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19 <h2 id="FS.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q22">Q. 22. OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q23">Q. 23. HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q24">Q. 24. OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q25">Q. 25. OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q26">Q. 26. OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q27">Q. 27. OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q28">Q. 28. OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q29">Q. 29. OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q30">Q. 30. OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q31">Q. 31. OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q32">Q. 32. OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q33">Q. 33. OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q34">Q. 34. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q35">Q. 35. OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q36">Q. 36. OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q37">Q. 37. OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q38">Q. 38. OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q39">Q. 39. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q40">Q. 40. OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q41">Q. 41. OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q42">Q. 42. OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q43">Q. 43. OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q44">Q. 44. OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q45">Q. 45. OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q46">Q. 46. OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q47">Q. 47. OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies
20 in the text, except in A[4].]
21 </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q48">Q. 48. OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
22 <div id="FS_Q22" class="div3">
23 <h3 id="FS_Q22-p0.1">Q. 22. OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
24 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
25 <p id="FS_Q22-p2"> We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there
26 are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their
27 malice and goodness.
28 </p><p id="FS_Q22-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q22-p4"><a href="#FS_Q22_A1"> (1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q22-p5"><a href="#FS_Q22_A2"> (2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q22-p6"><a href="#FS_Q22_A3"> (3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?</a></p>
29 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 pr."><a name="34515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34515]
30 Iª-IIae q. 22 pr.</span></a> Post hoc considerandum est de
31 passionibus animae, et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. In
32 generali autem, quatuor occurrunt circa eas consideranda, primo
33 quidem, de subiecto earum; secundo, de differentia earum; tertio,
34 de comparatione earum ad invicem; quarto, de malitia et bonitate
35 ipsarum. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum aliqua passio
36 sit in anima. Secundo, utrum magis in parte appetitiva quam in
37 apprehensiva. Tertio, utrum magis sit in appetitu sensitivo quam
38 intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas.</p></div></div></div>
39 <div id="FS_Q22_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A1-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 1. Whether any passion is in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p2">
40 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of
41 matter and form, as stated in the
42 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A5" id="FS_Q22_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[5]</a>. Therefore there is no passion in the soul.
43 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34516] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
44 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio sit in anima. Pati enim
45 est proprium materiae. Sed anima non est composita ex materia et
46 forma, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p3">
47 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore
48 passion is not in the soul.
49 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34517] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
50 passio est motus, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed anima non movetur,
51 ut probatur in I de anima. Ergo passio non est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p4">
52 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in
53 Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul.
54 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34518] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
55 passio est via in corruptionem, nam omnis passio, magis facta,
56 abiicit a substantia, ut dicitur in libro topicorum. Sed anima est
57 incorruptibilis. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p5">
58 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
59 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>): "When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members." Now sins are, properly
60 speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul.
61 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34519] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
62 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VII, <i>cum essemus in carne,
63 passiones peccatorum, quae per legem erant, operabantur in membris
64 nostris</i>. Peccata autem sunt proprie in anima. Ergo et
65 passiones, quae dicuntur peccatorum, sunt in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p6">
66 <b>I answer that,</b> The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although
67 nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than
68 to be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else
69 is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is
70 unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus
71 to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation.
72 For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it,
73 then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a
74 more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect:
75 whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens
76 that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind
77 of passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily
78 transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the "composite"
79 is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature
80 of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy.
81 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 co."><a name="34520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34520] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
82 dicendum quod pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter,
83 secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a
84 re, sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem
85 magis proprie est perfici, quam pati. Alio modo dicitur pati
86 proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abiectione. Sed hoc
87 contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiicitur id quod non est
88 conveniens rei, sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur, dicitur pati,
89 quia recipit sanitatem, aegritudine abiecta. Alio modo, quando e
90 converso contingit, sicut aegrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur
91 infirmitas, sanitate abiecta. Et hic est propriissimus modus
92 passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem,
93 quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur
94 ad aliud trahi. Et similiter in I de Generat. dicitur quod, quando
95 ex ignobiliori generatur nobilius, est generatio simpliciter, et
96 corruptio secundum quid, e converso autem quando ex nobiliori
97 ignobilius generatur. Et his tribus modis contingit esse in anima
98 passionem. Nam secundum receptionem tantum dicitur quod sentire et
99 intelligere est quoddam pati. Passio autem cum abiectione non est
100 nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem, unde passio proprie dicta
101 non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet
102 compositum patitur. Sed et in hoc est diversitas, nam quando
103 huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet
104 rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis
105 proprie est passio quam laetitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p7">
106 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those
107 things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be
108 in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality,
109 in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according
110 as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.
111 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34521] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
112 igitur dicendum quod pati, secundum quod est cum abiectione et
113 transmutatione, proprium est materiae, unde non invenitur nisi in
114 compositis ex materia et forma. Sed pati prout importat receptionem
115 solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiae, sed potest esse
116 cuiuscumque existentis in potentia. Anima autem, etsi non sit
117 composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis,
118 secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati, secundum quod
119 intelligere pati est, ut dicitur in III de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p8">
120 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in
121 De Anima i, 3.
122 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34522] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
123 dicendum quod pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animae per se,
124 convenit tamen ei per accidens, ut in I de anima dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p9">
125 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not found
126 in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.
127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34523] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
128 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passione quae est cum
129 transmutatione ad deterius. Et huiusmodi passio animae convenire
130 non potest nisi per accidens, per se autem convenit composito, quod
131 est corruptibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q22_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A2-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 2. Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p2">
132 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first
133 in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph.
134 ii, 1. Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not
135 affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in
136 the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.
137 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34524] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
138 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio magis sit in parte animae
139 apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva. Quod enim est primum in
140 quolibet genere videtur esse maximum eorum quae sunt in genere
141 illo, et causa aliorum, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Sed passio prius
142 invenitur in parte apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva, non enim
143 patitur pars appetitiva, nisi passione praecedente in parte
144 apprehensiva. Ergo passio est magis in parte apprehensiva quam in
145 parte appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p3">
146 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than
147 the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part.
148 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34525] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
149 quod est magis activum, videtur esse minus passivum, actio enim
150 passioni opponitur. Sed pars appetitiva est magis activa quam pars
151 apprehensiva. Ergo videtur quod in parte apprehensiva magis sit
152 passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p4">
153 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But
154 passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the
155 sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
156 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34526] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
157 sicut appetitus sensitivus est virtus in organo corporali, ita et
158 vis apprehensiva sensitiva. Sed passio animae fit, proprie
159 loquendo, secundum transmutationem corporalem. Ergo non magis est
160 passio in parte appetitiva sensitiva quam in apprehensiva
161 sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p5">
162 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of
163 our writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc.
164 iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call
165 them passions." From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as
166 affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are
167 in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part.
168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34527] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
169 est quod Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>motus animi,
170 quos Graeci pathe, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero,
171 perturbationes, quidam affectiones vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut
172 in Graeco habetur, expressius passiones vocant</i>. Ex quo patet
173 quod passiones animae sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones
174 manifeste pertinent ad partem appetitivam, et non ad apprehensivam.
175 Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in
176 apprehensiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p6">
177 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have already stated
178 <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q22_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing
179 by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order
180 to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of
181 the appetitive power, "are in things
182 themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason
183 of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph.
184 vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is
185 evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.
186 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 co."><a name="34528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34528] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
187 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in nomine passionis importatur
188 quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur
189 anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam
190 per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in
191 seipsis sunt, unde philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum
192 et malum, quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, sunt in ipsis
193 rebus. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in
194 seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se
195 habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur
196 quod verum et falsum, quae ad cognitionem pertinent, non sunt in
197 rebus, sed in mente. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis
198 invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p7">
199 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things
200 relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches,
201 the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with
202 light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the more
203 light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding
204 from that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes
205 from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which
206 afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it
207 is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality
208 and passion: while in other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power
209 of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.
210 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34529] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
211 ergo dicendum quod e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad
212 perfectionem, et in his quae pertinent ad defectum. Nam in his quae
213 ad perfectionem pertinent, attenditur intensio per accessum ad unum
214 primum principium, cui quanto est aliquid propinquius, tanto est
215 magis intensum, sicut intensio lucidi attenditur per accessum ad
216 aliquid summe lucidum, cui quanto aliquid magis appropinquat, tanto
217 est magis lucidum. Sed in his quae ad defectum pertinent,
218 attenditur intensio non per accessum ad aliquod summum, sed per
219 recessum a perfecto, quia in hoc ratio privationis et defectus
220 consistit. Et ideo quanto minus recedit a primo, tanto est minus
221 intensum, et propter hoc, in principio semper invenitur parvus
222 defectus, qui postea procedendo magis multiplicatur. Passio autem
223 ad defectum pertinet, quia est alicuius secundum quod est in
224 potentia. Unde in his quae appropinquant primo perfecto, scilicet
225 Deo, invenitur parum de ratione potentiae et passionis, in aliis
226 autem consequenter, plus. Et sic etiam in priori vi animae,
227 scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p8">
228 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior
229 action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves:
230 since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things.
231 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34530] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
232 dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia est
233 magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo
234 habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad
235 rem ut est in seipsa, per actionem enim exteriorem pervenimus ad
236 consequendas res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p9">
237 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the
238 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A3" id="FS_Q22_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[3]</a> the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an
239 "intention" of the object. And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the
240 object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of another and
241 natural change, which affects
242 their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind
243 of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently
244 at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive
245 appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change
246 of
247 the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion
248 of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although
249 both are actions of a corporeal organ.
250 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34531] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
251 dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, dupliciter organum animae
252 potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum
253 quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu
254 apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, sicut oculus immutatur a
255 visibili, non ita quod coloretur, sed ita quod recipiat intentionem
256 coloris. Est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout
257 organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem, puta
258 quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio simili modo transmutatur.
259 Et huiusmodi transmutatio per accidens se habet ad actum
260 apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, puta cum oculus fatigatur ex
261 forti intuitu, vel dissolvitur ex vehementia visibilis. Sed ad
262 actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio,
263 unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur
264 aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; sicut dicitur quod ira est
265 accensio sanguinis circa cor. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis
266 invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu
267 sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi
268 corporalis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q22_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A3-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 3. Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p2">
269 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.
270 ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering
271 [patiens] them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore
272 passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive
273 appetite.
274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34532] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
275 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio non magis sit in appetitu
276 sensitivo quam in appetitu intellectivo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II
277 cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Hierotheus ex quadam est doctus
278 diviniore inspiratione, non solum discens, sed etiam patiens
279 divina</i>. Sed passio divinorum non potest pertinere ad appetitum
280 sensitivum, cuius obiectum est bonum sensibile. Ergo passio est in
281 appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p3">
282 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which
283 is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good.
284 Therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite.
285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34533] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
286 quanto activum est potentius, tanto passio est fortior. Sed
287 obiectum appetitus intellectivi, quod est bonum universale, est
288 potentius activum quam obiectum appetitus sensitivi, quod est bonum
289 particulare. Ergo ratio passionis magis invenitur in appetitu
290 intellectivo quam in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p4">
291 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive
292 appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in
293 the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite.
294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34534] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
295 gaudium et amor passiones quaedam esse dicuntur. Sed haec
296 inveniuntur in appetitu intellectivo, et non solum in sensitivo,
297 alioquin non attribuerentur in Scripturis Deo et Angelis. Ergo
298 passiones non magis sunt in appetitu sensitivo quam in
299 intellectivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p5">
300 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite
301 when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil."
302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34535] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
303 est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales
304 passiones, <i>passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in
305 imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus
306 irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p6">
307 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
308 <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q22_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act
309 of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no
310 need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means
311 of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident
312 that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this is
313 again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above.
314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 co."><a name="34536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34536] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
315 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi
316 est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus
317 appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in
318 apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem
319 appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio
320 corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius
321 organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in
322 actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi; ut etiam patet per
323 definitiones Damasceni inductas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p7">
324 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place
325 without any alteration in the body.
326 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34537] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
327 ergo dicendum quod passio divinorum ibi dicitur affectio ad divina,
328 et coniunctio ad ipsa per amorem, quod tamen fit sine
329 transmutatione corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p8">
330 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things
331 that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite
332 has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive.
333 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34538] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
334 dicendum quod magnitudo passionis non solum dependet ex virtute
335 agentis, sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis, quia quae sunt bene
336 passibilia, multum patiuntur etiam a parvis activis. Licet ergo
337 obiectum appetitus intellectivi sit magis activum quam obiectum
338 appetitus sensitivi, tamen appetitus sensitivus est magis
339 passivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p9">
340 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they
341 signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy
342 angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary
343 human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because,
344 although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours."
345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34539] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
346 dicendum quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur
347 Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum,
348 significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus,
349 absque passione. Unde dicit Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, <i>sancti
350 Angeli et sine ira puniunt et sine miseriae compassione subveniunt.
351 Et tamen, istarum nomina passionum, consuetudine locutionis
352 humanae, etiam in eos usurpantur, propter quandam operum
353 similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem</i>.</p></div></div></div></div>
354 <div id="FS_Q23" class="div3">
355 <h3 id="FS_Q23-p0.1">Q. 23. HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
356 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
357 <p id="FS_Q23-p2"> We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q23-p3"><a href="#FS_Q23_A1"> (1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p4"><a href="#FS_Q23_A2"> (2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p5"><a href="#FS_Q23_A3"> (3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p6"><a href="#FS_Q23_A4"> (4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?</a></p>
358 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 pr."><a name="34540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34540]
359 Iª-IIae q. 23 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
360 passionum differentia ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
361 Primo, utrum passiones quae sunt in concupiscibili, sint diversae
362 ab his quae sunt in irascibili. Secundo, utrum contrarietas
363 passionum irascibili sit secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.
364 Tertio, utrum sit aliqua passio non habens contrarium. Quarto,
365 utrum sint aliquae passiones differentes specie, in eadem potentia,
366 non contrariae ad invicem.</p></div></div></div>
367 <div id="FS_Q23_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A1-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 1. Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p2">
368 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5)
369 that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible
370 part. Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible
371 part.
372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34541] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
373 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones eaedem sint in irascibili et
374 in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod
375 passiones animae sunt quas sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Sed
376 gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo omnes passiones
377 sunt in concupiscibili. Non ergo sunt aliae in irascibili, et aliae
378 in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p3">
379 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words of
380 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q23_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv"> Mat. 13:33, </a> "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice
381 in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also
382 is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and
383 irascible faculties.
384 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34542] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
385 Matth. XIII, super illud, <i>simile est regnum caelorum
386 fermento</i> etc., dicit Glossa Hieronymi, <i>in ratione
387 possideamus prudentiam, in irascibili odium vitiorum, in
388 concupiscibili desiderium virtutum</i>. Sed odium est in
389 concupiscibili, sicut et amor, cui contrariatur, ut dicitur in II
390 Topic. Ergo eadem passio est in concupiscibili et irascibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p4">
391 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible
392 passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34543] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
394 passiones et actus differunt specie secundum obiecta. Sed passionum
395 irascibilis et concupiscibilis eadem obiecta sunt, scilicet bonum
396 et malum. Ergo eaedem sunt passiones irascibilis et
397 concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p5">
398 <b>On the contrary,</b> The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible
399 are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the
400 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the
401 irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34544] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
403 diversarum potentiarum actus sunt specie diversi, sicut videre et
404 audire. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt duae potentiae
405 dividentes appetitum sensitivum, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo, cum
406 passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est,
407 passiones quae sunt in irascibili, erunt aliae secundum speciem a
408 passionibus quae sunt in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A1-p6">
409 <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers
410 have different objects, as stated in the
411 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q23_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>, the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions
412 of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of
413 the powers,
414 than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity
415 in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts
416 of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions
417 regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that
418 genus.
419 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A1-p7"> In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object
420 of each of these powers. For we have stated in the
421 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>, that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or
422 pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or
423 in avoiding some such
424 evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good
425 or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions
426 regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like:
427 whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the
428 irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
429 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 co."><a name="34545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34545] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
430 dicendum quod passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in
431 concupiscibili, differunt specie. Cum enim diversae potentiae
432 habeant diversa obiecta, ut in primo dictum est, necesse est quod
433 passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur.
434 Unde multo magis passiones diversarum potentiarum specie differunt,
435 maior enim differentia obiecti requiritur ad diversificandam
436 speciem potentiarum, quam ad diversificandam speciem passionum vel
437 actuum. Sicut enim in naturalibus diversitas generis consequitur
438 diversitatem potentiae materiae, diversitas autem speciei
439 diversitatem formae in eadem materia; ita in actibus animae, actus
440 ad diversas potentias pertinentes, sunt non solum specie, sed etiam
441 genere diversi; actus autem vel passiones respicientes diversa
442 obiecta specialia comprehensa sub uno communi obiecto unius
443 potentiae, differunt sicut species illius generis. Ad cognoscendum
444 ergo quae passiones sint in irascibili, et quae in concupiscibili,
445 oportet assumere obiectum utriusque potentiae. Dictum est autem in
446 primo quod obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum
447 sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum.
448 Sed quia necesse est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam
449 patiatur in adipiscendo aliquod huiusmodi bonum, vel fugiendo
450 aliquod huiusmodi malum, inquantum hoc est quodammodo elevatum
451 supra facilem potestatem animalis; ideo ipsum bonum vel malum,
452 secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum
453 irascibilis. Quaecumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum
454 vel malum, pertinent ad concupiscibilem; ut gaudium, tristitia,
455 amor, odium, et similia. Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum
456 vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel
457 fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem; ut
458 audacia, timor, spes, et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p8">
459 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in the
460 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>, the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from
461 tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result
462 is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are
463 in the irascible faculty
464 are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
465 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34546] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
466 ergo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, ad hoc vis
467 irascibilis data est animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus
468 concupiscibilis in suum obiectum tendere prohibetur, vel propter
469 difficultatem boni adipiscendi, vel propter difficultatem mali
470 superandi. Et ideo passiones irascibilis omnes terminantur ad
471 passiones concupiscibilis. Et secundum hoc, etiam passiones quae
472 sunt in irascibili, consequitur gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt in
473 concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p9">
474 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion;
475 but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power.
476 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34547] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
477 dicendum quod odium vitiorum attribuit Hieronymus irascibili, non
478 propter rationem odii, quae proprie competit concupiscibili; sed
479 propter impugnationem, quae pertinet ad irascibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p10">
480 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact
481 it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same
482 applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different
483 from the irascible passions.
484 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34548] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
485 dicendum quod bonum inquantum est delectabile, movet
486 concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quandam difficultatem ad
487 adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili.
488 Et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quae in id tenderet.
489 Et eadem ratio est de malis. Et haec potentia est irascibilis. Unde
490 ex consequenti passiones concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie
491 differunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A2-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 2. Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p2">
492 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
493 For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of
494 the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore
495 the same applies to the irascible passions.
496 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34549] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
497 sic proceditur. Videtur quod contrarietas passionum irascibilis non
498 sit nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Passiones enim
499 irascibilis ordinantur ad passiones concupiscibilis, ut dictum est.
500 Sed passiones concupiscibilis non contrariantur nisi secundum
501 contrarietatem boni et mali; sicut amor et odium, gaudium et
502 tristitia. Ergo nec passiones irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p3">
503 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no
504 other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety
505 of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can
506 there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil.
507 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34550] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
508 passiones differunt secundum obiecta; sicut et motus secundum
509 terminos. Sed contrarietas non est in motibus nisi secundum
510 contrarietatem terminorum, ut patet in V Physic. Ergo neque in
511 passionibus est contrarietas nisi secundum contrarietatem
512 obiectorum. Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum vel malum. Ergo in
513 nulla potentia appetitiva potest esse contrarietas passionum nisi
514 secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p4">
515 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics.
516 Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what
517 all desire" (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety
518 than that of good and evil.
519 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34551] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a>
520 <i>Praeterea, omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et
521 recessum</i>, ut Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sed
522 accessus causatur ex ratione boni, recessus autem ex ratione mali,
523 quia sicut bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic.,
524 ita malum est quod omnia fugiunt. Ergo contrarietas in passionibus
525 animae non potest esse nisi secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p5">
526 <b>On the contrary,</b> Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of
527 good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of
528 good and evil.
529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34552] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
530 timor et audacia sunt contraria, ut patet in III Ethic. sed timor
531 et audacia non differunt secundum bonum et malum, quia utrumque est
532 respectu aliquorum malorum. Ergo non omnis contrarietas passionum
533 irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p6">
534 <b>I answer that,</b> Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements
535 or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach
536 and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is
537 a change "to being," and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other
538 contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from
539 black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.
540 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p7"> Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of
541 good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions
542 the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we
543 find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
544
545 <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto,
546 since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but
547 all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every
548 concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every
549 concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible
550 passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.
551 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p8"> On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the
552 aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as
553 to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult,
554 it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil,
555 considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains
556 a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is
557 called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope
558 and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and
559 fear).
560 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 co."><a name="34553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34553] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
561 dicendum quod passio quidam motus est, ut dicitur in III Physic.
562 Unde oportet contrarietatem passionum accipere secundum
563 contrarietatem motuum vel mutationum. Est autem duplex contrarietas
564 in mutationibus vel motibus, ut dicitur in V Physic. Una quidem
565 secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, quae quidem
566 contrarietas est proprie mutationum, idest generationis, quae est
567 mutatio ad esse, et corruptionis, quae est mutatio ab esse. Alia
568 autem secundum contrarietatem terminorum, quae proprie est
569 contrarietas motuum, sicut dealbatio, quae est motus a nigro in
570 album, opponitur denigrationi, quae est motus ab albo in nigrum.
571 Sic igitur in passionibus animae duplex contrarietas invenitur, una
572 quidem secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali;
573 alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino. In
574 passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas
575 tantum, quae scilicet est secundum obiecta, in passionibus autem
576 irascibilis invenitur utraque. Cuius ratio est quia obiectum
577 concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est, est bonum vel malum sensibile
578 absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut
579 a quo, sed solum ut ad quem, quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum
580 bonum, sed omnia appetunt ipsum. Similiter nihil appetit malum
581 inquantum huiusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum, et propter hoc, malum
582 non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic
583 igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum,
584 sicut amor, desiderium et gaudium, omnis vero passio eius respectu
585 mali, est ut ab ipso, sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et
586 tristitia. Unde in passionibus concupiscibilis non potest esse
587 contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem obiecto. Sed
588 obiectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem
589 absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra
590 dictum est. Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in
591 ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem
592 spei; et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile,
593 quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis. Similiter malum arduum
594 habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum, et hoc pertinet ad
595 passionem timoris, habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut
596 in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem
597 mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia. Invenitur ergo in passionibus
598 irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali,
599 sicut inter spem et timorem, et iterum secundum accessum et
600 recessum ab eodem termino, sicut inter audaciam et timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="34554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34554] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
601 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A3-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 3. Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p2">
602 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or
603 in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
604 <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q23_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary.
605 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34555] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
606 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis passio animae habeat aliquid
607 contrarium. Omnis enim passio animae vel est in irascibili vel in
608 concupiscibili, sicut supra dictum est. Sed utraeque passiones
609 habent contrarietatem suo modo. Ergo omnis passio animae habet
610 contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p3">
611 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive
612 part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion
613 has a contrary.
614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34556] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
615 omnis passio animae habet vel bonum vel malum pro obiecto, quae
616 sunt obiecta universaliter appetitivae partis. Sed passioni cuius
617 obiectum est bonum, opponitur passio cuius obiectum est malum. Ergo
618 omnis passio habet contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p4">
619 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above
620 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q23_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34557] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
622 omnis passio animae est secundum accessum vel secundum recessum, ut
623 dictum est. Sed cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus, et e
624 converso. Ergo omnis passio animae habet contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p5">
625 <b>On the contrary,</b> Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore
626 not every passion has a contrary.
627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34558] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
628 ira est quaedam passio animae. Sed nulla passio ponitur contraria
629 irae, ut patet in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis passio habet
630 contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p6">
631 <b>I answer that,</b> The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or
632 according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil
633 is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible
634 passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement
635 is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past.
636 Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
637 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p7"> In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good
638 obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there
639 remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion
640 of the concupiscible faculty.
641 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p8"> Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement
642 is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety
643 but of negation or privation.
644 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="34559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34559] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
645 dicendum quod singulare est in passione irae, quod non potest
646 habere contrarium, neque secundum accessum et recessum, neque
647 secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Causatur enim ira ex malo
648 difficili iam iniacente. Ad cuius praesentiam, necesse est quod aut
649 appetitus succumbat, et sic non exit terminos tristitiae, quae est
650 passio concupiscibilis, aut habet motum ad invadendum malum
651 laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram. Motum autem ad fugiendum habere
652 non potest, quia iam malum ponitur praesens vel praeteritum. Et sic
653 motui irae non contrariatur aliqua passio secundum contrarietatem
654 accessus et recessus. Similiter etiam nec secundum contrarietatem
655 boni et mali. Quia malo iam iniacenti opponitur bonum iam adeptum,
656 quod iam non potest habere rationem ardui vel difficilis. Nec post
657 adeptionem boni remanet alius motus, nisi quietatio appetitus in
658 bono adepto, quae pertinet ad gaudium, quod est passio
659 concupiscibilis. Unde motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum
660 animae contrarium, sed solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu,
661 sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod <i>mitescere
662 opponitur ei quod est irasci</i>, quod non est oppositum contrarie,
663 sed negative vel privative.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="34560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34560] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
664 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A4-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 4. Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p2">
665 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
666 For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil;
667 and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary
668 to one another, differ specifically.
669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34561] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
670 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint in aliqua potentia esse
671 passiones specie differentes, et non contrariae ad invicem.
672 Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem
673 passionum animae sunt bonum et malum, secundum quorum differentiam
674 passiones habent contrarietatem. Ergo nullae passiones eiusdem
675 potentiae, non habentes contrarietatem ad invicem, differunt
676 specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p3">
677 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety,
678 as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
679 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34562] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
680 differentia speciei est differentia secundum formam. Sed omnis
681 differentia secundum formam, est secundum aliquam contrarietatem,
682 ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo passiones eiusdem potentiae quae non
683 sunt contrariae, non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p4">
684 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
685 difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach
686 and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions
687 of the soul, as stated above
688 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q23_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>: whereas the third
689 difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not
690 possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34563] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
692 cum omnis passio animae consistat in accessu vel recessu ad bonum
693 vel ad malum, necesse videtur quod omnis differentia passionum
694 animae sit vel secundum differentiam boni et mali; vel secundum
695 differentiam accessus et recessus; vel secundum maiorem vel minorem
696 accessum aut recessum. Sed primae duae differentiae inducunt
697 contrarietatem in passionibus animae, ut dictum est. Tertia autem
698 differentia non diversificat speciem, quia sic essent infinitae
699 species passionum animae. Ergo non potest esse quod passiones
700 eiusdem potentiae animae differant specie, et non sint
701 contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p5">
702 <b>On the contrary,</b> Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather,
703 in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary
704 to one another.
705 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34564] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
706 amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec
707 tamen contrariantur ad invicem, quin potius unum est causa
708 alterius. Ergo sunt aliquae passiones eiusdem potentiae quae
709 differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p6">
710 <b>I answer that,</b> Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects.
711 Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature,
712 as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the
713 soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their
714 motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels
715 it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the
716 patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body
717 generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place,
718 the
719 mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since
720 to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion.
721 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p7"> Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion.
722 In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in
723 respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of
724 evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the
725 attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect
726 of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as
727 it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of
728 evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness."
729 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p8"> On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed
730 as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained,
731 we have "hope" and "despair." In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in respect of good obtained
732 there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated
733 above
734 <a href="#FS_Q23_A3" id="FS_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger."
735 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p9"> Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire
736 and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear
737 and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion.
738 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p10"> Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
739 irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
740 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 co."><a name="34565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34565] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
741 dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt
742 obiecta passionum animae. Differentia autem activorum potest
743 attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum speciem vel naturam ipsorum
744 activorum, sicut ignis differt ab aqua; alio modo, secundum
745 diversam virtutem activam. Diversitas autem activi vel motivi
746 quantum ad virtutem movendi, potest accipi in passionibus animae
747 secundum similitudinem agentium naturalium. Omne enim movens trahit
748 quodammodo ad se patiens, vel a se repellit. Trahendo quidem ad se,
749 tria facit in ipso. Nam primo quidem, dat ei inclinationem vel
750 aptitudinem ut in ipsum tendat, sicut cum corpus leve, quod est
751 sursum, dat levitatem corpori generato, per quam habet
752 inclinationem vel aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum. Secundo, si
753 corpus generatum est extra locum proprium, dat ei moveri ad locum.
754 Tertio, dat ei quiescere, in locum cum pervenerit, quia ex eadem
755 causa aliquid quiescit in loco, per quam movebatur ad locum. Et
756 similiter intelligendum est de causa repulsionis. In motibus autem
757 appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum
758 autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia
759 appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu
760 connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui
761 per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum
762 sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et
763 hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex
764 opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum
765 adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso
766 bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui
767 opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia. In passionibus autem
768 irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad
769 prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae
770 absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti,
771 est spes et desperatio. Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est
772 timor et audacia. Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio
773 in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum
774 est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae. Sic igitur
775 patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum,
776 scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga gaudium et tristitia.
777 Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio,
778 timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Sunt ergo
779 omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in
780 concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae
781 passiones continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From this the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="34566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34566] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
782 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
783 <div id="FS_Q24" class="div3">
784 <h3 id="FS_Q24-p0.1">Q. 24. OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
785 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
786 <p id="FS_Q24-p2"> We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q24-p3"><a href="#FS_Q24_A1"> (1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p4"><a href="#FS_Q24_A2"> (2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p5"><a href="#FS_Q24_A3"> (3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p6"><a href="#FS_Q24_A4"> (4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?</a></p>
787 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 pr."><a name="34567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34567]
788 Iª-IIae q. 24 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de bono
789 et malo circa passiones animae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
790 Primo, utrum bonum et malum morale possit in passionibus animae
791 inveniri. Secundo, utrum omnis passio animae sit mala moraliter.
792 Tertio, utrum omnis passio addat, vel diminuat, ad bonitatem vel
793 malitiam actus. Quarto, utrum aliqua passio sit bona vel mala ex
794 sua specie.</p></div></div></div>
795 <div id="FS_Q24_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A1-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 1. Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p2">
796 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals
797 are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them
798 in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
799 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34568] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
800 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae sit bona vel mala
801 moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale est proprium hominis, mores
802 enim proprie dicuntur humani, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam. Sed
803 passiones non sunt propriae hominum, sed sunt etiam aliis
804 animalibus communes. Ergo nulla passio animae est bona vel mala
805 moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p3">
806 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
807 iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above (
808 <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q24_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.
809 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34569] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
810 bonum vel malum hominis est secundum rationem esse, vel praeter
811 rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed
812 passiones animae non sunt in ratione, sed in appetitu sensitivo, ut
813 supra dictum est. Ergo non pertinent ad bonum vel malum hominis,
814 quod est bonum morale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p4">
815 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised
816 and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil.
817 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34570] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
818 philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>passionibus neque laudamur
819 neque vituperamur</i>. Sed secundum bona et mala moralia, laudamur
820 et vituperamur. Ergo passiones non sunt bonae vel malae
821 moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p5">
822 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good
823 if our love is good."
824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34571] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
825 est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, de passionibus
826 animae loquens <i>mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si
827 bonus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p6">
828 <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of
829 the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus
830 there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (
831 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18] , A[5]</a>). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will,
832 then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and
833 will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much
834 more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be
835 voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.
836 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 co."><a name="34572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34572] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
837 dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno
838 modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio
839 rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout
840 scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in
841 eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra
842 dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio
843 rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale.
844 Propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et
845 voluntati, quam membra exteriora; quorum tamen motus et actus sunt
846 boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde multo
847 magis et ipsae passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt
848 dici bonae vel malae moraliter. Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex
849 eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non
850 prohibentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p7">
851 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are
852 proper to man.
853 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34573] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
854 ergo dicendum quod istae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt
855 communes hominibus et aliis animalibus, sed secundum quod a ratione
856 imperantur, sunt propriae hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p8">
857 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13).
858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34574] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
859 dicendum quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivae dicuntur
860 rationales, secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem, ut
861 dicitur in I Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p9">
862 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude
863 their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who
864 fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against
865 reason."
866 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34575] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
867 dicendum quod philosophus dicit quod non laudamur aut vituperamur
868 secundum passiones absolute consideratas, sed non removet quin
869 possint fieri laudabiles vel vituperabiles secundum quod a ratione
870 ordinantur. Unde subdit, <i>non enim laudatur aut vituperatur qui
871 timet aut irascitur, sed qui aliqualiter</i>, idest secundum
872 rationem vel praeter rationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A2-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 2. Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p2">
873 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
874 the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call
875 disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore
876 every passion of the soul is evil morally.
877 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34576] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
878 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes passiones animae sint malae
879 moraliter. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>passiones
880 animae quidam vocant morbos vel perturbationes animae</i>. Sed
881 omnis morbus vel perturbatio animae est aliquid malum moraliter.
882 Ergo omnis passio animae moraliter mala est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p3">
883 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
884 nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere
885 (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature." Therefore
886 these passions are morally evil.
887 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34577] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
888 Damascenus dicit quod <i>operatio quidem qui secundum naturam motus
889 est, passio vero qui praeter naturam</i>. Sed quod est praeter
890 naturam in motibus animae, habet rationem peccati et mali moralis,
891 unde ipse alibi dicit quod <i>Diabolus versus est ex eo quod est
892 secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam</i>. Ergo
893 huiusmodi passiones sunt malae moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p4">
894 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions
895 of sins" (
896 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34578] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
898 omne quod inducit ad peccatum, habet rationem mali. Sed huiusmodi
899 passiones inducunt ad peccatum, unde Rom. VII dicuntur passiones
900 peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod sint malae moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p5">
901 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
902 fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works."
903 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34579] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
904 est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>rectus amor
905 omnes istas affectiones rectas habet. Metuunt enim peccare, cupiunt
906 perseverare, dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q24_A2-p6">
907 <b>I answer that,</b> On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions
908 are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in
909 words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics
910 did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
911 and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far
912 as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual
913 appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds
914 the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of
915 the
916 soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we
917 speak of those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound."
918 </p><p id="FS_Q24_A2-p7"> On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore
919 they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident
920 that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when
921 he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately
922 ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called "diseases"
923 or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.
924 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="34580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34580] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
925 dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversa fuit sententia
926 Stoicorum et Peripateticorum, nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones
927 esse malas; Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse
928 bonas. Quae quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum
929 vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est, vel parva, si quis
930 utrorumque intentiones consideret. Stoici enim non discernebant
931 inter sensum et intellectum; et per consequens nec inter
932 intellectivum appetitum et sensitivum. Unde non discernebant
933 passiones animae a motibus voluntatis secundum hoc quod passiones
934 animae sunt in appetitu sensitivo, simplices autem motus voluntatis
935 sunt in intellectivo; sed omnem rationabilem motum appetitivae
936 partis vocabant voluntatem, passionem autem dicebant motum
937 progredientem extra limites rationis. Et ideo, eorum sententiam
938 sequens, Tullius, in III libro de Tusculanis quaestionibus, omnes
939 passiones vocat animae morbos. Ex quo argumentatur quod qui
940 <i>morbosi sunt, sani non sunt; et qui sani non sunt, insipientes
941 sunt</i>. Unde et insipientes insanos dicimus. Peripatetici vero
942 omnes motus appetitus sensitivi passiones vocant. Unde eas bonas
943 aestimant, cum sunt a ratione moderatae; malas autem, cum sunt
944 praeter moderationem rationis. Ex quo patet quod Tullius, in eodem
945 libro, Peripateticorum sententiam, qui approbabant mediocritatem
946 passionum, inconvenienter improbat, dicens quod <i>omne malum,
947 etiam mediocre, vitandum est, nam sicut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter
948 aegrum est, sanum non est; sic ista mediocritas morborum vel
949 passionum animae, sana non est</i>. Non enim passiones dicuntur
950 morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione
951 rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1</b> Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34581] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet
952 responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p9">
953 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more
954 or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion
955 to deviate always from the order of natural reason.
956 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34582] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
957 dicendum quod in omni passione animae additur aliquid, vel
958 diminuitur a naturali motu cordis, inquantum cor intensius vel
959 remissius movetur, secundum systolen aut diastolen, et secundum hoc
960 habet passionis rationem. Non tamen oportet quod passio semper
961 declinet ab ordine naturalis rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p10">
962 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they
963 are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
964 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34583] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
965 dicendum quod passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem
966 rationis, inclinant ad peccatum, inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a
967 ratione, pertinent ad virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A3-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 3. Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p2">
968 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason,
969 on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders
970 the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from
971 hatred, anger, friendship and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a
972 moral act.
973 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34584] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
974 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio quaecumque semper diminuat de
975 bonitate actus moralis. Omne enim quod impedit iudicium rationis,
976 ex quo dependet bonitas actus moralis, diminuit per consequens
977 bonitatem actus moralis. Sed omnis passio impedit iudicium
978 rationis, dicit enim Sallustius, in Catilinario, <i>omnes homines
979 qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, ira, amicitia atque
980 misericordia vacuos esse decet</i>. Ergo omnis passio diminuit
981 bonitatem moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p3">
982 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says (
983 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.1" target="asv">Eph. 5:1</a>): "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling
984 with misery when they relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like
985 deeds without than with a passion of the soul.
986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34585] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
987 actus hominis, quanto est Deo similior, tanto est melior, unde
988 dicit apostolus, Ephes. V, <i>estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii
989 carissimi. Sed Deus et sancti Angeli sine ira puniunt, sine
990 miseriae compassione subveniunt</i> ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de
991 Civ. Dei. Ergo est melius huiusmodi opera bona agere sine passione
992 animae, quam cum passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p4">
993 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion:
994 for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without
995 passion, than he who does with passion.
996 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34586] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
997 sicut malum morale attenditur per ordinem ad rationem, ita et bonum
998 morale. Sed malum morale diminuitur per passionem, minus enim
999 peccat qui peccat ex passione, quam qui peccat ex industria. Ergo
1000 maius bonum operatur qui operatur bonum sine passione, quam qui
1001 operatur cum passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p5">
1002 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating
1003 right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral
1004 good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
1005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34587] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1006 est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>passio
1007 misericordiae rationi deservit, quando ita praebetur misericordia,
1008 ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum
1009 ignoscitur poenitenti</i>. Sed nihil quod deservit rationi,
1010 diminuit bonum morale. Ergo passio animae non diminuit bonum
1011 moris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q24_A3-p6">
1012 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens
1013 the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this
1014 is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances
1015 or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the
1016 sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's
1017 good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining
1018 to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward
1019 members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above (
1020 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A7" id="FS_Q24_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[7]</a>), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason.
1021 </p><p id="FS_Q24_A3-p7"> Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to
1022 the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of
1023 his sensitive appetite; according to
1024 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv"> Ps. 83:3</a>: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite,
1025 and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite.
1026 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 co."><a name="34588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34588] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1027 dicendum quod Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse
1028 malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere
1029 actus bonitatem, omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter
1030 tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus
1031 passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout
1032 sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter
1033 nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem
1034 humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per
1035 rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in
1036 radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae
1037 homini conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad
1038 perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum
1039 per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus
1040 possit obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem
1041 moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae
1042 sint regulatae per rationem. Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et
1043 velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem
1044 boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum
1045 secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum;
1046 secundum illud quod in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, <i>cor meum et caro
1047 mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>, ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu
1048 intellectivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p8">
1049 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since
1050 they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act;
1051 for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the
1052 second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because,
1053 to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus
1054 the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates
1055 greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected
1056 by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the
1057 soul increases the goodness of an action.
1058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34589] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1059 ergo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter se possunt habere ad
1060 iudicium rationis. Uno modo, antecedenter. Et sic, cum obnubilent
1061 iudicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminuunt
1062 actus bonitatem, laudabilius enim est quod ex iudicio rationis
1063 aliquis faciat opus caritatis, quam ex sola passione misericordiae.
1064 Alio modo se habent consequenter. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, per
1065 modum redundantiae, quia scilicet, cum superior pars animae intense
1066 movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum eius etiam pars inferior. Et sic
1067 passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum
1068 intensionis voluntatis. Et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem.
1069 Alio modo, per modum electionis, quando scilicet homo ex iudicio
1070 rationis eligit affici aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur,
1071 cooperante appetitu sensitivo. Et sic passio animae addit ad
1072 bonitatem actionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p9">
1073 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the
1074 right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.
1075 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34590] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1076 dicendum quod in Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus,
1077 neque etiam membra corporea, et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur
1078 secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in
1079 nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p10">
1080 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the
1081 ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
1082 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34591] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1083 dicendum quod passio tendens in malum, praecedens iudicium
1084 rationis, diminuit peccatum, sed consequens aliquo praedictorum
1085 modorum, auget ipsum, vel significat augmentum eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A4-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 4. Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p2">
1086 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend
1087 on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore,
1088 nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species.
1089 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34592] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
1090 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae, secundum speciem
1091 suam, sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale
1092 attenditur secundum rationem. Sed passiones sunt in appetitu
1093 sensitivo, et ita id quod est secundum rationem, accidit eis. Cum
1094 ergo nihil quod est per accidens, pertineat ad speciem rei; videtur
1095 quod nulla passio secundum suam speciem sit bona vel mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p3">
1096 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according
1097 to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire
1098 and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this
1099 is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species.
1100 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34593] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1101 actus et passiones habent speciem ex obiecto. Si ergo aliqua passio
1102 secundum suam speciem esset bona vel mala, oporteret quod passiones
1103 quarum obiectum est bonum, bonae essent secundum suam speciem, ut
1104 amor, desiderium et gaudium; et passiones quarum obiectum est malum
1105 essent malae secundum suam speciem, ut odium, timor et tristitia.
1106 Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Non ergo aliqua passio est bona vel mala
1107 ex sua specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p4">
1108 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore
1109 no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
1110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34594] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1111 nulla species passionum est quae non inveniatur in aliis
1112 animalibus. Sed bonum morale non invenitur nisi in homine. Ergo
1113 nulla passio animae bona est vel mala ex sua specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p5">
1114 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty
1115 is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species.
1116 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34595] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1117 est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>misericordia
1118 pertinet ad virtutem</i>. Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic.,
1119 quod verecundia est passio laudabilis. Ergo aliquae passiones sunt
1120 bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6">
1121 <b>I answer that,</b> We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts (
1122 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[5]</a>,6;
1123 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[20], A[1]</a>)---viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according
1124 to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according
1125 to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary
1126 and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object
1127 to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is
1128 base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external
1129 act.
1130 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 co."><a name="34596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34596] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1131 dicendum quod sicut de actibus dictum est, ita et de passionibus
1132 dicendum videtur, quod scilicet species actus vel passionis
1133 dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in
1134 genere naturae, et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad
1135 speciem actus vel passionis. Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad
1136 genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de
1137 iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt
1138 pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum
1139 passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione,
1140 sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia,
1141 quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem
1142 exterioris actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p7">
1143 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself.
1144 But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of
1145 the appetite, but essentially.
1146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34597] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1147 ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passionibus secundum quod
1148 pertinent ad speciem naturae, prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus
1149 in se consideratur. Secundum vero quod appetitus sensitivus obedit
1150 rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius
1151 per accidens, sed per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p8">
1152 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if
1153 they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a
1154 tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
1155 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34598] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1156 dicendum quod passiones quae in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum,
1157 sunt bonae, et similiter quae a vero malo recedunt. E converso vero
1158 passiones quae sunt per recessum a bono, et per accessum ad malum,
1159 sunt malae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p9">
1160 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative
1161 power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard
1162 to the soul's passions.
1163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34599] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1164 dicendum quod in brutis animalibus appetitus sensitivus non obedit
1165 rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali,
1166 quae subiicitur rationi superiori, scilicet divinae, est in eis
1167 quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.</p></div></div></div></div>
1168 <div id="FS_Q25" class="div3">
1169 <h3 id="FS_Q25-p0.1">Q. 25. OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
1170 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
1171 <p id="FS_Q25-p2"> We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q25-p3"><a href="#FS_Q25_A1"> (1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p4"><a href="#FS_Q25_A2"> (2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p5"><a href="#FS_Q25_A3"> (3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p6"><a href="#FS_Q25_A4"> (4) The four principal passions.</a></p>
1172 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 pr."><a name="34600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34600]
1173 Iª-IIae q. 25 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
1174 ordine passionum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
1175 Primo, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad passiones
1176 concupiscibilis. Secundo, de ordine passionum concupiscibilis ad
1177 invicem. Tertio, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad invicem.
1178 Quarto, de quatuor principalibus passionibus.</p></div></div></div>
1179 <div id="FS_Q25_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A1-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 1. Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p2">
1180 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their
1181 objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the
1182 irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
1183 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34601] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
1184 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones irascibilis sint priores
1185 passionibus concupiscibilis. Ordo enim passionum est secundum
1186 ordinem obiectorum. Sed obiectum irascibilis est bonum arduum, quod
1187 videtur esse supremum inter alia bona. Ergo passiones irascibilis
1188 videntur praeesse passionibus concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p3">
1189 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to
1190 that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible
1191 faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1;
1192 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a> ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible
1193 passions precede the concupiscible passions.
1194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34602] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1195 movens est prius moto. Sed irascibilis comparatur ad
1196 concupiscibilem sicut movens ad motum, ad hoc enim datur
1197 animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis
1198 prohibetur frui suo obiecto, ut supra dictum est; removens autem
1199 prohibens habet rationem moventis, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Ergo
1200 passiones irascibilis sunt priores passionibus concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p4">
1201 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher
1202 says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore
1203 the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
1204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34603] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1205 gaudium et tristitia sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Sed gaudium et
1206 tristitia consequuntur ad passiones irascibilis, dicit enim
1207 philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod <i>punitio quietat impetum irae,
1208 delectationem loco tristitiae faciens</i>. Ergo passiones
1209 concupiscibilis sunt posteriores passionibus irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p5">
1210 <b>On the contrary,</b> The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult,
1211 good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the
1212 irascible.
1213 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34604] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1214 passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones
1215 autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum. Cum
1216 igitur bonum simpliciter sit prius quam bonum contractum, videtur
1217 quod passiones concupiscibilis sint priores passionibus
1218 irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p6">
1219 <b>I answer that,</b> In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we
1220 find something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible
1221 passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we
1222 find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous;
1223 whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
1224 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p7"> Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore,
1225 we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident
1226 that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty:
1227 thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (
1228 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv">Rom. 12:12</a>):
1229 "Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions:
1230 because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement
1231 of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked
1232 upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it
1233 is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in
1234 joy or in sadness.
1235 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p8"> But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the
1236 latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty;
1237 just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty.
1238 Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous
1239 good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning
1240 the evil.
1241 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p9"> Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards
1242 good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible
1243 passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
1244 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 co."><a name="34605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34605] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1245 dicendum quod passiones concupiscibilis ad plura se habent quam
1246 passiones irascibilis. Nam in passionibus concupiscibilis invenitur
1247 aliquid pertinens ad motum, sicut desiderium; et aliquid pertinens
1248 ad quietem, sicut gaudium et tristitia. Sed in passionibus
1249 irascibilis non invenitur aliquid pertinens ad quietem, sed solum
1250 pertinens ad motum. Cuius ratio est quia id in quo iam quiescitur,
1251 non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum
1252 irascibilis. Quies autem, cum sit finis motus, est prior in
1253 intentione, sed posterior in executione. Si ergo comparentur
1254 passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae significant
1255 quietem in bono; manifeste passiones irascibilis praecedunt, ordine
1256 executionis, huiusmodi passiones concupiscibilis, sicut spes
1257 praecedit gaudium, unde et causat ipsum, secundum illud apostoli,
1258 Rom. XII, <i>spe gaudentes</i>. Sed passio concupiscibilis
1259 importans quietem in malo, scilicet tristitia, media est inter duas
1260 passiones irascibilis. Sequitur enim timorem, cum enim occurrerit
1261 malum quod timebatur, causatur tristitia. Praecedit autem motum
1262 irae, quia cum ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in
1263 vindictam, hoc pertinet ad motum irae. Et quia rependere vicem
1264 malis, apprehenditur ut bonum; cum iratus hoc consecutus fuerit,
1265 gaudet. Et sic manifestum est quod omnis passio irascibilis
1266 terminatur ad passionem concupiscibilis pertinentem ad quietem,
1267 scilicet vel ad gaudium vel ad tristitiam. Sed si comparentur
1268 passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae important
1269 motum, sic manifeste passiones concupiscibilis sunt priores, eo
1270 quod passiones irascibilis addunt supra passiones concupiscibilis;
1271 sicut et obiectum irascibilis addit supra obiectum concupiscibilis
1272 arduitatem sive difficultatem. Spes enim supra desiderium addit
1273 quendam conatum, et quandam elevationem animi ad consequendum bonum
1274 arduum. Et similiter timor addit supra fugam seu abominationem,
1275 quandam depressionem animi, propter difficultatem mali. Sic ergo
1276 passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis
1277 quae important motum in bonum vel in malum; et inter passiones
1278 concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo. Et sic
1279 patet quod passiones irascibilis et principium habent a passionibus
1280 concupiscibilis, et in passiones concupiscibilis terminantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p10">
1281 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just
1282 as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty
1283 is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.
1284 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34606] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1285 ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procederet, si de ratione obiecti
1286 concupiscibilis esset aliquid oppositum arduo, sicut de ratione
1287 obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum
1288 concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam
1289 obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p11">
1290 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related
1291 to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
1292 Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest.
1293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34607] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1294 dicendum quod removens prohibens non est movens per se, sed per
1295 accidens. Nunc autem loquimur de ordine passionum per se. Et
1296 praeterea irascibilis removet prohibens quietem concupiscibilis in
1297 suo obiecto. Unde ex hoc non sequitur nisi quod passiones
1298 irascibilis praecedunt passiones concupiscibilis ad quietem
1299 pertinentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>The third object
1300 leads to the same conclusion.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34608] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> De quibus
1301 etiam tertia ratio procedit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A2-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 2. Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p2">
1302 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence,
1303 which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire
1304 takes precedence of love.
1305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34609] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
1306 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit prima passionum
1307 concupiscibilis. Vis enim concupiscibilis a concupiscentia
1308 denominatur, quae est eadem passio cum desiderio. Sed denominatio
1309 fit a potiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo concupiscentia est
1310 potior amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p3">
1311 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence
1312 or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
1313 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34610] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1314 amor unionem quandam importat, est enim vis unitiva et concretiva,
1315 ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed concupiscentia vel
1316 desiderium est motus ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae.
1317 Ergo concupiscentia est prior amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p4">
1318 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure
1319 (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
1320 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34611] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1321 causa est prior effectu. Sed delectatio est quandoque causa amoris,
1322 quidam enim propter delectationem amant, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic.
1323 Ergo delectatio est prior amore. Non ergo prima inter passiones
1324 concupiscibilis est amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p5">
1325 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object,
1326 is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.
1327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34612] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1328 est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones
1329 ex amore causantur, <i>amor enim inhians habere quod amatur,
1330 cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est</i>.
1331 Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A2-p6">
1332 <b>I answer that,</b> Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good.
1333 Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is
1334 to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.
1335 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A2-p7"> Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution.
1336 Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of
1337 execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the
1338 end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to
1339 that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after
1340 having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while
1341 movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes
1342 desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended
1343 causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good
1344 itself is, as stated above (
1345 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q11_A3" id="FS_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
1346 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="34613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34613] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1347 dicendum quod obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum.
1348 Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio
1349 boni. Unde et omnes passiones quarum obiectum est bonum,
1350 naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum,
1351 unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita, quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo
1352 refutatur oppositum malum. Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui
1353 quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione.
1354 Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum
1355 intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem
1356 consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad
1357 finem. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem,
1358 primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil
1359 enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem;
1360 tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem
1361 aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil
1362 aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est
1363 desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel
1364 delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit
1365 desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum
1366 ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat
1367 desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae
1368 quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p8">
1369 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now
1370 in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when
1371 it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love,
1372 when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions,
1373 concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
1374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34614] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1375 ergo dicendum quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis
1376 innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum
1377 philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus
1378 causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum,
1379 est delectatio, quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel
1380 concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>amor
1381 magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia</i>. Unde inter omnes
1382 passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et
1383 propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p9">
1384 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This
1385 union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion,
1386 in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and
1387 love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
1388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34615] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1389 dicendum quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis,
1390 secundum scilicet coniunctionem ad rem ipsam. Et talis unio
1391 pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quae sequitur desiderium.
1392 Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel
1393 proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem
1394 ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic
1395 amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedit motum
1396 desiderii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p10">
1397 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.
1398 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34616] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1399 dicendum quod delectatio causat amorem, secundum quod est prior in
1400 intentione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p2">
1401 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger.
1402 Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and
1403 surpasses hope.
1404 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34617] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
1405 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit prima inter passiones
1406 irascibilis. Vis enim irascibilis ab ira denominatur. Cum ergo
1407 denominatio fiat a potiori, videtur quod ira sit potior et prior
1408 quam spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p3">
1409 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary
1410 evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than
1411 to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil.
1412 Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And
1413 consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.
1414 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34618] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1415 arduum est obiectum irascibilis. Sed magis videtur esse arduum quod
1416 aliquis conetur superare malum contrarium quod imminet ut futurum,
1417 quod pertinet ad audaciam; vel quod iniacet iam ut praesens, quod
1418 pertinet ad iram; quam quod conetur acquirere simpliciter aliquod
1419 bonum. Et similiter magis videtur esse arduum quod conetur vincere
1420 malum praesens, quam malum futurum. Ergo ira videtur esse potior
1421 passio quam audacia, et audacia quam spes. Et sic spes non videtur
1422 esse prior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p4">
1423 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and
1424 despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair
1425 precede hope and daring.
1426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34619] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1427 prius occurrit, in motu ad finem, recessus a termino, quam accessus
1428 ad terminum. Sed timor et desperatio important recessum ab aliquo,
1429 audacia autem et spes important accessum ad aliquid. Ergo timor et
1430 desperatio praecedunt spem et audaciam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p5">
1431 <b>On the contrary,</b> The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions.
1432 Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty.
1433 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34620] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1434 quanto aliquid est propinquius primo, tanto est prius. Sed spes est
1435 propinquior amori, qui est prima passionum. Ergo spes est prior
1436 inter omnes passiones irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p6">
1437 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
1438 <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q25_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may
1439 be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose
1440 object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion
1441 in the irascible, as stated above (Q[23],
1442 AA[3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
1443 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p7"> Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it
1444 follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of
1445 the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz.
1446 hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope
1447 precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good
1448 directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect
1449 of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement
1450 from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this---that as the
1451 desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises
1452 from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is
1453 angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly,
1454 it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.
1455 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p8"> And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion,
1456 second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from
1457 all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair;
1458 fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
1459 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 co."><a name="34621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34621] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1460 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis
1461 important motum in aliquid. Motus autem ad aliquid in irascibili
1462 potest causari ex duobus, uno modo, ex sola aptitudine seu
1463 proportione ad finem, quae pertinet ad amorem vel odium; alio modo,
1464 ex praesentia ipsius boni vel mali, quae pertinet ad tristitiam vel
1465 gaudium. Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in
1466 irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio
1467 irae. Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio
1468 vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod
1469 ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine
1470 generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae
1471 important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali,
1472 oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et
1473 desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum
1474 est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est
1475 prior desperatione, quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem
1476 boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in
1477 bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non
1478 competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud,
1479 unde est quasi per accidens. Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit
1480 recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et
1481 desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc
1482 manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur
1483 malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae,
1484 nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur
1485 desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim
1486 irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare, secundum quod
1487 Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sic ergo patet quod spes
1488 est prima inter omnes passiones irascibilis. Et si ordinem omnium
1489 passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus, primo
1490 occurrunt amor et odium; secundo, desiderium et fuga; tertio, spes
1491 et desperatio; quarto, timor et audacia; quinto, ira; sexto et
1492 ultimo, gaudium et tristitia, quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones,
1493 ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et
1494 desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium
1495 quam tristitia, ut ex praedictis colligi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p9">
1496 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more
1497 manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
1498 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34622] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1499 ergo dicendum quod, quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut
1500 effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a
1501 manifestiori, denominatur potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p10">
1502 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more
1503 directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous.
1504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34623] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1505 dicendum quod arduum non est ratio accedendi vel appetendi, sed
1506 potius bonum. Et ideo spes, quae directius respicit bonum, est
1507 prior, quamvis audacia aliquando sit in magis arduum, vel etiam
1508 ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p11">
1509 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from
1510 evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention
1511 of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of
1512 obtaining the end.
1513 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34624] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1514 dicendum quod appetitus primo et per se movetur in bonum, sicut in
1515 proprium obiectum; et ex hoc causatur quod recedat a malo.
1516 Proportionatur enim motus appetitivae partis, non quidem motui
1517 naturali, sed intentioni naturae; quae per prius intendit finem
1518 quam remotionem contrarii, quae non quaeritur nisi propter
1519 adeptionem finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A4-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 4. Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p2">
1520 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7]
1521 sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.
1522 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34625] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
1523 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint istae quatuor principales
1524 passiones, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor. Augustinus enim, in
1525 XIV de Civ. Dei, non ponit spem, sed cupiditatem loco eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p3">
1526 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation.
1527 The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the
1528 final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal
1529 passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the
1530 four principal passions.
1531 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34626] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1532 in passionibus animae est duplex ordo, scilicet intentionis, et
1533 consecutionis seu generationis. Aut ergo principales passiones
1534 accipiuntur secundum ordinem intentionis, et sic tantum gaudium et
1535 tristitia, quae sunt finales, erunt principales passiones. Aut
1536 secundum ordinem consecutionis seu generationis, et sic amor erit
1537 principalis passio. Nullo ergo modo debent dici quatuor principales
1538 passiones istae quatuor, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p4">
1539 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned
1540 as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another.
1541 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34627] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1542 sicut audacia causatur ex spe, ita timor ex desperatione. Aut ergo
1543 spes et desperatio debent poni principales passiones, tanquam
1544 causae, aut spes et audacia, tanquam sibi ipsis affines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p5">
1545 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says:
1546 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p6"> "Banish joys: banish fears:</p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p7"> Away with hope: away with tears."</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34628] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1547 est illud quod Boetius, in libro de Consol., enumerans quatuor
1548 principales passiones, dicit, <i>gaudia pelle, pelle timorem,
1549 spemque fugato, nec dolor adsit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p8">
1550 <b>I answer that,</b> These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because
1551 in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated
1552 in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete
1553 them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good,
1554 movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on
1555 to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the
1556 future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness
1557 relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
1558 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p9"> As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some
1559 have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by
1560 hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
1561 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 co."><a name="34629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34629] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1562 dicendum quod hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse
1563 dicuntur. Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales
1564 dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu
1565 omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur, ut dicitur
1566 in II Ethic. Timor autem et spes sunt principales, non quidem quasi
1567 completivae simpliciter, sed quia sunt completivae in genere motus
1568 appetitivi ad aliquid, nam respectu boni, incipit motus in amore,
1569 et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero
1570 mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in
1571 timore. Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi
1572 secundum differentiam praesentis et futuri, motus enim respicit
1573 futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti. De bono igitur
1574 praesenti est gaudium; de malo praesenti est tristitia; de bono
1575 vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor. Omnes autem aliae
1576 passiones, quae sunt de bono vel de malo praesenti vel futuro, ad
1577 has completive reducuntur. Unde etiam a quibusdam dicuntur
1578 principales hae praedictae quatuor passiones, quia sunt generales.
1579 Quod quidem verum est, si spes et timor designant motum appetitus
1580 communiter tendentem in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p10">
1581 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future
1582 good.
1583 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34630] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1584 ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco
1585 spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum
1586 futurum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p11">
1587 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last
1588 passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed
1589 any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of
1590 daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply
1591 OBJ 3).
1592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34631] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1593 dicendum quod passiones istae dicuntur principales, secundum
1594 ordinem intentionis et complementi. Et quamvis timor et spes non
1595 sint ultimae passiones simpliciter, tamen sunt ultimae in genere
1596 passionum tendentium in aliud quasi in futurum. Nec potest esse
1597 instantia nisi de ira. Quae tamen non potest poni principalis
1598 passio, quia est quidam effectus audaciae, quae non potest esse
1599 passio principalis, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p12">
1600 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and
1601 this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to
1602 be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.
1603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34632] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1604 dicendum quod desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi
1605 per accidens, et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est
1606 per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales,
1607 quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic
1608 etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur
1609 audaciam.</p></div></div></div></div>
1610 <div id="FS_Q26" class="div3">
1611 <h3 id="FS_Q26-p0.1">Q. 26. OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
1612 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
1613 <p id="FS_Q26-p2"> We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions
1614 of the irascible faculty.
1615 </p><p id="FS_Q26-p3"> The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion;
1616 (3) Pleasure and sadness.
1617 </p><p id="FS_Q26-p4"> Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under
1618 the first head there are four points of inquiry:
1619 </p><p id="FS_Q26-p5"><a href="#FS_Q26_A1"> (1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p6"><a href="#FS_Q26_A2"> (2) Whether love is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p7"><a href="#FS_Q26_A3"> (3) Whether love is the same as dilection?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p8"><a href="#FS_Q26_A4"> (4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?</a></p>
1620 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 pr."><a name="34633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34633]
1621 Iª-IIae q. 26 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
1622 passionibus animae in speciali. Et primo, de passionibus
1623 concupiscibilis; secundo, de passionibus irascibilis. Prima
1624 consideratio erit tripartita, nam primo considerabimus de amore et
1625 odio; secundo, de concupiscentia et fuga tertio, de delectatione et
1626 tristitia. Circa amorem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de ipso
1627 amore; secundo, de causa amoris; tertio, de effectibus eius. Circa
1628 primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum amor sit in concupiscibili.
1629 Secundo, utrum amor sit passio. Tertio, utrum amor sit idem quod
1630 dilectio. Quarto, utrum amor convenienter dividatur in amorem
1631 amicitiae et amorem concupiscentiae.</p></div></div></div>
1632 <div id="FS_Q26_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A1-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 1. Whether love is in the concupiscible power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p2">
1633 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written (
1634 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q26_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.2" target="asv">Wis. 8:2</a>): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part
1635 of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible
1636 power.
1637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34634] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
1638 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in concupiscibili.
1639 Dicitur enim Sap. VIII, hanc, scilicet sapientiam, amavi et
1640 exquisivi a iuventute mea. Sed concupiscibilis, cum sit pars
1641 appetitus sensitivi, non potest tendere in sapientiam, quae non
1642 comprehenditur sensu. Ergo amor non est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p3">
1643 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the
1644 object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary
1645 to it, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage,
1646 is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the
1647 concupiscible power.
1648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34635] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1649 amor videtur esse idem cuilibet passioni, dicit enim Augustinus, in
1650 XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>amor inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est;
1651 id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia; fugiens quod ei
1652 adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia
1653 est</i>. Sed non omnis passio est in concupiscibili; sed timor,
1654 etiam hic enumeratus, est in irascibili. Ergo non est simpliciter
1655 dicendum quod amor sit in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p4">
1656 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers,
1657 which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power.
1658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34636] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1659 Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit quendam amorem naturalem.
1660 Sed amor naturalis magis videtur pertinere ad vires naturales, quae
1661 sunt animae vegetabilis. Ergo amor non simpliciter est in
1662 concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p5">
1663 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power."
1664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34637] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1665 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod amor est in
1666 concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A1-p6">
1667 <b>I answer that,</b> Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference
1668 of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but
1669 in some other: and this is called the "natural appetite." Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to
1670 their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author
1671 of their nature, as stated in the
1672 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[6], A[1]</a>, ad 2;
1673 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and
1674 not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share
1675 of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject
1676 of
1677 the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will."
1678 </p><p id="FS_Q26_A1-p7"> Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural
1679 appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may
1680 be called "natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called
1681 "natural love." In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to
1682 say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love
1683 is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible
1684 power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.
1685 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 co."><a name="34638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34638] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1686 dicendum quod amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum
1687 utriusque obiectum sit bonum. Unde secundum differentiam appetitus
1688 est differentia amoris. Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens
1689 apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius, et huiusmodi
1690 dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis
1691 convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam,
1692 sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam, ut in I libro dictum
1693 est. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius
1694 appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero. Et talis est
1695 appetitus sensitivus in brutis, qui tamen in hominibus aliquid
1696 libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est
1697 appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum
1698 iudicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui
1699 dicitur voluntas. In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur
1700 illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In
1701 appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est
1702 connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest
1703 amor naturalis, sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum
1704 medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et
1705 similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod
1706 bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel
1707 intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in
1708 appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu
1709 intellectivo. Et pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per
1710 respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est
1711 obiectum irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p8">
1712 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love.
1713 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34639] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1714 ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de amore intellectivo
1715 vel rationali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p9">
1716 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally.
1717 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34640] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1718 dicendum quod amor dicitur esse timor, gaudium, cupiditas et
1719 tristitia, non quidem essentialiter, sed causaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p10">
1720 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the
1721 body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things";
1722 since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it.
1723 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34641] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1724 dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae
1725 vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus
1726 partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus, quia, ut
1727 Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>omnibus est pulchrum et
1728 bonum amabile</i>; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id
1729 quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A2-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 2. Whether love is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p2">
1730 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
1731 iv). Therefore love is not a passion.
1732 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34642] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
1733 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus
1734 passio est. Sed omnis amor est virtus quaedam, ut dicit Dionysius,
1735 IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p3">
1736 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but
1737 rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
1738 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34643] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1739 amor est unio quaedam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum, in libro de
1740 Trin. Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo
1741 amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p4">
1742 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite;
1743 for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion.
1744 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34644] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1745 Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod passio est motus quidam. Amor
1746 autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed
1747 principium huiusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p5">
1748 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion."
1749 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34645] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1750 est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est
1751 passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p6">
1752 <b>I answer that,</b> Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the
1753 first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives
1754 the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement
1755 to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be
1756 called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which
1757 consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement
1758 is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were,
1759 into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement
1760 ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is
1761 nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this
1762 movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the
1763 appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the
1764 concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.
1765 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 co."><a name="34646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34646] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1766 dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem
1767 naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat
1768 formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans
1769 dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa
1770 gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter
1771 gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum
1772 appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad
1773 ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad
1774 appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III
1775 de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in
1776 eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter
1777 consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima
1778 ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est
1779 aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia
1780 sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies,
1781 quae est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam
1782 immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et
1783 passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili;
1784 communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in
1785 voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p7">
1786 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement
1787 in the appetite.
1788 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34647] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1789 ergo dicendum quod, quia virtus significat principium motus vel
1790 actionis, ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a
1791 Dionysio vocatur virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p8">
1792 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which
1793 he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but
1794 that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher
1795 says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.
1796 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34648] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1797 dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam
1798 appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad
1799 aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis,
1800 sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor
1801 est virtus unitiva, et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio
1802 est opus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p9">
1803 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement
1804 whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein.
1805 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34649] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1806 dicendum quod amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in
1807 appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus quo immutatur ab
1808 appetibili, ut ei appetibile complaceat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether love is the same as dilection?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p2">
1809 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is
1810 to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore
1811 love and dilection denote the same thing.
1812 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34650] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
1813 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius
1814 enim, IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicit quod hoc modo se habent amor et
1815 dilectio, <i>sicut quatuor et bis duo, rectilineum et habens rectas
1816 lineas</i>. Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio
1817 significant idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p3">
1818 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same.
1819 Therefore these are the same.
1820 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34651] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1821 appetitivi motus secundum obiecta differunt. Sed idem est obiectum
1822 dilectionis et amoris. Ergo sunt idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p4">
1823 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love
1824 to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because
1825 as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore
1826 love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7)
1827 that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection."
1828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34652] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1829 si dilectio et amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre
1830 videntur, quod dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo,
1831 ut quidam dixerunt, secundum quod Augustinus narrat, in XIV de Civ.
1832 Dei. Sed hoc modo non differunt, quia, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit,
1833 in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo
1834 amor et dilectio non differunt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem
1835 concludit quod <i>non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem
1836 dicere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p5">
1837 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does."
1838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34653] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1839 est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>quibusdam
1840 sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen
1841 dilectionis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A3-p6">
1842 <b>I answer that,</b> We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however,
1843 in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection"
1844 are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either way.
1845 </p><p id="FS_Q26_A3-p7"> Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection
1846 or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand,
1847 as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the
1848 rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that
1849 which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].
