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| 4 <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> | |
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| 16 <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.iii" class="div2"> | |
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| 19 <h2 id="FS.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q22">Q. 22. OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q23">Q. 23. HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q24">Q. 24. OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q25">Q. 25. OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q26">Q. 26. OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q27">Q. 27. OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q28">Q. 28. OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q29">Q. 29. OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q30">Q. 30. OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q31">Q. 31. OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q32">Q. 32. OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q33">Q. 33. OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q34">Q. 34. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q35">Q. 35. OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q36">Q. 36. OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q37">Q. 37. OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q38">Q. 38. OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q39">Q. 39. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q40">Q. 40. OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q41">Q. 41. OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q42">Q. 42. OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q43">Q. 43. OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q44">Q. 44. OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q45">Q. 45. OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q46">Q. 46. OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q47">Q. 47. OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies | |
| 20 in the text, except in A[4].] | |
| 21 </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q48">Q. 48. OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> | |
| 22 <div id="FS_Q22" class="div3"> | |
| 23 <h3 id="FS_Q22-p0.1">Q. 22. OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 24 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 25 <p id="FS_Q22-p2"> We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there | |
| 26 are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their | |
| 27 malice and goodness. | |
| 28 </p><p id="FS_Q22-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q22-p4"><a href="#FS_Q22_A1"> (1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q22-p5"><a href="#FS_Q22_A2"> (2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q22-p6"><a href="#FS_Q22_A3"> (3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?</a></p> | |
| 29 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 pr."><a name="34515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34515] | |
| 30 Iª-IIae q. 22 pr.</span></a> Post hoc considerandum est de | |
| 31 passionibus animae, et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. In | |
| 32 generali autem, quatuor occurrunt circa eas consideranda, primo | |
| 33 quidem, de subiecto earum; secundo, de differentia earum; tertio, | |
| 34 de comparatione earum ad invicem; quarto, de malitia et bonitate | |
| 35 ipsarum. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum aliqua passio | |
| 36 sit in anima. Secundo, utrum magis in parte appetitiva quam in | |
| 37 apprehensiva. Tertio, utrum magis sit in appetitu sensitivo quam | |
| 38 intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 39 <div id="FS_Q22_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A1-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 1. Whether any passion is in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p2"> | |
| 40 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of | |
| 41 matter and form, as stated in the | |
| 42 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A5" id="FS_Q22_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[5]</a>. Therefore there is no passion in the soul. | |
| 43 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34516] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 44 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio sit in anima. Pati enim | |
| 45 est proprium materiae. Sed anima non est composita ex materia et | |
| 46 forma, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p3"> | |
| 47 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore | |
| 48 passion is not in the soul. | |
| 49 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34517] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 50 passio est motus, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed anima non movetur, | |
| 51 ut probatur in I de anima. Ergo passio non est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p4"> | |
| 52 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in | |
| 53 Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul. | |
| 54 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34518] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 55 passio est via in corruptionem, nam omnis passio, magis facta, | |
| 56 abiicit a substantia, ut dicitur in libro topicorum. Sed anima est | |
| 57 incorruptibilis. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p5"> | |
| 58 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 59 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>): "When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members." Now sins are, properly | |
| 60 speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul. | |
| 61 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34519] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 62 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VII, <i>cum essemus in carne, | |
| 63 passiones peccatorum, quae per legem erant, operabantur in membris | |
| 64 nostris</i>. Peccata autem sunt proprie in anima. Ergo et | |
| 65 passiones, quae dicuntur peccatorum, sunt in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p6"> | |
| 66 <b>I answer that,</b> The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although | |
| 67 nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than | |
| 68 to be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else | |
| 69 is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is | |
| 70 unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus | |
| 71 to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. | |
| 72 For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, | |
| 73 then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a | |
| 74 more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: | |
| 75 whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens | |
| 76 that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind | |
| 77 of passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily | |
| 78 transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the "composite" | |
| 79 is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature | |
| 80 of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy. | |
| 81 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 co."><a name="34520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34520] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 82 dicendum quod pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, | |
| 83 secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a | |
| 84 re, sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem | |
| 85 magis proprie est perfici, quam pati. Alio modo dicitur pati | |
| 86 proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abiectione. Sed hoc | |
| 87 contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiicitur id quod non est | |
| 88 conveniens rei, sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur, dicitur pati, | |
| 89 quia recipit sanitatem, aegritudine abiecta. Alio modo, quando e | |
| 90 converso contingit, sicut aegrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur | |
| 91 infirmitas, sanitate abiecta. Et hic est propriissimus modus | |
| 92 passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem, | |
| 93 quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur | |
| 94 ad aliud trahi. Et similiter in I de Generat. dicitur quod, quando | |
| 95 ex ignobiliori generatur nobilius, est generatio simpliciter, et | |
| 96 corruptio secundum quid, e converso autem quando ex nobiliori | |
| 97 ignobilius generatur. Et his tribus modis contingit esse in anima | |
| 98 passionem. Nam secundum receptionem tantum dicitur quod sentire et | |
| 99 intelligere est quoddam pati. Passio autem cum abiectione non est | |
| 100 nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem, unde passio proprie dicta | |
| 101 non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet | |
| 102 compositum patitur. Sed et in hoc est diversitas, nam quando | |
| 103 huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet | |
| 104 rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis | |
| 105 proprie est passio quam laetitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p7"> | |
| 106 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those | |
| 107 things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be | |
| 108 in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, | |
| 109 in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according | |
| 110 as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4. | |
| 111 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34521] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 112 igitur dicendum quod pati, secundum quod est cum abiectione et | |
| 113 transmutatione, proprium est materiae, unde non invenitur nisi in | |
| 114 compositis ex materia et forma. Sed pati prout importat receptionem | |
| 115 solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiae, sed potest esse | |
| 116 cuiuscumque existentis in potentia. Anima autem, etsi non sit | |
| 117 composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis, | |
| 118 secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati, secundum quod | |
| 119 intelligere pati est, ut dicitur in III de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p8"> | |
| 120 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in | |
| 121 De Anima i, 3. | |
| 122 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34522] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 123 dicendum quod pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animae per se, | |
| 124 convenit tamen ei per accidens, ut in I de anima dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A1-p9"> | |
| 125 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not found | |
| 126 in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature. | |
| 127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34523] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 128 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passione quae est cum | |
| 129 transmutatione ad deterius. Et huiusmodi passio animae convenire | |
| 130 non potest nisi per accidens, per se autem convenit composito, quod | |
| 131 est corruptibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q22_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A2-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 2. Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p2"> | |
| 132 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first | |
| 133 in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. | |
| 134 ii, 1. Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not | |
| 135 affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in | |
| 136 the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive. | |
| 137 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34524] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 138 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio magis sit in parte animae | |
| 139 apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva. Quod enim est primum in | |
| 140 quolibet genere videtur esse maximum eorum quae sunt in genere | |
| 141 illo, et causa aliorum, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Sed passio prius | |
| 142 invenitur in parte apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva, non enim | |
| 143 patitur pars appetitiva, nisi passione praecedente in parte | |
| 144 apprehensiva. Ergo passio est magis in parte apprehensiva quam in | |
| 145 parte appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p3"> | |
| 146 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than | |
| 147 the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part. | |
| 148 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34525] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 149 quod est magis activum, videtur esse minus passivum, actio enim | |
| 150 passioni opponitur. Sed pars appetitiva est magis activa quam pars | |
| 151 apprehensiva. Ergo videtur quod in parte apprehensiva magis sit | |
| 152 passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p4"> | |
| 153 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But | |
| 154 passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the | |
| 155 sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part. | |
| 156 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34526] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 157 sicut appetitus sensitivus est virtus in organo corporali, ita et | |
| 158 vis apprehensiva sensitiva. Sed passio animae fit, proprie | |
| 159 loquendo, secundum transmutationem corporalem. Ergo non magis est | |
| 160 passio in parte appetitiva sensitiva quam in apprehensiva | |
| 161 sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p5"> | |
| 162 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of | |
| 163 our writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. | |
| 164 iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call | |
| 165 them passions." From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as | |
| 166 affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are | |
| 167 in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part. | |
| 168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34527] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 169 est quod Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>motus animi, | |
| 170 quos Graeci pathe, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, | |
| 171 perturbationes, quidam affectiones vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut | |
| 172 in Graeco habetur, expressius passiones vocant</i>. Ex quo patet | |
| 173 quod passiones animae sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones | |
| 174 manifeste pertinent ad partem appetitivam, et non ad apprehensivam. | |
| 175 Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in | |
| 176 apprehensiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p6"> | |
| 177 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have already stated | |
| 178 <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q22_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing | |
| 179 by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order | |
| 180 to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of | |
| 181 the appetitive power, "are in things | |
| 182 themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason | |
| 183 of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. | |
| 184 vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is | |
| 185 evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part. | |
| 186 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 co."><a name="34528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34528] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 187 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in nomine passionis importatur | |
| 188 quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur | |
| 189 anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam | |
| 190 per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in | |
| 191 seipsis sunt, unde philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum | |
| 192 et malum, quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, sunt in ipsis | |
| 193 rebus. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in | |
| 194 seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se | |
| 195 habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur | |
| 196 quod verum et falsum, quae ad cognitionem pertinent, non sunt in | |
| 197 rebus, sed in mente. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis | |
| 198 invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p7"> | |
| 199 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things | |
| 200 relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, | |
| 201 the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with | |
| 202 light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the more | |
| 203 light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding | |
| 204 from that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes | |
| 205 from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which | |
| 206 afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it | |
| 207 is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality | |
| 208 and passion: while in other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power | |
| 209 of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers. | |
| 210 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34529] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 211 ergo dicendum quod e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad | |
| 212 perfectionem, et in his quae pertinent ad defectum. Nam in his quae | |
| 213 ad perfectionem pertinent, attenditur intensio per accessum ad unum | |
| 214 primum principium, cui quanto est aliquid propinquius, tanto est | |
| 215 magis intensum, sicut intensio lucidi attenditur per accessum ad | |
| 216 aliquid summe lucidum, cui quanto aliquid magis appropinquat, tanto | |
| 217 est magis lucidum. Sed in his quae ad defectum pertinent, | |
| 218 attenditur intensio non per accessum ad aliquod summum, sed per | |
| 219 recessum a perfecto, quia in hoc ratio privationis et defectus | |
| 220 consistit. Et ideo quanto minus recedit a primo, tanto est minus | |
| 221 intensum, et propter hoc, in principio semper invenitur parvus | |
| 222 defectus, qui postea procedendo magis multiplicatur. Passio autem | |
| 223 ad defectum pertinet, quia est alicuius secundum quod est in | |
| 224 potentia. Unde in his quae appropinquant primo perfecto, scilicet | |
| 225 Deo, invenitur parum de ratione potentiae et passionis, in aliis | |
| 226 autem consequenter, plus. Et sic etiam in priori vi animae, | |
| 227 scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p8"> | |
| 228 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior | |
| 229 action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: | |
| 230 since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things. | |
| 231 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34530] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 232 dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia est | |
| 233 magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo | |
| 234 habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad | |
| 235 rem ut est in seipsa, per actionem enim exteriorem pervenimus ad | |
| 236 consequendas res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A2-p9"> | |
| 237 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the | |
| 238 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A3" id="FS_Q22_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[3]</a> the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an | |
| 239 "intention" of the object. And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the | |
| 240 object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of another and | |
| 241 natural change, which affects | |
| 242 their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind | |
| 243 of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently | |
| 244 at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive | |
| 245 appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change | |
| 246 of | |
| 247 the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion | |
| 248 of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although | |
| 249 both are actions of a corporeal organ. | |
| 250 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34531] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 251 dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, dupliciter organum animae | |
| 252 potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum | |
| 253 quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu | |
| 254 apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, sicut oculus immutatur a | |
| 255 visibili, non ita quod coloretur, sed ita quod recipiat intentionem | |
| 256 coloris. Est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout | |
| 257 organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem, puta | |
| 258 quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio simili modo transmutatur. | |
| 259 Et huiusmodi transmutatio per accidens se habet ad actum | |
| 260 apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, puta cum oculus fatigatur ex | |
| 261 forti intuitu, vel dissolvitur ex vehementia visibilis. Sed ad | |
| 262 actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio, | |
| 263 unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur | |
| 264 aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; sicut dicitur quod ira est | |
| 265 accensio sanguinis circa cor. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis | |
| 266 invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu | |
| 267 sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi | |
| 268 corporalis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q22_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q22_A3-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 3. Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p2"> | |
| 269 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. | |
| 270 ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering | |
| 271 [patiens] them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore | |
| 272 passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive | |
| 273 appetite. | |
| 274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34532] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 275 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio non magis sit in appetitu | |
| 276 sensitivo quam in appetitu intellectivo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II | |
| 277 cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Hierotheus ex quadam est doctus | |
| 278 diviniore inspiratione, non solum discens, sed etiam patiens | |
| 279 divina</i>. Sed passio divinorum non potest pertinere ad appetitum | |
| 280 sensitivum, cuius obiectum est bonum sensibile. Ergo passio est in | |
| 281 appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p3"> | |
| 282 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which | |
| 283 is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. | |
| 284 Therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite. | |
| 285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34533] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 286 quanto activum est potentius, tanto passio est fortior. Sed | |
| 287 obiectum appetitus intellectivi, quod est bonum universale, est | |
| 288 potentius activum quam obiectum appetitus sensitivi, quod est bonum | |
| 289 particulare. Ergo ratio passionis magis invenitur in appetitu | |
| 290 intellectivo quam in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p4"> | |
| 291 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive | |
| 292 appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in | |
| 293 the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. | |
| 294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34534] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 295 gaudium et amor passiones quaedam esse dicuntur. Sed haec | |
| 296 inveniuntur in appetitu intellectivo, et non solum in sensitivo, | |
| 297 alioquin non attribuerentur in Scripturis Deo et Angelis. Ergo | |
| 298 passiones non magis sunt in appetitu sensitivo quam in | |
| 299 intellectivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p5"> | |
| 300 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite | |
| 301 when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil." | |
| 302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34535] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 303 est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales | |
| 304 passiones, <i>passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in | |
| 305 imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus | |
| 306 irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p6"> | |
| 307 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 308 <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q22_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act | |
| 309 of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no | |
| 310 need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means | |
| 311 of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident | |
| 312 that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this is | |
| 313 again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above. | |
| 314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 co."><a name="34536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34536] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 315 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi | |
| 316 est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus | |
| 317 appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in | |
| 318 apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem | |
| 319 appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio | |
| 320 corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius | |
| 321 organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in | |
| 322 actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi; ut etiam patet per | |
| 323 definitiones Damasceni inductas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p7"> | |
| 324 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place | |
| 325 without any alteration in the body. | |
| 326 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34537] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 327 ergo dicendum quod passio divinorum ibi dicitur affectio ad divina, | |
| 328 et coniunctio ad ipsa per amorem, quod tamen fit sine | |
| 329 transmutatione corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p8"> | |
| 330 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things | |
| 331 that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite | |
| 332 has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive. | |
| 333 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34538] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 334 dicendum quod magnitudo passionis non solum dependet ex virtute | |
| 335 agentis, sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis, quia quae sunt bene | |
| 336 passibilia, multum patiuntur etiam a parvis activis. Licet ergo | |
| 337 obiectum appetitus intellectivi sit magis activum quam obiectum | |
| 338 appetitus sensitivi, tamen appetitus sensitivus est magis | |
| 339 passivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q22_A3-p9"> | |
| 340 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they | |
| 341 signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy | |
| 342 angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary | |
| 343 human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, | |
| 344 although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours." | |
| 345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 22 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34539] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 346 dicendum quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur | |
| 347 Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, | |
| 348 significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, | |
| 349 absque passione. Unde dicit Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, <i>sancti | |
| 350 Angeli et sine ira puniunt et sine miseriae compassione subveniunt. | |
| 351 Et tamen, istarum nomina passionum, consuetudine locutionis | |
| 352 humanae, etiam in eos usurpantur, propter quandam operum | |
| 353 similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 354 <div id="FS_Q23" class="div3"> | |
| 355 <h3 id="FS_Q23-p0.1">Q. 23. HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 356 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 357 <p id="FS_Q23-p2"> We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q23-p3"><a href="#FS_Q23_A1"> (1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p4"><a href="#FS_Q23_A2"> (2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p5"><a href="#FS_Q23_A3"> (3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q23-p6"><a href="#FS_Q23_A4"> (4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?</a></p> | |
| 358 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 pr."><a name="34540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34540] | |
| 359 Iª-IIae q. 23 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 360 passionum differentia ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | |
| 361 Primo, utrum passiones quae sunt in concupiscibili, sint diversae | |
| 362 ab his quae sunt in irascibili. Secundo, utrum contrarietas | |
| 363 passionum irascibili sit secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. | |
| 364 Tertio, utrum sit aliqua passio non habens contrarium. Quarto, | |
| 365 utrum sint aliquae passiones differentes specie, in eadem potentia, | |
| 366 non contrariae ad invicem.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 367 <div id="FS_Q23_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A1-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 1. Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p2"> | |
| 368 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) | |
| 369 that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible | |
| 370 part. Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible | |
| 371 part. | |
| 372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34541] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 373 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones eaedem sint in irascibili et | |
| 374 in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod | |
| 375 passiones animae sunt quas sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Sed | |
| 376 gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo omnes passiones | |
| 377 sunt in concupiscibili. Non ergo sunt aliae in irascibili, et aliae | |
| 378 in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p3"> | |
| 379 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words of | |
| 380 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q23_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv"> Mat. 13:33, </a> "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice | |
| 381 in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also | |
| 382 is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and | |
| 383 irascible faculties. | |
| 384 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34542] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 385 Matth. XIII, super illud, <i>simile est regnum caelorum | |
| 386 fermento</i> etc., dicit Glossa Hieronymi, <i>in ratione | |
| 387 possideamus prudentiam, in irascibili odium vitiorum, in | |
| 388 concupiscibili desiderium virtutum</i>. Sed odium est in | |
| 389 concupiscibili, sicut et amor, cui contrariatur, ut dicitur in II | |
| 390 Topic. Ergo eadem passio est in concupiscibili et irascibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p4"> | |
| 391 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible | |
| 392 passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties. | |
| 393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34543] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 394 passiones et actus differunt specie secundum obiecta. Sed passionum | |
| 395 irascibilis et concupiscibilis eadem obiecta sunt, scilicet bonum | |
| 396 et malum. Ergo eaedem sunt passiones irascibilis et | |
| 397 concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p5"> | |
| 398 <b>On the contrary,</b> The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible | |
| 399 are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the | |
| 400 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the | |
| 401 irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part. | |
| 402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34544] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 403 diversarum potentiarum actus sunt specie diversi, sicut videre et | |
| 404 audire. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt duae potentiae | |
| 405 dividentes appetitum sensitivum, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo, cum | |
| 406 passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est, | |
| 407 passiones quae sunt in irascibili, erunt aliae secundum speciem a | |
| 408 passionibus quae sunt in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A1-p6"> | |
| 409 <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers | |
| 410 have different objects, as stated in the | |
| 411 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q23_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>, the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions | |
| 412 of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of | |
| 413 the powers, | |
| 414 than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity | |
| 415 in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts | |
| 416 of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions | |
| 417 regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that | |
| 418 genus. | |
| 419 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A1-p7"> In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object | |
| 420 of each of these powers. For we have stated in the | |
| 421 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>, that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or | |
| 422 pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or | |
| 423 in avoiding some such | |
| 424 evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good | |
| 425 or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions | |
| 426 regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: | |
| 427 whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the | |
| 428 irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like. | |
| 429 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 co."><a name="34545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34545] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 430 dicendum quod passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in | |
| 431 concupiscibili, differunt specie. Cum enim diversae potentiae | |
| 432 habeant diversa obiecta, ut in primo dictum est, necesse est quod | |
| 433 passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur. | |
| 434 Unde multo magis passiones diversarum potentiarum specie differunt, | |
| 435 maior enim differentia obiecti requiritur ad diversificandam | |
| 436 speciem potentiarum, quam ad diversificandam speciem passionum vel | |
| 437 actuum. Sicut enim in naturalibus diversitas generis consequitur | |
| 438 diversitatem potentiae materiae, diversitas autem speciei | |
| 439 diversitatem formae in eadem materia; ita in actibus animae, actus | |
| 440 ad diversas potentias pertinentes, sunt non solum specie, sed etiam | |
| 441 genere diversi; actus autem vel passiones respicientes diversa | |
| 442 obiecta specialia comprehensa sub uno communi obiecto unius | |
| 443 potentiae, differunt sicut species illius generis. Ad cognoscendum | |
| 444 ergo quae passiones sint in irascibili, et quae in concupiscibili, | |
| 445 oportet assumere obiectum utriusque potentiae. Dictum est autem in | |
| 446 primo quod obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum | |
| 447 sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum. | |
| 448 Sed quia necesse est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam | |
| 449 patiatur in adipiscendo aliquod huiusmodi bonum, vel fugiendo | |
| 450 aliquod huiusmodi malum, inquantum hoc est quodammodo elevatum | |
| 451 supra facilem potestatem animalis; ideo ipsum bonum vel malum, | |
| 452 secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum | |
| 453 irascibilis. Quaecumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum | |
| 454 vel malum, pertinent ad concupiscibilem; ut gaudium, tristitia, | |
| 455 amor, odium, et similia. Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum | |
| 456 vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel | |
| 457 fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem; ut | |
| 458 audacia, timor, spes, et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p8"> | |
| 459 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in the | |
| 460 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q23_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>, the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from | |
| 461 tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result | |
| 462 is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are | |
| 463 in the irascible faculty | |
| 464 are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty. | |
| 465 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34546] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 466 ergo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, ad hoc vis | |
| 467 irascibilis data est animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus | |
| 468 concupiscibilis in suum obiectum tendere prohibetur, vel propter | |
| 469 difficultatem boni adipiscendi, vel propter difficultatem mali | |
| 470 superandi. Et ideo passiones irascibilis omnes terminantur ad | |
| 471 passiones concupiscibilis. Et secundum hoc, etiam passiones quae | |
| 472 sunt in irascibili, consequitur gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt in | |
| 473 concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p9"> | |
| 474 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; | |
| 475 but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power. | |
| 476 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34547] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 477 dicendum quod odium vitiorum attribuit Hieronymus irascibili, non | |
| 478 propter rationem odii, quae proprie competit concupiscibili; sed | |
| 479 propter impugnationem, quae pertinet ad irascibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A1-p10"> | |
| 480 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact | |
| 481 it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same | |
| 482 applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different | |
| 483 from the irascible passions. | |
| 484 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34548] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 485 dicendum quod bonum inquantum est delectabile, movet | |
| 486 concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quandam difficultatem ad | |
| 487 adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili. | |
| 488 Et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quae in id tenderet. | |
| 489 Et eadem ratio est de malis. Et haec potentia est irascibilis. Unde | |
| 490 ex consequenti passiones concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie | |
| 491 differunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A2-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 2. Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p2"> | |
| 492 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. | |
| 493 For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of | |
| 494 the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore | |
| 495 the same applies to the irascible passions. | |
| 496 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34549] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 497 sic proceditur. Videtur quod contrarietas passionum irascibilis non | |
| 498 sit nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Passiones enim | |
| 499 irascibilis ordinantur ad passiones concupiscibilis, ut dictum est. | |
| 500 Sed passiones concupiscibilis non contrariantur nisi secundum | |
| 501 contrarietatem boni et mali; sicut amor et odium, gaudium et | |
| 502 tristitia. Ergo nec passiones irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p3"> | |
| 503 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no | |
| 504 other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety | |
| 505 of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can | |
| 506 there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil. | |
| 507 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34550] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 508 passiones differunt secundum obiecta; sicut et motus secundum | |
| 509 terminos. Sed contrarietas non est in motibus nisi secundum | |
| 510 contrarietatem terminorum, ut patet in V Physic. Ergo neque in | |
| 511 passionibus est contrarietas nisi secundum contrarietatem | |
| 512 obiectorum. Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum vel malum. Ergo in | |
| 513 nulla potentia appetitiva potest esse contrarietas passionum nisi | |
| 514 secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p4"> | |
| 515 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. | |
| 516 Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what | |
| 517 all desire" (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety | |
| 518 than that of good and evil. | |
| 519 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34551] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> | |
| 520 <i>Praeterea, omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et | |
| 521 recessum</i>, ut Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sed | |
| 522 accessus causatur ex ratione boni, recessus autem ex ratione mali, | |
| 523 quia sicut bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic., | |
| 524 ita malum est quod omnia fugiunt. Ergo contrarietas in passionibus | |
| 525 animae non potest esse nisi secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p5"> | |
| 526 <b>On the contrary,</b> Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of | |
| 527 good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of | |
| 528 good and evil. | |
| 529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34552] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 530 timor et audacia sunt contraria, ut patet in III Ethic. sed timor | |
| 531 et audacia non differunt secundum bonum et malum, quia utrumque est | |
| 532 respectu aliquorum malorum. Ergo non omnis contrarietas passionum | |
| 533 irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p6"> | |
| 534 <b>I answer that,</b> Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements | |
| 535 or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach | |
| 536 and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is | |
| 537 a change "to being," and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other | |
| 538 contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from | |
| 539 black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black. | |
| 540 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p7"> Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of | |
| 541 good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions | |
| 542 the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we | |
| 543 find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above | |
| 544 | |
| 545 <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, | |
| 546 since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but | |
| 547 all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every | |
| 548 concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every | |
| 549 concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible | |
| 550 passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object. | |
| 551 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A2-p8"> On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the | |
| 552 aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as | |
| 553 to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, | |
| 554 it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, | |
| 555 considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains | |
| 556 a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is | |
| 557 called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope | |
| 558 and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and | |
| 559 fear). | |
| 560 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 co."><a name="34553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34553] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 561 dicendum quod passio quidam motus est, ut dicitur in III Physic. | |
| 562 Unde oportet contrarietatem passionum accipere secundum | |
| 563 contrarietatem motuum vel mutationum. Est autem duplex contrarietas | |
| 564 in mutationibus vel motibus, ut dicitur in V Physic. Una quidem | |
| 565 secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, quae quidem | |
| 566 contrarietas est proprie mutationum, idest generationis, quae est | |
| 567 mutatio ad esse, et corruptionis, quae est mutatio ab esse. Alia | |
| 568 autem secundum contrarietatem terminorum, quae proprie est | |
| 569 contrarietas motuum, sicut dealbatio, quae est motus a nigro in | |
| 570 album, opponitur denigrationi, quae est motus ab albo in nigrum. | |
| 571 Sic igitur in passionibus animae duplex contrarietas invenitur, una | |
| 572 quidem secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali; | |
| 573 alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino. In | |
| 574 passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas | |
| 575 tantum, quae scilicet est secundum obiecta, in passionibus autem | |
| 576 irascibilis invenitur utraque. Cuius ratio est quia obiectum | |
| 577 concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est, est bonum vel malum sensibile | |
| 578 absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut | |
| 579 a quo, sed solum ut ad quem, quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum | |
| 580 bonum, sed omnia appetunt ipsum. Similiter nihil appetit malum | |
| 581 inquantum huiusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum, et propter hoc, malum | |
| 582 non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic | |
| 583 igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum, | |
| 584 sicut amor, desiderium et gaudium, omnis vero passio eius respectu | |
| 585 mali, est ut ab ipso, sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et | |
| 586 tristitia. Unde in passionibus concupiscibilis non potest esse | |
| 587 contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem obiecto. Sed | |
| 588 obiectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem | |
| 589 absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra | |
| 590 dictum est. Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in | |
| 591 ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem | |
| 592 spei; et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile, | |
| 593 quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis. Similiter malum arduum | |
| 594 habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum, et hoc pertinet ad | |
| 595 passionem timoris, habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut | |
| 596 in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem | |
| 597 mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia. Invenitur ergo in passionibus | |
| 598 irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali, | |
| 599 sicut inter spem et timorem, et iterum secundum accessum et | |
| 600 recessum ab eodem termino, sicut inter audaciam et timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="34554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34554] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 601 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A3-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 3. Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p2"> | |
| 602 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or | |
| 603 in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above | |
| 604 <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q23_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary. | |
| 605 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34555] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 606 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis passio animae habeat aliquid | |
| 607 contrarium. Omnis enim passio animae vel est in irascibili vel in | |
| 608 concupiscibili, sicut supra dictum est. Sed utraeque passiones | |
| 609 habent contrarietatem suo modo. Ergo omnis passio animae habet | |
| 610 contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p3"> | |
| 611 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive | |
| 612 part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion | |
| 613 has a contrary. | |
| 614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34556] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 615 omnis passio animae habet vel bonum vel malum pro obiecto, quae | |
| 616 sunt obiecta universaliter appetitivae partis. Sed passioni cuius | |
| 617 obiectum est bonum, opponitur passio cuius obiectum est malum. Ergo | |
| 618 omnis passio habet contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p4"> | |
| 619 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above | |
| 620 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q23_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary. | |
| 621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34557] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 622 omnis passio animae est secundum accessum vel secundum recessum, ut | |
| 623 dictum est. Sed cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus, et e | |
| 624 converso. Ergo omnis passio animae habet contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p5"> | |
| 625 <b>On the contrary,</b> Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore | |
| 626 not every passion has a contrary. | |
| 627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34558] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 628 ira est quaedam passio animae. Sed nulla passio ponitur contraria | |
| 629 irae, ut patet in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis passio habet | |
| 630 contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p6"> | |
| 631 <b>I answer that,</b> The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or | |
| 632 according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil | |
| 633 is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible | |
| 634 passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement | |
| 635 is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. | |
| 636 Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal. | |
| 637 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p7"> In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good | |
| 638 obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there | |
| 639 remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion | |
| 640 of the concupiscible faculty. | |
