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34505] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod homo, qui habet dominium sui actus, ipse etiam,
+inquantum est alterius, scilicet communitatis, cuius est pars
+meretur aliquid vel demeretur, inquantum actus suos bene vel male
+disponit, sicut etiam si alia sua, de quibus communitati servire
+debet, bene vel male dispenset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34506] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod hoc ipsum bonum vel malum quod aliquis sibi facit per
+suum actum, redundat in communitatem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q21_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q21_A4-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 4. Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q21_A3" id="FS_Q21_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does
+no good or harm to God; for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6,7</a>): "If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him?"
+Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34507] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus hominis bonus vel malus non
+habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti per comparationem ad Deum.
+Quia, ut dictum est, meritum et demeritum importat ordinem ad
+recompensationem profectus vel damni ad alterum illati. Sed actus
+hominis bonus vel malus non cedit in aliquem profectum vel damnum
+ipsius Dei, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, <i>si peccaveris quid ei
+nocebis? Porro si iuste egeris, quid donabis ei?</i> Ergo actus
+hominis bonus vel malus non habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud
+Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument
+belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power which is the principal cause of his action;
+hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.15" target="asv">Is. 10:15</a>): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn?"
+where man while acting is
+evidently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's sight, by good or evil deeds.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34508] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+instrumentum nihil meretur vel demeretur apud eum qui utitur
+instrumento, quia tota actio instrumenti est utentis ipso. Sed homo
+in agendo est instrumentum divinae virtutis principaliter ipsum
+moventis, unde dicitur Isaiae X, <i>numquid gloriabitur securis
+contra eum qui secat in ea? Aut exaltabitur serra contra eum a quo
+trahitur?</i> Ubi manifeste hominem agentem comparat instrumento.
+Ergo homo, bene agendo vel male, nihil meretur vel demeretur apud
+Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained
+to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34509] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus humanus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti, inquantum
+ordinatur ad alterum. Sed non omnes actus humani ordinantur ad
+Deum. Ergo non omnes actus boni vel mali habent rationem meriti vel
+demeriti apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.12.14" target="asv">Eccles. 12:14</a>): "All things that are done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or evil." Now judgment implies retribution,
+in respect of which we speak of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit or demerit
+in God's sight.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34510] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Eccle. ult., <i>cuncta quae fiunt adducet Deus in
+iudicium, sive bonum sit sive malum</i>. Sed iudicium importat
+retributionem, respectu cuius meritum et demeritum dicitur. Ergo
+omnis actus hominis bonus vel malus habet rationem meriti vel
+demeriti apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A human action, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q21_A3" id="FS_Q21_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason of the community:
+and in each way, our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the part of God Himself, inasmuch
+as He is man's last end; and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above (Q[19], A[10]). Consequently,
+whoever
+does an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole
+community of the universe, because in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the common good;
+wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community. Now God is the
+governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A5" id="FS_Q21_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], A[5]</a>: and especially of
+rational creatures. Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: else it would
+follow that human actions are no business of God's.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 co."><a name="34511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34511] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, actus alicuius hominis habet
+rationem meriti vel demeriti, secundum quod ordinatur ad alterum,
+vel ratione eius, vel ratione communitatis. Utroque autem modo
+actus nostri boni vel mali habent rationem meriti vel demeriti apud
+Deum. Ratione quidem ipsius, inquantum est ultimus hominis finis,
+est autem debitum ut ad finem ultimum omnes actus referantur, ut
+supra habitum est. Unde qui facit actum malum non referibilem in
+Deum, non servat honorem Dei, qui ultimo fini debetur. Ex parte
+vero totius communitatis universi, quia in qualibet communitate
+ille qui regit communitatem, praecipue habet curam boni communis,
+unde ad eum pertinet retribuere pro his quae bene vel male fiunt in
+communitate. Est autem Deus gubernator et rector totius universi,
+sicut in primo habitum est, et specialiter rationalium creaturarum.
+Unde manifestum est quod actus humani habent rationem meriti vel
+demeriti per comparationem ad ipsum, alioquin sequeretur quod Deus
+non haberet curam de actibus humanis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or
+offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34512] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod per actum hominis Deo secundum se nihil potest
+accrescere vel deperire, sed tamen homo, quantum in se est, aliquid
+subtrahit Deo, vel ei exhibet, cum servat vel non servat ordinem
+quem Deus instituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that, at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above
+(
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A6" id="FS_Q21_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[6]</a>, ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34513] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod homo sic movetur a Deo ut instrumentum, quod tamen
+non excluditur quin moveat seipsum per liberum arbitrium, ut ex
+supradictis patet. Et ideo per suum actum meretur vel demeretur
+apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action
+of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred
+to God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the
+action itself is concerned.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34514] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum
+se totum, et secundum omnia sua, et ideo non oportet quod quilibet
+actus eius sit meritorius vel demeritorius per ordinem ad
+communitatem politicam. Sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et
+habet, ordinandum est ad Deum, et ideo omnis actus hominis bonus
+vel malus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quantum est
+ex ipsa ratione actus.</p></div></div></div></div>
+`
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>

Mercurial > hg > Aquinas

comparison summa/bilingual/FS_ii.html @ 107:3858f013e8cb