1850 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 co."><a name="34654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34654] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1851 dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo
1852 pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia.
1853 Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum philosophum in VIII
1854 Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per
1855 modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi
1856 potest. Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam
1857 amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est
1858 amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem,
1859 electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non
1860 est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola
1861 rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem, perfectionem
1862 quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur,
1863 ut ipsum nomen designat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p8">
1864 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same
1865 as dilection.
1866 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34655] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1867 ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione,
1868 secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo, sic enim amor idem est
1869 quod dilectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p9">
1870 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated
1871 above.
1872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34656] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1873 dicendum quod obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum
1874 dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut
1875 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p10">
1876 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same
1877 as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds
1878 that "a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible
1879 passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the
1880 difference spoken of.
1881 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34657] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1882 dicendum quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam
1883 boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est. In parte tamen intellectiva
1884 idem est amor et dilectio. Et sic loquitur ibi Augustinus de amore,
1885 unde parum post subdit quod <i>recta voluntas est bonus amor, et
1886 perversa voluntas est malus amor</i>. Quia tamen amor, qui est
1887 passio concupiscibilis, plurimos inclinat ad malum, inde habuerunt
1888 occasionem qui praedictam differentiam assignaverunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p11">
1889 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than
1890 "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection
1891 presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by
1892 Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the
1893 nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
1894 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="34658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34658] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
1895 dicendum quod ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen
1896 amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam
1897 passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo;
1898 dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in
1899 Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo
1900 attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod
1901 pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc,
1902 divinius est amor quam dilectio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A4-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 4. Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p2">
1903 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion,
1904 while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division
1905 of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.
1906 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34659] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
1907 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor inconvenienter dividatur in
1908 amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Amor enim est passio, amicitia
1909 vero est habitus, ut dicit philosophus, in VIII Ethic. Sed habitus
1910 non potest esse pars divisiva passionis. Ergo amor non convenienter
1911 dividitur per amorem concupiscentiae et amorem amicitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p3">
1912 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as
1913 "animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence
1914 is not a division of love.
1915 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34660] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1916 nihil dividitur per id quod ei connumeratur, non enim homo
1917 connumeratur animali. Sed concupiscentia connumeratur amori, sicut
1918 alia passio ab amore. Ergo amor non potest dividi per
1919 concupiscentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p4">
1920 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that
1921 which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on "goodness." But useful and pleasant friendship are not without
1922 concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship.
1923 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34661] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1924 secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., triplex est amicitia, utilis,
1925 delectabilis et honesta. Sed amicitia utilis et delectabilis habet
1926 concupiscentiam. Ergo concupiscentia non debet dividi contra
1927 amicitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p5">
1928 <b>On the contrary,</b> We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness
1929 which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic.
1930 viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.
1931 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34662] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1932 quaedam dicimur amare quia ea concupiscimus, sicut <i>dicitur
1933 aliquis amare vinum propter dulce quod in eo concupiscit</i>, ut
1934 dicitur in II Topic. Sed ad vinum, et ad huiusmodi, non habemus
1935 amicitiam, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo alius est amor
1936 concupiscentiae, et alius est amor amicitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A4-p6">
1937 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency:
1938 towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly,
1939 man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes
1940 good.
1941 </p><p id="FS_Q26_A4-p7"> Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship
1942 is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself,
1943 but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative
1944 being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good
1945 simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may
1946 have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.
1947 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 co."><a name="34663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34663] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1948 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est
1949 velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet
1950 in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui
1951 vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor
1952 concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur
1953 amor amicitiae. Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius.
1954 Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur,
1955 quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et
1956 secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter
1957 est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita
1958 bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum
1959 habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum
1960 quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum,
1961 est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum
1962 alterius, est amor secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p8">
1963 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend
1964 is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
1965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34664] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
1966 ergo dicendum quod amor non dividitur per amicitiam et
1967 concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam
1968 ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem
1969 dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34665] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc
1970 patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p10">
1971 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the
1972 character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that
1973 friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true
1974 friendship.
1975 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34666] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1976 dicendum quod in amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem
1977 aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio
1978 amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam
1979 delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et
1980 delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit
1981 a ratione verae amicitiae.</p></div></div></div></div>
1982 <div id="FS_Q27" class="div3">
1983 <h3 id="FS_Q27-p0.1">Q. 27. OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
1984 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
1985 <p id="FS_Q27-p2"> We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q27-p3"><a href="#FS_Q27_A1"> (1) Whether good is the only cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p4"><a href="#FS_Q27_A2"> (2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p5"><a href="#FS_Q27_A3"> (3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p6"><a href="#FS_Q27_A4"> (4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?</a></p>
1986 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 pr."><a name="34667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34667]
1987 Iª-IIae q. 27 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
1988 amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum bonum sit
1989 sola causa amoris. Secundo, utrum cognitio sit causa amoris.
1990 Tertio, utrum similitudo. Quarto, utrum aliqua alia animae
1991 passionum.</p></div></div></div>
1992 <div id="FS_Q27_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A1-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 1. Whether good is the only cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p2">
1993 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens
1994 that evil also is loved, according to
1995 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv"> Ps. 10:6</a>: "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of
1996 love.
1997 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34668] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
1998 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non solum bonum sit causa amoris.
1999 Bonum enim non est causa amoris, nisi quia amatur. Sed contingit
2000 etiam malum amari, secundum illud Psalmi X, <i>qui diligit
2001 iniquitatem, odit animam suam</i>, alioquin omnis amor esset bonus.
2002 Ergo non solum bonum est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p3">
2003 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil
2004 is the cause of love.
2005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34669] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2006 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>eos qui mala sua
2007 dicunt, amamus</i>. Ergo videtur quod malum sit causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p4">
2008 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all."
2009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34670] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2010 Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod non solum bonum, sed
2011 etiam pulchrum est omnibus amabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p5">
2012 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love.
2013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34671] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2014 est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII de Trin., <i>non amatur certe nisi
2015 bonum</i>. Solum igitur bonum est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6">
2016 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
2017 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause
2018 of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good;
2019 because, as stated above (
2020 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved,
2021 and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper
2022 cause of love.
2023 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 co."><a name="34672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34672] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2024 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor ad appetitivam
2025 potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius
2026 comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet
2027 igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum.
2028 Amoris autem proprium obiectum est bonum, quia, ut dictum est, amor
2029 importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad
2030 amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et
2031 proportionatum. Unde relinquitur quod bonum sit propria causa
2032 amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p7">
2033 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered
2034 as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is
2035 in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or
2036 money, or such like.
2037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34673] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2038 ergo dicendum quod malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni,
2039 scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut
2040 simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit
2041 in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum. Et per hunc modum homo
2042 diligit iniquitatem, inquantum per iniquitatem adipiscitur aliquod
2043 bonum, puta delectationem vel pecuniam vel aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p8">
2044 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good
2045 thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy.
2046 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34674] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2047 dicendum quod illi qui mala sua dicunt, non propter mala amantur,
2048 sed propter hoc quod dicunt mala, hoc enim quod est dicere mala
2049 sua, habet rationem boni, inquantum excludit fictionem seu
2050 simulationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p9">
2051 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good
2052 is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known.
2053 Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering
2054 to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to
2055 the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes,
2056 and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means
2057 that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend.
2058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34675] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2059 dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum
2060 enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo
2061 quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius
2062 aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Unde et illi sensus
2063 praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt,
2064 scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim
2065 pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum
2066 sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus
2067 pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra
2068 bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur
2069 id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id
2070 cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A2-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 2. Whether knowledge is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p2">
2071 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought
2072 without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83],
2073 qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
2074 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34676] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
2075 sic proceditur. Videtur quod cognitio non sit causa amoris. Quod
2076 enim aliquid quaeratur, hoc contingit ex amore. Sed aliqua
2077 quaeruntur quae nesciuntur, sicut scientiae, cum enim in his idem
2078 sit eas habere quod eas nosse, ut Augustinus dicit in libro
2079 octoginta trium quaest., si cognoscerentur, haberentur, et non
2080 quaererentur. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p3">
2081 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they
2082 are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause
2083 of love.
2084 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34677] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2085 eiusdem rationis videtur esse quod aliquid incognitum ametur, et
2086 quod aliquid ametur plus quam cognoscatur. Sed aliqua amantur plus
2087 quam cognoscantur, sicut Deus, qui in hac vita potest per seipsum
2088 amari, non autem per seipsum cognosci. Ergo cognitio non est causa
2089 amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p4">
2090 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there
2091 is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause
2092 of love.
2093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34678] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2094 si cognitio esset causa amoris, non posset inveniri amor ubi non
2095 est cognitio. Sed in omnibus rebus invenitur amor, ut dicit
2096 Dionysius in IV cap. de Div. Nom., non autem in omnibus invenitur
2097 cognitio. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p5">
2098 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."
2099 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34679] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2100 est quod Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod <i>nullus potest
2101 amare aliquid incognitum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p6">
2102 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
2103 <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q27_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore
2104 love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily
2105 sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning
2106 of spiritual love. Accordingly
2107 knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.
2108 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 co."><a name="34680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34680] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2109 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum est causa amoris per modum
2110 obiecti. Bonum autem non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est
2111 apprehensum. Et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod
2112 amatur. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., quod visio
2113 corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi. Et similiter
2114 contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est
2115 principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa
2116 amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi
2117 cognitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p7">
2118 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either
2119 in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But
2120 to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
2121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34681] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2122 ergo dicendum quod ille qui quaerit scientiam, non omnino ignorat
2123 eam, sed secundum aliquid eam praecognoscit, vel in universali, vel
2124 in aliquo eius effectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari, ut
2125 Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sic autem eam cognoscere non est eam
2126 habere; sed cognoscere eam perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p8">
2127 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs
2128 to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion,
2129 things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should
2130 know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and
2131 properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices,
2132 for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing
2133 is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. This is most evident
2134 in regard to the sciences, which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that
2135 rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the
2136 love of God.
2137 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34682] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2138 dicendum quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod
2139 non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem
2140 pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt
2141 coniuncta, et componere quodammodo ea quae sunt diversa, unum
2142 alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur
2143 quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes et
2144 virtutes et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae
2145 respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris
2146 sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo
2147 contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest
2148 perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur. Sicut maxime
2149 patet in scientiis, quas aliqui amant propter aliquam summariam
2150 cognitionem quam de eis habent, puta quod sciunt rhetoricam esse
2151 scientiam per quam homo potest persuadere, et hoc in rhetorica
2152 amant. Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p9">
2153 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves,
2154 but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]; cf.
2155 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q27_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[6], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
2156 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34683] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2157 dicendum quod etiam amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus,
2158 causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus
2159 naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit, ut supra
2160 dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A3-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 3. Whether likeness is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p2">
2161 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the
2162 cause of hatred; for it is written (
2163 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>) that "among the proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with
2164 one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
2165 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34684] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
2166 sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa amoris. Idem
2167 enim non est causa contrariorum. Sed similitudo est causa odii,
2168 dicitur enim Prov. XIII, quod <i>inter superbos semper sunt
2169 iurgia</i>; et philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod figuli
2170 corrixantur ad invicem. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p3">
2171 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves
2172 an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that
2173 case a man would love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause
2174 of love.
2175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34685] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2176 Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod <i>aliquis amat in alio quod
2177 esse non vellet, sicut homo amat histrionem, qui non vellet esse
2178 histrio</i>. Hoc autem non contingeret, si similitudo esset propria
2179 causa amoris, sic enim homo amaret in altero quod ipse haberet, vel
2180 vellet habere. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p4">
2181 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches.
2182 But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause
2183 of love.
2184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34686] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2185 quilibet homo amat id quo indiget, etiam si illud non habeat, sicut
2186 infirmus amat sanitatem, et pauper amat divitias. Sed inquantum
2187 indiget et caret eis, habet dissimilitudinem ad ipsa. Ergo non
2188 solum similitudo, sed etiam dissimilitudo est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p5">
2189 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain
2190 their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
2191 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="34687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34687] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
2192 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>beneficos in pecunias
2193 et salutem amamus, et similiter eos qui circa mortuos servant
2194 amicitiam, omnes diligunt</i>. Non autem omnes sunt tales. Ergo
2195 similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p6">
2196 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2197 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like."
2198 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34688] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2199 est quod dicitur Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit simile
2200 sibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p7">
2201 <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind
2202 of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness
2203 are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality
2204 which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its
2205 proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance
2206 to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
2207 </p><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p8"> Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike,
2208 having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of
2209 humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him;
2210 and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or
2211 friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and
2212 it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.
2213 </p><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p9"> Now it has been stated above (
2214 <a href="#FS_Q26_A4" id="FS_Q27_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[4]</a>), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But
2215 a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in
2216 the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders
2217 him from gaining the good that he loves, he
2218 becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel
2219 among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder
2220 one another in attaining the position they covet.
2221 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 co."><a name="34689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34689] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2222 dicendum quod similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris. Sed
2223 considerandum est quod similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi
2224 dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu,
2225 sicut duo habentes albedinem, dicuntur similes. Alio modo, ex hoc
2226 quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione, illud quod
2227 aliud habet in actu, sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens
2228 extra suum locum, habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo loco
2229 existenti. Vel etiam secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad
2230 actum ipsum, nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus. Primus ergo
2231 similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae. Ex
2232 hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam,
2233 sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa, sicut duo homines sunt unum in
2234 specie humanitatis, et duo albi in albedine. Et ideo affectus unius
2235 tendit in alterum, sicut in unum sibi; et vult ei bonum sicut et
2236 sibi. Sed secundus modus similitudinis causat amorem
2237 concupiscentiae, vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis. Quia
2238 unicuique existenti in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, inest
2239 appetitus sui actus, et in eius consecutione delectatur, si sit
2240 sentiens et cognoscens. Dictum est autem supra quod in amore
2241 concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum
2242 quod concupiscit. Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium,
2243 quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine
2244 alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in
2245 participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod
2246 amat; efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed
2247 inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus. Et propter hoc figuli
2248 corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro,
2249 et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria
2250 excellentia, quam concupiscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34690] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
2251 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p11">
2252 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the
2253 latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer
2254 love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect
2255 of his art.
2256 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34691] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2257 dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod aliquis in altero amat quod in se
2258 non amat, invenitur ratio similitudinis secundum
2259 proportionalitatem, nam sicut se habet alius ad hoc quod in eo
2260 amatur, ita ipse se habet ad hoc quod in se amat. Puta si bonus
2261 cantor bonum amet scriptorem, attenditur ibi similitudo
2262 proportionis, secundum quod uterque habet quod convenit ei secundum
2263 suam artem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p12">
2264 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above.
2265 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34692] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2266 dicendum quod ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad
2267 id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p13">
2268 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he
2269 expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to
2270 one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not
2271 all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to
2272 certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man,
2273 as being in conformity with his own natural reason.
2274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="34693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34693] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
2275 dicendum quod secundum eandem similitudinem potentiae ad actum,
2276 ille qui non est liberalis, amat eum qui est liberalis, inquantum
2277 expectat ab eo aliquid quod desiderat. Et eadem ratio est de
2278 perseverante in amicitia ad eum qui non perseverat. Utrobique enim
2279 videtur esse amicitia propter utilitatem. Vel dicendum quod, licet
2280 non omnes homines habeant huiusmodi virtutes secundum habitum
2281 completum, habent tamen ea secundum quaedam seminalia rationis,
2282 secundum quae, qui non habet virtutem, diligit virtuosum, tanquam
2283 suae naturali rationi conformem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A4-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 4. Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p2">
2284 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved
2285 for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
2286 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34694] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
2287 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia passio possit esse causa
2288 amoris. Dicit enim philosophus, in VIII Ethic., quod aliqui amantur
2289 propter delectationem. Sed delectatio est passio quaedam. Ergo
2290 aliqua alia passio est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p3">
2291 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship
2292 based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
2293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34695] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2294 desiderium quaedam passio est. Sed aliquos amamus propter
2295 desiderium alicuius quod ab eis expectamus, sicut apparet in omni
2296 amicitia quae est propter utilitatem. Ergo aliqua alia passio est
2297 causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p4">
2298 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at
2299 all, even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of love.
2300 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34696] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2301 Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>cuius rei adipiscendae spem
2302 quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat, aut omnino non amat, quamvis
2303 quam pulchra sit videat</i>. Ergo spes etiam est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p5">
2304 <b>On the contrary,</b> All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
2305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34697] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2306 est quod omnes aliae affectiones animi ex amore causantur, ut
2307 Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p6">
2308 <b>I answer that,</b> There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion
2309 of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest
2310 in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible
2311 for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may
2312 happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another.
2313 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 co."><a name="34698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34698] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2314 dicendum quod nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat
2315 aliquem amorem. Cuius ratio est quia omnis alia passio animae vel
2316 importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus
2317 in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel
2318 coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde
2319 impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa
2320 universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem
2321 esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa
2322 alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p7">
2323 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused,
2324 in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.
2325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34699] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2326 ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem,
2327 amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa
2328 iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur
2329 nisi in re aliquo modo amata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p8">
2330 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being
2331 loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it.
2332 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34700] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2333 dicendum quod desiderium rei alicuius semper praesupponit amorem
2334 illius rei. Sed desiderium alicuius rei potest esse causa ut res
2335 alia ametur, sicut qui desiderat pecuniam, amat propter hoc eum a
2336 quo pecuniam recipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p9">
2337 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because hope
2338 strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself
2339 is of a good that is loved.
2340 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34701] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2341 dicendum quod spes causat vel auget amorem, et ratione
2342 delectationis, quia delectationem causat, et etiam ratione
2343 desiderii, quia spes desiderium fortificat, non enim ita intense
2344 desideramus quae non speramus. Sed tamen et ipsa spes est alicuius
2345 boni amati.</p></div></div></div></div>
2346 <div id="FS_Q28" class="div3">
2347 <h3 id="FS_Q28-p0.1">Q. 28. OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
2348 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
2349 <p id="FS_Q28-p2"> We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q28-p3"><a href="#FS_Q28_A1"> (1) Whether union is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p4"><a href="#FS_Q28_A2"> (2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p5"><a href="#FS_Q28_A3"> (3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p6"><a href="#FS_Q28_A4"> (4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p7"><a href="#FS_Q28_A5"> (5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p8"><a href="#FS_Q28_A6"> (6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?</a></p>
2350 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 pr."><a name="34702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34702]
2351 Iª-IIae q. 28 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
2352 effectibus amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum unio
2353 sit effectus amoris. Secundo, utrum mutua inhaesio. Tertio, utrum
2354 extasis sit effectus amoris. Quarto, utrum zelus. Quinto, utrum
2355 amor sit passio laesiva amantis. Sexto, utrum amor sit causa omnium
2356 quae amans agit.</p></div></div></div>
2357 <div id="FS_Q28_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A1-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 1. Whether union is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p2">
2358 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence;
2359 for the Apostle says (
2360 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.18" target="asv">Gal. 4:18</a>): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only when
2361 I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of love.
2362 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34703] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
2363 sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio non sit effectus amoris. Absentia
2364 enim unioni repugnat. Sed amor compatitur secum absentiam, dicit
2365 enim apostolus, ad Galat. IV, <i>bonum aemulamini in bono
2366 semper</i> (loquens de seipso, ut Glossa dicit), <i>et non tantum
2367 cum praesens sum apud vos</i>. Ergo unio non est effectus
2368 amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p3">
2369 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the
2370 whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love
2371 does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does
2372 not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above (
2373 <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q28_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). Therefore union is not an effect of love.
2374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34704] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2375 omnis unio aut est per essentiam, sicut forma unitur materiae, et
2376 accidens subiecto, et pars toti vel alteri parti ad constitutionem
2377 totius, aut est per similitudinem vel generis, vel speciei, vel
2378 accidentis. Sed amor non causat unionem essentiae, alioquin nunquam
2379 haberetur amor ad ea quae sunt per essentiam divisa. Unionem autem
2380 quae est per similitudinem, amor non causat, sed magis ab ea
2381 causatur. Ut dictum est. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p4">
2382 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover
2383 in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love.
2384 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34705] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2385 sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit
2386 intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu.
2387 Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p5">
2388 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a "unitive love."
2389 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34706] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2390 est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet
2391 est virtus unitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A1-p6">
2392 <b>I answer that,</b> The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover.
2393 The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement
2394 of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these
2395 arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the
2396 lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man
2397 loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends
2398 him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self"
2399 (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."
2400 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A1-p7"> The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the
2401 beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself
2402 is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking
2403 to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the
2404 union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
2405 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 co."><a name="34707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34707] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2406 dicendum quod duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem
2407 secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia
2408 vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex
2409 apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur
2410 apprehensionem. Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae
2411 et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis
2412 amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens
2413 illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.
2414 Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum
2415 sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se,
2416 inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est
2417 quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV
2418 Confess., <i>bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae
2419 suae</i>. Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad
2420 desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi
2421 convenientis et ad se pertinentis. Secundam autem unionem facit
2422 formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde
2423 Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod <i>amor est quasi vita
2424 quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem
2425 scilicet et quod amatur</i>. Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad
2426 unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare
2427 intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p8">
2428 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of
2429 the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
2430 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34708] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2431 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de unione reali. Quam
2432 quidem requirit delectatio sicut causam, desiderium vero est in
2433 reali absentia amati, amor vero et in absentia et in
2434 praesentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p9">
2435 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love
2436 with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as
2437 stated above (
2438 <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q28_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened
2439 to substantial union, inasmuch as
2440 the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself,
2441 if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks
2442 with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit.
2443 ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in
2444 either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union---to live together, speak together, and be united
2445 together in other like things.
2446 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34709] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2447 dicendum quod unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim
2448 unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis,
2449 quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo
2450 quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est. Quaedam vero
2451 unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum
2452 coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali,
2453 inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut
2454 ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui.
2455 Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis,
2456 quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum
2457 convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic.,
2458 <i>Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri
2459 unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi</i>,
2460 quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul
2461 conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi
2462 coniungantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p10">
2463 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that
2464 the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love
2465 is closer than that which is caused by knowledge.
2466 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34710] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2467 dicendum quod cognitio perficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur
2468 cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem. Sed amor facit quod ipsa
2469 res quae amatur, amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde
2470 amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A2-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 2. Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p2">
2471 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which
2472 is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling,
2473 so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa.
2474 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34711] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
2475 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non causet mutuam inhaesionem, ut
2476 scilicet amans sit in amato, et e converso. Quod enim est in
2477 altero, continetur in eo. Sed non potest idem esse continens et
2478 contentum. Ergo per amorem non potest causari mutua inhaesio, ut
2479 amatum sit in amante et e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p3">
2480 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the
2481 reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not
2482 an effect of love.
2483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34712] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2484 nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicuius integri, nisi per
2485 aliquam divisionem. Sed dividere quae sunt secundum rem coniuncta,
2486 non pertinet ad appetitum, in quo est amor, sed ad rationem. Ergo
2487 mutua inhaesio non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p4">
2488 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover,
2489 in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above
2490 <a href="#FS_Q28_A1" id="FS_Q28_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual
2491 indwelling is not an effect of love.
2492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34713] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2493 si per amorem amans est in amato et e converso, sequetur quod hoc
2494 modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato. Sed ipsa unio est
2495 amor, ut dictum est. Ergo sequitur quod semper amans ametur ab
2496 amato, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo mutua inhaesio est effectus
2497 amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p5">
2498 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2499 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason,
2500 every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.
2501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34714] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2502 est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo
2503 manet, et Deus in eo</i>. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem
2504 ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e
2505 converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p6">
2506 <b>I answer that,</b> This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because,
2507 as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of
2508 the lover, according to
2509 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.7" target="asv"> Phil. 1:7, </a> "For that I have you in my heart": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the
2510 lover is not satisfied with a
2511 superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved,
2512 so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth
2513 all things, yea the deep things of God" (
2514 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>).
2515 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p7"> As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency:
2516 causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing,
2517 to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship:
2518 not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or
2519 wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart.
2520 For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the
2521 beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence
2522 is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved
2523 perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch
2524 as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems
2525 as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the
2526 same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently
2527 in
2528 so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were
2529 become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking
2530 on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.
2531 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p8"> In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch
2532 as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.
2533 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 co."><a name="34715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34715] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2534 dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et
2535 quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam
2536 quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante,
2537 inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud
2538 Philipp. I, <i>eo quod habeam vos in corde</i>. Amans vero dicitur
2539 esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est
2540 contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula
2541 quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad
2542 interiora eius ingreditur. Sicut de spiritu sancto, qui est amor
2543 Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor. II, quod <i>scrutatur etiam profunda
2544 Dei</i>. Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in
2545 amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel
2546 delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in
2547 absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem
2548 concupiscentiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae;
2549 non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat
2550 aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter
2551 aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam.
2552 Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis. E
2553 converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem
2554 concupiscentiae, aliter per amorem amicitiae. Amor namque
2555 concupiscentiae non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut
2556 superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati, sed quaerit amatum
2557 perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius perveniens. In amore vero
2558 amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala
2559 amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in
2560 suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc,
2561 proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere
2562 secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic,
2563 inquantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in
2564 amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et
2565 agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum
2566 idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante. Potest autem et tertio modo
2567 mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam
2568 redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona
2569 volunt et operantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p9">
2570 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On
2571 the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For
2572 nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species,
2573 and vice versa.
2574 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34716] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2575 ergo dicendum quod amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est
2576 impressum in affectu eius per quandam complacentiam. E converso
2577 vero amans continetur in amato, inquantum amans sequitur aliquo
2578 modo illud quod est intimum amati. Nihil enim prohibet diverso modo
2579 esse aliquid continens et contentum, sicut genus continetur in
2580 specie et e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p10">
2581 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement
2582 of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.
2583 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34717] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2584 dicendum quod rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris. Et
2585 ideo, sicut ratio disquirit, ita affectus amoris subintrat in
2586 amatum, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p11">
2587 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.
2588 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34718] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2589 dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de tertio modo mutuae
2590 inhaesionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A3-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 3. Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p2">
2591 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always
2592 result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.
2593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34719] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
2594 sic proceditur. Videtur quod extasis non sit effectus amoris.
2595 Extasis enim quandam alienationem importare videtur. Sed amor non
2596 semper facit alienationem, sunt enim amantes interdum sui compotes.
2597 Ergo amor non facit extasim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p3">
2598 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes
2599 himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.
2600 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34720] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2601 amans desiderat amatum sibi uniri. Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se,
2602 quam etiam pergat in amatum, extra se exiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p4">
2603 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above
2604 <a href="#FS_Q28_A1" id="FS_Q28_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always
2605 loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.
2606 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34721] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2607 amor unit amatum amanti, sicut dictum est. Si ergo amans extra se
2608 tendit, ut in amatum pergat, sequitur quod semper plus diligat
2609 amatum quam seipsum. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo extasis est
2610 effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p5">
2611 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through love."
2612 Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it
2613 seems that every love causes ecstasy.
2614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34722] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2615 est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>divinus
2616 amor extasim facit, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim
2617 passus</i>. Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quaedam similitudo
2618 participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur, videtur quod quilibet
2619 amor causet extasim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A3-p6">
2620 <b>I answer that,</b> To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive
2621 power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper
2622 to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is
2623 placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up
2624 so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement;
2625 thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a
2626 man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as
2627 it were.
2628 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A3-p7"> The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved,
2629 as stated above
2630 <a href="#FS_Q28_A2" id="FS_Q28_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love
2631 of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the
2632 lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so
2633 far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since
2634 he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally
2635 within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes
2636 and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.
2637 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 co."><a name="34723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34723] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2638 dicendum quod extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur.
2639 Quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, et secundum
2640 vim appetitivam. Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliquis dicitur
2641 extra se poni, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam, vel
2642 quia ad superiorem sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad
2643 comprehendenda aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur
2644 extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem apprehensionem
2645 rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur; puta, cum
2646 aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit, dicitur extasim passus.
2647 Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati,
2648 quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo
2649 extra seipsum. Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive,
2650 inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa
2651 autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim
2652 facit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem
2653 concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore
2654 concupiscentiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum
2655 scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui
2656 aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi
2657 habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine
2658 infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius
2659 simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur,
2660 quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum
2661 amicum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p8">
2662 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.
2663 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34724] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2664 ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de prima extasi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p9">
2665 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.
2666 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34725] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2667 dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de amore concupiscentiae, qui non
2668 facit simpliciter extasim, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p10">
2669 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will
2670 the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself.
2671 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34726] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2672 dicendum quod ille qui amat, intantum extra se exit, inquantum vult
2673 bona amici et operatur. Non tamen vult bona amici magis quam sua.
2674 Unde non sequitur quod alterum plus quam se diligat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A4-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 4. Whether zeal is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p2">
2675 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (
2676 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:3</a>): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore
2677 zeal is not an effect of love.
2678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34727] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
2679 sic proceditur. Videtur quod zelus non sit effectus amoris. Zelus
2680 enim est contentionis principium, unde dicitur I ad Cor. III,
2681 <i>cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio,</i> et cetera. Sed
2682 contentio repugnat amori. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p3">
2683 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since
2684 it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be
2685 jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
2686 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34728] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea
2687 obiectum amoris est bonum, quod est communicativum sui. Sed zelus
2688 repugnat communicationi, ad zelum enim pertinere videtur quod
2689 aliquis non patiatur consortium in amato; sicut viri dicuntur
2690 zelare uxores, quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris. Ergo zelus
2691 non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p4">
2692 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written (
2693 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.3" target="asv">Ps. 72:3</a>): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.
2694 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34729] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2695 zelus non est sine odio, sicut nec sine amore, dicitur enim in
2696 Psalmo LXXII, <i>zelavi super iniquos</i>. Non ergo debet dici
2697 magis effectus amoris quam odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p5">
2698 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things."
2699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34730] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2700 est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus
2701 appellatur Zelotes propter multum amorem quem habet ad
2702 existentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p6">
2703 <b>I answer that,</b> Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends
2704 to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object
2705 loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it.
2706 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p7"> But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence
2707 he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love.
2708 It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive
2709 individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel,
2710 as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (
2711 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.1" target="asv">Ps. 36:1</a>): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity."
2712 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p8"> On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved
2713 against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when
2714 he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be
2715 zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the
2716 honor or will of God; according to
2717 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of
2718 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#John.2.17" target="asv"> Jn. 2:17</a>: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever
2719 evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it."
2720 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 co."><a name="34731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34731] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2721 dicendum quod zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris
2722 provenit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius
2723 tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel
2724 repugnans. Cum igitur amor sit quidam motus in amatum, ut
2725 Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., intensus amor
2726 quaerit excludere omne quod sibi repugnat. Aliter tamen hoc
2727 contingit in amore concupiscentiae, et aliter in amore amicitiae.
2728 Nam in amore concupiscentiae, qui intense aliquid concupiscit,
2729 movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni
2730 quietae eius quod amatur. Et hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxores,
2731 ne per consortium aliorum impediatur singularitas quam in uxore
2732 quaerunt. Similiter etiam qui quaerunt excellentiam, moventur
2733 contra eos qui excellere videntur, quasi impedientes excellentiam
2734 eorum. Et iste est zelus invidiae, de quo dicitur in Psalmo XXXVI,
2735 <i>noli aemulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes
2736 iniquitatem</i>. Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici, unde
2737 quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod
2738 repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro
2739 amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo
2740 repellere studet. Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare
2741 pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei,
2742 repellere secundum posse conatur; secundum illud III Reg. XIX,
2743 <i>zelo zelatus sum pro domino exercituum</i>. Et Ioan. II, super
2744 illud, <i>zelus domus tuae comedit me</i>, dicit Glossa quod
2745 <i>bono zelo comeditur, qui quaelibet prava quae viderit, corrigere
2746 satagit; si nequit, tolerat et gemit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p9">
2747 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object
2748 of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
2749 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34732] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2750 ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de zelo invidiae; qui
2751 quidem est causa contentionis, non contra rem amatam, sed pro re
2752 amata contra impedimenta ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p10">
2753 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication,
2754 becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot,
2755 in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it
2756 does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in
2757 their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by
2758 many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
2759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34733] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2760 dicendum quod bonum amatur inquantum est communicabile amanti. Unde
2761 omne illud quod perfectionem huius communicationis impedit,
2762 efficitur odiosum. Et sic ex amore boni zelus causatur. Ex defectu
2763 autem bonitatis contingit quod quaedam parva bona non possunt
2764 integre simul possideri a multis. Et ex amore talium causatur zelus
2765 invidiae. Non autem proprie ex his quae integre possunt a multis
2766 possideri, nullus enim invidet alteri de cognitione veritatis, quae
2767 a multis integre cognosci potest; sed forte de excellentia circa
2768 cognitionem huius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p11">
2769 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down
2770 as an effect of love rather than of hatred.
2771 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34734] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2772 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliquis odio habet ea quae repugnant
2773 amato, ex amore procedit. Unde zelus proprie ponitur effectus
2774 amoris magis quam odii.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A5-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 5. Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p2">
2775 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor:
2776 for it is written (
2777 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Song.2.5" target="asv">Cant 2:5</a>): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a wounding passion.
2778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34735] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
2779 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit passio laesiva. Languor enim
2780 significat laesionem quandam languentis. Sed amor causat languorem,
2781 dicitur enim Cant. II, <i>fulcite me floribus, stipate me malis,
2782 quia amore langueo</i>. Ergo amor est passio laesiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p3">
2783 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in which it is: for it is written (
2784 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Song.5.6" target="asv">Cant 5:6</a>): "My soul melted when my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding passion.
2785 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34736] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2786 liquefactio est quaedam resolutio. Sed amor est liquefactivus,
2787 dicitur enim Cant. V, <i>anima mea liquefacta est, ut dilectus meus
2788 locutus est</i>. Ergo amor est resolutivus. Est ergo corruptivus et
2789 laesivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p4">
2790 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius
2791 (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent."
2792 Moreover it is said of love (
2793 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.6" target="asv">Cant 8:6</a>) that "its lamps are fire and flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion.
2794 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34737] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2795 fervor designat quendam excessum in caliditate, qui quidem excessus
2796 corruptivus est. Sed fervor causatur ex amore, Dionysius enim, VII
2797 cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates ad amorem Seraphim
2798 pertinentes, ponit calidum et acutum et superfervens. Et Cant.
2799 VIII, dicitur de amore quod <i>lampades eius sunt lampades ignis
2800 atque flammarum</i>. Ergo amor est passio laesiva et
2801 corruptiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p5">
2802 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it.
2803 Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects.
2804 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34738] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2805 est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod singula seipsa
2806 amant contentive, idest conservative. Ergo amor non est passio
2807 laesiva, sed magis conservativa et perfectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A5-p6">
2808 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
2809 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2;
2810 <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[1]</a>), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which
2811 is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable
2812 to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but
2813 love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by
2814 the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to
2815 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They became abominable, as those things which they loved."
2816 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A5-p7"> And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect
2817 of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of
2818 this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through
2819 the change of some bodily organ.
2820 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 co."><a name="34739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34739] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2821 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor significat coaptationem
2822 quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod
2823 coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso
2824 laeditur, sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod
2825 vero coaptatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso
2826 laeditur et deterioratur. Amor ergo boni convenientis est
2827 perfectivus et meliorativus amantis, amor autem boni quod non est
2828 conveniens amanti, est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis. Unde
2829 maxime homo perficitur et melioratur per amorem Dei, laeditur autem
2830 et deterioratur per amorem peccati, secundum illud Osee IX,
2831 <i>facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt</i>. Et hoc
2832 quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso,
2833 quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est
2834 materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis,
2835 accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis, sicut
2836 accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per
2837 aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment,
2838 languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely
2839 bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is
2840 loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above
2841 <a href="#FS_Q28_A2" id="FS_Q28_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>.
2842 Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening
2843 of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present
2844 and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence,
2845 which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term "ailment" chiefly to sadness); and
2846 an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of love considered formally,
2847 according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate
2848 to the above, in respect of a change in the organ.
2849 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34740] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad ea vero
2850 quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum quod amori attribui
2851 possunt quatuor effectus proximi, scilicet liquefactio, fruitio,
2852 languor et fervor. Inter quae primum est liquefactio, quae
2853 opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quae sunt congelata, in seipsis
2854 constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintrationem alterius
2855 pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam
2856 receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra
2857 dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio
2858 repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem
2859 cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret. Si
2860 ergo amatum fuerit praesens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive
2861 fruitio. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duae passiones,
2862 scilicet tristitia de absentia, quae significatur per languorem
2863 (unde et Tullius, in III de Tusculanis quaest., maxime tristitiam
2864 aegritudinem nominat); et intensum desiderium de consecutione
2865 amati, quod significatur per fervorem. Et isti quidem sunt effectus
2866 amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae
2867 virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui
2868 effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A6-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 6. Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p2">
2869 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above (
2870 <a href="#FS_Q26_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[2]</a>). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated
2871 in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.
2872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34741] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
2873 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amans non agat omnia ex amore. Amor
2874 enim quaedam passio est, ut supra dictum est. Sed non omnia quae
2875 agit homo, agit ex passione, sed quaedam agit ex electione, et
2876 quaedam ex ignorantia, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo non omnia quae
2877 homo agit, agit ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p3">
2878 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore,
2879 whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.
2880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34742] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2881 appetitus est principium motus et actionis in omnibus animalibus,
2882 ut patet in III de anima. Si igitur omnia quae quis agit, agit ex
2883 amore, aliae passiones appetitivae partis erunt superfluae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p4">
2884 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore
2885 all things are not done from love.
2886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34743] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2887 nihil causatur simul a contrariis causis. Sed quaedam fiunt ex
2888 odio. Non ergo omnia sunt ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p5">
2889 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
2890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34744] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2891 est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>propter
2892 amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p6">
2893 <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (
2894 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a> ). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does
2895 every action from love of some kind.
2896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 co."><a name="34745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34745] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2897 dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra
2898 dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique.
2899 Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit
2900 quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p7">
2901 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general
2902 sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks
2903 of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.
2904 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34746] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2905 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de amore qui est passio
2906 in appetitu sensitivo existens. Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore
2907 communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem
2908 intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem, sic enim Dionysius
2909 loquitur de amore in IV cap. de Div. Nom.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p8">
2910 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above
2911 <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q28_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[5];</a> Q[27], A[4]) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore
2912 every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate
2913 causes, are not superfluous.
2914 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34747] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2915 dicendum quod ex amore, sicut iam dictum est, causantur et
2916 desiderium et tristitia et delectatio, et per consequens omnes
2917 aliae passiones. Unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque
2918 passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non
2919 superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p9">
2920 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on (
2921 <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[2]</a>).
2922 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34748] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2923 dicendum quod odium etiam ex amore causatur, sicut infra
2924 dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div>
2925 <div id="FS_Q29" class="div3">
2926 <h3 id="FS_Q29-p0.1">Q. 29. OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
2927 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
2928 <p id="FS_Q29-p2"> We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q29-p3"><a href="#FS_Q29_A1"> (1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p4"><a href="#FS_Q29_A2"> (2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p5"><a href="#FS_Q29_A3"> (3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p6"><a href="#FS_Q29_A4"> (4) Whether a man can hate himself?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p7"><a href="#FS_Q29_A5"> (5) Whether a man can hate the truth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p8"><a href="#FS_Q29_A6"> (6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?</a></p>
2929 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 pr."><a name="34749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34749]
2930 Iª-IIae q. 29 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de odio.
2931 Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum causa et obiectum odii
2932 sit malum. Secundo, utrum odium causetur ex amore. Tertio, utrum
2933 odium sit fortius quam amor. Quarto, utrum aliquis possit habere
2934 odio seipsum. Quinto, utrum aliquis possit habere odio veritatem.
2935 Sexto, utrum aliquid possit haberi odio in universali.</p></div></div></div>
2936 <div id="FS_Q29_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A1-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 1. Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p2">
2937 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore
2938 evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly
2939 untrue.
2940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34750] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
2941 sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum et causa odii non sit malum.
2942 Omne enim quod est, inquantum huiusmodi bonum est. Si igitur
2943 obiectum odii sit malum, sequitur quod nulla res odio habeatur, sed
2944 solum defectus alicuius rei. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p3">
2945 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (
2946 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.3.1" target="asv">2 Macc 3:1</a>) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred
2947 of their souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow
2948 that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false.
2949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34751] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2950 odire malum est laudabile, unde in laudem quorundam dicitur II
2951 Machab. III, quod <i>leges optime custodiebantur, propter Oniae
2952 pontificis pietatem, et animos odio habentes mala</i>. Si igitur
2953 nihil oditur nisi malum, sequitur quod omne odium sit laudabile.
2954 Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p4">
2955 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different
2956 subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.
2957 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34752] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2958 idem non est simul bonum et malum. Sed idem diversis est odibile et
2959 amabile. Ergo odium non solum est mali, sed etiam boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5">
2960 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above (
2961 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>;
2962 <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[1]</a>). Therefore the object of hatred is evil.
2963 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34753] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
2964 odium contrariatur amori. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum, ut supra
2965 dictum est. Ergo obiectum odii est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p6">
2966 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural
2967 appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which
2968 does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above (
2969 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned
2970 and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which
2971 opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite,
2972 love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite
2973 from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of
2974 good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil
2975 is the object of hatred.
2976 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 co."><a name="34754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34754] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2977 dicendum quod, cum appetitus naturalis derivetur ab aliqua
2978 apprehensione, licet non coniuncta; eadem ratio videtur esse de
2979 inclinatione appetitus naturalis, et appetitus animalis, qui
2980 sequitur apprehensionem coniunctam, sicut supra dictum est. In
2981 appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut
2982 unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod
2983 sibi convenit, quae est amor naturalis; ita ad id quod est ei
2984 repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem, quae est
2985 odium naturale. Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in
2986 intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod
2987 apprehenditur ut conveniens, odium vero est dissonantia quaedam
2988 appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum. Sicut
2989 autem omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni;
2990 ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali. Et
2991 ideo, sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum
2992 odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p7">
2993 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being,
2994 inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being
2995 is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else.
2996 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34755] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
2997 ergo dicendum quod ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem
2998 repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente.
2999 Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem
3000 repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens
3001 est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per
3002 comparationem ad alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p8">
3003 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it
3004 is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good.
3005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34756] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3006 dicendum quod, sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est
3007 vere bonum; ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere
3008 malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni
3009 esse bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p9">
3010 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same
3011 thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming
3012 to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another
3013 as bad.
3014 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34757] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3015 dicendum quod contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis,
3016 secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est
3017 conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri, sicut
3018 calor convenit igni, et repugnat aquae. Secundum appetitum vero
3019 animalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem apprehenditur ab uno sub ratione
3020 boni, et ab alio sub ratione mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A2-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 2. Whether love is a cause of hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p2">
3021 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic.
3022 x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally
3023 simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
3024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34758] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
3025 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa odii. <i>Ea enim
3026 quae ex opposito dividuntur, naturaliter sunt simul</i>, ut dicitur
3027 in praedicamentis. Sed amor et odium, cum sint contraria, ex
3028 opposito dividuntur. Ergo naturaliter sunt simul. Non ergo amor est
3029 causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p3">
3030 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not
3031 the cause of hatred.
3032 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34759] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3033 unum contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed amor et odium sunt
3034 contraria. Ergo amor non est causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p4">
3035 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies
3036 a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
3037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34760] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3038 posterius non est causa prioris. Sed odium est prius amore, ut
3039 videtur, nam odium importat recessum a malo, amor vero accessum ad
3040 bonum. Ergo amor non est causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p5">
3041 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion
3042 of the soul, is caused by love.
3043 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34761] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3044 est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes affectiones
3045 causantur ex amore. Ergo et odium, cum sit quaedam affectio animae,
3046 causatur ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p6">
3047 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
3048 <a href="#FS_Q29_A1" id="FS_Q29_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement
3049 or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees
3050 with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and
3051 nothing is hated, save through being
3052 contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love.
3053 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 co."><a name="34762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34762] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3054 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, amor consistit in quadam
3055 convenientia amantis ad amatum, odium vero consistit in quadam
3056 repugnantia vel dissonantia. Oportet autem in quolibet prius
3057 considerare quid ei conveniat, quam quid ei repugnet, per hoc enim
3058 aliquid est repugnans alteri, quia est corruptivum vel impeditivum
3059 eius quod est conveniens. Unde necesse est quod amor sit prior
3060 odio; et quod nihil odio habeatur, nisi per hoc quod contrariatur
3061 convenienti quod amatur. Et secundum hoc, omne odium ex amore
3062 causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p7">
3063 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal,
3064 or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other;
3065 e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance
3066 and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and
3067 being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated
3068 of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not
3069 really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.
3070 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34763] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
3071 ergo dicendum quod in his quae ex opposito dividuntur, quaedam
3072 inveniuntur quae sunt naturaliter simul et secundum rem, et
3073 secundum rationem, sicut duae species animalis, vel duae species
3074 coloris. Quaedam vero sunt simul secundum rationem, sed unum
3075 realiter est prius altero et causa eius, sicut patet in speciebus
3076 numerorum, figurarum et motuum. Quaedam vero non sunt simul nec
3077 secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sicut substantia et accidens,
3078 nam substantia realiter est causa accidentis; et ens secundum
3079 rationem prius attribuitur substantiae quam accidenti, quia
3080 accidenti non attribuitur nisi inquantum est in substantia. Amor
3081 autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed
3082 non realiter. Unde nihil prohibet amorem esse causam odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p8">
3083 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are
3084 not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that
3085 one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary.
3086 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34764] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3087 dicendum quod amor et odium sunt contraria, quando accipiuntur
3088 circa idem. Sed quando sunt de contrariis, non sunt contraria, sed
3089 se invicem consequentia, eiusdem enim rationis est quod ametur
3090 aliquid, et odiatur eius contrarium. Et sic amor unius rei est
3091 causa quod eius contrarium odiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p9">
3092 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the
3093 case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive
3094 movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each
3095 is an appetitive movement.
3096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34765] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3097 dicendum quod in executione prius est recedere ab uno termino, quam
3098 accedere ad alterum terminum. Sed in intentione est e converso,
3099 propter hoc enim receditur ab uno termino, ut accedatur ad alterum.
3100 Motus autem appetitivus magis pertinet ad intentionem quam ad
3101 executionem. Et ideo amor est prior odio, cum utrumque sit motus
3102 appetitivus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A3-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 3. Whether hatred is stronger than love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p2">
3103 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee
3104 from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love.
3105 Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
3106 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34766] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
3107 sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium sit fortius amore. Dicit enim
3108 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nemo est qui non
3109 magis dolorem fugiat, quam appetat voluptatem</i>. Sed fugere
3110 dolorem pertinet ad odium, appetitus autem voluptatis pertinet ad
3111 amorem. Ergo odium est fortius amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p3">
3112 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into
3113 hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
3114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34767] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3115 debilius vincitur a fortiori. Sed amor vincitur ab odio, quando
3116 scilicet amor convertitur in odium. Ergo odium est fortius
3117 amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p4">
3118 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on
3119 seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances
3120 (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
3121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34768] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3122 affectio animae per effectum manifestatur. Sed fortius insistit
3123 homo ad repellendum odiosum, quam ad prosequendum amatum, sicut
3124 etiam bestiae abstinent a delectabilibus propter verbera, ut
3125 Augustinus introducit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo odium
3126 est fortius amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p5">
3127 <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred
3128 and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred.
3129 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34769] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
3130 bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute
3131 boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom. Sed odium et amor
3132 differunt secundum differentiam boni et mali. Ergo amor est fortior
3133 odio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p6">
3134 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above
3135 stated
3136 <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q29_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely.
3137 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 co."><a name="34770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34770] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3138 dicendum quod impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorem.
3139 Omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa, ut supra
3140 dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod odium sit fortius amore
3141 simpliciter. Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo,
3142 sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea
3143 quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad
3144 consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo,
3145 fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum. Sed tamen
3146 aliquando videtur odium fortius amore, propter duo. Primo quidem,
3147 quia odium est magis sensibile quam amor. Cum enim sensus perceptio
3148 sit in quadam immutatione, ex quo aliquid iam immutatum est, non
3149 ita sentitur sicut quando est in ipso immutari. Unde calor febris
3150 hecticae, quamvis sit maior, non tamen ita sentitur sicut calor
3151 tertianae, quia calor hecticae iam versus est quasi in habitum et
3152 naturam. Propter hoc etiam, amor magis sentitur in absentia amati,
3153 sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., quod <i>amor non ita
3154 sentitur, cum non prodit eum indigentia</i>. Et propter hoc etiam,
3155 repugnantia eius quod oditur, sensibilius percipitur quam
3156 convenientia eius quod amatur. Secundo, quia non comparatur odium
3157 ad amorem sibi correspondentem. Secundum enim diversitatem bonorum,
3158 est diversitas amorum in magnitudine et parvitate, quibus
3159 proportionantur opposita odia. Unde odium quod correspondet maiori
3160 amori, magis movet quam minor amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p7"> But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more
3161 strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely
3162 speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.
3163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34771] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
3164 patet responsio ad primum. Nam amor voluptatis est minor quam amor
3165 conservationis sui ipsius, cui respondet fuga doloris. Et ideo
3166 magis fugitur dolor, quam ametur voluptas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p8"> Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt
3167 than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received
3168 it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless
3169 not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a
3170 second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin.
3171 x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which
3172 is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a
3173 hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different
3174 degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves
3175 us more than a lesser love.
3176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34772] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3177 dicendum quod odium nunquam vinceret amorem, nisi propter maiorem
3178 amorem cui odium correspondet. Sicut homo magis diligit se quam
3179 amicum, et propter hoc quod diligit se, habet odio etiam amicum, si
3180 sibi contrarietur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p9"> Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation,
3181 to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure.
3182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34773] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3183 dicendum quod ideo intensius aliquid operatur ad repellendum
3184 odiosa, quia odium est magis sensibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A4-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 4. Whether a man can hate himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p2">
3185 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written (
3186 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv">Ps. 10:6</a>): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves.
3187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34774] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
3188 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit seipsum odio habere.
3189 Dicitur enim in Psalmo X, <i>qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam
3190 suam</i>. Sed multi diligunt iniquitatem. Ergo multi odiunt
3191 seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p3">
3192 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who
3193 kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves.
3194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34775] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3195 illum odimus, cui volumus et operamur malum. Sed quandoque aliquis
3196 vult et operatur sibi ipsi malum, puta qui interimunt seipsos. Ergo
3197 aliqui seipsos habent odio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p4">
3198 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser.
3199 But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.
3200 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34776] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3201 Boetius dicit, in II de Consol., quod <i>avaritia facit homines
3202 odiosos</i>, ex quo potest accipi quod omnis homo odit avarum. Sed
3203 aliqui sunt avari. Ergo illi odiunt seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p5">
3204 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
3205 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.29" target="asv">Eph. 5:29</a>) that "no man ever hated his own flesh."
3206 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34777] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3207 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod <i>nemo unquam carnem
3208 suam odio habuit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q29_A4-p6">
3209 <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire
3210 anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div.
3211 Nom. iv). Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above (
3212 <a href="#FS_Q26_A4" id="FS_Q29_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[4]</a>). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself,
3213 properly speaking.
3214 </p><p id="FS_Q29_A4-p7"> But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills
3215 to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this
3216 way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good.
3217 For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if
3218 the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account
3219 themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves
3220 according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to
3221 reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself.
3222 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 co."><a name="34778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34778] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3223 dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat
3224 seipsum. Naturaliter enim unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest
3225 aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni, nam malum est
3226 praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Amare
3227 autem aliquem est velle ei bonum, ut supra dictum est. Unde necesse
3228 est quod aliquis amet seipsum; et impossibile est quod aliquis
3229 odiat seipsum, per se loquendo. Per accidens tamen contingit quod
3230 aliquis seipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte
3231 boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod
3232 appetitur ut secundum quid bonum, esse simpliciter malum, et
3233 secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire.
3234 Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius, cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim
3235 maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso, unde civitas dicitur
3236 facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est
3237 ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui
3238 aestimant se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam
3239 corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant
3240 se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria
3241 rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligit iniquitatem, odit non
3242 solum animam suam, sed etiam seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34779] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
3243 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p9">
3244 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves,
3245 apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain.
3246 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34780] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3247 dicendum quod nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum
3248 apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt
3249 seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni,
3250 inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p10">
3251 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his
3252 sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself.
3253 In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should.
3254 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34781] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3255 dicendum quod avarus odit aliquod accidens suum, non tamen propter
3256 hoc odit seipsum, sicut aeger odit suam aegritudinem, ex hoc ipso
3257 quod se amat. Vel dicendum quod avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non
3258 autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore,
3259 secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam
3260 debeat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A5-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 5. Whether a man can hate the truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p2">
3261 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither,
3262 therefore, can he hate the truth.
3263 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34782] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
3264 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis non possit habere odio
3265 veritatem. Bonum enim et ens et verum convertuntur. Sed aliquis non
3266 potest habere odio bonitatem. Ergo nec veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p3">
3267 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge
3268 is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it.
3269 Therefore no man can hate the truth.
3270 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34783] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3271 omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant, ut dicitur in principio
3272 Metaphys. Sed scientia non est nisi verorum. Ergo veritas
3273 naturaliter desideratur et amatur. Sed quod naturaliter inest,
3274 semper inest. Nullus ergo potest habere odio veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p4">
3275 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive
3276 for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it.
3277 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34784] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3278 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>homines amant non
3279 fictos</i>. Sed non nisi propter veritatem. Ergo homo naturaliter
3280 amat veritatem. Non potest ergo eam odio habere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p5">
3281 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
3282 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.16" target="asv">Gal. 4:16</a>): "Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though
3283 it were an assertion: "I am become," etc.]
3284 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34785] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3285 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Galat. IV, <i>factus sum vobis
3286 inimicus, verum dicens vobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p6">
3287 <b>I answer that,</b> Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of
3288 something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as
3289 such, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being and truth in general cannot be the object
3290 of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love;
3291 while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an
3292 object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible
3293 with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good.
3294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 co."><a name="34786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34786] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3295 dicendum quod bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed
3296 differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem
3297 ens vel verum, quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo bonum,
3298 sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universali nec in
3299 particulari. Ens autem et verum in universali quidem odio haberi
3300 non possunt, quia dissonantia est causa odii, et convenientia causa
3301 amoris; ens autem et verum sunt communia omnibus. Sed in
3302 particulari nihil prohibet quoddam ens et quoddam verum odio
3303 haberi, inquantum habet rationem contrarii et repugnantis,
3304 contrarietas enim et repugnantia non adversatur rationi entis et
3305 veri, sicut adversatur rationi boni. Contingit autem verum aliquod
3306 particulare tripliciter repugnare vel contrariari bono amato. Uno
3307 modo, secundum quod veritas est causaliter et originaliter in ipsis
3308 rebus. Et sic homo quandoque odit aliquam veritatem, dum vellet non
3309 esse verum quod est verum. Alio modo, secundum quod veritas est in
3310 cognitione ipsius hominis, quae impedit ipsum a prosecutione amati.
3311 Sicut si aliqui vellent non cognoscere veritatem fidei, ut libere
3312 peccarent, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXI, <i>scientiam viarum
3313 tuarum nolumus</i>. Tertio modo habetur odio veritas particularis,
3314 tanquam repugnans, prout est in intellectu alterius. Puta, cum
3315 aliquis vult latere in peccato, odit quod aliquis veritatem circa
3316 peccatum suum cognoscat. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, in X
3317 Confess., quod <i>homines amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam
3318 redarguentem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p7"> Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according
3319 as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he wishes that what
3320 is true were not true. Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object loved:
3321 such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it is
3322 said (
3323 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.21.14" target="asv">Job 21:14</a>): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is
3324 in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should
3325 know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they
3326 hate it when it reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
3327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34787] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
3328 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p8">
3329 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally,
3330 the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire.
3331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34788] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3332 dicendum quod cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile, propter
3333 quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens
3334 cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab
3335 aliquo desiderato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p9">
3336 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered
3337 in itself, is a desirable thing.
3338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34789] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3339 dicendum quod ex hoc procedit quod non ficti amantur, quod homo
3340 amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non ficti
3341 manifestant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A6-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 6. Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p2">
3342 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite,
3343 which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be
3344 an object of universal hatred.
3345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34790] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
3346 sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium non possit esse alicuius in
3347 universali. Odium enim est passio appetitus sensitivi, qui movetur
3348 ex sensibili apprehensione. Sed sensus non potest apprehendere
3349 universale. Ergo odium non potest esse alicuius in universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p3">
3350 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of
3351 universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred.
3352 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34791] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3353 odium causatur ex aliqua dissonantia; quae communitati repugnat.
3354 Sed communitas est de ratione universalis. Ergo odium non potest
3355 esse alicuius in universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p4">
3356 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the
3357 universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a
3358 universal object.
3359 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34792] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3360 obiectum odii est malum. Malum autem est in rebus, et non in mente,
3361 ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Cum ergo universale sit solum in mente,
3362 quae abstrahit universale a particulari, videtur quod odium non
3363 possit esse alicuius universalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p5">
3364 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing
3365 in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."
3366 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34793] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3367 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira semper fit
3368 inter singularia odium autem etiam ad genera, furem enim odit et
3369 calumniatorem unusquisque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p6">
3370 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered
3371 in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as
3372 man. If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can
3373 attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual
3374 matter, on which every sensitive power is based.
3375 </p><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that
3376 the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact
3377 that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is
3378 color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by
3379 reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal---for instance, a wolf in regard to
3380 a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because
3381 it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher
3382 says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in
3383 general."
3384 </p><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p8"> But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it
3385 can regard the universal in both ways.
3386 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 co."><a name="34794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34794] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3387 dicendum quod de universali dupliciter contingit loqui, uno modo,
3388 secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo,
3389 de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur, alia est enim
3390 consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo.
3391 Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia
3392 sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri
3393 potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a
3394 materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva.
3395 Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et
3396 appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod
3397 obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat
3398 colorem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu,
3399 non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est
3400 color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam sensitivae partis, potest
3401 respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid
3402 adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut
3403 lupus ovi. Unde ovis odit lupum generaliter. Sed ira semper
3404 causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis;
3405 actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit
3406 quod <i>ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse
3407 ad aliquid in genere</i>. Sed odium secundum quod est in parte
3408 intellectiva, cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem
3409 intellectus, potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p9">
3410 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is
3411 given by abstraction.
3412 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34795] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
3413 ergo dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est
3414 universale, apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit
3415 universalitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p10">
3416 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance
3417 with others, so as to be hateful to them.
3418 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34796] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3419 dicendum quod id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio
3420 odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen
3421 dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p11">
3422 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension
3423 or appetite.
3424 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34797] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3425 dicendum quod illa obiectio procedit de universali secundum quod
3426 substat intentioni universalitatis, sic enim non cadit sub
3427 apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div></div></div>
3428 <div id="FS_Q30" class="div3">
3429 <h3 id="FS_Q30-p0.1">Q. 30. OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
3430 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
3431 <p id="FS_Q30-p2"> We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q30-p3"><a href="#FS_Q30_A1"> (1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p4"><a href="#FS_Q30_A2"> (2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p5"><a href="#FS_Q30_A3"> (3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p6"><a href="#FS_Q30_A4"> (4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?</a></p>
3432 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 pr."><a name="34798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34798]
3433 Iª-IIae q. 30 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
3434 concupiscentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
3435 concupiscentia sit in appetitu sensitivo tantum. Secundo, utrum
3436 concupiscentia sit passio specialis. Tertio, utrum sint aliquae
3437 concupiscentiae naturales, et aliquae non naturales. Quarto, utrum
3438 concupiscentia sit infinita.</p></div></div></div>
3439 <div id="FS_Q30_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A1-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 1. Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p2">
3440 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according
3441 to
3442 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv"> Wis. 6:21</a>: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have
3443 no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.
3444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34799] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
3445 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non solum sit in
3446 appetitu sensitivo. Est enim quaedam concupiscentia sapientiae, ut
3447 dicitur Sap. VI, <i>concupiscentia sapientiae deducit ad regnum
3448 perpetuum</i>. Sed appetitus sensitivus non potest ferri in
3449 sapientiam. Ergo concupiscentia non est in solo appetitu
3450 sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3">
3451 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says (
3452 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." But desire for God's commandments is an act
3453 of concupiscence, according to
3454 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.20" target="asv"> Ps. 118:20</a>: "My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive
3455 appetite.
3456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34800] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3457 desiderium mandatorum Dei non est in appetitu sensitivo, immo
3458 apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>non habitat in me, hoc est in carne
3459 mea, bonum</i>. Sed desiderium mandatorum Dei sub concupiscentia
3460 cadit, secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, <i>concupivit anima mea
3461 desiderare iustificationes tuas</i>. Ergo concupiscentia non est
3462 solum in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p4">
3463 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul,
3464 and not only in the sensitive appetite.
3465 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34801] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3466 cuilibet potentiae est concupiscibile proprium bonum. Ergo
3467 concupiscentia est in qualibet potentiae animae, et non solum in
3468 appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p5">
3469 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into
3470 the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence
3471 is in the sensitive appetite.
3472 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34802] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3473 est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>irrationale obediens et
3474 persuasibile rationi, dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram. Haec
3475 autem est irrationalis pars animae, passiva et appetitiva</i>. Ergo
3476 concupiscentia est in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p6">
3477 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold,
3478 as we shall state later on (
3479 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q30_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], AA[3]</a>,4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former
3480 pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated
3481 in a bodily organ:
3482 wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure,
3483 since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking,
3484 concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.
3485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 co."><a name="34803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34803] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3486 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric.,
3487 <i>concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis</i>. Est autem duplex
3488 delectatio, ut infra dicetur, una quae est in bono intelligibili,
3489 quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum.
3490 Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem
3491 est animae et corporis, quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo;
3492 unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis
3493 autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae
3494 simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen
3495 concupiscentiae sonat. Unde concupiscentia, proprie loquendo, est
3496 in appetitu sensitivo; et in vi concupiscibili, quae ab ea
3497 denominatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p7">
3498 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness;
3499 or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so
3500 that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being
3501 that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according
3502 to
3503 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv"> Ps. 83:3</a>: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
3504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34804] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
3505 ergo dicendum quod appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium
3506 bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter
3507 similitudinem quandam, vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris
3508 partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul
3509 etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum
3510 consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus
3511 spiritualibus deserviat; sicut in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, <i>cor
3512 meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p8">
3513 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship
3514 in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired.
3515 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34805] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3516 dicendum quod desiderium magis pertinere potest, proprie loquendo,
3517 non solum ad inferiorem appetitum, sed etiam ad superiorem. Non
3518 enim importat aliquam consociationem in cupiendo, sicut
3519 concupiscentia; sed simplicem motum in rem desideratam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p9">
3520 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension.
3521 But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And
3522 to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs
3523 to the concupiscible power.
3524 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34806] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3525 dicendum quod unicuique potentiae animae competit appetere proprium
3526 bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem. Sed
3527 appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem,
3528 pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam. Appetere autem aliquid sub
3529 ratione boni delectabilis secundum sensum, quod proprie est
3530 concupiscere, pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A2-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 2. Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p2">
3531 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by
3532 their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object
3533 of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible
3534 faculty.
3535 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34807] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
3536 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit passio
3537 specialis potentiae concupiscibilis. Passiones enim distinguuntur
3538 secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum concupiscibilis est delectabile
3539 secundum sensum; quod etiam est obiectum concupiscentiae, secundum
3540 philosophum, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio
3541 specialis in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p3">
3542 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct
3543 from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the
3544 concupiscible faculty.
3545 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34808] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3546 Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod
3547 <i>cupiditas est amor rerum transeuntium</i>, et sic ab amore non
3548 distinguitur. Omnes autem passiones speciales ab invicem
3549 distinguuntur. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio specialis in
3550 concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p4">
3551 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above
3552 (
3553 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q30_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
3554 12) that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend
3555 makes us fear, the evil that is present makes us sad":
3556 from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupiscible,
3557 but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.
3558 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34809] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3559 cuilibet passioni concupiscibilis opponitur aliqua passio specialis
3560 in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Sed concupiscentiae non
3561 opponitur aliqua passio specialis in concupiscibili. Dicit enim
3562 Damascenus quod <i>expectatum bonum concupiscentiam constituit,
3563 praesens vero laetitiam, similiter expectatum malum timorem,
3564 praesens vero tristitiam</i>, ex quo videtur quod, sicut tristitia
3565 contrariatur laetitiae, ita timor contrariatur concupiscentiae.
3566 Timor autem non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili. Non ergo
3567 concupiscentia est specialis passio in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p5">
3568 <b>On the contrary,</b> Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty. Hence it
3569 is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a specific passion.
3570 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34810] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3571 est quod concupiscentia causatur ab amore, et tendit in
3572 delectationem, quae sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Et sic
3573 distinguitur ab aliis passionibus concupiscibilis, tanquam passio
3574 specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A2-p6">
3575 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
3576 <a href="#FS_Q30_A1" id="FS_Q30_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[23], A[1]), the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various
3577 concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object can arise
3578 from the very nature of the object, or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the nature of the
3579 active object, causes a material
3580 difference of passions: while the difference in regard to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect
3581 of which the passions differ specifically.
3582 </p><p id="FS_Q30_A2-p7"> Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs according as it is really present, or absent: because,
3583 according as it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes the faculty
3584 to be moved towards it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms
3585 the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to
3586 itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence
3587 is a passion differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ
3588 "in number."
3589 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 co."><a name="34811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34811] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3590 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum delectabile secundum sensum
3591 est communiter obiectum concupiscibilis. Unde secundum eius
3592 differentias, diversae passiones concupiscibilis distinguuntur.
3593 Diversitas autem obiecti potest attendi vel secundum naturam ipsius
3594 obiecti, vel secundum diversitatem in virtute agendi. Diversitas
3595 quidem obiecti activi quae est secundum rei naturam, facit
3596 materialem differentiam passionum. Sed diversitas quae est secundum
3597 virtutem activam, facit formalem differentiam passionum, secundum
3598 quam passiones specie differunt. Est autem alia ratio virtutis
3599 motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens,
3600 et secundum quod est absens, nam secundum quod est praesens, facit
3601 in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad
3602 seipsum moveri. Unde ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum
3603 appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem;
3604 inquantum vero absens attrahit ad seipsum, causat concupiscentiam;
3605 inquantum vero praesens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem.
3606 Sic ergo concupiscentia est passio differens specie et ab amore et
3607 a delectatione. Sed concupiscere hoc delectabile vel illud, facit
3608 concupiscentias diversas numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p8">
3609 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered
3610 as past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers
3611 of the sensitive part, which regards particular things.
3612 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34812] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
3613 ergo dicendum quod bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum
3614 concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis, sicut et sensibile sub
3615 ratione praeteriti, est obiectum memoriae. Huiusmodi enim
3616 particulares conditiones diversificant speciem passionum, vel etiam
3617 potentiarum sensitivae partis, quae respicit particularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p9">
3618 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect
3619 of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect
3620 of good to come: so that it includes both love and hope.
3621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34813] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3622 dicendum quod illa praedicatio est per causam, non per essentiam,
3623 non enim cupiditas est per se amor, sed amoris effectus, vel aliter
3624 dicendum, quod Augustinus accipit cupiditatem large pro quolibet
3625 motu appetitus qui potest esse respectu boni futuri. Unde
3626 comprehendit sub se et amorem et spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p10">
3627 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in
3628 regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes
3629 called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the
3630 appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and
3631 evil as arduous.
3632 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34814] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3633 dicendum quod passio quae directe opponitur concupiscentiae,
3634 innominata est, quae ita se habet ad malum, sicut concupiscentia ad
3635 bonum. Sed quia est mali absentis sicut et timor, quandoque loco
3636 eius ponitur timor, sicut et quandoque cupiditas loco spei. Quod
3637 enim est parvum bonum vel malum, quasi non reputatur, et ideo pro
3638 omni motu appetitus in bonum vel in malum futurum, ponitur spes et
3639 timor, quae respiciunt bonum vel malum arduum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A3-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 3. Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p2">
3640 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence
3641 belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite.
3642 Therefore no concupiscence is natural.
3643 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34815] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
3644 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentiarum non sint quaedam
3645 naturales, et quaedam non naturales. Concupiscentia enim pertinet
3646 ad appetitum animalem, ut dictum est. Sed appetitus naturalis
3647 dividitur contra animalem. Ergo nulla concupiscentia est
3648 naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p3">
3649 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material differences makes no difference of species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside
3650 the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in respect of their objects;
3651 which amounts to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore concupiscences should not be divided into those
3652 that are natural and those that are not.
3653 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34816] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3654 diversitas materialis non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed
3655 solum secundum numerum, quae quidem diversitas sub arte non cadit.