| 641 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A3-p8"> Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement | |
| 642 is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety | |
| 643 but of negation or privation. | |
| 644 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="34559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34559] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 645 dicendum quod singulare est in passione irae, quod non potest | |
| 646 habere contrarium, neque secundum accessum et recessum, neque | |
| 647 secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Causatur enim ira ex malo | |
| 648 difficili iam iniacente. Ad cuius praesentiam, necesse est quod aut | |
| 649 appetitus succumbat, et sic non exit terminos tristitiae, quae est | |
| 650 passio concupiscibilis, aut habet motum ad invadendum malum | |
| 651 laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram. Motum autem ad fugiendum habere | |
| 652 non potest, quia iam malum ponitur praesens vel praeteritum. Et sic | |
| 653 motui irae non contrariatur aliqua passio secundum contrarietatem | |
| 654 accessus et recessus. Similiter etiam nec secundum contrarietatem | |
| 655 boni et mali. Quia malo iam iniacenti opponitur bonum iam adeptum, | |
| 656 quod iam non potest habere rationem ardui vel difficilis. Nec post | |
| 657 adeptionem boni remanet alius motus, nisi quietatio appetitus in | |
| 658 bono adepto, quae pertinet ad gaudium, quod est passio | |
| 659 concupiscibilis. Unde motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum | |
| 660 animae contrarium, sed solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu, | |
| 661 sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod <i>mitescere | |
| 662 opponitur ei quod est irasci</i>, quod non est oppositum contrarie, | |
| 663 sed negative vel privative.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="34560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34560] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 664 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q23_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q23_A4-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 4. Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p2"> | |
| 665 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. | |
| 666 For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; | |
| 667 and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary | |
| 668 to one another, differ specifically. | |
| 669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34561] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 670 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint in aliqua potentia esse | |
| 671 passiones specie differentes, et non contrariae ad invicem. | |
| 672 Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem | |
| 673 passionum animae sunt bonum et malum, secundum quorum differentiam | |
| 674 passiones habent contrarietatem. Ergo nullae passiones eiusdem | |
| 675 potentiae, non habentes contrarietatem ad invicem, differunt | |
| 676 specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p3"> | |
| 677 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, | |
| 678 as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically. | |
| 679 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34562] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 680 differentia speciei est differentia secundum formam. Sed omnis | |
| 681 differentia secundum formam, est secundum aliquam contrarietatem, | |
| 682 ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo passiones eiusdem potentiae quae non | |
| 683 sunt contrariae, non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p4"> | |
| 684 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every | |
| 685 difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach | |
| 686 and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions | |
| 687 of the soul, as stated above | |
| 688 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q23_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>: whereas the third | |
| 689 difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not | |
| 690 possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another. | |
| 691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34563] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 692 cum omnis passio animae consistat in accessu vel recessu ad bonum | |
| 693 vel ad malum, necesse videtur quod omnis differentia passionum | |
| 694 animae sit vel secundum differentiam boni et mali; vel secundum | |
| 695 differentiam accessus et recessus; vel secundum maiorem vel minorem | |
| 696 accessum aut recessum. Sed primae duae differentiae inducunt | |
| 697 contrarietatem in passionibus animae, ut dictum est. Tertia autem | |
| 698 differentia non diversificat speciem, quia sic essent infinitae | |
| 699 species passionum animae. Ergo non potest esse quod passiones | |
| 700 eiusdem potentiae animae differant specie, et non sint | |
| 701 contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p5"> | |
| 702 <b>On the contrary,</b> Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, | |
| 703 in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary | |
| 704 to one another. | |
| 705 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34564] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 706 amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec | |
| 707 tamen contrariantur ad invicem, quin potius unum est causa | |
| 708 alterius. Ergo sunt aliquae passiones eiusdem potentiae quae | |
| 709 differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p6"> | |
| 710 <b>I answer that,</b> Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. | |
| 711 Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, | |
| 712 as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the | |
| 713 soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their | |
| 714 motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels | |
| 715 it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the | |
| 716 patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body | |
| 717 generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, | |
| 718 the | |
| 719 mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since | |
| 720 to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion. | |
| 721 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p7"> Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. | |
| 722 In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in | |
| 723 respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of | |
| 724 evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the | |
| 725 attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect | |
| 726 of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as | |
| 727 it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of | |
| 728 evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness." | |
| 729 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p8"> On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed | |
| 730 as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, | |
| 731 we have "hope" and "despair." In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in respect of good obtained | |
| 732 there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated | |
| 733 above | |
| 734 <a href="#FS_Q23_A3" id="FS_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger." | |
| 735 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p9"> Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire | |
| 736 and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear | |
| 737 and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion. | |
| 738 </p><p id="FS_Q23_A4-p10"> Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the | |
| 739 irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained. | |
| 740 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 co."><a name="34565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34565] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 741 dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt | |
| 742 obiecta passionum animae. Differentia autem activorum potest | |
| 743 attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum speciem vel naturam ipsorum | |
| 744 activorum, sicut ignis differt ab aqua; alio modo, secundum | |
| 745 diversam virtutem activam. Diversitas autem activi vel motivi | |
| 746 quantum ad virtutem movendi, potest accipi in passionibus animae | |
| 747 secundum similitudinem agentium naturalium. Omne enim movens trahit | |
| 748 quodammodo ad se patiens, vel a se repellit. Trahendo quidem ad se, | |
| 749 tria facit in ipso. Nam primo quidem, dat ei inclinationem vel | |
| 750 aptitudinem ut in ipsum tendat, sicut cum corpus leve, quod est | |
| 751 sursum, dat levitatem corpori generato, per quam habet | |
| 752 inclinationem vel aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum. Secundo, si | |
| 753 corpus generatum est extra locum proprium, dat ei moveri ad locum. | |
| 754 Tertio, dat ei quiescere, in locum cum pervenerit, quia ex eadem | |
| 755 causa aliquid quiescit in loco, per quam movebatur ad locum. Et | |
| 756 similiter intelligendum est de causa repulsionis. In motibus autem | |
| 757 appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum | |
| 758 autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia | |
| 759 appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu | |
| 760 connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui | |
| 761 per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum | |
| 762 sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et | |
| 763 hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex | |
| 764 opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum | |
| 765 adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso | |
| 766 bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui | |
| 767 opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia. In passionibus autem | |
| 768 irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad | |
| 769 prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae | |
| 770 absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, | |
| 771 est spes et desperatio. Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est | |
| 772 timor et audacia. Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio | |
| 773 in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum | |
| 774 est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae. Sic igitur | |
| 775 patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, | |
| 776 scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga gaudium et tristitia. | |
| 777 Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, | |
| 778 timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Sunt ergo | |
| 779 omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in | |
| 780 concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae | |
| 781 passiones continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q23_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objections:</b> From this the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 23 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="34566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34566] Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 782 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 783 <div id="FS_Q24" class="div3"> | |
| 784 <h3 id="FS_Q24-p0.1">Q. 24. OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 785 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 786 <p id="FS_Q24-p2"> We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q24-p3"><a href="#FS_Q24_A1"> (1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p4"><a href="#FS_Q24_A2"> (2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p5"><a href="#FS_Q24_A3"> (3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q24-p6"><a href="#FS_Q24_A4"> (4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?</a></p> | |
| 787 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 pr."><a name="34567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34567] | |
| 788 Iª-IIae q. 24 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de bono | |
| 789 et malo circa passiones animae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | |
| 790 Primo, utrum bonum et malum morale possit in passionibus animae | |
| 791 inveniri. Secundo, utrum omnis passio animae sit mala moraliter. | |
| 792 Tertio, utrum omnis passio addat, vel diminuat, ad bonitatem vel | |
| 793 malitiam actus. Quarto, utrum aliqua passio sit bona vel mala ex | |
| 794 sua specie.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 795 <div id="FS_Q24_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A1-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 1. Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p2"> | |
| 796 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals | |
| 797 are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them | |
| 798 in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. | |
| 799 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34568] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 800 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae sit bona vel mala | |
| 801 moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale est proprium hominis, mores | |
| 802 enim proprie dicuntur humani, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam. Sed | |
| 803 passiones non sunt propriae hominum, sed sunt etiam aliis | |
| 804 animalibus communes. Ergo nulla passio animae est bona vel mala | |
| 805 moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p3"> | |
| 806 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. | |
| 807 iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( | |
| 808 <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q24_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil. | |
| 809 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34569] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 810 bonum vel malum hominis est secundum rationem esse, vel praeter | |
| 811 rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed | |
| 812 passiones animae non sunt in ratione, sed in appetitu sensitivo, ut | |
| 813 supra dictum est. Ergo non pertinent ad bonum vel malum hominis, | |
| 814 quod est bonum morale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p4"> | |
| 815 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised | |
| 816 and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil. | |
| 817 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34570] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 818 philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>passionibus neque laudamur | |
| 819 neque vituperamur</i>. Sed secundum bona et mala moralia, laudamur | |
| 820 et vituperamur. Ergo passiones non sunt bonae vel malae | |
| 821 moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p5"> | |
| 822 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good | |
| 823 if our love is good." | |
| 824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34571] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 825 est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, de passionibus | |
| 826 animae loquens <i>mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si | |
| 827 bonus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p6"> | |
| 828 <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of | |
| 829 the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus | |
| 830 there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above ( | |
| 831 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18] , A[5]</a>). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, | |
| 832 then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and | |
| 833 will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much | |
| 834 more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be | |
| 835 voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will. | |
| 836 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 co."><a name="34572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34572] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 837 dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno | |
| 838 modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio | |
| 839 rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout | |
| 840 scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in | |
| 841 eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra | |
| 842 dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio | |
| 843 rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale. | |
| 844 Propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et | |
| 845 voluntati, quam membra exteriora; quorum tamen motus et actus sunt | |
| 846 boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde multo | |
| 847 magis et ipsae passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt | |
| 848 dici bonae vel malae moraliter. Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex | |
| 849 eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non | |
| 850 prohibentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p7"> | |
| 851 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are | |
| 852 proper to man. | |
| 853 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34573] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 854 ergo dicendum quod istae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt | |
| 855 communes hominibus et aliis animalibus, sed secundum quod a ratione | |
| 856 imperantur, sunt propriae hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p8"> | |
| 857 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13). | |
| 858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34574] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 859 dicendum quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivae dicuntur | |
| 860 rationales, secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem, ut | |
| 861 dicitur in I Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A1-p9"> | |
| 862 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude | |
| 863 their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who | |
| 864 fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against | |
| 865 reason." | |
| 866 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34575] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 867 dicendum quod philosophus dicit quod non laudamur aut vituperamur | |
| 868 secundum passiones absolute consideratas, sed non removet quin | |
| 869 possint fieri laudabiles vel vituperabiles secundum quod a ratione | |
| 870 ordinantur. Unde subdit, <i>non enim laudatur aut vituperatur qui | |
| 871 timet aut irascitur, sed qui aliqualiter</i>, idest secundum | |
| 872 rationem vel praeter rationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A2-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 2. Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p2"> | |
| 873 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call | |
| 874 the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call | |
| 875 disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore | |
| 876 every passion of the soul is evil morally. | |
| 877 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34576] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 878 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes passiones animae sint malae | |
| 879 moraliter. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>passiones | |
| 880 animae quidam vocant morbos vel perturbationes animae</i>. Sed | |
| 881 omnis morbus vel perturbatio animae est aliquid malum moraliter. | |
| 882 Ergo omnis passio animae moraliter mala est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p3"> | |
| 883 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to | |
| 884 nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere | |
| 885 (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature." Therefore | |
| 886 these passions are morally evil. | |
| 887 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34577] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 888 Damascenus dicit quod <i>operatio quidem qui secundum naturam motus | |
| 889 est, passio vero qui praeter naturam</i>. Sed quod est praeter | |
| 890 naturam in motibus animae, habet rationem peccati et mali moralis, | |
| 891 unde ipse alibi dicit quod <i>Diabolus versus est ex eo quod est | |
| 892 secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam</i>. Ergo | |
| 893 huiusmodi passiones sunt malae moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p4"> | |
| 894 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions | |
| 895 of sins" ( | |
| 896 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil. | |
| 897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34578] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 898 omne quod inducit ad peccatum, habet rationem mali. Sed huiusmodi | |
| 899 passiones inducunt ad peccatum, unde Rom. VII dicuntur passiones | |
| 900 peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod sint malae moraliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p5"> | |
| 901 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they | |
| 902 fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works." | |
| 903 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34579] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 904 est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>rectus amor | |
| 905 omnes istas affectiones rectas habet. Metuunt enim peccare, cupiunt | |
| 906 perseverare, dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q24_A2-p6"> | |
| 907 <b>I answer that,</b> On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions | |
| 908 are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in | |
| 909 words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics | |
| 910 did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual | |
| 911 and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far | |
| 912 as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual | |
| 913 appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds | |
| 914 the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of | |
| 915 the | |
| 916 soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we | |
| 917 speak of those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound." | |
| 918 </p><p id="FS_Q24_A2-p7"> On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore | |
| 919 they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident | |
| 920 that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when | |
| 921 he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately | |
| 922 ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called "diseases" | |
| 923 or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason. | |
| 924 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="34580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34580] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 925 dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversa fuit sententia | |
| 926 Stoicorum et Peripateticorum, nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones | |
| 927 esse malas; Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse | |
| 928 bonas. Quae quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum | |
| 929 vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est, vel parva, si quis | |
| 930 utrorumque intentiones consideret. Stoici enim non discernebant | |
| 931 inter sensum et intellectum; et per consequens nec inter | |
| 932 intellectivum appetitum et sensitivum. Unde non discernebant | |
| 933 passiones animae a motibus voluntatis secundum hoc quod passiones | |
| 934 animae sunt in appetitu sensitivo, simplices autem motus voluntatis | |
| 935 sunt in intellectivo; sed omnem rationabilem motum appetitivae | |
| 936 partis vocabant voluntatem, passionem autem dicebant motum | |
| 937 progredientem extra limites rationis. Et ideo, eorum sententiam | |
| 938 sequens, Tullius, in III libro de Tusculanis quaestionibus, omnes | |
| 939 passiones vocat animae morbos. Ex quo argumentatur quod qui | |
| 940 <i>morbosi sunt, sani non sunt; et qui sani non sunt, insipientes | |
| 941 sunt</i>. Unde et insipientes insanos dicimus. Peripatetici vero | |
| 942 omnes motus appetitus sensitivi passiones vocant. Unde eas bonas | |
| 943 aestimant, cum sunt a ratione moderatae; malas autem, cum sunt | |
| 944 praeter moderationem rationis. Ex quo patet quod Tullius, in eodem | |
| 945 libro, Peripateticorum sententiam, qui approbabant mediocritatem | |
| 946 passionum, inconvenienter improbat, dicens quod <i>omne malum, | |
| 947 etiam mediocre, vitandum est, nam sicut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter | |
| 948 aegrum est, sanum non est; sic ista mediocritas morborum vel | |
| 949 passionum animae, sana non est</i>. Non enim passiones dicuntur | |
| 950 morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione | |
| 951 rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1</b> Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34581] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet | |
| 952 responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p9"> | |
| 953 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more | |
| 954 or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion | |
| 955 to deviate always from the order of natural reason. | |
| 956 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34582] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 957 dicendum quod in omni passione animae additur aliquid, vel | |
| 958 diminuitur a naturali motu cordis, inquantum cor intensius vel | |
| 959 remissius movetur, secundum systolen aut diastolen, et secundum hoc | |
| 960 habet passionis rationem. Non tamen oportet quod passio semper | |
| 961 declinet ab ordine naturalis rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A2-p10"> | |
| 962 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they | |
| 963 are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue. | |
| 964 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34583] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 965 dicendum quod passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem | |
| 966 rationis, inclinant ad peccatum, inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a | |
| 967 ratione, pertinent ad virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A3-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 3. Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p2"> | |
| 968 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, | |
| 969 on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders | |
| 970 the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from | |
| 971 hatred, anger, friendship and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a | |
| 972 moral act. | |
| 973 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34584] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 974 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio quaecumque semper diminuat de | |
| 975 bonitate actus moralis. Omne enim quod impedit iudicium rationis, | |
| 976 ex quo dependet bonitas actus moralis, diminuit per consequens | |
| 977 bonitatem actus moralis. Sed omnis passio impedit iudicium | |
| 978 rationis, dicit enim Sallustius, in Catilinario, <i>omnes homines | |
| 979 qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, ira, amicitia atque | |
| 980 misericordia vacuos esse decet</i>. Ergo omnis passio diminuit | |
| 981 bonitatem moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p3"> | |
| 982 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says ( | |
| 983 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.1" target="asv">Eph. 5:1</a>): "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling | |
| 984 with misery when they relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like | |
| 985 deeds without than with a passion of the soul. | |
| 986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34585] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 987 actus hominis, quanto est Deo similior, tanto est melior, unde | |
| 988 dicit apostolus, Ephes. V, <i>estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii | |
| 989 carissimi. Sed Deus et sancti Angeli sine ira puniunt, sine | |
| 990 miseriae compassione subveniunt</i> ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de | |
| 991 Civ. Dei. Ergo est melius huiusmodi opera bona agere sine passione | |
| 992 animae, quam cum passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p4"> | |
| 993 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: | |
| 994 for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without | |
| 995 passion, than he who does with passion. | |
| 996 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34586] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 997 sicut malum morale attenditur per ordinem ad rationem, ita et bonum | |
| 998 morale. Sed malum morale diminuitur per passionem, minus enim | |
| 999 peccat qui peccat ex passione, quam qui peccat ex industria. Ergo | |
| 1000 maius bonum operatur qui operatur bonum sine passione, quam qui | |
| 1001 operatur cum passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p5"> | |
| 1002 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating | |
| 1003 right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral | |
| 1004 good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good. | |
| 1005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34587] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1006 est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>passio | |
| 1007 misericordiae rationi deservit, quando ita praebetur misericordia, | |
| 1008 ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum | |
| 1009 ignoscitur poenitenti</i>. Sed nihil quod deservit rationi, | |
| 1010 diminuit bonum morale. Ergo passio animae non diminuit bonum | |
| 1011 moris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q24_A3-p6"> | |
| 1012 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens | |
| 1013 the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this | |
| 1014 is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances | |
| 1015 or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the | |
| 1016 sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's | |
| 1017 good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining | |
| 1018 to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward | |
| 1019 members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above ( | |
| 1020 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A7" id="FS_Q24_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[7]</a>), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason. | |
| 1021 </p><p id="FS_Q24_A3-p7"> Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to | |
| 1022 the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of | |
| 1023 his sensitive appetite; according to | |
| 1024 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv"> Ps. 83:3</a>: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, | |
| 1025 and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite. | |
| 1026 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 co."><a name="34588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34588] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1027 dicendum quod Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse | |
| 1028 malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere | |
| 1029 actus bonitatem, omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter | |
| 1030 tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus | |
| 1031 passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout | |
| 1032 sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter | |
| 1033 nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem | |
| 1034 humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per | |
| 1035 rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in | |
| 1036 radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae | |
| 1037 homini conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad | |
| 1038 perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum | |
| 1039 per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus | |
| 1040 possit obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem | |
| 1041 moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae | |
| 1042 sint regulatae per rationem. Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et | |
| 1043 velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem | |
| 1044 boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum | |
| 1045 secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum; | |
| 1046 secundum illud quod in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, <i>cor meum et caro | |
| 1047 mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>, ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu | |
| 1048 intellectivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p8"> | |
| 1049 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since | |
| 1050 they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; | |
| 1051 for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the | |
| 1052 second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, | |
| 1053 to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus | |
| 1054 the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates | |
| 1055 greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected | |
| 1056 by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the | |
| 1057 soul increases the goodness of an action. | |
| 1058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34589] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1059 ergo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter se possunt habere ad | |
| 1060 iudicium rationis. Uno modo, antecedenter. Et sic, cum obnubilent | |
| 1061 iudicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminuunt | |
| 1062 actus bonitatem, laudabilius enim est quod ex iudicio rationis | |
| 1063 aliquis faciat opus caritatis, quam ex sola passione misericordiae. | |
| 1064 Alio modo se habent consequenter. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, per | |
| 1065 modum redundantiae, quia scilicet, cum superior pars animae intense | |
| 1066 movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum eius etiam pars inferior. Et sic | |
| 1067 passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum | |
| 1068 intensionis voluntatis. Et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem. | |
| 1069 Alio modo, per modum electionis, quando scilicet homo ex iudicio | |
| 1070 rationis eligit affici aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur, | |
| 1071 cooperante appetitu sensitivo. Et sic passio animae addit ad | |
| 1072 bonitatem actionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p9"> | |
| 1073 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the | |
| 1074 right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us. | |
| 1075 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34590] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1076 dicendum quod in Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, | |
| 1077 neque etiam membra corporea, et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur | |
| 1078 secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in | |
| 1079 nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A3-p10"> | |
| 1080 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the | |
| 1081 ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous. | |
| 1082 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34591] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1083 dicendum quod passio tendens in malum, praecedens iudicium | |
| 1084 rationis, diminuit peccatum, sed consequens aliquo praedictorum | |
| 1085 modorum, auget ipsum, vel significat augmentum eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q24_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q24_A4-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 4. Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p2"> | |
| 1086 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend | |
| 1087 on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, | |
| 1088 nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species. | |
| 1089 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34592] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1090 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae, secundum speciem | |
| 1091 suam, sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale | |
| 1092 attenditur secundum rationem. Sed passiones sunt in appetitu | |
| 1093 sensitivo, et ita id quod est secundum rationem, accidit eis. Cum | |
| 1094 ergo nihil quod est per accidens, pertineat ad speciem rei; videtur | |
| 1095 quod nulla passio secundum suam speciem sit bona vel mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p3"> | |
| 1096 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according | |
| 1097 to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire | |
| 1098 and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this | |
| 1099 is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species. | |
| 1100 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34593] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1101 actus et passiones habent speciem ex obiecto. Si ergo aliqua passio | |
| 1102 secundum suam speciem esset bona vel mala, oporteret quod passiones | |
| 1103 quarum obiectum est bonum, bonae essent secundum suam speciem, ut | |
| 1104 amor, desiderium et gaudium; et passiones quarum obiectum est malum | |
| 1105 essent malae secundum suam speciem, ut odium, timor et tristitia. | |
| 1106 Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Non ergo aliqua passio est bona vel mala | |
| 1107 ex sua specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p4"> | |
| 1108 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore | |
| 1109 no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species. | |
| 1110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34594] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1111 nulla species passionum est quae non inveniatur in aliis | |
| 1112 animalibus. Sed bonum morale non invenitur nisi in homine. Ergo | |
| 1113 nulla passio animae bona est vel mala ex sua specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p5"> | |
| 1114 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty | |
| 1115 is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species. | |
| 1116 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34595] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1117 est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>misericordia | |
| 1118 pertinet ad virtutem</i>. Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., | |
| 1119 quod verecundia est passio laudabilis. Ergo aliquae passiones sunt | |
| 1120 bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6"> | |
| 1121 <b>I answer that,</b> We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts ( | |
| 1122 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[5]</a>,6; | |
| 1123 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q24_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[20], A[1]</a>)---viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according | |
| 1124 to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according | |
| 1125 to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary | |
| 1126 and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object | |
| 1127 to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is | |
| 1128 base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external | |
| 1129 act. | |
| 1130 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 co."><a name="34596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34596] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1131 dicendum quod sicut de actibus dictum est, ita et de passionibus | |
| 1132 dicendum videtur, quod scilicet species actus vel passionis | |
| 1133 dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in | |
| 1134 genere naturae, et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad | |
| 1135 speciem actus vel passionis. Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad | |
| 1136 genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de | |
| 1137 iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt | |
| 1138 pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum | |
| 1139 passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione, | |
| 1140 sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, | |
| 1141 quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem | |
| 1142 exterioris actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p7"> | |
| 1143 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. | |
| 1144 But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of | |
| 1145 the appetite, but essentially. | |
| 1146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34597] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1147 ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passionibus secundum quod | |
| 1148 pertinent ad speciem naturae, prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus | |
| 1149 in se consideratur. Secundum vero quod appetitus sensitivus obedit | |
| 1150 rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius | |
| 1151 per accidens, sed per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p8"> | |
| 1152 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if | |
| 1153 they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a | |
| 1154 tendency to evil, are themselves evil. | |
| 1155 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34598] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1156 dicendum quod passiones quae in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum, | |
| 1157 sunt bonae, et similiter quae a vero malo recedunt. E converso vero | |
| 1158 passiones quae sunt per recessum a bono, et per accessum ad malum, | |
| 1159 sunt malae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q24_A4-p9"> | |
| 1160 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative | |
| 1161 power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard | |
| 1162 to the soul's passions. | |
| 1163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 24 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34599] Iª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1164 dicendum quod in brutis animalibus appetitus sensitivus non obedit | |
| 1165 rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, | |
| 1166 quae subiicitur rationi superiori, scilicet divinae, est in eis | |
| 1167 quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 1168 <div id="FS_Q25" class="div3"> | |
| 1169 <h3 id="FS_Q25-p0.1">Q. 25. OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1170 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 1171 <p id="FS_Q25-p2"> We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q25-p3"><a href="#FS_Q25_A1"> (1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p4"><a href="#FS_Q25_A2"> (2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p5"><a href="#FS_Q25_A3"> (3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q25-p6"><a href="#FS_Q25_A4"> (4) The four principal passions.</a></p> | |
| 1172 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 pr."><a name="34600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34600] | |
| 1173 Iª-IIae q. 25 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 1174 ordine passionum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | |
| 1175 Primo, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad passiones | |
| 1176 concupiscibilis. Secundo, de ordine passionum concupiscibilis ad | |
| 1177 invicem. Tertio, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad invicem. | |
| 1178 Quarto, de quatuor principalibus passionibus.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 1179 <div id="FS_Q25_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A1-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 1. Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p2"> | |
| 1180 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their | |
| 1181 objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the | |
| 1182 irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions. | |
| 1183 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34601] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1184 sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones irascibilis sint priores | |
| 1185 passionibus concupiscibilis. Ordo enim passionum est secundum | |
| 1186 ordinem obiectorum. Sed obiectum irascibilis est bonum arduum, quod | |
| 1187 videtur esse supremum inter alia bona. Ergo passiones irascibilis | |
| 1188 videntur praeesse passionibus concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p3"> | |
| 1189 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to | |
| 1190 that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible | |
| 1191 faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; | |
| 1192 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a> ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible | |
| 1193 passions precede the concupiscible passions. | |
| 1194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34602] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1195 movens est prius moto. Sed irascibilis comparatur ad | |
| 1196 concupiscibilem sicut movens ad motum, ad hoc enim datur | |
| 1197 animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis | |
| 1198 prohibetur frui suo obiecto, ut supra dictum est; removens autem | |
| 1199 prohibens habet rationem moventis, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Ergo | |
| 1200 passiones irascibilis sunt priores passionibus concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p4"> | |
| 1201 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher | |
| 1202 says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore | |
| 1203 the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions. | |
| 1204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34603] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1205 gaudium et tristitia sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Sed gaudium et | |
| 1206 tristitia consequuntur ad passiones irascibilis, dicit enim | |
| 1207 philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod <i>punitio quietat impetum irae, | |
| 1208 delectationem loco tristitiae faciens</i>. Ergo passiones | |
| 1209 concupiscibilis sunt posteriores passionibus irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p5"> | |
| 1210 <b>On the contrary,</b> The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, | |
| 1211 good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the | |
| 1212 irascible. | |
| 1213 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34604] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 1214 passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones | |
| 1215 autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum. Cum | |
| 1216 igitur bonum simpliciter sit prius quam bonum contractum, videtur | |
| 1217 quod passiones concupiscibilis sint priores passionibus | |
| 1218 irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p6"> | |
| 1219 <b>I answer that,</b> In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we | |
| 1220 find something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible | |
| 1221 passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we | |
| 1222 find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; | |
| 1223 whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty. | |
| 1224 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p7"> Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, | |
| 1225 we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident | |
| 1226 that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: | |
| 1227 thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle ( | |
| 1228 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv">Rom. 12:12</a>): | |
| 1229 "Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: | |
| 1230 because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement | |
| 1231 of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked | |
| 1232 upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it | |
| 1233 is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in | |
| 1234 joy or in sadness. | |
| 1235 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p8"> But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the | |
| 1236 latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; | |
| 1237 just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. | |
| 1238 Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous | |
| 1239 good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning | |
| 1240 the evil. | |
| 1241 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A1-p9"> Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards | |
| 1242 good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible | |
| 1243 passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty. | |
| 1244 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 co."><a name="34605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34605] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1245 dicendum quod passiones concupiscibilis ad plura se habent quam | |
| 1246 passiones irascibilis. Nam in passionibus concupiscibilis invenitur | |
| 1247 aliquid pertinens ad motum, sicut desiderium; et aliquid pertinens | |
| 1248 ad quietem, sicut gaudium et tristitia. Sed in passionibus | |
| 1249 irascibilis non invenitur aliquid pertinens ad quietem, sed solum | |
| 1250 pertinens ad motum. Cuius ratio est quia id in quo iam quiescitur, | |
| 1251 non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum | |
| 1252 irascibilis. Quies autem, cum sit finis motus, est prior in | |
| 1253 intentione, sed posterior in executione. Si ergo comparentur | |
| 1254 passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae significant | |
| 1255 quietem in bono; manifeste passiones irascibilis praecedunt, ordine | |
| 1256 executionis, huiusmodi passiones concupiscibilis, sicut spes | |
| 1257 praecedit gaudium, unde et causat ipsum, secundum illud apostoli, | |
| 1258 Rom. XII, <i>spe gaudentes</i>. Sed passio concupiscibilis | |
| 1259 importans quietem in malo, scilicet tristitia, media est inter duas | |
| 1260 passiones irascibilis. Sequitur enim timorem, cum enim occurrerit | |
| 1261 malum quod timebatur, causatur tristitia. Praecedit autem motum | |
| 1262 irae, quia cum ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in | |
| 1263 vindictam, hoc pertinet ad motum irae. Et quia rependere vicem | |
| 1264 malis, apprehenditur ut bonum; cum iratus hoc consecutus fuerit, | |
| 1265 gaudet. Et sic manifestum est quod omnis passio irascibilis | |
| 1266 terminatur ad passionem concupiscibilis pertinentem ad quietem, | |
| 1267 scilicet vel ad gaudium vel ad tristitiam. Sed si comparentur | |
| 1268 passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae important | |
| 1269 motum, sic manifeste passiones concupiscibilis sunt priores, eo | |
| 1270 quod passiones irascibilis addunt supra passiones concupiscibilis; | |
| 1271 sicut et obiectum irascibilis addit supra obiectum concupiscibilis | |
| 1272 arduitatem sive difficultatem. Spes enim supra desiderium addit | |
| 1273 quendam conatum, et quandam elevationem animi ad consequendum bonum | |
| 1274 arduum. Et similiter timor addit supra fugam seu abominationem, | |
| 1275 quandam depressionem animi, propter difficultatem mali. Sic ergo | |
| 1276 passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis | |
| 1277 quae important motum in bonum vel in malum; et inter passiones | |
| 1278 concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo. Et sic | |
| 1279 patet quod passiones irascibilis et principium habent a passionibus | |