3656 Sed si quae sint concupiscentiae naturales et non naturales, non
3657 differunt nisi secundum diversa concupiscibilia, quod facit
3658 materialem differentiam, et secundum numerum tantum. Non ergo
3659 dividendae sunt concupiscentiae per naturales et non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p4">
3660 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is
3661 not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the
3662 sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not
3663 natural.
3664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34817] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3665 ratio contra naturam dividitur, ut patet in II Physic. Si igitur in
3666 homine est aliqua concupiscentia non naturalis, oportet quod sit
3667 rationalis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia concupiscentia cum sit
3668 passio quaedam, pertinet ad appetitum sensitivum, non autem ad
3669 voluntatem, quae est appetitus rationis. Non ergo sunt
3670 concupiscentiae aliquae non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p5">
3671 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural.
3672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34818] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3673 est quod philosophus, in III Ethic. et in I Rhetoric., ponit
3674 quasdam concupiscentias naturales, et quasdam non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A3-p6">
3675 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
3676 <a href="#FS_Q30_A1" id="FS_Q30_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable
3677 to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said
3678 to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends
3679 something as good and suitable, and
3680 consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont
3681 to be called "cupidity."
3682 </p><p id="FS_Q30_A3-p7"> Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to
3683 both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher
3684 (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it
3685 is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says
3686 (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because different men reason
3687 differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition to those that
3688 are natural.
3689 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 co."><a name="34819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34819] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3690 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, concupiscentia est appetitus boni
3691 delectabilis. Dupliciter autem aliquid est delectabile. Uno modo,
3692 quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cibus, potus, et alia
3693 huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi concupiscentia delectabilis dicitur
3694 naturalis. Alio modo aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens
3695 animali secundum apprehensionem, sicut cum aliquis apprehendit
3696 aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in
3697 ipso. Et huiusmodi delectabilis concupiscentia dicitur non
3698 naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas. Primae ergo
3699 concupiscentiae, naturales, communes sunt et hominibus et aliis
3700 animalibus, quia utrisque est aliquid conveniens et delectabile
3701 secundum naturam. Et in his etiam omnes homines conveniunt, unde et
3702 philosophus, in III Ethic., vocat eas communes et necessarias. Sed
3703 secundae concupiscentiae sunt propriae hominum, quorum proprium est
3704 excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, praeter id quod natura
3705 requirit. Unde et in I Rhetoric., philosophus dicit primas
3706 concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione. Et
3707 quia diversi diversimode ratiocinantur, ideo etiam secundae
3708 dicuntur, in III Ethic., propriae et appositae, scilicet supra
3709 naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p8">
3710 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended.
3711 And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite.
3712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34820] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
3713 ergo dicendum quod illud idem quod appetitur appetitu naturali,
3714 potest appeti appetitu animali cum fuerit apprehensum. Et secundum
3715 hoc cibi et potus et huiusmodi, quae appetuntur naturaliter, potest
3716 esse concupiscentia naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p9">
3717 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference;
3718 it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite
3719 is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing
3720 is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural
3721 concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence
3722 arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i,
3723 11).
3724 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34821] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3725 dicendum quod diversitas concupiscentiarum naturalium a non
3726 naturalibus, non est materialis tantum; sed etiam quodammodo
3727 formalis, inquantum procedit ex diversitate obiecti activi.
3728 Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum apprehensum. Unde ad
3729 diversitatem activi pertinet diversitas apprehensionis, prout
3730 scilicet apprehenditur aliquid ut conveniens absoluta
3731 apprehensione, ex qua causantur concupiscentiae naturales, quas
3732 philosophus in Rhetoric. vocat irrationales; et prout apprehenditur
3733 aliquid cum deliberatione, ex quo causantur concupiscentiae non
3734 naturales, quae propter hoc in Rhetoric. dicuntur cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10">
3735 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive
3736 faculty, as stated in the
3737 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>;
3738 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A3" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[3]</a>: so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved
3739 by the universal reason also, through the medium of the particular imagination.
3740 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34822] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3741 dicendum quod in homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae
3742 pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis,
3743 quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo libro dictum est.
3744 Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quae est cum ratione, potest
3745 ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et praeterea appetitus
3746 sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universali moveri, mediante
3747 imaginatione particulari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A4-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 4. Whether concupiscence is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p2">
3748 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end.
3749 But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.
3750 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34823] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
3751 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit infinita.
3752 Obiectum enim concupiscentiae est bonum; quod habet rationem finis.
3753 Qui autem ponit infinitum, excludit finem, ut dicitur in II
3754 Metaphys. Concupiscentia ergo non potest esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p3">
3755 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore
3756 unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.
3757 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34824] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3758 concupiscentia est boni convenientis, cum procedat ex amore. Sed
3759 infinitum, cum sit improportionatum, non potest esse conveniens.
3760 Ergo concupiscentia non potest esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p4">
3761 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject
3762 of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight
3763 would ever ensue.
3764 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34825] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3765 infinita non est transire, et sic in eis non est pervenire ad
3766 ultimum. Sed concupiscenti fit delectatio per hoc quod attingit ad
3767 ultimum. Ergo si concupiscentia esset infinita, sequeretur quod
3768 nunquam fieret delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p5">
3769 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things."
3770 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34826] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3771 est quod philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod, in infinitum
3772 concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p6">
3773 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
3774 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q30_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, concupiscence is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because
3775 it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite
3776 meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be
3777 infinite successively; so that, for
3778 instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these
3779 bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (
3780 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again."
3781 </p><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p7"> But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated above
3782 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q30_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire
3783 to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible.
3784 </p><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p8"> Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another
3785 infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and
3786 thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which
3787 is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the
3788 concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an
3789 infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite
3790 measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the
3791 concupiscence of any other things.
3792 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 co."><a name="34827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34827] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3793 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex est concupiscentia, una
3794 naturalis, et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem igitur
3795 concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim eius quod
3796 natura requirit, natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et
3797 certum. Unde nunquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel
3798 infinitum potum. Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in
3799 potentia per successionem, ita huiusmodi concupiscentiam contingit
3800 infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum
3801 iterum alia vice desideret cibum, vel quodcumque aliud quod natura
3802 requirit, quia huiusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non
3803 perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde dixit dominus Samaritanae,
3804 Ioan. IV, <i>qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum</i>. Sed
3805 concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita. Sequitur enim
3806 rationem, ut dictum est, rationi autem competit in infinitum
3807 procedere. Unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere,
3808 non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter se divitem esse,
3809 quantumcumque potest. Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum
3810 philosophum in I Polit., quare quaedam concupiscentia sit finita,
3811 et quaedam infinita. Semper enim concupiscentia finis est infinita,
3812 finis enim per se concupiscitur, ut sanitas; unde maior sanitas
3813 magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se
3814 disgregat, magis album magis disgregat. Concupiscentia vero eius
3815 quod est ad finem, non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram
3816 appetitur qua convenit fini. Unde qui finem ponunt in divitiis,
3817 habent concupiscentiam divitiarum in infinitum, qui autem divitias
3818 appetunt propter necessitatem vitae, concupiscunt divitias finitas,
3819 sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut philosophus dicit ibidem. Et
3820 eadem est ratio de concupiscentia, quarumcumque aliarum rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p9">
3821 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually
3822 desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from
3823 which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken" (Phys. iii, 6).
3824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34828] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
3825 ergo dicendum quod omne quod concupiscitur, accipitur ut quoddam
3826 finitum, vel quia est finitum secundum rem, prout semel
3827 concupiscitur in actu; vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub
3828 apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendi,
3829 <i>quia infinitum est, cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est
3830 aliquid extra sumere</i>, ut dicitur in III Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p10">
3831 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears
3832 in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact
3833 the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number
3834 of singulars.
3835 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34829] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3836 dicendum quod ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitae inquantum
3837 potest in infinitum aliquid considerare, ut apparet in additione
3838 numerorum et linearum. Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est
3839 proportionatum rationi. Nam et universale, quod ratio apprehendit,
3840 est quodammodo infinitum, inquantum in potentia continet infinita
3841 singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p11">
3842 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization
3843 of each object of his concupiscence.
3844 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34830] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3845 dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod
3846 omnia consequatur quae concupiscit, sed in quolibet concupito quod
3847 consequitur, delectatur.</p></div></div></div></div>
3848 <div id="FS_Q31" class="div3">
3849 <h3 id="FS_Q31-p0.1">Q. 31. OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
3850 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
3851 <p id="FS_Q31-p2"> We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The
3852 causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.
3853 </p><p id="FS_Q31-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q31-p4"><a href="#FS_Q31_A1"> (1) Whether delight is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p5"><a href="#FS_Q31_A2"> (2) Whether delight is subject to time?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p6"><a href="#FS_Q31_A3"> (3) Whether it differs from joy?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p7"><a href="#FS_Q31_A4"> (4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p8"><a href="#FS_Q31_A5"> (5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower;</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p9"><a href="#FS_Q31_A6"> (6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p10"><a href="#FS_Q31_A7"> (7) Whether any delight is non-natural?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p11"><a href="#FS_Q31_A8"> (8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?</a></p>
3854 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 pr."><a name="34831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34831]
3855 Iª-IIae q. 31 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
3856 delectatione et tristitia. Circa delectationem vero consideranda
3857 sunt quatuor, primo, de ipsa delectatione secundum se; secundo, de
3858 causis delectationis; tertio, de effectibus eius; quarto, de
3859 bonitate et malitia ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo,
3860 utrum delectatio sit passio. Secundo, utrum sit in tempore. Tertio,
3861 utrum differat a gaudio. Quarto, utrum sit in appetitu
3862 intellectivo. Quinto, de comparatione delectationum superioris
3863 appetitus, ad delectationem inferioris. Sexto, de comparatione
3864 delectationum sensitivarum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum sit aliqua
3865 delectatio non naturalis. Octavo, utrum delectatio possit esse
3866 contraria delectationi.</p></div></div></div>
3867 <div id="FS_Q31_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A1-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 1. Whether delight is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p2">
3868 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and
3869 says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is
3870 an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion.
3871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34832] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
3872 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit passio. Damascenus
3873 enim, in II libro, distinguit operationem a passione, dicens quod
3874 <i>operatio est motus qui est secundum naturam, passio vero est
3875 motus contra naturam</i>. Sed delectatio est operatio, ut
3876 philosophus dicit, in VII et X Ethic. Ergo delectatio non est
3877 passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p3">
3878 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having
3879 been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion.
3880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34833] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3881 pati est moveri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed delectatio non
3882 consistit in moveri, sed in motum esse, causatur enim delectatio ex
3883 bono iam adepto. Ergo delectatio non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p4">
3884 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic.
3885 x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima
3886 ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion.
3887 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34834] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3888 delectatio consistit in quadam perfectione delectati, perficit enim
3889 operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed perfici non est pati vel
3890 alterari, ut dicitur in VII Physic. et in II de anima. Ergo
3891 delectatio non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p5">
3892 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.
3893 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34835] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3894 est quod Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem,
3895 sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A1-p6">
3896 <b>I answer that,</b> The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above (
3897 <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q31_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be
3898 said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible
3899 establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing."
3900 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A1-p7"> In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections,
3901 so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural
3902 perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these
3903 latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do.
3904 And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight.
3905 Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing
3906 in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence
3907 of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be
3908 understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement,
3909 as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in Ethic.
3910 vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there
3911 is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an
3912 apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.
3913 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 co."><a name="34836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34836] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3914 dicendum quod motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur,
3915 sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione
3916 sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem
3917 necesse est competere delectationi. Nam, sicut philosophus dicit in
3918 I Rhetoric., <i>delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio
3919 simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem</i>. Ad cuius
3920 intellectum, considerandum est quod, sicut contingit in rebus
3921 naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc
3922 contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit
3923 totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul.
3924 Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales,
3925 quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit
3926 eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt.
3927 Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu
3928 sensitivo, et iste motus est delectatio. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur
3929 quod delectatio est motus animae, ponitur in genere. Per hoc autem
3930 quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam, idest in id quod
3931 existit in natura rei, ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet
3932 praesentia connaturalis boni. Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul
3933 tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in
3934 constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino
3935 motus, non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed
3936 magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Per hoc
3937 autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum
3938 insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio. Sic ergo patet quod,
3939 cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens
3940 apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p8">
3941 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing
3942 is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion,
3943 as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.
3944 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34837] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
3945 ergo dicendum quod operatio connaturalis non impedita, est
3946 perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando
3947 constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita,
3948 sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum
3949 est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est
3950 praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p9">
3951 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite;
3952 the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already
3953 gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of
3954 the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that
3955 which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the
3956 appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the
3957 impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.
3958 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34838] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3959 dicendum quod in animali duplex motus considerari potest, unus
3960 secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum, alius
3961 secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem licet
3962 ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset
3963 motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus
3964 appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita
3965 postea delectatur in habito. Licet enim delectatio sit quies
3966 quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod
3967 appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab
3968 appetibili, ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p10">
3969 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily
3970 ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (
3971 <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q31_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,4): and in this sense delight is called a passion.
3972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34839] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3973 dicendum quod, quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat
3974 passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus, sicut sunt
3975 aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima; tamen
3976 etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est.
3977 Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A2-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 2. Whether delight is in time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p2">
3978 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all
3979 movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
3980 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34840] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
3981 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit in tempore. Delectatio
3982 enim est motus quidam, ut in I Rhetoric. philosophus dicit. Sed
3983 motus omnis est in tempore. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p3">
3984 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore
3985 pleasure is in time.
3986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34841] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3987 diuturnum, vel morosum, dicitur aliquid secundum tempus. Sed
3988 aliquae delectationes dicuntur morosae. Ergo delectatio est in
3989 tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p4">
3990 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is
3991 too.
3992 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34842] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3993 passiones animae sunt unius generis. Sed aliquae passiones animae
3994 sunt in tempore. Ergo et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p5">
3995 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."
3996 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34843] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3997 est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod <i>secundum nullum
3998 tempus accipiet quis delectationem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A2-p6">
3999 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were.
4000 For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession
4001 or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those
4002 things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which
4003 succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially
4004 something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet,
4005 because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.
4006 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A2-p7"> Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as
4007 it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally:
4008 whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.
4009 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 co."><a name="34844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34844] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4010 dicendum quod aliquid contingit esse in tempore dupliciter, uno
4011 modo, secundum se; alio modo, per aliud, et quasi per accidens.
4012 Quia enim tempus est numerus successivorum, illa secundum se
4013 dicuntur esse in tempore, de quorum ratione est successio, vel
4014 aliquid ad successionem pertinens, sicut motus, quies, locutio, et
4015 alia huiusmodi. Secundum aliud vero, et non per se, dicuntur esse
4016 in tempore illa de quorum ratione non est aliqua successio, sed
4017 tamen alicui successivo subiacent. Sicut esse hominem de sui
4018 ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus
4019 motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius, sed quia
4020 humanum esse subiacet causis transmutabilibus, secundum hoc esse
4021 hominem est in tempore. Sic igitur dicendum est quod delectatio
4022 secundum se quidem non est in tempore, est enim delectatio in bono
4023 iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus. Sed si illud bonum
4024 adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in
4025 tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit
4026 in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p8">
4027 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in
4028 potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e.
4029 of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement
4030 is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.
4031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34845] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4032 ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter
4033 dicitur. Uno modo, qui est actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in
4034 potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, et talis motus est successivus, et
4035 in tempore. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis
4036 in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam
4037 delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in
4038 tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p9">
4039 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
4040 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34846] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4041 dicendum quod delectatio dicitur diuturna vel morosa, secundum quod
4042 per accidens est in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p10">
4043 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the
4044 imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.
4045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34847] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4046 dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum,
4047 sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti,
4048 quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non
4049 esse in tempore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A3-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 3. Whether delight differs from joy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p2">
4050 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects.
4051 But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.
4052 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34848] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
4053 sic proceditur. Videtur quod gaudium sit omnino idem quod
4054 delectatio. Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Sed
4055 idem est obiectum gaudii et delectationis, scilicet bonum adeptum.
4056 Ergo gaudium est omnino idem quod delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p3">
4057 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight.
4058 Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.
4059 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34849] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4060 unus motus non terminatur ad duos terminos. Sed idem est motus qui
4061 terminatur ad gaudium et delectationem, scilicet concupiscentia.
4062 Ergo delectatio et gaudium sunt omnino idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p4">
4063 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness
4064 from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not
4065 differ from delight.
4066 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34850] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4067 si gaudium est aliud a delectatione, videtur quod, pari ratione, et
4068 laetitia et exultatio et iucunditas significent aliquid aliud a
4069 delectatione, et sic erunt omnes diversae passiones. Quod videtur
4070 esse falsum. Non ergo gaudium differt a delectatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p5">
4071 <b>On the contrary,</b> We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight.
4072 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34851] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4073 est quod in brutis animalibus non dicimus gaudium. Sed in eis
4074 dicimus delectationem. Non ergo est idem gaudium et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A3-p6">
4075 <b>I answer that,</b> Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural,
4076 and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above (
4077 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q31_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[3]</a>), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory
4078 of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul";
4079 which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those
4080 things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do
4081 not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight.
4082 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A3-p7"> Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently
4083 whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always
4084 the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason.
4085 And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy.
4086 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 co."><a name="34852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34852] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4087 dicendum quod gaudium, ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo de anima, est
4088 quaedam species delectationis. Est enim considerandum quod, sicut
4089 sunt quaedam concupiscentiae naturales, quaedam autem non
4090 naturales, sed consequuntur rationem, ut supra dictum est; ita
4091 etiam delectationum quaedam sunt naturales, et quaedam non
4092 naturales, quae sunt cum ratione. Vel, sicut Damascenus et
4093 Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt, quaedam sunt corporales, quaedam
4094 animales, quod in idem redit. Delectamur enim et in his quae
4095 naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes; et in his quae
4096 concupiscimus secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudii non habet locum
4097 nisi in delectatione quae consequitur rationem, unde gaudium non
4098 attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis. Omne
4099 autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possumus etiam cum
4100 delectatione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso. Unde de
4101 omnibus de quibus est delectatio, potest etiam esse gaudium in
4102 habentibus rationem. Quamvis non semper de omnibus sit gaudium,
4103 quandoque enim aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum
4104 corpus, de qua tamen non gaudet secundum rationem. Et secundum hoc,
4105 patet quod delectatio est in plus quam gaudium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p8">
4106 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity
4107 of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called
4108 otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences (
4109 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q31_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[3]</a>, ad 2).
4110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34853] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4111 ergo dicendum quod, cum obiectum appetitus animalis sit bonum
4112 apprehensum, diversitas apprehensionis pertinet quodammodo ad
4113 diversitatem obiecti. Et sic delectationes animales, quae dicuntur
4114 etiam gaudia, distinguuntur a delectationibus corporalibus, quae
4115 dicuntur solum delectationes, sicut et de concupiscentiis supra
4116 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p9">
4117 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds
4118 to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to
4119 the difference of movement.
4120 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34854] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4121 dicendum quod similis differentia invenitur etiam in
4122 concupiscentiis, ita quod delectatio respondeat concupiscentiae, et
4123 gaudium respondeat desiderio, quod magis videtur pertinere ad
4124 concupiscentiam animalem. Et sic secundum differentiam motus, est
4125 etiam differentia quietis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p10">
4126 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from
4127 the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight,
4128 which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain
4129 special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to
4130 joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings.
4131 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34855] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4132 dicendum quod alia nomina ad delectationem pertinentia, sunt
4133 imposita ab effectibus delectationis, nam laetitia imponitur a
4134 dilatatione cordis, ac si diceretur latitia; exultatio vero dicitur
4135 ab exterioribus signis delectationis interioris, quae apparent
4136 exterius, inquantum scilicet interius gaudium prosilit ad
4137 exteriora; iucunditas vero dicitur a quibusdam specialibus
4138 laetitiae signis vel effectibus. Et tamen omnia ista nomina
4139 videntur pertinere ad gaudium, non enim utimur eis nisi in naturis
4140 rationalibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A4-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 4. Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p2">
4141 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight
4142 is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual
4143 appetite.
4144 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34856] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
4145 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit in appetitu
4146 intellectivo. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Rhetoric., quod
4147 <i>delectatio est motus quidam sensibilis</i>. Sed motus sensibilis
4148 non est in parte intellectiva. Ergo delectatio non est in parte
4149 intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p3">
4150 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive
4151 appetite.
4152 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34857] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4153 delectatio est passio quaedam. Sed omnis passio est in appetitu
4154 sensitivo. Ergo delectatio non est nisi in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p4">
4155 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we
4156 have in common with irrational animals.
4157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34858] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4158 delectatio est communis nobis et brutis. Ergo non est nisi in parte
4159 quae nobis et brutis communis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p5">
4160 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4161 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "Delight in the Lord." But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight
4162 can be in the intellectual appetite.
4163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34859] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4164 est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, <i>delectare in domino</i>. Sed
4165 ad Deum non potest extendi appetitus sensitivus, sed solum
4166 intellectivus. Ergo delectatio potest esse in appetitu
4167 intellectivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A4-p6">
4168 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
4169 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q31_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive
4170 appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called
4171 the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.
4172 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A4-p7"> However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a
4173 bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine
4174 says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish."
4175 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 co."><a name="34860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34860] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4176 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, delectatio quaedam sequitur
4177 apprehensionem rationis. Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non
4178 solum commovetur appetitus sensitivus, per applicationem ad aliquid
4179 particulare; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur
4180 voluntas. Et secundum hoc, in appetitu intellectivo, sive in
4181 voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem
4182 delectatio corporalis. Hoc tamen interest inter delectationem
4183 utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum
4184 aliqua transmutatione corporali, delectatio autem appetitus
4185 intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis. Et
4186 secundum hoc Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod
4187 <i>cupiditas et laetitia non est aliud quam voluntas in eorum
4188 consensione quae volumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p8">
4189 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For
4190 he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation."
4191 Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.
4192 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34861] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4193 ergo dicendum quod in illa definitione philosophi, sensibile
4194 ponitur communiter pro quacumque apprehensione. Dicit enim
4195 philosophus in X Ethic., quod <i>secundum omnem sensum est
4196 delectatio; similiter autem et secundum intellectum et
4197 speculationem</i>. Vel potest dici quod ipse definit delectationem
4198 appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p9">
4199 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the
4200 intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher
4201 says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels
4202 are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the
4203 gladness of incorruption."
4204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34862] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4205 dicendum quod delectatio habet rationem passionis, proprie
4206 loquendo, inquantum est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et sic
4207 non est in appetitu intellectivo, sed secundum simplicem motum, sic
4208 enim etiam est in Deo et in Angelis. Unde dicit philosophus, in VII
4209 Ethic., quod Deus una simplici operatione gaudet. Et Dionysius
4210 dicit, in fine Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli non sunt susceptibiles
4211 nostrae passibilis delectationis, sed congaudent Deo secundum
4212 incorruptionis laetitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p10">
4213 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De
4214 Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive
4215 appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the
4216 angels.
4217 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34863] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4218 dicendum quod in nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus
4219 cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Unde ibidem
4220 Dionysius dicit quod <i>sancti homines multoties fiunt in
4221 participatione delectationum angelicarum</i>. Et ita in nobis est
4222 delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo, in quo communicamus cum
4223 brutis; sed etiam in appetitu intellectivo, in quo communicamus cum
4224 Angelis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A5-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 5. Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p2">
4225 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek
4226 some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual
4227 pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
4228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34864] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
4229 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes corporales et sensibiles
4230 sint maiores delectationibus spiritualibus intelligibilibus. Omnes
4231 enim aliquam delectationem sequuntur, secundum philosophum, in X
4232 Ethic. Sed plures sequuntur delectationes sensibiles, quam
4233 delectationes spirituales intelligibiles. Ergo delectationes
4234 corporales sunt maiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p3">
4235 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the
4236 state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
4237 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34865] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4238 magnitudo causae ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed delectationes
4239 corporales habent fortiores effectus, <i>transmutant enim corpus,
4240 et quibusdam insanias faciunt</i>, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo
4241 delectationes corporales sunt fortiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p4">
4242 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check
4243 spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
4244 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34866] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4245 delectationes corporales oportet temperare et refraenare, propter
4246 earum vehementiam. Sed delectationes spirituales non oportet
4247 refraenare. Ergo delectationes corporales sunt maiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p5">
4248 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4249 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.103" target="asv">Ps. 118:103</a>): "How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest
4250 pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom."
4251 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34867] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4252 est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>quam dulcia faucibus meis
4253 eloquia tua, super mel ori meo</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in X
4254 Ethic., quod <i>maxima delectatio est quae est secundum operationem
4255 sapientiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p6">
4256 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
4257 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q31_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of
4258 the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections
4259 of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions
4260 and perfections rather of the
4261 matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid
4262 actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect.
4263 Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.
4264 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p7"> If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for
4265 instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures.
4266 For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with
4267 his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the
4268 intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one
4269 who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine
4270 says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
4271 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p8"> If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely
4272 speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure,
4273 viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual
4274 good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the
4275 greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty
4276 is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more
4277 firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the
4278 essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the
4279 sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part
4280 of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of
4281 the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized
4282 all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods
4283 are incorruptible.
4284 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p9"> On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things
4285 are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive
4286 appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason
4287 of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as
4288 remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding
4289 griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary
4290 griefs, as we shall state farther on (
4291 <a href="#FS_Q35_A5" id="FS_Q31_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[5]</a>).
4292 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 co."><a name="34868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34868] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4293 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, delectatio provenit ex
4294 coniunctione convenientis quae sentitur vel cognoscitur. In
4295 operibus autem animae, praecipue sensitivae et intellectivae, est
4296 hoc considerandum, quod, cum non transeant in materiam exteriorem,
4297 sunt actus vel perfectiones operantis, scilicet intelligere,
4298 sentire, velle, et huiusmodi, nam actiones quae transeunt in
4299 exteriorem materiam, magis sunt actiones et perfectiones materiae
4300 transmutatae; motus enim est actus mobilis a movente. Sic igitur
4301 praedictae actiones animae sensitivae et intellectivae, et ipsae
4302 sunt quoddam bonum operantis, et sunt etiam cognitae per sensum vel
4303 intellectum. Unde etiam ex ipsis consurgit delectatio, et non solum
4304 ex eorum obiectis. Si igitur comparentur delectationes
4305 intelligibiles delectationibus sensibilibus, secundum quod
4306 delectamur in ipsis actionibus, puta in cognitione sensus et in
4307 cognitione intellectus; non est dubium quod multo sunt maiores
4308 delectationes intelligibiles quam sensibiles. Multo enim magis
4309 delectatur homo de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid intelligendo, quam de
4310 hoc quod cognoscit aliquid sentiendo. Quia intellectualis cognitio
4311 et perfectior est, et etiam magis cognoscitur, quia intellectus
4312 magis reflectitur supra actum suum quam sensus. Est etiam cognitio
4313 intellectiva magis dilecta, nullus enim est qui non magis vellet
4314 carere visu corporali quam visu intellectuali, eo modo quo bestiae
4315 vel stulti carent, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei.
4316 Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibiles spirituales
4317 delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et
4318 simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores. Et
4319 hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem,
4320 scilicet bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa
4321 coniunctio. Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale
4322 bonum; et est magis dilectum. Cuius signum est quod homines etiam a
4323 maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent, ut non perdant
4324 honorem, qui est bonum intelligibile. Similiter etiam ipsa pars
4325 intellectiva est multo nobilior, et magis cognoscitiva, quam pars
4326 sensitiva. Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis
4327 perfecta, et magis firma. Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit
4328 circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad
4329 rei essentiam; obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est.
4330 Perfectior autem est, quia coniunctioni sensibilis ad sensum
4331 adiungitur motus, qui est actus imperfectus, unde et delectationes
4332 sensibiles non sunt totae simul, sed in eis aliquid pertransit, et
4333 aliquid expectatur consummandum, ut patet in delectatione ciborum
4334 et venereorum. Sed intelligibilia sunt absque motu, unde
4335 delectationes tales sunt totae simul. Est etiam firmior, quia
4336 delectabilia corporalia sunt corruptibilia, et cito deficiunt; bona
4337 vero spiritualia sunt incorruptibilia. Sed quoad nos, delectationes
4338 corporales sunt magis vehementes, propter tria. Primo, quia
4339 sensibilia sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam intelligibilia. Secundo
4340 etiam, quia delectationes sensibiles, cum sint passiones sensitivi
4341 appetitus, sunt cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Quod non
4342 contingit in delectationibus spiritualibus, nisi per quandam
4343 redundantiam a superiori appetitu in inferiorem. Tertio, quia
4344 delectationes corporales appetuntur ut medicinae quaedam contra
4345 corporales defectus vel molestias, ex quibus tristitiae quaedam
4346 consequuntur. Unde delectationes corporales, tristitiis huiusmodi
4347 supervenientes, magis sentiuntur, et per consequens magis
4348 acceptantur, quam delectationes spirituales quae non habent
4349 tristitias contrarias, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p10">
4350 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because
4351 men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures,
4352 which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.
4353 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34869] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4354 ergo dicendum quod ideo plures sequuntur delectationes corporales,
4355 quia bona sensibilia sunt magis et pluribus nota. Et etiam quia
4356 homines indigent delectationibus ut medicinis contra multiplices
4357 dolores et tristitias, et cum plures hominum non possint attingere
4358 ad delectationes spirituales, quae sunt propriae virtuosorum,
4359 consequens et quod declinent ad corporales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p11">
4360 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
4361 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34870] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4362 dicendum quod transmutatio corporis magis contingit ex
4363 delectationibus corporalibus, inquantum sunt passiones appetitus
4364 sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p12">
4365 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and
4366 checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both
4367 sober and moderate.
4368 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34871] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4369 dicendum quod delectationes corporales sunt secundum partem
4370 sensitivam, quae regulatur ratione, et ideo indigent temperari et
4371 refraenari per rationem. Sed delectationes spirituales sunt
4372 secundum mentem, quae est ipsa regula, unde sunt secundum seipsas
4373 sobriae et moderatae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A6-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 6. Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p2">
4374 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest
4375 pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to
4376 the words of
4377 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.5.12" target="asv"> Tob. 5:12</a>: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded
4378 by the sight is the greatest of sensible
4379 pleasures.
4380 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34872] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
4381 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes quae sunt secundum
4382 tactum, non sint maiores delectationibus quae sunt secundum alios
4383 sensus. Illa enim delectatio videtur esse maxima, qua exclusa, omne
4384 gaudium cessat. Sed talis est delectatio quae est secundum visum,
4385 dicitur enim Tobiae V, <i>quale gaudium erit mihi, qui in tenebris
4386 sedeo, et lumen caeli non video?</i> Ergo delectatio quae est per
4387 visum, est maxima inter sensibiles delectationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p3">
4388 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight
4389 is loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
4390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34873] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a>
4391 <i>Praeterea, unicuique fit delectabile illud quod amat</i>, ut
4392 philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric. Sed inter alios sensus maxime
4393 diligitur visus. Ergo delectatio quae est secundum visum, est
4394 maxima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p4">
4395 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause
4396 of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
4397 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34874] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4398 principium amicitiae delectabilis maxime est visio. Sed causa talis
4399 amicitiae est delectatio. Ergo secundum visum videtur esse maxime
4400 delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p5">
4401 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
4402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34875] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4403 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod maximae
4404 delectationes sunt secundum tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p6">
4405 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
4406 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q31_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
4407 <a href="#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q31_A6-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[4]</a>, ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two
4408 reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these
4409 ways. But because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former
4410 pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved
4411 for their usefulness, are common to all animals.
4412 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p7"> If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater
4413 pleasure than any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness,
4414 then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to
4415 the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this
4416 usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and
4417 the like. Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the end. For this
4418 reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from
4419 the other senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the smell of
4420 hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii,
4421 10).
4422 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p8"> Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the
4423 greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely
4424 speaking, greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure. Because
4425 it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the
4426 touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider
4427 the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as
4428 intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible.
4429 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 co."><a name="34876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34876] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4430 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque, inquantum amatur,
4431 efficitur delectabile. Sensus autem, ut dicitur in principio
4432 Metaphys., propter duo diliguntur, scilicet propter cognitionem, et
4433 propter utilitatem. Unde et utroque modo contingit esse
4434 delectationem secundum sensum. Sed quia apprehendere ipsam
4435 cognitionem tanquam bonum quoddam, proprium est hominis; ideo
4436 primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum
4437 cognitionem, sunt propriae hominum, delectationes autem sensuum
4438 inquantum diliguntur propter utilitatem, sunt communes omnibus
4439 animalibus. Si igitur loquamur de delectatione sensus quae est
4440 ratione cognitionis, manifestum est quod secundum visum est maior
4441 delectatio quam secundum aliquem alium sensum. Si autem loquamur de
4442 delectatione sensus quae est ratione utilitatis, sic maxima
4443 delectatio est secundum tactum. Utilitas enim sensibilium
4444 attenditur secundum ordinem ad conservationem naturae animalis. Ad
4445 hanc autem utilitatem propinquius se habent sensibilia tactus, est
4446 enim tactus cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus consistit animal,
4447 scilicet calidi et frigidi, et huiusmodi. Unde secundum hoc,
4448 delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, sunt maiores, quasi fini
4449 propinquiores. Et propter hoc etiam, alia animalia, quae non habent
4450 delectationem secundum sensum nisi ratione utilitatis, non
4451 delectantur secundum alios sensus, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia
4452 tactus, <i>neque enim odoribus leporum canes gaudent, sed
4453 cibatione; neque leo voce bovis, sed comestione</i>, ut dicitur in
4454 III Ethic. Cum igitur delectatio tactus sit maxima ratione
4455 utilitatis, delectatio autem visus ratione cognitionis; si quis
4456 utramque comparare velit, inveniet simpliciter delectationem tactus
4457 esse maiorem delectatione visus, secundum quod sistit infra limites
4458 sensibilis delectationis. Quia manifestum est quod id quod est
4459 naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum. Huiusmodi autem
4460 delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinantur concupiscentiae
4461 naturales, sicut cibi, et venerea, et huiusmodi. Sed si
4462 consideremus delectationes visus, secundum quod visus deservit
4463 intellectui; sic delectationes visus erunt potiores, ea ratione qua
4464 et intelligibiles delectationes sunt potiores sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p9">
4465 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Joy, as stated above
4466 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q31_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, denotes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the
4467 touch.
4468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34877] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4469 ergo dicendum quod gaudium, sicut supra dictum est, significat
4470 animalem delectationem, et haec maxime pertinet ad visum. Sed
4471 delectatio naturalis maxime pertinet ad tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p10">
4472 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the same
4473 passage (Metaph. i, 1).
4474 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34878] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4475 dicendum quod visus maxime diligitur propter cognitionem, eo quod
4476 multas rerum differentias nobis ostendit, ut ibidem dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p11">
4477 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch,
4478 is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which
4479 a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of its image, which
4480 entices him to love it and to seek its delight.
4481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34879] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4482 dicendum quod alio modo delectatio est causa amoris carnalis, et
4483 alio modo visio. Nam delectatio, et maxime quae est secundum
4484 tactum, est causa amicitiae delectabilis per modum finis, visio
4485 autem est causa sicut unde est principium motus, inquantum per
4486 visum amabilis imprimitur species rei, quae allicit ad amandum et
4487 ad concupiscendum eius delectationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A7-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 7. Whether any pleasure is not natural?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p2">
4488 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But
4489 the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal
4490 appetite, which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is non-natural.
4491 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34880] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
4492 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit innaturalis.
4493 Delectatio enim in affectibus animae proportionatur quieti in
4494 corporibus. Sed appetitus corporis naturalis non quiescit nisi in
4495 loco connaturali. Ergo nec quies appetitus animalis, quae est
4496 delectatio, potest esse nisi in aliquo connaturali. Nulla ergo
4497 delectatio est non naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p3">
4498 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which
4499 is unnatural can give pleasure.
4500 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34881] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4501 illud quod est contra naturam, est violentum. Sed omne violentum
4502 est contristans, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo nihil quod est
4503 contra naturam, potest esse delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p4">
4504 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the
4505 Philosopher's definition quoted above
4506 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q31_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural end. Therefore
4507 every pleasure is natural.
4508 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34882] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4509 constitui in propriam naturam, cum sentitur, causat delectationem;
4510 ut patet ex definitione philosophi supra posita. Sed constitui in
4511 naturam, unicuique est naturale, quia motus naturalis est qui est
4512 ad terminum naturalem. Ergo omnis delectatio est naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p5">
4513 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease."
4514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34883] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4515 est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod quaedam
4516 delectationes sunt aegritudinales et contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p6">
4517 <b>I answer that,</b> We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken
4518 in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has
4519 his own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining
4520 to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take
4521 pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with
4522 reason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason.
4523 And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink,
4524 sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each
4525 kind
4526 of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens
4527 in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary
4528 to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat.
4529 Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation
4530 of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this
4531 corruption may be either on the part of the body---from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem
4532 bitter, and vice versa---or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on
4533 the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast,
4534 or
4535 other such things, which are not in accord with human nature.
4536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 co."><a name="34884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34884] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4537 dicendum quod naturale dicitur quod est secundum naturam, ut
4538 dicitur in II Physic. Natura autem in homine dupliciter sumi
4539 potest. Uno modo, prout intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis
4540 natura, quia secundum eam homo in specie constituitur. Et secundum
4541 hoc, naturales delectationes hominum dici possunt quae sunt in eo
4542 quod convenit homini secundum rationem, sicut delectari in
4543 contemplatione veritatis, et in actibus virtutum, est naturale
4544 homini. Alio modo potest sumi natura in homine secundum quod
4545 condividitur rationi, id scilicet quod est commune homini et aliis,
4546 praecipue quod rationi non obedit. Et secundum hoc, ea quae
4547 pertinent ad conservationem corporis, vel secundum individuum, ut
4548 cibus, potus, lectus, et huiusmodi, vel secundum speciem, sicut
4549 venereorum usus, dicuntur homini delectabilia naturaliter. Secundum
4550 utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales,
4551 simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales secundum quid. Contingit
4552 enim in aliquo individuo corrumpi aliquod principiorum naturalium
4553 speciei; et sic id quod est contra naturam speciei, fieri per
4554 accidens naturale huic individuo; sicut huic aquae calefactae est
4555 naturale quod calefaciat. Ita igitur contingit quod id quod est
4556 contra naturam hominis, vel quantum ad rationem, vel quantum ad
4557 corporis conservationem, fiat huic homini connaturale, propter
4558 aliquam corruptionem naturae in eo existentem. Quae quidem
4559 corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis, sive ex aegritudine,
4560 sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso; sive
4561 propter malam complexionem, sicut aliqui delectantur in comestione
4562 terrae vel carbonum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi, vel etiam ex parte
4563 animae, sicut propter consuetudinem aliqui, delectantur in
4564 comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut
4565 aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p7"> This suffices for the answers to the objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 ad arg."><a name="34885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34885] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
4566 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A8-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 8. Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p2">
4567 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and
4568 contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but
4569 "good is contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another.
4570 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34886] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
4571 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi non sit delectatio
4572 contraria. Passiones enim animae speciem et contrarietatem
4573 recipiunt secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem delectationis est bonum.
4574 Cum igitur bonum non sit contrarium bono, sed bonum malo
4575 contrarietur, et malum malo, ut dicitur in praedicamentis; videtur
4576 quod delectatio non sit contraria delectationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p3">
4577 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore
4578 pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.
4579 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34887] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4580 uni unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed
4581 delectationi contraria est tristitia. Non ergo delectationi
4582 contraria est delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p4">
4583 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure.
4584 But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is
4585 no contrariety between one pleasure and another.
4586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34888] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4587 si delectationi contraria est delectatio hoc non est nisi propter
4588 contrarietatem eorum in quibus aliquis delectatur. Sed haec
4589 differentia est materialis, contrarietas autem est differentia
4590 secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo contrarietas non
4591 est delectationis ad delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p5">
4592 <b>On the contrary,</b> Things of the same genus that impede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures
4593 impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another.
4594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34889] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
4595 ea quae se impediunt, in eodem genere existentia, secundum
4596 philosophum, sunt contraria. Sed quaedam delectationes se invicem
4597 impediunt ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo aliquae delectationes sunt
4598 contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p6">
4599 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above (
4600 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q31_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary
4601 to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to
4602 another.
4603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 co."><a name="34890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34890] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4604 dicendum quod delectatio in affectionibus animae, sicut dictum est,
4605 proportionatur quieti in corporibus naturalibus. Dicuntur autem
4606 duae quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis;
4607 sicut quies quae est sursum, ei quae est deorsum, ut dicitur V
4608 Physic. Unde et contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes
4609 esse contrarias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p7">
4610 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may
4611 be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one
4612 good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in
4613 relation to water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this
4614 is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation
4615 to some one thing---i.e. the reason.
4616 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34891] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4617 ergo dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi est intelligendum
4618 secundum quod bonum et malum accipitur in virtutibus et vitiis, nam
4619 inveniuntur duo contraria vitia, non autem invenitur virtus
4620 contraria virtuti. In aliis autem nil prohibet duo bona esse ad
4621 invicem contraria, sicut calidum et frigidum, quorum unum est bonum
4622 igni, alterum aquae. Et per hunc modum delectatio potest esse
4623 delectationi contraria. Sed hoc in bono virtutis esse non potest,
4624 quia bonum virtutis non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid
4625 unum, scilicet rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p8">
4626 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and
4627 connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite,
4628 just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent
4629 repose of the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v,
4630 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
4631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34892] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4632 dicendum quod delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies
4633 naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi
4634 connaturali. Tristitia autem se habet sicut quies violenta,
4635 tristabile enim repugnat appetitui animali, sicut locus quietis
4636 violentae appetitui naturali. Quieti autem naturali opponitur et
4637 quies violenta eiusdem corporis, et quies naturalis alterius, ut
4638 dicitur in V Physic. Unde delectationi opponitur et delectatio et
4639 tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9">
4640 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal
4641 difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference
4642 in acts and passions, as stated above (
4643 <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,4;
4644 <a href="#FS_Q30_A2" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[30], A[2]</a>).
4645 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34893] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4646 dicendum quod ea in quibus delectamur, cum sint obiecta
4647 delectationis, non solum faciunt differentiam materialem, sed etiam
4648 formalem, si sit diversa ratio delectabilitatis. Diversa enim ratio
4649 obiecti diversificat speciem actus vel passionis, ut ex supradictis
4650 patet.</p></div></div></div></div>
4651 <div id="FS_Q32" class="div3">
4652 <h3 id="FS_Q32-p0.1">Q. 32. OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
4653 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
4654 <p id="FS_Q32-p2"> We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q32-p3"><a href="#FS_Q32_A1"> (1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p4"><a href="#FS_Q32_A2"> (2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p5"><a href="#FS_Q32_A3"> (3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p6"><a href="#FS_Q32_A4"> (4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p7"><a href="#FS_Q32_A5"> (5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p8"><a href="#FS_Q32_A6"> (6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p9"><a href="#FS_Q32_A7"> (7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p10"><a href="#FS_Q32_A8"> (8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?</a></p>
4655 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 pr."><a name="34894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34894]
4656 Iª-IIae q. 32 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
4657 causis delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum
4658 operatio sit causa propria delectationis. Secundo, utrum motus sit
4659 causa delectationis. Tertio, utrum spes et memoria. Quarto, utrum
4660 tristitia. Quinto, utrum actiones aliorum sint nobis delectationis
4661 causa. Sexto, utrum benefacere alteri sit causa delectationis.
4662 Septimo, utrum similitudo sit causa delectationis. Octavo, utrum
4663 admiratio sit causa delectationis.</p></div></div></div>
4664 <div id="FS_Q32_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A1-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 1. Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p2">
4665 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "pleasure
4666 consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above (
4667 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore operation is not the proper cause
4668 of pleasure.
4669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34895] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
4670 sic proceditur. Videtur quod operatio non sit propria et prima
4671 causa delectationis. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric.,
4672 <i>delectari consistit in hoc quod sensus aliquid patiatur</i>,
4673 requiritur enim ad delectationem cognitio, sicut dictum est. Sed
4674 per prius sunt cognoscibilia obiecta operationum quam ipsae
4675 operationes. Ergo operatio non est propria causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p3">
4676 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always
4677 an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
4678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34896] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4679 delectatio potissime consistit in fine adepto, hoc enim est quod
4680 praecipue concupiscitur. Sed non semper operatio est finis, sed
4681 quandoque ipsum operatum. Non ergo operatio est propria et per se
4682 causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p4">
4683 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation
4684 is not the proper cause of pleasure.
4685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34897] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4686 otium et requies dicuntur per cessationem operationis. Haec autem
4687 sunt delectabilia, ut dicitur in I Rhetoric. Non ergo operatio est
4688 propria causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p5">
4689 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that "pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation."
4690 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34898] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4691 est quod philosophus dicit, VII et X Ethic., quod <i>delectatio est
4692 operatio connaturalis non impedita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p6">
4693 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
4694 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>), two things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now
4695 each of these consists in a kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the suitable
4696 good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every pleasure must
4697 needs be the result of some
4698 operation.
4699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 co."><a name="34899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34899] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4700 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad delectationem duo
4701 requiruntur, scilicet consecutio boni convenientis, et cognitio
4702 huiusmodi adeptionis. Utrumque autem horum in quadam operatione
4703 consistit, nam actualis cognitio operatio quaedam est; similiter
4704 bonum conveniens adipiscimur aliqua operatione. Ipsa etiam operatio
4705 propria est quoddam bonum conveniens. Unde oportet quod omnis
4706 delectatio aliquam operationem consequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p7">
4707 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when
4708 we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man
4709 takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless they
4710 were apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
4711 great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such
4712 like things is nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation. Wherefore it is
4713 evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its cause.
4714 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34900] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4715 ergo dicendum quod ipsa obiecta operationum non sunt delectabilia,
4716 nisi inquantum coniunguntur nobis, vel per cognitionem solam, sicut
4717 cum delectamur in consideratione vel inspectione aliquorum; vel
4718 quocumque alio modo simul cum cognitione, sicut cum aliquis
4719 delectatur in hoc quod cognoscit se habere quodcumque bonum, puta
4720 divitias vel honorem vel aliquid huiusmodi; quae quidem non essent
4721 delectabilia, nisi inquantum apprehenduntur ut habita. Ut enim
4722 philosophus dicit, in II Polit., <i>magnam delectationem habet
4723 putare aliquid sibi proprium; quae procedit ex naturali amore
4724 alicuius ad seipsum</i>. Habere autem huiusmodi nihil est aliud
4725 quam uti eis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per aliquam operationem.
4726 Unde manifestum est quod omnis delectatio in operationem reducitur
4727 sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p8">
4728 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as possessed
4729 or effected: and this implies use or operation.
4730 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34901] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4731 dicendum quod etiam in illis in quibus operationes non sunt fines,
4732 sed operata, ipsa operata sunt delectabilia inquantum sunt habita
4733 vel facta. Quod refertur ad aliquem usum vel operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p9">
4734 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is finite,
4735 operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
4736 proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And in this sense, leisure and play and other things
4737 pertaining to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
4738 from labor.
4739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34902] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4740 dicendum quod operationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt
4741 proportionatae et connaturales operanti. Cum autem virtus humana
4742 sit finita, secundum aliquam mensuram operatio est sibi
4743 proportionata. Unde si excedat illam mensuram, iam non erit sibi
4744 proportionata, nec delectabilis, sed magis laboriosa et attaedians.
4745 Et secundum hoc, otium et ludus et alia quae ad requiem pertinent,
4746 delectabilia sunt, inquantum auferunt tristitiam quae est ex
4747 labore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A2-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 2. Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p2">
4748 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure. Because, as stated above (
4749 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>), the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
4750 vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence. Now that which
4751 is being moved towards something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its
4752 regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement
4753 is not a cause of pleasure.
4754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34903] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
4755 sic proceditur. Videtur quod motus non sit causa delectationis.
4756 Quia, sicut supra dictum est, bonum praesentialiter adeptum est
4757 causa delectationis, unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., dicit quod
4758 delectatio non comparatur generationi, sed operationi rei iam
4759 existentis. Id autem quod movetur ad aliquid, nondum habet illud;
4760 sed quodammodo est in via generationis respectu illius, secundum
4761 quod omni motui adiungitur generatio et corruptio, ut dicitur in
4762 VIII Physic. Ergo motus non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p3">
4763 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing
4764 are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
4765 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34904] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4766 motus praecipue laborem et lassitudinem inducit in operibus. Sed
4767 operationes, ex hoc quod sunt laboriosae et lassantes, non sunt
4768 delectabiles, sed magis afflictivae. Ergo motus non est causa
4769 delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p4">
4770 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to,
4771 are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
4772 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34905] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4773 motus importat innovationem quandam, quae opponitur consuetudini.
4774 Sed ea quae sunt consueta, sunt nobis delectabilia, ut philosophus
4775 dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo motus non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p5">
4776 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some
4777 things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased
4778 and reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore
4779 movement seems to cause pleasure.
4780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34906] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4781 est quod Augustinus dicit, in VIII Confess., <i>quid est hoc,
4782 domine Deus meus, cum tu aeternum tibi tu ipse sis gaudium; et
4783 quaedam de te circa te semper gaudeant; quod haec rerum pars
4784 alterno defectu et profectu, offensionibus et conciliationibus
4785 gaudet?</i> Ex quo accipitur quod homines gaudent et delectantur in
4786 quibusdam alternationibus. Et sic motus videtur esse causa
4787 delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q32_A2-p6">
4788 <b>I answer that,</b> Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and
4789 a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says
4790 (Ethic. vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our
4791 nature is changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not
4792 suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of
4793 the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect:
4794 thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in
4795 a certain measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode
4796 of
4797 being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because
4798 man desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change
4799 in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine
4800 says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the
4801 whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please collectively
4802 more than they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively."
4803 </p><p id="FS_Q32_A2-p7"> If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the
4804 continuation of any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its delight at once---to such a one change will
4805 afford no delight. And the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being continual.
4806 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 co."><a name="34907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34907] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4807 dicendum quod ad delectationem tria requiruntur, scilicet duo
4808 quorum est coniunctio delectabilis; et tertium, quod est cognitio
4809 huius coniunctionis. Et secundum haec tria motus efficitur
4810 delectabilis, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. et in I Rhetoric.
4811 Nam ex parte nostra qui delectamur, transmutatio efficitur nobis
4812 delectabilis propter hoc, quod natura nostra transmutabilis est; et
4813 propter hoc, quod est nobis conveniens nunc, non erit nobis
4814 conveniens postea; sicut calefieri ad ignem est conveniens homini
4815 in hieme, non autem in aestate. Ex parte vero boni delectantis quod
4816 nobis coniungitur, fit etiam transmutatio delectabilis. Quia actio
4817 continuata alicuius agentis auget effectum, sicut quanto aliquis
4818 diutius appropinquat igni, magis calefit et desiccatur. Naturalis
4819 autem habitudo in quadam mensura consistit. Et ideo quando
4820 continuata praesentia delectabilis superexcedit mensuram naturalis
4821 habitudinis, efficitur remotio eius delectabilis. Ex parte vero
4822 ipsius cognitionis, quia homo desiderat cognoscere aliquod totum et
4823 perfectum. Cum ergo aliqua non poterunt apprehendi tota simul,
4824 delectat in his transmutatio, ut unum transeat et alterum succedat,
4825 et sic totum sentiatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess.,
4826 <i>non vis utique stare syllabam, sed transvolare, ut aliae
4827 veniant, et totum audias. Ita semper omnia ex quibus unum aliquid
4828 constat, et non sunt omnia simul, plus delectant omnia quam
4829 singula, si possint sentiri omnia</i>. Si ergo sit aliqua res cuius
4830 natura sit intransmutabilis; et non possit in ea fieri excessus
4831 naturalis habitudinis per continuationem delectabilis; et quae
4832 possit totum suum delectabile simul intueri, non erit ei
4833 transmutatio delectabilis. Et quanto aliquae delectationes plus ad
4834 hoc accedunt, tanto plus continuari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p8">
4835 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have something
4836 thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure;
4837 because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in
4838 so far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes suitable or
4839 ceases to be, as stated above.
4840 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34908] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4841 ergo dicendum quod id quod movetur, etsi nondum habeat perfecte id
4842 ad quod movetur, incipit tamen iam aliquid habere eius ad quod
4843 movetur, et secundum hoc, ipse motus habet aliquid delectationis.
4844 Deficit tamen a delectationis perfectione, nam perfectiores
4845 delectationes sunt in rebus immobilibus. Motus etiam efficitur
4846 delectabilis, inquantum per ipsum fit aliquid conveniens quod prius
4847 conveniens non erat, vel desinit esse, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p9">
4848 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by removing
4849 the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
4850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34909] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4851 dicendum quod motus laborem et lassitudinem inducit, secundum quod
4852 transcendit habitudinem naturalem. Sic autem motus non est
4853 delectabilis, sed secundum quod removentur contraria habitudinis
4854 naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p10">
4855 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement
4856 which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode
4857 of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement
4858 become pleasant.
4859 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34910] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4860 dicendum quod id quod est consuetum, efficitur delectabile,
4861 inquantum efficitur naturale, nam consuetudo est quasi altera
4862 natura. Motus autem est delectabilis, non quidem quo receditur a
4863 consuetudine, sed magis secundum quod per ipsum impeditur corruptio
4864 naturalis habitudinis, quae posset provenire ex assiduitate
4865 alicuius operationis. Et sic ex eadem causa connaturalitatis
4866 efficitur consuetudo delectabilis, et motus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A3-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 3. Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p2">
4867 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De
4868 Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore
4869 memory and hope do not cause pleasure.
4870 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34911] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
4871 sic proceditur. Videtur quod memoria et spes non sint causae
4872 delectationis. Delectatio enim est de bono praesenti, ut Damascenus
4873 dicit. Sed memoria et spes sunt de absenti, est enim memoria
4874 praeteritorum, spes vero futurorum. Ergo memoria et spes non sunt
4875 causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p3">
4876 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to
4877 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv"> Prov. 13:12</a>: "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
4878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34912] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4879 idem non est causa contrariorum. Sed spes est causa afflictionis,
4880 dicitur enim Prov. XIII, <i>spes quae differtur, affligit
4881 animam</i>. Ergo spes non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p4">
4882 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned
4883 as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
4884 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34913] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4885 sicut spes convenit cum delectatione in eo quod est de bono, ita
4886 etiam concupiscentia et amor. Non ergo magis debet assignari spes
4887 causa delectationis, quam concupiscentia vel amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5">
4888 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4889 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv">Rom. 12:12</a>): "Rejoicing in hope"; and (
4890 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.76.4" target="asv">Ps. 76:4</a>): "I remembered God, and was delighted."
4891 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34914] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4892 est quod dicitur Rom. XII, <i>spe gaudentes</i>; et in Psalmo
4893 LXXVI, <i>memor fui Dei, et delectatus sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p6">
4894 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present
4895 to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in
4896 reality---i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either actually or potentially. And
4897 since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of
4898 knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises
4899 from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein
4900 there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining
4901 the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of
4902 apprehension.
4903 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 co."><a name="34915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34915] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4904 dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex praesentia boni convenientis,
4905 secundum quod sentitur, vel qualitercumque percipitur. Est autem
4906 aliquid praesens nobis dupliciter, uno modo, secundum cognitionem,
4907 prout scilicet cognitum est in cognoscente secundum suam
4908 similitudinem; alio modo, secundum rem, prout scilicet unum alteri
4909 realiter coniungitur, vel actu vel potentia, secundum quemcumque
4910 coniunctionis modum. Et quia maior est coniunctio secundum rem quam
4911 secundum similitudinem, quae est coniunctio cognitionis; itemque
4912 maior est coniunctio rei in actu quam in potentia, ideo maxima est
4913 delectatio quae fit per sensum, qui requirit praesentiam rei
4914 sensibilis. Secundum autem gradum tenet delectatio spei, in qua non
4915 solum est delectabilis coniunctio secundum apprehensionem, sed
4916 etiam secundum facultatem vel potestatem adipiscendi bonum quod
4917 delectat. Tertium autem gradum tenet delectatio memoriae, quae
4918 habet solam coniunctionem apprehensionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p7">
4919 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present,
4920 i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
4921 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34916] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
4922 ergo dicendum quod spes et memoria sunt quidem eorum quae sunt
4923 simpliciter absentia, quae tamen secundum quid sunt praesentia,
4924 scilicet vel secundum apprehensionem solam; vel secundum
4925 apprehensionem et facultatem, ad minus aestimatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p8">
4926 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a
4927 present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.
4928 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34917] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4929 dicendum quod nihil prohibet idem, secundum diversa, esse causam
4930 contrariorum. Sic igitur spes, inquantum habet praesentem
4931 aestimationem boni futuri, delectationem causat, inquantum autem
4932 caret praesentia eius, causat afflictionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p9">
4933 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind
4934 of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires,
4935 since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing
4936 good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in
4937 preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away.
4938 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34918] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4939 dicendum quod etiam amor et concupiscentia delectationem causant.
4940 Omne enim amatum fit delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam
4941 unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum. Similiter etiam omne
4942 concupitum est delectabile concupiscenti, cum concupiscentia sit
4943 praecipue appetitus delectationis. Sed tamen spes, inquantum
4944 importat quandam certitudinem realis praesentiae boni delectantis,
4945 quam non importat nec amor nec concupiscentia, magis ponitur causa
4946 delectationis quam illa. Et similiter magis quam memoria, quae est
4947 de eo quod iam transiit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A4-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 4. Whether sadness causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p2">
4948 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
4949 Therefore it does not cause it.
4950 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34919] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
4951 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non sit causa delectationis.
4952 Contrarium enim non est causa contrarii. Sed tristitia contrariatur
4953 delectationi. Ergo non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p3">
4954 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when
4955 remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.
4956 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34920] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4957 contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Sed delectabilia memorata
4958 sunt causa delectationis. Ergo tristia memorata sunt causa doloris,
4959 et non delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p4">
4960 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about,
4961 as stated above (
4962 <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q32_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[2]</a>). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure.
4963 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34921] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4964 sicut se habet tristitia ad delectationem, ita odium ad amorem. Sed
4965 odium non est causa amoris, sed magis e converso, ut supra dictum
4966 est. Ergo tristitia non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p5">
4967 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4968 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.41.4" target="asv">Ps. 41:4</a>): "My tears have been my bread day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise
4969 from sadness, can give pleasure.
4970 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34922] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4971 est quod in Psalmo XLI, dicitur, <i>fuerunt mihi lacrimae meae
4972 panes die ac nocte</i>. Per panem autem refectio delectationis
4973 intelligitur. Ergo lacrimae, quae ex tristitia oriuntur, possunt
4974 esse delectabiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p6">
4975 <b>I answer that,</b> Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can
4976 cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved,
4977 the absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a
4978 cause of pleasure, on account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked
4979 upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and
4980 pain, so much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes
4981 in joy we call to mind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling pain . . . and in
4982 proportion are the more filled with joy and gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril there was
4983 in the
4984 battle, so much the more joy will there be in the triumph."
4985 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 co."><a name="34923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34923] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4986 dicendum quod tristitia potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo,
4987 secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria.
4988 Et utroque modo tristitia potest esse delectationis causa.
4989 Tristitia siquidem in actu existens est causa delectationis,
4990 inquantum facit memoriam rei dilectae, de cuius absentia aliquis
4991 tristatur, et tamen de sola eius apprehensione delectatur. Memoria
4992 autem tristitiae fit causa delectationis, propter subsequentem
4993 evasionem. Nam carere malo accipitur in ratione boni, unde secundum
4994 quod homo apprehendit se evasisse ab aliquibus tristibus et
4995 dolorosis, accrescit ei gaudii materia; secundum quod Augustinus
4996 dicit, XXII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>saepe laeti tristium meminimus, et
4997 sani dolorum sine dolore, et inde amplius laeti et grati sumus</i>.
4998 Et in VIII Confess. dicit quod <i>quanto maius fuit periculum in
4999 proelio, tanto maius erit gaudium in triumpho</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p7">
5000 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as stated in
5001 Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension
5002 of something pleasant.
5003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34924] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5004 ergo dicendum quod contrarium quandoque per accidens est causa
5005 contrarii, sicut frigidum quandoque calefacit, ut dicitur in VIII
5006 Physic. Et similiter tristitia per accidens est delectationis
5007 causa, inquantum fit per eam apprehensio alicuius delectabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p8">
5008 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far
5009 as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause
5010 sadness.
5011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34925] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5012 dicendum quod tristia memorata, inquantum sunt tristia et
5013 delectabilibus contraria, non causant delectationem, sed inquantum
5014 ab eis homo liberatur. Et similiter memoria delectabilium, ex eo
5015 quod sunt amissa, potest causare tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p9">
5016 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one
5017 and the same thing.
5018 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34926] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5019 dicendum quod odium etiam per accidens potest esse causa amoris,
5020 prout scilicet aliqui diligunt se, inquantum conveniunt in odio
5021 unius et eiusdem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A5-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 5. Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p2">
5022 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good
5023 when conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.
5024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34927] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
5025 sic proceditur. Videtur quod actiones aliorum non sint nobis
5026 delectationis causa. Causa enim delectationis est proprium bonum
5027 coniunctum. Sed aliorum operationes non sunt nobis coniunctae. Ergo
5028 non sunt nobis causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p3">
5029 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the
5030 same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue.
5031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34928] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5032 operatio est proprium bonum operantis. Si igitur operationes
5033 aliorum sint nobis causa delectationis, pari ratione omnia alia
5034 bona aliorum erunt nobis delectationis causa. Quod patet esse
5035 falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p4">
5036 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon
5037 the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed
5038 from habits existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents. Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing
5039 to us, but to the agents themselves.
5040 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34929] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5041 operatio est delectabilis, inquantum procedit ex habitu nobis
5042 innato, unde dicitur in II Ethic., quod <i>signum generati habitus
5043 oportet accipere fientem in opere delectationem</i>. Sed
5044 operationes aliorum non procedunt ex habitibus qui in nobis sunt,
5045 sed interdum ex habitibus qui sunt in operantibus. Non ergo
5046 operationes aliorum sunt nobis delectabiles, sed ipsis
5047 operantibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p5">
5048 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the second canonical epistle of John (verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking
5049 in truth."
5050 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34930] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5051 est quod dicitur in secunda canonica Ioannis, <i>gavisus sum valde,
5052 quoniam inveni de filiis tuis ambulantes in veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6">
5053 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
5054 <a href="#FS_Q32_A1" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper good, and the knowledge of having
5055 obtained it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain some
5056 good through the action of another. And in this way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us: since
5057 it is pleasant to be benefited by
5058 another. Secondly, from the fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men
5059 take pleasure in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves.
5060 And since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure
5061 in being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some.
5062 And as love is for something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others,
5063 inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from
5064 the fact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes
5065 a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as
5066 being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written (
5067 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:6</a>) that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth."
5068 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 co."><a name="34931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34931] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5069 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ad delectationem duo
5070 requiruntur, scilicet consecutio proprii boni, et cognitio proprii
5071 boni consecuti. Tripliciter ergo operatio alterius potest esse
5072 delectationis causa. Uno modo, inquantum per operationem alicuius
5073 consequimur aliquod bonum. Et secundum hoc, operationes illorum qui
5074 nobis aliquod bonum faciunt, sunt nobis delectabiles, quia bene
5075 pati ab alio est delectabile. Alio modo, secundum quod per
5076 operationes aliorum efficitur nobis aliqua cognitio vel aestimatio
5077 proprii boni. Et propter hoc homines delectantur in hoc quod
5078 laudantur vel honorantur ab aliis, quia scilicet per hoc accipiunt
5079 aestimationem in seipsis aliquod bonum esse. Et quia ista
5080 aestimatio fortius generatur ex testimonio bonorum et sapientum,
5081 ideo in horum laudibus et honoribus homines magis delectantur. Et
5082 quia adulator est apparens laudator, propter hoc etiam adulationes
5083 quibusdam sunt delectabiles. Et quia amor est alicuius boni, et
5084 admiratio est alicuius magni, idcirco amari ab aliis, et in
5085 admiratione haberi, est delectabile; inquantum per hoc fit homini
5086 aestimatio propriae bonitatis vel magnitudinis, in quibus aliquis
5087 delectatur. Tertio modo, inquantum ipsae operationes aliorum, si
5088 sint bonae, aestimantur ut bonum proprium, propter vim amoris, qui
5089 facit aestimare amicum quasi eundem sibi. Et propter odium, quod
5090 facit aestimare bonum alterius esse sibi contrarium, efficitur mala
5091 operatio inimici delectabilis. Unde dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, quod
5092 <i>caritas non gaudet super iniquitate, congaudet autem
5093 veritati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p7">
5094 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way;
5095 or by affection, as in the third way.
5096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34932] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5097 ergo dicendum quod operatio alterius potest esse mihi coniuncta vel
5098 per effectum, sicut in primo modo; vel per apprehensionem, sicut in
5099 secundo modo; vel per affectionem, sicut in tertio modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p8">
5100 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument avails for the third mode, but not for the first two.
5101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34933] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5102 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad tertium modum, non
5103 autem quantum ad duos primos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p9">
5104 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives
5105 pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by
5106 love.
5107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34934] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5108 dicendum quod operationes aliorum etsi non procedant ex habitibus
5109 qui in me sunt, causant tamen in me aliquid delectabile; vel
5110 faciunt mihi aestimationem sive apprehensionem proprii habitus; vel
5111 procedunt ex habitu illius qui est unum mecum per amorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A6-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 6. Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p2">
5112 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's
5113 proper good, as stated above (
5114 <a href="#FS_Q32_A1" id="FS_Q32_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore it seems
5115 to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.
5116 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34935] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
5117 sic proceditur. Videtur quod benefacere alteri non sit
5118 delectationis causa. Delectatio enim causatur ex consecutione
5119 proprii boni, sicut supra dictum est. Sed benefacere non pertinet
5120 ad consecutionem proprii boni, sed magis ad emissionem. Ergo magis
5121 videtur esse causa tristitiae quam delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p3">
5122 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is a
5123 mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone
5124 takes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not
5125 a cause of pleasure.
5126 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34936] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5127 philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>illiberalitas
5128 connaturalior est hominibus quam prodigalitas</i>. Sed ad
5129 prodigalitatem pertinet benefacere aliis, ad illiberalitatem autem
5130 pertinet desistere a benefaciendo. Cum ergo operatio connaturalis
5131 sit delectabilis unicuique, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., videtur
5132 quod benefacere aliis non sit causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p4">
5133 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such
5134 as overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i,
5135 11). Therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.
5136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34937] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5137 contrarii effectus ex contrariis causis procedunt. Sed quaedam quae
5138 pertinent ad malefacere, sunt naturaliter homini delectabilia,
5139 sicut vincere, redarguere vel increpare alios, et etiam punire,
5140 quantum ad iratos, ut dicit philosophus in I Rhetoric. Ergo
5141 benefacere magis est causa tristitiae quam delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p5">
5142 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers."
5143 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34938] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5144 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod <i>largiri et
5145 auxiliari amicis aut extraneis, est delectabilissimum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p6">
5146 <b>I answer that,</b> Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred
5147 on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own,
5148 we take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of
5149 the end; as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either
5150 from God or from man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to
5151 another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing
5152 good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof
5153 he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their children, and in their own works, as being things
5154 on which
5155 they bestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual inclination to do good, by reason of which doing
5156 good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others. The third principle is
5157 the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for
5158 a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure.
5159 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 co."><a name="34939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34939] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5160 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est benefacere alteri, potest
5161 tripliciter esse delectationis causa. Uno modo, per comparationem
5162 ad effectum, quod est bonum in altero constitutum. Et secundum hoc,
5163 inquantum bonum alterius reputamus quasi nostrum bonum, propter
5164 unionem amoris, delectamur in bono quod per nos fit aliis,
5165 praecipue amicis, sicut in bono proprio. Alio modo, per
5166 comparationem ad finem, sicut cum aliquis, per hoc quod alteri
5167 benefacit, sperat consequi aliquod bonum sibi ipsi, vel a Deo vel
5168 ab homine. Spes autem delectationis est causa. Tertio modo, per
5169 comparationem ad principium. Et sic hoc quod est benefacere alteri,
5170 potest esse delectabile per comparationem ad triplex principium.
5171 Quorum unum est facultas benefaciendi, et secundum hoc, benefacere
5172 alteri fit delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini quaedam
5173 imaginatio abundantis boni in seipso existentis, ex quo possit
5174 aliis communicare. Et ideo homines delectantur in filiis et in
5175 propriis operibus, sicut quibus communicant proprium bonum. Aliud
5176 principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit
5177 alicui connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis.
5178 Tertium principium est motivum, puta cum aliquis movetur ab aliquo
5179 quem diligit, ad benefaciendum alicui, omnia enim quae facimus vel
5180 patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor praecipua
5181 causa delectationis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p7">
5182 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of
5183 sadness; for instance when it is excessive.
5184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34940] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5185 ergo dicendum quod emissio, inquantum est indicativa proprii boni,
5186 est delectabilis. Sed inquantum evacuat proprium bonum potest esse
5187 contristans; sicut quando est immoderata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p8">
5188 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.
5189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34941] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5190 dicendum quod prodigalitas habet immoderatam emissionem, quae
5191 repugnat naturae. Et ideo prodigalitas dicitur esse contra
5192 naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p9">
5193 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's own
5194 good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man
5195 to appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility
5196 of winning it, afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests,
5197 in so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine
5198 himself to be wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as
5199 by scolding and reproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to an angry
5200 man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous hurt:
5201 for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying
5202 back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is
5203 not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good.
5204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34942] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5205 dicendum quod vincere, redarguere et punire, non est delectabile
5206 inquantum est in malum alterius, sed inquantum pertinet ad proprium
5207 bonum, quod plus homo amat quam odiat malum alterius. Vincere enim
5208 est delectabile naturaliter, inquantum per hoc homini fit
5209 aestimatio propriae excellentiae. Et propter hoc, omnes ludi in
5210 quibus est concertatio, et in quibus potest esse victoria, sunt
5211 maxime delectabiles, et universaliter omnes concertationes,
5212 secundum quod habent spem victoriae. Redarguere autem et increpare
5213 potest esse dupliciter delectationis causa. Uno modo, inquantum
5214 facit homini imaginationem propriae sapientiae et excellentiae,
5215 increpare enim et corripere est sapientum et maiorum alio modo,
5216 secundum quod aliquis, increpando et reprehendendo, alteri
5217 benefacit, quod est delectabile, ut dictum est. Irato autem est
5218 delectabile punire, inquantum videtur removere apparentem
5219 minorationem, quae videtur esse ex praecedenti laesione. Cum enim
5220 aliquis est ab aliquo laesus, videtur per hoc ab illo minoratus
5221 esse, et ideo appetit ab hac minoratione liberari per retributionem
5222 laesionis. Et sic patet quod benefacere alteri per se potest esse
5223 delectabile, sed malefacere alteri non est delectabile, nisi
5224 inquantum videtur pertinere ad proprium bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A7-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 7. Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p2">
5225 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness.
5226 But "it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than
5227 likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
5228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34943] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
5229 sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa
5230 delectationis. Principari enim et praeesse quandam dissimilitudinem
5231 importat. Sed principari et praeesse naturaliter est delectabile,
5232 ut dicitur in I Rhetoric. Ergo dissimilitudo magis est causa
5233 delectationis quam similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p3">
5234 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures,
5235 as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
5236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34944] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5237 nihil magis est dissimile delectationi quam tristitia. Sed illi qui
5238 patiuntur tristitias, maxime sequuntur delectationes, ut dicitur in
5239 VII Ethic. Ergo dissimilitudo est magis causa delectationis quam
5240 similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p4">
5241 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated
5242 with food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
5243 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34945] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5244 illi qui sunt repleti aliquibus delectabilibus, non delectantur in
5245 eis, sed magis fastidiunt ea, sicut patet in repletione ciborum.
5246 Non ergo similitudo est delectationis causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p5">
5247 <b>On the contrary,</b> Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated (
5248 <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q32_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure.
5249 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34946] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5250 est quod similitudo est causa amoris, ut dictum est supra. Amor
5251 autem est causa delectationis. Ergo similitudo est causa
5252 delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q32_A7-p6">
5253 <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love,
5254 as stated above (
5255 <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q32_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). And if that which is like us does not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man
5256 in respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes
5257 disgust or sadness, not as being like and
5258 one with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us.
5259 </p><p id="FS_Q32_A7-p7"> Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good,
5260 by a kind of excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous
5261 good or any bodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's own good: thus a potter dislikes
5262 other potters, not because they are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or
5263 profits, which he seeks as his own good.
5264 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 co."><a name="34947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34947] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5265 dicendum quod similitudo est quaedam unitas, unde id quod est
5266 simile, inquantum est unum, est delectabile, sicut et amabile, ut
5267 supra dictum est. Et si quidem id quod est simile, proprium bonum
5268 non corrumpat, sed augeat, est simpliciter delectabile, puta homo
5269 homini, et iuvenis iuveni. Si vero sit corruptivum proprii boni,
5270 sic per accidens efficitur fastidiosum vel contristans; non quidem
5271 inquantum est simile et unum, sed inquantum corrumpit id quod est
5272 magis unum. Quod autem aliquid simile corrumpat proprium bonum,
5273 contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia corrumpit mensuram proprii
5274 boni per quendam excessum, bonum enim, praecipue corporale, ut
5275 sanitas, in quadam commensuratione consistit. Et propter hoc,
5276 superabundantes cibi, vel quaelibet delectationes corporales,
5277 fastidiuntur. Alio modo, per directam contrarietatem ad proprium
5278 bonum, sicut figuli abominantur alios figulos, non inquantum sunt
5279 figuli, sed inquantum per eos amittunt excellentiam propriam, sive
5280 proprium lucrum, quae appetunt sicut proprium bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p8">
5281 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since ruler and subject are in communion with one another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is
5282 conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they
5283 belong to men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another
5284 reason is that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is
5285 pleasant.
5286 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34948] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5287 ergo dicendum quod, cum sit quaedam communicatio principantis ad
5288 subiectum, est ibi quaedam similitudo. Tamen secundum quandam
5289 excellentiam, eo quod principari et praeesse pertinent ad
5290 excellentiam proprii boni, sapientum enim et meliorum est
5291 principari et praeesse. Unde per hoc fit homini propriae bonitatis
5292 imaginatio. Vel quia per hoc quod homo principatur et praeest,
5293 aliis benefacit, quod est delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p9">
5294 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is sorrowful:
5295 because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so
5296 far as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more
5297 sought than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall state
5298 later on (
5299 <a href="#FS_Q35_A5" id="FS_Q32_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[5]</a>). And this explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and movement. For
5300 this reason also young people are most inclined to seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject,
5301 while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow:
5302 because his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.
5303 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34949] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5304 dicendum quod id in quo delectatur tristatus, etsi non sit simile
5305 tristitiae, est tamen simile homini contristato. Quia tristitiae
5306 contrariantur proprio bono eius qui tristatur. Et ideo appetitur
5307 delectatio ab his qui in tristitia sunt, ut conferens ad proprium
5308 bonum, inquantum est medicativa contrarii. Et ista est causa quare
5309 delectationes corporales, quibus sunt contrariae quaedam
5310 tristitiae, magis appetuntur, quam delectationes intellectuales,
5311 quae non habent contrarietatem tristitiae, ut infra dicetur. Exinde
5312 etiam est quod omnia animalia naturaliter appetunt delectationem,
5313 quia semper animal laborat per sensum et motum. Et propter hoc
5314 etiam iuvenes maxime delectationes appetunt; propter multas
5315 transmutationes in eis existentes, dum sunt in statu augmenti. Et
5316 etiam melancholici vehementer appetunt delectationes, ad
5317 expellendum tristitiam, quia corpus eorum quasi pravo humore
5318 corroditur, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p10">
5319 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and consequently
5320 gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man.
5321 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34950] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5322 dicendum quod bona corporalia in quadam mensura consistunt, et ideo
5323 superexcessus similium corrumpit proprium bonum. Et propter hoc
5324 efficitur fastidiosum et contristans, inquantum contrariatur bono
5325 proprio hominis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A8-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 8. Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p2">
5326 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something,
5327 as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
5328 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34951] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
5329 sic proceditur. Videtur quod admiratio non sit causa delectationis.
5330 Admirari enim est ignorantis naturae, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed
5331 ignorantia non est delectabilis, sed magis scientia. Ergo admiratio
5332 non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p3">
5333 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning
5334 of Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says
5335 (Ethic. x, 7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises
5336 from an operation which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders
5337 rather than causes pleasure.
5338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34952] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5339 admiratio est principium sapientiae, quasi via ad inquirendum
5340 veritatem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. <i>Sed delectabilius
5341 est contemplari iam cognita, quam inquirere ignota</i>, ut
5342 philosophus dicit in X Ethic., cum hoc habeat difficultatem et
5343 impedimentum, illud autem non habeat; delectatio autem causatur ex
5344 operatione non impedita, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo admiratio
5345 non est causa delectationis, sed magis delectationem impedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p4">
5346 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant.
5347 But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of
5348 pleasure.
5349 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34953] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5350 unusquisque in consuetis delectatur, unde operationes habituum per
5351 consuetudinem acquisitorum, sunt delectabiles. Sed consueta non
5352 sunt admirabilia, ut dicit Augustinus, super Ioan. Ergo admiratio
5353 contrariatur causae delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p5">
5354 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure.
5355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34954] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5356 est quod philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod admiratio est
5357 delectationis causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p6">
5358 <b>I answer that,</b> It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above (
5359 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q32_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very
5360 increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which
5361 is loved, since it was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a
5362 kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him,
5363 or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes
5364 a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance
5365 things that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to
5366 pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper
5367 and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered
5368 from great danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.
5369 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 co."><a name="34955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34955] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5370 dicendum quod adipisci desiderata est delectabile, ut supra dictum
5371 est. Et ideo quanto alicuius rei amatae magis crescit desiderium,
5372 tanto magis per adeptionem crescit delectatio. Et etiam in ipso
5373 augmento desiderii fit augmentum delectationis, secundum quod fit
5374 etiam spes rei amatae; sicut supra dictum est quod ipsum desiderium
5375 ex spe est delectabile. Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam
5376 sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et
5377 ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit
5378 cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa
5379 delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi
5380 cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat. Et propter hoc omnia
5381 mirabilia sunt delectabilia, sicut quae sunt rara, et omnes
5382 repraesentationes rerum, etiam quae in se non sunt delectabiles;
5383 gaudet enim anima in collatione unius ad alterum, quia conferre
5384 unum alteri est proprius et connaturalis actus rationis, ut
5385 philosophus dicit in sua poetica. Et propter hoc etiam <i>liberari
5386 a magnis periculis magis est delectabile, quia est admirabile</i>,
5387 ut dicitur in I Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p7">
5388 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and
5389 in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to
5390 another reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be.]
5391 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34956] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5392 ergo dicendum quod admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet
5393 ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet desiderium addiscendi causam; et
5394 inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem
5395 non aestimabat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p8">
5396 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more
5397 perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more
5398 pleasing than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, it happens that research is sometimes more
5399 pleasing accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater
5400 desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning
5401 things for the first time.
5402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34957] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5403 dicendum quod delectatio duo habet, scilicet quietem in bono, et
5404 huiusmodi quietis perceptionem. Quantum igitur ad primum, cum sit
5405 perfectius contemplari veritatem cognitam quam inquirere ignotam,
5406 contemplationes rerum scitarum, per se loquendo, sunt magis
5407 delectabiles quam inquisitiones rerum ignotarum. Tamen per
5408 accidens, quantum ad secundum, contingit quod inquisitiones sunt
5409 quandoque delectabiliores, secundum quod ex maiori desiderio
5410 procedunt, desiderium autem maius excitatur ex perceptione
5411 ignorantiae. Unde maxime homo delectatur in his quae de novo
5412 invenit aut addiscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p9">
5413 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of
5414 rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in
5415 so far as they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely
5416 in things that are new," as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation
5417 causes more perfect pleasure.
5418 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34958] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5419 dicendum quod ea quae sunt consueta, sunt delectabilia ad
5420 operandum, inquantum sunt quasi connaturalia. Sed tamen ea quae
5421 sunt rara, possunt esse delectabilia, vel ratione cognitionis, quia
5422 desideratur eorum scientia, inquantum sunt mira; vel ratione
5423 operationis, <i>quia ex desiderio magis inclinatur mens ad hoc quod
5424 intense in novitate operetur</i>, ut dicitur in X Ethic.;
5425 perfectior enim operatio causat perfectiorem delectationem.</p></div></div></div></div>
5426 <div id="FS_Q33" class="div3">
5427 <h3 id="FS_Q33-p0.1">Q. 33. OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
5428 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
5429 <p id="FS_Q33-p2"> We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q33-p3"><a href="#FS_Q33_A1"> (1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p4"><a href="#FS_Q33_A2"> (2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p5"><a href="#FS_Q33_A3"> (3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p6"><a href="#FS_Q33_A4"> (4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?</a></p>
5430 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 pr."><a name="34959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34959]
5431 Iª-IIae q. 33 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
5432 effectibus delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo,
5433 utrum delectationis sit dilatare. Secundo, utrum delectatio causet
5434 sui sitim, vel desiderium. Tertio, utrum delectatio impediat usum
5435 rationis. Quarto, utrum delectatio perficiat operationem.</p></div></div></div>
5436 <div id="FS_Q33_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A1-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 1. Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2">
5437 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the
5438 Apostle (
5439 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:11</a>): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written (
5440 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.96" target="asv">Ps. 118:96</a>) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore
5441 expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
5442 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34960] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
5443 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dilatatio non sit effectus
5444 delectationis. Dilatatio enim videtur ad amorem magis pertinere,
5445 secundum quod dicit apostolus, II ad Cor. VI, <i>cor nostrum
5446 dilatatum est</i>. Unde et de praecepto caritatis in Psalmo CXVIII,
5447 dicitur, <i>latum mandatum tuum nimis</i>. Sed delectatio est alia
5448 passio ab amore. Ergo dilatatio non est effectus delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p3">
5449 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not
5450 yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure.
5451 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34961] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5452 ex hoc quod aliquid dilatatur, efficitur capacius ad recipiendum.
5453 Sed receptio pertinet ad desiderium, quod est rei nondum habitae.
5454 Ergo dilatatio magis videtur pertinere ad desiderium quam ad
5455 delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p4">
5456 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that which
5457 we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does
5458 not pertain to pleasure.
5459 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34962] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5460 constrictio dilatationi opponitur. Sed constrictio videtur ad
5461 delectationem pertinere, nam illud constringimus quod firmiter
5462 volumus retinere; et talis est affectio appetitus circa rem
5463 delectantem. Ergo dilatatio ad delectationem non pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5">
5464 <b>On the contrary,</b> In order to express joy, it is written (
5465 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.60.5" target="asv">Is. 60:5</a>): "Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged." Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia"
5466 as being derived from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above (
5467 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[31], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
5468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34963] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5469 est quod, ad expressionem gaudii, dicitur Isaiae LX, <i>videbis, et
5470 affluens, et mirabitur et dilatabitur cor tuum</i>. Ipsa etiam
5471 delectatio ex dilatatione nomen accepit ut laetitia nominetur sicut
5472 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p6">
5473 <b>I answer that,</b> Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically.
5474 Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite
5475 for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable
5476 good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a
5477 certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or
5478 expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable
5479 object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure,
5480 as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.
5481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 co."><a name="34964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34964] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5482 dicendum quod latitudo est quaedam dimensio magnitudinis
5483 corporalis, unde in affectionibus animae non nisi secundum
5484 metaphoram dicitur. Dilatatio autem dicitur quasi motus ad
5485 latitudinem. Et competit delectationi secundum duo quae ad
5486 delectationem requiruntur. Quorum unum est ex parte apprehensivae
5487 virtutis, quae apprehendit coniunctionem alicuius boni
5488 convenientis. Ex hac autem apprehensione apprehendit se homo
5489 perfectionem quandam adeptum, quae est spiritualis magnitudo, et
5490 secundum hoc, animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari,
5491 seu dilatari. Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae
5492 assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens
5493 ei ad eam interius capiendam. Et sic dilatatur affectus hominis per
5494 delectationem, quasi se tradens ad continendum interius rem
5495 delectantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p7">
5496 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different things according to
5497 different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection
5498 of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. On the
5499 other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more
5500 ample in itself so as to become more capacious.
5501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34965] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5502 ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae dicuntur metaphorice,
5503 idem diversis attribui secundum diversas similitudines. Et secundum
5504 hoc, dilatatio pertinet ad amorem ratione cuiusdam extensionis,
5505 inquantum affectus amantis ad alios extenditur, ut curet non solum
5506 quae sua sunt, sed quae aliorum. Ad delectationem vero pertinet
5507 dilatatio, inquantum aliquid in seipso ampliatur, ut quasi capacius
5508 reddatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p8">
5509 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the
5510 presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure
5511 in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end of desire.
5512 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34966] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5513 dicendum quod desiderium habet quidem aliquam ampliationem ex
5514 imaginatione rei desideratae, sed multo magis ex praesentia rei iam
5515 delectantis. Quia magis praebet se animus rei iam delectanti, quam
5516 rei non habitae desideratae, cum delectatio sit finis
5517 desiderii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p9">
5518 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that
5519 he may enjoy it perfectly.
5520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34967] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5521 dicendum quod ille qui delectatur, constringit quidem rem
5522 delectantem, dum ei fortiter inhaeret, sed cor suum ampliat, ut
5523 perfecte delectabili fruatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A2-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 2. Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2">
5524 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But pleasure
5525 is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as stated above (
5526 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>;
5527 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire.
5528 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34968] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
5529 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non causet desiderium sui
5530 ipsius. Omnis enim motus cessat, cum pervenerit ad quietem. Sed
5531 delectatio est quasi quaedam quies motus desiderii, ut supra dictum
5532 est. Cessat ergo motus desiderii, cum ad delectationem pervenerit.
5533 Non ergo delectatio causat desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p3">
5534 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since
5535 desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure
5536 does not cause desire for itself.
5537 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34969] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5538 oppositum non est causa sui oppositi. Sed delectatio quodammodo
5539 desiderio opponitur, ex parte obiecti, nam desiderium est boni non
5540 habiti, delectatio vero boni iam habiti. Ergo delectatio non causat
5541 desiderium sui ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p4">
5542 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
5543 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34970] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5544 fastidium desiderio repugnat. Sed delectatio plerumque causat
5545 fastidium. Non ergo facit sui desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p5">
5546 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
5547 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes
5548 pleasures of the body.
5549 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34971] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5550 est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, <i>qui biberit ex hac aqua,
5551 sitiet iterum</i>, per aquam autem significatur, secundum
5552 Augustinum, delectatio corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p6">
5553 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst,
5554 or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general,
5555 as excluding distaste.
5556 </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p7"> Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally;
5557 provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the
5558 appetite in respect of something actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed:
5559 and this may be on the part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing
5560 possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it
5561 successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with
5562 the first part of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all
5563 bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some
5564 movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses a thing
5565 which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this
5566 life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge;
5567 in which sense we may understand the words of
5568 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv"> Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that drink me shall yet thirst."
5569 </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p8"> On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more
5570 than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by
5571 reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted;
5572 as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in
5573 bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed
5574 the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest
5575 delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily
5576 powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those words of
5577 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">
5578 Ecclus. 24:29
5579 </a>: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written
5580 (
5581 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>) that they "desire to look at Him."
5582 </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p9"> Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural
5583 tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced
5584 the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure,
5585 but distaste: for instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
5586 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 co."><a name="34972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34972] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5587 dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo,
5588 secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria.
5589 Item sitis, vel desiderium, potest dupliciter accipi, uno modo,
5590 proprie, secundum quod importat appetitum rei non habitae; alio
5591 modo, communiter, secundum quod importat exclusionem fastidii.
5592 Secundum quidem igitur quod est in actu, delectatio non causat
5593 sitim vel desiderium sui ipsius, per se loquendo, sed solum per
5594 accidens, si tamen sitis vel desiderium dicatur rei non habitae
5595 appetitus, nam delectatio est affectio appetitus circa rem
5596 praesentem. Sed contingit rem praesentem non perfecte haberi. Et
5597 hoc potest esse vel ex parte rei habitae, vel ex parte habentis. Ex
5598 parte quidem rei habitae, eo quod res habita non est tota simul,
5599 unde successive recipitur, et dum aliquis delectatur in eo quod
5600 habet, desiderat potiri eo quod restat; sicut qui audit primam
5601 partem versus, et in hoc delectatur, desiderat alteram partem
5602 versus audire, ut Augustinus dicit, IV Confess. Et hoc modo omnes
5603 fere delectationes corporales faciunt sui ipsarum sitim, quousque
5604 consummentur, eo quod tales delectationes consequuntur aliquem
5605 motum, sicut patet in delectationibus ciborum. Ex parte autem
5606 ipsius habentis, sicut cum aliquis aliquam rem in se perfectam
5607 existentem, non statim perfecte habet, sed paulatim acquirit. Sicut
5608 in mundo isto, percipientes aliquid imperfecte de divina
5609 cognitione, delectamur; et ipsa delectatio excitat sitim vel
5610 desiderium perfectae cognitionis; secundum quod potest intelligi
5611 quod habetur Eccli. XXIV, <i>qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient</i>. Si
5612 vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus
5613 tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt
5614 sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum. Delectationes enim corporales,
5615 quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam
5616 naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in
5617 delectatione ciborum. Et propter hoc, quando aliquis iam pervenit
5618 ad perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus, fastidit eas, et
5619 quandoque appetit aliquas alias. Sed delectationes spirituales non
5620 superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem, sed perficiunt naturam. Unde
5621 cum pervenitur ad consummationem in ipsis, tunc sunt magis
5622 delectabiles, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum operationi
5623 contemplativae adiunguntur aliquae operationes virtutum
5624 corporalium, quae per assiduitatem operandi lassantur. Et per hunc
5625 etiam modum potest intelligi quod dicitur Eccli. XXIV <i>qui bibit
5626 me, adhuc sitiet</i>. Quia etiam de Angelis, qui perfecte Deum
5627 cognoscunt, et delectantur in ipso, dicitur I Petri I, quod
5628 <i>desiderant in eum conspicere</i>. Si vero consideretur
5629 delectatio prout est in memoria et non in actu, sic per se nata est
5630 causare sui ipsius sitim et desiderium, quando scilicet homo redit
5631 ad illam dispositionem in qua erat sibi delectabile quod
5632 praeteriit. Si vero immutatus sit ab illa dispositione, memoria
5633 delectationis non causat in eo delectationem, sed fastidium, sicut
5634 pleno existenti memoria cibi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p10">
5635 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed,
5636 ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
5637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34973] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5638 ergo dicendum quod, quando delectatio est perfecta, tunc habet
5639 omnimodam quietem, et cessat motus desiderii tendentis in non
5640 habitum. Sed quando imperfecte habetur, tunc non omnino cessat
5641 motus desiderii tendentis in non habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p11">
5642 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it
5643 may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.
5644 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34974] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5645 dicendum quod id quod imperfecte habetur, secundum quid habetur, et
5646 secundum quid non habetur. Et ideo simul de eo potest esse et
5647 desiderium et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p12">
5648 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as stated above.
5649 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34975] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5650 dicendum quod delectationes alio modo causant fastidium, et alio
5651 modo desiderium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A3-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 3. Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p2">
5652 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:
5653 wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence";
5654 and it is written (
5655 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it
5656 helps rather than hinders the use of
5657 reason.
5658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34976] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
5659 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non impediat usum rationis.
5660 Quies enim maxime confert ad debitum rationis usum, unde dicitur in
5661 VII Physic., quod in sedendo et quiescendo fit anima sciens et
5662 prudens; et Sap. VIII, <i>intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum
5663 illa</i>, scilicet sapientia. Sed delectatio est quaedam quies.
5664 Ergo non impedit, sed magis iuvat rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p3">
5665 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are not in the same subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in
5666 the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of
5667 reason.
5668 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34977] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5669 ea quae non sunt in eodem, etiam si sint contraria, non se
5670 impediunt. Sed delectatio est in parte appetitiva, usus autem
5671 rationis in parte apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio non impedit
5672 rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p4">
5673 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power
5674 moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use
5675 of reason.
5676 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34978] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5677 quod impeditur ab alio, videtur quodammodo transmutari ab ipso. Sed
5678 usus apprehensivae virtutis magis movet delectationem quam a
5679 delectatione moveatur, est enim causa delectationis. Ergo
5680 delectatio non impedit usum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p5">
5681 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence."
5682 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34979] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5683 est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectatio
5684 corrumpit existimationem prudentiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q33_A3-p6">
5685 <b>I answer that,</b> As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources
5686 are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one
5687 takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because
5688 we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters
5689 activity.
5690 </p><p id="FS_Q33_A3-p7"> On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as
5691 we have just observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is
5692 either weakened in respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily pleasure be great,
5693 either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else it hinders
5694 it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary
5695 to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but
5696 not the speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together
5697 equal to two right angles." In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason:
5698 in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in
5699 proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances
5700 hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.
5701 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 co."><a name="34980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34980] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5702 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., delectationes propriae
5703 adaugent operationes, extraneae vero impediunt. Est ergo quaedam
5704 delectatio quae habetur de ipso actu rationis, sicut cum aliquis
5705 delectatur in contemplando vel ratiocinando. Et talis delectatio
5706 non impedit usum rationis, sed ipsum adiuvat, quia illud attentius
5707 operamur in quo delectamur; attentio autem adiuvat operationem. Sed
5708 delectationes corporales impediunt usum rationis triplici ratione.
5709 Primo quidem, ratione distractionis. Quia, sicut iam dictum est, ad
5710 ea in quibus delectamur, multum attendimus, cum autem attentio
5711 fortiter inhaeserit alicui rei, debilitatur circa alias res, vel
5712 totaliter ab eis revocatur. Et secundum hoc, si delectatio
5713 corporalis fuerit magna, vel totaliter impediet usum rationis, ad
5714 se intentionem animi attrahendo; vel multum impediet. Secundo,
5715 ratione contrarietatis. Quaedam enim delectationes, maxime
5716 superexcedentes, sunt contra ordinem rationis. Et per hunc modum
5717 philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectationes corporales
5718 corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae, non autem existimationem
5719 speculativam</i>, cui non contrariantur, <i>puta quod triangulus
5720 habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis</i>. Secundum autem
5721 primum modum, utramque impedit. Tertio modo, secundum quandam
5722 ligationem, inquantum scilicet ad delectationem corporalem sequitur
5723 quaedam transmutatio corporalis, maior etiam quam in aliis
5724 passionibus, quanto vehementius afficitur appetitus ad rem
5725 praesentem quam ad rem absentem. Huiusmodi autem corporales
5726 perturbationes impediunt usum rationis, sicut patet in vinolentis,
5727 qui habent usum rationis ligatum vel impeditum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p8">
5728 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason;
5729 but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason.
5730 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34981] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5731 ergo dicendum quod delectatio corporalis habet quidem quietem
5732 appetitus in delectabili, quae quies interdum contrariatur rationi;
5733 sed ex parte corporis, semper habet transmutationem. Et quantum ad
5734 utrumque, impedit rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p9">
5735 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when
5736 the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part.
5737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34982] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5738 dicendum quod vis appetitiva et apprehensiva sunt quidem diversae
5739 partes, sed unius animae. Et ideo cum intentio animae vehementer
5740 applicatur ad actum unius, impeditur ab actu contrario
5741 alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p10">
5742 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through
5743 a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination
5744 and of the other sensitive powers.
5745 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34983] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5746 dicendum quod usus rationis requirit debitum usum imaginationis et
5747 aliarum virium sensitivarum, quae utuntur organo corporali. Et ideo
5748 ex transmutatione corporali usus rationis impeditur, impedito actu
5749 virtutis imaginativae et aliarum sensitivarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A4-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 4. Whether pleasure perfects operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p2">
5750 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure
5751 hinders the use of reason, as stated above
5752 <a href="#FS_Q33_A3" id="FS_Q33_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation.
5753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34984] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
5754 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non perficiat operationem.
5755 Omnis enim humana operatio ab usu rationis dependet. Sed delectatio
5756 impedit usum rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo delectatio non perficit,
5757 sed debilitat operationem humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p3">
5758 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its essence
5759 or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
5760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34985] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5761 nihil est perfectivum sui ipsius, vel suae causae. Sed delectatio
5762 est operatio, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., quod oportet ut
5763 intelligatur vel essentialiter, vel causaliter. Ergo delectatio non
5764 perficit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p4">
5765 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation
5766 is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above (
5767 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A2" id="FS_Q33_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the Philosopher
5768 (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure
5769 does not perfect operation.
5770 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34986] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5771 si delectatio perficit operationem, aut perficit ipsam sicut finis,
5772 aut sicut forma, aut sicut agens. Sed non sicut finis, quia
5773 operationes non quaeruntur propter delectationem, sed magis e
5774 converso, ut supra dictum est. Nec iterum per modum efficientis,
5775 quia magis operatio est causa efficiens delectationis. Nec iterum
5776 sicut forma, non enim perficit delectatio operationem ut habitus
5777 quidam, secundum philosophum, in X Ethic. Delectatio ergo non
5778 perficit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p5">
5779 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation."
5780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34987] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5781 est quod dicitur ibidem, quod delectatio operationem perficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p6">
5782 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a
5783 thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense
5784 the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it": that is to say, inasmuch
5785 as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure,
5786 denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher
5787 says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does": but it
5788 does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries
5789 it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities,
5790 and hinder those that are not appropriate."
5791 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 co."><a name="34988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34988] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5792 dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter operationem perficit. Uno modo,
5793 per modum finis, non quidem secundum quod finis dicitur id propter
5794 quod aliquid est; sed secundum quod omne bonum completive
5795 superveniens, potest dici finis. Et secundum hoc dicit philosophus,
5796 in X Ethic., quod <i>delectatio perficit operationem sicut quidam
5797 superveniens finis</i>, inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est
5798 operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat
5799 quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito. Secundo modo, ex
5800 parte causae agentis. Non quidem directe, quia philosophus dicit,
5801 in X Ethic., quod <i>perficit delectatio operationem, non sicut
5802 medicus sanum, sed sicut sanitas</i>. Indirecte autem, inquantum
5803 scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius
5804 attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur. Et secundum hoc
5805 dicitur in X Ethic., quod <i>delectationes adaugent proprias
5806 operationes, et impediunt extraneas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p7">
5807 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of reason,
5808 but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises
5809 from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.
5810 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34989] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5811 ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio impedit actum rationis, sed
5812 delectatio corporalis; quae non consequitur actum rationis, sed
5813 actum concupiscibilis, qui per delectationem augetur. Delectatio
5814 autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis
5815 usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p8">
5816 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And
5817 in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated
5818 above.
5819 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34990] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5820 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in II Physic., contingit quod duo sibi
5821 invicem sunt causa, ita quod unum sit causa efficiens, et aliud
5822 causa finalis alterius. Et per hunc modum, operatio causat
5823 delectationem sicut causa efficiens; delectatio autem perficit
5824 operationem per modum finis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34991] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5825 patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div></div>
5826 <div id="FS_Q34" class="div3">
5827 <h3 id="FS_Q34-p0.1">Q. 34. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
5828 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
5829 <p id="FS_Q34-p2"> We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q34-p3"><a href="#FS_Q34_A1"> (1) Whether every pleasure is evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p4"><a href="#FS_Q34_A2"> (2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p5"><a href="#FS_Q34_A3"> (3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p6"><a href="#FS_Q34_A4"> (4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?</a></p>
5830 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 pr."><a name="34992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34992]
5831 Iª-IIae q. 34 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
5832 bonitate et malitia delectationum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
5833 Primo, utrum omnis delectatio sit mala. Secundo, dato quod non,
5834 utrum omnis delectatio sit bona. Tertio, utrum aliqua delectatio
5835 sit optimum. Quarto, utrum delectatio sit mensura vel regula
5836 secundum quam iudicetur bonum vel malum in moralibus.</p></div></div></div>
5837 <div id="FS_Q34_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A1-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 1. Whether every pleasure is evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p2">
5838 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil
5839 in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence
5840 and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are
5841 the greatest of all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii,
5842 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of conjugal intercourse,
5843 the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty." Therefore pleasure
5844 is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil.
5845 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34993] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
5846 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit mala. Illud enim
5847 quod corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, videtur esse
5848 secundum se malum, quia bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse,
5849 ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed delectatio
5850 corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, et tanto magis,
5851 quanto delectationes sunt maiores. Unde in delectationibus
5852 venereis, quae sunt maximae, impossibile est aliquid intelligere,
5853 ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et Hieronymus etiam dicit, super Matth.,
5854 quod <i>illo tempore quo coniugales actus geruntur, praesentia
5855 sancti spiritus non dabitur, etiam si propheta esse videatur qui
5856 officio generationis obsequitur</i>. Ergo delectatio est secundum
5857 se malum. Ergo omnis delectatio mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p3">
5858 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be
5859 avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle
5860 says (
5861 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas
5862 the man who is master of himself does not. Therefore
5863 pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided.
5864 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34994] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5865 illud quod fugit virtuosus, et prosequitur deficiens a virtute,
5866 videtur esse secundum se malum, et fugiendum, quia, ut dicitur in X
5867 Ethic., <i>virtuosus est quasi mensura et regula humanorum
5868 actuum</i>; et apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. II, <i>spiritualis
5869 iudicat omnia</i>. Sed pueri et bestiae, in quibus non est virtus,
5870 prosequuntur delectationes, fugit autem eas temperatus. Ergo
5871 delectationes secundum se sunt malae, et fugiendae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p4">
5872 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure.
5873 Therefore pleasure is not something good.
5874 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34995] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a>
5875 <i>Praeterea, virtus et ars sunt circa difficile et bonum</i>, ut
5876 dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla ars ordinata est ad delectationem.
5877 Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p5">
5878 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
5879 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "Delight in the Lord." Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil.
5880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34996] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
5881 est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, <i>delectare in domino</i>. Cum
5882 igitur ad nihil mali auctoritas divina inducat, videtur quod non
5883 omnis delectatio sit mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p6">
5884 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took
5885 account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers
5886 did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they
5887 held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone
5888 to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion.
5889 Because, since none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are
5890 found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead
5891 of listening to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great weight,
5892 example moves more than words.
5893 </p><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p7"> We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power
5894 in some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for this assertion. The first
5895 is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or
5896 disagreement with reason, as stated above (
5897 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q34_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>): just as in the order of
5898 nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the
5899 natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance,
5900 when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its
5901 nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower
5902 appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant
5903 from reason and the law of God.
5904 </p><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p8"> The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined
5905 to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires
5906 of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions
5907 evil.
5908 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 co."><a name="34997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34997] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
5909 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., aliqui posuerunt omnes
5910 delectationes esse malas. Cuius ratio videtur fuisse, quia
5911 intentionem suam referebant ad solas delectationes sensibiles et
5912 corporales, quae sunt magis manifestae, nam et in ceteris
5913 intelligibilia a sensibilibus antiqui philosophi non distinguebant,
5914 nec intellectum a sensu, ut dicitur in libro de anima.
5915 Delectationes autem corporales ut dicitur in libro de anima.
5916 Delectationes autem corporales arbitrabantur dicendum omnes esse
5917 malas, ut sic homines, qui ad delectationes immoderatas sunt proni,
5918 a delectationibus se retrahentes, ad medium virtutis perveniant.
5919 Sed haec existimatio non fuit conveniens. Cum enim nullus possit
5920 vivere sine aliqua sensibili et corporali delectatione, si illi qui
5921 docent omnes delectationes esse malas, deprehendantur aliquas
5922 delectationes suscipere; magis homines ad delectationes erunt
5923 proclives exemplo operum, verborum doctrina praetermissa. In
5924 operationibus enim et passionibus humanis, in quibus experientia
5925 plurimum valet, magis movent exempla quam verba. Dicendum est ergo
5926 aliquas delectationes esse bonas, et aliquas esse malas. Est enim
5927 delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et
5928 consequens aliquam operationem. Unde huius ratio duplex accipi
5929 potest. Una quidem ex parte boni in quo aliquis quiescens
5930 delectatur. Bonum enim et malum in moralibus dicitur secundum quod
5931 convenit rationi vel discordat ab ea, ut supra dictum est, sicut in
5932 rebus naturalibus aliquid dicitur naturale ex eo quod naturae
5933 convenit, innaturale vero ex eo quod est a natura discordans. Sicut
5934 igitur in naturalibus est quaedam quies naturalis, quae scilicet
5935 est in eo quod convenit naturae, ut cum grave quiescit deorsum; et
5936 quaedam innaturalis, quae est in eo quod repugnat naturae, sicut
5937 cum grave quiescit sursum, ita et in moralibus est quaedam
5938 delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior
5939 requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod
5940 quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei. Alia ratio
5941 accipi potest ex parte operationum, quarum quaedam sunt bonae, et
5942 quaedam malae. Operationibus autem magis sunt affines
5943 delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae
5944 tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum
5945 operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae; multo magis
5946 delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero
5947 malae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p9">
5948 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy
5949 prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above
5950 (Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure
5951 morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the
5952 pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in
5953 this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken
5954 according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that
5955 although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither
5956 a
5957 mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as
5958 stated in the
5959 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q98_A2" id="FS_Q34_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[98], A[2]</a> the case was different in the state of innocence.
5960 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34998] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
5961 ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, delectationes quae sunt
5962 de actu rationis, non impediunt rationem, neque corrumpunt
5963 prudentiam; sed delectationes extraneae, cuiusmodi sunt
5964 delectationes corporales. Quae quidem rationis usum impediunt,
5965 sicut supra dictum est, et per contrarietatem appetitus, qui
5966 quiescit in eo quod repugnat rationi, et ex hoc habet delectatio
5967 quod sit moraliter mala, vel secundum quandam ligationem rationis,
5968 sicut in concubitu coniugali delectatio, quamvis sit in eo quod
5969 convenit rationi, tamen impedit rationis usum, propter corporalem
5970 transmutationem adiunctam. Sed ex hoc non consequitur malitiam
5971 moralem, sicut nec somnus quo ligatur usus rationis, moraliter est
5972 malus, si sit secundum rationem receptus, nam et ipsa ratio hoc
5973 habet, ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur. Dicimus tamen quod
5974 huiusmodi ligamentum rationis ex delectatione in actu coniugali,
5975 etsi non habeat malitiam moralem, quia non est peccatum mortale nec
5976 veniale; provenit tamen ex quadam morali malitia, scilicet ex
5977 peccato primi parentis, nam hoc in statu innocentiae non erat, ut
5978 patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p10">
5979 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children
5980 and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite,
5981 which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
5982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34999] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5983 dicendum quod temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed
5984 immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes. Quod autem pueri et
5985 bestiae delectationes prosequantur, non ostendit eas universaliter
5986 esse malas, quia in eis est naturalis appetitus a Deo, qui movetur
5987 in id quod est eis conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p11">
5988 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on (
5989 <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q57_A3" id="FS_Q34_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[3]</a>). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there
5990 is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.
5991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35000] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5992 dicendum quod non omnis boni est ars, sed exteriorum factibilium,
5993 ut infra dicetur. Circa operationes autem et passiones quae sunt in
5994 nobis, magis est prudentia et virtus quam ars. Et tamen aliqua ars
5995 est factiva delectationis; scilicet pulmentaria et pigmentaria, ut
5996 dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A2-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 2. Whether every pleasure is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p2">
5997 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in the
5998 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A6" id="FS_Q34_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[6]</a> there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner
5999 everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good.
6000 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35001] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
6001 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit bona. Sicut enim
6002 in primo dictum est, bonum in tria dividitur, scilicet honestum,
6003 utile et delectabile. Sed honestum omne est bonum; et similiter
6004 omne utile. Ergo et omnis delectatio est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p3">
6005 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But pleasure
6006 is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure
6007 is good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore
6008 every pleasure is good.
6009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35002] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6010 illud est per se bonum, quod non quaeritur propter aliud, ut
6011 dicitur in I Ethic. Sed delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud,
6012 ridiculum enim videtur ab aliquo quaerere quare vult delectari.
6013 Ergo delectatio est per se bonum. Sed quod per se praedicatur de
6014 aliquo, universaliter praedicatur de eo. Ergo omnis delectatio est
6015 bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p4">
6016 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic.
6017 i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and
6018 consequently all pleasure is good.
6019 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35003] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6020 id quod ab omnibus desideratur, videtur esse per se bonum, nam
6021 bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed omnes
6022 appetunt aliquam delectationem, etiam pueri et bestiae. Ergo
6023 delectatio est secundum se bonum. Omnis ergo delectatio est
6024 bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p5">
6025 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
6026 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>): "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things."
6027 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35004] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
6028 est quod dicitur Prov. II, <i>qui laetantur cum malefecerint, et
6029 exultant in rebus pessimis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p6">
6030 <b>I answer that,</b> While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and
6031 that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good
6032 simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that
6033 which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one
6034 way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural:
6035 thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament.
6036 In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in
6037 some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But
6038 if a man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will
6039 not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good.
6040 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 co."><a name="35005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35005] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6041 dicendum quod, sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes
6042 esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse
6043 bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. Qui ex hoc
6044 decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est
6045 bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc. Simpliciter
6046 quidem bonum est quod secundum se bonum est. Contingit autem quod
6047 non est secundum se bonum, esse huic bonum, dupliciter. Uno modo,
6048 quia est ei conveniens secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est, quae
6049 tamen non est naturalis, sicut leproso bonum est quandoque comedere
6050 aliqua venenosa, quae non sunt simpliciter convenientia complexioni
6051 humanae. Alio modo, quia id quod non est conveniens, aestimatur ut
6052 conveniens. Et quia delectatio est quies appetitus in bono, si sit
6053 bonum simpliciter illud in quo quiescit appetitus, erit simpliciter
6054 delectatio, et simpliciter bona. Si autem non sit bonum
6055 simpliciter, sed quoad hunc, tunc nec delectatio est simpliciter,
6056 sed huic, nec simpliciter est bona, sed bona secundum quid, vel
6057 apparens bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p7">
6058 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being
6059 good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason.
6060 Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason.
6061 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35006] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6062 ergo dicendum quod honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem, et
6063 ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit bonum. Delectabile
6064 autem dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit
6065 quod non est conveniens rationi. Et ideo non omne delectabile est
6066 bonum bonitate morali, quae attenditur secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p8">
6067 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may
6068 be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and
6069 so too with regard to pleasure.
6070 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35007] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6071 dicendum quod ideo delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est
6072 quies in fine. Finem autem contingit esse bonum et malum quamvis
6073 nunquam sit finis nisi secundum quod est bonum quoad hunc. Ita
6074 etiam est de delectatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p9">
6075 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just
6076 as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily
6077 good.
6078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35008] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6079 dicendum quod hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et
6080 bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut
6081 contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum;
6082 ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A3-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 3. Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p2">
6083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot
6084 be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being
6085 established in its own nature, as stated above (
6086 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q34_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good.
6087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35009] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
6088 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit optimum. Nulla
6089 enim generatio est optimum, nam generatio non potest esse ultimus
6090 finis. Sed delectatio consequitur generationem, nam ex eo quod
6091 aliquid constituitur in suam naturam, delectatur, ut supra dictum
6092 est. Ergo nulla delectatio potest esse optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p3">
6093 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since
6094 pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
6095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35010] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6096 illud quod est optimum, nullo addito potest fieri melius. Sed
6097 delectatio aliquo addito fit melior, est enim melior delectatio cum
6098 virtute quam sine virtute. Ergo delectatio non est optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p4">
6099 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself
6100 is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above
6101 <a href="#FS_Q34_A2" id="FS_Q34_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
6102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35011] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6103 id quod est optimum, est universaliter bonum, sicut per se bonum
6104 existens, nam quod est per se, est prius et potius eo quod est per
6105 accidens. Sed delectatio non est universaliter bonum, ut dictum
6106 est. Ergo delectatio non est optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p5">
6107 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written
6108 (
6109 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.15.11" target="asv">Ps. 15:11</a>): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end."
6110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35012] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
6111 beatitudo est optimum, cum sit finis humanae vitae. Sed beatitudo
6112 non est sine delectatione, dicitur enim in Psalmo XV, <i>adimplebis
6113 me laetitia cum vultu tuo; delectationes in dextera tua usque in
6114 finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A3-p6">
6115 <b>I answer that,</b> Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that
6116 all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest
6117 good. But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure
6118 consists in a certain movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating
6119 and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and movement: and from this, since "becoming" and
6120 movement are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But
6121 this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the "becoming"
6122 of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated above (
6123 <a href="#FS_Q32_A8" id="FS_Q34_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[8]</a>, ad 2); but also
6124 in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired.
6125 </p><p id="FS_Q34_A3-p7"> Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from,
6126 and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human
6127 things. Now the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above (
6128 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q34_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
6129 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q34_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing;
6130 thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to be either God
6131 Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense
6132 a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods.
6133 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 co."><a name="35013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35013] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6134 dicendum quod Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas,
6135 sicut Stoici; neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam
6136 esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas; ita tamen quod nulla sit summum
6137 bonum, vel optimum. Sed quantum ex eius rationibus datur intelligi,
6138 in duobus deficit. In uno quidem quia, cum videret delectationes
6139 sensibiles et corporales in quodam motu et generatione consistere,
6140 sicut patet in repletione ciborum et huiusmodi; aestimavit omnes
6141 delectationes consequi generationem et motum. Unde, cum generatio
6142 et motus sint actus imperfecti, sequeretur quod delectatio non
6143 haberet rationem ultimae perfectionis. Sed hoc manifeste apparet
6144 falsum in delectationibus intellectualibus. Aliquis enim non solum
6145 delectatur in generatione scientiae, puta cum addiscit aut miratur,
6146 sicut supra dictum est; sed etiam in contemplando secundum
6147 scientiam iam acquisitam. Alio vero modo, quia dicebat optimum
6148 illud quod est simpliciter summum bonum, quod scilicet est ipsum
6149 bonum quasi abstractum et non participatum, sicut ipse Deus est
6150 summum bonum. Nos autem loquimur de optimo in rebus humanis.
6151 Optimum autem in unaquaque re est ultimus finis. Finis autem, ut
6152 supra dictum est, dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res, et usus
6153 rei; sicut finis avari est vel pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae. Et
6154 secundum hoc, ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui
6155 est summum bonum simpliciter; vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat
6156 delectationem quandam in ultimo fine. Et per hunc modum aliqua
6157 delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p8">
6158 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. Accordingly
6159 nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such.
6160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35014] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6161 ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio consequitur generationem;
6162 sed aliquae delectationes consequuntur operationes perfectas, ut
6163 dictum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam delectationem esse
6164 optimum, etsi non omnis sit talis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p9">
6165 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can
6166 make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another
6167 good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies
6168 it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
6169 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35015] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6170 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de optimo simpliciter, per cuius
6171 participationem omnia sunt bona, unde ex nullius additione fit
6172 melius. Sed in aliis bonis universaliter verum est quod quodlibet
6173 bonum ex additione alterius fit melius. Quamvis posset dici quod
6174 delectatio non est aliquid extraneum ab operatione virtutis, sed
6175 concomitans ipsam, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p10">
6176 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose
6177 in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science
6178 is supremely good, but not every science is.
6179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35016] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6180 dicendum quod delectatio non habet quod sit optimum ex hoc quod est
6181 delectatio, sed ex hoc quod est perfecta quies in optimo. Unde non
6182 oportet quod omnis delectatio sit optima, aut etiam bona. Sicut
6183 aliqua scientia est optima, non tamen omnis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A4-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 4. Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p2">
6184 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is
6185 the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by
6186 love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
6187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35017] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
6188 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit mensura vel regula
6189 boni et mali moralis. <i>Omnia enim mensurantur primo sui
6190 generis</i>, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio non est
6191 primum in genere moralium, sed praecedunt ipsam amor et desiderium.
6192 Non ergo est regula bonitatis et malitiae in moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p3">
6193 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
6194 movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure
6195 is not the measure and rule of morals.
6196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35018] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6197 mensuram et regulam oportet esse uniformem, et ideo motus qui est
6198 maxime uniformis, est mensura et regula omnium motuum, ut dicitur
6199 in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio est varia et multiformis, cum quaedam
6200 earum sint bonae, et quaedam malae. Ergo delectatio non est mensura
6201 et regula moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p4">
6202 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice
6203 of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations,
6204 and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure
6205 of moral goodness and malice.
6206 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35019] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6207 certius iudicium sumitur de effectu per causam, quam e converso.
6208 Sed bonitas vel malitia operationis est causa bonitatis vel
6209 malitiae delectationis, quia bonae delectationes sunt quae
6210 consequuntur bonas operationes, malae autem quae malas, ut dicitur
6211 in X Ethic. Ergo delectationes non sunt regula et mensura bonitatis
6212 et malitiae in moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p5">
6213 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, commenting on
6214 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.10" target="asv"> Ps. 7:10 </a>"The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving."
6215 And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [*St. Thomas took "finis"
6216 as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher),
6217 "is the architect of
6218 the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."
6219 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35020] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
6220 est quod Augustinus dicit, super illud Psalmi VII, <i>scrutans
6221 corda et renes Deus, finis curae et cogitationis est delectatio ad
6222 quam quis nititur pervenire</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in VII
6223 Ethic., quod <i>delectatio est finis architecton</i>, idest
6224 principalis, <i>ad quem respicientes, unumquodque hoc quidem malum,
6225 hoc autem bonum simpliciter dicimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A4-p6">
6226 <b>I answer that,</b> Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above (
6227 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q34_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[1]</a>); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which
6228 the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned
6229 to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous,
6230 who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
6231 </p><p id="FS_Q34_A4-p7"> On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally
6232 pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in
6233 accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.
6234 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 co."><a name="35021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35021] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6235 dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in
6236 voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit
6237 bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro
6238 fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et
6239 cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum
6240 delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus
6241 vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus
6242 virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis. Delectationes autem
6243 appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis,
6244 nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum
6245 sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis
6246 secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas
6247 malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p8">
6248 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves
6249 a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
6250 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35022] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6251 ergo dicendum quod amor et desiderium sunt priora delectatione in
6252 via generationis. Sed delectatio est prior secundum rationem finis,
6253 qui in operabilibus habet rationem principii, a quo maxime sumitur
6254 iudicium, sicut a regula vel mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p9">
6255 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure
6256 can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests
6257 in evil.
6258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35023] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6259 dicendum quod omnis delectatio in hoc est uniformis, quod est quies
6260 in aliquo bono, et secundum hoc potest esse regula vel mensura. Nam
6261 ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem,
6262 cuius voluntas quiescit in malo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p10">
6263 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above (
6264 <a href="#FS_Q33_A4" id="FS_Q34_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[33], A[4]</a>); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on
6265 its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.
6266 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35024] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6267 dicendum quod, cum delectatio perficiat operationem per modum
6268 finis, ut supra dictum est; non potest esse operatio perfecte bona,
6269 nisi etiam adsit delectatio in bono, nam bonitas rei dependet ex
6270 fine. Et sic quodammodo bonitas delectationis est causa bonitas in
6271 operatione.</p></div></div></div></div>
6272 <div id="FS_Q35" class="div3">
6273 <h3 id="FS_Q35-p0.1">Q. 35. OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
6274 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
6275 <p id="FS_Q35-p2"> We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause;
6276 (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
6277 </p><p id="FS_Q35-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q35-p4"><a href="#FS_Q35_A1"> (1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p5"><a href="#FS_Q35_A2"> (2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p6"><a href="#FS_Q35_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p7"><a href="#FS_Q35_A4"> (4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p8"><a href="#FS_Q35_A5"> (5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p9"><a href="#FS_Q35_A6"> (6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p10"><a href="#FS_Q35_A7"> (7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p11"><a href="#FS_Q35_A8"> (8) Of the species of sorrow.</a></p>
6278 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 pr."><a name="35025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35025]
6279 Iª-IIae q. 35 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
6280 dolore et tristitia. Et circa hoc, primo considerandum est de
6281 tristitia, seu dolore, secundum se; secundo, de causis eius;
6282 tertio, de effectibus ipsius; quarto, de remediis eius; quinto, de
6283 bonitate vel malitia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo,
6284 utrum dolor sit passio animae. Secundo, utrum tristitia sit idem
6285 quod dolor. Tertio, utrum tristitia, seu dolor, sit contraria
6286 delectationi. Quarto, utrum omnis tristitia omni delectationi
6287 contrarietur. Quinto, utrum delectationi contemplationis sit aliqua
6288 tristitia contraria. Sexto, utrum magis fugienda sit tristitia,
6289 quam delectatio appetenda. Septimo, utrum dolor exterior sit maior
6290 quam dolor interior. Octavo, de speciebus tristitiae.</p></div></div></div>
6291 <div id="FS_Q35_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A1-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 1. Whether pain is a passion of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p2">
6292 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the
6293 body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing
6294 which the soul, by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
6295 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35026] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
6296 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non sit passio animae. Nulla
6297 enim passio animae est in corpore. Sed dolor potest esse in
6298 corpore, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod
6299 <i>dolor qui dicitur corporis, est corruptio repentina salutis eius
6300 rei, quam, male utendo, anima corruptioni obnoxiavit</i>. Ergo
6301 dolor non est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p3">
6302 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather
6303 to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful
6304 body." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
6305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35027] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6306 omnis passio animae pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Sed dolor non
6307 pertinet ad vim appetitivam, sed magis ad apprehensivam, dicit enim
6308 Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, quod <i>dolorem in corpore
6309 facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori</i>. Ergo dolor non est
6310 passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p4">
6311 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather
6312 to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel
6313 no pain in being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
6314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35028] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6315 omnis passio animae pertinet ad appetitum animalem. Sed dolor non
6316 pertinet ad appetitum animalem, sed magis ad appetitum naturalem,
6317 dicit enim Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>nisi aliquod
6318 bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi esset dolor in
6319 poena</i>. Ergo dolor non est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p5">
6320 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild
6321 desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears." [Translation: Conington.]
6322 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35029] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
6323 est quod Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit dolorem inter passiones
6324 animae, inducens illud Virgilii, <i>hinc metuunt, cupiunt,
6325 gaudentque dolentque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p6">
6326 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also
6327 two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some
6328 good), and perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard
6329 to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that
6330 something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects
6331 of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite.
6332 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p7"> Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite:
6333 since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to
6334 the apprehension of another, as stated in the
6335 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q35_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], AA[1]</a>,3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like
6336 pleasure, is in the
6337 intellective or sensitive appetite.
6338 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p8"> Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as stated above (
6339 <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q35_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,3): and especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most
6340 properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De
6341 Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment.
6342 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 co."><a name="35030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35030] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6343 dicendum quod, sicut ad delectationem duo requiruntur, scilicet
6344 coniunctio boni, et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis; ita etiam ad
6345 dolorem duo requiruntur, scilicet coniunctio alicuius mali (quod ea
6346 ratione est malum, quia privat aliquod bonum); et perceptio
6347 huiusmodi coniunctionis. Quidquid autem coniungitur, si non habeat,
6348 respectu eius cui coniungitur, rationem boni vel mali, non potest
6349 causare delectationem vel dolorem. Ex quo patet quod aliquid sub
6350 ratione boni vel mali, est obiectum delectationis et doloris. Bonum
6351 autem et malum, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt obiecta appetitus. Unde
6352 patet quod delectatio et dolor ad appetitum pertinent. Omnis autem
6353 motus appetitivus, seu inclinatio consequens apprehensionem,
6354 pertinet ad appetitum intellectivum vel sensitivum, nam inclinatio
6355 appetitus naturalis non consequitur apprehensionem ipsius
6356 appetentis, sed alterius, ut in primo dictum est. Cum igitur
6357 delectatio et dolor praesupponant in eodem subiecto sensum vel
6358 apprehensionem aliquam, manifestum est quod dolor, sicut et
6359 delectatio, est in appetitu intellectivo vel sensitivo. Omnis autem
6360 motus appetitus sensitivi dicitur passio, ut supra dictum est. Et
6361 praecipue illi qui in defectum sonant. Unde dolor, secundum quod
6362 est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae,
6363 sicut molestiae corporales proprie passiones corporis dicuntur.
6364 Unde et Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, dolorem specialiter
6365 aegritudinem nominat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p9">
6366 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the
6367 movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super
6368 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.87.4" target="asv"> Psalm 87:4</a>).
6369 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35031] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6370 ergo dicendum quod dolor dicitur esse corporis, quia causa doloris
6371 est in corpore, puta cum patimur aliquod nocivum corpori. Sed motus
6372 doloris semper est in anima, nam corpus non potest dolere nisi
6373 dolente anima, ut Augustinus dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p10">
6374 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required
6375 for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
6376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35032] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6377 dicendum quod dolor dicitur esse sensus, non quia sit actus
6378 sensitivae virtutis, sed quia requiritur ad dolorem corporalem,
6379 sicut ad delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p11">
6380 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because
6381 nature desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive
6382 appetite.
6383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35033] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6384 dicendum quod dolor de amissione boni demonstrat bonitatem naturae,
6385 non quia dolor sit actus naturalis appetitus, sed quia natura
6386 aliquid appetit ut bonum, quod cum removeri sentitur, sequitur
6387 doloris passio in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A2-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 2. Whether sorrow is the same as pain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p2">
6388 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering."
6389 But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain.
6390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35034] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
6391 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non sit dolor. Dicit enim
6392 Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>dolor in corporibus
6393 dicitur</i>. Tristitia autem dicitur magis in anima. Ergo tristitia
6394 non est dolor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p3">
6395 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow
6396 for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain.
6397 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35035] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6398 dolor non est nisi de praesenti malo. Sed tristitia potest esse de
6399 praeterito et de futuro, sicut poenitentia est tristitia de
6400 praeterito, et anxietas de futuro. Ergo tristitia omnino a dolore
6401 differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p4">
6402 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow
6403 is not pain, and extends to more objects.
6404 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35036] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6405 dolor non videtur consequi nisi sensum tactus. Sed tristitia potest
6406 consequi ex omnibus sensibus. Ergo tristitia non est dolor, sed se
6407 habet in pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p5">
6408 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
6409 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.2" target="asv">Rom. 9:2</a>): "I have great sorrow [Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart," thus denoting the same thing
6410 by sorrow and pain.
6411 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35037] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
6412 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. IX, <i>tristitia est mihi magna,
6413 et continuus dolor cordi meo</i>, pro eodem utens tristitia et
6414 dolore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p6">
6415 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the
6416 interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the
6417 exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely.
6418 Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is
6419 called joy, as stated above (
6420 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q35_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[3]</a>): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure
6421 which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior
6422 apprehension, is called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure.
6423 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 co."><a name="35038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35038] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6424 dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ex duplici apprehensione causari
6425 possunt, scilicet ex apprehensione exterioris sensus, et ex
6426 apprehensione interiori sive intellectus sive imaginationis.
6427 Interior autem apprehensio ad plura se extendit quam exterior, eo
6428 quod quaecumque cadunt sub exteriori apprehensione, cadunt sub
6429 interiori, sed non e converso. Sola igitur illa delectatio quae ex
6430 interiori apprehensione causatur, gaudium nominatur, ut supra
6431 dictum est. Et similiter ille solus dolor qui ex apprehensione
6432 interiori causatur, nominatur tristitia. Et sicut illa delectatio
6433 quae ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, delectatio quidem
6434 nominatur, non autem gaudium; ita ille dolor qui ex exteriori
6435 apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem
6436 tristitia. Sic igitur tristitia est quaedam species doloris, sicut
6437 gaudium delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p7">
6438 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which
6439 are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
6440 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35039] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6441 ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi quantum ad usum
6442 vocabuli, quia dolor magis usitatur in corporalibus doloribus, qui
6443 sunt magis noti, quam in doloribus spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p8">
6444 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future.
6445 Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense,
6446 can only regard something present.
6447 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35040] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6448 dicendum quod sensus exterior non percipit nisi praesens, vis autem
6449 cognitiva interior potest percipere praesens, praeteritum et
6450 futurum. Et ideo tristitia potest esse de praesenti, praeterito et
6451 futuro, dolor autem corporalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensus
6452 exterioris, non potest esse nisi de praesenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p9">
6453 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in
6454 so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive
6455 power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone,
6456 who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the
6457 other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch,
6458 as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far
6459 as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting
6460 bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior
6461 and
6462 exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be
6463 taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.
6464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35041] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6465 dicendum quod sensibilia tactus sunt dolorosa, non solum inquantum
6466 sunt improportionata virtuti apprehensivae, sed etiam inquantum
6467 contrariantur naturae. Aliorum vero sensuum sensibilia possunt
6468 quidem esse improportionata virtuti apprehensivae, non tamen
6469 contrariantur naturae, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus. Unde
6470 solus homo, qui est animal perfectum in cognitione, delectatur in
6471 sensibilibus aliorum sensuum secundum se ipsa, alia vero animalia
6472 non delectantur in eis nisi secundum quod referuntur ad sensibilia
6473 tactus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo de sensibilibus aliorum
6474 sensuum non dicitur esse dolor, secundum quod contrariatur
6475 delectationi naturali, sed magis tristitia, quae contrariatur
6476 gaudio animali. Sic igitur si dolor accipiatur pro corporali
6477 dolore, quod usitatius est, dolor ex opposito dividitur contra
6478 tristitiam, secundum distinctionem apprehensionis interioris et
6479 exterioris; licet, quantum ad obiecta, delectatio ad plura se
6480 extendat quam dolor corporalis. Si vero dolor accipiatur
6481 communiter, sic dolor est genus tristitiae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A3-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 3. Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p2">
6482 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow
6483 can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written (
6484 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv">Mat. 5:5</a>): "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not contrary to one another.
6485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35042] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
6486 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor delectationi non contrarietur.
6487 Unum enim contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed tristitia potest
6488 esse causa delectationis, dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>beati qui
6489 lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur</i>. Ergo non sunt
6490 contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p3">
6491 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess.
6492 iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it
6493 sometimes pleases us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure.
6494 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35043] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6495 unum contrariorum non denominat aliud. Sed in quibusdam ipse dolor
6496 vel tristitia est delectabilis, sicut Augustinus dicit, in III
6497 Confess., quod dolor in spectaculis delectat. Et IV Confess., dicit
6498 quod <i>fletus amara res est, et tamen quandoque delectat</i>. Ergo
6499 dolor non contrariatur delectationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p4">
6500 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the
6501 matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The
6502 Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore pleasure
6503 and pain are not contrary to one another.
6504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35044] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6505 unum contrariorum non est materia alterius, quia contraria simul
6506 esse non possunt. Sed dolor potest esse materia delectationis,
6507 dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de poenitentia, <i>semper poenitens
6508 doleat, et de dolore gaudeat</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in IX
6509 Ethic., quod e converso <i>malus dolet de eo quod delectatus
6510 est</i>. Ergo delectatio et dolor non sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p5">
6511 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the volition
6512 of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary
6513 to one another.
6514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35045] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
6515 est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>laetitia est
6516 voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus, tristitia autem est
6517 voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus</i>. Sed consentire et
6518 dissentire sunt contraria. Ergo laetitia et tristitia sunt
6519 contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p6">
6520 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion
6521 or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present
6522 good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another.
6523 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 co."><a name="35046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35046] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6524 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit X Metaphys., contrarietas
6525 est differentia secundum formam. Forma autem, seu species,
6526 passionis et motus sumitur ex obiecto vel termino. Unde, cum
6527 obiecta delectationis et tristitiae, seu doloris, sint contraria,
6528 scilicet bonum praesens et malum praesens, sequitur quod dolor et
6529 delectatio sint contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p7">
6530 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way, in
6531 so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something
6532 pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way,
6533 in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink
6534 from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the
6535 comfort of the future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he merits the
6536 consolation of eternity. In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain
6537 it.
6538 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35047] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6539 ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum contrariorum esse causam
6540 alterius per accidens. Sic autem tristitia potest esse causa
6541 delectationis. Uno quidem modo, inquantum tristitia de absentia
6542 alicuius rei, vel de praesentia contrarii, vehementius quaerit id
6543 in quo delectetur, sicut sitiens vehementius quaerit delectationem
6544 potus, ut remedium contra tristitiam quam patitur. Alio modo,
6545 inquantum ex magno desiderio delectationis alicuius, non recusat
6546 aliquis tristitias perferre, ut ad illam delectationem perveniat.
6547 Et utroque modo luctus praesens ad consolationem futurae vitae
6548 perducit. Quia ex hoc ipso quod homo luget pro peccatis, vel pro
6549 dilatione gloriae, meretur consolationem aeternam. Similiter etiam
6550 meretur eam aliquis ex hoc quod, ad ipsam consequendam, non refugit
6551 labores et angustias propter ipsam sustinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p8">
6552 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as
6553 it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently,
6554 since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant.
6555 And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the
6556 stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented.
6557 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35048] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6558 dicendum quod dolor ipse potest esse delectabilis per accidens,
6559 inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam admirationem, ut in spectaculis;
6560 vel inquantum facit recordationem rei amatae, et facit percipere
6561 amorem eius, de cuius absentia doletur. Unde, cum amor sit
6562 delectabilis, et dolor et omnia quae ex amore consequuntur,
6563 inquantum in eis sentitur amor, sunt delectabilia. Et propter hoc
6564 etiam dolores in spectaculis possunt esse delectabiles, inquantum
6565 in eis sentitur aliquis amor conceptus ad illos qui in spectaculis
6566 commemorantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p9">
6567 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered
6568 under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally:
6569 that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil.
6570 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35049] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6571 dicendum quod voluntas et ratio supra suos actus reflectuntur,
6572 inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione
6573 boni vel mali. Et hoc modo tristitia potest esse materia
6574 delectationis, vel e converso, non per se, sed per accidens,
6575 inquantum scilicet utrumque accipitur in ratione boni vel mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A4-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 4. Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p2">
6576 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species
6577 of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally
6578 contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.
6579 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35050] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
6580 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia omni delectationi
6581 contrarietur. Sicut enim albedo et nigredo sunt contrariae species
6582 coloris, ita delectatio et tristitia sunt contrariae species animae
6583 passionum. Sed albedo et nigredo universaliter sibi opponuntur.
6584 Ergo etiam delectatio et tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p3">
6585 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as
6586 the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow.
6587 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35051] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6588 medicinae per contraria fiunt. Sed quaelibet delectatio est
6589 medicina contra quamlibet tristitiam, ut patet per philosophum, in
6590 VII Ethic. Ergo quaelibet delectatio cuilibet tristitiae
6591 contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p4">
6592 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic.
6593 x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
6594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35052] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6595 contraria sunt quae se invicem impediunt. Sed quaelibet tristitia
6596 impedit quamlibet delectationem, ut patet per illud quod dicitur X
6597 Ethic. Ergo quaelibet tristitia cuilibet delectationi
6598 contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p5">
6599 <b>On the contrary,</b> The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the
6600 same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (
6601 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.15" target="asv">Rom. 12:15</a>). Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
6602 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35053] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
6603 contrariorum non est eadem causa. Sed ab eodem habitu procedit quod
6604 aliquis gaudeat de uno, et tristetur de opposito, <i>ex caritate
6605 enim contingit gaudere cum gaudentibus, et flere cum flentibus</i>,
6606 ut dicitur Rom. XII. Ergo non omnis tristitia omni delectationi
6607 contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p6">
6608 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently
6609 things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and
6610 injustice.
6611 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p7"> Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things
6612 are specified in relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which derive their species from their terms
6613 or objects. Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species contained under contrary
6614 genera are not contrary as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or
6615 fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary
6616 to one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other
6617 hand, in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species belonging to contrary
6618 genera, are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The
6619 reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white
6620 thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a certain
6621 likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident in the case of contradiction,
6622 which is the principle of opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g.
6623 "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the
6624 other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white."
6625 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p8"> Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary
6626 to one another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation
6627 and denial are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically
6628 contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary
6629 but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of
6630 a friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and
6631 sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice
6632 in good and to sorrow for evil.
6633 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 co."><a name="35054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35054] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6634 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Metaphys., contrarietas est
6635 differentia secundum formam. Forma autem est et generalis, et
6636 specialis. Unde contingit esse aliqua contraria secundum formam
6637 generis, sicut virtus et vitium; et secundum formam speciei, sicut
6638 iustitia et iniustitia. Est autem considerandum quod quaedam
6639 specificantur secundum formas absolutas, sicut substantiae et
6640 qualitates, quaedam vero specificantur per comparationem ad aliquid
6641 extra, sicut passiones et motus recipiunt speciem ex terminis sive
6642 ex obiectis. In his ergo quorum species considerantur secundum
6643 formas absolutas, contingit quidem species quae continentur sub
6644 contrariis generibus, non esse contrarias secundum rationem
6645 speciei, non tamen contingit quod habeant aliquam affinitatem vel
6646 convenientiam ad invicem. Intemperantia enim et iustitia, quae sunt
6647 in contrariis generibus, virtute scilicet et vitio, non
6648 contrariantur ad invicem secundum rationem propriae speciei, nec
6649 tamen habent aliquam affinitatem vel convenientiam ad invicem. Sed
6650 in illis quorum species sumuntur secundum habitudinem ad aliquid
6651 extrinsecum, contingit quod species contrariorum generum non solum
6652 non sunt contrariae ad invicem, sed etiam habent quandam
6653 convenientiam et affinitatem ad invicem, eo quod eodem modo se
6654 habere ad contraria, contrarietatem inducit, sicut accedere ad
6655 album et accedere ad nigrum habent rationem contrarietatis; sed
6656 contrario modo se habere ad contraria, habet rationem
6657 similitudinis, sicut recedere ab albo et accedere ad nigrum. Et hoc
6658 maxime apparet in contradictione, quae est principium oppositionis,
6659 nam in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio, sicut
6660 album et non album; in affirmatione autem unius oppositorum et
6661 negatione alterius, attenditur convenientia et similitudo, ut si
6662 dicam nigrum et non album. Tristitia autem et delectatio, cum sint
6663 passiones, specificantur ex obiectis. Et quidem secundum genus
6664 suum, contrarietatem habent, nam unum pertinet ad prosecutionem,
6665 aliud vero ad fugam, <i>quae se habent in appetitu sicut affirmatio
6666 et negatio in ratione</i>, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et ideo tristia
6667 et delectatio quae sunt de eodem, habent oppositionem ad invicem
6668 secundum speciem. Tristitia vero et delectatio de diversis, si
6669 quidem illa diversa non sint opposita, sed disparata, non habent
6670 oppositionem ad invicem secundum rationem speciei, sed sunt etiam
6671 disparatae, sicut tristari de morte amici, et delectari in
6672 contemplatione. Si vero illa diversa sint contraria, tunc
6673 delectatio et tristitia non solum non habent contrarietatem
6674 secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam habent convenientiam et
6675 affinitatem, sicut gaudere de bono, et tristari de malo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p9">
6676 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow
6677 do: wherefore the comparison does not hold.