| 1280 concupiscibilis, et in passiones concupiscibilis terminantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p10"> | |
| 1281 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just | |
| 1282 as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty | |
| 1283 is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper. | |
| 1284 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34606] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1285 ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procederet, si de ratione obiecti | |
| 1286 concupiscibilis esset aliquid oppositum arduo, sicut de ratione | |
| 1287 obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum | |
| 1288 concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam | |
| 1289 obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p11"> | |
| 1290 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related | |
| 1291 to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. | |
| 1292 Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. | |
| 1293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34607] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1294 dicendum quod removens prohibens non est movens per se, sed per | |
| 1295 accidens. Nunc autem loquimur de ordine passionum per se. Et | |
| 1296 praeterea irascibilis removet prohibens quietem concupiscibilis in | |
| 1297 suo obiecto. Unde ex hoc non sequitur nisi quod passiones | |
| 1298 irascibilis praecedunt passiones concupiscibilis ad quietem | |
| 1299 pertinentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>The third object | |
| 1300 leads to the same conclusion.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34608] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> De quibus | |
| 1301 etiam tertia ratio procedit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A2-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 2. Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p2"> | |
| 1302 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, | |
| 1303 which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire | |
| 1304 takes precedence of love. | |
| 1305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34609] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1306 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit prima passionum | |
| 1307 concupiscibilis. Vis enim concupiscibilis a concupiscentia | |
| 1308 denominatur, quae est eadem passio cum desiderio. Sed denominatio | |
| 1309 fit a potiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo concupiscentia est | |
| 1310 potior amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p3"> | |
| 1311 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence | |
| 1312 or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love. | |
| 1313 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34610] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1314 amor unionem quandam importat, est enim vis unitiva et concretiva, | |
| 1315 ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed concupiscentia vel | |
| 1316 desiderium est motus ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae. | |
| 1317 Ergo concupiscentia est prior amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p4"> | |
| 1318 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure | |
| 1319 (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. | |
| 1320 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34611] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1321 causa est prior effectu. Sed delectatio est quandoque causa amoris, | |
| 1322 quidam enim propter delectationem amant, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. | |
| 1323 Ergo delectatio est prior amore. Non ergo prima inter passiones | |
| 1324 concupiscibilis est amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p5"> | |
| 1325 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, | |
| 1326 is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions. | |
| 1327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34612] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1328 est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones | |
| 1329 ex amore causantur, <i>amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, | |
| 1330 cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est</i>. | |
| 1331 Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A2-p6"> | |
| 1332 <b>I answer that,</b> Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. | |
| 1333 Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is | |
| 1334 to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil. | |
| 1335 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A2-p7"> Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. | |
| 1336 Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of | |
| 1337 execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the | |
| 1338 end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to | |
| 1339 that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after | |
| 1340 having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while | |
| 1341 movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes | |
| 1342 desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended | |
| 1343 causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good | |
| 1344 itself is, as stated above ( | |
| 1345 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q11_A3" id="FS_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>, ad 3). | |
| 1346 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="34613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34613] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1347 dicendum quod obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. | |
| 1348 Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio | |
| 1349 boni. Unde et omnes passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, | |
| 1350 naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, | |
| 1351 unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita, quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo | |
| 1352 refutatur oppositum malum. Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui | |
| 1353 quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. | |
| 1354 Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum | |
| 1355 intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem | |
| 1356 consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad | |
| 1357 finem. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, | |
| 1358 primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil | |
| 1359 enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; | |
| 1360 tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem | |
| 1361 aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil | |
| 1362 aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est | |
| 1363 desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel | |
| 1364 delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit | |
| 1365 desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum | |
| 1366 ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat | |
| 1367 desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae | |
| 1368 quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p8"> | |
| 1369 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now | |
| 1370 in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when | |
| 1371 it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, | |
| 1372 when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, | |
| 1373 concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it. | |
| 1374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34614] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1375 ergo dicendum quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis | |
| 1376 innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum | |
| 1377 philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus | |
| 1378 causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, | |
| 1379 est delectatio, quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel | |
| 1380 concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>amor | |
| 1381 magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia</i>. Unde inter omnes | |
| 1382 passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et | |
| 1383 propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p9"> | |
| 1384 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This | |
| 1385 union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, | |
| 1386 in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and | |
| 1387 love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire. | |
| 1388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34615] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1389 dicendum quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis, | |
| 1390 secundum scilicet coniunctionem ad rem ipsam. Et talis unio | |
| 1391 pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quae sequitur desiderium. | |
| 1392 Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel | |
| 1393 proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem | |
| 1394 ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic | |
| 1395 amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedit motum | |
| 1396 desiderii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A2-p10"> | |
| 1397 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention. | |
| 1398 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34616] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1399 dicendum quod delectatio causat amorem, secundum quod est prior in | |
| 1400 intentione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p2"> | |
| 1401 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. | |
| 1402 Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and | |
| 1403 surpasses hope. | |
| 1404 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34617] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1405 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit prima inter passiones | |
| 1406 irascibilis. Vis enim irascibilis ab ira denominatur. Cum ergo | |
| 1407 denominatio fiat a potiori, videtur quod ira sit potior et prior | |
| 1408 quam spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p3"> | |
| 1409 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary | |
| 1410 evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than | |
| 1411 to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. | |
| 1412 Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And | |
| 1413 consequently it seems that hope does not precede them. | |
| 1414 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34618] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1415 arduum est obiectum irascibilis. Sed magis videtur esse arduum quod | |
| 1416 aliquis conetur superare malum contrarium quod imminet ut futurum, | |
| 1417 quod pertinet ad audaciam; vel quod iniacet iam ut praesens, quod | |
| 1418 pertinet ad iram; quam quod conetur acquirere simpliciter aliquod | |
| 1419 bonum. Et similiter magis videtur esse arduum quod conetur vincere | |
| 1420 malum praesens, quam malum futurum. Ergo ira videtur esse potior | |
| 1421 passio quam audacia, et audacia quam spes. Et sic spes non videtur | |
| 1422 esse prior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p4"> | |
| 1423 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and | |
| 1424 despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair | |
| 1425 precede hope and daring. | |
| 1426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34619] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1427 prius occurrit, in motu ad finem, recessus a termino, quam accessus | |
| 1428 ad terminum. Sed timor et desperatio important recessum ab aliquo, | |
| 1429 audacia autem et spes important accessum ad aliquid. Ergo timor et | |
| 1430 desperatio praecedunt spem et audaciam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p5"> | |
| 1431 <b>On the contrary,</b> The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions. | |
| 1432 Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty. | |
| 1433 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34620] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 1434 quanto aliquid est propinquius primo, tanto est prius. Sed spes est | |
| 1435 propinquior amori, qui est prima passionum. Ergo spes est prior | |
| 1436 inter omnes passiones irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p6"> | |
| 1437 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 1438 <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q25_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may | |
| 1439 be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose | |
| 1440 object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion | |
| 1441 in the irascible, as stated above (Q[23], | |
| 1442 AA[3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger. | |
| 1443 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p7"> Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it | |
| 1444 follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of | |
| 1445 the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. | |
| 1446 hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope | |
| 1447 precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good | |
| 1448 directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect | |
| 1449 of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement | |
| 1450 from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this---that as the | |
| 1451 desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises | |
| 1452 from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is | |
| 1453 angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, | |
| 1454 it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions. | |
| 1455 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A3-p8"> And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, | |
| 1456 second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from | |
| 1457 all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; | |
| 1458 fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above. | |
| 1459 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 co."><a name="34621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34621] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1460 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis | |
| 1461 important motum in aliquid. Motus autem ad aliquid in irascibili | |
| 1462 potest causari ex duobus, uno modo, ex sola aptitudine seu | |
| 1463 proportione ad finem, quae pertinet ad amorem vel odium; alio modo, | |
| 1464 ex praesentia ipsius boni vel mali, quae pertinet ad tristitiam vel | |
| 1465 gaudium. Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in | |
| 1466 irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio | |
| 1467 irae. Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio | |
| 1468 vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod | |
| 1469 ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine | |
| 1470 generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae | |
| 1471 important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, | |
| 1472 oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et | |
| 1473 desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum | |
| 1474 est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est | |
| 1475 prior desperatione, quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem | |
| 1476 boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in | |
| 1477 bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non | |
| 1478 competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, | |
| 1479 unde est quasi per accidens. Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit | |
| 1480 recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et | |
| 1481 desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc | |
| 1482 manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur | |
| 1483 malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, | |
| 1484 nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur | |
| 1485 desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim | |
| 1486 irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare, secundum quod | |
| 1487 Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sic ergo patet quod spes | |
| 1488 est prima inter omnes passiones irascibilis. Et si ordinem omnium | |
| 1489 passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus, primo | |
| 1490 occurrunt amor et odium; secundo, desiderium et fuga; tertio, spes | |
| 1491 et desperatio; quarto, timor et audacia; quinto, ira; sexto et | |
| 1492 ultimo, gaudium et tristitia, quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, | |
| 1493 ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et | |
| 1494 desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium | |
| 1495 quam tristitia, ut ex praedictis colligi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p9"> | |
| 1496 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more | |
| 1497 manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name. | |
| 1498 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34622] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1499 ergo dicendum quod, quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut | |
| 1500 effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a | |
| 1501 manifestiori, denominatur potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p10"> | |
| 1502 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more | |
| 1503 directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous. | |
| 1504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34623] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1505 dicendum quod arduum non est ratio accedendi vel appetendi, sed | |
| 1506 potius bonum. Et ideo spes, quae directius respicit bonum, est | |
| 1507 prior, quamvis audacia aliquando sit in magis arduum, vel etiam | |
| 1508 ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A3-p11"> | |
| 1509 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from | |
| 1510 evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention | |
| 1511 of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of | |
| 1512 obtaining the end. | |
| 1513 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34624] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1514 dicendum quod appetitus primo et per se movetur in bonum, sicut in | |
| 1515 proprium obiectum; et ex hoc causatur quod recedat a malo. | |
| 1516 Proportionatur enim motus appetitivae partis, non quidem motui | |
| 1517 naturali, sed intentioni naturae; quae per prius intendit finem | |
| 1518 quam remotionem contrarii, quae non quaeritur nisi propter | |
| 1519 adeptionem finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q25_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q25_A4-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 4. Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p2"> | |
| 1520 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] | |
| 1521 sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place. | |
| 1522 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34625] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1523 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint istae quatuor principales | |
| 1524 passiones, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor. Augustinus enim, in | |
| 1525 XIV de Civ. Dei, non ponit spem, sed cupiditatem loco eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p3"> | |
| 1526 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. | |
| 1527 The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the | |
| 1528 final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal | |
| 1529 passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the | |
| 1530 four principal passions. | |
| 1531 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34626] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1532 in passionibus animae est duplex ordo, scilicet intentionis, et | |
| 1533 consecutionis seu generationis. Aut ergo principales passiones | |
| 1534 accipiuntur secundum ordinem intentionis, et sic tantum gaudium et | |
| 1535 tristitia, quae sunt finales, erunt principales passiones. Aut | |
| 1536 secundum ordinem consecutionis seu generationis, et sic amor erit | |
| 1537 principalis passio. Nullo ergo modo debent dici quatuor principales | |
| 1538 passiones istae quatuor, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p4"> | |
| 1539 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned | |
| 1540 as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another. | |
| 1541 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34627] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1542 sicut audacia causatur ex spe, ita timor ex desperatione. Aut ergo | |
| 1543 spes et desperatio debent poni principales passiones, tanquam | |
| 1544 causae, aut spes et audacia, tanquam sibi ipsis affines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p5"> | |
| 1545 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says: | |
| 1546 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p6"> "Banish joys: banish fears:</p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p7"> Away with hope: away with tears."</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34628] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1547 est illud quod Boetius, in libro de Consol., enumerans quatuor | |
| 1548 principales passiones, dicit, <i>gaudia pelle, pelle timorem, | |
| 1549 spemque fugato, nec dolor adsit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p8"> | |
| 1550 <b>I answer that,</b> These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because | |
| 1551 in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated | |
| 1552 in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete | |
| 1553 them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, | |
| 1554 movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on | |
| 1555 to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the | |
| 1556 future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness | |
| 1557 relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil. | |
| 1558 </p><p id="FS_Q25_A4-p9"> As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some | |
| 1559 have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by | |
| 1560 hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something. | |
| 1561 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 co."><a name="34629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34629] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1562 dicendum quod hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse | |
| 1563 dicuntur. Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales | |
| 1564 dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu | |
| 1565 omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur, ut dicitur | |
| 1566 in II Ethic. Timor autem et spes sunt principales, non quidem quasi | |
| 1567 completivae simpliciter, sed quia sunt completivae in genere motus | |
| 1568 appetitivi ad aliquid, nam respectu boni, incipit motus in amore, | |
| 1569 et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero | |
| 1570 mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in | |
| 1571 timore. Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi | |
| 1572 secundum differentiam praesentis et futuri, motus enim respicit | |
| 1573 futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti. De bono igitur | |
| 1574 praesenti est gaudium; de malo praesenti est tristitia; de bono | |
| 1575 vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor. Omnes autem aliae | |
| 1576 passiones, quae sunt de bono vel de malo praesenti vel futuro, ad | |
| 1577 has completive reducuntur. Unde etiam a quibusdam dicuntur | |
| 1578 principales hae praedictae quatuor passiones, quia sunt generales. | |
| 1579 Quod quidem verum est, si spes et timor designant motum appetitus | |
| 1580 communiter tendentem in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p10"> | |
| 1581 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future | |
| 1582 good. | |
| 1583 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34630] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1584 ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco | |
| 1585 spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum | |
| 1586 futurum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p11"> | |
| 1587 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last | |
| 1588 passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed | |
| 1589 any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of | |
| 1590 daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply | |
| 1591 OBJ 3). | |
| 1592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34631] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1593 dicendum quod passiones istae dicuntur principales, secundum | |
| 1594 ordinem intentionis et complementi. Et quamvis timor et spes non | |
| 1595 sint ultimae passiones simpliciter, tamen sunt ultimae in genere | |
| 1596 passionum tendentium in aliud quasi in futurum. Nec potest esse | |
| 1597 instantia nisi de ira. Quae tamen non potest poni principalis | |
| 1598 passio, quia est quidam effectus audaciae, quae non potest esse | |
| 1599 passio principalis, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q25_A4-p12"> | |
| 1600 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and | |
| 1601 this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to | |
| 1602 be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring. | |
| 1603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 25 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34632] Iª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1604 dicendum quod desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi | |
| 1605 per accidens, et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est | |
| 1606 per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, | |
| 1607 quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic | |
| 1608 etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur | |
| 1609 audaciam.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 1610 <div id="FS_Q26" class="div3"> | |
| 1611 <h3 id="FS_Q26-p0.1">Q. 26. OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1612 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 1613 <p id="FS_Q26-p2"> We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions | |
| 1614 of the irascible faculty. | |
| 1615 </p><p id="FS_Q26-p3"> The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; | |
| 1616 (3) Pleasure and sadness. | |
| 1617 </p><p id="FS_Q26-p4"> Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under | |
| 1618 the first head there are four points of inquiry: | |
| 1619 </p><p id="FS_Q26-p5"><a href="#FS_Q26_A1"> (1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p6"><a href="#FS_Q26_A2"> (2) Whether love is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p7"><a href="#FS_Q26_A3"> (3) Whether love is the same as dilection?</a></p><p id="FS_Q26-p8"><a href="#FS_Q26_A4"> (4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?</a></p> | |
| 1620 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 pr."><a name="34633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34633] | |
| 1621 Iª-IIae q. 26 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de | |
| 1622 passionibus animae in speciali. Et primo, de passionibus | |
| 1623 concupiscibilis; secundo, de passionibus irascibilis. Prima | |
| 1624 consideratio erit tripartita, nam primo considerabimus de amore et | |
| 1625 odio; secundo, de concupiscentia et fuga tertio, de delectatione et | |
| 1626 tristitia. Circa amorem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de ipso | |
| 1627 amore; secundo, de causa amoris; tertio, de effectibus eius. Circa | |
| 1628 primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum amor sit in concupiscibili. | |
| 1629 Secundo, utrum amor sit passio. Tertio, utrum amor sit idem quod | |
| 1630 dilectio. Quarto, utrum amor convenienter dividatur in amorem | |
| 1631 amicitiae et amorem concupiscentiae.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 1632 <div id="FS_Q26_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A1-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 1. Whether love is in the concupiscible power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p2"> | |
| 1633 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written ( | |
| 1634 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q26_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.2" target="asv">Wis. 8:2</a>): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part | |
| 1635 of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible | |
| 1636 power. | |
| 1637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34634] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1638 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in concupiscibili. | |
| 1639 Dicitur enim Sap. VIII, hanc, scilicet sapientiam, amavi et | |
| 1640 exquisivi a iuventute mea. Sed concupiscibilis, cum sit pars | |
| 1641 appetitus sensitivi, non potest tendere in sapientiam, quae non | |
| 1642 comprehenditur sensu. Ergo amor non est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p3"> | |
| 1643 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the | |
| 1644 object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary | |
| 1645 to it, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, | |
| 1646 is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the | |
| 1647 concupiscible power. | |
| 1648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34635] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1649 amor videtur esse idem cuilibet passioni, dicit enim Augustinus, in | |
| 1650 XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>amor inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; | |
| 1651 id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia; fugiens quod ei | |
| 1652 adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia | |
| 1653 est</i>. Sed non omnis passio est in concupiscibili; sed timor, | |
| 1654 etiam hic enumeratus, est in irascibili. Ergo non est simpliciter | |
| 1655 dicendum quod amor sit in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p4"> | |
| 1656 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, | |
| 1657 which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power. | |
| 1658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34636] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1659 Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit quendam amorem naturalem. | |
| 1660 Sed amor naturalis magis videtur pertinere ad vires naturales, quae | |
| 1661 sunt animae vegetabilis. Ergo amor non simpliciter est in | |
| 1662 concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p5"> | |
| 1663 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power." | |
| 1664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34637] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1665 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod amor est in | |
| 1666 concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A1-p6"> | |
| 1667 <b>I answer that,</b> Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference | |
| 1668 of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but | |
| 1669 in some other: and this is called the "natural appetite." Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to | |
| 1670 their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author | |
| 1671 of their nature, as stated in the | |
| 1672 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[6], A[1]</a>, ad 2; | |
| 1673 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and | |
| 1674 not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share | |
| 1675 of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject | |
| 1676 of | |
| 1677 the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will." | |
| 1678 </p><p id="FS_Q26_A1-p7"> Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural | |
| 1679 appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may | |
| 1680 be called "natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called | |
| 1681 "natural love." In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to | |
| 1682 say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love | |
| 1683 is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible | |
| 1684 power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty. | |
| 1685 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 co."><a name="34638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34638] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1686 dicendum quod amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum | |
| 1687 utriusque obiectum sit bonum. Unde secundum differentiam appetitus | |
| 1688 est differentia amoris. Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens | |
| 1689 apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius, et huiusmodi | |
| 1690 dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis | |
| 1691 convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam, | |
| 1692 sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam, ut in I libro dictum | |
| 1693 est. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius | |
| 1694 appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero. Et talis est | |
| 1695 appetitus sensitivus in brutis, qui tamen in hominibus aliquid | |
| 1696 libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est | |
| 1697 appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum | |
| 1698 iudicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui | |
| 1699 dicitur voluntas. In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur | |
| 1700 illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In | |
| 1701 appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est | |
| 1702 connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest | |
| 1703 amor naturalis, sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum | |
| 1704 medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et | |
| 1705 similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod | |
| 1706 bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel | |
| 1707 intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in | |
| 1708 appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu | |
| 1709 intellectivo. Et pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per | |
| 1710 respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est | |
| 1711 obiectum irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p8"> | |
| 1712 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love. | |
| 1713 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34639] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1714 ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de amore intellectivo | |
| 1715 vel rationali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p9"> | |
| 1716 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally. | |
| 1717 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34640] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1718 dicendum quod amor dicitur esse timor, gaudium, cupiditas et | |
| 1719 tristitia, non quidem essentialiter, sed causaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A1-p10"> | |
| 1720 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the | |
| 1721 body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; | |
| 1722 since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it. | |
| 1723 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34641] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1724 dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae | |
| 1725 vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus | |
| 1726 partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus, quia, ut | |
| 1727 Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>omnibus est pulchrum et | |
| 1728 bonum amabile</i>; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id | |
| 1729 quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A2-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 2. Whether love is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p2"> | |
| 1730 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. | |
| 1731 iv). Therefore love is not a passion. | |
| 1732 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34642] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1733 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus | |
| 1734 passio est. Sed omnis amor est virtus quaedam, ut dicit Dionysius, | |
| 1735 IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p3"> | |
| 1736 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but | |
| 1737 rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion. | |
| 1738 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34643] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1739 amor est unio quaedam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum, in libro de | |
| 1740 Trin. Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo | |
| 1741 amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p4"> | |
| 1742 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; | |
| 1743 for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion. | |
| 1744 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34644] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1745 Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod passio est motus quidam. Amor | |
| 1746 autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed | |
| 1747 principium huiusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p5"> | |
| 1748 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion." | |
| 1749 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34645] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1750 est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est | |
| 1751 passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p6"> | |
| 1752 <b>I answer that,</b> Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the | |
| 1753 first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives | |
| 1754 the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement | |
| 1755 to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be | |
| 1756 called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which | |
| 1757 consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement | |
| 1758 is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, | |
| 1759 into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement | |
| 1760 ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is | |
| 1761 nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this | |
| 1762 movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the | |
| 1763 appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the | |
| 1764 concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will. | |
| 1765 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 co."><a name="34646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34646] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1766 dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem | |
| 1767 naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat | |
| 1768 formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans | |
| 1769 dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa | |
| 1770 gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter | |
| 1771 gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum | |
| 1772 appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad | |
| 1773 ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad | |
| 1774 appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III | |
| 1775 de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in | |
| 1776 eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter | |
| 1777 consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima | |
| 1778 ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est | |
| 1779 aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia | |
| 1780 sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, | |
| 1781 quae est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam | |
| 1782 immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et | |
| 1783 passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; | |
| 1784 communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in | |
| 1785 voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p7"> | |
| 1786 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement | |
| 1787 in the appetite. | |
| 1788 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34647] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1789 ergo dicendum quod, quia virtus significat principium motus vel | |
| 1790 actionis, ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a | |
| 1791 Dionysio vocatur virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p8"> | |
| 1792 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which | |
| 1793 he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but | |
| 1794 that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher | |
| 1795 says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love. | |
| 1796 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34648] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1797 dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam | |
| 1798 appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad | |
| 1799 aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, | |
| 1800 sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor | |
| 1801 est virtus unitiva, et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio | |
| 1802 est opus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A2-p9"> | |
| 1803 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement | |
| 1804 whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein. | |
| 1805 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34649] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1806 dicendum quod amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in | |
| 1807 appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus quo immutatur ab | |
| 1808 appetibili, ut ei appetibile complaceat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether love is the same as dilection?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p2"> | |
| 1809 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is | |
| 1810 to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore | |
| 1811 love and dilection denote the same thing. | |
| 1812 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34650] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1813 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius | |
| 1814 enim, IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicit quod hoc modo se habent amor et | |
| 1815 dilectio, <i>sicut quatuor et bis duo, rectilineum et habens rectas | |
| 1816 lineas</i>. Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio | |
| 1817 significant idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p3"> | |
| 1818 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. | |
| 1819 Therefore these are the same. | |
| 1820 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34651] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1821 appetitivi motus secundum obiecta differunt. Sed idem est obiectum | |
| 1822 dilectionis et amoris. Ergo sunt idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p4"> | |
| 1823 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love | |
| 1824 to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because | |
| 1825 as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore | |
| 1826 love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) | |
| 1827 that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection." | |
| 1828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34652] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1829 si dilectio et amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre | |
| 1830 videntur, quod dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo, | |
| 1831 ut quidam dixerunt, secundum quod Augustinus narrat, in XIV de Civ. | |
| 1832 Dei. Sed hoc modo non differunt, quia, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit, | |
| 1833 in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo | |
| 1834 amor et dilectio non differunt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem | |
| 1835 concludit quod <i>non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem | |
| 1836 dicere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p5"> | |
| 1837 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does." | |
| 1838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34653] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1839 est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>quibusdam | |
| 1840 sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen | |
| 1841 dilectionis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A3-p6"> | |
| 1842 <b>I answer that,</b> We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however, | |
| 1843 in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" | |
| 1844 are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either way. | |
| 1845 </p><p id="FS_Q26_A3-p7"> Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection | |
| 1846 or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, | |
| 1847 as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the | |
| 1848 rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that | |
| 1849 which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)]. | |
| 1850 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 co."><a name="34654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34654] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1851 dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo | |
| 1852 pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. | |
| 1853 Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum philosophum in VIII | |
| 1854 Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per | |
| 1855 modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi | |
| 1856 potest. Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam | |
| 1857 amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est | |
| 1858 amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, | |
| 1859 electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non | |
| 1860 est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola | |
| 1861 rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem, perfectionem | |
| 1862 quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, | |
| 1863 ut ipsum nomen designat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p8"> | |
| 1864 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same | |
| 1865 as dilection. | |
| 1866 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34655] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1867 ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione, | |
| 1868 secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo, sic enim amor idem est | |
| 1869 quod dilectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p9"> | |
| 1870 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated | |
| 1871 above. | |
| 1872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34656] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1873 dicendum quod obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum | |
| 1874 dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut | |
| 1875 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p10"> | |
| 1876 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same | |
| 1877 as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds | |
| 1878 that "a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible | |
| 1879 passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the | |
| 1880 difference spoken of. | |
| 1881 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34657] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1882 dicendum quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam | |
| 1883 boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est. In parte tamen intellectiva | |
| 1884 idem est amor et dilectio. Et sic loquitur ibi Augustinus de amore, | |
| 1885 unde parum post subdit quod <i>recta voluntas est bonus amor, et | |
| 1886 perversa voluntas est malus amor</i>. Quia tamen amor, qui est | |
| 1887 passio concupiscibilis, plurimos inclinat ad malum, inde habuerunt | |
| 1888 occasionem qui praedictam differentiam assignaverunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A3-p11"> | |
| 1889 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than | |
| 1890 "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection | |
| 1891 presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by | |
| 1892 Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the | |
| 1893 nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection. | |
| 1894 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="34658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34658] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1895 dicendum quod ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen | |
| 1896 amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam | |
| 1897 passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; | |
| 1898 dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in | |
| 1899 Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo | |
| 1900 attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod | |
| 1901 pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, | |
| 1902 divinius est amor quam dilectio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q26_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q26_A4-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 4. Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p2"> | |
| 1903 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, | |
| 1904 while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division | |
| 1905 of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship. | |
| 1906 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34659] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1907 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor inconvenienter dividatur in | |
| 1908 amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Amor enim est passio, amicitia | |
| 1909 vero est habitus, ut dicit philosophus, in VIII Ethic. Sed habitus | |
| 1910 non potest esse pars divisiva passionis. Ergo amor non convenienter | |
| 1911 dividitur per amorem concupiscentiae et amorem amicitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p3"> | |
| 1912 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as | |
| 1913 "animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence | |
| 1914 is not a division of love. | |
| 1915 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34660] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1916 nihil dividitur per id quod ei connumeratur, non enim homo | |
| 1917 connumeratur animali. Sed concupiscentia connumeratur amori, sicut | |
| 1918 alia passio ab amore. Ergo amor non potest dividi per | |
| 1919 concupiscentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p4"> | |
| 1920 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that | |
| 1921 which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on "goodness." But useful and pleasant friendship are not without | |
| 1922 concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship. | |
| 1923 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34661] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1924 secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., triplex est amicitia, utilis, | |
| 1925 delectabilis et honesta. Sed amicitia utilis et delectabilis habet | |