6678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35055] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6679 ergo dicendum quod albedo et nigredo non habent speciem ex
6680 habitudine ad aliquid exterius, sicut delectatio et tristitia. Unde
6681 non est eadem ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p10">
6682 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now
6683 it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the
6684 subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is
6685 viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And
6686 therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of
6687 all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.
6688 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35056] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6689 dicendum quod genus sumitur ex materia, ut patet in VIII Metaphys.
6690 In accidentibus autem loco materiae est subiectum. Dictum est autem
6691 quod delectatio et tristitia contrariantur secundum genus. Et ideo
6692 in qualibet tristitia est contraria dispositio subiecti
6693 dispositioni quae est in qualibet delectatione, nam in qualibet
6694 delectatione appetitus se habet ut acceptans id quod habet; in
6695 qualibet autem tristitia se habet ut fugiens. Et ideo ex parte
6696 subiecti quaelibet delectatio est medicina contra quamlibet
6697 tristitiam, et quaelibet tristitia est impeditiva cuiuslibet
6698 delectationis, praecipue tamen quando delectatio tristitiae
6699 contrariatur etiam secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary
6700 to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening
6701 the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
6702 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35057] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet
6703 solutio ad tertium. Vel aliter dicendum quod, etsi non omnis
6704 tristitia contrarietur omni delectationi secundum speciem, tamen
6705 quantum ad effectum contrariantur, nam ex uno confortatur natura
6706 animalis, ex alio vero quodammodo molestatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A5-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 5. Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p2">
6707 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (
6708 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>): "The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher
6709 reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow
6710 contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
6711 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35058] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
6712 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi contemplationis sit
6713 aliqua tristitia contraria. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII,
6714 <i>quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem
6715 stabilem operatur</i>. Sed respicere ad Deum pertinet ad superiorem
6716 rationem, cuius est contemplationi vacare, secundum Augustinum, in
6717 XII de Trin. Ergo delectationi contemplationis opponitur
6718 tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p3">
6719 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other
6720 contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
6721 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35059] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6722 contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Si ergo unum contrariorum
6723 contemplatum est causa delectationis, aliud erit causa tristitiae.
6724 Et sic delectationi contemplationis erit tristitia contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p4">
6725 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the
6726 Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the
6727 pleasure of contemplation.
6728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35060] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6729 sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum, ita obiectum tristitiae est
6730 malum. Sed contemplatio potest habere mali rationem, dicit enim
6731 philosophus, in XII Metaphys., quod quaedam inconveniens est
6732 meditari. Ergo contemplationis delectationi potest esse contraria
6733 tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p5">
6734 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the
6735 work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore
6736 in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.
6737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="35061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35061] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
6738 operatio quaelibet, secundum quod non est impedita, est causa
6739 delectationis, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic. Sed operatio
6740 contemplationis potest multipliciter impediri, vel ut totaliter non
6741 sit, vel ut cum difficultate sit. Ergo in contemplatione potest
6742 esse tristitia delectationi contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p6">
6743 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it is written (
6744 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.12.12" target="asv">Eccles. 12:12</a>) "much study is an affliction of the flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure.
6745 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="35062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35062] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
6746 carnis afflictio est causa tristitiae. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle.
6747 ult., <i>frequens meditatio carnis est afflictio</i>. Ergo
6748 contemplatio habet tristitiam delectationi contrariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p7">
6749 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
6750 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness." Now the
6751 conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
6752 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35063] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
6753 est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, <i>non habet amaritudinem conversatio
6754 illius</i> scilicet sapientiae, <i>nec taedium convictus eius; sed
6755 laetitiam et gaudium</i>. Conversatio autem et convictus sapientiae
6756 est per contemplationem. Ergo nulla tristitia est quae sit
6757 contraria delectationi contemplationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p8">
6758 <b>I answer that,</b> The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the
6759 object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate
6760 something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation
6761 be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the
6762 pleasure of contemplation.
6763 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p9"> In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes
6764 pleasure in the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow
6765 is contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3).
6766 This, however, is to be understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of
6767 itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is
6768 no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the
6769 means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
6770 Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a
6771 man
6772 takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking
6773 ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that
6774 contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated above (
6775 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q35_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>).
6776 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p10"> Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of
6777 an organ, secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension,
6778 directly, as regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ; either from the sensible object
6779 disagreeing with the normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and the smell
6780 of something foul; or from the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it
6781 exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above (
6782 <a href="#FS_Q33_A2" id="FS_Q35_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[33], A[2]</a>), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly
6783 in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above
6784 that intellectual
6785 contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of
6786 the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly
6787 mingled with contemplation.
6788 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p11"> Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure
6789 thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but rather
6790 is in affinity and in harmony with it, as is evident from what has been said above
6791 <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q35_A5-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate.
6792 Accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any sorrow
6793 connected with it save accidentally.
6794 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 co."><a name="35064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35064] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6795 dicendum quod delectatio contemplationis potest intelligi
6796 dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod contemplatio sit delectationis
6797 causa, et non obiectum. Et tunc delectatio non est de ipsa
6798 contemplatione, sed de re contemplata. Contingit autem contemplari
6799 aliquid nocivum et contristans, sicut et aliquid conveniens et
6800 delectans. Unde si sic delectatio contemplationis accipiatur, nihil
6801 prohibet delectationi contemplationis esse tristitiam contrariam.
6802 Alio modo potest dici delectatio contemplationis, quia contemplatio
6803 est eius obiectum et causa, puta cum aliquis delectatur de hoc ipso
6804 quod contemplatur. Et sic, ut dicit Gregorius Nyssenus, <i>ei
6805 delectationi quae est secundum contemplationem, non opponitur
6806 aliqua tristitia</i>. Et hoc idem philosophus dicit, in I Topic. et
6807 in X Ethic. Sed hoc est intelligendum, per se loquendo. Cuius ratio
6808 est, quia tristitia per se contrariatur delectationi quae est de
6809 contrario obiecto, sicut delectationi quae est de calore,
6810 contrariatur tristitia quae est de frigore. Obiecto autem
6811 contemplationis nihil est contrarium, contrariorum enim rationes,
6812 secundum quod sunt apprehensae, non sunt contrariae, sed unum
6813 contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud. Unde delectationi quae est
6814 in contemplando, non potest, per se loquendo, esse aliqua tristitia
6815 contraria. Sed nec etiam habet tristitiam annexam, sicut corporales
6816 delectationes, quae sunt ut medicinae quaedam contra aliquas
6817 molestias, sicut aliquis delectatur in potu ex hoc quod anxiatur
6818 siti, quando autem iam tota sitis est repulsa, etiam cessat
6819 delectatio potus. Delectatio enim contemplationis non causatur ex
6820 hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum
6821 seipsam delectabilis, non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam
6822 perfecta, ut dictum est. Per accidens autem admiscetur tristitia
6823 delectationi apprehensionis. Et hoc dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte
6824 organi; alio modo, ex impedimento apprehensionis. Ex parte quidem
6825 organi, admiscetur tristitia vel dolor apprehensioni, directe
6826 quidem in viribus apprehensivis sensitivae partis, quae habent
6827 organum corporale, vel ex sensibili, quod est contrarium debitae
6828 complexioni organi, sicut gustus rei amarae et olfactus rei
6829 foetidae; vel ex continuitate sensibilis convenientis, quod per
6830 assiduitatem facit superexcrescentiam naturalis habitus, ut supra
6831 dictum est, et sic redditur apprehensio sensibilis quae prius erat
6832 delectabilis, taediosa. Sed haec duo directe in contemplatione
6833 mentis locum non habent, quia mens non habet organum corporale.
6834 Unde dictum est in auctoritate inducta, quod non habet contemplatio
6835 mentis nec amaritudinem nec taedium. Sed quia mens humana utitur in
6836 contemplando viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, in quarum actibus
6837 accidit lassitudo; ideo indirecte admiscetur aliqua afflictio vel
6838 dolor contemplationi. Sed neutro modo tristitia contemplationi per
6839 accidens adiuncta, contrariatur delectationi eius. Nam tristitia
6840 quae est de impedimento contemplationis, non contrariatur
6841 delectationi contemplationis, sed magis habet affinitatem et
6842 convenientiam cum ipsa, ut ex supradictis patet. Tristitia vero vel
6843 afflictio quae est de lassitudine corporali, non ad idem genus
6844 refertur, unde est penitus disparata. Et sic manifestum est quod
6845 delectationi quae est de ipsa contemplatione, nulla tristitia
6846 contrariatur; nec adiungitur ei aliqua tristitia nisi per
6847 accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p12">
6848 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which
6849 the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to the love of God.
6850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35065] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6851 ergo dicendum quod illa tristitia quae est secundum Deum, non est
6852 de ipsa contemplatione mentis, sed est de aliquo quod mens
6853 contemplatur, scilicet de peccato, quod mens considerat ut
6854 contrarium dilectioni divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p13">
6855 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are contrary
6856 in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence
6857 one and the same science considers contraries.
6858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35066] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6859 dicendum quod ea quae sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod
6860 sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim rationes
6861 contrariorum sunt contrariae, sed magis unum contrarium est ratio
6862 cognoscendi aliud. Propter quod est una scientia contrariorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p14">
6863 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the
6864 intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation
6865 of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached.
6866 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35067] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6867 dicendum quod contemplatio, secundum se, nunquam habet rationem
6868 mali, cum contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri, quod
6869 est bonum intellectus, sed per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet
6870 contemplatio vilioris impedit contemplationem melioris; vel ex
6871 parte rei contemplatae, ad quam inordinatae appetitus
6872 afficitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p15">
6873 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it,
6874 as stated above.
6875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="35068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35068] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
6876 dicendum quod tristitia quae est de impedimento contemplationis,
6877 non contrariatur delectationi contemplationis, sed est ei affinis,
6878 ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p16">
6879 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
6880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="35069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35069] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
6881 dicendum quod afflictio carnis per accidens et indirecte se habet
6882 ad contemplationem mentis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A6-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 6. Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p2">
6883 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There
6884 is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural.
6885 Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought.
6886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35070] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
6887 sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis sit fugienda tristitia, quam
6888 delectatio appetenda. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta
6889 trium quaest., <i>nemo est qui non magis dolorem fugiat, quam
6890 appetat voluptatem</i>. Illud autem in quo communiter omnia
6891 consentiunt, videtur esse naturale. Ergo naturale est et conveniens
6892 quod plus tristitia fugiatur, quam delectatio appetatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p3">
6893 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder,"
6894 as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas
6895 the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore
6896 sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought.
6897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35071] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6898 actio contrarii facit ad velocitatem et intensionem motus, aqua
6899 enim calida citius et fortius congelatur, ut dicit philosophus, in
6900 libro Meteor. Sed fuga tristitiae est ex contrarietate
6901 contristantis, appetitus autem delectationis non est ex aliqua
6902 contrarietate, sed magis procedit ex convenientia delectantis. Ergo
6903 maior est fuga tristitiae quam appetitus delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p4">
6904 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more
6905 virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement
6906 of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher
6907 says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised." Therefore
6908 the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure.
6909 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35072] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6910 quanto aliquis secundum rationem fortiori passioni repugnat, tanto
6911 laudabilior est et virtuosior, quia virtus est circa difficile et
6912 bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed fortis, qui resistit motui quo
6913 fugitur dolor, est virtuosior quam temperatus, qui resistit motui
6914 quo appetitur delectatio, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric.,
6915 quod fortes et iusti maxime honorantur. Ergo vehementior est motus
6916 quo fugitur tristitia, quam motus quo appetitur delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p5">
6917 <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which
6918 is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than
6919 the shunning of sorrow.
6920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35073] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
6921 bonum est fortius quam malum, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de
6922 Div. Nom. Sed delectatio est appetibilis propter bonum, quod est
6923 eius obiectum, fuga autem tristitiae est propter malum. Ergo
6924 fortior est appetitus delectationis quam fuga tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A6-p6">
6925 <b>I answer that,</b> The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure
6926 is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable
6927 without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way.
6928 Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore
6929 desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object
6930 of pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation
6931 of good: and that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find
6932 a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing
6933 approaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its
6934 nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore
6935 the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.
6936 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A6-p7"> But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First,
6937 on the part of the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is felt more keenly, when we lack that
6938 which we love." Now from the lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved good,
6939 or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in
6940 possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned, according as love is
6941 the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which
6942 cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being
6943 of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from fear
6944 of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part
6945 of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but all.
6946 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 co."><a name="35074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35074] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
6947 dicendum quod, per se loquendo, appetitus delectationis est fortior
6948 quam fuga tristitiae. Cuius ratio est, quia causa delectationis est
6949 bonum conveniens, causa autem doloris sive tristitiae est aliquod
6950 malum repugnans. Contingit autem aliquod bonum esse conveniens
6951 absque omni dissonantia, non autem potest esse aliquod malum
6952 totaliter, absque omni convenientia, repugnans. Unde delectatio
6953 potest esse integra et perfecta, tristitia autem est semper
6954 secundum partem. Unde naturaliter maior est appetitus delectationis
6955 quam fuga tristitiae. Alia vero ratio est, quia bonum, quod est
6956 obiectum delectationis, propter seipsum appetitur, malum autem,
6957 quod est obiectum tristitiae, est fugiendum inquantum est privatio
6958 boni. Quod autem est per se, potius est illo quod est per aliud.
6959 Cuius etiam signum apparet in motibus naturalibus. Nam omnis motus
6960 naturalis intensior est in fine, cum appropinquat ad terminum suae
6961 naturae convenientem, quam in principio, cum recedit a termino suae
6962 naturae non convenienti, quasi natura magis tendat in id quod est
6963 sibi conveniens, quam fugiat id quod est sibi repugnans. Unde et
6964 inclinatio appetitivae virtutis, per se loquendo, vehementius
6965 tendit in delectationem quam fugiat tristitiam. Sed per accidens
6966 contingit quod tristitiam aliquis magis fugit, quam delectationem
6967 appetat. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte apprehensionis.
6968 Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>amor magis sentitur, cum
6969 eum prodit indigentia</i>. Ex indigentia autem amati procedit
6970 tristitia, quae est ex amissione alicuius boni amati, vel ex
6971 incursu alicuius mali contrarii. Delectatio autem non habet
6972 indigentiam boni amati, sed quiescit in eo iam adepto. Cum igitur
6973 amor sit causa delectationis et tristitiae, tanto magis fugitur
6974 tristitia, quanto magis sentitur amor ex eo quod contrariatur
6975 amori. Secundo, ex parte causae contristantis, vel dolorem
6976 inferentis, quae repugnat bono magis amato quam sit bonum illud in
6977 quo delectamur. Magis enim amamus consistentiam corporis naturalem,
6978 quam delectationem cibi. Et ideo timore doloris qui provenit ex
6979 flagellis vel aliis huiusmodi, quae contrariantur bonae
6980 consistentiae corporis, dimittimus delectationem ciborum vel
6981 aliorum huiusmodi. Tertio, ex parte effectus, inquantum scilicet
6982 tristitia impedit non unam tantum delectationem, sed omnes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p8">
6983 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And this
6984 is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear
6985 of pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.
6986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35075] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
6987 ergo dicendum quod illud quod Augustinus dicit, quod <i>dolor magis
6988 fugitur quam voluptas appetatur</i>, est verum per accidens, et non
6989 per se. Et hoc patet ex eo quod subdit, <i>quandoquidem videmus
6990 etiam immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri
6991 dolorum metu</i>, qui contrariatur vitae, quae maxime amatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p9">
6992 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the same with movement from within and movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable
6993 more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from
6994 without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it,
6995 as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and
6996 slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object.
6997 Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty
6998 is from without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And
6999 then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure
7000 is sought.
7001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35076] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7002 dicendum quod aliter est in motu qui est ab interiori, et aliter in
7003 motu qui est ab exteriori. Motus enim qui est ab interiori, magis
7004 tendit in id quod est conveniens, quam recedat a contrario, sicut
7005 supra dictum est de motu naturali. Sed motus qui est ab extrinseco,
7006 intenditur ex ipsa contrarietate, quia unumquodque suo modo nititur
7007 ad resistendum contrario, sicut ad conservationem sui ipsius. Unde
7008 motus violentus intenditur in principio, et remittitur in fine.
7009 Motus autem appetitivae partis est ab intrinseco, cum sit ab anima
7010 ad res. Et ideo, per se loquendo, magis appetitur delectatio quam
7011 fugiatur tristitia. Sed motus sensitivae partis est ab exteriori,
7012 quasi a rebus ad animam. Unde magis sentitur quod est magis
7013 contrarium. Et sic etiam per accidens, inquantum sensus requiritur
7014 ad delectationem et tristitiam, magis fugitur tristitia quam
7015 delectatio appetatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p10">
7016 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever,
7017 but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned,
7018 than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus
7019 life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised
7020 for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic.
7021 iii, 11.
7022 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35077] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7023 dicendum quod fortis non laudatur ex eo quod secundum rationem non
7024 vincitur a dolore vel tristitia quacumque, sed ea quae consistit in
7025 periculis mortis. Quae quidem tristitia magis fugitur quam
7026 appetatur delectatio ciborum vel venereorum, circa quam est
7027 temperantia, sicut vita magis amatur quam cibus vel coitus. Sed
7028 temperatus magis laudatur ex hoc quod non prosequitur delectationes
7029 tactus, quam ex hoc quod non fugit tristitias contrarias, ut patet
7030 in III Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A7-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 7. Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p2">
7031 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant
7032 to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since,
7033 therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been said above
7034 <a href="#FS_Q35_A6" id="FS_Q35_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, outward pain is greater than interior sorrow.
7035 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35078] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
7036 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor exterior sit maior quam dolor
7037 cordis interior. Dolor enim exterior causatur ex causa repugnante
7038 bonae consistentiae corporis, in quo est vita, dolor autem interior
7039 causatur ex aliqua imaginatione mali. Cum ergo vita magis ametur
7040 quam imaginatum bonum, videtur, secundum praedicta, quod dolor
7041 exterior sit maior quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p3">
7042 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary;
7043 whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
7044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35079] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7045 res magis movet quam rei similitudo. Sed dolor exterior provenit ex
7046 reali coniunctione alicuius contrarii, dolor autem interior ex
7047 similitudine contrarii apprehensa. Ergo maior est dolor exterior
7048 quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p4">
7049 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain
7050 than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow.
7051 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35080] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7052 causa ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed dolor exterior habet fortiores
7053 effectus, facilius enim homo moritur propter dolores exteriores
7054 quam propter dolorem interiorem. Ergo exterior dolor est maior, et
7055 magis fugitur, quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p5">
7056 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (
7057 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.17" target="asv">Ecclus. 25:17</a>): "The sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman is all evil." Therefore, just
7058 as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses every
7059 outward wound.
7060 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35081] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7061 est quod dicitur Eccli. XXV, <i>omnis plaga tristitia cordis est,
7062 et omnis malitia nequitia mulieris</i>. Ergo, sicut nequitia
7063 mulieris alias nequitias superat, ut ibi intenditur; ita tristitia
7064 cordis omnem plagam exteriorem excedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A7-p6">
7065 <b>I answer that,</b> Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive
7066 power, as stated above
7067 <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q35_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the cause,
7068 which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant
7069 to the body; while the
7070 cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense,
7071 chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.
7072 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A7-p7"> If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite
7073 to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly. Because inward pain arises from something
7074 being repugnant to the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite, through
7075 being repugnant to the body. Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another.
7076 Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because
7077 the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently
7078 inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward
7079 pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in
7080 a
7081 manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then
7082 the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever
7083 is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended
7084 by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the
7085 heart is every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart.
7086 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 co."><a name="35082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35082] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7087 dicendum quod dolor interior et exterior in uno conveniunt, et in
7088 duobus differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod uterque est motus
7089 appetitivae virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Differunt autem secundum
7090 illa duo quae ad tristitiam et delectationem requiruntur, scilicet
7091 secundum causam, quae est bonum vel malum coniunctum; et secundum
7092 apprehensionem. Causa enim doloris exterioris est malum coniunctum
7093 quod repugnat corpori, causa autem interioris doloris est malum
7094 coniunctum quod repugnat appetitui. Dolor etiam exterior sequitur
7095 apprehensionem sensus, et specialiter tactus, dolor autem interior
7096 sequitur apprehensionem interiorem, imaginationis scilicet vel
7097 etiam rationis. Si ergo comparatur causa interioris doloris ad
7098 causam exterioris, una per se pertinet ad appetitum, cuius est
7099 uterque dolor, alia vero per aliud. Nam dolor interior est ex hoc
7100 quod aliquid repugnat ipsi appetitui, exterior autem dolor, ex hoc
7101 quod repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem quod
7102 est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud. Unde ex parte ista,
7103 dolor interior praeeminet dolori exteriori. Similiter etiam ex
7104 parte apprehensionis. Nam apprehensio rationis et imaginationis
7105 altior est quam apprehensio sensu tactus. Unde simpliciter et per
7106 se loquendo, dolor interior potior est quam dolor exterior. Cuius
7107 signum est, quod etiam dolores exteriores aliquis voluntarie
7108 suscipit, ut evitet interiorem dolorem. Et inquantum non repugnat
7109 dolor exterior interiori appetitui, fit quodammodo delectabilis et
7110 iucundus interiori gaudio. Quandoque tamen dolor exterior est cum
7111 interiori dolore, et tunc dolor augetur. Non solum enim interior
7112 dolor est maior quam exterior, sed etiam universalior. Quidquid
7113 enim est repugnans corpori, potest esse repugnans interiori
7114 appetitui; et quidquid apprehenditur sensu, potest apprehendi
7115 imaginatione et ratione; sed non convertitur. Et ideo signanter in
7116 auctoritate adducta dicitur, omnis plaga tristitia cordis est, quia
7117 etiam dolores exteriorum plagarum sub interiori cordis tristitia
7118 comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p8">
7119 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must
7120 not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain
7121 is compared to the appetite.
7122 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="35083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35083] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
7123 ergo dicendum quod dolor interior potest etiam esse de his quae
7124 contrariantur vitae. Et sic comparatio doloris interioris ad
7125 exteriorem non est accipienda secundum diversa mala quae sunt causa
7126 doloris, sed secundum diversam comparationem huius causae doloris
7127 ad appetitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p9">
7128 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness
7129 itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its
7130 likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused
7131 by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward
7132 apprehension.
7133 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="35084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35084] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7134 dicendum quod tristitia interior non procedit ex similitudine rei
7135 apprehensa, sicut ex causa, non enim homo tristatur interius de
7136 ipsa similitudine apprehensa, sed de re cuius est similitudo. Quae
7137 quidem res tanto perfectius apprehenditur per aliquam
7138 similitudinem, quanto similitudo est magis immaterialis et
7139 abstracta. Et ideo dolor interior, per se loquendo, est maior,
7140 tanquam de maiori malo existens; propter hoc quod interiori
7141 apprehensione magis cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10">
7142 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive
7143 conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more
7144 material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective. For this reason, as
7145 stated above (
7146 <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>;
7147 <a href="#FS_Q31_A5" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[31],
7148 A[5]
7149 </a> ), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than
7150 from inward pain.
7151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="35085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35085] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7152 dicendum quod immutationes corporales magis causantur ex dolore
7153 exteriori, tum quia causa doloris exterioris est corrumpens
7154 coniunctum corporaliter, quod exigit apprehensio tactus. Tum etiam
7155 quia sensus exterior est magis corporalis quam sensus interior,
7156 sicut et appetitus sensitivus quam intellectivus. Et propter hoc,
7157 ut supra dictum est, ex motu appetitus sensitivi magis corpus
7158 immutatur. Et similiter ex dolore exteriori, magis quam ex dolore
7159 interiori.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A8-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 8. Whether there are only four species of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p2">
7160 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor,
7161 distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls "anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary
7162 to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.
7163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35086] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
7164 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter quatuor
7165 tristitiae species assignet, quae sunt acedia, achthos (vel
7166 anxietas secundum Gregorium Nyssenum), misericordia et invidia.
7167 Tristitia enim delectationi opponitur. Sed delectationis non
7168 assignantur aliquae species. Ergo nec tristitiae species debent
7169 assignari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p3">
7170 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are "indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
7171 9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient.
7172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35087] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7173 poenitentia est quaedam species tristitiae. Similiter etiam Nemesis
7174 et zelus, ut dicit philosophus, II Rhetoric. Quae quidem sub his
7175 speciebus non comprehenduntur. Ergo insufficiens est eius praedicta
7176 divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p4">
7177 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to
7178 one another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] "torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the
7179 sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs." But it is possible for one
7180 to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed
7181 down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is correct.
7182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35088] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7183 omnis divisio debet esse per opposita. Sed praedicta non habent
7184 oppositionem ad invicem. Nam secundum Gregorium <i>acedia est
7185 tristitia vocem amputans; anxietas vero est tristitia aggravans;
7186 invidia vero est tristitia in alienis bonis; misericordia autem est
7187 tristitia in alienis malis</i>. Contingit autem aliquem tristari et
7188 de alienis malis, et de alienis bonis et simul cum hoc interius
7189 aggravari, et exterius vocem amittere. Ergo praedicta divisio non
7190 est conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p5">
7191 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] and of Damascene.
7192 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35089] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7193 est auctoritas utriusque, scilicet Gregorii Nysseni et
7194 Damasceni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A8-p6">
7195 <b>I answer that,</b> It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two
7196 ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal."
7197 Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing
7198 may be added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that
7199 genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the
7200 genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a species
7201 of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable:
7202 thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a
7203 foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles
7204 of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
7205 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A8-p7"> In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow
7206 to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect. For
7207 the proper object of sorrow is "one's own evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through
7208 one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil,
7209 considered, however, as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's
7210 good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have "envy." The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain "flight
7211 of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only,
7212 by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence
7213 it is also called "perplexity." If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which
7214 belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in
7215 the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements
7216 the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated
7217 in
7218 Polit. i, 1.
7219 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 co."><a name="35090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35090] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7220 dicendum quod ad rationem speciei pertinet quod se habeat ex
7221 additione ad genus. Sed generi potest aliquid addi dupliciter. Uno
7222 modo, quod per se ad ipsum pertinet, et virtute continetur in ipso,
7223 sicut rationale additur animali. Et talis additio facit veras
7224 species alicuius generis, ut per philosophum patet, in VII et VIII
7225 Metaphys. Aliquid vero additur generi quasi aliquid extraneum a
7226 ratione ipsius, sicut si album animali addatur, vel aliquid
7227 huiusmodi. Et talis additio non facit veras species generis,
7228 secundum quod communiter loquimur de genere et speciebus. Interdum
7229 tamen dicitur aliquid esse species alicuius generis propter hoc
7230 quod habet aliquid extraneum ad quod applicatur generis ratio,
7231 sicut carbo et flamma dicuntur esse species ignis, propter
7232 applicationem naturae ignis ad materiam alienam. Et simili modo
7233 loquendi dicuntur astrologia et perspectiva species mathematicae,
7234 inquantum principia mathematica applicantur ad materiam naturalem.
7235 Et hoc modo loquendi assignantur hic species tristitiae, per
7236 applicationem rationis tristitiae ad aliquid extraneum. Quod quidem
7237 extraneum accipi potest vel ex parte causae, obiecti; vel ex parte
7238 effectus. Proprium enim obiectum tristitiae est proprium malum.
7239 Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum
7240 alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic
7241 est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum
7242 tamen aestimatur ut proprium. Vel quantum ad utrumque, quia neque
7243 est de proprio, neque de malo, sed de bono alieno, inquantum tamen
7244 bonum alienum aestimatur ut proprium malum, et sic est invidia.
7245 Proprius autem effectus tristitiae consistit in quadam fuga
7246 appetitus. Unde extraneum circa effectum tristitiae, potest accipi
7247 quantum ad alterum tantum, quia scilicet tollitur fuga, et sic est
7248 anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod
7249 refugium, unde alio nomine dicitur angustia. Si vero intantum
7250 procedat talis aggravatio, ut etiam exteriora membra immobilitet ab
7251 opere, quod pertinet ad acediam; sic erit extraneum quantum ad
7252 utrumque, quia nec est fuga, nec est in appetitu. Ideo autem
7253 specialiter acedia dicitur vocem amputare, quia vox inter omnes
7254 exteriores motus magis exprimit interiorem conceptum et affectum,
7255 non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in aliis animalibus, ut dicitur
7256 in I Polit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p8">
7257 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is;
7258 for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
7259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35091] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
7260 ergo dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex bono, quod uno modo
7261 dicitur. Et ideo delectationis non assignantur tot species sicut
7262 tristitiae, quae causatur ex malo, quod multifariam contingit, ut
7263 dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p9">
7264 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. Jealousy
7265 and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later (
7266 <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q35_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[36], A[2]</a>).
7267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35092] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7268 dicendum quod poenitentia est de malo proprio, quod per se est
7269 obiectum tristitiae. Unde non pertinet ad has species. Zelus vero
7270 et Nemesis sub invidia continentur, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p10">
7271 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This division is not according to opposite species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion
7272 of sorrow is applied, as stated above.
7273 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35093] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7274 dicendum quod divisio ista non sumitur secundum oppositiones
7275 specierum, sed secundum diversitatem extraneorum ad quae trahitur
7276 ratio tristitiae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
7277 <div id="FS_Q36" class="div3">
7278 <h3 id="FS_Q36-p0.1">Q. 36. OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
7279 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
7280 <p id="FS_Q36-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q36-p3"><a href="#FS_Q36_A1"> (1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p4"><a href="#FS_Q36_A2"> (2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p5"><a href="#FS_Q36_A3"> (3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p6"><a href="#FS_Q36_A4"> (4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?</a></p>
7281 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 pr."><a name="35094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35094]
7282 Iª-IIae q. 36 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
7283 causis tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
7284 causa doloris sit bonum amissum, vel magis malum coniunctum.
7285 Secundo, utrum concupiscentia sit causa doloris. Tertio, utrum
7286 appetitus unitatis sit causa doloris. Quarto, utrum potestas cui
7287 resisti non potest, sit causa doloris.</p></div></div></div>
7288 <div id="FS_Q36_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A1-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 1. Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p2">
7289 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De
7290 viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused
7291 by the loss of some good.
7292 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35095] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
7293 sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum amissum sit magis causa doloris
7294 quam malum coniunctum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de octo
7295 quaestionibus Dulcitii, dolorem esse de amissione bonorum
7296 temporalium. Eadem ergo ratione, quilibet dolor ex amissione
7297 alicuius boni contingit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3">
7298 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it was said above (
7299 <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a>) that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good,
7300 as stated above (
7301 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>;
7302 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.3" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[1]</a>;
7303 <a href="#FS_Q35_A3" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.4" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[3]</a>). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
7304 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35096] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7305 supra dictum est quod dolor qui delectationi contrariatur, est de
7306 eodem de quo est delectatio. Sed delectatio est de bono, sicut
7307 supra dictum est. Ergo dolor est principaliter de amissione
7308 boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p4">
7309 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul.
7310 But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present.
7311 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35097] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7312 secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, amor est causa tristitiae,
7313 sicut et aliarum affectionum animae. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum.
7314 Ergo dolor vel tristitia magis respicit bonum amissum quam malum
7315 coniunctum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p5">
7316 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow."
7317 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35098] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7318 est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod <i>expectatum malum
7319 timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p6">
7320 <b>I answer that,</b> If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance.
7321 For, as stated in the
7322 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A10" id="FS_Q36_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[14], A[10]</a> and
7323 <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q36_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[3]</a>, evil is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in
7324 this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But
7325 sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect
7326 of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary."
7327 Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly,
7328 the present evil or the good which is lost.
7329 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p7"> Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in
7330 natural things; the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural movements, we
7331 observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal
7332 is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place,
7333 and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity
7334 itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is
7335 the reason for its downward tendency.
7336 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p8"> Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind
7337 of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards the evil
7338 that is present. On the other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and therefore,
7339 forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or
7340 pain, than the good which is lost.
7341 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 co."><a name="35099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35099] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7342 dicendum quod, si hoc modo se haberent privationes in apprehensione
7343 animae, sicut se habent in ipsis rebus, ista quaestio nullius
7344 momenti esse videretur. Malum enim, ut in primo libro habitum est,
7345 est privatio boni, privatio autem, in rerum natura, nihil est aliud
7346 quam carentia oppositi habitus, secundum hoc ergo, idem esset
7347 tristari de bono amisso, et de malo habito. Sed tristitia est motus
7348 appetitus apprehensionem sequentis. In apprehensione autem ipsa
7349 privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur ens rationis.
7350 Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et
7351 ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat
7352 principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum. Et quia motus
7353 appetitus animalis hoc modo se habet in operibus animae, sicut
7354 motus naturalis in rebus naturalibus; ex consideratione naturalium
7355 motuum veritas accipi potest. Si enim accipiamus in motibus
7356 naturalibus accessum et recessum, accessus per se respicit id quod
7357 est conveniens naturae; recessus autem per se respicit id quod est
7358 contrarium; sicut grave per se recedit a loco superiori, accedit
7359 autem naturaliter ad locum inferiorem. Sed si accipiamus causam
7360 utriusque motus, scilicet gravitatem, ipsa gravitas per prius
7361 inclinat ad locum deorsum, quam retrahat a loco sursum, a quo
7362 recedit ut deorsum tendat. Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus
7363 appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio
7364 autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per
7365 prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita
7366 tristitia respicit malum coniunctum. Sed causa delectationis et
7367 tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic
7368 ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est
7369 causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum
7370 amissum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p9">
7371 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine
7372 says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.
7373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35100] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
7374 ergo dicendum quod ipsa amissio boni apprehenditur sub ratione
7375 mali, sicut et amissio mali apprehenditur sub ratione boni. Et ideo
7376 Augustinus dicit dolorem provenire ex amissione temporalium
7377 bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p10">
7378 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular
7379 thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation
7380 of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the
7381 same thing under a contrary aspect.
7382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35101] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7383 dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ei contrarius respiciunt idem,
7384 sed sub contraria ratione, nam si delectatio est de praesentia
7385 alicuius, tristitia est de absentia eiusdem. In uno autem
7386 contrariorum includitur privatio alterius, ut patet in X Metaphys.
7387 Et inde est quod tristitia quae est de contrario, est quodammodo de
7388 eodem sub contraria ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p11">
7389 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many movements arise from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly,
7390 but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
7391 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35102] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7392 dicendum quod, quando ex una causa proveniunt multi motus, non
7393 oportet quod omnes principalius respiciant illud quod principalius
7394 respicit causa, sed primus tantum. Unusquisque autem aliorum
7395 principalius respicit illud quod est ei conveniens secundum
7396 propriam rationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A2-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 2. Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p2">
7397 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above
7398 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement
7399 towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
7400 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35103] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
7401 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit causa doloris
7402 seu tristitiae. Tristitia enim per se respicit malum, ut dictum
7403 est. Concupiscentia autem est motus quidam appetitus in bonum.
7404 Motus autem qui est in unum contrarium, non est causa motus qui
7405 respicit aliud contrarium. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa
7406 doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p3">
7407 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire
7408 is something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
7409 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35104] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7410 dolor, secundum Damascenum, est de praesenti, concupiscentia autem
7411 est de futuro. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p4">
7412 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says
7413 (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
7414 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35105] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7415 id quod est per se delectabile, non est causa doloris. Sed
7416 concupiscentia est secundum seipsam delectabilis, ut philosophus
7417 dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris seu
7418 tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p5">
7419 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their
7420 way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause
7421 of sorrow.
7422 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35106] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7423 est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., <i>subintrantibus
7424 ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites
7425 subinferuntur error et dolor</i>. Sed ignorantia est causa erroris.
7426 Ergo concupiscentia est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A2-p6">
7427 <b>I answer that,</b> Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above
7428 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on
7429 the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy
7430 body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting
7431 from gravity.
7432 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A2-p7"> Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said
7433 above
7434 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement,
7435 is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection
7436 of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive
7437 movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle
7438 is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire
7439 is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine
7440 often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he
7441 says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow.
7442 Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the
7443 movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for
7444 the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more
7445 for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire
7446 to have.
7447 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 co."><a name="35107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35107] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7448 dicendum quod tristitia est motus quidam appetitus animalis. Motus
7449 autem appetitivus habet, sicut dictum est, similitudinem appetitus
7450 naturalis. Cuius duplex causa assignari potest, una per modum
7451 finis; alia sicut unde est principium motus. Sicut descensionis
7452 corporis gravis causa sicut finis, est locus deorsum, principium
7453 autem motus est inclinatio naturalis, quae est ex gravitate. Causa
7454 autem motus appetitivi per modum finis, est eius obiectum. Et sic
7455 supra dictum est quod causa doloris seu tristitiae est malum
7456 coniunctum. Causa autem sicut unde est principium talis motus, est
7457 interior inclinatio appetitus. Qui quidem per prius inclinatur ad
7458 bonum; et ex consequenti ad repudiandum malum contrarium. Et ideo
7459 huiusmodi motus appetitivi primum principium est amor, qui est
7460 prima inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, secundum autem
7461 principium est odium, quod est inclinatio prima appetitus ad malum
7462 fugiendum. Sed quia concupiscentia vel cupiditas est primus
7463 effectus amoris, quo maxime delectamur, ut supra dictum est; ideo
7464 frequenter Augustinus cupiditatem vel concupiscentiam pro amore
7465 ponit, ut etiam supra dictum est. Et hoc modo concupiscentiam dicit
7466 esse universalem causam doloris. Sed ipsa concupiscentia, secundum
7467 propriam rationem considerata, est interdum causa doloris. Omne
7468 enim quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium
7469 motui. Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est
7470 contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa
7471 tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali
7472 ablatione, tristamur. Universalis autem causa doloris esse non
7473 potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in
7474 quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p8">
7475 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated
7476 above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that
7477 regard evil.
7478 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35108] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
7479 ergo dicendum quod inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, est
7480 causa inclinationis appetitus ad malum fugiendum, sicut dictum est.
7481 Et ex hoc contingit quod motus appetitivi qui respiciunt bonum,
7482 ponuntur causa motuum appetitus qui respiciunt malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p9">
7483 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is desired, though really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may
7484 say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
7485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35109] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7486 dicendum quod illud quod concupiscitur, etsi realiter sit futurum,
7487 est tamen quodammodo praesens, inquantum speratur. Vel potest dici
7488 quod, licet ipsum bonum concupitum sit futurum, tamen impedimentum
7489 praesentialiter apponitur, quod dolorem causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p10">
7490 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the
7491 presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
7492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35110] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7493 dicendum quod concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes
7494 adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum
7495 appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A3-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 3. Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p2">
7496 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion,"
7497 which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin
7498 version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and
7499 pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind.
7500 Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is the
7501 cause of multitude.
7502 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35111] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
7503 sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus unitatis non sit causa
7504 doloris. Dicit enim philosophus, in X Ethic., quod haec opinio,
7505 quae posuit repletionem esse causam delectationis, et incisionem
7506 causam tristitiae, videtur esse facta ex delectationibus et
7507 tristitiis quae sunt circa cibum. Sed non omnis delectatio vel
7508 tristitia est huiusmodi. Ergo appetitus unitatis non est causa
7509 universalis doloris, cum repletio ad unitatem pertineat, incisio
7510 vero multitudinem inducat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p3">
7511 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would
7512 be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous.
7513 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35112] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7514 quaelibet separatio unitati opponitur. Si ergo dolor causaretur ex
7515 appetitu unitatis, nulla separatio esset delectabilis. Quod patet
7516 esse falsum in separatione omnium superfluorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p4">
7517 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity,
7518 since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather
7519 than the craving for separation, as causing sorrow.
7520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35113] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7521 eadem ratione appetimus coniunctionem boni, et remotionem mali. Sed
7522 sicut coniunctio pertinet ad unitatem, cum sit unio quaedam; ita
7523 separatio est contrarium unitati. Ergo appetitus unitatis non magis
7524 debet poni causa doloris quam appetitus separationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p5">
7525 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire
7526 unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?"
7527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35114] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7528 est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, <i>quod ex
7529 dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis
7530 animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis.
7531 Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel
7532 corruptionis impatiens?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p6">
7533 <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted
7534 as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself,
7535 the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is.
7536 Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and
7537 therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity.
7538 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 co."><a name="35115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35115] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7539 dicendum quod eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est
7540 causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis, vel amor, causa doloris
7541 ponendus est. Bonum enim uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate
7542 consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex
7543 quibus consistit eius perfectio, unde et Platonici posuerunt unum
7544 esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque
7545 appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor
7546 vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus
7547 unitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p7">
7548 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither
7549 does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher
7550 from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further
7551 pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather
7552 than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity
7553 in which the perfection of nature consists.
7554 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35116] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
7555 ergo dicendum quod non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum
7556 illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non
7557 cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut
7558 quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per
7559 hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles, sicut repleti
7560 cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio,
7561 sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum
7562 constitueret. Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet
7563 unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p8">
7564 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some
7565 union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.
7566 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35117] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7567 dicendum quod separatio potest esse delectabilis, vel inquantum
7568 removetur illud quod est contrarium perfectioni rei, vel inquantum
7569 separatio habet aliquam unionem adiunctam, puta sensibilis ad
7570 sensum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p9">
7571 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the
7572 desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is.
7573 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35118] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7574 dicendum quod separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur,
7575 inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi
7576 separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus
7577 unitatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A4-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 4. Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p2">
7578 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent
7579 is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow.
7580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35119] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
7581 sic proceditur. Videtur quod potestas maior non debeat poni causa
7582 doloris. Quod enim est in potestate agentis, nondum est praesens,
7583 sed futurum. Dolor autem est de malo praesenti. Ergo potestas maior
7584 non est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p3">
7585 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power
7586 should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
7587 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35120] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7588 nocumentum illatum est causa doloris. Sed nocumentum potest inferri
7589 etiam a potestate minore. Ergo potestas maior non debet poni causa
7590 doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p4">
7591 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something
7592 external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
7593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35121] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7594 causae appetitivorum motuum sunt interiores inclinationes animae.
7595 Potestas autem maior est aliquid exterius. Ergo non debet poni
7596 causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p5">
7597 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the
7598 body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."
7599 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35122] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7600 est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, <i>in animo
7601 dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore
7602 dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p6">
7603 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
7604 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, a present evil, is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present,
7605 should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to
7606 be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action
7607 of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine
7608 reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow.
7609 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p7"> But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination
7610 there will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its
7611 downward tendency, its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.
7612 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p8"> Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective
7613 inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite
7614 remains. And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power": for were
7615 it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.
7616 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 co."><a name="35123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35123] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7617 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, malum coniunctum est causa
7618 doloris vel tristitiae per modum obiecti. Id ergo quod est causa
7619 coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae.
7620 Manifestum est autem hoc esse contra inclinationem appetitus, ut
7621 malo praesentialiter inhaereat. Quod autem est contra inclinationem
7622 alicuius, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicuius fortioris.
7623 Et ideo potestas maior ponitur esse causa doloris ab Augustino. Sed
7624 sciendum est quod, si potestas fortior intantum invalescat quod
7625 mutet contrariam inclinationem in inclinationem propriam, iam non
7626 erit aliqua repugnantia vel violentia, sicut quando agens fortius,
7627 corrumpendo corpus grave, aufert ei inclinationem qua tendit
7628 deorsum; et tunc ferri sursum non est ei violentum, sed naturale.
7629 Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod
7630 auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non
7631 sequitur dolor vel tristitia, sed tunc solum sequitur, quando
7632 remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium. Et inde est quod
7633 Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat
7634 dolorem, si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non
7635 sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p9">
7636 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive
7637 evil.
7638 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35124] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
7639 ergo dicendum quod maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod
7640 est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu, dum
7641 scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p10">
7642 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict
7643 some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
7644 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35125] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7645 dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquam potestatem quae non est maior
7646 simpliciter, esse maiorem quantum ad aliquid. Et secundum hoc,
7647 aliquod nocumentum inferre potest. Si autem nullo modo maior esset,
7648 nullo modo posset nocere. Unde non posset causam doloris
7649 inferre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p11">
7650 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is
7651 thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.
7652 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35126] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7653 dicendum quod exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum
7654 appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti. Et hoc modo
7655 potestas maior ponitur causa doloris.</p></div></div></div></div>
7656 <div id="FS_Q37" class="div3">
7657 <h3 id="FS_Q37-p0.1">Q. 37. OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
7658 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
7659 <p id="FS_Q37-p2"> We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q37-p3"><a href="#FS_Q37_A1"> (1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p4"><a href="#FS_Q37_A2"> (2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p5"><a href="#FS_Q37_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p6"><a href="#FS_Q37_A4"> (4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?</a></p>
7660 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 pr."><a name="35127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35127]
7661 Iª-IIae q. 37 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
7662 effectibus doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
7663 Primo, utrum dolor auferat facultatem addiscendi. Secundo, utrum
7664 aggravatio animi sit effectus tristitiae vel doloris. Tertio, utrum
7665 tristitia vel dolor debilitet omnem operationem. Quarto, utrum
7666 tristitia noceat corpori magis quam aliae passiones animae.</p></div></div></div>
7667 <div id="FS_Q37_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A1-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 1. Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p2">
7668 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn. For it is written (
7669 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.9" target="asv">Is. 26:9</a>): "When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice": and further on (verse
7670 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with them." But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow
7671 in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning.
7672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35128] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
7673 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non auferat facultatem
7674 addiscendi. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXVI, <i>cum feceris iudicia tua in
7675 terra, iustitiam discent omnes habitatores orbis</i>. Et infra,
7676 <i>in tribulatione murmuris doctrina tua eis</i>, sed ex iudiciis
7677 Dei, et tribulatione, sequitur dolor seu tristitia in cordibus
7678 hominum. Ergo dolor vel tristitia non tollit, sed magis auget
7679 facultatem addiscendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3">
7680 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
7681 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.9" target="asv">Is. 28:9</a>): "Whom shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that
7682 are drawn away from the breasts," i.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure; since sorrow
7683 hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and (
7684 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:29</a>) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great
7685 delights." Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the faculty of learning.
7686 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35129] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7687 Isaiae XXVIII, dicitur, <i>quem docebit scientiam? Et quem
7688 intelligere faciet auditum? Ablactatos a lacte, avulsos ab
7689 uberibus</i> idest a delectationibus. Sed dolor et tristitia maxime
7690 tollunt delectationes, impedit enim tristitia omnem delectationem,
7691 ut dicitur in VII Ethic.; et Eccli. XI dicitur quod <i>malitia
7692 unius horae oblivionem facit luxuriae maximae</i>. Ergo dolor non
7693 tollit, sed magis praebet facultatem addiscendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p4">
7694 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated above (
7695 <a href="#FS_Q35_A7" id="FS_Q37_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[7]</a>). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.
7696 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35130] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7697 tristitia interior praeeminet dolori exteriori, ut supra dictum
7698 est. Sed simul cum tristitia potest homo addiscere. Ergo multo
7699 magis simul cum dolore corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p5">
7700 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to
7701 turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it,
7702 because it required undivided attention."
7703 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35131] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7704 est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., <i>quanquam acerrimo
7705 dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo
7706 volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus
7707 impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q37_A1-p6">
7708 <b>I answer that,</b> Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the
7709 soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power: because the
7710 soul, being one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the
7711 soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is
7712 incompatible therewith.
7713 </p><p id="FS_Q37_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing
7714 to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident that
7715 in order to learn anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in
7716 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.4" target="asv"> Prov. 2:4,5</a>: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou
7717 understand learning" [Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from
7718 learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that
7719 which he knew already. However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning
7720 or for considering: because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from
7721 turning entirely to the pain.
7722 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 co."><a name="35132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35132] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7723 dicendum quod, quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae
7724 radicantur, necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer
7725 trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione
7726 alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio. Et
7727 propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel
7728 magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod
7729 magnam attentionem requirat. Manifestum est autem quod dolor
7730 sensibilis maxime trahit ad se intentionem animae, quia naturaliter
7731 unumquodque tota intentione tendit ad repellendum contrarium, sicut
7732 etiam in rebus naturalibus apparet. Similiter etiam manifestum est
7733 quod ad addiscendum aliquid de novo, requiritur studium et conatus
7734 cum magna intentione, ut patet per illud quod dicitur Prov. II,
7735 <i>si quaesieris sapientiam quasi pecuniam, et sicut thesauros
7736 effoderis eam, tunc intelliges disciplinam</i>. Et ideo si sit
7737 dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit. Et
7738 tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo
7739 aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit. In hoc tamen
7740 attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet
7741 ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis
7742 retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p8">
7743 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard
7744 to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, "in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt
7745 to be taught by God.
7746 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35133] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
7747 ergo dicendum quod tristitia moderata, quae excludit evagationem
7748 animi, potest conferre ad disciplinam suscipiendam, et praecipue
7749 eorum per quae homo sperat se posse a tristitia liberari. Et hoc
7750 modo in tribulatione murmuris homines doctrinam Dei magis
7751 recipiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p9">
7752 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration,
7753 wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless
7754 pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural
7755 body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot
7756 water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate,
7757 it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself,
7758 it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.
7759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35134] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7760 dicendum quod tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt
7761 animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII
7762 Ethic. dicitur quod <i>impossibile est in ipsa delectatione
7763 venereorum, aliquid intelligere</i>. Sed tamen dolor magis trahit
7764 ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio, sicut etiam videmus in
7765 rebus naturalibus, quod actio corporis naturalis magis intenditur
7766 in contrarium; sicut aqua calefacta magis patitur a frigido, ut
7767 fortius congeletur. Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata,
7768 per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert
7769 superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si
7770 intendatur, totaliter aufert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p10">
7771 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: and
7772 yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is
7773 a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow
7774 be very intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for
7775 the first time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).
7776 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35135] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7777 dicendum quod dolor exterior accidit ex laesione corporali, et ita
7778 magis habet transmutationem corporalem adiunctam quam dolor
7779 interior, qui tamen est maior secundum illud quod est formale in
7780 dolore, quod est ex parte animae. Et ideo dolor corporalis magis
7781 impedit contemplationem, quae requirit omnimodam quietem, quam
7782 dolor interior. Et tamen etiam dolor interior, si multum
7783 intendatur, ita trahit intentionem, ut non possit homo de novo
7784 aliquid addiscere. Unde et Gregorius propter tristitiam intermisit
7785 Ezechielis expositionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A2-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 2. Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p2">
7786 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says (
7787 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:11</a>): "Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you: yea,
7788 defence, yea indignation," etc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being
7789 depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow.
7790 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35136] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
7791 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aggravatio animi non sit effectus
7792 tristitiae. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII, <i>ecce hoc
7793 ipsum, contristari vos secundum Deum, quantam in vobis operatur
7794 sollicitudinem, sed defensionem, sed indignationem,</i> et cetera.
7795 Sed sollicitudo et indignatio ad quandam erectionem animi
7796 pertinent, quae aggravationi opponitur. Non ergo aggravatio est
7797 effectus tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p3">
7798 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression
7799 but contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow.
7800 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35137] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7801 tristitia delectationi opponitur. Sed effectus delectationis est
7802 dilatatio, cui non opponitur aggravatio, sed constrictio. Ergo
7803 effectus tristitiae non debet poni aggravatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p4">
7804 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (
7805 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:7</a>): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is
7806 weighed down by something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer. Therefore depression should not
7807 be reckoned an effect of sorrow.
7808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35138] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7809 ad tristitiam pertinet absorbere, ut patet per illud quod apostolus
7810 dicit, II ad Cor. II, <i>ne forte abundantiori tristitia
7811 absorbeatur qui est eiusmodi</i>. Sed quod aggravatur, non
7812 absorbetur, quinimmo sub aliquo ponderoso deprimitur; quod autem
7813 absorbetur, intra absorbens includitur. Ergo aggravatio non debet
7814 poni effectus tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p5">
7815 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow."
7816 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35139] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7817 est quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt tristitiam
7818 aggravantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6">
7819 <b>I answer that,</b> The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason
7820 that the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed
7821 to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his
7822 own movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said above (
7823 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>;
7824 <a href="#FS_Q25_A4" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[25], A[4]</a>;
7825 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[36], A[1]</a>) that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will,
7826 depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause
7827 of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for
7828 the present, it
7829 fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand,
7830 the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul
7831 is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes even the external movement of the
7832 body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied.
7833 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 co."><a name="35140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35140] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7834 dicendum quod effectus passionum animae quandoque metaphorice
7835 nominantur, secundum similitudinem sensibilium corporum, eo quod
7836 motus appetitus animalis sunt similes inclinationibus appetitus
7837 naturalis. Et per hunc modum fervor attribuitur amori, dilatatio
7838 delectationi, et aggravatio tristitiae. Dicitur enim homo
7839 aggravari, ex eo quod aliquo pondere impeditur a proprio motu.
7840 Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod tristitia contingit ex
7841 aliquo malo praesenti. Quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui
7842 voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo
7843 quod vult. Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut
7844 auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod
7845 in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult; remanet tamen motus ad
7846 repellendum nocivum contristans. Si vero superexcrescat vis mali
7847 intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur
7848 etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac
7849 divertere valeat. Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus
7850 corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p7">
7851 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness
7852 of sin.
7853 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35141] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
7854 ergo dicendum quod illa erectio animi provenit ex tristitia quae
7855 est secundum Deum, propter spem adiunctam de remissione
7856 peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p8">
7857 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, through
7858 being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.
7859 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35142] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7860 dicendum quod, quantum ad motum appetitivum pertinet, ad idem
7861 refertur constrictio et aggravatio. Ex hoc enim quod aggravatur
7862 animus, ut ad exteriora libere progredi non possit, ad seipsum
7863 retrahitur, quasi in seipso constrictus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p9">
7864 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus
7865 also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken
7866 literally, appear to exclude one another.
7867 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35143] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7868 dicendum quod tristitia absorbere hominem dicitur, quando sic
7869 totaliter vis contristantis mali afficit animam, ut omnem spem
7870 evasionis excludat. Et sic etiam eodem modo aggravat et absorbet.
7871 Quaedam enim se consequuntur in his quae metaphorice dicuntur, quae
7872 sibi repugnare videntur, si secundum proprietatem accipiantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A3-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 3. Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p2">
7873 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage
7874 of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore the Apostle says (
7875 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.15" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:15</a>): "Carefully study to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed." Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance
7876 to work, but helps one to work well.
7877 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35144] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
7878 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non impediat omnem
7879 operationem. Sollicitudo enim ex tristitia causatur, ut patet per
7880 auctoritatem apostoli inductam. Sed sollicitudo adiuvat ad bene
7881 operandum, unde apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, <i>sollicite cura
7882 teipsum exhibere operarium inconfusibilem</i>. Ergo tristitia non
7883 impedit operationem, sed magis adiuvat ad bene operandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p3">
7884 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore
7885 sorrow does too.
7886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35145] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7887 tristitia causat in multis concupiscentiam, ut dicitur in VII
7888 Ethic. Sed concupiscentia facit ad intensionem operationis. Ergo et
7889 tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p4">
7890 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing
7891 is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.
7892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35146] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7893 sicut quaedam operationes propriae sunt gaudentium, ita etiam
7894 quaedam operationes his qui tristantur, sicut lugere. Sed
7895 unumquodque augetur ex sibi convenienti. Ergo aliquae operationes
7896 non impediuntur, sed meliorantur propter tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p5">
7897 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it" (Ethic.
7898 x, 5).
7899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35147] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7900 est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit
7901 operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p6">
7902 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
7903 <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q37_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, sorrow at times does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal or external; but certain
7904 movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being
7905 the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which
7906 we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The
7907 reason for this is that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the
7908 action must of necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and
7909 cause: and such action must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the more
7910 one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result
7911 from
7912 that sorrow.
7913 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 co."><a name="35148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35148] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7914 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, tristitia quandoque non ita
7915 aggravat vel absorbet animum, ut omnem motum interiorem et
7916 exteriorem excludat; sed aliqui motus quandoque ex ipsa tristitia
7917 causantur. Sic ergo operatio ad tristitiam dupliciter potest
7918 comparari. Uno modo, sicut ad id de quo est tristitia. Et sic
7919 tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod
7920 cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus
7921 cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia. Cuius ratio est, quia
7922 voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de
7923 qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur. Alio
7924 modo comparatur operatio ad tristitiam sicut ad principium et
7925 causam. Et sic necesse est quod operatio talis ex tristitia
7926 augeatur, sicut quanto aliquis magis tristatur de re aliqua, tanto
7927 magis conatur ad expellendam tristitiam, dummodo remaneat spes
7928 expellendi, alioquin nullus motus vel operatio ex tristitia
7929 causaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p7"> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35149] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
7930 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A4-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 4. Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p2">
7931 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things
7932 which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of
7933 colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body.
7934 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35150] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
7935 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non inferat maxime corpori
7936 nocumentum. Tristitia enim habet esse spirituale in anima. Sed ea
7937 quae habent tantum esse spirituale, non causant transmutationem
7938 corporalem, sicut patet de intentionibus colorum quae sunt in aere,
7939 a quibus nullum corpus coloratur. Ergo tristitia non facit aliquod
7940 corporale nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p3">
7941 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But
7942 bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above (
7943 <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q37_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
7944 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35151] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7945 si facit aliquod corporale nocumentum, hoc non est nisi inquantum
7946 habet corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed corporalis
7947 transmutatio invenitur in omnibus animae passionibus, ut supra
7948 dictum est. Ergo non magis tristitia quam aliae animae passiones,
7949 corpori nocet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p4">
7950 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great
7951 harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the
7952 cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
7953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35152] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7954 philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>irae et concupiscentiae
7955 quibusdam insanias faciunt</i>, quod videtur esse maximum
7956 nocumentum, cum ratio sit excellentissimum eorum quae sunt in
7957 homine. Desperatio etiam videtur esse magis nociva quam tristitia,
7958 cum sit causa tristitiae. Ergo tristitia non magis nocet corpori
7959 quam aliae animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5">
7960 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
7961 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.22" target="asv">Prov. 17:22</a>): "A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (
7962 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.20" target="asv">Prov. 25:20</a>): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (
7963 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:19</a>): "Of sadness cometh death."
7964 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35153] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
7965 est quod dicitur Prov. XVII, <i>animus gaudens aetatem floridam
7966 facit, spiritus tristis exsiccat ossa</i>. Et Prov. XXV, <i>sicut
7967 tinea vestimento, et vermis ligno, ita tristitia viri nocet
7968 cordi</i>. Et Eccli. XXXVIII, <i>a tristitia festinat mors</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q37_A4-p6">
7969 <b>I answer that,</b> Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's
7970 life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with
7971 the other passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts
7972 of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed
7973 measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the
7974 measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it
7975 will be repugnant to life in respect of its species.
7976 </p><p id="FS_Q37_A4-p7"> Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is
7977 in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter
7978 is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not
7979 repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure:
7980 such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be
7981 excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight
7982 or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore
7983 they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present
7984 evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.
7985 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 co."><a name="35154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35154] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
7986 dicendum quod tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis
7987 corpori nocet. Cuius ratio est, quia tristitia repugnat humanae
7988 vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus; et non solum quantum ad
7989 mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones. Consistit
7990 enim humana vita in quadam motione, quae a corde in cetera membra
7991 diffunditur, quae quidem motio convenit naturae humanae secundum
7992 aliquam determinatam mensuram. Si ergo ista motio procedat ultra
7993 mensuram debitam, repugnabit humanae vitae secundum quantitatis
7994 mensuram; non autem secundum similitudinem speciei. Si autem
7995 impediatur processus huius motionis, repugnabit vitae secundum suam
7996 speciem. Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod
7997 transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis
7998 et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis, sicut in
7999 omnibus materia proportionatur formae. Illae ergo animae passiones
8000 quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non
8001 repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare
8002 secundum quantitatem, ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi.
8003 Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed
8004 propter excessum possunt nocere. Passiones autem quae important
8005 motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali
8006 motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem
8007 motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent, sicut timor et desperatio, et
8008 prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti,
8009 cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p8">
8010 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation.
8011 Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are
8012 not naturally moved by the soul.
8013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35155] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8014 ergo dicendum quod, quia anima naturaliter movet corpus,
8015 spiritualis motus animae naturaliter est causa transmutationis
8016 corporalis. Nec est simile de spiritualibus intentionibus, quae non
8017 habent naturaliter ordinem movendi alia corpora, quae non sunt nata
8018 moveri ab anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p9">
8019 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies
8020 a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
8021 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35156] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8022 dicendum quod aliae passiones habent transmutationem corporalem
8023 conformem, secundum suam speciem, motioni vitali, sed tristitia
8024 contrariam, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p10">
8025 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one
8026 of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason
8027 of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives
8028 man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a
8029 prey to melancholy or madness.
8030 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35157] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8031 dicendum quod ex leviori causa impeditur usus rationis quam
8032 corrumpatur vita, cum videamus multas aegritudines usum rationis
8033 tollere, quae nondum adimunt vitam. Et tamen timor et ira maxime
8034 nocumentum corporale afferunt ex permixtione tristitiae, propter
8035 absentiam eius quod cupitur. Ipsa etiam tristitia quandoque
8036 rationem aufert, sicut patet in his qui propter dolorem in
8037 melancholiam vel in maniam incidunt.</p></div></div></div></div>
8038 <div id="FS_Q38" class="div3">
8039 <h3 id="FS_Q38-p0.1">Q. 38. OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
8040 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
8041 <p id="FS_Q38-p2"> We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q38-p3"><a href="#FS_Q38_A1"> (1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p4"><a href="#FS_Q38_A2"> (2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p5"><a href="#FS_Q38_A3"> (3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p6"><a href="#FS_Q38_A4"> (4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p7"><a href="#FS_Q38_A5"> (5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?</a></p>
8042 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 pr."><a name="35158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35158]
8043 Iª-IIae q. 38 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
8044 remediis doloris seu tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque.
8045 Primo, utrum dolor vel tristitia mitigetur per quamlibet
8046 delectationem. Secundo, utrum mitigetur per fletum. Tertio, utrum
8047 per compassionem amicorum. Quarto, utrum per contemplationem
8048 veritatis. Quinto, utrum per somnum et balnea.</p></div></div></div>
8049 <div id="FS_Q38_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A1-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 1. Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p2">
8050 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far
8051 as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow;
8052 as stated above (
8053 <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a> ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow.
8054 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35159] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
8055 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non quaelibet delectatio mitiget
8056 quemlibet dolorem seu tristitiam. Non enim delectatio tristitiam
8057 mitigat, nisi inquantum ei contrariatur, medicinae enim fiunt per
8058 contraria, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed non quaelibet delectatio
8059 contrariatur cuilibet tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non
8060 quaelibet delectatio mitigat quamlibet tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p3">
8061 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,
8062 "the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every pleasure assuages sorrow.
8063 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35160] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8064 illud quod causat tristitiam, non mitigat tristitiam. Sed aliquae
8065 delectationes causant tristitiam, quia, ut dicitur in IX Ethic.,
8066 <i>malus tristatur quoniam delectatus est</i>. Non ergo omnis
8067 delectatio mitigat tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p4">
8068 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend,
8069 now dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those
8070 things which united us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing
8071 united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures
8072 become burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow.
8073 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35161] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8074 Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod ipse fugit de patria, in qua
8075 conversari solitus erat cum amico suo iam mortuo, <i>minus enim
8076 quaerebant eum oculi eius, ubi videre non solebant</i>. Ex quo
8077 accipi potest quod illa in quibus nobis amici mortui vel absentes
8078 communicaverunt, efficiuntur nobis, de eorum morte vel absentia
8079 dolentibus, onerosa. Sed maxime communicaverunt nobis in
8080 delectationibus. Ergo ipsae delectationes efficiuntur nobis
8081 dolentibus onerosae. Non ergo quaelibet delectatio mitigat
8082 quamlibet tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p5">
8083 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other,
8084 provided it be intense."
8085 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35162] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
8086 est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>expellit
8087 delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si
8088 sit fortis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p6">
8089 <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been said above (
8090 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a> ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite.
8091 Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to
8092 a non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore
8093 just as
8094 all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings
8095 relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.
8096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 co."><a name="35163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35163] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8097 dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, delectatio est quaedam
8098 quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod
8099 repugnat appetitui. Unde sic se habet delectatio ad tristitiam in
8100 motibus appetitivis, sicut se habet in corporibus quies ad
8101 fatigationem, quae accidit ex aliqua transmutatione innaturali, nam
8102 et ipsa tristitia fatigationem quandam, seu aegritudinem
8103 appetitivae virtutis importat. Sicut igitur quaelibet quies
8104 corporis remedium affert contra quamlibet fatigationem, ex
8105 quacumque causa innaturali provenientem; ita quaelibet delectatio
8106 remedium affert ad mitigandam quamlibet tristitiam, ex quocumque
8107 procedat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p7">
8108 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above (
8109 <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a>). And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure.
8110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35164] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8111 ergo dicendum quod, licet non omnis delectatio contrarietur omni
8112 tristitiae secundum speciem, contrariatur tamen secundum genus, ut
8113 supra dictum est. Et ideo ex parte dispositionis subiecti,
8114 quaelibet tristitia per quamlibet delectationem mitigari
8115 potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p8">
8116 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as
8117 wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures.
8118 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35165] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8119 dicendum quod delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in
8120 praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de
8121 malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur
8122 per contrarias delectationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p9">
8123 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When there are two causes inclining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and more
8124 persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with
8125 a deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence,
8126 inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure.
8127 Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory
8128 of the past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives
8129 out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures."
8130 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35166] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8131 dicendum quod, quando sunt duae causae ad contrarios motus
8132 inclinantes, utraque alteram impedit, et tamen illa finaliter
8133 vincit, quae fortior est et diuturnior. In eo autem qui tristatur
8134 de his in quibus simul cum amico mortuo vel absente delectari
8135 consuevit, duae causae in contrarium moventes inveniuntur. Nam mors
8136 vel absentia amici recogitata, inclinat ad dolorem, bonum autem
8137 praesens inclinat ad delectationem. Unde utrumque per alterum
8138 minuitur. Sed tamen, quia fortius movet sensus praesentis quam
8139 memoria praeteriti, et amor sui ipsius quam amor alterius
8140 diuturnius manet; inde est quod finaliter delectatio tristitiam
8141 expellit. Unde post pauca subdit ibidem Augustinus quod
8142 <i>pristinis generibus delectationum cedebat dolor eius</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A2-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 2. Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p2">
8143 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect
8144 of sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow.
8145 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35167] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
8146 sic proceditur. Videtur quod fletus non mitiget tristitiam. Nullus
8147 enim effectus diminuit suam causam. Sed fletus, vel gemitus, est
8148 effectus tristitiae. Ergo non minuit tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p3">
8149 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy.
8150 Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.
8151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35168] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8152 sicut fletus vel gemitus est effectus tristitiae, ita risus est
8153 effectus laetitiae. Sed risus non minuit laetitiam. Ergo fletus non
8154 mitigat tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p4">
8155 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases
8156 sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that tears do not assuage sorrow.
8157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35169] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8158 in fletu repraesentatur nobis malum contristans. Sed imaginatio rei
8159 contristantis auget tristitiam, sicut imaginatio rei delectantis
8160 auget laetitiam. Ergo videtur quod fletus non mitiget
8161 tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p5">
8162 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some
8163 little refreshment."
8164 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35170] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
8165 est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod quando dolebat de
8166 morte amici, <i>in solis gemitibus et lacrimis erat ei aliquantula
8167 requies</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p6">
8168 <b>I answer that,</b> Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we
8169 keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed
8170 as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show
8171 of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly,
8172 because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans
8173 are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated
8174 above
8175 <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans.
8176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 co."><a name="35171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35171] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8177 dicendum quod lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam.
8178 Et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia omne nocivum interius
8179 clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae
8180 circa ipsum, sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae
8181 intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor
8182 minuitur. Et propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis,
8183 exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel
8184 etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia. Secundo, quia semper operatio
8185 conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est
8186 delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes
8187 convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei
8188 delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget
8189 tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum
8190 et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p7">
8191 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man.
8192 For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him
8193 that sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For
8194 this reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid
8195 contrariety.
8196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35172] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8197 ergo dicendum quod ipsa habitudo causae ad effectum contrariatur
8198 habitudini contristantis ad contristatum, nam omnis effectus est
8199 conveniens suae causae, et per consequens est ei delectabilis;
8200 contristans autem contrariatur contristato. Et ideo effectus
8201 tristitiae habet contrariam habitudinem ad contristatum, quam
8202 contristans ad ipsum. Et propter hoc, mitigatur tristitia per
8203 effectum tristitiae, ratione contrarietatis praedictae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p8">
8204 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because
8205 in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter
8206 and the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it.
8207 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35173] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8208 dicendum quod habitudo effectus ad causam est similis habitudini
8209 delectantis ad delectatum, quia utrobique convenientia invenitur.
8210 Omne autem simile auget suum simile. Et ideo per risum et alios
8211 effectus laetitiae augetur laetitia, nisi forte per accidens,
8212 propter excessum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p9">
8213 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very fact
8214 that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of
8215 pleasure. For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry
8216 for it, as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest.
8217 iii, 27).
8218 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35174] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8219 dicendum quod imaginatio rei contristantis, quantum est de se, nata
8220 est augere tristitiam, sed ex hoc ipso quod homo imaginatur quod
8221 facit illud quod convenit sibi secundum talem statum, consurgit
8222 inde quaedam delectatio. Et eadem ratione, si alicui subrepat risus
8223 in statu in quo videtur sibi esse lugendum, ex hoc ipso dolet,
8224 tanquam faciat id quod non convenit, ut Tullius dicit, in III de
8225 Tuscul. quaestionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A3-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 3. Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p2">
8226 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects.
8227 Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled
8228 and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.
8229 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35175] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
8230 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor amici compatientis non mitiget
8231 tristitiam. Contrariorum enim contrarii sunt effectus. Sed sicut
8232 Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., <i>quando cum multis gaudetur, in
8233 singulis uberius est gaudium, quia fervere faciunt se, et
8234 inflammantur ex alterutro</i>. Ergo, pari ratione, quando multi
8235 simul tristantur, videtur quod sit maior tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p3">
8236 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the
8237 sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow,
8238 a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase.
8239 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35176] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8240 hoc requirit amicitia, ut amoris vicem quis rependat, ut Augustinus
8241 dicit, IV Confess. Sed amicus condolens dolet de dolore amici
8242 dolentis. Ergo ipse dolor amici condolentis est causa amico prius
8243 dolenti de proprio malo, alterius doloris. Et sic, duplicato
8244 dolore, videtur tristitia crescere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p4">
8245 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other
8246 self" (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the
8247 friend with whom he sympathizes.
8248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35177] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8249 omne malum amici est contristans, sicut et malum proprium, nam
8250 amicus est alter ipse. Sed dolor est quoddam malum. Ergo dolor
8251 amici condolentis auget tristitiam amico cui condoletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p5">
8252 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.
8253 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35178] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
8254 est quod philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod in tristitiis amicus
8255 condolens consolatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p6">
8256 <b>I answer that,</b> When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates
8257 a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof
8258 we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were
8259 bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load
8260 of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason
8261 is because when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated
8262 above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above
8263 <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
8264 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 co."><a name="35179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35179] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8265 dicendum quod naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est
8266 consolativus. Cuius duplicem rationem tangit philosophus in IX
8267 Ethic. Quarum prima est quia, cum ad tristitiam pertineat
8268 aggravare, habet rationem cuiusdam oneris, a quo aliquis aggravatus
8269 alleviari conatur. Cum ergo aliquis videt de sua tristitia alios
8270 contristatos, fit ei quasi quaedam imaginatio quod illud onus alii
8271 cum ipso ferant, quasi conantes ad ipsum ab onere alleviandum et
8272 ideo levius fert tristitiae onus, sicut etiam in portandis oneribus
8273 corporalibus contingit. Secunda ratio, et melior, est quia per hoc
8274 quod amici contristantur ei, percipit se ab eis amari; quod est
8275 delectabile, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio
8276 mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus
8277 condolens tristitiam mitiget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p7">
8278 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful.
8279 Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause.
8280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35180] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8281 ergo dicendum quod in utroque amicitia manifestatur, scilicet et
8282 quod congaudet gaudenti, et quod condolet dolenti. Et ideo utrumque
8283 ratione causae redditur delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p8">
8284 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to
8285 pleasure.
8286 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35181] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8287 dicendum quod ipse dolor amici secundum se contristaret. Sed
8288 consideratio causae eius, quae est amor, magis delectat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p9"> And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35182] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc
8289 patet responsio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A4-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 4. Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p2">
8290 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written (
8291 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q38_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv">Eccles. 1:18</a>): "He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore
8292 the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow.
8293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35183] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
8294 sic proceditur. Videtur quod contemplatio veritatis non mitiget
8295 dolorem. Dicitur enim Eccle. I, <i>qui addit scientiam, addit et
8296 dolorem</i>. Sed scientia ad contemplationem veritatis pertinet.
8297 Non ergo contemplatio veritatis mitigat dolorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p3">
8298 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle
8299 of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the
8300 contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow.
8301 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35184] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8302 contemplatio veritatis ad intellectum speculativum pertinet. Sed
8303 intellectus speculativus non movet, ut dicitur in III de anima. Cum
8304 igitur gaudium et dolor sint quidam motus animi, videtur quod
8305 contemplatio veritatis nihil faciat ad mitigationem doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p4">
8306 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect.
8307 Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.
8308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35185] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8309 remedium aegritudinis apponendum est ubi est aegritudo. Sed
8310 contemplatio veritatis est in intellectu. Non ergo mitigat dolorem
8311 corporalem, qui est in sensu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p5">
8312 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should
8313 not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."
8314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35186] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
8315 est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., <i>videbatur mihi, si se
8316 ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me
8317 sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo
8318 toleraturum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6">
8319 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure assuages
8320 pain as stated above
8321 <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom.
8322 And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according
8323 to
8324 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.2" target="asv"> James
8325 1:2
8326 </a>: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily
8327 tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I
8328 walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.]
8329 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 co."><a name="35187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35187] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8330 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in contemplatione veritatis
8331 maxima delectatio consistit. Omnis autem delectatio dolorem
8332 mitigat, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo contemplatio veritatis
8333 mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius
8334 aliquis est amator sapientiae. Et ideo homines ex contemplatione
8335 divina et futurae beatitudinis, in tribulationibus gaudent;
8336 secundum illud Iacobi I, <i>omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei,
8337 cum in tentationes varias incideritis</i>. Et quod est amplius,
8338 etiam inter corporis cruciatus huiusmodi gaudium invenitur,
8339 <i>sicut Tiburtius martyr, cum nudatis plantis super ardentes
8340 prunas incederet, dixit, videtur mihi quod super roseos flores
8341 incedam, in nomine Iesu Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p7">
8342 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth;
8343 or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the
8344 things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure.
8345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35188] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8346 ergo dicendum quod qui addit scientiam, addit dolorem, vel propter
8347 difficultatem et defectum inveniendae veritatis, vel propter hoc,
8348 quod per scientiam homo cognoscit multa quae voluntati
8349 contrariantur. Et sic ex parte rerum cognitarum, scientia dolorem
8350 causat, ex parte autem contemplationis veritatis,
8351 delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p8">
8352 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation
8353 itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him.
8354 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35189] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8355 dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non movet animum ex parte
8356 rei speculatae, movet tamen animum ex parte ipsius speculationis,
8357 quae est quoddam bonum hominis, et naturaliter delectabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p9">
8358 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation,
8359 which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.
8360 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35190] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8361 dicendum quod in viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad
8362 inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in
8363 superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in
8364 sensu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A5-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 5. Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p2">
8365 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body.
8366 Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.
8367 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35191] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
8368 sic proceditur. Videtur quod somnus et balneum non mitigent
8369 tristitiam. Tristitia enim in anima consistit. Sed somnus et
8370 balneum ad corpus pertinent. Non ergo aliquid faciunt ad
8371 mitigationem tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p3">
8372 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with
8373 the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated above
8374 <a href="#FS_Q38_A4" id="FS_Q38_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like.
8375 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35192] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8376 idem effectus non videtur causari ex contrariis causis. Sed
8377 huiusmodi, cum sint corporalia, repugnant contemplationi veritatis,
8378 quae est causa mitigationis tristitiae, ut dictum est. Non ergo per
8379 huiusmodi tristitia mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p4">
8380 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies
8381 as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore
8382 they do not assuage sorrow.
8383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35193] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8384 tristitia et dolor, secundum quod pertinent ad corpus, in quadam
8385 transmutatione cordis consistunt. Sed huiusmodi remedia magis
8386 videntur pertinere ad exteriores sensus et membra, quam ad
8387 interiorem cordis dispositionem. Non ergo per huiusmodi tristitia
8388 mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p5">
8389 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from
8390 the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not
8391 a little assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the
8392 Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired
8393 limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow."
8394 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35194] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
8395 est quod Augustinus dicit, IX Confess., <i>audieram balnei nomen
8396 inde dictum, quod anxietatem pellat ex animo</i> et infra,
8397 <i>dormivi, et evigilavi, et non parva ex parte mitigatum inveni
8398 dolorem meum</i>. Et inducit quod in hymno Ambrosii dicitur, quod
8399 <i>quies artus solutos reddit laboris usui, mentesque fessas
8400 allevat, luctusque solvit anxios</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6">
8401 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
8402 <a href="#FS_Q37_A4" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[4]</a>), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever restores
8403 the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such remedies, from the
8404 very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure
8405 consists, as stated above (
8406 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). Therefore, since every
8407 pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.
8408 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 co."><a name="35195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35195] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8409 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tristitia secundum suam
8410 speciem repugnat vitali motioni corporis. Et ideo illa quae
8411 reformant naturam corporalem in debitum statum vitalis motionis,
8412 repugnant tristitiae, et ipsam mitigant. Per hoc etiam quod
8413 huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex
8414 his delectatio, hoc enim est quod delectationem facit, ut supra
8415 dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per
8416 huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p7">
8417 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow.
8418 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35196] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8419 ergo dicendum quod ipsa debita corporis dispositio, inquantum
8420 sentitur, delectationem causat, et per consequens tristitiam
8421 mitigat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p8">
8422 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
8423 <a href="#FS_Q31_A8" id="FS_Q38_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[8]</a>), one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should
8424 be assuaged by causes which hinder one another.
8425 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35197] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8426 dicendum quod delectationum una aliam impedit, ut supra dictum est,
8427 et tamen omnis delectatio tristitiam mitigat. Unde non est
8428 inconveniens quod ex causis se invicem impedientibus tristitia
8429 mitigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p9">
8430 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated
8431 in De Causa Mot. Animal. xi.
8432 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35198] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8433 dicendum quod omnis bona dispositio corporis redundat quodammodo ad
8434 cor, sicut ad principium et finem corporalium motionum, ut dicitur
8435 in libro de causa motus animalium.</p></div></div></div></div>
8436 <div id="FS_Q39" class="div3">
8437 <h3 id="FS_Q39-p0.1">Q. 39. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
8438 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
8439 <p id="FS_Q39-p2"> We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q39-p3"><a href="#FS_Q39_A1"> (1) Whether all sorrow is evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p4"><a href="#FS_Q39_A2"> (2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p5"><a href="#FS_Q39_A3"> (3) Whether it can be a useful good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p6"><a href="#FS_Q39_A4"> (4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?</a></p>
8440 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 pr."><a name="35199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35199]
8441 Iª-IIae q. 39 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
8442 bonitate et malitia doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
8443 quatuor. Primo, utrum omnis tristitia sit malum. Secundo, utrum
8444 possit esse bonum honestum. Tertio, utrum possit esse bonum utile.
8445 Quarto, utrum dolor corporis sit summum malum.</p></div></div></div>
8446 <div id="FS_Q39_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A1-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 1. Whether all sorrow is evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p2">
8447 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from
8448 its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil.
8449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35200] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
8450 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia sit mala. Dicit enim
8451 Gregorius Nyssenus, <i>omnis tristitia malum est, sui ipsius
8452 natura</i>. Sed quod naturaliter est malum, semper et ubique est
8453 malum. Ergo omnis tristitia est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p3">
8454 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in Ethic.
8455 vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil.
8456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35201] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8457 illud quod omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, est malum. Sed tristitiam
8458 omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.,
8459 <i>etsi prudens non intendat delectari, tamen intendit non
8460 tristari</i>. Ergo tristitia est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p4">
8461 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow
8462 in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul.
8463 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35202] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8464 sicut malum corporale est obiectum et causa doloris corporalis, ita
8465 malum spirituale est obiectum et causa tristitiae spiritualis. Sed
8466 omnis dolor corporalis est malum corporis. Ergo omnis tristitia
8467 spiritualis est malum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p5">
8468 <b>On the contrary,</b> Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men,
8469 it is written (
8470 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>), that "they were glad when they had done evil." Therefore sorrow for evil is good.
8471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35203] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
8472 tristitia de malo contrariatur delectationi de malo. Sed delectatio
8473 de malo est mala, unde in detestationem quorundam dicitur Prov. II,
8474 quod <i>laetantur cum malefecerint</i>. Ergo tristitia de malo est
8475 bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p6">
8476 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the
8477 mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the
8478 appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to
8479 be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9.
8480 Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain
8481 on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it
8482 not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition
8483 of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
8484 viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature,
8485 he could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things individually---for
8486 actions are concerned about individuals---that which is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as that
8487 which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and likewise above (
8488 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A6" id="FS_Q39_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[6]</a>).
8489 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 co."><a name="35204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35204] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8490 dicendum quod aliquid esse bonum vel malum, potest dici dupliciter.
8491 Uno modo, simpliciter et secundum se. Et sic omnis tristitia est
8492 quoddam malum, hoc enim ipsum quod est appetitum hominis anxiari de
8493 malo praesenti, rationem mali habet; impeditur enim per hoc quies
8494 appetitus in bono. Alio modo dicitur aliquid bonum vel malum, ex
8495 suppositione alterius, sicut verecundia dicitur esse bonum, ex
8496 suppositione alicuius turpis commissi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sic
8497 igitur, supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem
8498 pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat. Quod
8499 enim non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel
8500 non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque
8501 istorum est malum manifeste. Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut,
8502 supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor. Et hoc est
8503 quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>adhuc est bonum
8504 quod dolet amissum bonum, nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in
8505 natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena</i>. Sed quia
8506 sermones morales sunt in singularibus, quorum sunt operationes,
8507 illud quod est ex suppositione bonum, debet bonum iudicari, sicut
8508 quod est ex suppositione voluntarium, iudicatur voluntarium, ut
8509 dicitur in III Ethic., et supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p7">
8510 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject
8511 that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not
8512 shun the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily
8513 evil is the proof of the goodness of nature.
8514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35205] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8515 ergo dicendum quod Gregorius Nyssenus loquitur de tristitia ex
8516 parte mali tristantis, non autem ex parte sentientis et repudiantis
8517 malum. Et ex hac etiam parte omnes fugiunt tristitiam, inquantum
8518 fugiunt malum, sed sensum et refutationem mali non fugiunt. Et sic
8519 etiam dicendum est de dolore corporali, nam sensus et recusatio
8520 mali corporalis attestatur naturae bonae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35206] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet
8521 responsio ad secundum et tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A2-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 2. Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p2">
8522 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine
8523 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of
8524 entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
8525 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35207] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
8526 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non habeat rationem boni
8527 honesti. Quod enim ad Inferos deducit, contrariatur honesto. Sed
8528 sicut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>Iacob hoc
8529 timuisse videtur, ne nimia tristitia sic perturbaretur, ut non ad
8530 requiem beatorum iret, sed ad Inferos peccatorum</i>. Ergo
8531 tristitia non habet rationem boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p3">
8532 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (
8533 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
8534 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35208] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8535 bonum honestum habet rationem laudabilis et meritorii. Sed
8536 tristitia diminuit rationem laudis et meriti, dicit enim apostolus,
8537 II ad Cor. IX, <i>unusquisque prout destinavit in corde suo, non ex
8538 tristitia aut ex necessitate</i>. Ergo tristitia non est bonum
8539 honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p4">
8540 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will."
8541 But not to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence
8542 whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the
8543 will, as stated above (
8544 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A9" id="FS_Q39_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[9]</a>), it seems that sorrow is
8545 incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous.
8546 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35209] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8547 sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>tristitia est de his
8548 quae, nobis nolentibus, accidunt</i>. Sed non velle ea quae
8549 praesentialiter fiunt, est habere voluntatem repugnantem
8550 ordinationi divinae, cuius providentiae subiacent omnia quae
8551 aguntur. Ergo, cum conformitas humanae voluntatis ad divinam
8552 pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis, ut supra dictum est; videtur
8553 quod tristitia contrarietur rectitudini voluntatis. Et sic non
8554 habet rationem honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p5">
8555 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from
8556 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv"> Mat. 5:5</a>: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.
8557 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35210] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
8558 omne quod meretur praemium vitae aeternae, habet rationem honesti.
8559 Sed tristitia est huiusmodi, ut patet per id quod dicitur Matth. V,
8560 <i>beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur</i>. Ergo tristitia
8561 est bonum honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p6">
8562 <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. For it has been said above
8563 <a href="#FS_Q39_A1" id="FS_Q39_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain,
8564 are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing
8565 that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right
8566 judgment of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every
8567 virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow
8568 may be a virtuous good.
8569 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 co."><a name="35211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35211] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8570 dicendum quod, secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum,
8571 potest esse bonum honestum. Dictum est enim quod tristitia est
8572 bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali. Quae quidem duo in
8573 dolore corporali, attestantur bonitati naturae, ex qua provenit
8574 quod sensus sentit, et natura refugit laesivum, quod causat
8575 dolorem. In interiori vero tristitia, cognitio mali quandoque
8576 quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis; et recusatio mali est per
8577 voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum. Omne autem bonum
8578 honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis
8579 et voluntatis. Unde manifestum est quod tristitia potest habere
8580 rationem boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p7">
8581 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good;
8582 but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.
8583 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35212] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8584 ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae regulari debent secundum
8585 regulam rationis, quae est radix boni honesti. Quam transcendit
8586 immoderata tristitia, de qua loquitur Augustinus. Et ideo recedit a
8587 ratione boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p8">
8588 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse
8589 reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good;
8590 for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.
8591 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35213] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8592 dicendum quod, sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et
8593 ratione recta, quae detestatur malum; ita tristitia de bono
8594 procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quae detestatur bonum.
8595 Et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti,
8596 sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p9">
8597 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen---such as sins. Consequently
8598 a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen
8599 actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves:
8600 but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated
8601 above (
8602 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A10" id="FS_Q39_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[10]</a>).
8603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35214] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8604 dicendum quod aliqua praesentialiter eveniunt, quae non fiunt Deo
8605 volente, sed Deo permittente, sicut peccata. Unde voluntas
8606 repugnans peccato existenti vel in se vel in alio, non discordat a
8607 voluntate Dei. Mala vero poenalia praesentialiter contingunt, etiam
8608 Deo volente. Non tamen exigitur ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quod ea
8609 secundum se homo velit, sed solum quod non contranitatur ordini
8610 divinae iustitiae, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A3-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 3. Whether sorrow can be a useful good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p2">
8611 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written (
8612 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:25</a>): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it."
8613 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35215] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
8614 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non possit esse bonum utile.
8615 Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, <i>multos occidit tristitia, et non est
8616 utilitas in illa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p3">
8617 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow
8618 is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
8619 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35216] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8620 electio est de eo quod est utile ad finem aliquem. Sed tristitia
8621 non est eligibilis, quinimmo <i>idem sine tristitia, quam cum
8622 tristitia, est magis eligendum</i>, ut dicitur in III Topic. Ergo
8623 tristitia non est bonum utile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p4">
8624 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation,"
8625 as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
8626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35217] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a>
8627 <i>Praeterea, omnis res est propter suam operationem</i>, ut
8628 dicitur in II de coelo. Sed tristitia impedit operationem, ut
8629 dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni
8630 utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p5">
8631 <b>On the contrary,</b> The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to
8632 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.5" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:5, </a> "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow is useful.
8633 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35218] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
8634 sapiens non quaerit nisi utilia. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. VII,
8635 <i>cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia</i>.
8636 Ergo tristitia est utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q39_A3-p6">
8637 <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present
8638 evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement
8639 arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use,
8640 if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may
8641 be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance,
8642 sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says (
8643 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:9</a>): "I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is
8644 to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being
8645 attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the
8646 case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to
8647 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.3" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:3</a>: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of
8648 all."
8649 </p><p id="FS_Q39_A3-p7"> Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because
8650 the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the
8651 good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for
8652 evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.
8653 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 co."><a name="35219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35219] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8654 dicendum quod ex malo praesenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus.
8655 Unus quidem est quo appetitus contrariatur malo praesenti. Et ex
8656 ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est
8657 praesens, non potest non esse praesens. Secundus motus consurgit in
8658 appetitu ad fugiendum vel repellendum malum contristans. Et quantum
8659 ad hoc, tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est
8660 fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter. Uno modo, propter
8661 seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum; sicut peccatum. Et
8662 ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat
8663 peccatum, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, <i>gaudeo, non
8664 quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad
8665 poenitentiam</i>. Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit
8666 secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali; dum vel homo nimis
8667 inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod
8668 malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus. Et secundum hoc,
8669 tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur
8670 Eccle. VII, <i>melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum
8671 convivii, in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum</i>. Ideo
8672 autem tristitia in omni fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur
8673 fugiendi causa. Nam ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est, ipsam
8674 autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes
8675 appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono
8676 facit ut bonum avidius quaeratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut
8677 malum vehementius fugiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p8">
8678 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul,
8679 and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (
8680 <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q39_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[2]</a>).
8681 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35220] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8682 ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa intelligitur de immoderata
8683 tristitia, quae animum absorbet. Huiusmodi enim tristitia
8684 immobilitat animum, et impedit fugam mali, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p9">
8685 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to
8686 be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful.
8687 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35221] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8688 dicendum quod, sicut quodlibet eligibile fit minus eligibile
8689 propter tristitiam, ita quodlibet fugiendum redditur magis
8690 fugiendum propter tristitiam. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia est
8691 utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p10">
8692 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.
8693 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35222] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8694 dicendum quod tristitia de operatione aliqua, impedit operationem,
8695 sed tristitia de cessatione operationis, facit avidius operari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A4-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 4. Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p2">
8696 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain
8697 pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil.
8698 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35223] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
8699 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia sit summum malum. Optimo
8700 enim opponitur pessimum, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed quaedam
8701 delectatio est optimum, quae scilicet pertinet ad felicitatem. Ergo
8702 aliqua tristitia est summum malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3">
8703 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever
8704 he will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above (
8705 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>, OBJ[5];
8706 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A8" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[5], A[8]</a>, OBJ[3]). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening
8707 contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain
8708 is man's greatest evil.
8709 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35224] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8710 beatitudo est summum bonum hominis, quia est ultimus hominis finis.
8711 Sed beatitudo consistit in hoc quod homo habeat quidquid velit, et
8712 nihil mali velit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo summum bonum hominis
8713 est impletio voluntatis ipsius. Sed tristitia consistit in hoc quod
8714 accidit aliquid contra voluntatem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de
8715 Civ. Dei. Ergo tristitia est summum malum hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p4">
8716 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body
8717 is the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil
8718 of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's
8719 greatest good is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain."
8720 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35225] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8721 Augustinus sic argumentatur in Soliloq., <i>ex duabus partibus
8722 compositi sumus, ex anima scilicet et corpore, quarum pars deterior
8723 corpus est. Summum autem bonum est melioris partis optimum, summum
8724 autem malum, pessimum deterioris. Est autem optimum in animo
8725 sapientia, in corpore pessimum dolor. Summum igitur bonum hominis
8726 est sapere, summum malum dolere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p5">
8727 <b>On the contrary,</b> Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated in the
8728 <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A6" id="FS_Q39_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[6]</a>. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For
8729 Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont
8730 to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin."
8731 Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil.
8732 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35226] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
8733 culpa est magis malum quam poena, ut in primo habitum est. Sed
8734 tristitia seu dolor pertinet ad poenam peccati; sicut frui rebus
8735 mutabilibus est malum culpae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de
8736 vera religione, <i>quis est dolor qui dicitur animi, nisi carere
8737 mutabilibus rebus quibus fruebatur, aut frui se posse speraverat?
8738 Et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum, idest peccatum, et poena
8739 peccati</i>. Ergo tristitia seu dolor non est summum malum
8740 hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p6">
8741 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is
8742 truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil
8743 cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil,
8744 or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really
8745 good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it
8746 is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil.
8747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 co."><a name="35227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35227] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8748 dicendum quod impossibile est aliquam tristitiam seu dolorem esse
8749 summum hominis malum. Omnis enim tristitia seu dolor aut est de hoc
8750 quod est vere malum, aut est de aliquo apparenti malo, quod est
8751 vere bonum. Dolor autem seu tristitia quae est de vere malo, non
8752 potest esse summum malum, est enim aliquid eo peius, scilicet vel
8753 non iudicare esse malum illud quod vere est malum, vel etiam non
8754 refutare illud. Tristitia autem vel dolor qui est de apparenti
8755 malo, quod est vere bonum, non potest esse summum malum, quia peius
8756 esset omnino alienari a vero bono. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua
8757 tristitia vel dolor sit summum hominis malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p7">
8758 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order
8759 of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal
8760 of which they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better.
8761 Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated (
8762 <a href="#FS_Q34_A3" id="FS_Q39_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[34],
8763 A[3]
8764 </a>): whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil.
8765 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35228] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8766 ergo dicendum quod duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et
8767 tristitiae, scilicet iudicium verum de bono et malo; et ordo
8768 debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum. Et sic
8769 patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cuius
8770 privationem potest fieri deterius. Sed non in omni delectatione est
8771 aliquod malum, per cuius remotionem possit fieri melius. Unde
8772 delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum, eo modo quo
8773 supra dictum est, tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis
8774 malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p8">
8775 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil;
8776 because it has an admixture of good.
8777 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35229] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8778 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est voluntatem repugnare malo, est
8779 quoddam bonum. Et propter hoc, tristitia vel dolor non potest esse
8780 summum malum, quia habet aliquam permixtionem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p9">
8781 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms,"
8782 as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil
8783 to the body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius
8784 Celsus].
8785 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35230] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8786 dicendum quod peius est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori.
8787 Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid.
8788 Unde maius malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum
8789 corporis. Unde non est efficax, ratio, quam Augustinus inducit non
8790 ex sensu suo sed ex sensu alterius.</p></div></div></div></div>
8791 <div id="FS_Q40" class="div3">
8792 <h3 id="FS_Q40-p0.1">Q. 40. OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
8793 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
8794 <p id="FS_Q40-p2"> We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there
8795 are eight points of inquiry:
8796 </p><p id="FS_Q40-p3"><a href="#FS_Q40_A1"> (1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p4"><a href="#FS_Q40_A2"> (2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p5"><a href="#FS_Q40_A3"> (3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p6"><a href="#FS_Q40_A4"> (4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p7"><a href="#FS_Q40_A5"> (5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p8"><a href="#FS_Q40_A6"> (6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p9"><a href="#FS_Q40_A7"> (7) Concerning the order of hope to love;</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p10"><a href="#FS_Q40_A8"> (8) Whether love conduces to action?</a></p>
8797 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 pr."><a name="35231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35231]
8798 Iª-IIae q. 40 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
8799 passionibus irascibilis, et primo, de spe et desperatione; secundo,
8800 de timore et audacia; tertio, de ira. Circa primum quaeruntur octo.
8801 Primo, utrum spes sit idem quod desiderium vel cupiditas. Secundo,
8802 utrum spes sit in vi apprehensiva, vel in vi appetitiva. Tertio,
8803 utrum spes sit in brutis animalibus. Quarto, utrum spei
8804 contrarietur desperatio. Quinto, utrum causa spei sit experientia.
8805 Sexto, utrum in iuvenibus et ebriosis spes abundet. Septimo, de
8806 ordine spei ad amorem. Octavo, utrum spes conferat ad
8807 operationem.</p></div></div></div>
8808 <div id="FS_Q40_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A1-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 1. Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p2">
8809 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions.
8810 But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore
8811 hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
8812 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35232] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
8813 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes sit idem quod desiderium sive
8814 cupiditas. Spes enim ponitur una quatuor principalium passionum.
8815 Sed Augustinus, enumerans quatuor principales passiones, ponit
8816 cupiditatem loco spei, ut patet in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo spes est
8817 idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p3">
8818 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire,
8819 viz. the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
8820 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35233] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8821 passiones differunt secundum obiecta. Sed idem est obiectum spei,
8822 et cupiditatis sive desiderii, scilicet bonum futurum. Ergo spes
8823 est idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p4">
8824 <b>Objection 3:</b> If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever
8825 is accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to
8826 a future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire
8827 or cupidity.
8828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35234] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur
8829 quod spes addit supra desiderium possibilitatem adipiscendi bonum
8830 futurum, contra, id quod per accidens se habet ad obiectum, non
8831 variat speciem passionis. Sed possibile se habet per accidens ad
8832 bonum futurum, quod est obiectum cupiditatis vel desiderii, et
8833 spei. Ergo spes non est passio specie differens a desiderio vel
8834 cupiditate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p5">
8835 <b>On the contrary,</b> To different powers belong different species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity
8836 is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity.
8837 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35235] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
8838 diversarum potentiarum sunt diversae passiones specie differentes.
8839 Sed spes est in irascibili; desiderium autem et cupiditas in
8840 concupiscibili. Ergo spes differt specie a desiderio seu
8841 cupiditate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p6">
8842 <b>I answer that,</b> The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it
8843 is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards
8844 evil. Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect,
8845 hope differs from joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something
8846 arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any
8847 time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs
8848 to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible
8849 to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair. It
8850 is
8851 therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason,
8852 moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as
8853 stated above (
8854 <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q40_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>).
8855 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 co."><a name="35236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35236] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8856 dicendum quod species passionis ex obiecto consideratur circa
8857 obiectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem,
8858 quod sit bonum, non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono.
8859 Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo. Secundo, ut sit
8860 futurum, non enim spes est de praesenti iam habito. Et per hoc
8861 differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono praesenti. Tertio,
8862 requiritur quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile,
8863 non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum, quod statim est
8864 in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel
8865 cupiditate, quae est de bono futuro absolute, unde pertinet ad
8866 concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem. Quarto, quod illud
8867 arduum sit possibile adipisci, non enim aliquis sperat id quod
8868 omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a
8869 desperatione. Sic ergo patet quod spes differt a desiderio, sicut
8870 differunt passiones irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et
8871 propter hoc, spes praesupponit desiderium, sicut et omnes passiones
8872 irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis, ut supra
8873 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p7">
8874 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is
8875 reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.
8876 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35237] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8877 ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit cupiditatem loco spei, propter
8878 hoc quod utrumque respicit bonum futurum, et quia bonum quod non
8879 est arduum, quasi nihil reputatur; ut sic cupiditas maxime videatur
8880 tendere in bonum arduum, in quod etiam tendit spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p8">
8881 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above.
8882 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35238] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8883 dicendum quod obiectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum
8884 arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p9">
8885 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to
8886 another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in the
8887 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q40_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the
8888 appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under
8889 the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from
8890 despair according to the difference of possible and impossible.
8891 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35239] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8892 dicendum quod obiectum spei non tantum addit possibilitatem super
8893 obiectum desiderii, sed etiam arduitatem, quae ad aliam potentiam
8894 facit spem pertinere, scilicet ad irascibilem, quae respicit
8895 arduum, ut in primo dictum est. Possibile autem et impossibile non
8896 omnino per accidens se habent ad obiectum appetitivae virtutis. Nam
8897 appetitus est principium motionis, nihil autem movetur ad aliquid
8898 nisi sub ratione possibilis; nullus enim movetur ad id quod
8899 existimat impossibile adipisci. Et propter hoc, spes differt a
8900 desperatione secundum differentiam possibilis et impossibilis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A2-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 2. Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p2">
8901 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says
8902 (
8903 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.25" target="asv">Rom. 8:25</a>): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power,
8904 which we exercise by "looking out." Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power.
8905 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35240] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
8906 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam. Spes
8907 enim videtur esse expectatio quaedam, dicit enim apostolus, Rom.
8908 VIII, <i>si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam
8909 expectamus</i>. Sed expectatio videtur ad vim cognitivam pertinere,
8910 cuius est exspectare. Ergo spes ad cognitivam pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p3">
8911 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope
8912 and to be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope
8913 does too.
8914 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35241] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8915 idem est, ut videtur, spes quod fiducia, unde et sperantes
8916 confidentes vocamus, quasi pro eodem utentes eo quod est confidere
8917 et sperare. Sed fiducia, sicut et fides, videtur ad vim cognitivam
8918 pertinere. Ergo et spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p4">
8919 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the
8920 cognitive power.
8921 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35242] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8922 certitudo est proprietas cognitivae virtutis. Sed certitudo
8923 attribuitur spei. Ergo spes ad vim cognitivam pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p5">
8924 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope regards good, as stated above
8925 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive,
8926 but to the appetitive power.
8927 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35243] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
8928 spes est de bono, sicut dictum est. Bonum autem, inquantum
8929 huiusmodi, non est obiectum cognitivae, sed appetitivae virtutis.
8930 Ergo spes non pertinet ad cognitivam, sed ad appetitivam
8931 virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p6">
8932 <b>I answer that,</b> Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power; since
8933 movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by
8934 the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive
8935 power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite
8936 various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind
8937 of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise
8938 from the apprehension of something present and of something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something considered
8939 as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive
8940 power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the
8941 appetite to such a good.
8942 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 co."><a name="35244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35244] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
8943 dicendum quod, cum spes importet extensionem quandam appetitus in
8944 bonum, manifeste pertinet ad appetitivam virtutem, motus enim ad
8945 res pertinet proprie ad appetitum. Actio vero virtutis cognitivae
8946 perficitur non secundum motum cognoscentis ad res, sed potius
8947 secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Sed quia vis
8948 cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum;
8949 secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi
8950 motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex
8951 apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali, et similiter
8952 alius motus ex apprehensione praesentis et futuri, absoluti et
8953 ardui, possibilis et impossibilis. Et secundum hoc, spes est motus
8954 appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardui
8955 possibilis adipisci, scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi
8956 obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p7">
8957 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in
8958 two ways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is
8959 not said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get
8960 by another's help as though to await [exspectare] implied keeping one's eyes on another
8961 [ex alio spectare], in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends
8962 to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to
8963 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.51.10" target="asv"> Ecclus. 51:10, </a> "I looked for the succor of men." Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding
8964 inspection of the cognitive power.
8965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35245] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
8966 ergo dicendum quod, quia spes respicit ad bonum possibile, insurgit
8967 dupliciter homini motus spei, sicut dupliciter est ei aliquid
8968 possibile, scilicet secundum propriam virtutem, et secundum
8969 virtutem alterius. Quod ergo aliquis sperat per propriam virtutem
8970 adipisci, non dicitur expectare, sed sperare tantum. Sed proprie
8971 dicitur expectare quod sperat ex auxilio virtutis alienae, ut
8972 dicatur exspectare quasi ex alio spectare, inquantum scilicet vis
8973 apprehensiva praecedens non solum respicit ad bonum quod intendit
8974 adipisci, sed etiam ad illud cuius virtute adipisci sperat;
8975 secundum illud Eccli. li, <i>respiciens eram ad adiutorium
8976 hominum</i>. Motus ergo spei quandoque dicitur expectatio, propter
8977 inspectionem virtutis cognitivae praecedentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p8">
8978 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it;
8979 and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because
8980 the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better
8981 known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the
8982 appetite.
8983 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35246] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8984 dicendum quod illud quod homo desiderat, et aestimat se posse
8985 adipisci, credit se adepturum, et ex tali fide in cognitiva
8986 praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur.
8987 Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione praecedente, sicut
8988 effectus ex causa magis nota, magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva
8989 suum actum quam actum appetitivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p9">
8990 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone
8991 is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite
8992 derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.
8993 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35247] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8994 dicendum quod certitudo attribuitur motui non solum appetitus
8995 sensitivi, sed etiam appetitus naturalis, sicut dicitur quod lapis
8996 certitudinaliter tendit deorsum. Et hoc propter infallibilitatem
8997 quam habet ex certitudine cognitionis quae praecedit motum
8998 appetitus sensitivi, vel etiam naturalis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A3-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 3. Whether hope is in dumb animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p2">
8999 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
9000 ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and
9001 does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.
9002 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35248] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
9003 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in brutis animalibus non sit spes.
9004 Spes enim est de futuro bono, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed cognoscere
9005 futurum non pertinet ad animalia bruta, quae habent solum
9006 cognitionem sensitivam, quae non est futurorum. Ergo spes non est
9007 in brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p3">
9008 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the
9009 true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb
9010 animals, since they have no mind.
9011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35249] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9012 obiectum spei est bonum possibile adipisci. Sed possibile et
9013 impossibile sunt quaedam differentiae veri et falsi, quae solum
9014 sunt in mente, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. Ergo spes non
9015 est in brutis animalibus, in quibus non est mens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p4">
9016 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things
9017 unseen: "for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" (
9018 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.
9019 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35250] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9020 Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur
9021 visis. Sed spes non est de eo quod videtur, <i>nam quod videt quis,
9022 quid sperat?</i> Ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Ergo spes non est in brutis
9023 animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p5">
9024 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.
9025 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35251] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
9026 spes est passio irascibilis. Sed in brutis animalibus est
9027 irascibilis. Ergo et spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6">
9028 <b>I answer that,</b> The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb
9029 animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to
9030 catch it: whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it. Because as stated above
9031 (
9032 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>;
9033 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[26], A[1]</a>;
9034 <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the apprehension
9035 of an intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will. But there is a difference, in
9036 that the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural appetite
9037 results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as
9038 does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the actions of
9039 irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions
9040 of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.
9041 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 co."><a name="35252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35252] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9042 dicendum quod interiores passiones animalium ex exterioribus
9043 motibus deprehendi possunt. Ex quibus apparet quod in animalibus
9044 brutis est spes. Si enim canis videat leporem, aut accipiter avem,
9045 nimis distantem, non movetur ad ipsam, quasi non sperans se eam
9046 posse adipisci, si autem sit in propinquo, movetur, quasi sub spe
9047 adipiscendi. Ut enim supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus
9048 brutorum animalium, et etiam appetitus naturalis rerum
9049 insensibilium, sequuntur apprehensionem alicuius intellectus, sicut
9050 et appetitus naturae intellectivae, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed in
9051 hoc est differentia, quod voluntas movetur ex apprehensione
9052 intellectus coniuncti, sed motus appetitus naturalis sequitur
9053 apprehensionem intellectus separati, qui naturam instituit; et
9054 similiter appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, quae etiam
9055 quodam instinctu naturali agunt. Unde in operibus brutorum
9056 animalium, et aliarum rerum naturalium, apparet similis processus
9057 sicut et in operibus artis. Et per hunc modum in animalibus brutis
9058 est spes et desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p7">
9059 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as though
9060 it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future.
9061 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35253] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
9062 ergo dicendum quod, quamvis bruta animalia non cognoscant futurum,
9063 tamen ex instinctu naturali movetur animal ad aliquid in futurum,
9064 ac si futurum praevideret. Huiusmodi enim instinctus est eis
9065 inditus ab intellectu divino praevidente futura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p8">
9066 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of hope is not the possible as differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate
9067 to a subject. The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the possible given in
9068 Metaph. v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have just mentioned.
9069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35254] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
9070 dicendum quod obiectum spei non est possibile, prout est quaedam
9071 differentia veri, sic enim consequitur habitudinem praedicati ad
9072 subiectum. Sed obiectum spei est possibile quod dicitur secundum
9073 aliquam potentiam. Sic enim distinguitur possibile in V Metaphys.,
9074 scilicet in duo possibilia praedicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p9">
9075 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the thing which is future does not come under the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present,
9076 an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future.
9077 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35255] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
9078 dicendum quod, licet id quod est futurum, non cadat sub visu; tamen
9079 ex his quae videt animal in praesenti, movetur eius appetitus in
9080 aliquod futurum vel prosequendum vel vitandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A4-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 4. Whether despair is contrary to hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p2">
9081 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. Because "to one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear
9082 is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope.
9083 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35256] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
9084 sic proceditur. Videtur quod desperatio non sit contraria spei. Uni
9085 enim unum est contrarium, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed spei
9086 contrariatur timor. Non ergo contrariatur ei desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p3">
9087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards
9088 the good, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair.
9089 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35257] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9090 contraria videntur esse circa idem. Sed spes et desperatio non sunt
9091 circa idem, nam spes respicit bonum, desperatio autem est propter
9092 aliquod malum impeditivum adeptionis boni. Ergo spes non
9093 contrariatur desperationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p4">
9094 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair
9095 seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to hope, which implies movement of stretching
9096 out towards the hoped-for good.
9097 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35258] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9098 motui contrariatur motus, quies vero opponitur motui ut privatio.
9099 Sed desperatio magis videtur importare immobilitatem quam motum.
9100 Ergo non contrariatur spei, quae importat motum extensionis in
9101 bonum speratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p5">
9102 <b>On the contrary,</b> The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes].
9103 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35259] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9104 est quod desperatio nominatur per contrarium spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6">
9105 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
9106 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>), there is a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone
9107 is to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according to approach and
9108 withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above (
9109 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>). Now the object of
9110 hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the light of something
9111 attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable,
9112 it has the character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an impossibility
9113 they disperse." And this is how despair stands in regard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: and
9114 consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach.
9115 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 co."><a name="35260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35260] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9116 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in mutationibus invenitur
9117 duplex contrarietas. Una secundum accessum ad contrarios terminos,
9118 et talis contrarietas sola invenitur in passionibus
9119 concupiscibilis, sicut amor et odium contrariantur. Alio modo, per
9120 accessum et per recessum respectu eiusdem termini, et talis
9121 contrarietas invenitur in passionibus irascibilis, sicut supra
9122 dictum est. Obiectum autem spei, quod est bonum arduum, habet
9123 quidem rationem attractivi, prout consideratur cum possibilitate
9124 adipiscendi, et sic tendit in ipsum spes, quae importat quendam
9125 accessum. Sed secundum quod consideratur cum impossibilitate
9126 obtinendi, habet rationem repulsivi, quia, ut dicitur in III
9127 Ethic., <i>cum ventum fuerit ad aliquid impossibile, tunc homines
9128 discedunt</i>. Et sic respicit hoc obiectum desperatio. Unde
9129 importat motum cuiusdam recessus. Et propter hoc, contrariatur spei
9130 sicut recessus accessui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p7">
9131 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the irascible
9132 passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety
9133 of approach and withdrawal.
9134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35261] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
9135 ergo dicendum quod timor contrariatur spei secundum contrarietatem
9136 obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali, haec enim contrarietas invenitur
9137 in passionibus irascibilis, secundum quod derivantur a passionibus
9138 concupiscibilis. Sed desperatio contrariatur ei solum secundum
9139 contrarietatem accessus et recessus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p8">
9140 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible
9141 to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good.
9142 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35262] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
9143 dicendum quod desperatio non respicit malum sub ratione mali, sed
9144 per accidens quandoque respicit malum, inquantum facit
9145 impossibilitatem adipiscendi. Potest autem esse desperatio ex solo
9146 superexcessu boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p9">
9147 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed impossible
9148 to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire
9149 to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is the object of desire.
9150 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35263] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
9151 dicendum quod desperatio non importat solam privationem spei; sed
9152 importat quendam recessum a re desiderata, propter aestimatam
9153 impossibilitatem adipiscendi. Unde desperatio praesupponit
9154 desiderium, sicut et spes, de eo enim quod sub desiderio nostro non
9155 cadit, neque spem neque desperationem habemus. Et propter hoc
9156 etiam, utrumque eorum est de bono, quod sub desiderio cadit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A5-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 5. Whether experience is a cause of hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p2">
9157 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher
9158 says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs experience and time." But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the
9159 appetite, as stated above
9160 <a href="#FS_Q40_A2" id="FS_Q40_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.
9161 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35264] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
9162 sic proceditur. Videtur quod experientia non sit causa spei.
9163 Experientia enim ad vim cognitivam pertinet, unde philosophus
9164 dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus intellectualis indiget
9165 experimento et tempore</i>. Spes autem non est in vi cognitiva, sed
9166 in appetitiva, ut dictum est. Ergo experientia non est causa
9167 spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p3">
9168 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old are slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems
9169 to follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive of opposites. Therefore experience is
9170 not a cause of hope.
9171 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35265] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9172 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>senes sunt difficilis
9173 spei, propter experientiam</i>, ex quo videtur quod experientia sit
9174 causa defectus spei. Sed non est idem causa oppositorum. Ergo
9175 experientia non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p4">
9176 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to have something to say about everything, without leaving anything
9177 out, is sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to point to great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience.
9178 Therefore inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope.
9179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35266] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9180 philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod <i>de omnibus enuntiare
9181 aliquid, et nihil praetermittere, quandoque est signum
9182 stultitiae</i>. Sed quod homo tentet omnia, ad magnitudinem spei
9183 pertinere videtur, stultitia autem provenit ex inexperientia. Ergo
9184 inexperientia videtur esse magis causa spei quam experientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p5">
9185 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which
9186 seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope.
9187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35267] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9188 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>aliqui sunt
9189 bonae spei, propter multoties et multos vicisse</i>, quod ad
9190 experientiam pertinet. Ergo experientia est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q40_A5-p6">
9191 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
9192 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either
9193 because it makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is caused
9194 by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man
9195 acquires the faculty of doing something
9196 easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do that which he is sure
9197 of having learned well."
9198 </p><p id="FS_Q40_A5-p7"> In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching
9199 and persuasion may be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far as it makes him reckon something
9200 possible, which before his experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope:
9201 because just as it makes a man think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely,
9202 experience makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope
9203 in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope.
9204 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 co."><a name="35268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35268] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9205 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, spei obiectum est bonum
9206 futurum arduum possibile adipisci. Potest ergo aliquid esse causa
9207 spei, vel quia facit homini aliquid esse possibile, vel quia facit
9208 eum existimare aliquid esse possibile. Primo modo est causa spei
9209 omne illud quod auget potestatem hominis, sicut divitiae,
9210 fortitudo, et, inter cetera, etiam experientia, nam per
9211 experientiam homo acquirit facultatem aliquid de facili faciendi,
9212 et ex hoc sequitur spes. Unde Vegetius dicit, in libro de re
9213 militari, <i>nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse
9214 confidit</i>. Alio modo est causa spei omne illud quod facit alicui
9215 existimationem quod aliquid sit sibi possibile. Et hoc modo et
9216 doctrina, et persuasio quaelibet potest esse causa spei. Et sic
9217 etiam experientia est causa spei, inquantum scilicet per
9218 experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sit sibi
9219 possibile, quod impossibile ante experientiam reputabat. Sed per
9220 hunc modum experientia potest etiam esse causa defectus spei. Quia
9221 sicut per experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sibi sit
9222 possibile, quod reputabat impossibile; ita e converso per
9223 experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid non sit sibi
9224 possibile, quod possibile existimabat. Sic ergo experientia est
9225 causa spei duobus modis, causa autem defectus spei, uno modo. Et
9226 propter hoc, magis dicere possumus eam esse causam spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p8">
9227 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom,
9228 which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it
9229 shows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope.
9230 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35269] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
9231 ergo dicendum quod experientia in operabilibus non solum causat
9232 scientiam; sed etiam causat quendam habitum, propter consuetudinem,
9233 qui facit operationem faciliorem. Sed et ipsa virtus intellectualis
9234 facit ad potestatem facile operandi, demonstrat enim aliquid esse
9235 possibile. Et sic causat spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p9">
9236 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence
9237 he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them."
9238 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35270] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
9239 dicendum quod in senibus est defectus spei propter experientiam,
9240 inquantum experientia facit existimationem impossibilis. Unde
9241 ibidem subditur quod eis multa evenerunt in deterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p10">
9242 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to
9243 judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes
9244 lack of hope.
9245 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35271] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
9246 dicendum quod stultitia et inexperientia possunt esse causa spei
9247 quasi per accidens, removendo scilicet scientiam per quam vere
9248 existimatur aliquid esse non possibile. Unde ea ratione
9249 inexperientia est causa spei, qua experientia est causa defectus
9250 spei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A6-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 6. Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p2">
9251 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so
9252 that it is compared to an anchor (
9253 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.19" target="asv">Heb. 6:19</a>). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness
9254 are not causes of hope.
9255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35272] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
9256 sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuventus et ebrietas non sint causa
9257 spei. Spes enim importat quandam certitudinem et firmitatem, unde
9258 ad Heb. VI, spes comparatur ancorae. Sed iuvenes et ebrii deficiunt
9259 a firmitate, habent enim animum de facili mutabilem. Ergo iuventus
9260 et ebrietas non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p3">
9261 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above
9262 <a href="#FS_Q40_A5" id="FS_Q40_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore
9263 they are not causes of hope.
9264 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35273] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9265 ea quae augent potestatem, maxime sunt causa spei, ut supra dictum
9266 est. Sed iuventus et ebrietas quandam infirmitatem habent
9267 adiunctam. Ergo non sunt causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p4">
9268 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above
9269 <a href="#FS_Q40_A5" id="FS_Q40_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope.
9270 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35274] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9271 experientia est causa spei, ut dictum est. Sed iuvenibus
9272 experientia deficit. Ergo iuventus non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p5">
9273 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope."
9274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35275] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9275 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>inebriati sunt
9276 bene sperantes</i>. Et in II Rhetoric. dicitur quod <i>iuvenes sunt
9277 bonae spei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p6">
9278 <b>I answer that,</b> Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered
9279 from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated
9280 above
9281 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope
9282 of the future, it has little to remember and
9283 lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands:
9284 and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful.
9285 Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible
9286 to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing
9287 possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink---viz. heat and high spirits,
9288 on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons
9289 attempt everything and are full of hope.
9290 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 co."><a name="35276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35276] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9291 dicendum quod iuventus est causa spei propter tria, ut philosophus
9292 dicit in II Rhetoric. Et haec tria possunt accipi secundum tres
9293 conditiones boni quod est obiectum spei, quod est futurum, et
9294 arduum, et possibile, ut dictum est. Iuvenes enim multum habent de
9295 futuro, et parum de praeterito. Et ideo, quia memoria est
9296 praeteriti, spes autem futuri; parum habent de memoria, sed multum
9297 vivunt in spe. Iuvenes etiam, propter caliditatem naturae, habent
9298 multos spiritus, et ita in eis cor ampliatur. Ex amplitudine autem
9299 cordis est quod aliquis ad ardua tendat. Et ideo iuvenes sunt
9300 animosi et bonae spei. Similiter etiam illi qui non sunt passi
9301 repulsam, nec experti impedimenta in suis conatibus, de facili
9302 reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Unde et iuvenes, propter
9303 inexperientiam impedimentorum et defectuum, de facili reputant
9304 aliquid sibi possibile. Et ideo sunt bonae spei. Duo etiam istorum
9305 sunt in ebriis, scilicet caliditas et multiplicatio spirituum,
9306 propter vinum; et iterum inconsideratio periculorum vel defectuum.
9307 Et propter eandem rationem etiam omnes stulti, et deliberatione non
9308 utentes, omnia tentant, et sunt bonae spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p7">
9309 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think
9310 that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
9311 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35277] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
9312 ergo dicendum quod in iuvenibus et in ebriis licet non sit firmitas
9313 secundum rei veritatem, est tamen in eis secundum eorum
9314 aestimationem, reputant enim se firmiter assecuturos illud quod
9315 sperant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p8"> In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady
9316 in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings.
9317 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35278] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
9318 dicendum ad secundum, quod iuvenes et ebrii habent quidem
9319 infirmitatem secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum eorum
9320 existimationem, habent potestatem; quia suos defectus non
9321 cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p9">
9322 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3).
9323 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35279] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
9324 dicendum quod non solum experientia, sed etiam inexperientia est
9325 quodammodo causa spei, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A7-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 7. Whether hope is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p2">
9326 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first
9327 of the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause
9328 love.
9329 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35280] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
9330 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit causa amoris. Quia
9331 secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, prima affectionum animae est
9332 amor. Sed spes est quaedam affectio animae. Amor ergo praecedit
9333 spem. Non ergo spes causat amorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p3">
9334 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above (
9335 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q40_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause.
9336 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35281] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9337 desiderium praecedit spem. Sed desiderium causatur ex amore, ut
9338 dictum est. Ergo etiam spes sequitur amorem. Non ergo causat
9339 ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p4">
9340 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above (
9341 <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[3]</a>). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope.
9342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35282] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9343 spes causat delectationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed delectatio non
9344 est nisi de bono amato. Ergo amor praecedit spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p5">
9345 <b>On the contrary,</b> The gloss commenting on
9346 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2, </a> "Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets charity." But charity is love.
9347 Therefore love is caused by hope.
9348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35283] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9349 est quod Matth. I, super illud, Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac autem
9350 genuit Iacob, dicit Glossa, <i>idest, fides spem, spes
9351 caritatem</i>. Caritas autem est amor. Ergo amor causatur a
9352 spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p6">
9353 <b>I answer that,</b> Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is
9354 something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us,
9355 not through ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us.
9356 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 co."><a name="35284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35284] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9357 dicendum quod spes duo respicere potest. Respicit enim sicut
9358 obiectum, bonum speratum. Sed quia bonum speratum est arduum
9359 possibile; aliquando autem fit aliquod arduum possibile nobis, non
9360 per nos, sed per alios; ideo spes etiam respicit illud per quod fit
9361 nobis aliquid possibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p7"> In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which
9362 we desire and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope,
9363 and not vice versa. Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards
9364 him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope
9365 in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by
9366 another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
9367 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum
9368 speratum, spes ex amore causatur, non enim est spes nisi de bono
9369 desiderato et amato. Inquantum vero spes respicit illum per quem
9370 fit aliquid nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e
9371 converso. Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse
9372 provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum, et sic
9373 incipimus ipsum amare. Ex hoc autem quod amamus aliquem, non
9374 speramus de eo, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet credimus nos
9375 redamari ab ipso. Unde amari ab aliquo facit nos sperare de eo, sed
9376 amor eius causatur ex spe quam de eo habemus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p8"> Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 ad arg."><a name="35285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35285] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 ad arg.</span></a> Et per
9377 haec patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A8-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 8. Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p2">
9378 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence
9379 which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.
9380 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35286] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
9381 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non adiuvet operationem, sed
9382 magis impediat. Ad spem enim securitas pertinet. Sed securitas
9383 parit negligentiam, quae impedit operationem. Ergo spes impedit
9384 operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3">
9385 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above (
9386 <a href="#FS_Q37_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[3]</a>). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (
9387 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv">Prov. 13:12</a>): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action.
9388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35287] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9389 tristitia impedit operationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed spes
9390 quandoque causat tristitiam, dicitur enim Prov. XIII, <i>spes quae
9391 differtur, affligit animam</i>. Ergo spes impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4">
9392 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above
9393 <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written (
9394 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.2.26" target="asv">2 Kings 2:26</a>), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action.
9395 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35288] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9396 desperatio contrariatur spei, ut dictum est. Sed desperatio, maxime
9397 in rebus bellicis, adiuvat operationem, dicitur enim II Reg. II,
9398 quod <i>periculosa res est desperatio</i>. Ergo spes facit
9399 contrarium effectum, impediendo scilicet operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p5">
9400 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
9401 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:10</a>) that "he that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to all other actions.
9402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35289] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9403 est quod dicitur I ad Cor. IX, quod <i>qui arat, debet arare in spe
9404 fructus percipiendi</i>. Et eadem ratio est in omnibus aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6">
9405 <b>I answer that,</b> Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its
9406 object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought
9407 that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly,
9408 on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above (
9409 <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[32],
9410 A[3]
9411 </a>), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above (
9412 <a href="#FS_Q33_A4" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[33], A[4]</a>). Therefore hope is conducive to action.
9413 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 co."><a name="35290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35290] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9414 dicendum quod spes per se habet quod adiuvet operationem,
9415 intendendo ipsam. Et hoc ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex ratione sui
9416 obiecti, quod est bonum arduum possibile. Existimatio enim ardui
9417 excitat attentionem, existimatio vero possibilis non retardat
9418 conatum. Unde sequitur quod homo intente operetur propter spem.
9419 Secundo vero, ex ratione sui effectus. Spes enim, ut supra dictum
9420 est, causat delectationem, quae adiuvat operationem, ut supra
9421 dictum est. Unde spes operationem adiuvat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p7">
9422 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear
9423 rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty:
9424 whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon
9425 as difficult.
9426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35291] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
9427 ergo dicendum quod spes respicit bonum consequendum, securitas
9428 autem respicit malum vitandum. Unde securitas magis videtur opponi
9429 timori, quam ad spem pertinere. Et tamen securitas non causat
9430 negligentiam, nisi inquantum diminuit existimationem ardui, in quo
9431 etiam diminuitur ratio spei. Illa enim in quibus homo nullum
9432 impedimentum timet, quasi iam non reputantur ardua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p8">
9433 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above (
9434 <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[3]</a>, ad 2).
9435 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35292] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
9436 dicendum quod spes per se causat delectationem, sed per accidens
9437 est ut causet tristitiam, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p9">
9438 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive
9439 less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove
9440 dangerous to the foe.
9441 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35293] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
9442 dicendum quod desperatio in bello fit periculosa, propter aliquam
9443 spem adiunctam. Illi enim qui desperant de fuga, debilitantur in
9444 fugiendo, sed sperant mortem suam vindicare. Et ideo ex hac spe
9445 acrius pugnant, unde periculosi hostibus fiunt.</p></div></div></div></div>
9446 <div id="FS_Q41" class="div3">
9447 <h3 id="FS_Q41-p0.1">Q. 41. OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
9448 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
9449 <p id="FS_Q41-p2"> We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered:
9450 (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
9451 </p><p id="FS_Q41-p3"><a href="#FS_Q41_A1"> (1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p4"><a href="#FS_Q41_A2"> (2) Whether fear is a special passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p5"><a href="#FS_Q41_A3"> (3) Whether there is a natural fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p6"><a href="#FS_Q41_A4"> (4) Of the species of fear.</a></p>
9452 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 pr."><a name="35294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35294]
9453 Iª-IIae q. 41 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est,
9454 primo, de timore; et secundo, de audacia. Circa timorem
9455 consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ipso timore; secundo, de
9456 obiecto eius; tertio, de causa ipsius; quarto, de effectu. Circa
9457 primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum timor sit passio animae.
9458 Secundo, utrum sit specialis passio. Tertio, utrum sit aliquis
9459 timor naturalis. Quarto, de speciebus timoris.</p></div></div></div>
9460 <div id="FS_Q41_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A1-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 1. Whether fear is a passion of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p2">
9461 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by
9462 way of {systole}"---i.e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature." But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic.
9463 ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion.
9464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35295] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
9465 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit passio animae. Dicit
9466 enim Damascenus, in libro III, quod timor est virtus secundum
9467 systolen idest contractionem, essentiae desiderativa. Sed nulla
9468 virtus est passio, ut probatur in II Ethic. Ergo timor non est
9469 passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p3">
9470 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something
9471 future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion.
9472 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35296] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9473 omnis passio est effectus ex praesentia agentis proveniens. Sed
9474 timor non est de aliquo praesenti, sed de futuro, ut Damascenus
9475 dicit in II libro. Ergo timor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p4">
9476 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses.
9477 But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion
9478 of the soul.
9479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35297] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9480 omnis passio animae est motus appetitus sensitivi, qui sequitur
9481 apprehensionem sensus. Sensus autem non est apprehensivus futuri,
9482 sed praesentis. Cum ergo timor sit de malo futuro, videtur quod non
9483 sit passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p5">
9484 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul.
9485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35298] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9486 est quod Augustinus, in XIV de Civ. Dei, enumerat timorem inter
9487 alias animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p6">
9488 <b>I answer that,</b> Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above
9489 (Q[22] ), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power---i.e. of a power whose object is compared
9490 to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are
9491 passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive
9492 power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied
9493 by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration.
9494 Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil.
9495 Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation---i.e. contraction---as
9496 Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore
9497 it has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards
9498 future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil.
9499 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 co."><a name="35299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35299] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9500 dicendum quod, inter ceteros animae motus, post tristitiam, timor
9501 magis rationem obtinet passionis. Ut enim supra dictum est, ad
9502 rationem passionis primo quidem pertinet quod sit motus passivae
9503 virtutis, ad quam scilicet comparetur suum obiectum per modum
9504 activi moventis, eo quod passio est effectus agentis. Et per hunc
9505 modum, etiam sentire et intelligere dicuntur pati. Secundo, magis
9506 proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivae virtutis. Et adhuc magis
9507 proprie, motus appetitivae virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui
9508 fit cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et adhuc propriissime illi
9509 motus passiones dicuntur, qui important aliquod nocumentum.
9510 Manifestum est autem quod timor, cum sit de malo, ad appetitivam
9511 potentiam pertinet, quae per se respicit bonum et malum. Pertinet
9512 autem ad appetitum sensitivum, fit enim cum quadam transmutatione,
9513 scilicet cum contractione, ut Damascenus dicit. Et importat etiam
9514 habitudinem ad malum, secundum quod malum habet quodammodo
9515 victoriam super aliquod bonum. Unde verissime sibi competit ratio
9516 passionis. Tamen post tristitiam, quae est de malo praesenti, nam
9517 timor est de malo futuro, quod non ita movet sicut praesens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p7">
9518 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles
9519 of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.
9520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35300] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
9521 ergo dicendum quod virtus nominat quoddam principium actionis, et
9522 ideo, inquantum interiores motus appetitivae virtutis sunt
9523 principia exteriorum actuum, dicuntur virtutes. Philosophus autem
9524 negat passionem esse virtutem quae est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p8">
9525 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the
9526 agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which
9527 is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.
9528 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35301] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
9529 dicendum quod, sicut passio corporis naturalis provenit ex
9530 corporali praesentia agentis, ita passio animae provenit ex animali
9531 praesentia agentis, absque praesentia corporali vel reali,
9532 inquantum scilicet malum quod est futurum realiter, est praesens
9533 secundum apprehensionem animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p9">
9534 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope
9535 for a future good, or to fear a future evil.
9536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35302] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
9537 dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit futurum, sed ex eo quod
9538 apprehendit praesens, animal naturali instinctu movetur ad
9539 sperandum futurum bonum, vel timendum futurum malum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A2-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 2. Whether fear is a special passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p2">
9540 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught
9541 by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i.e. sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of empty
9542 joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special
9543 but a general passion.
9544 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35303] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
9545 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit specialis passio. Dicit
9546 enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>quem non
9547 exanimat metus, nec cupiditas eum vastat, nec aegritudo</i>, idest
9548 tristitia, <i>macerat, nec ventilat gestiens et vana laetitia</i>.
9549 Ex quo videtur quod, remoto timore, omnes aliae passiones
9550 removentur. Non ergo passio est specialis, sed generalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p3">
9551 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial
9552 are in the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to
9553 many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil.
9554 Therefore it is not a special passion.
9555 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35304] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9556 philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>ita se habet in appetitu
9557 prosecutio et fuga, sicut in intellectu affirmatio et negatio</i>.
9558 Sed negatio non est aliquid speciale in intellectu, sicut nec
9559 affirmatio, sed aliquid commune ad multa. Ergo nec fuga in
9560 appetitu. Sed nihil est aliud timor quam fuga quaedam mali. Ergo
9561 timor non est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p4">
9562 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible:
9563 since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that
9564 fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (
9565 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q41_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different
9566 powers.
9567 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35305] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9568 si timor esset passio specialis, praecipue in irascibili esset. Est
9569 autem timor etiam in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II
9570 Rhetoric., quod timor est tristitia quaedam, et Damascenus dicit
9571 quod timor est virtus desiderativa, tristitia autem et desiderium
9572 sunt in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Non est ergo passio
9573 specialis, cum pertineat ad diversas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p5">
9574 <b>On the contrary,</b> Fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15).
9575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35306] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9576 est quod condividitur aliis passionibus animae; ut patet per
9577 Damascenum, in II libro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p6">
9578 <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object.
9579 Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain;
9580 so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul.
9581 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 co."><a name="35307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35307] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9582 dicendum quod passiones animae recipiunt speciem ex obiectis. Unde
9583 specialis passio est quae habet speciale obiectum. Timor autem
9584 habet speciale obiectum, sicut et spes. Sicut enim obiectum spei
9585 est bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci; ita obiectum timoris
9586 est malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest. Unde timor est
9587 specialis passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p7">
9588 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of
9589 this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general
9590 passion.
9591 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35308] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
9592 ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae derivantur ex uno
9593 principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem.
9594 Et ratione huius connexionis, remoto timore, removentur aliae
9595 passiones animae, non ideo quia sit passio generalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p8">
9596 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be
9597 something common, yet fear is a special passion.
9598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35309] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
9599 dicendum quod non omnis fuga appetitus est timor, sed fuga ab
9600 aliquo speciali obiecto, ut dictum est. Et ideo, licet fuga sit
9601 quoddam generale, tamen timor est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9">
9602 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost
9603 unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein,
9604 as stated above (
9605 <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object
9606 of fear causes sorrow when
9607 present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is
9608 either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the
9609 desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident
9610 from what has been said above (
9611 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>;
9612 <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.3" shape="rect"> Q[29], A[2]</a>;
9613 <a href="#FS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.4" shape="rect">
9614 Q[36], A[2]
9615 </a>).
9616 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35310] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
9617 dicendum quod timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim
9618 respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate,
9619 ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur
9620 a passionibus concupiscibilis et ad eas terminantur, ut supra
9621 dictum est; ideo timori attribuuntur ea quae sunt concupiscibilis.
9622 Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum obiectum, timoris est
9623 contristans, si praesens fuerit, unde et philosophus dicit ibidem
9624 quod timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel
9625 contristativi. Similiter et desiderium attribuitur a Damasceno
9626 timori, quia, sicut spes oritur a desiderio boni ita timor ex fuga
9627 mali; fuga autem mali oritur ex desiderio boni, ut ex supra dictis
9628 patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A3-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 3. Whether there is a natural fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p2">
9629 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through
9630 the soul refusing to be severed from the body."
9631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35311] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
9632 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor aliquis sit naturalis. Dicit
9633 enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod <i>est quidam timor naturalis,
9634 nolente anima dividi a corpore</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p3">
9635 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
9636 Therefore there is also a natural fear.
9637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35312] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9638 timor ex amore oritur, ut dictum est. Sed est aliquis amor
9639 naturalis, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo etiam est
9640 aliquis timor naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4">
9641 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (
9642 <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[4]</a>, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from
9643 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.18" target="asv"> Rom. 4:18, </a> where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear
9644 of nature.
9645 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35313] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9646 timor opponitur spei, ut supra dictum est. Sed est aliqua spes
9647 naturae, ut patet per id quod dicitur Rom. IV, de Abraham, quod
9648 contra spem naturae, in spem gratiae credidit. Ergo etiam est
9649 aliquis timor naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p5">
9650 <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is
9651 no natural fear.
9652 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35314] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
9653 ea quae sunt naturalia, communiter inveniuntur in rebus animatis et
9654 inanimatis. Sed timor non invenitur in rebus inanimatis. Ergo timor
9655 non est naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p6">
9656 <b>I answer that,</b> A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely
9657 accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire,
9658 and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines
9659 thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated
9660 above (
9661 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[1]</a>), the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way,
9662 even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the
9663 animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.
9664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 co."><a name="35315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35315] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9665 dicendum quod aliquis motus dicitur naturalis, quia ad ipsum
9666 inclinat natura. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quod totum
9667 perficitur a natura, absque aliqua operatione apprehensivae
9668 virtutis, sicut moveri sursum est motus naturalis ignis, et augeri
9669 est motus naturalis animalium et plantarum. Alio modo dicitur motus
9670 naturalis, ad quem natura inclinat, licet non perficiatur nisi per
9671 apprehensionem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, motus cognitivae et
9672 appetitivae virtutis reducuntur in naturam, sicut in principium
9673 primum. Et per hunc modum, etiam ipsi actus apprehensivae virtutis,
9674 ut intelligere, sentire et memorari, et etiam motus appetitus
9675 animalis, quandoque dicuntur naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7"> And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the
9676 diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks
9677 from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of "painful evil,"
9678 which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In
9679 this sense we have stated above (
9680 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>;
9681 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[30], A[3]</a>;
9682 <a href="#FS_Q31_A7" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.3" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[7]</a>) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural.