| 1926 concupiscentiam. Ergo concupiscentia non debet dividi contra | |
| 1927 amicitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p5"> | |
| 1928 <b>On the contrary,</b> We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness | |
| 1929 which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. | |
| 1930 viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship. | |
| 1931 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34662] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 1932 quaedam dicimur amare quia ea concupiscimus, sicut <i>dicitur | |
| 1933 aliquis amare vinum propter dulce quod in eo concupiscit</i>, ut | |
| 1934 dicitur in II Topic. Sed ad vinum, et ad huiusmodi, non habemus | |
| 1935 amicitiam, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo alius est amor | |
| 1936 concupiscentiae, et alius est amor amicitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q26_A4-p6"> | |
| 1937 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: | |
| 1938 towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, | |
| 1939 man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes | |
| 1940 good. | |
| 1941 </p><p id="FS_Q26_A4-p7"> Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship | |
| 1942 is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, | |
| 1943 but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative | |
| 1944 being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good | |
| 1945 simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may | |
| 1946 have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love. | |
| 1947 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 co."><a name="34663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34663] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1948 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est | |
| 1949 velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet | |
| 1950 in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui | |
| 1951 vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor | |
| 1952 concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur | |
| 1953 amor amicitiae. Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. | |
| 1954 Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, | |
| 1955 quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et | |
| 1956 secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter | |
| 1957 est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita | |
| 1958 bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum | |
| 1959 habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum | |
| 1960 quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, | |
| 1961 est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum | |
| 1962 alterius, est amor secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p8"> | |
| 1963 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend | |
| 1964 is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves. | |
| 1965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34664] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1966 ergo dicendum quod amor non dividitur per amicitiam et | |
| 1967 concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam | |
| 1968 ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem | |
| 1969 dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34665] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 1970 patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q26_A4-p10"> | |
| 1971 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the | |
| 1972 character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that | |
| 1973 friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true | |
| 1974 friendship. | |
| 1975 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34666] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1976 dicendum quod in amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem | |
| 1977 aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio | |
| 1978 amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam | |
| 1979 delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et | |
| 1980 delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit | |
| 1981 a ratione verae amicitiae.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 1982 <div id="FS_Q27" class="div3"> | |
| 1983 <h3 id="FS_Q27-p0.1">Q. 27. OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1984 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 1985 <p id="FS_Q27-p2"> We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q27-p3"><a href="#FS_Q27_A1"> (1) Whether good is the only cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p4"><a href="#FS_Q27_A2"> (2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p5"><a href="#FS_Q27_A3"> (3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q27-p6"><a href="#FS_Q27_A4"> (4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?</a></p> | |
| 1986 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 pr."><a name="34667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34667] | |
| 1987 Iª-IIae q. 27 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa | |
| 1988 amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum bonum sit | |
| 1989 sola causa amoris. Secundo, utrum cognitio sit causa amoris. | |
| 1990 Tertio, utrum similitudo. Quarto, utrum aliqua alia animae | |
| 1991 passionum.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 1992 <div id="FS_Q27_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A1-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 1. Whether good is the only cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p2"> | |
| 1993 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens | |
| 1994 that evil also is loved, according to | |
| 1995 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv"> Ps. 10:6</a>: "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of | |
| 1996 love. | |
| 1997 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34668] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1998 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non solum bonum sit causa amoris. | |
| 1999 Bonum enim non est causa amoris, nisi quia amatur. Sed contingit | |
| 2000 etiam malum amari, secundum illud Psalmi X, <i>qui diligit | |
| 2001 iniquitatem, odit animam suam</i>, alioquin omnis amor esset bonus. | |
| 2002 Ergo non solum bonum est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p3"> | |
| 2003 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil | |
| 2004 is the cause of love. | |
| 2005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34669] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2006 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>eos qui mala sua | |
| 2007 dicunt, amamus</i>. Ergo videtur quod malum sit causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p4"> | |
| 2008 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all." | |
| 2009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34670] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2010 Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod non solum bonum, sed | |
| 2011 etiam pulchrum est omnibus amabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p5"> | |
| 2012 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love. | |
| 2013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34671] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2014 est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII de Trin., <i>non amatur certe nisi | |
| 2015 bonum</i>. Solum igitur bonum est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6"> | |
| 2016 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 2017 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause | |
| 2018 of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good; | |
| 2019 because, as stated above ( | |
| 2020 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q27_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, | |
| 2021 and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper | |
| 2022 cause of love. | |
| 2023 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 co."><a name="34672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34672] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2024 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor ad appetitivam | |
| 2025 potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius | |
| 2026 comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet | |
| 2027 igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum. | |
| 2028 Amoris autem proprium obiectum est bonum, quia, ut dictum est, amor | |
| 2029 importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad | |
| 2030 amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et | |
| 2031 proportionatum. Unde relinquitur quod bonum sit propria causa | |
| 2032 amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p7"> | |
| 2033 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered | |
| 2034 as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is | |
| 2035 in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or | |
| 2036 money, or such like. | |
| 2037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34673] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2038 ergo dicendum quod malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, | |
| 2039 scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut | |
| 2040 simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit | |
| 2041 in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum. Et per hunc modum homo | |
| 2042 diligit iniquitatem, inquantum per iniquitatem adipiscitur aliquod | |
| 2043 bonum, puta delectationem vel pecuniam vel aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p8"> | |
| 2044 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good | |
| 2045 thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy. | |
| 2046 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34674] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2047 dicendum quod illi qui mala sua dicunt, non propter mala amantur, | |
| 2048 sed propter hoc quod dicunt mala, hoc enim quod est dicere mala | |
| 2049 sua, habet rationem boni, inquantum excludit fictionem seu | |
| 2050 simulationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A1-p9"> | |
| 2051 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good | |
| 2052 is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. | |
| 2053 Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering | |
| 2054 to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to | |
| 2055 the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, | |
| 2056 and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means | |
| 2057 that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend. | |
| 2058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34675] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2059 dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum | |
| 2060 enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo | |
| 2061 quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius | |
| 2062 aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Unde et illi sensus | |
| 2063 praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, | |
| 2064 scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim | |
| 2065 pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum | |
| 2066 sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus | |
| 2067 pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra | |
| 2068 bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur | |
| 2069 id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id | |
| 2070 cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A2-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 2. Whether knowledge is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p2"> | |
| 2071 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought | |
| 2072 without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], | |
| 2073 qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. | |
| 2074 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34676] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2075 sic proceditur. Videtur quod cognitio non sit causa amoris. Quod | |
| 2076 enim aliquid quaeratur, hoc contingit ex amore. Sed aliqua | |
| 2077 quaeruntur quae nesciuntur, sicut scientiae, cum enim in his idem | |
| 2078 sit eas habere quod eas nosse, ut Augustinus dicit in libro | |
| 2079 octoginta trium quaest., si cognoscerentur, haberentur, et non | |
| 2080 quaererentur. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p3"> | |
| 2081 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they | |
| 2082 are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause | |
| 2083 of love. | |
| 2084 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34677] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2085 eiusdem rationis videtur esse quod aliquid incognitum ametur, et | |
| 2086 quod aliquid ametur plus quam cognoscatur. Sed aliqua amantur plus | |
| 2087 quam cognoscantur, sicut Deus, qui in hac vita potest per seipsum | |
| 2088 amari, non autem per seipsum cognosci. Ergo cognitio non est causa | |
| 2089 amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p4"> | |
| 2090 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there | |
| 2091 is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause | |
| 2092 of love. | |
| 2093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34678] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2094 si cognitio esset causa amoris, non posset inveniri amor ubi non | |
| 2095 est cognitio. Sed in omnibus rebus invenitur amor, ut dicit | |
| 2096 Dionysius in IV cap. de Div. Nom., non autem in omnibus invenitur | |
| 2097 cognitio. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p5"> | |
| 2098 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know." | |
| 2099 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34679] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2100 est quod Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod <i>nullus potest | |
| 2101 amare aliquid incognitum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p6"> | |
| 2102 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 2103 <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q27_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore | |
| 2104 love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily | |
| 2105 sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning | |
| 2106 of spiritual love. Accordingly | |
| 2107 knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known. | |
| 2108 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 co."><a name="34680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34680] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2109 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum est causa amoris per modum | |
| 2110 obiecti. Bonum autem non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est | |
| 2111 apprehensum. Et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod | |
| 2112 amatur. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., quod visio | |
| 2113 corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi. Et similiter | |
| 2114 contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est | |
| 2115 principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa | |
| 2116 amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi | |
| 2117 cognitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p7"> | |
| 2118 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either | |
| 2119 in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But | |
| 2120 to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly. | |
| 2121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34681] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2122 ergo dicendum quod ille qui quaerit scientiam, non omnino ignorat | |
| 2123 eam, sed secundum aliquid eam praecognoscit, vel in universali, vel | |
| 2124 in aliquo eius effectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari, ut | |
| 2125 Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sic autem eam cognoscere non est eam | |
| 2126 habere; sed cognoscere eam perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p8"> | |
| 2127 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs | |
| 2128 to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, | |
| 2129 things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should | |
| 2130 know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and | |
| 2131 properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, | |
| 2132 for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing | |
| 2133 is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. This is most evident | |
| 2134 in regard to the sciences, which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that | |
| 2135 rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the | |
| 2136 love of God. | |
| 2137 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34682] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2138 dicendum quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod | |
| 2139 non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem | |
| 2140 pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt | |
| 2141 coniuncta, et componere quodammodo ea quae sunt diversa, unum | |
| 2142 alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur | |
| 2143 quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes et | |
| 2144 virtutes et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae | |
| 2145 respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris | |
| 2146 sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo | |
| 2147 contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest | |
| 2148 perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur. Sicut maxime | |
| 2149 patet in scientiis, quas aliqui amant propter aliquam summariam | |
| 2150 cognitionem quam de eis habent, puta quod sciunt rhetoricam esse | |
| 2151 scientiam per quam homo potest persuadere, et hoc in rhetorica | |
| 2152 amant. Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A2-p9"> | |
| 2153 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, | |
| 2154 but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]; cf. | |
| 2155 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q27_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[6], A[1]</a>, ad 2). | |
| 2156 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34683] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2157 dicendum quod etiam amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus, | |
| 2158 causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus | |
| 2159 naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit, ut supra | |
| 2160 dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A3-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 3. Whether likeness is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p2"> | |
| 2161 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the | |
| 2162 cause of hatred; for it is written ( | |
| 2163 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>) that "among the proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with | |
| 2164 one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. | |
| 2165 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34684] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2166 sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa amoris. Idem | |
| 2167 enim non est causa contrariorum. Sed similitudo est causa odii, | |
| 2168 dicitur enim Prov. XIII, quod <i>inter superbos semper sunt | |
| 2169 iurgia</i>; et philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod figuli | |
| 2170 corrixantur ad invicem. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p3"> | |
| 2171 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves | |
| 2172 an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that | |
| 2173 case a man would love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause | |
| 2174 of love. | |
| 2175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34685] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2176 Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod <i>aliquis amat in alio quod | |
| 2177 esse non vellet, sicut homo amat histrionem, qui non vellet esse | |
| 2178 histrio</i>. Hoc autem non contingeret, si similitudo esset propria | |
| 2179 causa amoris, sic enim homo amaret in altero quod ipse haberet, vel | |
| 2180 vellet habere. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p4"> | |
| 2181 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. | |
| 2182 But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause | |
| 2183 of love. | |
| 2184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34686] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2185 quilibet homo amat id quo indiget, etiam si illud non habeat, sicut | |
| 2186 infirmus amat sanitatem, et pauper amat divitias. Sed inquantum | |
| 2187 indiget et caret eis, habet dissimilitudinem ad ipsa. Ergo non | |
| 2188 solum similitudo, sed etiam dissimilitudo est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p5"> | |
| 2189 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain | |
| 2190 their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. | |
| 2191 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="34687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34687] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2192 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>beneficos in pecunias | |
| 2193 et salutem amamus, et similiter eos qui circa mortuos servant | |
| 2194 amicitiam, omnes diligunt</i>. Non autem omnes sunt tales. Ergo | |
| 2195 similitudo non est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p6"> | |
| 2196 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 2197 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." | |
| 2198 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34688] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2199 est quod dicitur Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit simile | |
| 2200 sibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p7"> | |
| 2201 <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind | |
| 2202 of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness | |
| 2203 are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality | |
| 2204 which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its | |
| 2205 proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance | |
| 2206 to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself. | |
| 2207 </p><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p8"> Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, | |
| 2208 having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of | |
| 2209 humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; | |
| 2210 and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or | |
| 2211 friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and | |
| 2212 it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being. | |
| 2213 </p><p id="FS_Q27_A3-p9"> Now it has been stated above ( | |
| 2214 <a href="#FS_Q26_A4" id="FS_Q27_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[4]</a>), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But | |
| 2215 a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in | |
| 2216 the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders | |
| 2217 him from gaining the good that he loves, he | |
| 2218 becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel | |
| 2219 among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder | |
| 2220 one another in attaining the position they covet. | |
| 2221 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 co."><a name="34689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34689] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2222 dicendum quod similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris. Sed | |
| 2223 considerandum est quod similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi | |
| 2224 dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu, | |
| 2225 sicut duo habentes albedinem, dicuntur similes. Alio modo, ex hoc | |
| 2226 quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione, illud quod | |
| 2227 aliud habet in actu, sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens | |
| 2228 extra suum locum, habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo loco | |
| 2229 existenti. Vel etiam secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad | |
| 2230 actum ipsum, nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus. Primus ergo | |
| 2231 similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae. Ex | |
| 2232 hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, | |
| 2233 sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa, sicut duo homines sunt unum in | |
| 2234 specie humanitatis, et duo albi in albedine. Et ideo affectus unius | |
| 2235 tendit in alterum, sicut in unum sibi; et vult ei bonum sicut et | |
| 2236 sibi. Sed secundus modus similitudinis causat amorem | |
| 2237 concupiscentiae, vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis. Quia | |
| 2238 unicuique existenti in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, inest | |
| 2239 appetitus sui actus, et in eius consecutione delectatur, si sit | |
| 2240 sentiens et cognoscens. Dictum est autem supra quod in amore | |
| 2241 concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum | |
| 2242 quod concupiscit. Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, | |
| 2243 quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine | |
| 2244 alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in | |
| 2245 participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod | |
| 2246 amat; efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed | |
| 2247 inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus. Et propter hoc figuli | |
| 2248 corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, | |
| 2249 et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria | |
| 2250 excellentia, quam concupiscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34690] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 2251 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p11"> | |
| 2252 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the | |
| 2253 latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer | |
| 2254 love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect | |
| 2255 of his art. | |
| 2256 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34691] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2257 dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod aliquis in altero amat quod in se | |
| 2258 non amat, invenitur ratio similitudinis secundum | |
| 2259 proportionalitatem, nam sicut se habet alius ad hoc quod in eo | |
| 2260 amatur, ita ipse se habet ad hoc quod in se amat. Puta si bonus | |
| 2261 cantor bonum amet scriptorem, attenditur ibi similitudo | |
| 2262 proportionis, secundum quod uterque habet quod convenit ei secundum | |
| 2263 suam artem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p12"> | |
| 2264 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above. | |
| 2265 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34692] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2266 dicendum quod ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad | |
| 2267 id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A3-p13"> | |
| 2268 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he | |
| 2269 expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to | |
| 2270 one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not | |
| 2271 all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to | |
| 2272 certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, | |
| 2273 as being in conformity with his own natural reason. | |
| 2274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="34693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34693] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 2275 dicendum quod secundum eandem similitudinem potentiae ad actum, | |
| 2276 ille qui non est liberalis, amat eum qui est liberalis, inquantum | |
| 2277 expectat ab eo aliquid quod desiderat. Et eadem ratio est de | |
| 2278 perseverante in amicitia ad eum qui non perseverat. Utrobique enim | |
| 2279 videtur esse amicitia propter utilitatem. Vel dicendum quod, licet | |
| 2280 non omnes homines habeant huiusmodi virtutes secundum habitum | |
| 2281 completum, habent tamen ea secundum quaedam seminalia rationis, | |
| 2282 secundum quae, qui non habet virtutem, diligit virtuosum, tanquam | |
| 2283 suae naturali rationi conformem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q27_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q27_A4-p0.1">Q. 27. A. 4. Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p2"> | |
| 2284 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved | |
| 2285 for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. | |
| 2286 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34694] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 2287 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia passio possit esse causa | |
| 2288 amoris. Dicit enim philosophus, in VIII Ethic., quod aliqui amantur | |
| 2289 propter delectationem. Sed delectatio est passio quaedam. Ergo | |
| 2290 aliqua alia passio est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p3"> | |
| 2291 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship | |
| 2292 based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. | |
| 2293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34695] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2294 desiderium quaedam passio est. Sed aliquos amamus propter | |
| 2295 desiderium alicuius quod ab eis expectamus, sicut apparet in omni | |
| 2296 amicitia quae est propter utilitatem. Ergo aliqua alia passio est | |
| 2297 causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p4"> | |
| 2298 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at | |
| 2299 all, even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of love. | |
| 2300 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34696] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2301 Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>cuius rei adipiscendae spem | |
| 2302 quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat, aut omnino non amat, quamvis | |
| 2303 quam pulchra sit videat</i>. Ergo spes etiam est causa amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p5"> | |
| 2304 <b>On the contrary,</b> All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9). | |
| 2305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34697] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2306 est quod omnes aliae affectiones animi ex amore causantur, ut | |
| 2307 Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p6"> | |
| 2308 <b>I answer that,</b> There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion | |
| 2309 of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest | |
| 2310 in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible | |
| 2311 for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may | |
| 2312 happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another. | |
| 2313 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 co."><a name="34698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34698] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2314 dicendum quod nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat | |
| 2315 aliquem amorem. Cuius ratio est quia omnis alia passio animae vel | |
| 2316 importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus | |
| 2317 in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel | |
| 2318 coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde | |
| 2319 impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa | |
| 2320 universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem | |
| 2321 esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa | |
| 2322 alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p7"> | |
| 2323 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, | |
| 2324 in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way. | |
| 2325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34699] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2326 ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, | |
| 2327 amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa | |
| 2328 iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur | |
| 2329 nisi in re aliquo modo amata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p8"> | |
| 2330 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being | |
| 2331 loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it. | |
| 2332 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34700] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2333 dicendum quod desiderium rei alicuius semper praesupponit amorem | |
| 2334 illius rei. Sed desiderium alicuius rei potest esse causa ut res | |
| 2335 alia ametur, sicut qui desiderat pecuniam, amat propter hoc eum a | |
| 2336 quo pecuniam recipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q27_A4-p9"> | |
| 2337 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because hope | |
| 2338 strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself | |
| 2339 is of a good that is loved. | |
| 2340 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 27 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34701] Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2341 dicendum quod spes causat vel auget amorem, et ratione | |
| 2342 delectationis, quia delectationem causat, et etiam ratione | |
| 2343 desiderii, quia spes desiderium fortificat, non enim ita intense | |
| 2344 desideramus quae non speramus. Sed tamen et ipsa spes est alicuius | |
| 2345 boni amati.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 2346 <div id="FS_Q28" class="div3"> | |
| 2347 <h3 id="FS_Q28-p0.1">Q. 28. OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2348 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 2349 <p id="FS_Q28-p2"> We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q28-p3"><a href="#FS_Q28_A1"> (1) Whether union is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p4"><a href="#FS_Q28_A2"> (2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p5"><a href="#FS_Q28_A3"> (3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p6"><a href="#FS_Q28_A4"> (4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p7"><a href="#FS_Q28_A5"> (5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?</a></p><p id="FS_Q28-p8"><a href="#FS_Q28_A6"> (6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?</a></p> | |
| 2350 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 pr."><a name="34702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34702] | |
| 2351 Iª-IIae q. 28 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 2352 effectibus amoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum unio | |
| 2353 sit effectus amoris. Secundo, utrum mutua inhaesio. Tertio, utrum | |
| 2354 extasis sit effectus amoris. Quarto, utrum zelus. Quinto, utrum | |
| 2355 amor sit passio laesiva amantis. Sexto, utrum amor sit causa omnium | |
| 2356 quae amans agit.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 2357 <div id="FS_Q28_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A1-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 1. Whether union is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p2"> | |
| 2358 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; | |
| 2359 for the Apostle says ( | |
| 2360 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.18" target="asv">Gal. 4:18</a>): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only when | |
| 2361 I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of love. | |
| 2362 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34703] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2363 sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio non sit effectus amoris. Absentia | |
| 2364 enim unioni repugnat. Sed amor compatitur secum absentiam, dicit | |
| 2365 enim apostolus, ad Galat. IV, <i>bonum aemulamini in bono | |
| 2366 semper</i> (loquens de seipso, ut Glossa dicit), <i>et non tantum | |
| 2367 cum praesens sum apud vos</i>. Ergo unio non est effectus | |
| 2368 amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p3"> | |
| 2369 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the | |
| 2370 whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love | |
| 2371 does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does | |
| 2372 not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above ( | |
| 2373 <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q28_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). Therefore union is not an effect of love. | |
| 2374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34704] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2375 omnis unio aut est per essentiam, sicut forma unitur materiae, et | |
| 2376 accidens subiecto, et pars toti vel alteri parti ad constitutionem | |
| 2377 totius, aut est per similitudinem vel generis, vel speciei, vel | |
| 2378 accidentis. Sed amor non causat unionem essentiae, alioquin nunquam | |
| 2379 haberetur amor ad ea quae sunt per essentiam divisa. Unionem autem | |
| 2380 quae est per similitudinem, amor non causat, sed magis ab ea | |
| 2381 causatur. Ut dictum est. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p4"> | |
| 2382 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover | |
| 2383 in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love. | |
| 2384 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34705] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2385 sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit | |
| 2386 intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu. | |
| 2387 Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p5"> | |
| 2388 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a "unitive love." | |
| 2389 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34706] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2390 est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet | |
| 2391 est virtus unitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A1-p6"> | |
| 2392 <b>I answer that,</b> The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. | |
| 2393 The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement | |
| 2394 of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these | |
| 2395 arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the | |
| 2396 lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man | |
| 2397 loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends | |
| 2398 him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" | |
| 2399 (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul." | |
| 2400 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A1-p7"> The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the | |
| 2401 beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself | |
| 2402 is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking | |
| 2403 to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the | |
| 2404 union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union. | |
| 2405 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 co."><a name="34707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34707] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2406 dicendum quod duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem | |
| 2407 secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia | |
| 2408 vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex | |
| 2409 apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur | |
| 2410 apprehensionem. Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae | |
| 2411 et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis | |
| 2412 amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens | |
| 2413 illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. | |
| 2414 Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum | |
| 2415 sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, | |
| 2416 inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est | |
| 2417 quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV | |
| 2418 Confess., <i>bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae | |
| 2419 suae</i>. Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad | |
| 2420 desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi | |
| 2421 convenientis et ad se pertinentis. Secundam autem unionem facit | |
| 2422 formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde | |
| 2423 Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod <i>amor est quasi vita | |
| 2424 quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem | |
| 2425 scilicet et quod amatur</i>. Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad | |
| 2426 unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare | |
| 2427 intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p8"> | |
| 2428 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of | |
| 2429 the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present. | |
| 2430 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34708] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2431 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de unione reali. Quam | |
| 2432 quidem requirit delectatio sicut causam, desiderium vero est in | |
| 2433 reali absentia amati, amor vero et in absentia et in | |
| 2434 praesentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p9"> | |
| 2435 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love | |
| 2436 with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as | |
| 2437 stated above ( | |
| 2438 <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q28_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened | |
| 2439 to substantial union, inasmuch as | |
| 2440 the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, | |
| 2441 if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks | |
| 2442 with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. | |
| 2443 ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in | |
| 2444 either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union---to live together, speak together, and be united | |
| 2445 together in other like things. | |
| 2446 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34709] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2447 dicendum quod unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim | |
| 2448 unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, | |
| 2449 quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo | |
| 2450 quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est. Quaedam vero | |
| 2451 unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum | |
| 2452 coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, | |
| 2453 inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut | |
| 2454 ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui. | |
| 2455 Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, | |
| 2456 quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum | |
| 2457 convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., | |
| 2458 <i>Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri | |
| 2459 unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi</i>, | |
| 2460 quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul | |
| 2461 conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi | |
| 2462 coniungantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A1-p10"> | |
| 2463 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that | |
| 2464 the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love | |
| 2465 is closer than that which is caused by knowledge. | |
| 2466 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34710] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2467 dicendum quod cognitio perficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur | |
| 2468 cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem. Sed amor facit quod ipsa | |
| 2469 res quae amatur, amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde | |
| 2470 amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A2-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 2. Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p2"> | |
| 2471 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which | |
| 2472 is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, | |
| 2473 so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. | |
| 2474 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34711] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2475 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non causet mutuam inhaesionem, ut | |
| 2476 scilicet amans sit in amato, et e converso. Quod enim est in | |
| 2477 altero, continetur in eo. Sed non potest idem esse continens et | |
| 2478 contentum. Ergo per amorem non potest causari mutua inhaesio, ut | |
| 2479 amatum sit in amante et e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p3"> | |
| 2480 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the | |
| 2481 reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not | |
| 2482 an effect of love. | |
| 2483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34712] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2484 nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicuius integri, nisi per | |
| 2485 aliquam divisionem. Sed dividere quae sunt secundum rem coniuncta, | |
| 2486 non pertinet ad appetitum, in quo est amor, sed ad rationem. Ergo | |
| 2487 mutua inhaesio non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p4"> | |
| 2488 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, | |
| 2489 in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above | |
| 2490 <a href="#FS_Q28_A1" id="FS_Q28_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual | |
| 2491 indwelling is not an effect of love. | |
| 2492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34713] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2493 si per amorem amans est in amato et e converso, sequetur quod hoc | |
| 2494 modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato. Sed ipsa unio est | |
| 2495 amor, ut dictum est. Ergo sequitur quod semper amans ametur ab | |
| 2496 amato, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo mutua inhaesio est effectus | |
| 2497 amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p5"> | |
| 2498 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 2499 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, | |
| 2500 every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa. | |
| 2501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34714] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2502 est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo | |
| 2503 manet, et Deus in eo</i>. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem | |
| 2504 ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e | |
| 2505 converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p6"> | |
| 2506 <b>I answer that,</b> This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, | |
| 2507 as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of | |
| 2508 the lover, according to | |
| 2509 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.7" target="asv"> Phil. 1:7, </a> "For that I have you in my heart": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the | |
| 2510 lover is not satisfied with a | |
| 2511 superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, | |
| 2512 so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth | |
| 2513 all things, yea the deep things of God" ( | |
| 2514 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>). | |
| 2515 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p7"> As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: | |
| 2516 causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, | |
| 2517 to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: | |
| 2518 not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or | |
| 2519 wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. | |
| 2520 For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the | |
| 2521 beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence | |
| 2522 is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved | |
| 2523 perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch | |
| 2524 as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems | |
| 2525 as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the | |
| 2526 same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently | |
| 2527 in | |
| 2528 so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were | |
| 2529 become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking | |
| 2530 on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover. | |
| 2531 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A2-p8"> In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch | |
| 2532 as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another. | |
| 2533 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 co."><a name="34715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34715] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2534 dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et | |
| 2535 quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam | |
| 2536 quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, | |
| 2537 inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud | |
| 2538 Philipp. I, <i>eo quod habeam vos in corde</i>. Amans vero dicitur | |
| 2539 esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est | |
| 2540 contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula | |
| 2541 quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad | |
| 2542 interiora eius ingreditur. Sicut de spiritu sancto, qui est amor | |
| 2543 Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor. II, quod <i>scrutatur etiam profunda | |
| 2544 Dei</i>. Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in | |
| 2545 amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel | |
| 2546 delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in | |
| 2547 absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem | |
| 2548 concupiscentiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; | |
| 2549 non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat | |
| 2550 aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter | |
| 2551 aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. | |
| 2552 Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis. E | |
| 2553 converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem | |
| 2554 concupiscentiae, aliter per amorem amicitiae. Amor namque | |
| 2555 concupiscentiae non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut | |
| 2556 superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati, sed quaerit amatum | |
| 2557 perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius perveniens. In amore vero | |
| 2558 amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala | |
| 2559 amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in | |
| 2560 suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, | |
| 2561 proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere | |
| 2562 secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic, | |
| 2563 inquantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in | |
| 2564 amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et | |
| 2565 agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum | |
| 2566 idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante. Potest autem et tertio modo | |
| 2567 mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam | |
| 2568 redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona | |
| 2569 volunt et operantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p9"> | |
| 2570 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On | |