9683 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Et per hunc modum potest
9684 dici timor naturalis. Et distinguitur a timore non naturali,
9685 secundum diversitatem obiecti. Est enim, ut philosophus dicit in II
9686 Rhetoric., timor de malo corruptivo, quod natura refugit propter
9687 naturale desiderium essendi, et talis timor dicitur naturalis. Est
9688 iterum de malo contristativo, quod non repugnat naturae, sed
9689 desiderio appetitus, et talis timor non est naturalis. Sicut etiam
9690 supra amor, concupiscentia et delectatio distincta sunt per
9691 naturale et non naturale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8"> But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be
9692 natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred,
9693 desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to
9694 be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire
9695 and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain
9696 movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge
9697 is essential to these passions (thus we have said
9698 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">, Q[31], AA[1]</a>,3;
9699 <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be
9700 said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural
9701 inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary
9702 evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate
9703 beings.
9704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed secundum primam acceptionem
9705 naturalis, sciendum est quod quaedam de passionibus animae
9706 quandoque dicuntur naturales, ut amor, desiderium et spes, aliae
9707 vero naturales dici non possunt. Et hoc ideo, quia amor et odium,
9708 desiderium et fuga, important inclinationem quandam ad prosequendum
9709 bonum et fugiendum malum; quae quidem inclinatio pertinet etiam ad
9710 appetitum naturalem. Et ideo est amor quidam naturalis, et
9711 desiderium vel spes potest quodammodo dici etiam in rebus
9712 naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Sed aliae passiones animae
9713 important quosdam motus ad quos nullo modo sufficit inclinatio
9714 naturalis. Vel quia de ratione harum passionum est sensus seu
9715 cognitio, sicut dictum est quod apprehensio requiritur ad rationem
9716 delectationis et doloris, unde quae carent cognitione, non possunt
9717 dici delectari vel dolere. Aut quia huiusmodi motus sunt contra
9718 rationem inclinationis naturalis, puta quod desperatio refugit
9719 bonum propter aliquam difficultatem; et timor refugit impugnationem
9720 mali contrarii, ad quod est inclinatio naturalis. Et ideo huiusmodi
9721 passiones nullo modo attribuuntur rebus inanimatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p9"><b>Reply to the Objections</b> are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35316] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
9722 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A4-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 4. Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p2">
9723 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness,
9724 shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore
9725 the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (
9726 <a href="#FS_Q35_A8" id="FS_Q41_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Therefore there should only be four
9727 species of fear corresponding to them.
9728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35317] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
9729 sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Damascenus assignet sex
9730 species timoris, scilicet <i>segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam,
9731 admirationem, stuporem, agoniam</i>. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in
9732 II Rhetoric., <i>timor est de malo contristativo</i>. Ergo species
9733 timoris debent respondere speciebus tristitiae. Sunt autem quatuor
9734 species tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo solum debent esse
9735 quatuor species timoris, eis correspondentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p3">
9736 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power,
9737 as stated above
9738 <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q41_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.
9739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35318] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9740 illud quod in actu nostro consistit, nostrae potestati subiicitur.
9741 Sed timor est de malo quod excedit potestatem nostram, ut dictum
9742 est. Non ergo segnities et erubescentia et verecundia, quae
9743 respiciunt operationem nostram, debent poni species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p4">
9744 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (
9745 <a href="#FS_Q41_A1" id="FS_Q41_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>, 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore
9746 shame is not a species of fear.
9747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35319] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9748 timor est de futuro, ut dictum est. Sed verecundia est de turpi
9749 actu iam commisso, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Ergo verecundia non
9750 est species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p5">
9751 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore
9752 amazement and stupor are not species of fear.
9753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35320] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
9754 timor non est nisi de malo. Sed admiratio et stupor sunt de magno
9755 et insolito, sive bono sive malo. Ergo admiratio et stupor non sunt
9756 species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p6">
9757 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads
9758 to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.
9759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="35321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35321] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
9760 philosophi ex admiratione sunt moti ad inquirendum veritatem, ut
9761 dicitur in principio Metaphys. Timor autem non movet ad
9762 inquirendum, sed magis ad fugiendum. Ergo admiratio non est species
9763 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p7"><b>On the contrary,</b> suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35322] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in
9764 contrarium sufficiat auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q41_A4-p8">
9765 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
9766 <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q41_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like
9767 his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First,
9768 there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much
9769 toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which
9770 damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness";
9771 if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame."
9772 </p><p id="FS_Q41_A4-p9"> On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First
9773 by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge:
9774 and then there is "amazement." Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before
9775 us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the
9776 representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and
9777 fear of this kind is called "anxiety."
9778 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 co."><a name="35323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35323] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9779 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod
9780 excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit.
9781 Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in
9782 operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus. In operatione autem
9783 ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor
9784 gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis
9785 refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris. Secundo,
9786 turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu
9787 committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est
9788 verecundia. Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit,
9789 triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum.
9790 Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis, cum scilicet aliquis
9791 considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non
9792 sufficit. Et sic est admiratio. Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis,
9793 quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi
9794 offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est
9795 stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione. Tertio modo, ratione
9796 improvisionis, quia scilicet provideri non potest, sicut futura
9797 infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p10">
9798 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and
9799 for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of
9800 fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself.
9801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35324] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
9802 ergo dicendum quod illae species tristitiae quae supra positae
9803 sunt, non accipiuntur secundum diversitatem obiecti, sed secundum
9804 effectus, et secundum quasdam speciales rationes. Et ideo non
9805 oportet quod illae species tristitiae respondeant istis speciebus
9806 timoris, quae accipiuntur secundum divisionem propriam obiecti
9807 ipsius timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p11">
9808 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something
9809 connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this
9810 sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear.
9811 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35325] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
9812 dicendum quod operatio secundum quod iam fit, subditur potestati
9813 operantis. Sed aliquid circa operationem considerari potest
9814 facultatem operantis excedens, propter quod aliquis refugit
9815 actionem. Et secundum hoc, segnities, erubescentia et verecundia
9816 ponuntur species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p12">
9817 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear.
9818 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35326] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
9819 dicendum quod de actu praeterito potest timeri convitium vel
9820 opprobrium futurum. Et secundum hoc, verecundia est species
9821 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p13">
9822 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which
9823 arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement
9824 and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and
9825 stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to
9826 external work.
9827 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35327] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
9828 dicendum quod non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species
9829 timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de
9830 malo insolito. Vel potest dici quod, sicut segnities refugit
9831 laborem exterioris operationis, ita admiratio et stupor refugiunt
9832 difficultatem considerationis rei magnae et insolitae, sive sit
9833 bona sive mala, ut hoc modo se habeat admiratio et stupor ad actum
9834 intellectus, sicut segnities ad exteriorem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p14">
9835 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth,
9836 but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore
9837 amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto.
9838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="35328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35328] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
9839 dicendum quod admirans refugit in praesenti dare iudicium de eo
9840 quod miratur, timens defectum, sed in futurum inquirit. Stupens
9841 autem timet et in praesenti iudicare, et in futuro inquirere. Unde
9842 admiratio est principium philosophandi, sed stupor est
9843 philosophicae considerationis impedimentum.</p></div></div></div></div>
9844 <div id="FS_Q42" class="div3">
9845 <h3 id="FS_Q42-p0.1">Q. 42. OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
9846 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
9847 <p id="FS_Q42-p2"> We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q42-p3"><a href="#FS_Q42_A1"> (1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p4"><a href="#FS_Q42_A2"> (2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p5"><a href="#FS_Q42_A3"> (3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p6"><a href="#FS_Q42_A4"> (4) Whether fear itself can be feared?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p7"><a href="#FS_Q42_A5"> (5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p8"><a href="#FS_Q42_A6"> (6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?</a></p>
9848 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 pr."><a name="35329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35329]
9849 Iª-IIae q. 42 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
9850 obiecto timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum
9851 sit obiectum timoris, vel malum. Secundo, utrum malum naturae sit
9852 obiectum timoris. Tertio, utrum timor sit de malo culpae. Quarto,
9853 utrum ipse timor timeri possit. Quinto, utrum repentina magis
9854 timeantur. Sexto, utrum ea contra quae non est remedium, magis
9855 timeantur.</p></div></div></div>
9856 <div id="FS_Q42_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A1-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 1. Whether the object of fear is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p2">
9857 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what
9858 we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good
9859 as its proper object.
9860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35330] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
9861 sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum sit obiectum timoris. Dicit enim
9862 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>nihil
9863 timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non
9864 adipiscamur speratum</i>. Sed id quod amamus est bonum. Ergo timor
9865 respicit bonum sicut proprium obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p3">
9866 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good
9867 thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.
9868 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35331] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9869 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>potestas, et super
9870 alium ipsum esse, est terribile</i>. Sed huiusmodi est quoddam
9871 bonum. Ergo bonum est obiectum timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p4">
9872 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to fear God, according to
9873 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.10" target="asv"> Ps. 33:10</a>: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints." Therefore even the good is an object of fear.
9874 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35332] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9875 in Deo nihil malum esse potest. Sed mandatur nobis ut Deum
9876 timeamus; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, <i>timete dominum, omnes
9877 sancti eius</i>. Ergo etiam timor est de bono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p5">
9878 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.
9879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35333] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9880 est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo
9881 futuro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p6">
9882 <b>I answer that,</b> Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic.
9883 vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies
9884 pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since
9885 fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as
9886 its proper object.
9887 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p7"> It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil
9888 causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil
9889 is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through
9890 love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we
9891 love.
9892 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p8"> In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good
9893 we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above (
9894 <a href="#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q42_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[7]</a>), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired
9895 good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can
9896 inflict that evil. In this
9897 way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power
9898 of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm.
9899 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p9"> In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus
9900 a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.
9901 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 co."><a name="35334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35334] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9902 dicendum quod timor est quidam motus appetitivae virtutis. Ad
9903 virtutem autem appetitivam pertinet prosecutio et fuga, ut dicitur
9904 in VI Ethic. Est autem prosecutio boni. Fuga autem mali. Unde
9905 quicumque motus appetitivae virtutis importat prosecutionem, habet
9906 aliquod bonum pro obiecto, quicumque autem importat fugam, habet
9907 malum pro obiecto. Unde, cum timor fugam quandam importet, primo et
9908 per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum. Potest autem
9909 respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum.
9910 Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per
9911 malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est
9912 privativum boni. Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur
9913 ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et
9914 secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne
9915 amittatur bonum amatum. Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut
9916 causa ipsius, inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest
9917 inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato. Et ideo, sicut spes, ut
9918 supra dictum est, ad duo respicit, scilicet ad bonum in quod
9919 tendit, et ad id per quod sperat se bonum concupitum adipisci; ita
9920 etiam timor ad duo respicit, scilicet ad malum quod refugit, et ad
9921 illud bonum quod sua virtute potest infligere malum. Et per hunc
9922 modum Deus timetur ab homine, inquantum potest infligere poenam,
9923 vel spiritualem vel corporalem. Per hunc etiam modum timetur
9924 potestas alicuius hominis, maxime quando est laesa, vel quando est
9925 iniusta, quia sic in promptu habet nocumentum inferre. Ita etiam
9926 timetur super alium esse, idest inniti alii, ut scilicet in eius
9927 potestate sic constitutum nobis nocumentum inferre, sicut ille qui
9928 est conscius criminis, timetur, ne crimen revelet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to objections</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 ad arg."><a name="35335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35335] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
9929 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A2-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 2. Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p2">
9930 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take
9931 counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature
9932 is not an object of fear.
9933 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35336] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
9934 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit de malo naturae. Dicit
9935 enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>timor consiliativos
9936 facit</i>. Non autem consiliamur de his quae a natura eveniunt, ut
9937 dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo timor non est de malo naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p3">
9938 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object
9939 of fear, man would needs be always in fear.
9940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35337] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
9941 defectus naturales semper homini imminent, ut mors et alia
9942 huiusmodi. Si igitur de huiusmodi malis esset timor, oporteret quod
9943 homo semper esset in timore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p4">
9944 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such
9945 like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and
9946 yet it seems that it should be.
9947 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35338] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
9948 natura non movet ad contraria. Sed malum naturae provenit ex
9949 natura. Ergo quod timendo aliquis refugiat huiusmodi malum, non est
9950 a natura. Timor ergo naturalis non est de malo naturae; ad quem
9951 tamen hoc malum pertinere videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p5">
9952 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
9953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35339] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
9954 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia
9955 terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p6">
9956 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or
9957 painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary
9958 to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear.
9959 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p7"> But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature,
9960 not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and
9961 other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant.
9962 In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear
9963 arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the
9964 future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being
9965 remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either
9966 do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very
9967 far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered
9968 as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher
9969 says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of
9970 a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for
9971 him."
9972 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p8"> Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive,
9973 be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
9974 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 co."><a name="35340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35340] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
9975 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor
9976 provenit <i>ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel
9977 contristativi</i>. Sicut autem contristativum malum est quod
9978 contrariatur voluntati; ita corruptivum malum est quod contrariatur
9979 naturae. Et hoc est malum naturae. Unde de malo naturae potest esse
9980 timor. Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a
9981 causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia
9982 privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut
9983 mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus. Aliquando vero malum
9984 naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter
9985 infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo
9986 timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex
9987 phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus; illud quod removet
9988 futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem. Quod autem non
9989 appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno
9990 quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans, hoc enim, propter
9991 distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel
9992 parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., <i>quae
9993 valde longe sunt non timentur, sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur;
9994 sed quia non prope est, nihil curant</i>. Alio modo aestimatur
9995 aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter
9996 necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde
9997 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>illi qui iam
9998 decapitantur non timent</i>, videntes sibi necessitatem mortis
9999 imminere; sed <i>ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam
10000 spem salutis</i>. Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non
10001 apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est
10002 corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe
10003 evasionis, tunc timebitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p9">
10004 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although
10005 it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about
10006 avoiding it.
10007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35341] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10008 ergo dicendum quod malum naturae quandoque non provenit a natura,
10009 ut dictum est. Secundum tamen quod a natura provenit, etsi non ex
10010 toto vitari possit, potest tamen differri. Et sub hac spe, potest
10011 esse consilium de vitatione ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p10">
10012 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always
10013 feared.
10014 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35342] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10015 dicendum quod malum naturae, etsi semper immineat, non tamen semper
10016 imminet de propinquo. Et ideo non semper timetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p11">
10017 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them
10018 as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when
10019 present; fear when threatening in the future.
10020 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35343] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10021 dicendum quod mors et alii defectus naturae proveniunt a natura
10022 universali, quibus tamen repugnat natura particularis quantum
10023 potest. Et sic ex inclinatione particularis naturae, est dolor et
10024 tristitia de huiusmodi malis, cum sunt praesentia; et timor, si
10025 immineant in futurum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A3-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 3. Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p2">
10026 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract.
10027 ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to
10028 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear.
10029 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35344] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
10030 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor possit esse de malo culpae.
10031 Dicit enim Augustinus, super canonicam Ioan., quod <i>timore casto
10032 timet homo separationem a Deo</i>. Sed nihil separat nos a Deo nisi
10033 culpa; secundum illud Isaiae LIX. <i>Peccata vestra diviserunt
10034 inter vos et Deum vestrum</i>. Ergo timor potest esse de malo
10035 culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p3">
10036 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when
10037 they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also
10038 fear the evil of sin.
10039 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35345] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10040 Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod <i>de illis
10041 timemus, cum futura sunt, de quorum praesentia tristamur</i>. Sed
10042 de malo culpae potest aliquis dolere vel tristari. Ergo etiam malum
10043 culpae aliquis potest timere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p4">
10044 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
10045 ix, 4): and the Apostle says (
10046 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.10" target="asv">Gal. 5:10</a>): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.
10047 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35346] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10048 spes timori opponitur. Sed spes potest esse de bono virtutis, ut
10049 patet per philosophum in IX Ethic. Et apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V,
10050 <i>confido de vobis in domino, quod nihil aliud sapietis</i>. Ergo
10051 etiam timor potest esse de malo culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p5">
10052 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (
10053 <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q42_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.
10054 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="35347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35347] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
10055 verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed
10056 verecundia est de turpi facto. Quod est malum culpae. Ergo et
10057 timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p6">
10058 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow."
10059 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35348] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10060 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>non omnia mala
10061 timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A3-p7">
10062 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
10063 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q42_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>;
10064 <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q42_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[41], A[2]</a>), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous
10065 and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object
10066 of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause
10067 of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.
10068 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A3-p8"> But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination,
10069 in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell
10070 in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being
10071 led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this
10072 light it is not an object of fear to him.
10073 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 co."><a name="35349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35349] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10074 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut obiectum spei est
10075 bonum futurum arduum quod quis potest adipisci; ita timor est de
10076 malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest
10077 accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae,
10078 non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod
10079 habet causam extrinsecam. Malum autem culpae propriam causam habet
10080 voluntatem humanam. Et ideo proprie non habet rationem terribilis.
10081 Sed quia voluntas humana ab aliquo exteriori potest inclinari ad
10082 peccandum; si illud inclinans habeat magnam vim ad inclinandum,
10083 secundum hoc poterit esse timor de malo culpae, inquantum est ab
10084 exteriori causa, puta cum aliquis timet commorari in societate
10085 malorum, ne ab eis ad peccandum inducatur. Sed proprie loquendo, in
10086 tali dispositione magis timet homo seductionem quam culpam secundum
10087 propriam rationem, idest inquantum est voluntaria, sic enim non
10088 habet ut timeatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p9">
10089 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause.
10090 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35350] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10091 ergo dicendum quod separatio a Deo est quaedam poena consequens
10092 peccatum, et omnis poena aliquo modo est ab exteriori causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p10">
10093 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is
10094 about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil
10095 absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with
10096 the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so
10097 far as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when
10098 they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.
10099 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35351] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10100 dicendum quod tristitia et timor in uno conveniunt, quia utrumque
10101 est de malo, differunt autem in duobus. In uno quidem, quia
10102 tristitia est de malo praesenti, timor de malo futuro. In alio
10103 vero, quia tristitia, cum sit in concupiscibili, respicit malum
10104 absolute, unde potest esse de quocumque malo, sive parvo sive
10105 magno. Timor vero, cum sit in irascibili, respicit malum cum quadam
10106 arduitate seu difficultate, quae tollitur, inquantum aliquid
10107 subiacet voluntati. Et ideo non omnia timemus quae sunt futura, de
10108 quibus tristamur cum sunt praesentia, sed aliqua, quae scilicet
10109 sunt ardua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p11">
10110 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be
10111 of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power:
10112 and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both
10113 from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause.
10114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35352] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10115 dicendum quod spes est de bono quod quis potest adipisci. Potest
10116 autem aliquis adipisci bonum vel per se, vel per alium, et ideo
10117 spes potest esse de actu virtutis, qui est in potestate nostra
10118 constitutus. Sed timor est de malo quod non subiacet nostrae
10119 potestati, et ideo semper malum quod timetur, est a causa
10120 extrinseca. Bonum autem quod speratur, potest esse et a causa
10121 intrinseca, et a causa extrinseca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p12">
10122 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above (
10123 <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q42_A3-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>, ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is
10124 due to an extrinsic cause.
10125 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="35353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35353] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
10126 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, verecundia non est timor de
10127 actu ipso peccati, sed de turpitudine vel ignominia quae
10128 consequitur ipsum, quae est a causa extrinseca.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A4-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 4. Whether fear itself can be feared?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p2">
10129 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus
10130 a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep
10131 himself from fear by being afraid: which seems absurd.
10132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35354] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
10133 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor timeri non possit. Omne enim
10134 quod timetur, timendo custoditur, ne amittatur, sicut ille qui
10135 timet amittere sanitatem timendo custodit eam. Si igitur timor
10136 timeatur, timendo se custodiet homo ne timeat. Quod videtur esse
10137 inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p3">
10138 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.
10139 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35355] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10140 timor est quaedam fuga. Sed nihil fugit seipsum. Ergo timor non
10141 timet timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p4">
10142 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.
10143 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35356] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10144 timor est de futuro. Sed ille qui timet, iam habet timorem. Non
10145 ergo potest timere timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p5">
10146 <b>On the contrary,</b> A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.
10147 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35357] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10148 est quod homo potest amare amorem, et dolere de dolore. Ergo etiam,
10149 pari ratione, potest timere timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p6">
10150 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
10151 <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q42_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now
10152 fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far
10153 as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object
10154 of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he
10155 should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will, in
10156 so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object
10157 of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear
10158 cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.
10159 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 co."><a name="35358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35358] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10160 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, illud solum habet rationem
10161 terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit, non autem quod
10162 provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa
10163 extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati. Provenit quidem ex causa
10164 extrinseca, inquantum est passio quaedam consequens phantasiam
10165 imminentis mali. Et secundum hoc, potest aliquis timere timorem, ne
10166 scilicet immineat ei necessitas timendi, propter ingruentiam
10167 alicuius excellentis mali. Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum
10168 appetitus inferior obedit rationi, unde homo potest timorem
10169 repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit
10170 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Sed quia rationibus
10171 quas inducit, aliquis posset uti ad ostendendum quod timor nullo
10172 modo timeatur, ideo ad eas respondendum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p7">
10173 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every fear is identically the same; there are various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then,
10174 prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him
10175 from the fear which he has not.
10176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35359] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10177 ergo dicendum quod, non omnis timor est unus timor, sed secundum
10178 diversa quae timentur, sunt diversi timores. Nihil ergo prohibet
10179 quin uno timore aliquis praeservet se ab alio timore, et sic
10180 custodiat se non timentem illo timore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p8">
10181 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing
10182 flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.
10183 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35360] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10184 dicendum quod, cum sit alius timor quo timetur malum imminens, et
10185 alius timor quo timetur ipse timor mali imminentis; non sequitur
10186 quod idem fugiat seipsum, vel quod sit idem fuga sui ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p9">
10187 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object.
10188 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35361] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10189 dicendum quod propter diversitatem timorum iam dictam, timore
10190 praesenti potest homo timere futurum timorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A5-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 5. Whether sudden things are especially feared?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p2">
10191 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is
10192 about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil
10193 things.
10194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35362] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
10195 sic proceditur. Videtur quod insolita et repentina non sint magis
10196 terribilia. Sicut enim spes est de bono, ita timor est de malo. Sed
10197 experientia facit ad augmentum spei in bonis. Ergo etiam facit ad
10198 augmentum timoris in malis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p3">
10199 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and
10200 cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are
10201 less to be feared.
10202 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35363] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10203 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod magis timentur non qui
10204 acutae sunt irae, sed mites et astuti. Constat autem quod illi qui
10205 acutae irae sunt, magis habent subitos motus. Ergo ea quae sunt
10206 subita, sunt minus terribilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p4">
10207 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence
10208 the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that
10209 the case is different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared less.
10210 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35364] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10211 quae sunt subita, minus considerari possunt. Sed tanto aliqua magis
10212 timentur, quanto magis considerantur, unde philosophus dicit, in
10213 III Ethic., quod <i>aliqui videntur fortes propter ignorantiam,
10214 qui, si cognoverint quod aliud sit quam suspicantur, fugiunt</i>.
10215 Ergo repentina minus timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p5">
10216 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes
10217 forethought for their safety."
10218 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35365] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10219 est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., <i>timor insolita et
10220 repentina exhorrescit, rebus quae amantur adversantia, dum
10221 praecavet securitati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p6">
10222 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated about
10223 <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q42_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[41], A[2]), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one
10224 of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce
10225 to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil,
10226 the more we consider them, the smaller
10227 they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc.
10228 iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness
10229 increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide
10230 himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.
10231 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 co."><a name="35366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35366] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10232 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum timoris est malum
10233 imminens quod non de facili repelli potest. Hoc autem ex duobus
10234 contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex debilitate timentis.
10235 Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et
10236 repentinum. Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius
10237 appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis
10238 considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter
10239 diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium
10240 in III de Tusculanis quaest.; ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur
10241 timor futuri mali. Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum
10242 facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae
10243 homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non
10244 possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p7">
10245 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to
10246 increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since,
10247 therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear.
10248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35367] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10249 ergo dicendum quod obiectum spei est bonum quod quis potest
10250 adipisci. Et ideo ea quae augmentant potestatem hominis, nata sunt
10251 augere spem, et eadem ratione, diminuere timorem, quia timor est de
10252 malo cui non de facili potest resisti. Quia igitur experientia
10253 facit hominem magis potentem ad operandum, ideo, sicut auget spem,
10254 ita diminuit timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p8">
10255 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen.
10256 On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them,
10257 cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.
10258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35368] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10259 dicendum quod illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et
10260 ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin
10261 praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo
10262 nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex
10263 improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales
10264 magis timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p9">
10265 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when
10266 seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his
10267 wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty
10268 all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it
10269 seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance
10270 if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about.
10271 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35369] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10272 dicendum quod, per se loquendo, bona vel mala corporalia in
10273 principio maiora apparent. Cuius ratio est, quia unumquodque magis
10274 apparet, contrario iuxta se posito. Unde cum aliquis statim a
10275 paupertate ad divitias transit, propter paupertatem praeexistentem
10276 divitias magis aestimat, et e contrario divites statim ad
10277 paupertatem devenientes, eam magis horrent. Et propter hoc, malum
10278 repentinum magis timetur, quia magis videtur esse malum. Sed potest
10279 propter aliquod accidens contingere quod magnitudo alicuius mali
10280 lateat, puta cum hostes se insidiose occultant. Et tunc verum est
10281 quod malum ex diligenti consideratione fit terribilius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A6-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 6. Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p2">
10282 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear,
10283 that there be some hope of safety, as stated above
10284 <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q42_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared at all.
10285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35370] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
10286 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae non habent remedium, non sint
10287 magis timenda. Ad timorem enim requiritur quod remaneat aliqua spes
10288 salutis, ut supra dictum est. Sed in malis quae non habent
10289 remedium, nulla remanet spes salutis. Ergo talia mala nullo modo
10290 timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p3">
10291 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death
10292 to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things
10293 are not feared most, for which there is no remedy.
10294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35371] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10295 malo mortis nullum remedium adhiberi potest, non enim, secundum
10296 naturam, potest esse reditus a morte ad vitam. Non tamen mors
10297 maxime timetur, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Non ergo ea
10298 magis timentur quae remedium non habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p4">
10299 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day:
10300 nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things
10301 that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever. Consequently
10302 they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared.
10303 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35372] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10304 philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>non est magis bonum quod
10305 est diuturnius, eo quod est unius diei, neque quod est perpetuum,
10306 eo quod non est perpetuum</i>. Ergo, eadem ratione, neque maius
10307 malum. Sed ea quae non habent remedium, non videntur differre ab
10308 aliis nisi propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem. Ergo propter
10309 hoc non sunt peiora, vel magis timenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p5">
10310 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . .
10311 . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy."
10312 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35373] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10313 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>omnia timenda
10314 sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non
10315 contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p6">
10316 <b>I answer that,</b> The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased
10317 not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above (
10318 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q42_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[3]</a>). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase
10319 of evil. Because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to
10320 the duration of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil
10321 doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length
10322 of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have come, cannot be
10323 remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they inspire
10324 the greatest fear.
10325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 co."><a name="35374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35374] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10326 dicendum quod obiectum timoris est malum, unde illud quod facit ad
10327 augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non
10328 solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum
10329 circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem
10330 circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur
10331 facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum
10332 durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur, unde si pati aliquid in
10333 tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur
10334 ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito
10335 tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum
10336 augmentum. Mala autem quae, postquam advenerint, non possunt habere
10337 remedium, vel non de facili, accipiuntur ut perpetua vel diuturna.
10338 Et ideo maxime redduntur timenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p7">
10339 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there
10340 is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one
10341 by which an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now.
10342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35375] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10343 ergo dicendum quod remedium mali est duplex. Unum, per quod
10344 impeditur futurum malum, ne adveniat. Et tali remedio sublato,
10345 aufertur spes, et per consequens timor. Unde de tali remedio nunc
10346 non loquimur. Aliud remedium mali est, quo malum iam praesens
10347 removetur. Et de tali remedio nunc loquimur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p8">
10348 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above
10349 <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q42_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>.
10350 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35376] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10351 dicendum quod, licet mors sit irremediabile malum, tamen, quia non
10352 imminet de prope, non timetur, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p9">
10353 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is no
10354 better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature.
10355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35377] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10356 dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de per se bono, quod est
10357 bonum secundum speciem suam. Sic autem non fit aliquid magis bonum
10358 propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem, sed propter naturam ipsius
10359 boni.</p></div></div></div></div>
10360 <div id="FS_Q43" class="div3">
10361 <h3 id="FS_Q43-p0.1">Q. 43. OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
10362 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
10363 <p id="FS_Q43-p2"> We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q43-p3"><a href="#FS_Q43_A1"> (1) Whether love is the cause of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q43-p4"><a href="#FS_Q43_A2"> (2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?</a></p>
10364 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 pr."><a name="35378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35378]
10365 Iª-IIae q. 43 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
10366 timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum causa timoris
10367 sit amor. Secundo, utrum causa timoris sit defectus.</p></div></div></div>
10368 <div id="FS_Q43_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q43_A1-p0.1">Q. 43. A. 1. Whether love is the cause of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p2">
10369 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love
10370 of charity" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely.
10371 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35379] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
10372 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa timoris. Illud enim
10373 quod introducit aliquid, est causa eius. Sed timor introducit
10374 amorem caritatis, ut Augustinus dicit, super canonicam Ioan. Ergo
10375 timor est causa amoris, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p3">
10376 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But
10377 the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than
10378 by love.
10379 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35380] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10380 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>illi maxime timentur, a
10381 quibus expectamus imminere nobis aliqua mala</i>. Sed per hoc quod
10382 ab aliquo expectamus malum, magis provocamur ad odium eius quam ad
10383 amorem. Ergo timor magis causatur ab odio quam ab amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p4">
10384 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it has been stated above (
10385 <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q43_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[3]</a>) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost
10386 heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love.
10387 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35381] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10388 supra dictum est quod ea quae sunt a nobis ipsis, non habent
10389 rationem terribilium. Sed ea quae sunt ex amore, maxime proveniunt
10390 ex intimo cordis. Ergo timor ex amore non causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p5">
10391 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when
10392 we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for." Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently
10393 love is the cause of fear.
10394 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35382] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10395 est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
10396 <i>nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod
10397 amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum</i>.
10398 Omnis ergo timor causatur ex hoc quod aliquid amamus. Amor igitur
10399 est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q43_A1-p6">
10400 <b>I answer that,</b> The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions
10401 of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever
10402 is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of
10403 the object, is a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either
10404 by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable
10405 and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension
10406 of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which
10407 this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.
10408 </p><p id="FS_Q43_A1-p7"> Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and
10409 difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently,
10410 of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its
10411 object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his
10412 loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an
10413 evil.
10414 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 co."><a name="35383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35383] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10415 dicendum quod obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam
10416 formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae
10417 speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis.
10418 Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae
10419 per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa
10420 obiecti, est causa passionis. Contingit autem aliquid esse causam
10421 obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum
10422 dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum
10423 apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud
10424 quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel
10425 bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum
10426 dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio
10427 secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod
10428 est ei coniunctum. Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est
10429 aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non
10430 potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa
10431 effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud
10432 autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est
10433 causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis.
10434 Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat
10435 aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et
10436 per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8">
10437 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
10438 <a href="#FS_Q42_A1" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[1]</a>), fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: and
10439 thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that
10440 sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments, man keeps
10441 His commandments, and thus
10442 begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above (
10443 <a href="#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[40] , A[7]</a>).
10444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35384] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10445 ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, timor per se et primo
10446 respicit ad malum, quod refugit, quod opponitur alicui bono amato.
10447 Et sic per se timor nascitur ex amore. Secundario vero respicit ad
10448 id per quod provenit tale malum. Et sic per accidens quandoque
10449 timor inducit amorem, inquantum scilicet homo qui timet puniri a
10450 Deo, servat mandata eius, et sic incipit sperare, et spes
10451 introducit amorem, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p9">
10452 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we
10453 begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the beginning.
10454 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35385] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10455 dicendum quod ille a quo expectantur mala, primo quidem odio
10456 habetur, sed postquam ab ipso iam incipiunt sperari bona, tunc
10457 incipit amari. Bonum autem cui contrariatur malum quod timetur, a
10458 principio amabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p10">
10459 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material
10460 disposition, as stated above.
10461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35386] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10462 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de eo quod est causa mali
10463 terribilis per modum efficientis. Amor autem est causa eius per
10464 modum materialis dispositionis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q43_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q43_A2-p0.1">Q. 43. A. 2. Whether defect is the cause of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p2">
10465 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary
10466 to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
10467 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35387] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
10468 sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus non sit causa timoris. Illi
10469 enim qui potentiam habent, maxime timentur. Sed defectus
10470 contrariatur potentiae. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p3">
10471 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii,
10472 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
10473 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35388] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10474 illi qui iam decapitantur, maxime sunt in defectu. Sed tales non
10475 timent. Ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa
10476 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p4">
10477 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii,
10478 5). Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
10479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35389] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10480 decertare ex fortitudine provenit, non ex defectu. <i>Sed
10481 decertantes timent eos qui pro eisdem decertant</i>, ut dicitur in
10482 II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p5">
10483 <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet. ii,
10484 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.
10485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35390] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
10486 contrariorum contrariae sunt causae. Sed <i>divitiae, et robur, et
10487 multitudo amicorum, et potestas, excludunt timorem</i>, ut dicitur
10488 in II Rhetoric. Ergo ex defectu horum timor causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q43_A2-p6">
10489 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
10490 <a href="#FS_Q43_A1" id="FS_Q43_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, fear may be set down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that fears; the other
10491 is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause
10492 of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order
10493 to cause fear, this defect must be according
10494 to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is
10495 the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary
10496 is feared, were entirely absent.
10497 </p><p id="FS_Q43_A2-p7"> But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the
10498 cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that
10499 some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason
10500 of injustice, either because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by
10501 him.
10502 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 co."><a name="35391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35391] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10503 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex causa timoris accipi
10504 potest, una quidem per modum materialis dispositionis, ex parte
10505 eius qui timet; alia per modum causae efficientis, ex parte eius
10506 qui timetur. Quantum igitur ad primum, defectus, per se loquendo,
10507 est causa timoris, ex aliquo enim defectu virtutis contingit quod
10508 non possit aliquis de facili repellere imminens malum. Sed tamen ad
10509 causandum timorem requiritur defectus cum aliqua mensura. Minor
10510 enim est defectus qui causat timorem futuri mali, quam defectus
10511 consequens malum praesens, de quo est tristitia. Et adhuc esset
10512 maior defectus, si totaliter sensus mali auferretur, vel amor boni
10513 cuius contrarium timetur. Quantum vero ad secundum, virtus et
10514 robur, per se loquendo, est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquid
10515 quod apprehenditur ut nocivum, est virtuosum, contingit quod eius
10516 effectus repelli non potest. Contingit tamen per accidens quod
10517 aliquis defectus ex ista parte causat timorem, inquantum ex aliquo
10518 defectu contingit quod aliquis velit nocumentum inferre, puta
10519 propter iniustitiam, vel quia ante laesus fuit, vel quia timet
10520 laedi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p8">
10521 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause.
10522 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35392] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10523 ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa timoris ex parte
10524 causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p9">
10525 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are already being executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure
10526 of fear.
10527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35393] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10528 dicendum quod illi qui iam decapitantur, sunt in passione
10529 praesentis mali. Et ideo iste defectus excedit mensuram
10530 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p10">
10531 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account
10532 of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory.
10533 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35394] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10534 dicendum quod decertantes timent non propter potentiam, qua
10535 decertare possunt, sed propter defectum potentiae, ex quo contingit
10536 quod se superaturos non confidunt.</p></div></div></div></div>
10537 <div id="FS_Q44" class="div3">
10538 <h3 id="FS_Q44-p0.1">Q. 44. OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
10539 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
10540 <p id="FS_Q44-p2"> We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q44-p3"><a href="#FS_Q44_A1"> (1) Whether fear causes contraction?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p4"><a href="#FS_Q44_A2"> (2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p5"><a href="#FS_Q44_A3"> (3) Whether it makes one tremble?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p6"><a href="#FS_Q44_A4"> (4) Whether it hinders action?</a></p>
10541 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 pr."><a name="35395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35395]
10542 Iª-IIae q. 44 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
10543 effectibus timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
10544 timor faciat contractionem. Secundo, utrum faciat consiliativos.
10545 Tertio, utrum faciat tremorem. Quarto, utrum impediat
10546 operationem.</p></div></div></div>
10547 <div id="FS_Q44_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A1-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 1. Whether fear causes contraction?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p2">
10548 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn
10549 inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of
10550 daring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not
10551 cause contraction.
10552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35396] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
10553 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non faciat contractionem.
10554 Contractione enim facta, calor et spiritus ad interiora revocantur.
10555 Sed ex multitudine caloris et spirituum in interioribus,
10556 magnificatur cor ad audacter aliquid aggrediendum, ut patet in
10557 iratis, cuius contrarium in timore accidit. Non ergo timor facit
10558 contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p3">
10559 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out,
10560 as may be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore
10561 fear does not cause contraction.
10562 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35397] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10563 multiplicatis spiritibus et calore in interioribus per
10564 contractionem, sequitur quod homo in vocem prorumpat, ut patet in
10565 dolentibus. Sed timentes non emittunt vocem, sed magis redduntur
10566 taciturni. Ergo timor non facit contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p4">
10567 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (
10568 <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q44_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But
10569 blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is not an effect of fear.
10570 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35398] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10571 verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed
10572 verecundati rubescunt, ut dicit Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest.,
10573 et philosophus in IV Ethic. Rubor autem faciei non attestatur
10574 contractioni, sed contrario. Non ergo contractio est effectus
10575 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p5">
10576 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction.
10577 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35399] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10578 est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod timor est virtus
10579 secundum systolen, idest secundum contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6">
10580 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
10581 <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[28], A[5]</a>), in the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation
10582 is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance
10583 to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain
10584 contraction: the reason of which
10585 is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above (
10586 <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[41], A[2]</a>). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (
10587 <a href="#FS_Q43_A2" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[43], A[2]</a>): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear
10588 there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who is dying that nature
10589 withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when seized with fear, leave
10590 the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which pertains
10591 to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place
10592 in regard to the body.
10593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 co."><a name="35400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35400] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10594 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in passionibus animae est
10595 sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem
10596 materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri
10597 proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi
10598 motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio. Quantum autem ad animalem
10599 motum appetitus, timor contractionem quandam importat. Cuius ratio
10600 est, quia timor provenit ex phantasia alicuius mali imminentis quod
10601 difficile repelli potest, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem aliquid
10602 difficile possit repelli, provenit ex debilitate virtutis, ut supra
10603 dictum est. Virtus autem, quanto est debilior, tanto ad pauciora se
10604 potest extendere. Et ideo ex ipsa imaginatione quae causat timorem,
10605 sequitur quaedam contractio in appetitu. Sicut etiam videmus in
10606 morientibus quod natura retrahitur ad interiora, propter
10607 debilitatem virtutis, et videmus etiam in civitatibus quod, quando
10608 cives timent, retrahunt se ab exterioribus, et recurrunt, quantum
10609 possunt, ad interiora. Et secundum similitudinem huius
10610 contractionis, quae pertinet ad appetitum animalem, sequitur etiam
10611 in timore ex parte corporis, contractio caloris et spirituum ad
10612 interiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p7">
10613 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner
10614 parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For
10615 in those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance,
10616 the inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat
10617 concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid,
10618 on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the
10619 imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it: the
10620 result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.
10621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35401] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10622 ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in libro de
10623 problematibus, licet in timentibus retrahantur spiritus ab
10624 exterioribus ad interiora, non tamen est idem motus spirituum in
10625 iratis et timentibus. Nam in iratis, propter calorem et
10626 subtilitatem spirituum, quae proveniunt ex appetitu vindictae,
10627 interius fit spirituum motus ab inferioribus ad superiora, et ideo
10628 congregantur spiritus et calor circa cor. Ex quo sequitur quod
10629 irati redduntur prompti et audaces ad invadendum. Sed in
10630 timentibus, propter frigiditatem ingrossantem, spiritus moventur a
10631 superioribus ad inferiora, quae quidem frigiditas contingit ex
10632 imaginatione defectus virtutis. Et ideo non multiplicantur calor et
10633 spiritus circa cor, sed magis a corde refugiunt. Et propter hoc,
10634 timentes non prompte invadunt, sed magis refugiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p8">
10635 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing
10636 that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns.
10637 Now the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are in pain, their nature
10638 stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in
10639 repelling the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated
10640 together within, they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from
10641 crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards,
10642 as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward
10643 direction through the mouth: the result being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes its
10644 subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7).
10645 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35402] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10646 dicendum quod naturale est cuilibet dolenti, sive homini sive
10647 animali, quod utatur quocumque auxilio potest, ad repellendum
10648 nocivum praesens quod infert dolorem, unde videmus quod animalia
10649 dolentia percutiunt vel faucibus vel cornibus. Maximum autem
10650 auxilium ad omnia in animalibus est calor et spiritus. Et ideo in
10651 dolore natura conservat calorem et spiritum interius, ut hoc utatur
10652 ad repellendum nocivum. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in libro de
10653 problematibus, quod multiplicatis introrsum spiritibus et calore,
10654 necesse est quod emittantur per vocem. Et propter hoc, dolentes vix
10655 se possunt continere quin clament. Sed in timentibus fit motus
10656 interioris caloris et spirituum a corde ad inferiora, ut dictum
10657 est. Et ideo timor contrariatur formationi vocis, quae fit per
10658 emissionem spirituum ad superiora per os. Et propter hoc, timor
10659 tacentes facit. Et inde est etiam quod timor trementes facit, ut
10660 dicit philosophus, in libro de problematibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p9">
10661 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there
10662 is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination
10663 of death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were threatened by a natural
10664 death. Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9).
10665 But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. Consequently there results
10666 a contraction in this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free
10667 to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body: the result being that
10668 those who are ashamed blush.
10669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35403] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10670 dicendum quod pericula mortis non solum contrariantur appetitui
10671 animali, sed etiam contrariantur naturae. Et propter hoc, in
10672 huiusmodi timore non solum fit contractio ex parte appetitus, sed
10673 etiam ex parte naturae corporalis, sic enim disponitur animal ex
10674 imaginatione mortis contrahens calorem ad interiora, sicut quando
10675 naturaliter mors imminet. Et inde est quod timentes mortem
10676 pallescunt, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed malum quod timet
10677 verecundia, non opponitur naturae, sed solum appetitui animali. Et
10678 ideo fit quidem contractio secundum appetitum animalem, non autem
10679 secundum naturam corporalem, sed magis anima, quasi in se
10680 contracta, vacat ad motionem spirituum et caloris, unde fit eorum
10681 diffusio ad exteriora. Et propter hoc, verecundati rubescunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A2-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 2. Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p2">
10682 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a
10683 hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of
10684 reason. Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.
10685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35404] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
10686 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non faciat consiliativos. Non
10687 enim est eiusdem consiliativos facere, et consilium impedire. Sed
10688 timor consilium impedit, omnis enim passio perturbat quietem, quae
10689 requiritur ad bonum usum rationis. Ergo timor non facit
10690 consiliativos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p3">
10691 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all
10692 thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel,
10693 but hinders it.
10694 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35405] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10695 consilium est actus rationis de futuris cogitantis et deliberantis.
10696 Sed aliquis timor est <i>excutiens cogitata, et mentem a suo loco
10697 removet</i>, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest. Ergo
10698 timor non facit consiliativos, sed magis impedit consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p4">
10699 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas
10700 fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel,
10701 than hope is.
10702 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35406] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10703 sicut consilium adhibetur ad vitanda mala, ita etiam adhibetur ad
10704 consequenda bona. Sed sicut timor est de malis vitandis, ita spes
10705 est de bonis consequendis. Ergo timor non facit magis consiliativos
10706 quam spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p5">
10707 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel."
10708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35407] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10709 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod timor
10710 consiliativos facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q44_A2-p6">
10711 <b>I answer that,</b> A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes
10712 men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust
10713 ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult
10714 to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above (
10715 <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q44_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[2]</a>). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.
10716 </p><p id="FS_Q44_A2-p7"> Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion
10717 makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really
10718 are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing
10719 to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
10720 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 co."><a name="35408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35408] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10721 dicendum quod aliquis potest dici consiliativus dupliciter. Uno
10722 modo, a voluntate seu sollicitudine consiliandi. Et sic timor
10723 consiliativos facit. Quia, ut philosophus in III Ethic. dicit,
10724 <i>consiliamur de magnis, in quibus quasi nobis ipsis
10725 discredimus</i>. Ea autem quae timorem incutiunt, non sunt
10726 simpliciter mala, sed habent quandam magnitudinem, tum ex eo quod
10727 apprehenduntur ut quae difficiliter repelli possunt; tum etiam quia
10728 apprehenduntur ut de prope existentia, sicut iam dictum est. Unde
10729 homines maxime in timoribus quaerunt consiliari. Alio modo dicitur
10730 aliquis consiliativus, a facultate bene consiliandi. Et sic nec
10731 timor, nec aliqua passio consiliativos facit. Quia homini affecto
10732 secundum aliquam passionem, videtur aliquid vel maius vel minus
10733 quam sit secundum rei veritatem, sicut amanti videntur ea quae
10734 amat, meliora; et timenti, ea quae timet, terribiliora. Et sic ex
10735 defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se,
10736 impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to objections</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35409] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
10737 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p9">
10738 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense,
10739 man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear
10740 be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for
10741 him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
10742 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35410] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10743 dicendum quod quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo
10744 secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur. Et ideo quando timor fuerit
10745 fortis, vult quidem homo consiliari, sed adeo perturbatur in suis
10746 cogitationibus, quod consilium adinvenire non potest. Si autem sit
10747 parvus timor, qui sollicitudinem consiliandi inducat, nec multum
10748 rationem conturbet; potest etiam conferre ad facultatem bene
10749 consiliandi, ratione sollicitudinis consequentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p10">
10750 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he
10751 despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because
10752 hope is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that
10753 fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in
10754 matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above.
10755 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35411] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10756 dicendum quod etiam spes facit consiliativos, quia, ut in II
10757 Rhetoric. philosophus dicit, <i>nullus consiliatur de his de quibus
10758 desperat</i>; sicut nec de impossibilibus, ut dicitur in III Ethic.
10759 Timor tamen facit magis consiliativos quam spes. Quia spes est de
10760 bono, prout possumus ipsum consequi, timor autem de malo, prout vix
10761 repelli potest, et ita magis respicit rationem difficilis timor
10762 quam spes. In difficilibus autem, maxime in quibus nobis non
10763 confidimus, consiliamur, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A3-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 3. Whether fear makes one tremble?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p2">
10764 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold
10765 person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those
10766 who fear are thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are being led to execution. Therefore
10767 fear does not cause trembling.
10768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35412] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
10769 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tremor non sit effectus timoris.
10770 Tremor enim ex frigore accidit, videmus enim infrigidatos tremere.
10771 Timor autem non videtur causare frigus, sed magis calorem
10772 desiccantem, cuius signum est quod timentes sitiunt, et praecipue
10773 in maximis timoribus, sicut patet in illis qui ad mortem ducuntur.
10774 Ergo timor non causat tremorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p3">
10775 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are
10776 often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause trembling.
10777 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35413] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10778 emissio superfluitatum ex calore accidit, unde, ut plurimum,
10779 medicinae laxativae sunt calidae. Sed huiusmodi emissiones
10780 superfluitatum ex timore frequenter contingunt. Ergo timor videtur
10781 causare calorem. Et sic non causat tremorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p4">
10782 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his
10783 outward parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trembling in all the external members.
10784 But such is not the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.
10785 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35414] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10786 in timore calor ab exterioribus ad interiora revocatur. Si igitur
10787 propter huiusmodi revocationem caloris, in exterioribus homo
10788 tremit; videtur quod similiter in omnibus exterioribus membris
10789 deberet causari tremor ex timore. Hoc autem non videtur. Non ergo
10790 tremor corporis est effectus timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p5">
10791 <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth."
10792 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35415] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10793 est quod Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod
10794 <i>terrorem sequitur tremor, et pallor, et dentium
10795 crepitus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p6">
10796 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
10797 <a href="#FS_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q44_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that the
10798 outer parts become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling
10799 the members: which lack of power is due to the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members,
10800 as stated in De Anima ii, 4.
10801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 co."><a name="35416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35416] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10802 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in timore fit quaedam
10803 contractio ab exterioribus ad interiora, et ideo exteriora frigida
10804 remanent. Et propter hoc in eis accidit tremor, qui causatur ex
10805 debilitate virtutis continentis membra, ad huiusmodi autem
10806 debilitatem maxime facit defectus caloris, qui est instrumentum quo
10807 anima movet, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p7">
10808 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive
10809 parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels,
10810 and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles,
10811 as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11).
10812 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35417] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10813 ergo dicendum quod, calore ab exterioribus ad interiora revocato,
10814 multiplicatur calor interius, et maxime versus inferiora, idest
10815 circa nutritivam. Et ideo, consumpto humido, consequitur sitis, et
10816 etiam interdum solutio ventris, et urinae emissio, et quandoque
10817 etiam seminis. Vel huiusmodi emissio superfluitatum accidit propter
10818 contractionem ventris et testiculorum, ut philosophus dicit, in
10819 libro de problematibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35418] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet
10820 solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p9">
10821 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles,
10822 as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially
10823 in their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through
10824 their connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For
10825 the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the knees
10826 tremble in those who are afraid, according to
10827 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q44_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.35.3" target="asv">Is. 35:3</a>: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: 'weak'] knees."
10828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35419] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10829 dicendum quod, quia in timore calor deserit cor, a superioribus ad
10830 inferiora tendens, ideo timentibus maxime tremit cor, et membra
10831 quae habent aliquam connexionem ad pectus, ubi est cor. Unde
10832 timentes maxime tremunt in voce, propter vicinitatem vocalis
10833 arteriae ad cor. Tremit etiam labium inferius, et tota inferior
10834 mandibula, propter continuationem ad cor, unde et crepitus dentium
10835 sequitur. Et eadem ratione brachia et manus tremunt. Vel etiam quia
10836 huiusmodi membra sunt magis mobilia. Propter quod et genua tremunt
10837 timentibus; secundum illud Isaiae XXXV, <i>confortate manus
10838 dissolutas, et genua trementia roborate</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A4-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 4. Whether fear hinders action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p2">
10839 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action.
10840 But fear disturbs reason, as stated above
10841 <a href="#FS_Q44_A2" id="FS_Q44_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore fear hinders action.
10842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35420] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
10843 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor impediat operationem. Operatio
10844 enim maxime impeditur ex perturbatione rationis, quae dirigit in
10845 opere. Sed timor perturbat rationem, ut dictum est. Ergo timor
10846 impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p3">
10847 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily
10848 falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid.
10849 Therefore fear hinders action.
10850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35421] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10851 illi qui faciunt aliquid cum timore, facilius in operando
10852 deficiunt, sicut si aliquis incedat super trabem in alto positam,
10853 propter timorem de facili cadit; non autem caderet, si incederet
10854 super eandem trabem in imo positam, propter defectum timoris. Ergo
10855 timor impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p4">
10856 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too.
10857 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35422] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10858 pigritia, sive segnities, est quaedam species timoris. Sed pigritia
10859 impedit operationem. Ergo et timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p5">
10860 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
10861 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q44_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.12" target="asv">Phil. 2:12</a>): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore
10862 fear does not hinder a good action.
10863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35423] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10864 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, <i>cum metu et tremore
10865 vestram salutem operamini</i>, quod non diceret, si timor bonam
10866 operationem impediret. Timor ergo non impedit bonam
10867 operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p6">
10868 <b>I answer that,</b> Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be
10869 hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear,
10870 considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear,
10871 of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much
10872 disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take
10873 counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even
10874 on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.
10875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 co."><a name="35424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35424] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10876 dicendum quod operatio hominis exterior causatur quidem ab anima
10877 sicut a primo movente, sed a membris corporeis sicut ab
10878 instrumentis. Contingit autem operationem impediri et propter
10879 defectum instrumenti, et propter defectum principalis moventis. Ex
10880 parte igitur instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se,
10881 semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, propter defectum
10882 caloris qui ex timore accidit in exterioribus membris. Sed ex parte
10883 animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans;
10884 confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam sollicitudinem,
10885 et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari. Si vero timor
10886 tantum increscat quod rationem perturbet, impedit operationem etiam
10887 ex parte animae. Sed de tali timore apostolus non loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35425] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per haec
10888 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p8">
10889 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured
10890 to his imagination.
10891 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35426] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10892 dicendum quod illi qui cadunt de trabe in alto posita, patiuntur
10893 perturbationem imaginationis, propter timorem casus imaginati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p9">
10894 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it
10895 hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will
10896 to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears.
10897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35427] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10898 dicendum quod omnis timens refugit id quod timet, et ideo, cum
10899 pigritia sit timor de ipsa operatione, inquantum est laboriosa,
10900 impedit operationem, quia retrahit voluntatem ab ipsa. Sed timor
10901 qui est de aliis rebus, intantum adiuvat operationem, inquantum
10902 inclinat voluntatem ad operandum ea per quae homo effugit id quod
10903 timet.</p></div></div></div></div>
10904 <div id="FS_Q45" class="div3">
10905 <h3 id="FS_Q45-p0.1">Q. 45. OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
10906 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
10907 <p id="FS_Q45-p2"> We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q45-p3"><a href="#FS_Q45_A1"> (1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p4"><a href="#FS_Q45_A2"> (2) How is daring related to hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p5"><a href="#FS_Q45_A3"> (3) Of the cause of daring;</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p6"><a href="#FS_Q45_A4"> (4) Of its effect.</a></p>
10908 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 pr."><a name="35428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35428]
10909 Iª-IIae q. 45 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
10910 audacia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum audacia sit
10911 contraria timori. Secundo, quomodo audacia se habeat ad spem.
10912 Tertio, de causa audaciae. Quarto, de effectus ipsius.</p></div></div></div>
10913 <div id="FS_Q45_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A1-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 1. Whether daring is contrary to fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p2">
10914 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice
10915 is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.
10916 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35429] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
10917 sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non contrarietur timori. Dicit
10918 enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod audacia
10919 vitium est. Vitium autem virtuti contrariatur. Cum ergo timor non
10920 sit virtus, sed passio, videtur quod timori non contrarietur
10921 audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p3">
10922 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
10923 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35430] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10924 uni unum est contrarium. Sed timori contrariatur spes. Non ergo
10925 contrariatur ei audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p4">
10926 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes
10927 forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
10928 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35431] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
10929 unaquaeque passio excludit passionem oppositam. Sed id quod
10930 excluditur per timorem, est securitas, dicit enim Augustinus, II
10931 Confess., quod timor securitati praecavet ergo securitas
10932 contrariatur timori. Non ergo audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p5">
10933 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear."
10934 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35432] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
10935 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>audacia est
10936 timori contraria</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p6">
10937 <b>I answer that,</b> It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is
10938 farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that
10939 fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident
10940 that daring is contrary to fear.
10941 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 co."><a name="35433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35433] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
10942 dicendum quod de ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent,
10943 ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Illud autem quod maxime distat a timore,
10944 est audacia, timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius
10945 victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum
10946 imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum. Unde
10947 manifeste timori contrariatur audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p7">
10948 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the
10949 sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides
10950 this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks
10951 of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense.
10952 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35434] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
10953 ergo dicendum quod ira et audacia, et omnium passionum nomina,
10954 dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo, secundum quod important
10955 absolute motus appetitus sensitivi in aliquod obiectum bonum vel
10956 malum, et sic sunt nomina passionum. Alio modo, secundum quod simul
10957 cum huiusmodi motu important recessum ab ordine rationis, et sic
10958 sunt nomina vitiorum. Et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus de audacia,
10959 sed nos loquimur nunc de audacia secundum primum modum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8">
10960 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing
10961 having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (
10962 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>;
10963 <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[40], A[4]</a>) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus
10964 fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of
10965 approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
10966 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35435] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
10967 dicendum quod uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria, sed
10968 secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic
10969 dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem
10970 contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic
10971 timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et
10972 recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero
10973 desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p9">
10974 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears
10975 not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety
10976 implies privation, so daring implies safety.
10977 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35436] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10978 dicendum quod securitas non significat aliquid contrarium timori,
10979 sed solam timoris exclusionem, ille enim dicitur esse securus, qui
10980 non timet. Unde securitas opponitur timori sicut privatio, audacia
10981 autem sicut contrarium. Et sicut contrarium includit in se
10982 privationem, ita audacia securitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A2-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 2. Whether daring ensues from hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p2">
10983 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii,
10984 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above (
10985 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.
10986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35437] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
10987 sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non consequatur spem. Audacia
10988 enim est respectu malorum et terribilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic.
10989 Spes autem respicit bonum. Ut supra dictum est. Ergo habent diversa
10990 obiecta, et non sunt unius ordinis. Non ergo audacia consequitur
10991 spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p3">
10992 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact,
10993 despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope.
10994 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35438] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10995 sicut audacia contrariatur timori, ita desperatio spei. Sed timor
10996 non sequitur desperationem, quinimmo desperatio excludit timorem.
10997 Ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Ergo audacia non consequitur
10998 spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p4">
10999 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult.
11000 Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it.
11001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35439] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11002 audacia intendit quoddam bonum, scilicet victoriam. Sed tendere in
11003 bonum arduum pertinet ad spem. Ergo audacia est idem spei. Non ergo
11004 consequitur ad spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p5">
11005 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from
11006 hope.
11007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35440] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
11008 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>illi qui sunt
11009 bonae spei, sunt audaces</i>. Videtur ergo audacia consequi
11010 spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6">
11011 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have often stated (
11012 <a href="#FS_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>;
11013 <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>;
11014 <a href="#FS_Q41_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[41], A[1]</a>), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either
11015 of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something
11016 else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the
11017 object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it;
11018 and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else,
11019 follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows
11020 avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil
11021 to
11022 fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that
11023 daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.
11024 But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good
11025 he should hope for.
11026 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 co."><a name="35441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35441] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11027 dicendum quod, sicut iam pluries dictum est, omnes huiusmodi
11028 passiones animae ad appetitivam potentiam pertinent. Omnis autem
11029 motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam.
11030 Prosecutio autem vel fuga est alicuius et per se, et per accidens,
11031 per se quidem est prosecutio boni, fuga vero mali; per accidens
11032 autem potest prosecutio esse mali, propter aliquod bonum adiunctum,
11033 et fuga boni, propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Quod autem est per
11034 accidens, sequitur ad id quod est per se. Et ideo prosecutio mali,
11035 sequitur prosecutionem boni, sicut et fuga boni sequitur fugam
11036 mali. Haec autem quatuor pertinent ad quatuor passiones, nam
11037 prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio
11038 mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad
11039 desperationem. Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex
11040 hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc
11041 audacter insequitur ipsum. Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio,
11042 ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa
11043 bonum sperandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p7">
11044 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good,
11045 since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which
11046 pursues good.
11047 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35442] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11048 ergo dicendum quod ratio sequeretur, si bonum et malum essent
11049 obiecta non habentia ordinem ad invicem. Sed quia malum habet
11050 aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio
11051 habitu; ideo audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae
11052 insequitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p8">
11053 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit
11054 of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear
11055 does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is
11056 strong.
11057 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35443] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11058 dicendum quod, etsi bonum simpliciter sit prius quam malum, tamen
11059 fuga per prius debetur malo quam bono, sicut insecutio per prius
11060 debetur bono quam malo. Et ideo sicut spes est prior quam audacia,
11061 ita timor est prior quam desperatio. Et sicut ex timore non semper
11062 sequitur desperatio, sed quando fuerit intensus; ita ex spe non
11063 semper sequitur audacia, sed quando fuerit vehemens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p9">
11064 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined;
11065 yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it
11066 turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect:
11067 just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring
11068 cannot be a principal passion.
11069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35444] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11070 dicendum quod audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est
11071 bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit
11072 malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes. Et similiter desperatio
11073 respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit
11074 timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius
11075 effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus.
11076 Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non
11077 potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A3-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 3. Whether some defect is a cause of daring?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p2">
11078 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine
11079 are strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
11080 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35445] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
11081 sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus aliquis sit causa audaciae.
11082 Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de problematibus, quod <i>amatores
11083 vini sunt fortes et audaces</i>. Sed ex vino sequitur defectus
11084 ebrietatis. Ergo audacia causatur ex aliquo defectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p3">
11085 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience
11086 is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
11087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35446] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11088 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>inexperti periculorum
11089 sunt audaces</i>. Sed inexperientia defectus quidam est. Ergo
11090 audacia ex defectu causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p4">
11091 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5.
11092 But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
11093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35447] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11094 iniusta passi audaciores esse solent; sicut etiam bestiae cum
11095 percutiuntur, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed iniustum pati ad
11096 defectum pertinet. Ergo audacia ex aliquo defectu causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p5">
11097 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means
11098 of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect
11099 implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining
11100 to defect is a cause of daring.
11101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35448] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
11102 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod causa audaciae
11103 est, <i>cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium ut prope
11104 existentium, timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium</i>.
11105 Sed id quod pertinet ad defectum, vel pertinet ad salutarium
11106 remotionem, vel ad terribilium propinquitatem. Ergo nihil quod ad
11107 defectum pertinet, est causa audaciae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p6">
11108 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
11109 <a href="#FS_Q45_A1" id="FS_Q45_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) daring results from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is
11110 a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite,
11111 and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope,
11112 or by banishing fear; in one way, in the
11113 part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation.
11114 </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p7"> On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that
11115 make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance
11116 of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means
11117 of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it
11118 is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal
11119 of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that
11120 he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others.
11121 </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p8"> On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those
11122 things which raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose
11123 heart is small in size, are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural heat is unable
11124 to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large
11125 house as well as it does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those whose lungs contain much blood,
11126 are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that "lovers of wine
11127 are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": hence it has been said above (
11128 <a href="#FS_Q40_A6" id="FS_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[6]</a>) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation
11129 and
11130 enlargement of the heart.
11131 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 co."><a name="35449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35449] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11132 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, audacia consequitur spem, et
11133 contrariatur timori, unde quaecumque nata sunt causare spem, vel
11134 excludere timorem, sunt causa audaciae. Quia vero timor et spes, et
11135 etiam audacia, cum sint passiones quaedam, consistunt in motu
11136 appetitus et in quadam transmutatione corporali; dupliciter potest
11137 accipi causa audaciae, sive quantum ad provocationem spei, sive
11138 quantum ad exclusionem timoris, uno modo quidem, ex parte
11139 appetitivi motus; alio vero modo, ex parte transmutationis
11140 corporalis. Ex parte quidem appetitivi motus, qui sequitur
11141 apprehensionem, provocatur spes causans audaciam, per ea quae
11142 faciunt nos aestimare quod possibile sit adipisci victoriam; vel
11143 secundum propriam potentiam, sicut fortitudo corporis, experientia
11144 in periculis, multitudo pecuniarum, et alia huiusmodi; sive per
11145 potentiam aliorum, sicut multitudo amicorum vel quorumcumque
11146 auxiliantium, et praecipue si homo confidat de auxilio divino;
11147 <i>unde illi qui se bene habent ad divina, audaciores sunt</i>, ut
11148 etiam philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Timor autem excluditur,
11149 secundum istum modum, per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium,
11150 puta quia homo non habet inimicos, quia nulli nocuit, quia non
11151 videt aliquod periculum imminere; illis enim videntur maxime
11152 pericula imminere, qui aliis nocuerunt. Ex parte vero
11153 transmutationis corporalis, causatur audacia per provocationem spei
11154 et exclusionem timoris, ex his quae faciunt caliditatem circa cor.
11155 Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de partibus animalium, quod
11156 <i>illi qui habent parvum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt magis
11157 audaces; et animalia habentia magnum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt
11158 timida, quia calor naturalis non tantum potest calefacere magnum
11159 cor; sicut parvum, sicut ignis non tantum potest calefacere magnam
11160 domum, sicut parvam</i>. Et in libro de problematibus dicit quod
11161 <i>habentes pulmonem sanguineum, sunt audaciores, propter
11162 caliditatem cordis exinde consequentem</i>. Et ibidem dicit quod
11163 <i>vini amatores sunt magis audaces, propter caliditatem vini</i>,
11164 unde et supra dictum est quod ebrietas facit ad bonitatem spei,
11165 caliditas enim cordis repellit timorem, et causat spem, propter
11166 cordis extensionem et amplificationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p9">
11167 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think
11168 greatly of himself.
11169 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35450] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11170 ergo dicendum quod ebrietas causat audaciam, non inquantum est
11171 defectus, sed inquantum facit cordis dilatationem, et inquantum
11172 etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p10">
11173 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as
11174 through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal
11175 of the cause of fear gives rise to daring.
11176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35451] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11177 dicendum quod illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores,
11178 non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet, propter
11179 inexperientiam, neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque
11180 praesentiam periculorum. Et ita, per subtractionem causae timoris,
11181 sequitur audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p11">
11182 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the
11183 assistance of those who suffer unjustly."
11184 </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p12"> Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto,
11185 real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.
11186 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35452] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11187 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., <i>iniustum
11188 passi redduntur audaciores, quia aestimant quod Deus iniustum
11189 passis auxilium ferat</i>. Et sic patet quod nullus defectus causat
11190 audaciam nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam
11191 aliquam excellentiam, vel veram vel aestimatam, vel ex parte sui
11192 vel ex parte alterius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A4-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 4. Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p2">
11193 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear,
11194 which is contrary to daring, as stated above
11195 <a href="#FS_Q45_A1" id="FS_Q45_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[44], A[3]). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are
11196 not more eager at first than in the midst of danger.
11197 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35453] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
11198 sic proceditur. Videtur quod audaces non sint promptiores in
11199 principio quam in ipsis periculis. Tremor enim ex timore causatur,
11200 qui contrariatur audaciae, ut ex dictis patet. Sed audaces
11201 quandoque in principio tremunt, ut philosophus dicit, in libro de
11202 problematibus. Ergo non sunt promptiores in principio quam in ipsis
11203 periculis existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p3">
11204 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable.
11205 But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger
11206 is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest.
11207 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35454] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11208 per augmentum obiecti augetur passio, sicut si bonum est amabile,
11209 et magis bonum est magis amabile. Sed arduum est obiectum audaciae.
11210 Augmentato ergo arduo, augmentatur audacia. Sed magis fit arduum et
11211 difficile periculum, quando est praesens. Ergo debet tunc magis
11212 crescere audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p4">
11213 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
11214 "anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.
11215 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35455] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11216 ex vulneribus inflictis provocatur ira. Sed ira causat audaciam,
11217 dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est ausivum. Ergo
11218 quando iam sunt in ipsis periculis, et percutiuntur, videtur quod
11219 magis audaces reddantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p5">
11220 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of
11221 dangers they stand aloof."
11222 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35456] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
11223 est quod dicitur in III Ethic., quod <i>audaces praevolantes sunt
11224 et volentes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A4-p6">
11225 <b>I answer that,</b> Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty
11226 cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that
11227 it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the
11228 movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the
11229 danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
11230 </p><p id="FS_Q45_A4-p7"> On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according
11231 to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet
11232 when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less
11233 than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the
11234 danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas
11235 men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above
11236 <a href="#FS_Q45_A3" id="FS_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>.
11237 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 co."><a name="35457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35457] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11238 dicendum quod audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi,
11239 sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva
11240 non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem,
11241 sed subitum habet iudicium. Contingit autem quandoque quod secundum
11242 subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae
11243 difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt, unde surgit audaciae
11244 motus ad aggrediendum periculum. Unde quando iam experiuntur ipsum
11245 periculum, sentiunt maiorem difficultatem quam aestimaverunt. Et
11246 ideo deficiunt. Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt
11247 difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis
11248 aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non
11249 passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt
11250 in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum; sed
11251 quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt. Et ideo magis
11252 persistunt. Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula
11253 aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque
11254 sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem
11255 spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p8">
11256 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body,
11257 as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid,
11258 it withdraws to the inferior parts.
11259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35458] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11260 ergo dicendum quod etiam in audacibus accidit tremor, propter
11261 revocationem caloris ab exterioribus ad interiora, sicut etiam in
11262 timentibus. Sed in audacibus revocatur calor ad cor, in timentibus
11263 autem, ad inferiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p9">
11264 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a
11265 compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore,
11266 so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if
11267 the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the
11268 daring considered to be.