| 2571 the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For | |
| 2572 nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, | |
| 2573 and vice versa. | |
| 2574 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34716] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2575 ergo dicendum quod amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est | |
| 2576 impressum in affectu eius per quandam complacentiam. E converso | |
| 2577 vero amans continetur in amato, inquantum amans sequitur aliquo | |
| 2578 modo illud quod est intimum amati. Nihil enim prohibet diverso modo | |
| 2579 esse aliquid continens et contentum, sicut genus continetur in | |
| 2580 specie et e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p10"> | |
| 2581 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement | |
| 2582 of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above. | |
| 2583 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34717] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2584 dicendum quod rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris. Et | |
| 2585 ideo, sicut ratio disquirit, ita affectus amoris subintrat in | |
| 2586 amatum, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A2-p11"> | |
| 2587 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love. | |
| 2588 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34718] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2589 dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de tertio modo mutuae | |
| 2590 inhaesionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A3-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 3. Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p2"> | |
| 2591 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always | |
| 2592 result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy. | |
| 2593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34719] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2594 sic proceditur. Videtur quod extasis non sit effectus amoris. | |
| 2595 Extasis enim quandam alienationem importare videtur. Sed amor non | |
| 2596 semper facit alienationem, sunt enim amantes interdum sui compotes. | |
| 2597 Ergo amor non facit extasim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p3"> | |
| 2598 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes | |
| 2599 himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were. | |
| 2600 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34720] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2601 amans desiderat amatum sibi uniri. Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se, | |
| 2602 quam etiam pergat in amatum, extra se exiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p4"> | |
| 2603 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above | |
| 2604 <a href="#FS_Q28_A1" id="FS_Q28_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always | |
| 2605 loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love. | |
| 2606 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34721] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2607 amor unit amatum amanti, sicut dictum est. Si ergo amans extra se | |
| 2608 tendit, ut in amatum pergat, sequitur quod semper plus diligat | |
| 2609 amatum quam seipsum. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo extasis est | |
| 2610 effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p5"> | |
| 2611 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through love." | |
| 2612 Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it | |
| 2613 seems that every love causes ecstasy. | |
| 2614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34722] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2615 est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>divinus | |
| 2616 amor extasim facit, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim | |
| 2617 passus</i>. Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quaedam similitudo | |
| 2618 participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur, videtur quod quilibet | |
| 2619 amor causet extasim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A3-p6"> | |
| 2620 <b>I answer that,</b> To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive | |
| 2621 power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper | |
| 2622 to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is | |
| 2623 placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up | |
| 2624 so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; | |
| 2625 thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a | |
| 2626 man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as | |
| 2627 it were. | |
| 2628 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A3-p7"> The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, | |
| 2629 as stated above | |
| 2630 <a href="#FS_Q28_A2" id="FS_Q28_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love | |
| 2631 of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the | |
| 2632 lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so | |
| 2633 far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since | |
| 2634 he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally | |
| 2635 within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes | |
| 2636 and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake. | |
| 2637 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 co."><a name="34723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34723] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2638 dicendum quod extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur. | |
| 2639 Quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, et secundum | |
| 2640 vim appetitivam. Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliquis dicitur | |
| 2641 extra se poni, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam, vel | |
| 2642 quia ad superiorem sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad | |
| 2643 comprehendenda aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur | |
| 2644 extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem apprehensionem | |
| 2645 rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur; puta, cum | |
| 2646 aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit, dicitur extasim passus. | |
| 2647 Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, | |
| 2648 quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo | |
| 2649 extra seipsum. Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, | |
| 2650 inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa | |
| 2651 autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim | |
| 2652 facit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem | |
| 2653 concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore | |
| 2654 concupiscentiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum | |
| 2655 scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui | |
| 2656 aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi | |
| 2657 habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine | |
| 2658 infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius | |
| 2659 simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, | |
| 2660 quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum | |
| 2661 amicum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p8"> | |
| 2662 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy. | |
| 2663 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34724] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2664 ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de prima extasi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p9"> | |
| 2665 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply. | |
| 2666 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34725] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2667 dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de amore concupiscentiae, qui non | |
| 2668 facit simpliciter extasim, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A3-p10"> | |
| 2669 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will | |
| 2670 the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself. | |
| 2671 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34726] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2672 dicendum quod ille qui amat, intantum extra se exit, inquantum vult | |
| 2673 bona amici et operatur. Non tamen vult bona amici magis quam sua. | |
| 2674 Unde non sequitur quod alterum plus quam se diligat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A4-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 4. Whether zeal is an effect of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p2"> | |
| 2675 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written ( | |
| 2676 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:3</a>): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore | |
| 2677 zeal is not an effect of love. | |
| 2678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34727] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 2679 sic proceditur. Videtur quod zelus non sit effectus amoris. Zelus | |
| 2680 enim est contentionis principium, unde dicitur I ad Cor. III, | |
| 2681 <i>cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio,</i> et cetera. Sed | |
| 2682 contentio repugnat amori. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p3"> | |
| 2683 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since | |
| 2684 it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be | |
| 2685 jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love. | |
| 2686 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34728] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea | |
| 2687 obiectum amoris est bonum, quod est communicativum sui. Sed zelus | |
| 2688 repugnat communicationi, ad zelum enim pertinere videtur quod | |
| 2689 aliquis non patiatur consortium in amato; sicut viri dicuntur | |
| 2690 zelare uxores, quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris. Ergo zelus | |
| 2691 non est effectus amoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p4"> | |
| 2692 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written ( | |
| 2693 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.3" target="asv">Ps. 72:3</a>): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred. | |
| 2694 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34729] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2695 zelus non est sine odio, sicut nec sine amore, dicitur enim in | |
| 2696 Psalmo LXXII, <i>zelavi super iniquos</i>. Non ergo debet dici | |
| 2697 magis effectus amoris quam odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p5"> | |
| 2698 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things." | |
| 2699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34730] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2700 est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus | |
| 2701 appellatur Zelotes propter multum amorem quem habet ad | |
| 2702 existentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p6"> | |
| 2703 <b>I answer that,</b> Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends | |
| 2704 to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object | |
| 2705 loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it. | |
| 2706 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p7"> But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence | |
| 2707 he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. | |
| 2708 It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive | |
| 2709 individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, | |
| 2710 as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written ( | |
| 2711 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.1" target="asv">Ps. 36:1</a>): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity." | |
| 2712 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A4-p8"> On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved | |
| 2713 against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when | |
| 2714 he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be | |
| 2715 zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the | |
| 2716 honor or will of God; according to | |
| 2717 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of | |
| 2718 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#John.2.17" target="asv"> Jn. 2:17</a>: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever | |
| 2719 evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it." | |
| 2720 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 co."><a name="34731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34731] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2721 dicendum quod zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris | |
| 2722 provenit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius | |
| 2723 tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel | |
| 2724 repugnans. Cum igitur amor sit quidam motus in amatum, ut | |
| 2725 Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., intensus amor | |
| 2726 quaerit excludere omne quod sibi repugnat. Aliter tamen hoc | |
| 2727 contingit in amore concupiscentiae, et aliter in amore amicitiae. | |
| 2728 Nam in amore concupiscentiae, qui intense aliquid concupiscit, | |
| 2729 movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni | |
| 2730 quietae eius quod amatur. Et hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxores, | |
| 2731 ne per consortium aliorum impediatur singularitas quam in uxore | |
| 2732 quaerunt. Similiter etiam qui quaerunt excellentiam, moventur | |
| 2733 contra eos qui excellere videntur, quasi impedientes excellentiam | |
| 2734 eorum. Et iste est zelus invidiae, de quo dicitur in Psalmo XXXVI, | |
| 2735 <i>noli aemulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes | |
| 2736 iniquitatem</i>. Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici, unde | |
| 2737 quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod | |
| 2738 repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro | |
| 2739 amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo | |
| 2740 repellere studet. Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare | |
| 2741 pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, | |
| 2742 repellere secundum posse conatur; secundum illud III Reg. XIX, | |
| 2743 <i>zelo zelatus sum pro domino exercituum</i>. Et Ioan. II, super | |
| 2744 illud, <i>zelus domus tuae comedit me</i>, dicit Glossa quod | |
| 2745 <i>bono zelo comeditur, qui quaelibet prava quae viderit, corrigere | |
| 2746 satagit; si nequit, tolerat et gemit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p9"> | |
| 2747 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object | |
| 2748 of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it. | |
| 2749 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34732] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2750 ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de zelo invidiae; qui | |
| 2751 quidem est causa contentionis, non contra rem amatam, sed pro re | |
| 2752 amata contra impedimenta ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p10"> | |
| 2753 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, | |
| 2754 becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, | |
| 2755 in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it | |
| 2756 does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in | |
| 2757 their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by | |
| 2758 many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it. | |
| 2759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34733] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2760 dicendum quod bonum amatur inquantum est communicabile amanti. Unde | |
| 2761 omne illud quod perfectionem huius communicationis impedit, | |
| 2762 efficitur odiosum. Et sic ex amore boni zelus causatur. Ex defectu | |
| 2763 autem bonitatis contingit quod quaedam parva bona non possunt | |
| 2764 integre simul possideri a multis. Et ex amore talium causatur zelus | |
| 2765 invidiae. Non autem proprie ex his quae integre possunt a multis | |
| 2766 possideri, nullus enim invidet alteri de cognitione veritatis, quae | |
| 2767 a multis integre cognosci potest; sed forte de excellentia circa | |
| 2768 cognitionem huius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A4-p11"> | |
| 2769 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down | |
| 2770 as an effect of love rather than of hatred. | |
| 2771 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34734] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2772 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliquis odio habet ea quae repugnant | |
| 2773 amato, ex amore procedit. Unde zelus proprie ponitur effectus | |
| 2774 amoris magis quam odii.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A5-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 5. Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p2"> | |
| 2775 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: | |
| 2776 for it is written ( | |
| 2777 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Song.2.5" target="asv">Cant 2:5</a>): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a wounding passion. | |
| 2778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34735] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 2779 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit passio laesiva. Languor enim | |
| 2780 significat laesionem quandam languentis. Sed amor causat languorem, | |
| 2781 dicitur enim Cant. II, <i>fulcite me floribus, stipate me malis, | |
| 2782 quia amore langueo</i>. Ergo amor est passio laesiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p3"> | |
| 2783 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in which it is: for it is written ( | |
| 2784 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Song.5.6" target="asv">Cant 5:6</a>): "My soul melted when my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding passion. | |
| 2785 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34736] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2786 liquefactio est quaedam resolutio. Sed amor est liquefactivus, | |
| 2787 dicitur enim Cant. V, <i>anima mea liquefacta est, ut dilectus meus | |
| 2788 locutus est</i>. Ergo amor est resolutivus. Est ergo corruptivus et | |
| 2789 laesivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p4"> | |
| 2790 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius | |
| 2791 (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent." | |
| 2792 Moreover it is said of love ( | |
| 2793 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.6" target="asv">Cant 8:6</a>) that "its lamps are fire and flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion. | |
| 2794 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34737] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2795 fervor designat quendam excessum in caliditate, qui quidem excessus | |
| 2796 corruptivus est. Sed fervor causatur ex amore, Dionysius enim, VII | |
| 2797 cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates ad amorem Seraphim | |
| 2798 pertinentes, ponit calidum et acutum et superfervens. Et Cant. | |
| 2799 VIII, dicitur de amore quod <i>lampades eius sunt lampades ignis | |
| 2800 atque flammarum</i>. Ergo amor est passio laesiva et | |
| 2801 corruptiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p5"> | |
| 2802 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it. | |
| 2803 Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects. | |
| 2804 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34738] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2805 est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod singula seipsa | |
| 2806 amant contentive, idest conservative. Ergo amor non est passio | |
| 2807 laesiva, sed magis conservativa et perfectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q28_A5-p6"> | |
| 2808 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 2809 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2; | |
| 2810 <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[1]</a>), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which | |
| 2811 is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable | |
| 2812 to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but | |
| 2813 love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by | |
| 2814 the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to | |
| 2815 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They became abominable, as those things which they loved." | |
| 2816 </p><p id="FS_Q28_A5-p7"> And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect | |
| 2817 of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of | |
| 2818 this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through | |
| 2819 the change of some bodily organ. | |
| 2820 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 co."><a name="34739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34739] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2821 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor significat coaptationem | |
| 2822 quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod | |
| 2823 coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso | |
| 2824 laeditur, sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod | |
| 2825 vero coaptatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso | |
| 2826 laeditur et deterioratur. Amor ergo boni convenientis est | |
| 2827 perfectivus et meliorativus amantis, amor autem boni quod non est | |
| 2828 conveniens amanti, est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis. Unde | |
| 2829 maxime homo perficitur et melioratur per amorem Dei, laeditur autem | |
| 2830 et deterioratur per amorem peccati, secundum illud Osee IX, | |
| 2831 <i>facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt</i>. Et hoc | |
| 2832 quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, | |
| 2833 quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est | |
| 2834 materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, | |
| 2835 accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis, sicut | |
| 2836 accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per | |
| 2837 aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A5-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, | |
| 2838 languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely | |
| 2839 bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is | |
| 2840 loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above | |
| 2841 <a href="#FS_Q28_A2" id="FS_Q28_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. | |
| 2842 Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening | |
| 2843 of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present | |
| 2844 and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence, | |
| 2845 which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term "ailment" chiefly to sadness); and | |
| 2846 an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of love considered formally, | |
| 2847 according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate | |
| 2848 to the above, in respect of a change in the organ. | |
| 2849 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34740] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad ea vero | |
| 2850 quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum quod amori attribui | |
| 2851 possunt quatuor effectus proximi, scilicet liquefactio, fruitio, | |
| 2852 languor et fervor. Inter quae primum est liquefactio, quae | |
| 2853 opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quae sunt congelata, in seipsis | |
| 2854 constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintrationem alterius | |
| 2855 pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam | |
| 2856 receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra | |
| 2857 dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio | |
| 2858 repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem | |
| 2859 cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret. Si | |
| 2860 ergo amatum fuerit praesens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive | |
| 2861 fruitio. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duae passiones, | |
| 2862 scilicet tristitia de absentia, quae significatur per languorem | |
| 2863 (unde et Tullius, in III de Tusculanis quaest., maxime tristitiam | |
| 2864 aegritudinem nominat); et intensum desiderium de consecutione | |
| 2865 amati, quod significatur per fervorem. Et isti quidem sunt effectus | |
| 2866 amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae | |
| 2867 virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui | |
| 2868 effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q28_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q28_A6-p0.1">Q. 28. A. 6. Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p2"> | |
| 2869 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above ( | |
| 2870 <a href="#FS_Q26_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[2]</a>). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated | |
| 2871 in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love. | |
| 2872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34741] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 2873 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amans non agat omnia ex amore. Amor | |
| 2874 enim quaedam passio est, ut supra dictum est. Sed non omnia quae | |
| 2875 agit homo, agit ex passione, sed quaedam agit ex electione, et | |
| 2876 quaedam ex ignorantia, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo non omnia quae | |
| 2877 homo agit, agit ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p3"> | |
| 2878 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, | |
| 2879 whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous. | |
| 2880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34742] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2881 appetitus est principium motus et actionis in omnibus animalibus, | |
| 2882 ut patet in III de anima. Si igitur omnia quae quis agit, agit ex | |
| 2883 amore, aliae passiones appetitivae partis erunt superfluae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p4"> | |
| 2884 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore | |
| 2885 all things are not done from love. | |
| 2886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34743] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2887 nihil causatur simul a contrariis causis. Sed quaedam fiunt ex | |
| 2888 odio. Non ergo omnia sunt ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p5"> | |
| 2889 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good." | |
| 2890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34744] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2891 est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>propter | |
| 2892 amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p6"> | |
| 2893 <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end, as stated above ( | |
| 2894 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a> ). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does | |
| 2895 every action from love of some kind. | |
| 2896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 co."><a name="34745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34745] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2897 dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra | |
| 2898 dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. | |
| 2899 Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit | |
| 2900 quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p7"> | |
| 2901 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general | |
| 2902 sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks | |
| 2903 of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus. | |
| 2904 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34746] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2905 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de amore qui est passio | |
| 2906 in appetitu sensitivo existens. Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore | |
| 2907 communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem | |
| 2908 intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem, sic enim Dionysius | |
| 2909 loquitur de amore in IV cap. de Div. Nom.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p8"> | |
| 2910 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above | |
| 2911 <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q28_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[5];</a> Q[27], A[4]) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore | |
| 2912 every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate | |
| 2913 causes, are not superfluous. | |
| 2914 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34747] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2915 dicendum quod ex amore, sicut iam dictum est, causantur et | |
| 2916 desiderium et tristitia et delectatio, et per consequens omnes | |
| 2917 aliae passiones. Unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque | |
| 2918 passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non | |
| 2919 superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q28_A6-p9"> | |
| 2920 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on ( | |
| 2921 <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q28_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[2]</a>). | |
| 2922 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 28 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34748] Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2923 dicendum quod odium etiam ex amore causatur, sicut infra | |
| 2924 dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 2925 <div id="FS_Q29" class="div3"> | |
| 2926 <h3 id="FS_Q29-p0.1">Q. 29. OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2927 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 2928 <p id="FS_Q29-p2"> We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q29-p3"><a href="#FS_Q29_A1"> (1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p4"><a href="#FS_Q29_A2"> (2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p5"><a href="#FS_Q29_A3"> (3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p6"><a href="#FS_Q29_A4"> (4) Whether a man can hate himself?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p7"><a href="#FS_Q29_A5"> (5) Whether a man can hate the truth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q29-p8"><a href="#FS_Q29_A6"> (6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?</a></p> | |
| 2929 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 pr."><a name="34749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34749] | |
| 2930 Iª-IIae q. 29 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de odio. | |
| 2931 Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum causa et obiectum odii | |
| 2932 sit malum. Secundo, utrum odium causetur ex amore. Tertio, utrum | |
| 2933 odium sit fortius quam amor. Quarto, utrum aliquis possit habere | |
| 2934 odio seipsum. Quinto, utrum aliquis possit habere odio veritatem. | |
| 2935 Sexto, utrum aliquid possit haberi odio in universali.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 2936 <div id="FS_Q29_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A1-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 1. Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p2"> | |
| 2937 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore | |
| 2938 evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly | |
| 2939 untrue. | |
| 2940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34750] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2941 sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum et causa odii non sit malum. | |
| 2942 Omne enim quod est, inquantum huiusmodi bonum est. Si igitur | |
| 2943 obiectum odii sit malum, sequitur quod nulla res odio habeatur, sed | |
| 2944 solum defectus alicuius rei. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p3"> | |
| 2945 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence ( | |
| 2946 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.3.1" target="asv">2 Macc 3:1</a>) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred | |
| 2947 of their souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow | |
| 2948 that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false. | |
| 2949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34751] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2950 odire malum est laudabile, unde in laudem quorundam dicitur II | |
| 2951 Machab. III, quod <i>leges optime custodiebantur, propter Oniae | |
| 2952 pontificis pietatem, et animos odio habentes mala</i>. Si igitur | |
| 2953 nihil oditur nisi malum, sequitur quod omne odium sit laudabile. | |
| 2954 Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p4"> | |
| 2955 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different | |
| 2956 subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good. | |
| 2957 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34752] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2958 idem non est simul bonum et malum. Sed idem diversis est odibile et | |
| 2959 amabile. Ergo odium non solum est mali, sed etiam boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5"> | |
| 2960 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above ( | |
| 2961 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>; | |
| 2962 <a href="#FS_Q27_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p5.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[1]</a>). Therefore the object of hatred is evil. | |
| 2963 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34753] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 2964 odium contrariatur amori. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum, ut supra | |
| 2965 dictum est. Ergo obiectum odii est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p6"> | |
| 2966 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural | |
| 2967 appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which | |
| 2968 does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above ( | |
| 2969 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q29_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned | |
| 2970 and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which | |
| 2971 opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, | |
| 2972 love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite | |
| 2973 from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of | |
| 2974 good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil | |
| 2975 is the object of hatred. | |
| 2976 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 co."><a name="34754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34754] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2977 dicendum quod, cum appetitus naturalis derivetur ab aliqua | |
| 2978 apprehensione, licet non coniuncta; eadem ratio videtur esse de | |
| 2979 inclinatione appetitus naturalis, et appetitus animalis, qui | |
| 2980 sequitur apprehensionem coniunctam, sicut supra dictum est. In | |
| 2981 appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut | |
| 2982 unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod | |
| 2983 sibi convenit, quae est amor naturalis; ita ad id quod est ei | |
| 2984 repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem, quae est | |
| 2985 odium naturale. Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in | |
| 2986 intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod | |
| 2987 apprehenditur ut conveniens, odium vero est dissonantia quaedam | |
| 2988 appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum. Sicut | |
| 2989 autem omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni; | |
| 2990 ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali. Et | |
| 2991 ideo, sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum | |
| 2992 odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p7"> | |
| 2993 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, | |
| 2994 inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being | |
| 2995 is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else. | |
| 2996 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34755] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2997 ergo dicendum quod ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem | |
| 2998 repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente. | |
| 2999 Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem | |
| 3000 repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens | |
| 3001 est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per | |
| 3002 comparationem ad alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p8"> | |
| 3003 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it | |
| 3004 is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good. | |
| 3005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34756] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3006 dicendum quod, sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est | |
| 3007 vere bonum; ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere | |
| 3008 malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni | |
| 3009 esse bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A1-p9"> | |
| 3010 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same | |
| 3011 thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming | |
| 3012 to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another | |
| 3013 as bad. | |
| 3014 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34757] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3015 dicendum quod contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, | |
| 3016 secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est | |
| 3017 conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri, sicut | |
| 3018 calor convenit igni, et repugnat aquae. Secundum appetitum vero | |
| 3019 animalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem apprehenditur ab uno sub ratione | |
| 3020 boni, et ab alio sub ratione mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A2-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 2. Whether love is a cause of hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p2"> | |
| 3021 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic. | |
| 3022 x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally | |
| 3023 simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. | |
| 3024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34758] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3025 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa odii. <i>Ea enim | |
| 3026 quae ex opposito dividuntur, naturaliter sunt simul</i>, ut dicitur | |
| 3027 in praedicamentis. Sed amor et odium, cum sint contraria, ex | |
| 3028 opposito dividuntur. Ergo naturaliter sunt simul. Non ergo amor est | |
| 3029 causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p3"> | |
| 3030 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not | |
| 3031 the cause of hatred. | |
| 3032 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34759] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3033 unum contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed amor et odium sunt | |
| 3034 contraria. Ergo amor non est causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p4"> | |
| 3035 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies | |
| 3036 a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. | |
| 3037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34760] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3038 posterius non est causa prioris. Sed odium est prius amore, ut | |
| 3039 videtur, nam odium importat recessum a malo, amor vero accessum ad | |
| 3040 bonum. Ergo amor non est causa odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p5"> | |
| 3041 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion | |
| 3042 of the soul, is caused by love. | |
| 3043 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34761] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3044 est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes affectiones | |
| 3045 causantur ex amore. Ergo et odium, cum sit quaedam affectio animae, | |
| 3046 causatur ex amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p6"> | |
| 3047 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 3048 <a href="#FS_Q29_A1" id="FS_Q29_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement | |
| 3049 or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees | |
| 3050 with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and | |
| 3051 nothing is hated, save through being | |
| 3052 contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love. | |
| 3053 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 co."><a name="34762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34762] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3054 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, amor consistit in quadam | |
| 3055 convenientia amantis ad amatum, odium vero consistit in quadam | |
| 3056 repugnantia vel dissonantia. Oportet autem in quolibet prius | |
| 3057 considerare quid ei conveniat, quam quid ei repugnet, per hoc enim | |
| 3058 aliquid est repugnans alteri, quia est corruptivum vel impeditivum | |
| 3059 eius quod est conveniens. Unde necesse est quod amor sit prior | |
| 3060 odio; et quod nihil odio habeatur, nisi per hoc quod contrariatur | |
| 3061 convenienti quod amatur. Et secundum hoc, omne odium ex amore | |
| 3062 causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p7"> | |
| 3063 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, | |
| 3064 or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; | |
| 3065 e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance | |
| 3066 and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and | |
| 3067 being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated | |
| 3068 of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not | |
| 3069 really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred. | |
| 3070 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34763] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3071 ergo dicendum quod in his quae ex opposito dividuntur, quaedam | |
| 3072 inveniuntur quae sunt naturaliter simul et secundum rem, et | |
| 3073 secundum rationem, sicut duae species animalis, vel duae species | |
| 3074 coloris. Quaedam vero sunt simul secundum rationem, sed unum | |
| 3075 realiter est prius altero et causa eius, sicut patet in speciebus | |
| 3076 numerorum, figurarum et motuum. Quaedam vero non sunt simul nec | |
| 3077 secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sicut substantia et accidens, | |
| 3078 nam substantia realiter est causa accidentis; et ens secundum | |
| 3079 rationem prius attribuitur substantiae quam accidenti, quia | |
| 3080 accidenti non attribuitur nisi inquantum est in substantia. Amor | |
| 3081 autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed | |
| 3082 non realiter. Unde nihil prohibet amorem esse causam odii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p8"> | |
| 3083 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are | |
| 3084 not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that | |
| 3085 one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary. | |
| 3086 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34764] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3087 dicendum quod amor et odium sunt contraria, quando accipiuntur | |
| 3088 circa idem. Sed quando sunt de contrariis, non sunt contraria, sed | |
| 3089 se invicem consequentia, eiusdem enim rationis est quod ametur | |
| 3090 aliquid, et odiatur eius contrarium. Et sic amor unius rei est | |
| 3091 causa quod eius contrarium odiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A2-p9"> | |
| 3092 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the | |
| 3093 case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive | |
| 3094 movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each | |
| 3095 is an appetitive movement. | |
| 3096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34765] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3097 dicendum quod in executione prius est recedere ab uno termino, quam | |
| 3098 accedere ad alterum terminum. Sed in intentione est e converso, | |
| 3099 propter hoc enim receditur ab uno termino, ut accedatur ad alterum. | |
| 3100 Motus autem appetitivus magis pertinet ad intentionem quam ad | |
| 3101 executionem. Et ideo amor est prior odio, cum utrumque sit motus | |
| 3102 appetitivus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A3-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 3. Whether hatred is stronger than love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p2"> | |
| 3103 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee | |
| 3104 from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. | |
| 3105 Therefore hatred is stronger than love. | |
| 3106 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34766] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3107 sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium sit fortius amore. Dicit enim | |
| 3108 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nemo est qui non | |
| 3109 magis dolorem fugiat, quam appetat voluptatem</i>. Sed fugere | |
| 3110 dolorem pertinet ad odium, appetitus autem voluptatis pertinet ad | |
| 3111 amorem. Ergo odium est fortius amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p3"> | |
| 3112 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into | |
| 3113 hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. | |
| 3114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34767] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3115 debilius vincitur a fortiori. Sed amor vincitur ab odio, quando | |
| 3116 scilicet amor convertitur in odium. Ergo odium est fortius | |
| 3117 amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p4"> | |
| 3118 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on | |
| 3119 seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances | |
| 3120 (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love. | |
| 3121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34768] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3122 affectio animae per effectum manifestatur. Sed fortius insistit | |
| 3123 homo ad repellendum odiosum, quam ad prosequendum amatum, sicut | |
| 3124 etiam bestiae abstinent a delectabilibus propter verbera, ut | |
| 3125 Augustinus introducit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo odium | |
| 3126 est fortius amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p5"> | |
| 3127 <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred | |
| 3128 and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred. | |
| 3129 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34769] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 3130 bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute | |
| 3131 boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom. Sed odium et amor | |
| 3132 differunt secundum differentiam boni et mali. Ergo amor est fortior | |
| 3133 odio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p6"> | |
| 3134 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above | |
| 3135 stated | |
| 3136 <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q29_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely. | |
| 3137 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 co."><a name="34770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34770] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3138 dicendum quod impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorem. | |
| 3139 Omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa, ut supra | |
| 3140 dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod odium sit fortius amore | |
| 3141 simpliciter. Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, | |
| 3142 sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea | |
| 3143 quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad | |
| 3144 consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, | |
| 3145 fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum. Sed tamen | |
| 3146 aliquando videtur odium fortius amore, propter duo. Primo quidem, | |
| 3147 quia odium est magis sensibile quam amor. Cum enim sensus perceptio | |
| 3148 sit in quadam immutatione, ex quo aliquid iam immutatum est, non | |
| 3149 ita sentitur sicut quando est in ipso immutari. Unde calor febris | |
| 3150 hecticae, quamvis sit maior, non tamen ita sentitur sicut calor | |
| 3151 tertianae, quia calor hecticae iam versus est quasi in habitum et | |
| 3152 naturam. Propter hoc etiam, amor magis sentitur in absentia amati, | |
| 3153 sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., quod <i>amor non ita | |
| 3154 sentitur, cum non prodit eum indigentia</i>. Et propter hoc etiam, | |
| 3155 repugnantia eius quod oditur, sensibilius percipitur quam | |
| 3156 convenientia eius quod amatur. Secundo, quia non comparatur odium | |
| 3157 ad amorem sibi correspondentem. Secundum enim diversitatem bonorum, | |
| 3158 est diversitas amorum in magnitudine et parvitate, quibus | |
| 3159 proportionantur opposita odia. Unde odium quod correspondet maiori | |
| 3160 amori, magis movet quam minor amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p7"> But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more | |
| 3161 strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely | |
| 3162 speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil. | |
| 3163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34771] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 3164 patet responsio ad primum. Nam amor voluptatis est minor quam amor | |
| 3165 conservationis sui ipsius, cui respondet fuga doloris. Et ideo | |
| 3166 magis fugitur dolor, quam ametur voluptas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p8"> Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt | |
| 3167 than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received | |
| 3168 it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless | |
| 3169 not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a | |
| 3170 second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. | |
| 3171 x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which | |
| 3172 is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a | |
| 3173 hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different | |
| 3174 degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves | |
| 3175 us more than a lesser love. | |
| 3176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34772] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3177 dicendum quod odium nunquam vinceret amorem, nisi propter maiorem | |
| 3178 amorem cui odium correspondet. Sicut homo magis diligit se quam | |
| 3179 amicum, et propter hoc quod diligit se, habet odio etiam amicum, si | |
| 3180 sibi contrarietur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A3-p9"> Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, | |
| 3181 to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure. | |
| 3182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34773] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3183 dicendum quod ideo intensius aliquid operatur ad repellendum | |
| 3184 odiosa, quia odium est magis sensibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A4-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 4. Whether a man can hate himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p2"> | |
| 3185 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written ( | |
| 3186 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv">Ps. 10:6</a>): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves. | |