11269 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35459] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11270 dicendum quod obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde
11271 augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est
11272 compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum,
11273 praesupponit motum spei in bonum. Et ideo si tantum addatur de
11274 arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus
11275 audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius
11276 est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p10">
11277 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on (
11278 <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q45_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that
11279 if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring.
11280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35460] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11281 dicendum quod ex laesione non causatur ira, nisi supposita aliqua
11282 spe, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo si fuerit tantum periculum quod
11283 excedat spem victoriae, non sequetur ira. Sed verum est quod, si
11284 ira sequatur, audacia augebitur.</p></div></div></div></div>
11285 <div id="FS_Q46" class="div3">
11286 <h3 id="FS_Q46-p0.1">Q. 46. OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
11287 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
11288 <p id="FS_Q46-p2"> We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.</p><p id="FS_Q46-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q46-p4"><a href="#FS_Q46_A1"> (1) Whether anger is a special passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p5"><a href="#FS_Q46_A2"> (2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p6"><a href="#FS_Q46_A3"> (3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p7"><a href="#FS_Q46_A4"> (4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p8"><a href="#FS_Q46_A5"> (5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p9"><a href="#FS_Q46_A6"> (6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p10"><a href="#FS_Q46_A7"> (7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p11"><a href="#FS_Q46_A8"> (8) Of the species of anger.</a></p>
11289 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 pr."><a name="35461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35461]
11290 Iª-IIae q. 46 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ira.
11291 Et primo, de ira secundum se; secundo, de causa factiva irae, et
11292 remedio eius; tertio, de effectu eius. Circa primum quaeruntur
11293 octo. Primo, utrum ira sit passio specialis. Secundo, utrum
11294 obiectum irae sit bonum, an malum. Tertio, utrum ira sit in
11295 concupiscibili. Quarto, utrum ira sit cum ratione. Quinto, utrum
11296 ira sit naturalior quam concupiscentia. Sexto, utrum ira sit
11297 gravior quam odium. Septimo, utrum ira solum sit ad illos ad quos
11298 est iustitia. Octavo, de speciebus irae.</p></div></div></div>
11299 <div id="FS_Q46_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A1-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 1. Whether anger is a special passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p2">
11300 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are
11301 several passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special passion.
11302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35462] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
11303 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit passio specialis. Ab ira
11304 enim denominatur potentia irascibilis. Sed huius potentiae non est
11305 una tantum passio, sed multae. Ergo ira non est una passio
11306 specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p3">
11307 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion
11308 is contrary to anger, as stated above (
11309 <a href="#FS_Q23_A3" id="FS_Q46_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[3]</a>). Therefore anger is not a special passion.
11310 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35463] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11311 cuilibet passioni speciali est aliquid contrarium; ut patet
11312 inducenti per singula. Sed irae non est aliqua passio contraria, ut
11313 supra dictum est. Ergo ira non est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p4">
11314 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow,
11315 pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special passion.
11316 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35464] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11317 una specialis passio non includit aliam. Sed ira includit multas
11318 passiones, est enim cum tristitia, et cum delectatione, et cum spe,
11319 ut patet per philosophum, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est passio
11320 specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p5">
11321 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
11322 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35465] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
11323 est quod Damascenus ponit iram specialem passionem. Et similiter
11324 Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A1-p6">
11325 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals. Secondly,
11326 by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
11327 Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains
11328 many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is
11329 produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet
11330 a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes
11331 are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.
11332 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A1-p7"> Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above (
11333 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q46_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may
11334 be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is the primary root of all the other
11335 passions, as stated above (
11336 <a href="#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q46_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a> ). But, in a
11337 third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the
11338 movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for,
11339 as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently
11340 if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states
11341 (De Anima iv, 6).
11342 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 co."><a name="35466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35466] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11343 dicendum quod aliquid dicitur generale dupliciter. Uno modo, per
11344 praedicationem, sicut animal est generale ad omnia animalia. Alio
11345 modo, per causam, sicut sol est causa generalis omnium quae
11346 generantur in his inferioribus, secundum Dionysium, in IV cap. de
11347 Div. Nom. Sicut enim genus continet multas differentias potestate,
11348 secundum similitudinem materiae; ita causa agens continet multos
11349 effectus secundum virtutem activam. Contingit autem aliquem
11350 effectum ex concursu diversarum causarum produci, et quia omnis
11351 causa aliquo modo in effectu manet, potest etiam dici, tertio modo,
11352 quod effectus ex congregatione multarum causarum productus, habet
11353 quandam generalitatem, inquantum continet multas causas quodammodo
11354 in actu. Primo ergo modo, ira non est passio generalis, sed
11355 condivisa aliis passionibus, ut supra dictum est. Similiter autem
11356 nec secundo modo. Non est enim causa aliarum passionum, sed per
11357 hunc modum potest dici generalis passio amor, ut patet per
11358 Augustinum, in XIV libro de Civ. Dei; amor enim est prima radix
11359 omnium passionum, ut supra dictum est. Sed tertio modo potest ira
11360 dici passio generalis, inquantum ex concursu multarum passionum
11361 causatur. Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam
11362 tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi,
11363 quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., <i>iratus habet spem
11364 puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem</i>. Unde si
11365 fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non
11366 sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de
11367 anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p8">
11368 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because
11369 all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent.
11370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35467] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11371 ergo dicendum quod, vis irascibilis denominatur ab ira, non quia
11372 omnis motus huius potentiae sit ira, sed quia ad iram terminantur
11373 omnes motus huius potentiae; et inter alios eius motus, iste est
11374 manifestior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p9">
11375 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of
11376 evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there
11377 is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
11378 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35468] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11379 dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ira causatur ex contrariis
11380 passionibus, scilicet a spe, quae est boni, et a tristitia, quae
11381 est mali, includit in seipsa contrarietatem, et ideo non habet
11382 contrarium extra se. Sicut etiam in mediis coloribus non invenitur
11383 contrarietas, nisi quae est simplicium colorum, ex quibus
11384 causantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p10">
11385 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of
11386 cause and effect.
11387 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35469] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11388 dicendum quod ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus
11389 species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A2-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 2. Whether the object of anger is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p2">
11390 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the
11391 sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has
11392 the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.
11393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35470] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
11394 sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum irae sit malum. Dicit enim
11395 Gregorius Nyssenus quod ira est quasi armigera concupiscentiae,
11396 inquantum scilicet impugnat id quod concupiscentiam impedit. Sed
11397 omne impedimentum habet rationem mali. Ergo ira respicit malum
11398 tanquam obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p3">
11399 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as
11400 its object, as stated above (
11401 <a href="#FS_Q29_A1" id="FS_Q46_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[1]</a>). Therefore anger does also.
11402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35471] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11403 ira et odium conveniunt in effectu, utriusque enim est inferre
11404 nocumentum alteri. Sed odium respicit malum tanquam obiectum, ut
11405 supra dictum est. Ergo etiam et ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p4">
11406 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil
11407 is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
11408 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35472] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11409 ira causatur ex tristitia, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.,
11410 quod ira operatur cum tristitia. Sed tristitiae obiectum est malum.
11411 Ergo et irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p5">
11412 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good:
11413 since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.
11414 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p6"> Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the
11415 object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
11416 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 1"><a name="35473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35473] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra
11417 est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod ira appetit
11418 vindictam. Sed appetitus vindictae est appetitus boni, cum vindicta
11419 ad iustitiam pertineat. Ergo obiectum irae est bonum.</p><p title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 2"><a name="35474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35474] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11420 ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit
11421 philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est
11422 bonum. Ergo et irae.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p7">
11423 <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing
11424 in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object,
11425 as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both
11426 good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows
11427 and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of
11428 a complex object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking
11429 this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some
11430 good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a
11431 man
11432 is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself,
11433 which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance,
11434 as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.
11435 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p8"> We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the
11436 other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object,
11437 as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects
11438 of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the
11439 objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable
11440 to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged.
11441 Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.
11442 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 co."><a name="35475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35475] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11443 dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis sequitur actum virtutis
11444 apprehensivae. Vis autem apprehensiva dupliciter aliquid
11445 apprehendit, uno modo, per modum incomplexi, sicut cum intelligimus
11446 quid est homo; alio modo, per modum complexi, sicut cum
11447 intelligimus album inesse homini. Unde utroque modo vis appetitiva
11448 potest tendere in bonum et malum. Per modum quidem simplicis et
11449 incomplexi, cum appetitus simpliciter sequitur vel inhaeret bono,
11450 vel refugit malum. Et tales motus sunt desiderium et spes,
11451 delectatio et tristitia, et alia huiusmodi. Per modum autem
11452 complexi, sicut cum appetitus fertur in hoc quod aliquod bonum vel
11453 malum insit vel fiat circa alterum, vel tendendo in hoc, vel
11454 refugiendo ab hoc. Sicut manifeste apparet in amore et odio, amamus
11455 enim aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod bonum; odimus
11456 autem aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod malum. Et
11457 similiter est in ira, quicumque enim irascitur, quaerit vindicari
11458 de aliquo. Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam
11459 vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de
11460 ipsa delectatur, tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam,
11461 sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali. Est
11462 tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad
11463 amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta,
11464 amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut
11465 cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam
11466 odire. Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor,
11467 est bonum, vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti.
11468 Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali, vult
11469 enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti. Sed ira
11470 respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam,
11471 quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem
11472 nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo
11473 composita ex contrariis passionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="35476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35476] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
11474 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A3-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 3. Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p2">
11475 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of
11476 "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too.
11477 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35477] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
11478 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit in concupiscibili. Dicit enim
11479 Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod ira est libido quaedam.
11480 Sed libido est in concupiscibili. Ergo et ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p3">
11481 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred
11482 is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
11483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35478] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11484 Augustinus dicit, in regula, quod ira crescit in odium. Et Tullius
11485 dicit, in eodem libro, quod odium est ira inveterata. Sed odium est
11486 in concupiscibili, sicut amor. Ergo ira est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p4">
11487 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up
11488 of sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.
11489 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35479] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11490 Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt quod ira componitur ex
11491 tristitia et desiderio. Sed utrumque horum est in concupiscibili.
11492 Ergo ira est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p5">
11493 <b>On the contrary,</b> The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible
11494 would not take its name from it.
11495 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35480] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
11496 vis concupiscibilis est alia ab irascibili. Si igitur ira esset in
11497 concupiscibili, non denominaretur ab ea vis irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p6">
11498 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,
11499 in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible
11500 passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated
11501 <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it
11502 seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless
11503 there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the
11504 Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.
11505 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 co."><a name="35481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35481] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11506 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passiones irascibilis in hoc
11507 differunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, quod obiecta passionum
11508 concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum absolute; obiecta autem
11509 passionum irascibilis sunt bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel
11510 arduitate. Dictum est autem quod ira respicit duo obiecta, scilicet
11511 vindictam, quam appetit; et eum de quo vindictam quaerit. Et circa
11512 utrumque quandam arduitatem ira requirit, non enim insurgit motus
11513 irae, nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrumque existente;
11514 <i>quaecumque enim nihil sunt, aut modica valde nullo digna
11515 aestimamus</i>, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Unde
11516 manifestum est quod ira non est in concupiscibili, sed in
11517 irascibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p7">
11518 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous
11519 and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this
11520 sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
11521 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35482] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11522 ergo dicendum quod Tullius libidinem nominat appetitum cuiuscumque
11523 boni futuri non habita discretione ardui vel non ardui. Et secundum
11524 hoc, ponit iram sub libidine, inquantum est appetitus vindictae.
11525 Sic autem libido communis est ad irascibilem et
11526 concupiscibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p8">
11527 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by
11528 becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred.
11529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35483] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11530 dicendum quod ira dicitur crescere in odium, non quod eadem numero
11531 passio quae prius fuit ira, postmodum fiat odium per quandam
11532 inveterationem, sed per quandam causalitatem. Ira enim, per
11533 diuturnitatem, causat odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p9">
11534 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and
11535 it has been said above (
11536 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q46_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.
11537 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35484] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11538 dicendum quod ira dicitur componi ex tristitia et desiderio, non
11539 sicut ex partibus, sed sicut ex causis. Dictum est autem supra quod
11540 passiones concupiscibilis sunt causae passionum irascibilis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A4-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 4. Whether anger requires an act of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p2">
11541 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite.
11542 But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not
11543 require an act of reason.
11544 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35485] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
11545 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit cum ratione. Ira enim, cum
11546 sit passio quaedam, est in appetitu sensitivo. Sed appetitus
11547 sensitivus non sequitur rationis apprehensionem, sed sensitivae
11548 partis. Ergo ira non est cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p3">
11549 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of
11550 reason.
11551 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35486] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11552 animalia bruta carent ratione. Et tamen in eis invenitur ira. Ergo
11553 ira non est cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p4">
11554 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
11555 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35487] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11556 ebrietas ligat rationem. Adiuvat autem ad iram. Ergo ira non est
11557 cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p5">
11558 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger listens to reason somewhat."
11559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35488] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
11560 est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>ira consequitur
11561 rationem aliqualiter</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p6">
11562 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
11563 <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, anger is a desire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt
11564 done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel
11565 with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore
11566 anger, in a fashion, requires an act of
11567 reason.
11568 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 co."><a name="35489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35489] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11569 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus vindictae.
11570 Haec autem collationem importat poenae infligendae ad nocumentum
11571 sibi illatum, unde, in VII Ethic., dicit philosophus quod
11572 <i>syllogizans quoniam oportet talem oppugnare, irascitur
11573 confestim</i>. Conferre autem et syllogizare est rationis. Et ideo
11574 ira est quodammodo cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p7">
11575 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in
11576 so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another
11577 way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem.
11578 xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a
11579 result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through
11580 the will.
11581 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35490] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11582 ergo dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis potest esse cum
11583 ratione dupliciter. Uno modo, cum ratione praecipiente, et sic
11584 voluntas est cum ratione; unde et dicitur appetitus rationalis.
11585 Alio modo, cum ratione denuntiante, et sic ira est cum ratione.
11586 Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Problemat., quod ira est cum
11587 ratione, <i>non sicut praecipiente ratione, sed ut manifestante
11588 iniuriam</i>. Appetitus enim sensitivus immediate rationi non
11589 obedit, sed mediante voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p8">
11590 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements,
11591 both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above (
11592 <a href="#FS_Q40_A3" id="FS_Q46_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[3]</a>).
11593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35491] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11594 dicendum quod bruta animalia habent instinctum naturalem ex divina
11595 ratione eis inditum, per quem habent motus interiores et exteriores
11596 similes motibus rationis, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p9">
11597 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens
11598 not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires
11599 an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose
11600 who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry:
11601 but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
11602 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35492] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11603 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., ira audit aliqualiter
11604 rationem, sicut nuntiantem quod iniuriatum est ei, sed non perfecte
11605 audit, quia non observat regulam rationis in rependendo vindictam.
11606 Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur
11607 impedimentum rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de
11608 Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes
11609 de iudicio rationis, non irascuntur, sed quando sunt parum ebrii,
11610 irascuntur, tanquam habentes iudicium rationis, sed impeditum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A5-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 5. Whether anger is more natural than desire?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p2">
11611 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But
11612 "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire,
11613 in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man.
11614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35493] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
11615 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit naturalior quam
11616 concupiscentia. Proprium enim hominis dicitur quod sit animal
11617 mansuetum natura. Sed mansuetudo opponitur irae, ut dicit
11618 philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est naturalior quam
11619 concupiscentia, sed omnino videtur esse contra hominis naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p3">
11620 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according
11621 to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more
11622 natural than anger.
11623 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35494] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11624 ratio contra naturam dividitur, ea enim quae secundum rationem
11625 agunt, non dicimus secundum naturam agere. Sed ira est cum ratione,
11626 concupiscentia autem sine ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo
11627 concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p4">
11628 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the
11629 touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance.
11630 Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
11631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35495] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11632 ira est appetitus vindictae, concupiscentia autem maxime est
11633 appetitus delectabilium secundum tactum, scilicet ciborum et
11634 venereorum. Haec autem sunt magis naturalia homini quam vindicta.
11635 Ergo concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p5">
11636 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is more natural than desire."
11637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35496] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
11638 est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>ira est
11639 naturalior quam concupiscentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A5-p6">
11640 <b>I answer that,</b> By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a
11641 particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause
11642 of a passion, as stated above (
11643 <a href="#FS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q46_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[36], A[2]</a>), may be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we consider
11644 the cause of anger and of
11645 desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural
11646 than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.
11647 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A5-p7"> If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in
11648 a manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic, or as
11649 to the specific nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the generic nature,
11650 i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from
11651 this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species
11652 and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then
11653 anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher
11654 says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to
11655 everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the individual, in respect of
11656 his particular temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural
11657 tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies
11658 result from a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the
11659 humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner
11660 incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the
11661 Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a
11662 disposition to desire.
11663 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 co."><a name="35497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35497] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11664 dicendum quod naturale dicitur illud quod causatur a natura, ut
11665 patet in II Physic. Unde utrum aliqua passio sit magis vel minus
11666 naturalis, considerari non potest nisi ex causa sua. Causa autem
11667 passionis, ut supra dictum est, dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo,
11668 ex parte obiecti; alio modo, ex parte subiecti. Si ergo
11669 consideretur causa irae et concupiscentiae ex parte obiecti, sic
11670 concupiscentia, et maxime ciborum et venereorum, naturalior est
11671 quam ira, inquantum ista sunt magis naturalia quam vindicta. Si
11672 autem consideretur causa irae ex parte subiecti, sic quodammodo ira
11673 est naturalior, et quodammodo concupiscentia. Potest enim natura
11674 alicuius hominis considerari vel secundum naturam generis, vel
11675 secundum naturam speciei, vel secundum complexionem propriam
11676 individui. Si igitur consideretur natura generis, quae est natura
11677 huius hominis inquantum est animal; sic naturalior est
11678 concupiscentia quam ira, quia ex ipsa natura communi habet homo
11679 quandam inclinationem ad appetendum ea quae sunt conservativa
11680 vitae, vel secundum speciem vel secundum individuum. Si autem
11681 consideremus naturam hominis ex parte speciei, scilicet inquantum
11682 est rationalis; sic ira est magis naturalis homini quam
11683 concupiscentia, inquantum ira est cum ratione magis quam
11684 concupiscentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod humanius
11685 est punire, quod pertinet ad iram, quam mansuetum esse, unumquodque
11686 enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva. Si vero
11687 consideretur natura huius individui secundum propriam complexionem,
11688 sic ira naturalior est quam concupiscentia, quia scilicet
11689 habitudinem naturalem ad irascendum, quae est ex complexione, magis
11690 de facili sequitur ira, quam concupiscentia vel aliqua alia passio.
11691 Est enim homo dispositus ad irascendum, secundum quod habet
11692 cholericam complexionem, cholera autem, inter alios humores, citius
11693 movetur; assimilatur enim igni. Et ideo magis est in promptu ut
11694 ille qui est dispositus secundum naturalem complexionem ad iram,
11695 irascatur; quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum, quod
11696 concupiscat. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod
11697 ira magis traducitur a parentibus in filios, quam
11698 concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p8">
11699 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament,
11700 a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the
11701 moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches
11702 to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of
11703 passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it
11704 is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury
11705 which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of reason,"
11706 as stated above (A[4], ad 3).
11707 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35498] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11708 ergo dicendum quod in homine considerari potest et naturalis
11709 complexio ex parte corporis, quae est temperata; et ipsa ratio. Ex
11710 parte igitur complexionis corporalis, naturaliter homo, secundum
11711 suam speciem, est non habens superexcellentiam neque irae neque
11712 alicuius alterius passionis, propter temperamentum suae
11713 complexionis. Alia vero animalia, secundum quod recedunt ab hac
11714 qualitate complexionis ad dispositionem alicuius complexionis
11715 extremae, secundum hoc etiam naturaliter disponuntur ad excessum
11716 alicuius passionis, ut leo ad audaciam, canis ad iram, lepus ad
11717 timorem, et sic de aliis. Ex parte vero rationis, est naturale
11718 homini et irasci et mansuetum esse, secundum quod ratio quodammodo
11719 causat iram, inquantum nuntiat causam irae; et quodammodo sedat
11720 iram, inquantum iratus non totaliter audit imperium rationis, ut
11721 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p9">
11722 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows
11723 that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
11724 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35499] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11725 dicendum quod ipsa ratio pertinet ad naturam hominis. Unde ex hoc
11726 ipso quod ira est cum ratione, sequitur quod secundum aliquem modum
11727 sit homini naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p10">
11728 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object.
11729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35500] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11730 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de ira et concupiscentia, ex
11731 parte obiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A6-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 6. Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p2">
11732 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is written (
11733 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv">Prov. 27:4</a>) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous
11734 than hatred.
11735 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35501] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
11736 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit gravior quam odium. Dicitur
11737 enim Prov. XXVII, quod <i>ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens
11738 furor</i>. Odium autem quandoque habet misericordiam. Ergo ira est
11739 gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p3">
11740 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented
11741 if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and
11742 be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred.
11743 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35502] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11744 maius est pati malum et de malo dolere, quam simpliciter pati. Sed
11745 illi qui habet aliquem odio, sufficit quod ille quem odit, patiatur
11746 malum, irato autem non sufficit, sed quaerit quod cognoscat illud
11747 et de illo doleat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira
11748 est gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p4">
11749 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the
11750 more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above
11751
11752 <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q46_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred.
11753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35503] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11754 quanto ad constitutionem alicuius plura concurrunt, tanto videtur
11755 esse stabilius, sicut habitus permanentior est qui ex pluribus
11756 actibus causatur. Sed ira causatur ex concursu plurium passionum,
11757 ut supra dictum est, non autem odium. Ergo ira est stabilior et
11758 gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p5">
11759 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam," but anger to "a mote."
11760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35504] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
11761 est quod Augustinus, in regula, odium comparat trabi, iram vero
11762 festucae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p6">
11763 <b>I answer that,</b> The species and nature of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object
11764 of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he
11765 is angry. But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes
11766 evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good,
11767 that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above
11768 <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is evident that
11769 to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone
11770 under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity
11771 with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently
11772 it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.
11773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 co."><a name="35505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35505] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11774 dicendum quod species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto
11775 pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto, nam sicut
11776 odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem
11777 irascitur. Sed non eadem ratione, sed odiens appetit malum inimici,
11778 inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem
11779 irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam
11780 rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum
11781 est vindicativum. Unde etiam supra dictum est quod odium est per
11782 applicationem mali ad malum; ira autem per applicationem boni ad
11783 malum. Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti,
11784 minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter.
11785 Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam
11786 secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur,
11787 sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in
11788 ulciscendo. Unde manifestum est quod odium est multo deterius et
11789 gravius quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A6-p7">
11790 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing
11791 desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with
11792 no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the
11793 Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches.
11794 Hence it is written (
11795 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.12.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 12:16</a>): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only
11796 under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according
11797 to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased
11798 if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never
11799 appeased."
11800 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A6-p8"> As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous,
11801 through the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear the violence of one provoked?"
11802 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35506] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11803 ergo dicendum quod in ira et odio duo possunt considerari, scilicet
11804 ipsum quod desideratur, et intensio desiderii. Quantum igitur ad id
11805 quod desideratur, ira habet magis misericordiam quam odium. Quia
11806 enim odium appetit malum alterius secundum se, nulla mensura mali
11807 satiatur, ea enim quae secundum se appetuntur, sine mensura
11808 appetuntur, ut philosophus dicit I Politic., sicut avarus divitias.
11809 Unde dicitur Eccli. XII, <i>inimicus si invenerit tempus, non
11810 satiabitur sanguine</i>. Sed ira non appetit malum nisi sub ratione
11811 iusti vindicativi. Unde quando malum illatum excedit mensuram
11812 iustitiae, secundum aestimationem irascentis, tunc miseretur. Unde
11813 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>iratus, si fiant multa,
11814 miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo</i>. Quantum vero ad
11815 intensionem desiderii, ira magis excludit misericordiam quam odium,
11816 quia motus irae est impetuosior, propter cholerae inflammationem.
11817 Unde statim subditur, <i>impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis
11818 poterit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p9">
11819 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance
11820 is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful,
11821 and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and
11822 be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the
11823 other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however,
11824 that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not
11825 grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
11826 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35507] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11827 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iratus appetit malum alicuius,
11828 inquantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem fit per
11829 illationem poenae. Est autem de ratione poenae quod sit contraria
11830 voluntati, et quod sit afflictiva, et quod pro aliqua culpa
11831 inferatur. Et ideo iratus hoc appetit, ut ille cui nocumentum
11832 infert, percipiat, et doleat, et quod cognoscat propter iniuriam
11833 illatam sibi hoc provenire. Sed odiens de hoc nihil curat, quia
11834 appetit malum alterius inquantum huiusmodi. Non est autem verum
11835 quod id de quo quis tristatur, sit peius, iniustitia enim et
11836 imprudentia, cum sint mala, quia tamen sunt voluntaria, non
11837 contristant eos quibus insunt, ut dicit philosophus, in II
11838 Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p10">
11839 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause
11840 prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion
11841 of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers
11842 that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is
11843 more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing
11844 from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."
11845 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35508] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11846 dicendum quod id quod ex pluribus causis causatur, tunc est
11847 stabilius, quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis, sed una causa
11848 potest praevalere multis aliis. Odium autem provenit ex
11849 permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione
11850 animi propter laesionem illatam, sed odium procedit ex aliqua
11851 dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et
11852 nocivum id quod odit. Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam
11853 dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis
11854 etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter
11855 hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>odium est magis
11856 insanabile quam ira</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A7-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 7. Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p2">
11857 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between
11858 man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away
11859 his pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.
11860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35509] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
11861 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non solum sit ad illos ad quos est
11862 iustitia. Non enim est iustitia hominis ad res irrationales. Sed
11863 tamen homo quandoque irascitur rebus irrationalibus, puta cum
11864 scriptor ex ira proiicit pennam, vel eques percutit equum. Ergo ira
11865 non solum est ad illos ad quos est iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p3">
11866 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes
11867 a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written (
11868 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.5" target="asv">Ps. 4:5</a>): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice.
11869 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35510] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a>
11870 <i>Praeterea, non est iustitia hominis ad seipsum, nec ad ea quae
11871 sui ipsius sunt</i>, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Sed homo quandoque sibi
11872 ipsi irascitur, sicut poenitens propter peccatum, unde dicitur in
11873 Psalmo IV, <i>irascimini, et nolite peccare</i>. Ergo ira non solum
11874 est ad quos est iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p4">
11875 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state
11876 injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
11877 4). Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice.
11878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35511] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11879 iustitia et iniustitia potest esse alicuius ad totum aliquod genus,
11880 vel ad totam aliquam communitatem, puta cum civitas aliquem laesit.
11881 Sed ira non est ad aliquod genus, sed solum ad aliquod singularium,
11882 ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non proprie est ad
11883 quos est iustitia et iniustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p5"> The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35512] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed
11884 contrarium accipi potest a philosopho in II Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p6">
11885 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
11886 <a href="#FS_Q46_A6" id="FS_Q46_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust:
11887 since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz.
11888 the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those
11889 to whom one is just or unjust.
11890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 co."><a name="35513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35513] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
11891 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira appetit malum, inquantum
11892 habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Et ideo ad eosdem est ira, ad
11893 quos est iustitia et iniustitia. Nam inferre vindictam ad iustitiam
11894 pertinet, laedere autem aliquem pertinet ad iniustitiam. Unde tam
11895 ex parte causae, quae est laesio illata ab altero; quam etiam ex
11896 parte vindictae, quam appetit iratus; manifestum est quod ad eosdem
11897 pertinet ira, ad quos iustitia et iniustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p7">
11898 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid
11899 of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action.
11900 Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when
11901 only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to
11902 a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against
11903 anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii,
11904 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above
11905 all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since
11906 they can do us no harm.
11907 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="35514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35514] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
11908 ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira, quamvis sit cum
11909 ratione, potest tamen etiam esse in brutis animalibus, quae ratione
11910 carent, inquantum naturali instinctu per imaginationem moventur ad
11911 aliquid simile operibus rationis. Sic igitur, cum in homine sit et
11912 ratio et imaginatio, dupliciter in homine potest motus irae
11913 insurgere. Uno modo, ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem. Et
11914 sic insurgit aliquis motus irae etiam ad res irrationales et
11915 inanimatas, secundum similitudinem illius motus qui est in
11916 animalibus contra quodlibet nocivum. Alio modo, ex ratione
11917 nuntiante laesionem. Et sic, ut philosophus dicit II Rhetoric.,
11918 <i>nullo modo potest esse ira ad res insensibiles, neque ad
11919 mortuos</i>. Tum quia non dolent, quod maxime quaerunt irati in eis
11920 quibus irascuntur. Tum etiam quia non est ad eos vindicta, cum
11921 eorum non sit iniuriam facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p8">
11922 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and
11923 himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said
11924 to be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things,
11925 a man is never angry with himself.
11926 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="35515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35515] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
11927 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., <i>quaedam
11928 metaphorica iustitia et iniustitia est hominis ad seipsum</i>,
11929 inquantum scilicet ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Et
11930 secundum hoc etiam homo dicitur de seipso vindictam facere, et per
11931 consequens sibi ipsi irasci. Proprie autem et per se, non contingit
11932 aliquem sibi ipsi irasci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p9">
11933 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class,
11934 as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises
11935 from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular.
11936 Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his
11937 action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. When the
11938 whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf.
11939 <a href="#FS_Q29_A6" id="FS_Q46_A7-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[29], A[6]</a>].
11940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="35516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35516] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
11941 dicendum quod philosophus, in II Rhetoric., assignat unam
11942 differentiam inter odium et iram, quod <i>odium potest esse ad
11943 aliquod genus, sicut habemus odio omne latronum genus, sed ira non
11944 est nisi ad aliquod singulare</i>. Cuius ratio est, quia odium
11945 causatur ex hoc quod qualitas alicuius rei apprehenditur ut
11946 dissonans nostrae dispositioni, et hoc potest esse vel in
11947 universali, vel in particulari. Sed ira causatur ex hoc quod
11948 aliquis nos laesit per suum actum. Actus autem omnes sunt
11949 singularium. Et ideo ira semper est circa aliquod singulare. Cum
11950 autem tota civitas nos laeserit, tota civitas computatur sicut unum
11951 singulare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A8-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 8. Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p2">
11952 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor."
11953 For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because
11954 "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor
11955 {kotos} is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these
11956 are not different species of anger.
11957 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35517] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
11958 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter assignet
11959 tres species irae, scilicet fel, maniam et furorem. Nullius enim
11960 generis species diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens. Sed ista
11961 tria diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens, <i>principium enim
11962 motus irae fel vocatur; ira autem permanens dicitur mania; furor
11963 autem est ira observans tempus in vindictam</i>. Ergo non sunt
11964 diversae species irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p3">
11965 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and
11966 is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek
11967 {kotos} [rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.
11968 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35518] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
11969 Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., dicit quod <i>excandescentia
11970 Graece dicitur thymosis; et est ira modo nascens et modo
11971 desistens</i>. Thymosis autem secundum Damascenum, est idem quod
11972 furor. Non ergo furor tempus quaerit ad vindictam, sed tempore
11973 deficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p4">
11974 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and
11975 anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord (
11976 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his
11977 brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly,
11978 "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since
11979 it takes no account of utterance.
11980 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35519] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
11981 Gregorius, XXI Moral., ponit tres gradus irae, scilicet <i>iram
11982 sine voce, et iram cum voce, et iram cum verbo expresso</i>,
11983 secundum illa tria quae dominus ponit Matth. V, qui irascitur
11984 fratri suo, ubi tangitur ira sine voce; et postea subdit, qui
11985 dixerit fratri suo, raca, ubi tangitur ira cum voce, sed necdum
11986 pleno verbo formata; et postea dicit, qui autem dixerit fratri suo,
11987 fatue, ubi expletur vox perfectione sermonis. Ergo insufficienter
11988 divisit Damascenus iram, nihil ponens ex parte vocis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p5">
11989 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].
11990 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35520] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
11991 est auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6">
11992 <b>I answer that,</b> The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This
11993 happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because
11994 it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs
11995 to {menis} [ill-will] which is derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part
11996 of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged
11997 [*
11998 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.31" target="asv">Eph. 4:31</a>: "Let all bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls
11999 some angry persons {akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi} [bitter], because they
12000 retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they
12001 never rest until they have retaliated [*Cf.
12002 <a href="SS_iii.html#SS_Q158_A5" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">SS, Q[158], A[5]</a>].
12003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 co."><a name="35521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35521] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12004 dicendum quod tres species irae quas Damascenus ponit, et etiam
12005 Gregorius Nyssenus, sumuntur secundum ea quae dant irae aliquod
12006 augmentum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ex
12007 facilitate ipsius motus, et talem iram vocat fel, quia cito
12008 accenditur. Alio modo, ex parte tristitiae causantis iram, quae diu
12009 in memoria manet, et haec pertinet ad maniam, quae a manendo
12010 dicitur. Tertio, ex parte eius quod iratus appetit, scilicet
12011 vindictae, et haec pertinet ad furorem, qui nunquam quiescit donec
12012 puniat. Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., quosdam irascentium vocat
12013 acutos, quia cito irascuntur; quosdam amaros, quia diu retinent
12014 iram; quosdam difficiles, quia nunquam quiescunt nisi puniant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p7">
12015 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing
12016 prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof.
12017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35522] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
12018 ergo dicendum quod omnia illa per quae ira recipit aliquam
12019 perfectionem, non omnino per accidens se habent ad iram. Et ideo
12020 nihil prohibet secundum ea species irae assignari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p8">
12021 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness
12022 of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor,"
12023 should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.
12024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35523] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
12025 dicendum quod excandescentia, quam Tullius ponit, magis videtur
12026 pertinere ad primam speciem irae, quae perficitur secundum
12027 velocitatem irae, quam ad furorem. Nihil autem prohibet ut thymosis
12028 Graece, quod Latine furor dicitur, utrumque importet, et
12029 velocitatem ad irascendum et firmitatem propositi ad puniendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p9">
12030 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the
12031 very movement of anger.
12032 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35524] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12033 dicendum quod gradus illi irae distinguuntur secundum effectum
12034 irae, non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus
12035 irae.</p></div></div></div></div>
12036 <div id="FS_Q47" class="div3">
12037 <h3 id="FS_Q47-p0.1">Q. 47. OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies
12038 in the text, except in A[4].]
12039 </h3>
12040 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
12041 <p id="FS_Q47-p2"> We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q47-p3"><a href="#FS_Q47_A1"> (1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p4"><a href="#FS_Q47_A2"> (2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p5"><a href="#FS_Q47_A3"> (3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p6"><a href="#FS_Q47_A4"> (4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.</a></p>
12042 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 pr."><a name="35525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35525]
12043 Iª-IIae q. 47 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
12044 effectiva irae, et de remediis eius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
12045 quatuor. Primo, utrum semper motivum irae sit aliquid factum contra
12046 eum qui irascitur. Secundo, utrum sola parvipensio vel despectio
12047 sit motivum irae. Tertio, de causa irae ex parte irascentis.
12048 Quarto, de causa irae ex parte eius contra quem aliquis
12049 irascitur.</p></div></div></div>
12050 <div id="FS_Q47_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A1-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 1. Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2">
12051 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning,
12052 can do nothing against God; since it is written (
12053 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>): "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on
12054 account of sin, according to
12055 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv"> Ps. 105:40</a>: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always on
12056 account of something done against him, that a man is angry.
12057 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35526] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
12058 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non semper aliquis irascatur propter
12059 aliquid contra se factum. Homo enim, peccando, nihil contra Deum
12060 facere potest, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, <i>si multiplicatae fuerint
12061 iniquitates tuae, quid facies contra illum?</i> Dicitur tamen Deus
12062 irasci contra homines propter peccata; secundum illud Psalmi CV,
12063 <i>iratus est furore dominus in populum suum</i>. Ergo non semper
12064 aliquis irascitur propter aliquid contra se factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p3">
12065 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not
12066 always angry on account of something done against us.
12067 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35527] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
12068 ira est appetitus vindictae. Sed aliquis appetit vindictam facere
12069 etiam de his quae contra alios fiunt. Ergo non semper motivum irae
12070 est aliquid contra nos factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p4">
12071 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest
12072 in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does
12073 not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry.
12074 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35528] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12075 sicut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., homines irascuntur
12076 praecipue contra eos qui despiciunt <i>ea circa quae ipsi maxime
12077 student, sicut qui student in philosophia, irascuntur contra eos
12078 qui philosophiam despiciunt</i>, et simile est in aliis. Sed
12079 despicere philosophiam non est nocere ipsi studenti. Non ergo
12080 semper irascimur propter id quod contra nos fit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p5">
12081 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii,
12082 in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something
12083 done against him.
12084 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="35529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35529] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
12085 ille qui tacet contra contumeliantem, magis ipsum ad iram provocat,
12086 ut dicit Chrysostomus. Sed in hoc contra ipsum nihil agit, quod
12087 tacet. Ergo non semper ira alicuius provocatur propter aliquid quod
12088 contra ipsum fit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p6">
12089 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without
12090 anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such."
12091 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35530] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
12092 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira fit semper
12093 ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum,
12094 si enim putemus talem esse odimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p7">
12095 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
12096 <a href="#FS_Q46_A6" id="FS_Q47_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[6]</a>), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no
12097 question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance:
12098 for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does
12099 not affect a man unless in
12100 some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him.
12101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 co."><a name="35531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35531] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12102 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi
12103 alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem locum non
12104 habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam
12105 provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam,
12106 sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita
12107 etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo
12108 facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo
12109 modo sit contra ipsum. Unde sequitur quod motivum irae alicuius
12110 semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p8">
12111 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance
12112 on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against
12113 God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another;
12114 which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object
12115 of God's providence and protection.
12116 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35532] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
12117 ergo dicendum quod ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi,
12118 sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de
12119 peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective
12120 potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo
12121 quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo,
12122 inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri,
12123 quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei
12124 providentia et tutela continetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p9">
12125 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in
12126 some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.
12127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35533] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
12128 dicendum quod irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam
12129 appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos
12130 pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel
12131 saltem per communionem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p10">
12132 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as
12133 though we ourselves were despised and injured.
12134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35534] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12135 dicendum quod id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum
12136 nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque
12137 despici, et arbitramur nos laesos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p11">
12138 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight
12139 is an action.
12140 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="35535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35535] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
12141 dicendum quod tunc aliquis tacens ad iram provocat iniuriantem,
12142 quando videtur ex contemptu tacere, quasi parvipendat alterius
12143 iram. Ipsa autem parvipensio quidam actus est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A2-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 2. Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p2">
12144 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we
12145 are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised
12146 or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger.
12147 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35536] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
12148 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sola parvipensio vel despectio sit
12149 motivum irae. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>iniuriam passi, vel
12150 aestimantes pati, irascimur</i>. Sed homo potest iniuriam pati
12151 etiam absque despectu vel parvipensione. Ergo non sola parvipensio
12152 est irae motivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p3">
12153 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore
12154 they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
12155 iii, 8). Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger.
12156 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35537] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
12157 eiusdem est appetere honorem, et contristari de parvipensione. Sed
12158 bruta animalia non appetunt honorem. Ergo non contristantur de
12159 parvipensione. Et tamen in eis provocatur ira propter hoc quod
12160 vulnerantur, ut dicit philosophus, in III Ethic. Ergo non sola
12161 parvipensio videtur esse motivum irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p4">
12162 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others
12163 should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore
12164 being slighted is not the only motive for being angry.
12165 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35538] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12166 philosophus, in II Rhetoric., ponit multas alias causas irae, puta
12167 <i>oblivionem, et exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem
12168 malorum, impedimentum consequendae propriae voluntatis</i>. Non
12169 ergo sola parvipensio est provocativum irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p5">
12170 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done
12171 unbecomingly."
12172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35539] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
12173 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira est
12174 appetitus cum tristitia punitionis, propter apparentem
12175 parvipensionem non convenienter factam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A2-p6">
12176 <b>I answer that,</b> All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful
12177 treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three.
12178 Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore
12179 it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only
12180 for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice.
12181 Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering
12182 justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through
12183 ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury
12184 from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those
12185 who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through
12186 passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion
12187 takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand,
12188 who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher
12189 says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because
12190 they do not seem to have acted slightingly."
12191 </p><p id="FS_Q47_A2-p7"> The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: because "men think little of things that are not
12192 worth much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is
12193 inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
12194 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 co."><a name="35540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35540] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12195 dicendum quod omnes causae irae reducuntur ad parvipensionem. Sunt
12196 enim tres species parvipensionis, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric.,
12197 scilicet despectus, epereasmus, idest impedimentum voluntatis
12198 implendae, et contumeliatio, et ad haec tria omnia motiva irae
12199 reducuntur. Cuius ratio potest accipi duplex. Prima est, quia ira
12200 appetit nocumentum alterius, inquantum habet rationem iusti
12201 vindicativi, et ideo intantum quaerit vindictam, inquantum videtur
12202 esse iusta. Iusta autem vindicta non fit nisi de eo quod est
12203 iniuste factum, et ideo provocativum ad iram semper est aliquid sub
12204 ratione iniusti. Unde dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod
12205 <i>si homines putaverint eos qui laeserunt, esse iuste passos, non
12206 irascuntur, non enim fit ira ad iustum</i>. Contingit autem
12207 tripliciter nocumentum alicui inferri, scilicet ex ignorantia, ex
12208 passione, et ex electione. Tunc autem aliquis maxime iniustum
12209 facit, quando ex electione vel industria, vel ex certa malitia
12210 nocumentum infert, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Et ideo maxime irascimur
12211 contra illos quos putamus ex industria nobis nocuisse. Si enim
12212 putemus aliquos vel per ignorantiam, vel ex passione nobis
12213 intulisse iniuriam, vel non irascimur contra eos, vel multo minus,
12214 agere enim aliquid ex ignorantia vel ex passione, diminuit rationem
12215 iniuriae, et est quodammodo provocativum misericordiae et veniae.
12216 Illi autem qui ex industria nocumentum inferunt, ex contemptu
12217 peccare videntur, et ideo contra eos maxime irascimur. Unde
12218 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>his qui propter iram
12219 aliquid fecerunt, aut non irascimur, aut minus irascimur, non enim
12220 propter parvipensionem videntur egisse</i>. Secunda ratio est, quia
12221 parvipensio excellentiae hominis opponitur, quae enim homines
12222 putant nullo digna esse, parvipendunt, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric.
12223 Ex omnibus autem bonis nostris aliquam excellentiam quaerimus. Et
12224 ideo quodcumque nocumentum nobis inferatur, inquantum excellentiae
12225 derogat, videtur ad parvipensionem pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p8">
12226 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt
12227 or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of anger.
12228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35541] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
12229 ergo dicendum quod ex quacumque alia causa aliquis iniuriam
12230 patiatur quam ex contemptu, illa causa minuit rationem iniuriae.
12231 Sed solus contemptus, vel parvipensio, rationem irae auget. Et ideo
12232 est per se causa irascendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p9">
12233 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything
12234 derogatory thereto.
12235 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35542] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
12236 dicendum quod, licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione
12237 honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quandam excellentiam, et
12238 irascitur contra ea quae illi excellentiae derogant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p10">
12239 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we
12240 think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another,
12241 this seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem
12242 to care little about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from
12243 carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently
12244 all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.
12245 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35543] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12246 dicendum quod omnes illae causae ad quandam parvipensionem
12247 reducuntur. Oblivio enim parvipensionis est evidens signum, ea enim
12248 quae magna aestimamus, magis memoriae infigimus. Similiter ex
12249 quadam parvipensione est quod aliquis non vereatur contristare
12250 aliquem, denuntiando sibi aliqua tristia. Qui etiam in infortuniis
12251 alicuius hilaritatis signa ostendit, videtur parum curare de bono
12252 vel malo eius. Similiter etiam qui impedit aliquem a sui propositi
12253 assecutione, non propter aliquam utilitatem sibi inde provenientem,
12254 non videtur multum curare de amicitia eius. Et ideo omnia talia,
12255 inquantum sunt signa contemptus, sunt provocativa irae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A3-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 3. Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p2">
12256 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
12257 2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed."
12258 But these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger.
12259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35544] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
12260 sic proceditur. Videtur quod excellentia alicuius non sit causa
12261 quod facilius irascatur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric.,
12262 quod <i>maxime aliqui irascuntur cum tristantur, ut infirmi, et
12263 egentes, et qui non habent id quod concupiscunt</i>. Sed omnia ista
12264 ad defectum pertinere videntur. Ergo magis facit pronum ad iram
12265 defectus quam excellentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p3">
12266 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some
12267 failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points,
12268 they do not trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause
12269 of a man being angry.
12270 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35545] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
12271 philosophus dicit ibidem quod <i>tunc aliqui maxime irascuntur,
12272 quando in eis despicitur id de quo potest esse suspicio quod vel
12273 non insit eis, vel quod insit eis debiliter, sed cum putant se
12274 multum excellere in illis in quibus despiciuntur, non curant</i>.
12275 Sed praedicta suspicio ex defectu provenit. Ergo defectus est magis
12276 causa quod aliquis irascatur, quam excellentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p4">
12277 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men
12278 are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate
12279 pleasures and well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.
12280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35546] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12281 ea quae ad excellentiam pertinent, maxime faciunt homines iucundos
12282 et bonae spei esse. Sed philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod
12283 <i>in ludo, in risu, in festo, in prosperitate, in consummatione
12284 operum, in delectatione non turpi, et in spe optima, homines non
12285 irascuntur</i>. Ergo excellentia non est causa irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p5">
12286 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger.
12287 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35547] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
12288 est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter
12289 excellentiam indignantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A3-p6">
12290 <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus
12291 excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above
12292 <a href="#FS_Q47_A2" id="FS_Q47_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Now it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels.
12293 Consequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all
12294 angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so
12295 forth.
12296 </p><p id="FS_Q47_A3-p7"> Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by
12297 the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors
12298 of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who
12299 are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
12300 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 co."><a name="35548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35548] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12301 dicendum quod causa irae in eo qui irascitur, dupliciter accipi
12302 potest. Uno modo, secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae. Et sic
12303 excellentia est causa ut aliquis de facili irascatur. Est enim
12304 motivum irae iniusta parvipensio, ut dictum est. Constat autem quod
12305 quanto aliquis est excellentior, iniustius parvipenditur in hoc in
12306 quo excellit. Et ideo illi qui sunt in aliqua excellentia, maxime
12307 irascuntur, si parvipendantur, puta si dives parvipenditur in
12308 pecunia, et rhetor in loquendo, et sic de aliis. Alio modo potest
12309 considerari causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis
12310 quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod
12311 nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae
12312 ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines
12313 defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare
12314 homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius
12315 irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35549] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
12316 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p9">
12317 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and
12318 therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly
12319 despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt
12320 but through ignorance, or some other like cause.
12321 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35550] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
12322 dicendum quod ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum
12323 excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non
12324 contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte,
12325 inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi.
12326 Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter
12327 despectum; sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud
12328 huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p10">
12329 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger,
12330 because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.
12331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35551] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12332 dicendum quod omnia illa impediunt iram, inquantum impediunt
12333 tristitiam. Sed ex alia parte, nata sunt provocare iram, secundum
12334 quod faciunt hominem inconvenientius despici.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A4-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 4. Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p2">
12335 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet.
12336 ii, 3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with
12337 them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of
12338 a person is a reason for being less angry with him.
12339 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35552] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
12340 sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus alicuius non sit causa ut
12341 contra ipsum facilius irascamur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II
12342 Rhetoric., quod <i>his qui confitentur et poenitent et humiliantur,
12343 non irascimur, sed magis ad eos mitescimus. Unde et canes non
12344 mordent eos qui resident</i>. Sed haec pertinent ad parvitatem et
12345 defectum. Ergo parvitas alicuius est causa ut ei minus
12346 irascamur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p3">
12347 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does
12348 not provoke anger against him.
12349 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35553] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
12350 nullus est maior defectus quam mortis. Sed ad mortuos desinit ira.
12351 Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa provocativa irae contra
12352 ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p4">
12353 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they
12354 offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (
12355 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.54.13" target="asv">Ps. 54:13</a>): "If my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a person's defect is not a reason for being more
12356 easily angry with him.
12357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35554] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12358 nullus aestimat aliquem parvum ex hoc quod est sibi amicus. Sed ad
12359 amicos, si nos offenderint, vel si non iuverint, magis offendimur,
12360 unde dicitur in Psalmo LIV, <i>si inimicus meus maledixisset mihi,
12361 sustinuissem utique</i>. Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa ut
12362 contra ipsum facilius irascamur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p5">
12363 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like
12364 manner the prince is angry with his subject."
12365 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35555] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
12366 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>dives
12367 irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra
12368 subiectum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A4-p6">
12369 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
12370 <a href="#FS_Q47_A2" id="FS_Q47_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3) unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person
12371 with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For just
12372 as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising.
12373 Thus a nobleman is angry if he be
12374 insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant.
12375 </p><p id="FS_Q47_A4-p7"> If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In
12376 this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon,
12377 mitigate anger, according to
12378 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.1" target="asv">Prov. 15:1</a>: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom
12379 they humble themselves.
12380 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 co."><a name="35556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35556] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12381 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, indigna despectio est maxime
12382 provocativa irae. Defectus igitur vel parvitas eius contra quem
12383 irascimur, facit ad augmentum irae, inquantum auget indignam
12384 despectionem. Sicut enim quanto aliquis est maior, tanto indignius
12385 despicitur; ita quanto aliquis est minor, tanto indignius despicit.
12386 Et ideo nobiles irascuntur si despiciantur a rusticis, vel
12387 sapientes ab insipientibus, vel domini a servis. Si vero parvitas
12388 vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non
12389 auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de
12390 iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et
12391 veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, <i>responsio
12392 mollis frangit iram</i>, inquantum scilicet tales videntur non
12393 despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35557] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
12394 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p9">
12395 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation;
12396 and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have
12397 attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses
12398 the measure of just retaliation.
12399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35558] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
12400 dicendum quod duplex est causa quare ad mortuos cessat ira. Una,
12401 quia non possunt dolere et sentire, quod maxime quaerunt irati in
12402 his quibus irascuntur. Alio modo, quia iam videntur ad ultimum
12403 malorum pervenisse. Unde etiam ad quoscumque graviter laesos cessat
12404 ira, inquantum eorum malum excedit mensuram iustae
12405 retributionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p10">
12406 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing
12407 to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us.
12408 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35559] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12409 dicendum quod etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse
12410 magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos,
12411 si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra
12412 minores.</p></div></div></div></div>
12413 <div id="FS_Q48" class="div3">
12414 <h3 id="FS_Q48-p0.1">Q. 48. OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
12415 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
12416 <p id="FS_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q48-p3"><a href="#FS_Q48_A1"> (1) Whether anger causes pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p4"><a href="#FS_Q48_A2"> (2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p5"><a href="#FS_Q48_A3"> (3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p6"><a href="#FS_Q48_A4"> (4) Whether it causes taciturnity?</a></p>
12417 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 pr."><a name="35560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35560]
12418 Iª-IIae q. 48 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
12419 effectibus irae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ira
12420 causet delectationem. Secundo, utrum maxime causet fervorem in
12421 corde. Tertio, utrum maxime impediat rationis usum. Quarto, utrum
12422 causet taciturnitatem.</p></div></div></div>
12423 <div id="FS_Q48_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A1-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 1. Whether anger causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p2">
12424 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since,
12425 as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
12426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35561] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
12427 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet delectationem.
12428 Tristitia enim delectationem excludit. Sed ira est semper cum
12429 tristitia, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., <i>omnis qui facit
12430 aliquid per iram, facit tristatus</i>. Ergo ira non causat
12431 delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p3">
12432 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain":
12433 whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on
12434 the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure.
12435 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35562] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
12436 philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>punitio quietat impetum
12437 irae, delectationem pro tristitia faciens</i>, ex quo potest accipi
12438 quod delectatio irato provenit ex punitione, punitio autem excludit
12439 iram. Ergo, adveniente delectatione, ira tollitur. Non est ergo
12440 effectus delectationi coniunctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p4">
12441 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii,
12442 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
12443 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35563] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12444 nullus effectus impedit causam suam, cum sit suae causae conformis.
12445 Sed delectationes impediunt iram, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo
12446 delectatio non est effectus irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p5">
12447 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109
12448 [trl. Pope]).
12449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35564] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
12450 est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod
12451 <i>ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum
12452 crescit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6">
12453 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow:
12454 and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in
12455 the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said (
12456 <a href="#FS_Q47_A1" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for
12457 which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the
12458 greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding
12459 sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man
12460 in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above (
12461 <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought
12462 of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much
12463 about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger.
12464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 co."><a name="35565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35565] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12465 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic.,
12466 delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae
12467 quaedam contra tristitiam, et ideo quanto per delectationem contra
12468 maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto
12469 delectatio magis percipitur; sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit,
12470 delectabilior fit ei potus. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod
12471 motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante; cui
12472 quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam. Et ideo ad
12473 praesentiam vindictae delectatio sequitur, et tanto maior, quanto
12474 maior fuit tristitia. Si igitur vindicta fuerit praesens realiter,
12475 fit perfecta delectatio, quae totaliter excludit tristitiam, et per
12476 hoc quietat motum irae. Sed antequam vindicta sit praesens
12477 realiter, fit irascenti praesens dupliciter. Uno modo, per spem,
12478 quia nullus irascitur nisi sperans vindictam, ut supra dictum est.
12479 Alio modo, secundum continuam cogitationem. Unicuique enim
12480 concupiscenti est delectabile immorari in cogitatione eorum quae
12481 concupiscit, propter quod etiam imaginationes somniorum sunt
12482 delectabiles. Et ideo, cum iratus multum in animo suo cogitet de
12483 vindicta, ex hoc delectatur. Tamen delectatio non est perfecta,
12484 quae tollat tristitiam, et per consequens iram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p7">
12485 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the
12486 thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus
12487 of anger.
12488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35566] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
12489 ergo dicendum quod non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet, sed
12490 tristatur de illata iniuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata
12491 et sperata. Unde tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed
12492 delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p8">
12493 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.
12494 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35567] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
12495 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de delectatione quae causatur
12496 ex reali praesentia vindictae, quae totaliter tollit iram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p9">
12497 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking
12498 vengeance follows from anger.
12499 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35568] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12500 dicendum quod delectationes praecedentes impediunt ne sequatur
12501 tristitia; et per consequens impediunt iram. Sed delectatio de
12502 vindicta consequitur ipsam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A2-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 2. Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2">
12503 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above (
12504 <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[28], A[5]</a>;
12505 <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[37], A[2]</a>), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more
12506 powerful than its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor.
12507 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35569] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
12508 sic proceditur. Videtur quod fervor non sit maxime effectus irae.
12509 Fervor enim, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet ad amorem. Sed amor,
12510 sicut supra dictum est, principium est et causa omnium passionum.
12511 Cum ergo causa sit potior effectu, videtur quod ira non faciat
12512 maxime fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p3">
12513 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer
12514 it lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger."
12515 Therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger.
12516 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35570] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
12517 illa quae de se excitant fervorem, per temporis assiduitatem magis
12518 augentur, sicut amor diuturnitate convalescit. Sed ira per tractum
12519 temporis debilitatur, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod
12520 tempus quietat iram. Ergo ira non proprie causat fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p4">
12521 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger,"
12522 as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor.
12523 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35571] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12524 fervor additus fervori, augmentat fervorem. <i>Sed maior ira
12525 superveniens facit iram mitescere</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in II
12526 Rhetoric. Ergo ira non causat fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p5">
12527 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger is fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of
12528 the bile."
12529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35572] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
12530 est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>ira est fervor eius qui circa
12531 cor est sanguinis, ex evaporatione fellis fiens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p6">
12532 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
12533 <a href="#FS_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q48_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>), the bodily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now
12534 it is evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to
12535 it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object.
12536 Since then the appetitive movement
12537 of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great
12538 force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of
12539 anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecution,
12540 which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital
12541 spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being
12542 so disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral.
12543 v, 30) "the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the
12544 countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes
12545 a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says."
12546 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 co."><a name="35573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35573] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12547 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, corporalis transmutatio quae est
12548 in passionibus animae, proportionatur motui appetitus. Manifestum
12549 est autem quod quilibet appetitus, etiam naturalis, fortius tendit
12550 in id quod est sibi contrarium, si fuerit praesens, unde videmus
12551 quod aqua calefacta magis congelatur, quasi frigido vehementius in
12552 calidum agente. Motus autem appetitivus irae causatur ex aliqua
12553 iniuria illata, sicut ex quodam contrario iniacente. Et ideo
12554 appetitus potissime tendit ad repellendum iniuriam per appetitum
12555 vindictae, et ex hoc sequitur magna vehementia et impetuositas in
12556 motu irae. Et quia motus irae non est per modum retractionis, cui
12557 proportionatur frigus; sed magis per modum insecutionis, cui
12558 proportionatur calor; consequenter fit motus irae causativus
12559 cuiusdam fervoris sanguinis et spirituum circa cor, quod est
12560 instrumentum passionum animae. Et exinde est quod, propter magnam
12561 perturbationem cordis quae est in ira, maxime apparent in iratis
12562 indicia quaedam in exterioribus membris. Ut enim Gregorius dicit,
12563 in V Moral., <i>irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus
12564 tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi,
12565 et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed
12566 sensus quid loquatur, ignorat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p7">
12567 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently
12568 when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being
12569 that his heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor
12570 of love and makes it to be felt more.
12571 </p><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor
12572 of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is likened to the warmth
12573 of the air and of the blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that "love
12574 springs from the liver," because of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has
12575 a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to
12576 the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation
12577 of the bile whence it takes its name {chole}."
12578 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35574] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
12579 ergo dicendum quod <i>amor ipse non ita sentitur, nisi cum eum
12580 prodit indigentia</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin. Et ideo
12581 quando homo patitur detrimentum amatae excellentiae propter
12582 iniuriam illatam, magis sentitur amor; et ideo ferventius cor
12583 mutatur ad removendum impedimentum rei amatae; ut sic fervor ipse
12584 amoris per iram crescat, et magis sentiatur. Et tamen fervor qui
12585 consequitur calorem, alia ratione pertinet ad amorem, et ad iram.
12586 Nam fervor amoris est cum quadam dulcedine et lenitate, est enim in
12587 bonum amatum. Et ideo assimilatur calori aeris et sanguinis,
12588 propter quod, sanguinei sunt magis amativi; et dicitur quod cogit
12589 amare iecur, in quo fit quaedam generatio sanguinis. Fervor autem
12590 irae est cum amaritudine, ad consumendum, quia tendit ad punitionem
12591 contrarii. Unde assimilatur calori ignis et cholerae, et propter
12592 hoc Damascenus dicit quod <i>procedit ex evaporatione fellis, et
12593 fellea nominatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p9">
12594 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is
12595 weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong
12596 done. Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether.
12597 Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is
12598 gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love, so long as the
12599 cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a friend's absence lasts long,
12600 it seems to make men forget their friendship." But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being
12601 multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually
12602 multiplied.
12603 </p><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p10"> Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent
12604 having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away.
12605 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35575] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
12606 dicendum quod omne illud cuius causa per tempus diminuitur, necesse
12607 est quod tempore debilitetur. Manifestum est autem quod memoria
12608 tempore diminuitur, quae enim antiqua sunt, a memoria de facili
12609 excidunt. Ira autem causatur ex memoria iniuriae illatae. Et ideo
12610 causa irae per tempus paulatim diminuitur, quousque totaliter
12611 tollatur. Maior etiam videtur iniuria quando primo sentitur; et
12612 paulatim diminuitur eius aestimatio, secundum quod magis receditur
12613 a praesenti sensu iniuriae. Et similiter etiam est de amore, si
12614 amoris causa remaneat in sola memoria, unde philosophus dicit, in
12615 VIII Ethic., quod si <i>diuturna fiat amici absentia, videtur
12616 amicitiae oblivionem facere</i>. Sed in praesentia amici, semper
12617 per tempus multiplicatur causa amicitiae, et ideo amicitia crescit.
12618 Et similiter esset de ira, si continue multiplicaretur causa
12619 ipsius. Tamen hoc ipsum quod ira cito consumitur, attestatur
12620 vehementi fervori ipsius. Sicut enim ignis magnus cito extinguitur,
12621 consumpta materia; ita etiam ira, propter suam vehementiam, cito
12622 deficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p11">
12623 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with
12624 another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be
12625 greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned
12626 greater, seem to be of little or no account.
12627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35576] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12628 dicendum quod omnis virtus divisa in plures partes, diminuitur. Et
12629 ideo quando aliquis iratus alicui, irascitur postmodum alteri, ex
12630 hoc ipso diminuitur ira ad primum. Et praecipue si ad secundum
12631 fuerit maior ira, nam iniuria quae excitavit iram ad primum,
12632 videbitur, comparatione secundae iniuriae, quae aestimatur maior,
12633 esse parva vel nulla.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A3-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 3. Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p2">
12634 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem
12635 to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.
12636 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35577] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
12637 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non impediat rationem. Illud enim
12638 quod est cum ratione, non videtur esse rationis impedimentum. Sed
12639 ira est cum ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo ira non impedit
12640 rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p3">
12641 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
12642 that "an angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does;
12643 for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).
12644 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35578] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
12645 quanto magis impeditur ratio, tanto diminuitur manifestatio. Sed
12646 philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., quod <i>iracundus non est
12647 insidiator, sed manifestus</i>. Ergo ira non videtur impedire usum
12648 rationis, sicut concupiscentia; quae est insidiosa, ut ibidem
12649 dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p4">
12650 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more
12651 clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are
12652 more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored": and so forth. Therefore
12653 the same cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does
12654 not hinder the judgment of reason.
12655 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35579] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12656 iudicium rationis evidentius fit ex adiunctione contrarii, quia
12657 contraria iuxta se posita magis elucescunt. Sed ex hoc etiam
12658 crescit ira, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>magis
12659 homines irascuntur, si contraria praeexistunt, sicut honorati si
12660 dehonorentur</i>; et sic de aliis. Ergo ex eodem et ira crescit, et
12661 iudicium rationis adiuvatur. Non ergo ira impedit iudicium
12662 rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p5">
12663 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind."
12664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35580] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
12665 est quod Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod <i>ira intelligentiae
12666 lucem subtrahit, cum mentem permovendo confundit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6">
12667 <b>I answer that,</b> Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers
12668 for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that
12669 any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has
12670 been stated
12671 <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that anger, above all, causes a bodily
12672 disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions,
12673 anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to
12674 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.10" target="asv"> Ps. 30:10</a>: "My eye is troubled with wrath."
12675 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 co."><a name="35581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35581] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12676 dicendum quod mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in
12677 suo proprio actu; tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam
12678 viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato;
12679 necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis
12680 impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno. Dictum est autem quod
12681 ira maxime facit perturbationem corporalem circa cor, ita ut etiam
12682 usque ad exteriora membra derivetur. Unde ira, inter ceteras
12683 passiones, manifestius impedit iudicium rationis; secundum illud
12684 Psalmi XXX, <i>conturbatus est in ira oculus meus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p7">
12685 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the
12686 passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of
12687 the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders
12688 the judgment of reason.
12689 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35582] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
12690 ergo dicendum quod a ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum
12691 appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira. Sed perfectum iudicium
12692 rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte rationem
12693 audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae
12694 est materialis in ira. Et quantum ad hoc, impedit iudicium
12695 rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p8">
12696 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without
12697 thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and
12698 what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity
12699 which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man
12700 (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly." Desire, on the other
12701 hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame
12702 and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as
12703 matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
12704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35583] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
12705 dicendum quod iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia
12706 manifestum sit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste
12707 operatur, non quaerens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit
12708 propter impedimentum rationis, quae non potest discernere quid sit
12709 occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi
12710 vias. Partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quae pertinet ad
12711 magnanimitatem, quam facit ira, unde et de magnanimo philosophus
12712 dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>est manifestus oditor et amator et
12713 manifeste dicit et operatur</i>. Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse
12714 latens et insidiosa, quia, ut plurimum, delectabilia quae
12715 concupiscuntur, habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem, in quibus
12716 homo vult latere. In his autem quae sunt virilitatis et
12717 excellentiae, cuiusmodi sunt vindictae, quaerit homo manifestus
12718 esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p9">
12719 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another
12720 facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or
12721 wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen.
12722 Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being
12723 received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, anger is increased
12724 also.
12725 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35584] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12726 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus irae a ratione incipit, et
12727 ideo secundum idem appositio contrarii ad contrarium adiuvat
12728 iudicium rationis, et auget iram. Cum enim aliquis habet honorem
12729 vel divitias, et postea incurrit alicuius detrimentum, illud
12730 detrimentum apparet maius, tum propter vicinitatem contrarii; tum
12731 quia erat inopinatum. Et ideo causat maiorem tristitiam, sicut
12732 etiam magna bona ex inopinato venientia, causant maiorem
12733 delectationem. Et secundum augmentum tristitiae praecedentis,
12734 consequenter augetur et ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A4-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 4. Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p2">
12735 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger conduces
12736 to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord (
12737 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and " .
12738 . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity.
12739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35585] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
12740 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet taciturnitatem.
12741 Taciturnitas enim locutioni opponitur. Sed per crementum irae usque
12742 ad locutionem pervenitur, ut patet per gradus irae quos dominus
12743 assignat, Matth. V, dicens, <i>qui irascitur fratri suo; et, qui
12744 dixerit fratri suo, raca; et, qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue</i>.
12745 Ergo ira non causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3">
12746 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written (
12747 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.28" target="asv">Prov. 25:28</a>): "As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking."
12748 But anger, above all, hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above
12749 <a href="#FS_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words. Therefore it does not
12750 cause taciturnity.
12751 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35586] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
12752 ex hoc quod custodia rationis deficit, contingit quod homo
12753 prorumpat ad verba inordinata, unde dicitur Prov. XXV, <i>sicut
12754 urbs patens et absque murorum ambitu, ita vir qui non potest
12755 cohibere in loquendo spiritum suum</i>. Sed ira maxime impedit
12756 iudicium rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo facit maxime profluere in
12757 verba inordinata. Non ergo causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4">
12758 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
12759 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.34" target="asv">Mat. 12:34</a>): "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as stated
12760 above
12761 <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore above all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
12762 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35587] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12763 Matth. XII dicitur, ex abundantia cordis os loquitur. Sed per iram
12764 cor maxime perturbatur, ut dictum est. Ergo maxime causat
12765 locutionem. Non ergo causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p5">
12766 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely."
12767 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35588] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
12768 est quod Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod <i>ira per silentium
12769 clausa, intra mentem vehementius aestuat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6">
12770 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
12771 <a href="#FS_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[46], A[4]), anger both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects it may cause taciturnity.
12772 On the part of the reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite in its
12773 inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes
12774 when the mind is disturbed, anger, as
12775 if in judgment, commands silence." On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated above
12776 <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the
12777 emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above
12778 <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, "the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." Consequently anger may cause such a disturbance,
12779 that
12780 the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result.
12781 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 co."><a name="35589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35589] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
12782 dicendum quod ira, sicut iam dictum est, et cum ratione est, et
12783 impedit rationem. Et ex utraque parte, potest taciturnitatem
12784 causare. Ex parte quidem rationis, quando iudicium rationis
12785 intantum viget quod, etsi non cohibeat affectum ab inordinato
12786 appetitu vindictae, cohibet tamen linguam ab inordinata locutione.
12787 Unde Gregorius, in V Moral., dicit, <i>aliquando ira perturbato
12788 animo, quasi ex iudicio, silentium indicit</i>. Ex parte vero
12789 impedimenti rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, perturbatio irae
12790 usque ad exteriora membra perducitur; et maxime ad illa membra in
12791 quibus expressius relucet vestigium cordis, sicut in oculis et in
12792 facie et in lingua; unde, sicut dictum est, <i>lingua se praepedit,
12793 facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi</i>. Potest ergo esse tanta
12794 perturbatio irae, quod omnino impediatur lingua ab usu loquendi. Et
12795 tunc sequitur taciturnitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p7">
12796 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to
12797 paralyze the tongue and other outward members.
12798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35590] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
12799 ergo dicendum quod augmentum irae quandoque est usque ad
12800 impediendum rationem a cohibitione linguae. Quandoque autem ultra
12801 procedit, usque ad impediendum motum linguae, et aliorum membrorum
12802 exteriorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35591] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc
12803 etiam patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p9">
12804 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered
12805 by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even
12806 death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds
12807 to speak.
12808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35592] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12809 dicendum quod perturbatio cordis quandoque potest superabundare
12810 usque ad hoc, quod per inordinatum motum cordis impediatur motus
12811 exteriorum membrorum. Et tunc causatur taciturnitas, et immobilitas
12812 exteriorum membrorum, et quandoque etiam mors. Si autem non fuerit
12813 tanta perturbatio, tunc ex abundantia perturbationis cordis,
12814 sequitur oris locutio.</p></div></div></div></div>
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