| 3187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34774] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 3188 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit seipsum odio habere. | |
| 3189 Dicitur enim in Psalmo X, <i>qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam | |
| 3190 suam</i>. Sed multi diligunt iniquitatem. Ergo multi odiunt | |
| 3191 seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p3"> | |
| 3192 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who | |
| 3193 kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves. | |
| 3194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34775] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3195 illum odimus, cui volumus et operamur malum. Sed quandoque aliquis | |
| 3196 vult et operatur sibi ipsi malum, puta qui interimunt seipsos. Ergo | |
| 3197 aliqui seipsos habent odio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p4"> | |
| 3198 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. | |
| 3199 But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves. | |
| 3200 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34776] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3201 Boetius dicit, in II de Consol., quod <i>avaritia facit homines | |
| 3202 odiosos</i>, ex quo potest accipi quod omnis homo odit avarum. Sed | |
| 3203 aliqui sunt avari. Ergo illi odiunt seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p5"> | |
| 3204 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 3205 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.29" target="asv">Eph. 5:29</a>) that "no man ever hated his own flesh." | |
| 3206 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34777] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3207 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod <i>nemo unquam carnem | |
| 3208 suam odio habuit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q29_A4-p6"> | |
| 3209 <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire | |
| 3210 anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. | |
| 3211 Nom. iv). Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above ( | |
| 3212 <a href="#FS_Q26_A4" id="FS_Q29_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[4]</a>). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself, | |
| 3213 properly speaking. | |
| 3214 </p><p id="FS_Q29_A4-p7"> But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills | |
| 3215 to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this | |
| 3216 way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. | |
| 3217 For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if | |
| 3218 the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account | |
| 3219 themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves | |
| 3220 according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to | |
| 3221 reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself. | |
| 3222 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 co."><a name="34778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34778] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3223 dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat | |
| 3224 seipsum. Naturaliter enim unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest | |
| 3225 aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni, nam malum est | |
| 3226 praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Amare | |
| 3227 autem aliquem est velle ei bonum, ut supra dictum est. Unde necesse | |
| 3228 est quod aliquis amet seipsum; et impossibile est quod aliquis | |
| 3229 odiat seipsum, per se loquendo. Per accidens tamen contingit quod | |
| 3230 aliquis seipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte | |
| 3231 boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod | |
| 3232 appetitur ut secundum quid bonum, esse simpliciter malum, et | |
| 3233 secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire. | |
| 3234 Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius, cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim | |
| 3235 maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso, unde civitas dicitur | |
| 3236 facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est | |
| 3237 ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui | |
| 3238 aestimant se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam | |
| 3239 corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant | |
| 3240 se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria | |
| 3241 rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligit iniquitatem, odit non | |
| 3242 solum animam suam, sed etiam seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34779] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 3243 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p9"> | |
| 3244 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, | |
| 3245 apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain. | |
| 3246 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34780] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3247 dicendum quod nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum | |
| 3248 apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt | |
| 3249 seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, | |
| 3250 inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A4-p10"> | |
| 3251 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his | |
| 3252 sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. | |
| 3253 In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should. | |
| 3254 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34781] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3255 dicendum quod avarus odit aliquod accidens suum, non tamen propter | |
| 3256 hoc odit seipsum, sicut aeger odit suam aegritudinem, ex hoc ipso | |
| 3257 quod se amat. Vel dicendum quod avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non | |
| 3258 autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, | |
| 3259 secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam | |
| 3260 debeat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A5-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 5. Whether a man can hate the truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p2"> | |
| 3261 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither, | |
| 3262 therefore, can he hate the truth. | |
| 3263 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34782] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 3264 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis non possit habere odio | |
| 3265 veritatem. Bonum enim et ens et verum convertuntur. Sed aliquis non | |
| 3266 potest habere odio bonitatem. Ergo nec veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p3"> | |
| 3267 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge | |
| 3268 is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. | |
| 3269 Therefore no man can hate the truth. | |
| 3270 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34783] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3271 omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant, ut dicitur in principio | |
| 3272 Metaphys. Sed scientia non est nisi verorum. Ergo veritas | |
| 3273 naturaliter desideratur et amatur. Sed quod naturaliter inest, | |
| 3274 semper inest. Nullus ergo potest habere odio veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p4"> | |
| 3275 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive | |
| 3276 for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it. | |
| 3277 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34784] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3278 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>homines amant non | |
| 3279 fictos</i>. Sed non nisi propter veritatem. Ergo homo naturaliter | |
| 3280 amat veritatem. Non potest ergo eam odio habere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p5"> | |
| 3281 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 3282 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.16" target="asv">Gal. 4:16</a>): "Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though | |
| 3283 it were an assertion: "I am become," etc.] | |
| 3284 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34785] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3285 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Galat. IV, <i>factus sum vobis | |
| 3286 inimicus, verum dicens vobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p6"> | |
| 3287 <b>I answer that,</b> Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of | |
| 3288 something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as | |
| 3289 such, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being and truth in general cannot be the object | |
| 3290 of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love; | |
| 3291 while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an | |
| 3292 object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible | |
| 3293 with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good. | |
| 3294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 co."><a name="34786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34786] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3295 dicendum quod bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed | |
| 3296 differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem | |
| 3297 ens vel verum, quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo bonum, | |
| 3298 sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universali nec in | |
| 3299 particulari. Ens autem et verum in universali quidem odio haberi | |
| 3300 non possunt, quia dissonantia est causa odii, et convenientia causa | |
| 3301 amoris; ens autem et verum sunt communia omnibus. Sed in | |
| 3302 particulari nihil prohibet quoddam ens et quoddam verum odio | |
| 3303 haberi, inquantum habet rationem contrarii et repugnantis, | |
| 3304 contrarietas enim et repugnantia non adversatur rationi entis et | |
| 3305 veri, sicut adversatur rationi boni. Contingit autem verum aliquod | |
| 3306 particulare tripliciter repugnare vel contrariari bono amato. Uno | |
| 3307 modo, secundum quod veritas est causaliter et originaliter in ipsis | |
| 3308 rebus. Et sic homo quandoque odit aliquam veritatem, dum vellet non | |
| 3309 esse verum quod est verum. Alio modo, secundum quod veritas est in | |
| 3310 cognitione ipsius hominis, quae impedit ipsum a prosecutione amati. | |
| 3311 Sicut si aliqui vellent non cognoscere veritatem fidei, ut libere | |
| 3312 peccarent, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXI, <i>scientiam viarum | |
| 3313 tuarum nolumus</i>. Tertio modo habetur odio veritas particularis, | |
| 3314 tanquam repugnans, prout est in intellectu alterius. Puta, cum | |
| 3315 aliquis vult latere in peccato, odit quod aliquis veritatem circa | |
| 3316 peccatum suum cognoscat. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, in X | |
| 3317 Confess., quod <i>homines amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam | |
| 3318 redarguentem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p7"> Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according | |
| 3319 as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he wishes that what | |
| 3320 is true were not true. Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object loved: | |
| 3321 such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it is | |
| 3322 said ( | |
| 3323 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.21.14" target="asv">Job 21:14</a>): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is | |
| 3324 in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should | |
| 3325 know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they | |
| 3326 hate it when it reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. | |
| 3327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34787] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 3328 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p8"> | |
| 3329 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, | |
| 3330 the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire. | |
| 3331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34788] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3332 dicendum quod cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile, propter | |
| 3333 quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens | |
| 3334 cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab | |
| 3335 aliquo desiderato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A5-p9"> | |
| 3336 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered | |
| 3337 in itself, is a desirable thing. | |
| 3338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34789] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3339 dicendum quod ex hoc procedit quod non ficti amantur, quod homo | |
| 3340 amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non ficti | |
| 3341 manifestant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q29_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q29_A6-p0.1">Q. 29. A. 6. Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p2"> | |
| 3342 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, | |
| 3343 which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be | |
| 3344 an object of universal hatred. | |
| 3345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34790] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 3346 sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium non possit esse alicuius in | |
| 3347 universali. Odium enim est passio appetitus sensitivi, qui movetur | |
| 3348 ex sensibili apprehensione. Sed sensus non potest apprehendere | |
| 3349 universale. Ergo odium non potest esse alicuius in universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p3"> | |
| 3350 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of | |
| 3351 universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred. | |
| 3352 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34791] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3353 odium causatur ex aliqua dissonantia; quae communitati repugnat. | |
| 3354 Sed communitas est de ratione universalis. Ergo odium non potest | |
| 3355 esse alicuius in universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p4"> | |
| 3356 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the | |
| 3357 universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a | |
| 3358 universal object. | |
| 3359 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34792] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3360 obiectum odii est malum. Malum autem est in rebus, et non in mente, | |
| 3361 ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Cum ergo universale sit solum in mente, | |
| 3362 quae abstrahit universale a particulari, videtur quod odium non | |
| 3363 possit esse alicuius universalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p5"> | |
| 3364 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing | |
| 3365 in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter." | |
| 3366 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34793] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3367 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira semper fit | |
| 3368 inter singularia odium autem etiam ad genera, furem enim odit et | |
| 3369 calumniatorem unusquisque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p6"> | |
| 3370 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered | |
| 3371 in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as | |
| 3372 man. If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can | |
| 3373 attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual | |
| 3374 matter, on which every sensitive power is based. | |
| 3375 </p><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that | |
| 3376 the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact | |
| 3377 that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is | |
| 3378 color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by | |
| 3379 reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal---for instance, a wolf in regard to | |
| 3380 a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because | |
| 3381 it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher | |
| 3382 says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in | |
| 3383 general." | |
| 3384 </p><p id="FS_Q29_A6-p8"> But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it | |
| 3385 can regard the universal in both ways. | |
| 3386 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 co."><a name="34794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34794] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3387 dicendum quod de universali dupliciter contingit loqui, uno modo, | |
| 3388 secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, | |
| 3389 de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur, alia est enim | |
| 3390 consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo. | |
| 3391 Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia | |
| 3392 sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri | |
| 3393 potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a | |
| 3394 materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva. | |
| 3395 Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et | |
| 3396 appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod | |
| 3397 obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat | |
| 3398 colorem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, | |
| 3399 non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est | |
| 3400 color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam sensitivae partis, potest | |
| 3401 respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid | |
| 3402 adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut | |
| 3403 lupus ovi. Unde ovis odit lupum generaliter. Sed ira semper | |
| 3404 causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; | |
| 3405 actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit | |
| 3406 quod <i>ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse | |
| 3407 ad aliquid in genere</i>. Sed odium secundum quod est in parte | |
| 3408 intellectiva, cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem | |
| 3409 intellectus, potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p9"> | |
| 3410 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is | |
| 3411 given by abstraction. | |
| 3412 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34795] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3413 ergo dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est | |
| 3414 universale, apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit | |
| 3415 universalitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p10"> | |
| 3416 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance | |
| 3417 with others, so as to be hateful to them. | |
| 3418 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34796] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3419 dicendum quod id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio | |
| 3420 odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen | |
| 3421 dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q29_A6-p11"> | |
| 3422 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension | |
| 3423 or appetite. | |
| 3424 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 29 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34797] Iª-IIae q. 29 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3425 dicendum quod illa obiectio procedit de universali secundum quod | |
| 3426 substat intentioni universalitatis, sic enim non cadit sub | |
| 3427 apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 3428 <div id="FS_Q30" class="div3"> | |
| 3429 <h3 id="FS_Q30-p0.1">Q. 30. OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 3430 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 3431 <p id="FS_Q30-p2"> We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q30-p3"><a href="#FS_Q30_A1"> (1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p4"><a href="#FS_Q30_A2"> (2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p5"><a href="#FS_Q30_A3"> (3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?</a></p><p id="FS_Q30-p6"><a href="#FS_Q30_A4"> (4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?</a></p> | |
| 3432 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 pr."><a name="34798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34798] | |
| 3433 Iª-IIae q. 30 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 3434 concupiscentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum | |
| 3435 concupiscentia sit in appetitu sensitivo tantum. Secundo, utrum | |
| 3436 concupiscentia sit passio specialis. Tertio, utrum sint aliquae | |
| 3437 concupiscentiae naturales, et aliquae non naturales. Quarto, utrum | |
| 3438 concupiscentia sit infinita.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 3439 <div id="FS_Q30_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A1-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 1. Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p2"> | |
| 3440 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according | |
| 3441 to | |
| 3442 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv"> Wis. 6:21</a>: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have | |
| 3443 no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. | |
| 3444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34799] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3445 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non solum sit in | |
| 3446 appetitu sensitivo. Est enim quaedam concupiscentia sapientiae, ut | |
| 3447 dicitur Sap. VI, <i>concupiscentia sapientiae deducit ad regnum | |
| 3448 perpetuum</i>. Sed appetitus sensitivus non potest ferri in | |
| 3449 sapientiam. Ergo concupiscentia non est in solo appetitu | |
| 3450 sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3"> | |
| 3451 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says ( | |
| 3452 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." But desire for God's commandments is an act | |
| 3453 of concupiscence, according to | |
| 3454 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.20" target="asv"> Ps. 118:20</a>: "My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive | |
| 3455 appetite. | |
| 3456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34800] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3457 desiderium mandatorum Dei non est in appetitu sensitivo, immo | |
| 3458 apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>non habitat in me, hoc est in carne | |
| 3459 mea, bonum</i>. Sed desiderium mandatorum Dei sub concupiscentia | |
| 3460 cadit, secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, <i>concupivit anima mea | |
| 3461 desiderare iustificationes tuas</i>. Ergo concupiscentia non est | |
| 3462 solum in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p4"> | |
| 3463 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, | |
| 3464 and not only in the sensitive appetite. | |
| 3465 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34801] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3466 cuilibet potentiae est concupiscibile proprium bonum. Ergo | |
| 3467 concupiscentia est in qualibet potentiae animae, et non solum in | |
| 3468 appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p5"> | |
| 3469 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into | |
| 3470 the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence | |
| 3471 is in the sensitive appetite. | |
| 3472 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34802] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3473 est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>irrationale obediens et | |
| 3474 persuasibile rationi, dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram. Haec | |
| 3475 autem est irrationalis pars animae, passiva et appetitiva</i>. Ergo | |
| 3476 concupiscentia est in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p6"> | |
| 3477 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, | |
| 3478 as we shall state later on ( | |
| 3479 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q30_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], AA[3]</a>,4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former | |
| 3480 pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated | |
| 3481 in a bodily organ: | |
| 3482 wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, | |
| 3483 since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking, | |
| 3484 concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it. | |
| 3485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 co."><a name="34803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34803] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3486 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., | |
| 3487 <i>concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis</i>. Est autem duplex | |
| 3488 delectatio, ut infra dicetur, una quae est in bono intelligibili, | |
| 3489 quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum. | |
| 3490 Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem | |
| 3491 est animae et corporis, quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo; | |
| 3492 unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis | |
| 3493 autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae | |
| 3494 simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen | |
| 3495 concupiscentiae sonat. Unde concupiscentia, proprie loquendo, est | |
| 3496 in appetitu sensitivo; et in vi concupiscibili, quae ab ea | |
| 3497 denominatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p7"> | |
| 3498 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; | |
| 3499 or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so | |
| 3500 that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being | |
| 3501 that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according | |
| 3502 to | |
| 3503 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv"> Ps. 83:3</a>: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." | |
| 3504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34804] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3505 ergo dicendum quod appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium | |
| 3506 bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter | |
| 3507 similitudinem quandam, vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris | |
| 3508 partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul | |
| 3509 etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum | |
| 3510 consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus | |
| 3511 spiritualibus deserviat; sicut in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, <i>cor | |
| 3512 meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p8"> | |
| 3513 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship | |
| 3514 in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired. | |
| 3515 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34805] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3516 dicendum quod desiderium magis pertinere potest, proprie loquendo, | |
| 3517 non solum ad inferiorem appetitum, sed etiam ad superiorem. Non | |
| 3518 enim importat aliquam consociationem in cupiendo, sicut | |
| 3519 concupiscentia; sed simplicem motum in rem desideratam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A1-p9"> | |
| 3520 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension. | |
| 3521 But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And | |
| 3522 to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs | |
| 3523 to the concupiscible power. | |
| 3524 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34806] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3525 dicendum quod unicuique potentiae animae competit appetere proprium | |
| 3526 bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem. Sed | |
| 3527 appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem, | |
| 3528 pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam. Appetere autem aliquid sub | |
| 3529 ratione boni delectabilis secundum sensum, quod proprie est | |
| 3530 concupiscere, pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A2-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 2. Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p2"> | |
| 3531 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by | |
| 3532 their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object | |
| 3533 of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible | |
| 3534 faculty. | |
| 3535 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34807] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3536 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit passio | |
| 3537 specialis potentiae concupiscibilis. Passiones enim distinguuntur | |
| 3538 secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum concupiscibilis est delectabile | |
| 3539 secundum sensum; quod etiam est obiectum concupiscentiae, secundum | |
| 3540 philosophum, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio | |
| 3541 specialis in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p3"> | |
| 3542 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct | |
| 3543 from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the | |
| 3544 concupiscible faculty. | |
| 3545 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34808] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3546 Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod | |
| 3547 <i>cupiditas est amor rerum transeuntium</i>, et sic ab amore non | |
| 3548 distinguitur. Omnes autem passiones speciales ab invicem | |
| 3549 distinguuntur. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio specialis in | |
| 3550 concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p4"> | |
| 3551 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above | |
| 3552 ( | |
| 3553 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q30_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, | |
| 3554 12) that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend | |
| 3555 makes us fear, the evil that is present makes us sad": | |
| 3556 from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupiscible, | |
| 3557 but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty. | |
| 3558 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34809] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3559 cuilibet passioni concupiscibilis opponitur aliqua passio specialis | |
| 3560 in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Sed concupiscentiae non | |
| 3561 opponitur aliqua passio specialis in concupiscibili. Dicit enim | |
| 3562 Damascenus quod <i>expectatum bonum concupiscentiam constituit, | |
| 3563 praesens vero laetitiam, similiter expectatum malum timorem, | |
| 3564 praesens vero tristitiam</i>, ex quo videtur quod, sicut tristitia | |
| 3565 contrariatur laetitiae, ita timor contrariatur concupiscentiae. | |
| 3566 Timor autem non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili. Non ergo | |
| 3567 concupiscentia est specialis passio in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p5"> | |
| 3568 <b>On the contrary,</b> Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty. Hence it | |
| 3569 is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a specific passion. | |
| 3570 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34810] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3571 est quod concupiscentia causatur ab amore, et tendit in | |
| 3572 delectationem, quae sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Et sic | |
| 3573 distinguitur ab aliis passionibus concupiscibilis, tanquam passio | |
| 3574 specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A2-p6"> | |
| 3575 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 3576 <a href="#FS_Q30_A1" id="FS_Q30_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[23], A[1]), the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various | |
| 3577 concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object can arise | |
| 3578 from the very nature of the object, or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the nature of the | |
| 3579 active object, causes a material | |
| 3580 difference of passions: while the difference in regard to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect | |
| 3581 of which the passions differ specifically. | |
| 3582 </p><p id="FS_Q30_A2-p7"> Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs according as it is really present, or absent: because, | |
| 3583 according as it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes the faculty | |
| 3584 to be moved towards it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms | |
| 3585 the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to | |
| 3586 itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence | |
| 3587 is a passion differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ | |
| 3588 "in number." | |
| 3589 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 co."><a name="34811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34811] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3590 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum delectabile secundum sensum | |
| 3591 est communiter obiectum concupiscibilis. Unde secundum eius | |
| 3592 differentias, diversae passiones concupiscibilis distinguuntur. | |
| 3593 Diversitas autem obiecti potest attendi vel secundum naturam ipsius | |
| 3594 obiecti, vel secundum diversitatem in virtute agendi. Diversitas | |
| 3595 quidem obiecti activi quae est secundum rei naturam, facit | |
| 3596 materialem differentiam passionum. Sed diversitas quae est secundum | |
| 3597 virtutem activam, facit formalem differentiam passionum, secundum | |
| 3598 quam passiones specie differunt. Est autem alia ratio virtutis | |
| 3599 motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, | |
| 3600 et secundum quod est absens, nam secundum quod est praesens, facit | |
| 3601 in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad | |
| 3602 seipsum moveri. Unde ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum | |
| 3603 appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem; | |
| 3604 inquantum vero absens attrahit ad seipsum, causat concupiscentiam; | |
| 3605 inquantum vero praesens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem. | |
| 3606 Sic ergo concupiscentia est passio differens specie et ab amore et | |
| 3607 a delectatione. Sed concupiscere hoc delectabile vel illud, facit | |
| 3608 concupiscentias diversas numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p8"> | |
| 3609 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered | |
| 3610 as past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers | |
| 3611 of the sensitive part, which regards particular things. | |
| 3612 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34812] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3613 ergo dicendum quod bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum | |
| 3614 concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis, sicut et sensibile sub | |
| 3615 ratione praeteriti, est obiectum memoriae. Huiusmodi enim | |
| 3616 particulares conditiones diversificant speciem passionum, vel etiam | |
| 3617 potentiarum sensitivae partis, quae respicit particularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p9"> | |
| 3618 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect | |
| 3619 of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect | |
| 3620 of good to come: so that it includes both love and hope. | |
| 3621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34813] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3622 dicendum quod illa praedicatio est per causam, non per essentiam, | |
| 3623 non enim cupiditas est per se amor, sed amoris effectus, vel aliter | |
| 3624 dicendum, quod Augustinus accipit cupiditatem large pro quolibet | |
| 3625 motu appetitus qui potest esse respectu boni futuri. Unde | |
| 3626 comprehendit sub se et amorem et spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A2-p10"> | |
| 3627 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in | |
| 3628 regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes | |
| 3629 called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the | |
| 3630 appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and | |
| 3631 evil as arduous. | |
| 3632 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34814] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3633 dicendum quod passio quae directe opponitur concupiscentiae, | |
| 3634 innominata est, quae ita se habet ad malum, sicut concupiscentia ad | |
| 3635 bonum. Sed quia est mali absentis sicut et timor, quandoque loco | |
| 3636 eius ponitur timor, sicut et quandoque cupiditas loco spei. Quod | |
| 3637 enim est parvum bonum vel malum, quasi non reputatur, et ideo pro | |
| 3638 omni motu appetitus in bonum vel in malum futurum, ponitur spes et | |
| 3639 timor, quae respiciunt bonum vel malum arduum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A3-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 3. Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p2"> | |
| 3640 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence | |
| 3641 belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. | |
| 3642 Therefore no concupiscence is natural. | |
| 3643 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34815] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3644 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentiarum non sint quaedam | |
| 3645 naturales, et quaedam non naturales. Concupiscentia enim pertinet | |
| 3646 ad appetitum animalem, ut dictum est. Sed appetitus naturalis | |
| 3647 dividitur contra animalem. Ergo nulla concupiscentia est | |
| 3648 naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p3"> | |
| 3649 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material differences makes no difference of species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside | |
| 3650 the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; | |
| 3651 which amounts to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore concupiscences should not be divided into those | |
| 3652 that are natural and those that are not. | |
| 3653 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34816] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3654 diversitas materialis non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed | |
| 3655 solum secundum numerum, quae quidem diversitas sub arte non cadit. | |
| 3656 Sed si quae sint concupiscentiae naturales et non naturales, non | |
| 3657 differunt nisi secundum diversa concupiscibilia, quod facit | |
| 3658 materialem differentiam, et secundum numerum tantum. Non ergo | |
| 3659 dividendae sunt concupiscentiae per naturales et non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p4"> | |
| 3660 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is | |
| 3661 not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the | |
| 3662 sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not | |
| 3663 natural. | |
| 3664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34817] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3665 ratio contra naturam dividitur, ut patet in II Physic. Si igitur in | |
| 3666 homine est aliqua concupiscentia non naturalis, oportet quod sit | |
| 3667 rationalis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia concupiscentia cum sit | |
| 3668 passio quaedam, pertinet ad appetitum sensitivum, non autem ad | |
| 3669 voluntatem, quae est appetitus rationis. Non ergo sunt | |
| 3670 concupiscentiae aliquae non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p5"> | |
| 3671 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural. | |
| 3672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34818] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3673 est quod philosophus, in III Ethic. et in I Rhetoric., ponit | |
| 3674 quasdam concupiscentias naturales, et quasdam non naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A3-p6"> | |
| 3675 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 3676 <a href="#FS_Q30_A1" id="FS_Q30_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable | |
| 3677 to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said | |
| 3678 to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends | |
| 3679 something as good and suitable, and | |
| 3680 consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont | |
| 3681 to be called "cupidity." | |
| 3682 </p><p id="FS_Q30_A3-p7"> Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to | |
| 3683 both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher | |
| 3684 (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it | |
| 3685 is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says | |
| 3686 (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because different men reason | |
| 3687 differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition to those that | |
| 3688 are natural. | |
| 3689 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 co."><a name="34819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34819] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3690 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, concupiscentia est appetitus boni | |
| 3691 delectabilis. Dupliciter autem aliquid est delectabile. Uno modo, | |
| 3692 quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cibus, potus, et alia | |
| 3693 huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi concupiscentia delectabilis dicitur | |
| 3694 naturalis. Alio modo aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens | |
| 3695 animali secundum apprehensionem, sicut cum aliquis apprehendit | |
| 3696 aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in | |
| 3697 ipso. Et huiusmodi delectabilis concupiscentia dicitur non | |
| 3698 naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas. Primae ergo | |
| 3699 concupiscentiae, naturales, communes sunt et hominibus et aliis | |
| 3700 animalibus, quia utrisque est aliquid conveniens et delectabile | |
| 3701 secundum naturam. Et in his etiam omnes homines conveniunt, unde et | |
| 3702 philosophus, in III Ethic., vocat eas communes et necessarias. Sed | |
| 3703 secundae concupiscentiae sunt propriae hominum, quorum proprium est | |
| 3704 excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, praeter id quod natura | |
| 3705 requirit. Unde et in I Rhetoric., philosophus dicit primas | |
| 3706 concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione. Et | |
| 3707 quia diversi diversimode ratiocinantur, ideo etiam secundae | |
| 3708 dicuntur, in III Ethic., propriae et appositae, scilicet supra | |
| 3709 naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p8"> | |
| 3710 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended. | |
| 3711 And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite. | |
| 3712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34820] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3713 ergo dicendum quod illud idem quod appetitur appetitu naturali, | |
| 3714 potest appeti appetitu animali cum fuerit apprehensum. Et secundum | |
| 3715 hoc cibi et potus et huiusmodi, quae appetuntur naturaliter, potest | |
| 3716 esse concupiscentia naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p9"> | |
| 3717 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; | |
| 3718 it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite | |
| 3719 is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing | |
| 3720 is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural | |
| 3721 concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence | |
| 3722 arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, | |
| 3723 11). | |
| 3724 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34821] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3725 dicendum quod diversitas concupiscentiarum naturalium a non | |
| 3726 naturalibus, non est materialis tantum; sed etiam quodammodo | |
| 3727 formalis, inquantum procedit ex diversitate obiecti activi. | |
| 3728 Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum apprehensum. Unde ad | |
| 3729 diversitatem activi pertinet diversitas apprehensionis, prout | |
| 3730 scilicet apprehenditur aliquid ut conveniens absoluta | |
| 3731 apprehensione, ex qua causantur concupiscentiae naturales, quas | |
| 3732 philosophus in Rhetoric. vocat irrationales; et prout apprehenditur | |
| 3733 aliquid cum deliberatione, ex quo causantur concupiscentiae non | |
| 3734 naturales, quae propter hoc in Rhetoric. dicuntur cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10"> | |
| 3735 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive | |
| 3736 faculty, as stated in the | |
| 3737 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>; | |
| 3738 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A3" id="FS_Q30_A3-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[3]</a>: so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved | |
| 3739 by the universal reason also, through the medium of the particular imagination. | |
| 3740 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34822] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3741 dicendum quod in homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae | |
| 3742 pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, | |
| 3743 quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo libro dictum est. | |
| 3744 Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quae est cum ratione, potest | |
| 3745 ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et praeterea appetitus | |
| 3746 sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universali moveri, mediante | |
| 3747 imaginatione particulari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q30_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q30_A4-p0.1">Q. 30. A. 4. Whether concupiscence is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p2"> | |
| 3748 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. | |
| 3749 But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. | |
| 3750 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34823] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 3751 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit infinita. | |
| 3752 Obiectum enim concupiscentiae est bonum; quod habet rationem finis. | |
| 3753 Qui autem ponit infinitum, excludit finem, ut dicitur in II | |
| 3754 Metaphys. Concupiscentia ergo non potest esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p3"> | |
| 3755 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore | |
| 3756 unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. | |
| 3757 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34824] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3758 concupiscentia est boni convenientis, cum procedat ex amore. Sed | |
| 3759 infinitum, cum sit improportionatum, non potest esse conveniens. | |
| 3760 Ergo concupiscentia non potest esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p4"> | |
| 3761 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject | |
| 3762 of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight | |
| 3763 would ever ensue. | |
| 3764 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34825] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3765 infinita non est transire, et sic in eis non est pervenire ad | |
| 3766 ultimum. Sed concupiscenti fit delectatio per hoc quod attingit ad | |
| 3767 ultimum. Ergo si concupiscentia esset infinita, sequeretur quod | |
| 3768 nunquam fieret delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p5"> | |
| 3769 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things." | |
| 3770 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34826] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3771 est quod philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod, in infinitum | |
| 3772 concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p6"> | |
| 3773 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 3774 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q30_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, concupiscence is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because | |
| 3775 it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite | |
| 3776 meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be | |
| 3777 infinite successively; so that, for | |
| 3778 instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these | |
| 3779 bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria ( | |
| 3780 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again." | |
| 3781 </p><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p7"> But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated above | |
| 3782 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q30_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire | |
| 3783 to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible. | |
| 3784 </p><p id="FS_Q30_A4-p8"> Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another | |
| 3785 infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and | |
| 3786 thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which | |
| 3787 is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the | |
| 3788 concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an | |
| 3789 infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite | |
| 3790 measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the | |
| 3791 concupiscence of any other things. | |
| 3792 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 co."><a name="34827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34827] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3793 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex est concupiscentia, una | |
| 3794 naturalis, et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem igitur | |
| 3795 concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim eius quod | |
| 3796 natura requirit, natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et | |
| 3797 certum. Unde nunquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel | |
| 3798 infinitum potum. Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in | |
| 3799 potentia per successionem, ita huiusmodi concupiscentiam contingit | |
| 3800 infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum | |
| 3801 iterum alia vice desideret cibum, vel quodcumque aliud quod natura | |
| 3802 requirit, quia huiusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non | |
| 3803 perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde dixit dominus Samaritanae, | |
| 3804 Ioan. IV, <i>qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum</i>. Sed | |
| 3805 concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita. Sequitur enim | |
| 3806 rationem, ut dictum est, rationi autem competit in infinitum | |
| 3807 procedere. Unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere, | |
| 3808 non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter se divitem esse, | |
| 3809 quantumcumque potest. Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum | |
| 3810 philosophum in I Polit., quare quaedam concupiscentia sit finita, | |
| 3811 et quaedam infinita. Semper enim concupiscentia finis est infinita, | |
| 3812 finis enim per se concupiscitur, ut sanitas; unde maior sanitas | |
| 3813 magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se | |
| 3814 disgregat, magis album magis disgregat. Concupiscentia vero eius | |
| 3815 quod est ad finem, non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram | |
| 3816 appetitur qua convenit fini. Unde qui finem ponunt in divitiis, | |
| 3817 habent concupiscentiam divitiarum in infinitum, qui autem divitias | |
| 3818 appetunt propter necessitatem vitae, concupiscunt divitias finitas, | |
| 3819 sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut philosophus dicit ibidem. Et | |
| 3820 eadem est ratio de concupiscentia, quarumcumque aliarum rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p9"> | |
| 3821 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually | |
| 3822 desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from | |
| 3823 which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken" (Phys. iii, 6). | |
| 3824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34828] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3825 ergo dicendum quod omne quod concupiscitur, accipitur ut quoddam | |
| 3826 finitum, vel quia est finitum secundum rem, prout semel | |
| 3827 concupiscitur in actu; vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub | |
| 3828 apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendi, | |
| 3829 <i>quia infinitum est, cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est | |
| 3830 aliquid extra sumere</i>, ut dicitur in III Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p10"> | |
| 3831 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears | |
| 3832 in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact | |
| 3833 the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number | |
| 3834 of singulars. | |
| 3835 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34829] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3836 dicendum quod ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitae inquantum | |
| 3837 potest in infinitum aliquid considerare, ut apparet in additione | |
| 3838 numerorum et linearum. Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est | |
| 3839 proportionatum rationi. Nam et universale, quod ratio apprehendit, | |
| 3840 est quodammodo infinitum, inquantum in potentia continet infinita | |
| 3841 singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q30_A4-p11"> | |
| 3842 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization | |
| 3843 of each object of his concupiscence. | |
| 3844 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 30 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34830] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3845 dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod | |
| 3846 omnia consequatur quae concupiscit, sed in quolibet concupito quod | |
| 3847 consequitur, delectatur.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 3848 <div id="FS_Q31" class="div3"> | |
| 3849 <h3 id="FS_Q31-p0.1">Q. 31. OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 3850 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 3851 <p id="FS_Q31-p2"> We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The | |
| 3852 causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice. | |
| 3853 </p><p id="FS_Q31-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q31-p4"><a href="#FS_Q31_A1"> (1) Whether delight is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p5"><a href="#FS_Q31_A2"> (2) Whether delight is subject to time?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p6"><a href="#FS_Q31_A3"> (3) Whether it differs from joy?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p7"><a href="#FS_Q31_A4"> (4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p8"><a href="#FS_Q31_A5"> (5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower;</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p9"><a href="#FS_Q31_A6"> (6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p10"><a href="#FS_Q31_A7"> (7) Whether any delight is non-natural?</a></p><p id="FS_Q31-p11"><a href="#FS_Q31_A8"> (8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?</a></p> | |
| 3854 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 pr."><a name="34831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34831] | |
| 3855 Iª-IIae q. 31 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 3856 delectatione et tristitia. Circa delectationem vero consideranda | |
| 3857 sunt quatuor, primo, de ipsa delectatione secundum se; secundo, de | |
| 3858 causis delectationis; tertio, de effectibus eius; quarto, de | |
| 3859 bonitate et malitia ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, | |
| 3860 utrum delectatio sit passio. Secundo, utrum sit in tempore. Tertio, | |
| 3861 utrum differat a gaudio. Quarto, utrum sit in appetitu | |
| 3862 intellectivo. Quinto, de comparatione delectationum superioris | |
| 3863 appetitus, ad delectationem inferioris. Sexto, de comparatione | |
| 3864 delectationum sensitivarum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum sit aliqua | |
| 3865 delectatio non naturalis. Octavo, utrum delectatio possit esse | |
| 3866 contraria delectationi.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 3867 <div id="FS_Q31_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A1-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 1. Whether delight is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p2"> | |
| 3868 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and | |
| 3869 says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is | |
| 3870 an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion. | |
| 3871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34832] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3872 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit passio. Damascenus | |
| 3873 enim, in II libro, distinguit operationem a passione, dicens quod | |
| 3874 <i>operatio est motus qui est secundum naturam, passio vero est | |
| 3875 motus contra naturam</i>. Sed delectatio est operatio, ut | |
| 3876 philosophus dicit, in VII et X Ethic. Ergo delectatio non est | |
| 3877 passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p3"> | |
| 3878 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having | |
| 3879 been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion. | |
| 3880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34833] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3881 pati est moveri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed delectatio non | |
| 3882 consistit in moveri, sed in motum esse, causatur enim delectatio ex | |
| 3883 bono iam adepto. Ergo delectatio non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p4"> | |
| 3884 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. | |
| 3885 x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima | |
| 3886 ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion. | |
| 3887 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34834] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3888 delectatio consistit in quadam perfectione delectati, perficit enim | |
| 3889 operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed perfici non est pati vel | |
| 3890 alterari, ut dicitur in VII Physic. et in II de anima. Ergo | |
| 3891 delectatio non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p5"> | |
| 3892 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul. | |
| 3893 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34835] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3894 est quod Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem, | |
| 3895 sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A1-p6"> | |
| 3896 <b>I answer that,</b> The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above ( | |
| 3897 <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q31_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be | |
| 3898 said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible | |
| 3899 establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing." | |
| 3900 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A1-p7"> In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, | |
| 3901 so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural | |
| 3902 perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these | |
| 3903 latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. | |
| 3904 And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. | |
| 3905 Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing | |
| 3906 in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence | |
| 3907 of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be | |
| 3908 understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, | |
| 3909 as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in Ethic. | |
| 3910 vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there | |
| 3911 is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an | |
| 3912 apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul. | |
| 3913 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 co."><a name="34836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34836] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 3914 dicendum quod motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur, | |
| 3915 sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione | |
| 3916 sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem | |
| 3917 necesse est competere delectationi. Nam, sicut philosophus dicit in | |
| 3918 I Rhetoric., <i>delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio | |
| 3919 simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem</i>. Ad cuius | |
| 3920 intellectum, considerandum est quod, sicut contingit in rebus | |
| 3921 naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc | |
| 3922 contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit | |
| 3923 totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul. | |
| 3924 Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, | |
| 3925 quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit | |
| 3926 eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. | |
| 3927 Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu | |
| 3928 sensitivo, et iste motus est delectatio. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur | |
| 3929 quod delectatio est motus animae, ponitur in genere. Per hoc autem | |
| 3930 quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam, idest in id quod | |
| 3931 existit in natura rei, ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet | |
| 3932 praesentia connaturalis boni. Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul | |
| 3933 tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in | |
| 3934 constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino | |
| 3935 motus, non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed | |
| 3936 magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Per hoc | |
| 3937 autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum | |
| 3938 insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio. Sic ergo patet quod, | |
| 3939 cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens | |
| 3940 apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p8"> | |
| 3941 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing | |
| 3942 is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, | |
| 3943 as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause. | |
| 3944 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34837] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3945 ergo dicendum quod operatio connaturalis non impedita, est | |
| 3946 perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando | |
| 3947 constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita, | |
| 3948 sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum | |
| 3949 est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est | |
| 3950 praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p9"> | |
| 3951 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; | |
| 3952 the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already | |
| 3953 gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of | |
| 3954 the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that | |
| 3955 which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the | |
| 3956 appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the | |
| 3957 impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement. | |
| 3958 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34838] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3959 dicendum quod in animali duplex motus considerari potest, unus | |
| 3960 secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum, alius | |
| 3961 secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem licet | |
| 3962 ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset | |
| 3963 motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus | |
| 3964 appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita | |
| 3965 postea delectatur in habito. Licet enim delectatio sit quies | |
| 3966 quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod | |
| 3967 appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab | |
| 3968 appetibili, ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A1-p10"> | |
| 3969 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily | |
| 3970 ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above ( | |
| 3971 <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q31_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,4): and in this sense delight is called a passion. | |
| 3972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34839] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3973 dicendum quod, quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat | |
| 3974 passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus, sicut sunt | |
| 3975 aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima; tamen | |
| 3976 etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est. | |
| 3977 Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A2-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 2. Whether delight is in time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p2"> | |
| 3978 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all | |
| 3979 movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time. | |
| 3980 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34840] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3981 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit in tempore. Delectatio | |
| 3982 enim est motus quidam, ut in I Rhetoric. philosophus dicit. Sed | |
| 3983 motus omnis est in tempore. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p3"> | |
| 3984 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore | |
| 3985 pleasure is in time. | |
| 3986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34841] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3987 diuturnum, vel morosum, dicitur aliquid secundum tempus. Sed | |
| 3988 aliquae delectationes dicuntur morosae. Ergo delectatio est in | |
| 3989 tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p4"> | |
| 3990 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is | |
| 3991 too. | |
| 3992 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34842] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3993 passiones animae sunt unius generis. Sed aliquae passiones animae | |
| 3994 sunt in tempore. Ergo et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p5"> | |
| 3995 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time." | |
| 3996 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34843] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 3997 est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod <i>secundum nullum | |
| 3998 tempus accipiet quis delectationem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A2-p6"> | |
| 3999 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. | |
| 4000 For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession | |
| 4001 or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those | |
| 4002 things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which | |
| 4003 succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially | |
| 4004 something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, | |
| 4005 because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time. | |
| 4006 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A2-p7"> Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as | |
| 4007 it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: | |
| 4008 whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally. | |
| 4009 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 co."><a name="34844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34844] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4010 dicendum quod aliquid contingit esse in tempore dupliciter, uno | |
| 4011 modo, secundum se; alio modo, per aliud, et quasi per accidens. | |
| 4012 Quia enim tempus est numerus successivorum, illa secundum se | |
| 4013 dicuntur esse in tempore, de quorum ratione est successio, vel | |
| 4014 aliquid ad successionem pertinens, sicut motus, quies, locutio, et | |
| 4015 alia huiusmodi. Secundum aliud vero, et non per se, dicuntur esse | |
| 4016 in tempore illa de quorum ratione non est aliqua successio, sed | |
| 4017 tamen alicui successivo subiacent. Sicut esse hominem de sui | |
| 4018 ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus | |
| 4019 motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius, sed quia | |
| 4020 humanum esse subiacet causis transmutabilibus, secundum hoc esse | |
| 4021 hominem est in tempore. Sic igitur dicendum est quod delectatio | |
| 4022 secundum se quidem non est in tempore, est enim delectatio in bono | |
| 4023 iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus. Sed si illud bonum | |
| 4024 adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in | |
| 4025 tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit | |
| 4026 in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p8"> | |
| 4027 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in | |
| 4028 potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. | |
| 4029 of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement | |
| 4030 is not successive, nor is it of itself in time. | |
| 4031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34845] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4032 ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter | |
| 4033 dicitur. Uno modo, qui est actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in | |
| 4034 potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, et talis motus est successivus, et | |
| 4035 in tempore. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis | |
| 4036 in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam | |
| 4037 delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in | |
| 4038 tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p9"> | |
| 4039 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time. | |
| 4040 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34846] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4041 dicendum quod delectatio dicitur diuturna vel morosa, secundum quod | |
| 4042 per accidens est in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A2-p10"> | |
| 4043 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the | |
| 4044 imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time. | |
| 4045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34847] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4046 dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, | |
| 4047 sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, | |
| 4048 quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non | |
| 4049 esse in tempore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A3-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 3. Whether delight differs from joy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p2"> | |
| 4050 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. | |
| 4051 But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight. | |
| 4052 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34848] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4053 sic proceditur. Videtur quod gaudium sit omnino idem quod | |
| 4054 delectatio. Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Sed | |
| 4055 idem est obiectum gaudii et delectationis, scilicet bonum adeptum. | |
| 4056 Ergo gaudium est omnino idem quod delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p3"> | |
| 4057 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. | |
| 4058 Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same. | |
| 4059 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34849] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4060 unus motus non terminatur ad duos terminos. Sed idem est motus qui | |
| 4061 terminatur ad gaudium et delectationem, scilicet concupiscentia. | |
| 4062 Ergo delectatio et gaudium sunt omnino idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p4"> | |
| 4063 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness | |
| 4064 from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not | |
| 4065 differ from delight. | |
| 4066 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34850] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4067 si gaudium est aliud a delectatione, videtur quod, pari ratione, et | |
| 4068 laetitia et exultatio et iucunditas significent aliquid aliud a | |
| 4069 delectatione, et sic erunt omnes diversae passiones. Quod videtur | |
| 4070 esse falsum. Non ergo gaudium differt a delectatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p5"> | |
| 4071 <b>On the contrary,</b> We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight. | |
| 4072 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34851] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4073 est quod in brutis animalibus non dicimus gaudium. Sed in eis | |
| 4074 dicimus delectationem. Non ergo est idem gaudium et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A3-p6"> | |
| 4075 <b>I answer that,</b> Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural, | |
| 4076 and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above ( | |
| 4077 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q31_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[3]</a>), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory | |
| 4078 of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; | |
| 4079 which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those | |
| 4080 things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do | |
| 4081 not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight. | |
| 4082 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A3-p7"> Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently | |
| 4083 whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always | |
| 4084 the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason. | |
| 4085 And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy. | |
| 4086 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 co."><a name="34852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34852] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4087 dicendum quod gaudium, ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo de anima, est | |
| 4088 quaedam species delectationis. Est enim considerandum quod, sicut | |
| 4089 sunt quaedam concupiscentiae naturales, quaedam autem non | |
| 4090 naturales, sed consequuntur rationem, ut supra dictum est; ita | |
| 4091 etiam delectationum quaedam sunt naturales, et quaedam non | |
| 4092 naturales, quae sunt cum ratione. Vel, sicut Damascenus et | |
| 4093 Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt, quaedam sunt corporales, quaedam | |
| 4094 animales, quod in idem redit. Delectamur enim et in his quae | |
| 4095 naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes; et in his quae | |
| 4096 concupiscimus secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudii non habet locum | |
| 4097 nisi in delectatione quae consequitur rationem, unde gaudium non | |
| 4098 attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis. Omne | |
| 4099 autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possumus etiam cum | |
| 4100 delectatione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso. Unde de | |
| 4101 omnibus de quibus est delectatio, potest etiam esse gaudium in | |
| 4102 habentibus rationem. Quamvis non semper de omnibus sit gaudium, | |
| 4103 quandoque enim aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum | |
| 4104 corpus, de qua tamen non gaudet secundum rationem. Et secundum hoc, | |
| 4105 patet quod delectatio est in plus quam gaudium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p8"> | |
| 4106 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity | |
| 4107 of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called | |
| 4108 otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences ( | |
| 4109 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q31_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[3]</a>, ad 2). | |
| 4110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34853] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4111 ergo dicendum quod, cum obiectum appetitus animalis sit bonum | |
| 4112 apprehensum, diversitas apprehensionis pertinet quodammodo ad | |
| 4113 diversitatem obiecti. Et sic delectationes animales, quae dicuntur | |
| 4114 etiam gaudia, distinguuntur a delectationibus corporalibus, quae | |
| 4115 dicuntur solum delectationes, sicut et de concupiscentiis supra | |
| 4116 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p9"> | |
| 4117 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds | |
| 4118 to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to | |
| 4119 the difference of movement. | |
| 4120 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34854] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4121 dicendum quod similis differentia invenitur etiam in | |
| 4122 concupiscentiis, ita quod delectatio respondeat concupiscentiae, et | |
| 4123 gaudium respondeat desiderio, quod magis videtur pertinere ad | |
| 4124 concupiscentiam animalem. Et sic secundum differentiam motus, est | |
| 4125 etiam differentia quietis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A3-p10"> | |
| 4126 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from | |
| 4127 the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, | |
| 4128 which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain | |
| 4129 special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to | |
| 4130 joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings. | |
| 4131 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34855] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4132 dicendum quod alia nomina ad delectationem pertinentia, sunt | |
| 4133 imposita ab effectibus delectationis, nam laetitia imponitur a | |
| 4134 dilatatione cordis, ac si diceretur latitia; exultatio vero dicitur | |
| 4135 ab exterioribus signis delectationis interioris, quae apparent | |
| 4136 exterius, inquantum scilicet interius gaudium prosilit ad | |
| 4137 exteriora; iucunditas vero dicitur a quibusdam specialibus | |
| 4138 laetitiae signis vel effectibus. Et tamen omnia ista nomina | |
| 4139 videntur pertinere ad gaudium, non enim utimur eis nisi in naturis | |
| 4140 rationalibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A4-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 4. Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p2"> | |
| 4141 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight | |
| 4142 is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual | |
| 4143 appetite. | |
| 4144 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34856] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4145 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit in appetitu | |
| 4146 intellectivo. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Rhetoric., quod | |
| 4147 <i>delectatio est motus quidam sensibilis</i>. Sed motus sensibilis | |
| 4148 non est in parte intellectiva. Ergo delectatio non est in parte | |
| 4149 intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p3"> | |
| 4150 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive | |
| 4151 appetite. | |
| 4152 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34857] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4153 delectatio est passio quaedam. Sed omnis passio est in appetitu | |
| 4154 sensitivo. Ergo delectatio non est nisi in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p4"> | |
| 4155 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we | |
| 4156 have in common with irrational animals. | |
| 4157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34858] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4158 delectatio est communis nobis et brutis. Ergo non est nisi in parte | |
| 4159 quae nobis et brutis communis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p5"> | |
| 4160 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 4161 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "Delight in the Lord." But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight | |
| 4162 can be in the intellectual appetite. | |
| 4163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34859] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4164 est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, <i>delectare in domino</i>. Sed | |
| 4165 ad Deum non potest extendi appetitus sensitivus, sed solum | |
| 4166 intellectivus. Ergo delectatio potest esse in appetitu | |
| 4167 intellectivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A4-p6"> | |
| 4168 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 4169 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q31_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive | |
| 4170 appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called | |
| 4171 the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight. | |
| 4172 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A4-p7"> However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a | |
| 4173 bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine | |
| 4174 says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish." | |
| 4175 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 co."><a name="34860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34860] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4176 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, delectatio quaedam sequitur | |
| 4177 apprehensionem rationis. Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non | |
| 4178 solum commovetur appetitus sensitivus, per applicationem ad aliquid | |
| 4179 particulare; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur | |
| 4180 voluntas. Et secundum hoc, in appetitu intellectivo, sive in | |
| 4181 voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem | |
| 4182 delectatio corporalis. Hoc tamen interest inter delectationem | |
| 4183 utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum | |
| 4184 aliqua transmutatione corporali, delectatio autem appetitus | |
| 4185 intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis. Et | |
| 4186 secundum hoc Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod | |
| 4187 <i>cupiditas et laetitia non est aliud quam voluntas in eorum | |
| 4188 consensione quae volumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p8"> | |
| 4189 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For | |
| 4190 he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." | |
| 4191 Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite. | |
| 4192 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34861] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4193 ergo dicendum quod in illa definitione philosophi, sensibile | |
| 4194 ponitur communiter pro quacumque apprehensione. Dicit enim | |
| 4195 philosophus in X Ethic., quod <i>secundum omnem sensum est | |
| 4196 delectatio; similiter autem et secundum intellectum et | |
| 4197 speculationem</i>. Vel potest dici quod ipse definit delectationem | |
| 4198 appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p9"> | |
| 4199 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the | |
| 4200 intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher | |
| 4201 says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels | |
| 4202 are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the | |
| 4203 gladness of incorruption." | |
| 4204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34862] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4205 dicendum quod delectatio habet rationem passionis, proprie | |
| 4206 loquendo, inquantum est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et sic | |
| 4207 non est in appetitu intellectivo, sed secundum simplicem motum, sic | |
| 4208 enim etiam est in Deo et in Angelis. Unde dicit philosophus, in VII | |
| 4209 Ethic., quod Deus una simplici operatione gaudet. Et Dionysius | |
| 4210 dicit, in fine Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli non sunt susceptibiles | |
| 4211 nostrae passibilis delectationis, sed congaudent Deo secundum | |
| 4212 incorruptionis laetitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A4-p10"> | |
| 4213 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De | |
| 4214 Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive | |
| 4215 appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the | |
| 4216 angels. | |
| 4217 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34863] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4218 dicendum quod in nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus | |
| 4219 cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Unde ibidem | |
| 4220 Dionysius dicit quod <i>sancti homines multoties fiunt in | |
| 4221 participatione delectationum angelicarum</i>. Et ita in nobis est | |
| 4222 delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo, in quo communicamus cum | |
| 4223 brutis; sed etiam in appetitu intellectivo, in quo communicamus cum | |
| 4224 Angelis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A5-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 5. Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p2"> | |
| 4225 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek | |
| 4226 some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual | |
| 4227 pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. | |
| 4228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34864] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 4229 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes corporales et sensibiles | |
| 4230 sint maiores delectationibus spiritualibus intelligibilibus. Omnes | |
| 4231 enim aliquam delectationem sequuntur, secundum philosophum, in X | |
| 4232 Ethic. Sed plures sequuntur delectationes sensibiles, quam | |
| 4233 delectationes spirituales intelligibiles. Ergo delectationes | |
| 4234 corporales sunt maiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p3"> | |
| 4235 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the | |
| 4236 state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. | |
| 4237 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34865] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4238 magnitudo causae ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed delectationes | |
| 4239 corporales habent fortiores effectus, <i>transmutant enim corpus, | |
| 4240 et quibusdam insanias faciunt</i>, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo | |
| 4241 delectationes corporales sunt fortiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p4"> | |
| 4242 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check | |
| 4243 spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. | |
| 4244 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34866] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4245 delectationes corporales oportet temperare et refraenare, propter | |
| 4246 earum vehementiam. Sed delectationes spirituales non oportet | |
| 4247 refraenare. Ergo delectationes corporales sunt maiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p5"> | |
| 4248 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 4249 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.103" target="asv">Ps. 118:103</a>): "How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest | |
| 4250 pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom." | |
| 4251 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34867] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4252 est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>quam dulcia faucibus meis | |
| 4253 eloquia tua, super mel ori meo</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in X | |
| 4254 Ethic., quod <i>maxima delectatio est quae est secundum operationem | |
| 4255 sapientiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p6"> | |
| 4256 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 4257 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q31_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of | |
| 4258 the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections | |
| 4259 of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions | |
| 4260 and perfections rather of the | |
| 4261 matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid | |
| 4262 actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. | |
| 4263 Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects. | |
| 4264 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p7"> If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for | |
| 4265 instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. | |
| 4266 For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with | |
| 4267 his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the | |
| 4268 intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one | |
| 4269 who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine | |
| 4270 says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14). | |
| 4271 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p8"> If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely | |
| 4272 speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, | |
| 4273 viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual | |
| 4274 good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the | |
| 4275 greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty | |
| 4276 is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more | |
| 4277 firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the | |
| 4278 essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the | |
| 4279 sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part | |
| 4280 of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of | |
| 4281 the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized | |
| 4282 all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods | |
| 4283 are incorruptible. | |
| 4284 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A5-p9"> On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things | |
| 4285 are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive | |
| 4286 appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason | |
| 4287 of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as | |
| 4288 remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding | |
| 4289 griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary | |
| 4290 griefs, as we shall state farther on ( | |
| 4291 <a href="#FS_Q35_A5" id="FS_Q31_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[5]</a>). | |
| 4292 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 co."><a name="34868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34868] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4293 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, delectatio provenit ex | |
| 4294 coniunctione convenientis quae sentitur vel cognoscitur. In | |
| 4295 operibus autem animae, praecipue sensitivae et intellectivae, est | |
| 4296 hoc considerandum, quod, cum non transeant in materiam exteriorem, | |
| 4297 sunt actus vel perfectiones operantis, scilicet intelligere, | |
| 4298 sentire, velle, et huiusmodi, nam actiones quae transeunt in | |
| 4299 exteriorem materiam, magis sunt actiones et perfectiones materiae | |
| 4300 transmutatae; motus enim est actus mobilis a movente. Sic igitur | |
| 4301 praedictae actiones animae sensitivae et intellectivae, et ipsae | |
| 4302 sunt quoddam bonum operantis, et sunt etiam cognitae per sensum vel | |
| 4303 intellectum. Unde etiam ex ipsis consurgit delectatio, et non solum | |
| 4304 ex eorum obiectis. Si igitur comparentur delectationes | |
| 4305 intelligibiles delectationibus sensibilibus, secundum quod | |
| 4306 delectamur in ipsis actionibus, puta in cognitione sensus et in | |
| 4307 cognitione intellectus; non est dubium quod multo sunt maiores | |
| 4308 delectationes intelligibiles quam sensibiles. Multo enim magis | |
| 4309 delectatur homo de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid intelligendo, quam de | |
| 4310 hoc quod cognoscit aliquid sentiendo. Quia intellectualis cognitio | |
| 4311 et perfectior est, et etiam magis cognoscitur, quia intellectus | |
| 4312 magis reflectitur supra actum suum quam sensus. Est etiam cognitio | |
| 4313 intellectiva magis dilecta, nullus enim est qui non magis vellet | |
| 4314 carere visu corporali quam visu intellectuali, eo modo quo bestiae | |
| 4315 vel stulti carent, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei. | |
| 4316 Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibiles spirituales | |
| 4317 delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et | |
| 4318 simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores. Et | |
| 4319 hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem, | |
| 4320 scilicet bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa | |
| 4321 coniunctio. Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale | |
| 4322 bonum; et est magis dilectum. Cuius signum est quod homines etiam a | |
| 4323 maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent, ut non perdant | |
| 4324 honorem, qui est bonum intelligibile. Similiter etiam ipsa pars | |
| 4325 intellectiva est multo nobilior, et magis cognoscitiva, quam pars | |
| 4326 sensitiva. Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis | |
| 4327 perfecta, et magis firma. Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit | |
| 4328 circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad | |
| 4329 rei essentiam; obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est. | |
| 4330 Perfectior autem est, quia coniunctioni sensibilis ad sensum | |
| 4331 adiungitur motus, qui est actus imperfectus, unde et delectationes | |
| 4332 sensibiles non sunt totae simul, sed in eis aliquid pertransit, et | |
| 4333 aliquid expectatur consummandum, ut patet in delectatione ciborum | |
| 4334 et venereorum. Sed intelligibilia sunt absque motu, unde | |
| 4335 delectationes tales sunt totae simul. Est etiam firmior, quia | |
| 4336 delectabilia corporalia sunt corruptibilia, et cito deficiunt; bona | |
| 4337 vero spiritualia sunt incorruptibilia. Sed quoad nos, delectationes | |
| 4338 corporales sunt magis vehementes, propter tria. Primo, quia | |
| 4339 sensibilia sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam intelligibilia. Secundo | |
| 4340 etiam, quia delectationes sensibiles, cum sint passiones sensitivi | |
| 4341 appetitus, sunt cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Quod non | |
| 4342 contingit in delectationibus spiritualibus, nisi per quandam | |
| 4343 redundantiam a superiori appetitu in inferiorem. Tertio, quia | |
| 4344 delectationes corporales appetuntur ut medicinae quaedam contra | |
| 4345 corporales defectus vel molestias, ex quibus tristitiae quaedam | |
| 4346 consequuntur. Unde delectationes corporales, tristitiis huiusmodi | |
| 4347 supervenientes, magis sentiuntur, et per consequens magis | |
| 4348 acceptantur, quam delectationes spirituales quae non habent | |
| 4349 tristitias contrarias, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p10"> | |
| 4350 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because | |
| 4351 men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, | |
| 4352 which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body. | |
| 4353 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34869] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4354 ergo dicendum quod ideo plures sequuntur delectationes corporales, | |
| 4355 quia bona sensibilia sunt magis et pluribus nota. Et etiam quia | |
| 4356 homines indigent delectationibus ut medicinis contra multiplices | |
| 4357 dolores et tristitias, et cum plures hominum non possint attingere | |
| 4358 ad delectationes spirituales, quae sunt propriae virtuosorum, | |
| 4359 consequens et quod declinent ad corporales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p11"> | |
| 4360 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite. | |
| 4361 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34870] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4362 dicendum quod transmutatio corporis magis contingit ex | |
| 4363 delectationibus corporalibus, inquantum sunt passiones appetitus | |
| 4364 sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A5-p12"> | |
| 4365 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and | |
| 4366 checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both | |
| 4367 sober and moderate. | |
| 4368 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34871] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4369 dicendum quod delectationes corporales sunt secundum partem | |
| 4370 sensitivam, quae regulatur ratione, et ideo indigent temperari et | |
| 4371 refraenari per rationem. Sed delectationes spirituales sunt | |
| 4372 secundum mentem, quae est ipsa regula, unde sunt secundum seipsas | |
| 4373 sobriae et moderatae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A6-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 6. Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p2"> | |
| 4374 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest | |
| 4375 pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to | |
| 4376 the words of | |
| 4377 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.5.12" target="asv"> Tob. 5:12</a>: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded | |
| 4378 by the sight is the greatest of sensible | |
| 4379 pleasures. | |
| 4380 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34872] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 4381 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes quae sunt secundum | |
| 4382 tactum, non sint maiores delectationibus quae sunt secundum alios | |
| 4383 sensus. Illa enim delectatio videtur esse maxima, qua exclusa, omne | |
| 4384 gaudium cessat. Sed talis est delectatio quae est secundum visum, | |
| 4385 dicitur enim Tobiae V, <i>quale gaudium erit mihi, qui in tenebris | |
| 4386 sedeo, et lumen caeli non video?</i> Ergo delectatio quae est per | |
| 4387 visum, est maxima inter sensibiles delectationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p3"> | |
| 4388 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight | |
| 4389 is loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. | |
| 4390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34873] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> | |
| 4391 <i>Praeterea, unicuique fit delectabile illud quod amat</i>, ut | |
| 4392 philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric. Sed inter alios sensus maxime | |
| 4393 diligitur visus. Ergo delectatio quae est secundum visum, est | |
| 4394 maxima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p4"> | |
| 4395 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause | |
| 4396 of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. | |
| 4397 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34874] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4398 principium amicitiae delectabilis maxime est visio. Sed causa talis | |
| 4399 amicitiae est delectatio. Ergo secundum visum videtur esse maxime | |
| 4400 delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p5"> | |
| 4401 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch. | |
| 4402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34875] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4403 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod maximae | |
| 4404 delectationes sunt secundum tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p6"> | |
| 4405 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 4406 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q31_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1; | |
| 4407 <a href="#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q31_A6-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[4]</a>, ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two | |
| 4408 reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these | |
| 4409 ways. But because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former | |
| 4410 pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved | |
| 4411 for their usefulness, are common to all animals. | |
| 4412 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p7"> If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater | |
| 4413 pleasure than any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, | |
| 4414 then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to | |
| 4415 the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this | |
| 4416 usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and | |
| 4417 the like. Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the end. For this | |
| 4418 reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from | |
| 4419 the other senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the smell of | |
| 4420 hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, | |
| 4421 10). | |
| 4422 </p><p id="FS_Q31_A6-p8"> Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the | |
| 4423 greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely | |
| 4424 speaking, greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure. Because | |
| 4425 it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the | |
| 4426 touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider | |
| 4427 the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as | |
| 4428 intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible. | |
| 4429 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 co."><a name="34876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34876] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4430 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque, inquantum amatur, | |
| 4431 efficitur delectabile. Sensus autem, ut dicitur in principio | |
| 4432 Metaphys., propter duo diliguntur, scilicet propter cognitionem, et | |
| 4433 propter utilitatem. Unde et utroque modo contingit esse | |
| 4434 delectationem secundum sensum. Sed quia apprehendere ipsam | |
| 4435 cognitionem tanquam bonum quoddam, proprium est hominis; ideo | |
| 4436 primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum | |
| 4437 cognitionem, sunt propriae hominum, delectationes autem sensuum | |
| 4438 inquantum diliguntur propter utilitatem, sunt communes omnibus | |
| 4439 animalibus. Si igitur loquamur de delectatione sensus quae est | |
| 4440 ratione cognitionis, manifestum est quod secundum visum est maior | |
| 4441 delectatio quam secundum aliquem alium sensum. Si autem loquamur de | |
| 4442 delectatione sensus quae est ratione utilitatis, sic maxima | |
| 4443 delectatio est secundum tactum. Utilitas enim sensibilium | |
| 4444 attenditur secundum ordinem ad conservationem naturae animalis. Ad | |
| 4445 hanc autem utilitatem propinquius se habent sensibilia tactus, est | |
| 4446 enim tactus cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus consistit animal, | |
| 4447 scilicet calidi et frigidi, et huiusmodi. Unde secundum hoc, | |
| 4448 delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, sunt maiores, quasi fini | |
| 4449 propinquiores. Et propter hoc etiam, alia animalia, quae non habent | |
| 4450 delectationem secundum sensum nisi ratione utilitatis, non | |
| 4451 delectantur secundum alios sensus, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia | |
| 4452 tactus, <i>neque enim odoribus leporum canes gaudent, sed | |
| 4453 cibatione; neque leo voce bovis, sed comestione</i>, ut dicitur in | |
| 4454 III Ethic. Cum igitur delectatio tactus sit maxima ratione | |
| 4455 utilitatis, delectatio autem visus ratione cognitionis; si quis | |
| 4456 utramque comparare velit, inveniet simpliciter delectationem tactus | |
| 4457 esse maiorem delectatione visus, secundum quod sistit infra limites | |
| 4458 sensibilis delectationis. Quia manifestum est quod id quod est | |
| 4459 naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum. Huiusmodi autem | |
| 4460 delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinantur concupiscentiae | |
| 4461 naturales, sicut cibi, et venerea, et huiusmodi. Sed si | |
| 4462 consideremus delectationes visus, secundum quod visus deservit | |
| 4463 intellectui; sic delectationes visus erunt potiores, ea ratione qua | |
| 4464 et intelligibiles delectationes sunt potiores sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p9"> | |
| 4465 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Joy, as stated above | |
| 4466 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q31_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, denotes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the | |
| 4467 touch. | |
| 4468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34877] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4469 ergo dicendum quod gaudium, sicut supra dictum est, significat | |
| 4470 animalem delectationem, et haec maxime pertinet ad visum. Sed | |
| 4471 delectatio naturalis maxime pertinet ad tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p10"> | |
| 4472 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the same | |
| 4473 passage (Metaph. i, 1). | |
| 4474 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34878] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4475 dicendum quod visus maxime diligitur propter cognitionem, eo quod | |
| 4476 multas rerum differentias nobis ostendit, ut ibidem dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A6-p11"> | |
| 4477 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, | |
| 4478 is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which | |
| 4479 a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of its image, which | |
| 4480 entices him to love it and to seek its delight. | |
| 4481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34879] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4482 dicendum quod alio modo delectatio est causa amoris carnalis, et | |
| 4483 alio modo visio. Nam delectatio, et maxime quae est secundum | |
| 4484 tactum, est causa amicitiae delectabilis per modum finis, visio | |
| 4485 autem est causa sicut unde est principium motus, inquantum per | |
| 4486 visum amabilis imprimitur species rei, quae allicit ad amandum et | |
| 4487 ad concupiscendum eius delectationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A7-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 7. Whether any pleasure is not natural?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p2"> | |
| 4488 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But | |
| 4489 the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal | |
| 4490 appetite, which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is non-natural. | |
| 4491 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34880] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum | |
| 4492 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit innaturalis. | |
| 4493 Delectatio enim in affectibus animae proportionatur quieti in | |
| 4494 corporibus. Sed appetitus corporis naturalis non quiescit nisi in | |
| 4495 loco connaturali. Ergo nec quies appetitus animalis, quae est | |
| 4496 delectatio, potest esse nisi in aliquo connaturali. Nulla ergo | |
| 4497 delectatio est non naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p3"> | |
| 4498 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which | |
| 4499 is unnatural can give pleasure. | |
| 4500 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34881] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4501 illud quod est contra naturam, est violentum. Sed omne violentum | |
| 4502 est contristans, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo nihil quod est | |
| 4503 contra naturam, potest esse delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p4"> | |
| 4504 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the | |
| 4505 Philosopher's definition quoted above | |
| 4506 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q31_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural end. Therefore | |
| 4507 every pleasure is natural. | |
| 4508 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34882] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4509 constitui in propriam naturam, cum sentitur, causat delectationem; | |
| 4510 ut patet ex definitione philosophi supra posita. Sed constitui in | |
| 4511 naturam, unicuique est naturale, quia motus naturalis est qui est | |
| 4512 ad terminum naturalem. Ergo omnis delectatio est naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p5"> | |
| 4513 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease." | |
| 4514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34883] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4515 est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod quaedam | |
| 4516 delectationes sunt aegritudinales et contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p6"> | |
| 4517 <b>I answer that,</b> We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken | |
| 4518 in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has | |
| 4519 his own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining | |
| 4520 to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take | |
| 4521 pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with | |
| 4522 reason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason. | |
| 4523 And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink, | |
| 4524 sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each | |
| 4525 kind | |
| 4526 of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens | |
| 4527 in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary | |
| 4528 to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat. | |
| 4529 Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation | |
| 4530 of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this | |
| 4531 corruption may be either on the part of the body---from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem | |
| 4532 bitter, and vice versa---or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on | |
| 4533 the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, | |
| 4534 or | |
| 4535 other such things, which are not in accord with human nature. | |
| 4536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 co."><a name="34884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34884] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4537 dicendum quod naturale dicitur quod est secundum naturam, ut | |
| 4538 dicitur in II Physic. Natura autem in homine dupliciter sumi | |
| 4539 potest. Uno modo, prout intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis | |
| 4540 natura, quia secundum eam homo in specie constituitur. Et secundum | |
| 4541 hoc, naturales delectationes hominum dici possunt quae sunt in eo | |
| 4542 quod convenit homini secundum rationem, sicut delectari in | |
| 4543 contemplatione veritatis, et in actibus virtutum, est naturale | |
| 4544 homini. Alio modo potest sumi natura in homine secundum quod | |
| 4545 condividitur rationi, id scilicet quod est commune homini et aliis, | |
| 4546 praecipue quod rationi non obedit. Et secundum hoc, ea quae | |
| 4547 pertinent ad conservationem corporis, vel secundum individuum, ut | |
| 4548 cibus, potus, lectus, et huiusmodi, vel secundum speciem, sicut | |
| 4549 venereorum usus, dicuntur homini delectabilia naturaliter. Secundum | |
| 4550 utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, | |
| 4551 simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales secundum quid. Contingit | |
| 4552 enim in aliquo individuo corrumpi aliquod principiorum naturalium | |
| 4553 speciei; et sic id quod est contra naturam speciei, fieri per | |
| 4554 accidens naturale huic individuo; sicut huic aquae calefactae est | |
| 4555 naturale quod calefaciat. Ita igitur contingit quod id quod est | |
| 4556 contra naturam hominis, vel quantum ad rationem, vel quantum ad | |
| 4557 corporis conservationem, fiat huic homini connaturale, propter | |
| 4558 aliquam corruptionem naturae in eo existentem. Quae quidem | |
| 4559 corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis, sive ex aegritudine, | |
| 4560 sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso; sive | |
| 4561 propter malam complexionem, sicut aliqui delectantur in comestione | |
| 4562 terrae vel carbonum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi, vel etiam ex parte | |
| 4563 animae, sicut propter consuetudinem aliqui, delectantur in | |
| 4564 comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut | |
| 4565 aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A7-p7"> This suffices for the answers to the objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 7 ad arg."><a name="34885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34885] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 4566 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q31_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q31_A8-p0.1">Q. 31. A. 8. Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p2"> | |
| 4567 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and | |
| 4568 contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but | |
| 4569 "good is contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another. | |
| 4570 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34886] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum | |
| 4571 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi non sit delectatio | |
| 4572 contraria. Passiones enim animae speciem et contrarietatem | |
| 4573 recipiunt secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem delectationis est bonum. | |
| 4574 Cum igitur bonum non sit contrarium bono, sed bonum malo | |
| 4575 contrarietur, et malum malo, ut dicitur in praedicamentis; videtur | |
| 4576 quod delectatio non sit contraria delectationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p3"> | |
| 4577 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore | |
| 4578 pleasure is not contrary to pleasure. | |
| 4579 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34887] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4580 uni unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed | |
| 4581 delectationi contraria est tristitia. Non ergo delectationi | |
| 4582 contraria est delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p4"> | |
| 4583 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. | |
| 4584 But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is | |
| 4585 no contrariety between one pleasure and another. | |
| 4586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34888] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4587 si delectationi contraria est delectatio hoc non est nisi propter | |
| 4588 contrarietatem eorum in quibus aliquis delectatur. Sed haec | |
| 4589 differentia est materialis, contrarietas autem est differentia | |
| 4590 secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo contrarietas non | |
| 4591 est delectationis ad delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p5"> | |
| 4592 <b>On the contrary,</b> Things of the same genus that impede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures | |
| 4593 impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another. | |
| 4594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34889] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 4595 ea quae se impediunt, in eodem genere existentia, secundum | |
| 4596 philosophum, sunt contraria. Sed quaedam delectationes se invicem | |
| 4597 impediunt ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo aliquae delectationes sunt | |
| 4598 contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p6"> | |
| 4599 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above ( | |
| 4600 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q31_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary | |
| 4601 to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to | |
| 4602 another. | |
| 4603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 co."><a name="34890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34890] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4604 dicendum quod delectatio in affectionibus animae, sicut dictum est, | |
| 4605 proportionatur quieti in corporibus naturalibus. Dicuntur autem | |
| 4606 duae quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis; | |
| 4607 sicut quies quae est sursum, ei quae est deorsum, ut dicitur V | |
| 4608 Physic. Unde et contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes | |
| 4609 esse contrarias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p7"> | |
| 4610 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may | |
| 4611 be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one | |
| 4612 good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in | |
| 4613 relation to water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this | |
| 4614 is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation | |
| 4615 to some one thing---i.e. the reason. | |
| 4616 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34891] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4617 ergo dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi est intelligendum | |
| 4618 secundum quod bonum et malum accipitur in virtutibus et vitiis, nam | |
| 4619 inveniuntur duo contraria vitia, non autem invenitur virtus | |
| 4620 contraria virtuti. In aliis autem nil prohibet duo bona esse ad | |
| 4621 invicem contraria, sicut calidum et frigidum, quorum unum est bonum | |
| 4622 igni, alterum aquae. Et per hunc modum delectatio potest esse | |
| 4623 delectationi contraria. Sed hoc in bono virtutis esse non potest, | |
| 4624 quia bonum virtutis non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid | |
| 4625 unum, scilicet rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p8"> | |
| 4626 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and | |
| 4627 connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, | |
| 4628 just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent | |
| 4629 repose of the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, | |
| 4630 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness. | |
| 4631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34892] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4632 dicendum quod delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies | |
| 4633 naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi | |
| 4634 connaturali. Tristitia autem se habet sicut quies violenta, | |
| 4635 tristabile enim repugnat appetitui animali, sicut locus quietis | |
| 4636 violentae appetitui naturali. Quieti autem naturali opponitur et | |
| 4637 quies violenta eiusdem corporis, et quies naturalis alterius, ut | |
| 4638 dicitur in V Physic. Unde delectationi opponitur et delectatio et | |
| 4639 tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9"> | |
| 4640 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal | |
| 4641 difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference | |
| 4642 in acts and passions, as stated above ( | |
| 4643 <a href="#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,4; | |
| 4644 <a href="#FS_Q30_A2" id="FS_Q31_A8-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[30], A[2]</a>). | |
| 4645 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 31 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34893] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4646 dicendum quod ea in quibus delectamur, cum sint obiecta | |
| 4647 delectationis, non solum faciunt differentiam materialem, sed etiam | |
| 4648 formalem, si sit diversa ratio delectabilitatis. Diversa enim ratio | |
| 4649 obiecti diversificat speciem actus vel passionis, ut ex supradictis | |
| 4650 patet.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 4651 <div id="FS_Q32" class="div3"> | |
| 4652 <h3 id="FS_Q32-p0.1">Q. 32. OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 4653 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 4654 <p id="FS_Q32-p2"> We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q32-p3"><a href="#FS_Q32_A1"> (1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p4"><a href="#FS_Q32_A2"> (2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p5"><a href="#FS_Q32_A3"> (3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p6"><a href="#FS_Q32_A4"> (4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p7"><a href="#FS_Q32_A5"> (5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p8"><a href="#FS_Q32_A6"> (6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p9"><a href="#FS_Q32_A7"> (7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q32-p10"><a href="#FS_Q32_A8"> (8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?</a></p> | |
| 4655 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 pr."><a name="34894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34894] | |
| 4656 Iª-IIae q. 32 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 4657 causis delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum | |
| 4658 operatio sit causa propria delectationis. Secundo, utrum motus sit | |
| 4659 causa delectationis. Tertio, utrum spes et memoria. Quarto, utrum | |
| 4660 tristitia. Quinto, utrum actiones aliorum sint nobis delectationis | |
| 4661 causa. Sexto, utrum benefacere alteri sit causa delectationis. | |
| 4662 Septimo, utrum similitudo sit causa delectationis. Octavo, utrum | |
| 4663 admiratio sit causa delectationis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 4664 <div id="FS_Q32_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A1-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 1. Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p2"> | |
| 4665 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "pleasure | |
| 4666 consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above ( | |
| 4667 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore operation is not the proper cause | |
| 4668 of pleasure. | |
| 4669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34895] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4670 sic proceditur. Videtur quod operatio non sit propria et prima | |
| 4671 causa delectationis. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., | |
| 4672 <i>delectari consistit in hoc quod sensus aliquid patiatur</i>, | |
| 4673 requiritur enim ad delectationem cognitio, sicut dictum est. Sed | |
| 4674 per prius sunt cognoscibilia obiecta operationum quam ipsae | |
| 4675 operationes. Ergo operatio non est propria causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p3"> | |
| 4676 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always | |
| 4677 an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure. | |
| 4678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34896] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4679 delectatio potissime consistit in fine adepto, hoc enim est quod | |
| 4680 praecipue concupiscitur. Sed non semper operatio est finis, sed | |
| 4681 quandoque ipsum operatum. Non ergo operatio est propria et per se | |
| 4682 causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p4"> | |
| 4683 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation | |
| 4684 is not the proper cause of pleasure. | |
| 4685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34897] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4686 otium et requies dicuntur per cessationem operationis. Haec autem | |
| 4687 sunt delectabilia, ut dicitur in I Rhetoric. Non ergo operatio est | |
| 4688 propria causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p5"> | |
| 4689 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that "pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation." | |
| 4690 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34898] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4691 est quod philosophus dicit, VII et X Ethic., quod <i>delectatio est | |
| 4692 operatio connaturalis non impedita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p6"> | |
| 4693 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 4694 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>), two things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now | |
| 4695 each of these consists in a kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the suitable | |
| 4696 good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every pleasure must | |
| 4697 needs be the result of some | |
| 4698 operation. | |
| 4699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 co."><a name="34899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34899] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4700 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad delectationem duo | |
| 4701 requiruntur, scilicet consecutio boni convenientis, et cognitio | |
| 4702 huiusmodi adeptionis. Utrumque autem horum in quadam operatione | |
| 4703 consistit, nam actualis cognitio operatio quaedam est; similiter | |
| 4704 bonum conveniens adipiscimur aliqua operatione. Ipsa etiam operatio | |
| 4705 propria est quoddam bonum conveniens. Unde oportet quod omnis | |
| 4706 delectatio aliquam operationem consequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p7"> | |
| 4707 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when | |
| 4708 we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man | |
| 4709 takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless they | |
| 4710 were apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take | |
| 4711 great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such | |
| 4712 like things is nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation. Wherefore it is | |
| 4713 evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its cause. | |
| 4714 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34900] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4715 ergo dicendum quod ipsa obiecta operationum non sunt delectabilia, | |
| 4716 nisi inquantum coniunguntur nobis, vel per cognitionem solam, sicut | |
| 4717 cum delectamur in consideratione vel inspectione aliquorum; vel | |
| 4718 quocumque alio modo simul cum cognitione, sicut cum aliquis | |
| 4719 delectatur in hoc quod cognoscit se habere quodcumque bonum, puta | |
| 4720 divitias vel honorem vel aliquid huiusmodi; quae quidem non essent | |
| 4721 delectabilia, nisi inquantum apprehenduntur ut habita. Ut enim | |
| 4722 philosophus dicit, in II Polit., <i>magnam delectationem habet | |
| 4723 putare aliquid sibi proprium; quae procedit ex naturali amore | |
| 4724 alicuius ad seipsum</i>. Habere autem huiusmodi nihil est aliud | |
| 4725 quam uti eis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per aliquam operationem. | |
| 4726 Unde manifestum est quod omnis delectatio in operationem reducitur | |
| 4727 sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p8"> | |
| 4728 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as possessed | |
| 4729 or effected: and this implies use or operation. | |
| 4730 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34901] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4731 dicendum quod etiam in illis in quibus operationes non sunt fines, | |
| 4732 sed operata, ipsa operata sunt delectabilia inquantum sunt habita | |
| 4733 vel facta. Quod refertur ad aliquem usum vel operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A1-p9"> | |
| 4734 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is finite, | |
| 4735 operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer | |
| 4736 proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And in this sense, leisure and play and other things | |
| 4737 pertaining to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results | |
| 4738 from labor. | |
| 4739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34902] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4740 dicendum quod operationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt | |
| 4741 proportionatae et connaturales operanti. Cum autem virtus humana | |
| 4742 sit finita, secundum aliquam mensuram operatio est sibi | |
| 4743 proportionata. Unde si excedat illam mensuram, iam non erit sibi | |
| 4744 proportionata, nec delectabilis, sed magis laboriosa et attaedians. | |
| 4745 Et secundum hoc, otium et ludus et alia quae ad requiem pertinent, | |
| 4746 delectabilia sunt, inquantum auferunt tristitiam quae est ex | |
| 4747 labore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A2-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 2. Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p2"> | |
| 4748 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure. Because, as stated above ( | |
| 4749 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q32_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>), the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. | |
| 4750 vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence. Now that which | |
| 4751 is being moved towards something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its | |
| 4752 regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement | |
| 4753 is not a cause of pleasure. | |
| 4754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34903] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4755 sic proceditur. Videtur quod motus non sit causa delectationis. | |
| 4756 Quia, sicut supra dictum est, bonum praesentialiter adeptum est | |
| 4757 causa delectationis, unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., dicit quod | |
| 4758 delectatio non comparatur generationi, sed operationi rei iam | |
| 4759 existentis. Id autem quod movetur ad aliquid, nondum habet illud; | |
| 4760 sed quodammodo est in via generationis respectu illius, secundum | |
| 4761 quod omni motui adiungitur generatio et corruptio, ut dicitur in | |
| 4762 VIII Physic. Ergo motus non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p3"> | |
| 4763 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing | |
| 4764 are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. | |
| 4765 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34904] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4766 motus praecipue laborem et lassitudinem inducit in operibus. Sed | |
| 4767 operationes, ex hoc quod sunt laboriosae et lassantes, non sunt | |
| 4768 delectabiles, sed magis afflictivae. Ergo motus non est causa | |
| 4769 delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p4"> | |
| 4770 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, | |
| 4771 are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. | |
| 4772 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34905] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4773 motus importat innovationem quandam, quae opponitur consuetudini. | |
| 4774 Sed ea quae sunt consueta, sunt nobis delectabilia, ut philosophus | |
| 4775 dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo motus non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p5"> | |
| 4776 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some | |
| 4777 things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased | |
| 4778 and reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore | |
| 4779 movement seems to cause pleasure. | |
| 4780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34906] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4781 est quod Augustinus dicit, in VIII Confess., <i>quid est hoc, | |
| 4782 domine Deus meus, cum tu aeternum tibi tu ipse sis gaudium; et | |
| 4783 quaedam de te circa te semper gaudeant; quod haec rerum pars | |
| 4784 alterno defectu et profectu, offensionibus et conciliationibus | |
| 4785 gaudet?</i> Ex quo accipitur quod homines gaudent et delectantur in | |
| 4786 quibusdam alternationibus. Et sic motus videtur esse causa | |
| 4787 delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q32_A2-p6"> | |
| 4788 <b>I answer that,</b> Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and | |
| 4789 a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says | |
| 4790 (Ethic. vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our | |
| 4791 nature is changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not | |
| 4792 suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of | |
| 4793 the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: | |
| 4794 thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in | |
| 4795 a certain measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode | |
| 4796 of | |
| 4797 being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because | |
| 4798 man desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change | |
| 4799 in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine | |
| 4800 says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the | |
| 4801 whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please collectively | |
| 4802 more than they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively." | |
| 4803 </p><p id="FS_Q32_A2-p7"> If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the | |
| 4804 continuation of any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its delight at once---to such a one change will | |
| 4805 afford no delight. And the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being continual. | |
| 4806 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 co."><a name="34907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34907] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4807 dicendum quod ad delectationem tria requiruntur, scilicet duo | |
| 4808 quorum est coniunctio delectabilis; et tertium, quod est cognitio | |
| 4809 huius coniunctionis. Et secundum haec tria motus efficitur | |
| 4810 delectabilis, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. et in I Rhetoric. | |
| 4811 Nam ex parte nostra qui delectamur, transmutatio efficitur nobis | |
| 4812 delectabilis propter hoc, quod natura nostra transmutabilis est; et | |
| 4813 propter hoc, quod est nobis conveniens nunc, non erit nobis | |
| 4814 conveniens postea; sicut calefieri ad ignem est conveniens homini | |
| 4815 in hieme, non autem in aestate. Ex parte vero boni delectantis quod | |
| 4816 nobis coniungitur, fit etiam transmutatio delectabilis. Quia actio | |
| 4817 continuata alicuius agentis auget effectum, sicut quanto aliquis | |
| 4818 diutius appropinquat igni, magis calefit et desiccatur. Naturalis | |
| 4819 autem habitudo in quadam mensura consistit. Et ideo quando | |
| 4820 continuata praesentia delectabilis superexcedit mensuram naturalis | |
| 4821 habitudinis, efficitur remotio eius delectabilis. Ex parte vero | |
| 4822 ipsius cognitionis, quia homo desiderat cognoscere aliquod totum et | |
| 4823 perfectum. Cum ergo aliqua non poterunt apprehendi tota simul, | |
| 4824 delectat in his transmutatio, ut unum transeat et alterum succedat, | |
| 4825 et sic totum sentiatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., | |
| 4826 <i>non vis utique stare syllabam, sed transvolare, ut aliae | |
| 4827 veniant, et totum audias. Ita semper omnia ex quibus unum aliquid | |
| 4828 constat, et non sunt omnia simul, plus delectant omnia quam | |
| 4829 singula, si possint sentiri omnia</i>. Si ergo sit aliqua res cuius | |
| 4830 natura sit intransmutabilis; et non possit in ea fieri excessus | |
| 4831 naturalis habitudinis per continuationem delectabilis; et quae | |
| 4832 possit totum suum delectabile simul intueri, non erit ei | |
| 4833 transmutatio delectabilis. Et quanto aliquae delectationes plus ad | |
| 4834 hoc accedunt, tanto plus continuari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p8"> | |
| 4835 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have something | |
| 4836 thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; | |
| 4837 because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in | |
| 4838 so far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes suitable or | |
| 4839 ceases to be, as stated above. | |
| 4840 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34908] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4841 ergo dicendum quod id quod movetur, etsi nondum habeat perfecte id | |
| 4842 ad quod movetur, incipit tamen iam aliquid habere eius ad quod | |
| 4843 movetur, et secundum hoc, ipse motus habet aliquid delectationis. | |
| 4844 Deficit tamen a delectationis perfectione, nam perfectiores | |
| 4845 delectationes sunt in rebus immobilibus. Motus etiam efficitur | |
| 4846 delectabilis, inquantum per ipsum fit aliquid conveniens quod prius | |
| 4847 conveniens non erat, vel desinit esse, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p9"> | |
| 4848 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by removing | |
| 4849 the obstacles to our natural aptitude. | |
| 4850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34909] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4851 dicendum quod motus laborem et lassitudinem inducit, secundum quod | |
| 4852 transcendit habitudinem naturalem. Sic autem motus non est | |
| 4853 delectabilis, sed secundum quod removentur contraria habitudinis | |
| 4854 naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A2-p10"> | |
| 4855 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement | |
| 4856 which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode | |
| 4857 of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement | |
| 4858 become pleasant. | |
| 4859 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34910] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4860 dicendum quod id quod est consuetum, efficitur delectabile, | |
| 4861 inquantum efficitur naturale, nam consuetudo est quasi altera | |
| 4862 natura. Motus autem est delectabilis, non quidem quo receditur a | |
| 4863 consuetudine, sed magis secundum quod per ipsum impeditur corruptio | |
| 4864 naturalis habitudinis, quae posset provenire ex assiduitate | |
| 4865 alicuius operationis. Et sic ex eadem causa connaturalitatis | |
| 4866 efficitur consuetudo delectabilis, et motus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A3-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 3. Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p2"> | |
| 4867 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De | |
| 4868 Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore | |
| 4869 memory and hope do not cause pleasure. | |
| 4870 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34911] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4871 sic proceditur. Videtur quod memoria et spes non sint causae | |
| 4872 delectationis. Delectatio enim est de bono praesenti, ut Damascenus | |
| 4873 dicit. Sed memoria et spes sunt de absenti, est enim memoria | |
| 4874 praeteritorum, spes vero futurorum. Ergo memoria et spes non sunt | |
| 4875 causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p3"> | |
| 4876 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to | |
| 4877 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv"> Prov. 13:12</a>: "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure. | |
| 4878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34912] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4879 idem non est causa contrariorum. Sed spes est causa afflictionis, | |
| 4880 dicitur enim Prov. XIII, <i>spes quae differtur, affligit | |
| 4881 animam</i>. Ergo spes non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p4"> | |
| 4882 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned | |
| 4883 as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love. | |
| 4884 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34913] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4885 sicut spes convenit cum delectatione in eo quod est de bono, ita | |
| 4886 etiam concupiscentia et amor. Non ergo magis debet assignari spes | |
| 4887 causa delectationis, quam concupiscentia vel amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5"> | |
| 4888 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 4889 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv">Rom. 12:12</a>): "Rejoicing in hope"; and ( | |
| 4890 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.76.4" target="asv">Ps. 76:4</a>): "I remembered God, and was delighted." | |
| 4891 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34914] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4892 est quod dicitur Rom. XII, <i>spe gaudentes</i>; et in Psalmo | |
| 4893 LXXVI, <i>memor fui Dei, et delectatus sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p6"> | |
| 4894 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present | |
| 4895 to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in | |
| 4896 reality---i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either actually or potentially. And | |
| 4897 since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of | |
| 4898 knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises | |
| 4899 from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein | |
| 4900 there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining | |
| 4901 the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of | |
| 4902 apprehension. | |
| 4903 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 co."><a name="34915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34915] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4904 dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex praesentia boni convenientis, | |
| 4905 secundum quod sentitur, vel qualitercumque percipitur. Est autem | |
| 4906 aliquid praesens nobis dupliciter, uno modo, secundum cognitionem, | |
| 4907 prout scilicet cognitum est in cognoscente secundum suam | |
| 4908 similitudinem; alio modo, secundum rem, prout scilicet unum alteri | |
| 4909 realiter coniungitur, vel actu vel potentia, secundum quemcumque | |
| 4910 coniunctionis modum. Et quia maior est coniunctio secundum rem quam | |
| 4911 secundum similitudinem, quae est coniunctio cognitionis; itemque | |
| 4912 maior est coniunctio rei in actu quam in potentia, ideo maxima est | |
| 4913 delectatio quae fit per sensum, qui requirit praesentiam rei | |
| 4914 sensibilis. Secundum autem gradum tenet delectatio spei, in qua non | |
| 4915 solum est delectabilis coniunctio secundum apprehensionem, sed | |
| 4916 etiam secundum facultatem vel potestatem adipiscendi bonum quod | |
| 4917 delectat. Tertium autem gradum tenet delectatio memoriae, quae | |
| 4918 habet solam coniunctionem apprehensionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p7"> | |
| 4919 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present, | |
| 4920 i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment. | |
| 4921 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34916] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 4922 ergo dicendum quod spes et memoria sunt quidem eorum quae sunt | |
| 4923 simpliciter absentia, quae tamen secundum quid sunt praesentia, | |
| 4924 scilicet vel secundum apprehensionem solam; vel secundum | |
| 4925 apprehensionem et facultatem, ad minus aestimatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p8"> | |
| 4926 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a | |
| 4927 present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction. | |
| 4928 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34917] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4929 dicendum quod nihil prohibet idem, secundum diversa, esse causam | |
| 4930 contrariorum. Sic igitur spes, inquantum habet praesentem | |
| 4931 aestimationem boni futuri, delectationem causat, inquantum autem | |
| 4932 caret praesentia eius, causat afflictionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A3-p9"> | |
| 4933 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind | |
| 4934 of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, | |
| 4935 since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing | |
| 4936 good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in | |
| 4937 preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away. | |
| 4938 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34918] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4939 dicendum quod etiam amor et concupiscentia delectationem causant. | |
| 4940 Omne enim amatum fit delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam | |
| 4941 unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum. Similiter etiam omne | |
| 4942 concupitum est delectabile concupiscenti, cum concupiscentia sit | |
| 4943 praecipue appetitus delectationis. Sed tamen spes, inquantum | |
| 4944 importat quandam certitudinem realis praesentiae boni delectantis, | |
| 4945 quam non importat nec amor nec concupiscentia, magis ponitur causa | |
| 4946 delectationis quam illa. Et similiter magis quam memoria, quae est | |
| 4947 de eo quod iam transiit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A4-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 4. Whether sadness causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p2"> | |
| 4948 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. | |
| 4949 Therefore it does not cause it. | |
| 4950 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34919] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4951 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non sit causa delectationis. | |
| 4952 Contrarium enim non est causa contrarii. Sed tristitia contrariatur | |
| 4953 delectationi. Ergo non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p3"> | |
| 4954 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when | |
| 4955 remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure. | |
| 4956 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34920] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4957 contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Sed delectabilia memorata | |
| 4958 sunt causa delectationis. Ergo tristia memorata sunt causa doloris, | |
| 4959 et non delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p4"> | |
| 4960 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, | |
| 4961 as stated above ( | |
| 4962 <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q32_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[2]</a>). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure. | |
| 4963 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34921] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4964 sicut se habet tristitia ad delectationem, ita odium ad amorem. Sed | |
| 4965 odium non est causa amoris, sed magis e converso, ut supra dictum | |
| 4966 est. Ergo tristitia non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p5"> | |
| 4967 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 4968 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.41.4" target="asv">Ps. 41:4</a>): "My tears have been my bread day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise | |
| 4969 from sadness, can give pleasure. | |
| 4970 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34922] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 4971 est quod in Psalmo XLI, dicitur, <i>fuerunt mihi lacrimae meae | |
| 4972 panes die ac nocte</i>. Per panem autem refectio delectationis | |
| 4973 intelligitur. Ergo lacrimae, quae ex tristitia oriuntur, possunt | |
| 4974 esse delectabiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p6"> | |
| 4975 <b>I answer that,</b> Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can | |
| 4976 cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, | |
| 4977 the absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a | |
| 4978 cause of pleasure, on account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked | |
| 4979 upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and | |
| 4980 pain, so much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes | |
| 4981 in joy we call to mind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling pain . . . and in | |
| 4982 proportion are the more filled with joy and gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril there was | |
| 4983 in the | |
| 4984 battle, so much the more joy will there be in the triumph." | |
| 4985 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 co."><a name="34923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34923] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 4986 dicendum quod tristitia potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, | |
| 4987 secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria. | |
| 4988 Et utroque modo tristitia potest esse delectationis causa. | |
| 4989 Tristitia siquidem in actu existens est causa delectationis, | |
| 4990 inquantum facit memoriam rei dilectae, de cuius absentia aliquis | |
| 4991 tristatur, et tamen de sola eius apprehensione delectatur. Memoria | |
| 4992 autem tristitiae fit causa delectationis, propter subsequentem | |
| 4993 evasionem. Nam carere malo accipitur in ratione boni, unde secundum | |
| 4994 quod homo apprehendit se evasisse ab aliquibus tristibus et | |
| 4995 dolorosis, accrescit ei gaudii materia; secundum quod Augustinus | |
| 4996 dicit, XXII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>saepe laeti tristium meminimus, et | |
| 4997 sani dolorum sine dolore, et inde amplius laeti et grati sumus</i>. | |
| 4998 Et in VIII Confess. dicit quod <i>quanto maius fuit periculum in | |
| 4999 proelio, tanto maius erit gaudium in triumpho</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p7"> | |
| 5000 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as stated in | |
| 5001 Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension | |
| 5002 of something pleasant. | |
| 5003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34924] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5004 ergo dicendum quod contrarium quandoque per accidens est causa | |
| 5005 contrarii, sicut frigidum quandoque calefacit, ut dicitur in VIII | |
| 5006 Physic. Et similiter tristitia per accidens est delectationis | |
| 5007 causa, inquantum fit per eam apprehensio alicuius delectabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p8"> | |
| 5008 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far | |
| 5009 as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause | |
| 5010 sadness. | |
| 5011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34925] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5012 dicendum quod tristia memorata, inquantum sunt tristia et | |
| 5013 delectabilibus contraria, non causant delectationem, sed inquantum | |
| 5014 ab eis homo liberatur. Et similiter memoria delectabilium, ex eo | |
| 5015 quod sunt amissa, potest causare tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A4-p9"> | |
| 5016 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one | |
| 5017 and the same thing. | |
| 5018 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34926] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5019 dicendum quod odium etiam per accidens potest esse causa amoris, | |
| 5020 prout scilicet aliqui diligunt se, inquantum conveniunt in odio | |
| 5021 unius et eiusdem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A5-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 5. Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p2"> | |
| 5022 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good | |
| 5023 when conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us. | |
| 5024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34927] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 5025 sic proceditur. Videtur quod actiones aliorum non sint nobis | |
| 5026 delectationis causa. Causa enim delectationis est proprium bonum | |
| 5027 coniunctum. Sed aliorum operationes non sunt nobis coniunctae. Ergo | |
| 5028 non sunt nobis causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p3"> | |
| 5029 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the | |
| 5030 same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue. | |
| 5031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34928] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5032 operatio est proprium bonum operantis. Si igitur operationes | |
| 5033 aliorum sint nobis causa delectationis, pari ratione omnia alia | |
| 5034 bona aliorum erunt nobis delectationis causa. Quod patet esse | |
| 5035 falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p4"> | |
| 5036 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon | |
| 5037 the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed | |
| 5038 from habits existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents. Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing | |
| 5039 to us, but to the agents themselves. | |
| 5040 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34929] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5041 operatio est delectabilis, inquantum procedit ex habitu nobis | |
| 5042 innato, unde dicitur in II Ethic., quod <i>signum generati habitus | |
| 5043 oportet accipere fientem in opere delectationem</i>. Sed | |
| 5044 operationes aliorum non procedunt ex habitibus qui in nobis sunt, | |
| 5045 sed interdum ex habitibus qui sunt in operantibus. Non ergo | |
| 5046 operationes aliorum sunt nobis delectabiles, sed ipsis | |
| 5047 operantibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p5"> | |
| 5048 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the second canonical epistle of John (verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking | |
| 5049 in truth." | |
| 5050 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34930] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5051 est quod dicitur in secunda canonica Ioannis, <i>gavisus sum valde, | |
| 5052 quoniam inveni de filiis tuis ambulantes in veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6"> | |
| 5053 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 5054 <a href="#FS_Q32_A1" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper good, and the knowledge of having | |
| 5055 obtained it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain some | |
| 5056 good through the action of another. And in this way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us: since | |
| 5057 it is pleasant to be benefited by | |
| 5058 another. Secondly, from the fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men | |
| 5059 take pleasure in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves. | |
| 5060 And since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure | |
| 5061 in being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. | |
| 5062 And as love is for something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, | |
| 5063 inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from | |
| 5064 the fact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes | |
| 5065 a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as | |
| 5066 being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written ( | |
| 5067 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:6</a>) that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." | |
| 5068 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 co."><a name="34931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34931] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5069 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ad delectationem duo | |
| 5070 requiruntur, scilicet consecutio proprii boni, et cognitio proprii | |
| 5071 boni consecuti. Tripliciter ergo operatio alterius potest esse | |
| 5072 delectationis causa. Uno modo, inquantum per operationem alicuius | |
| 5073 consequimur aliquod bonum. Et secundum hoc, operationes illorum qui | |
| 5074 nobis aliquod bonum faciunt, sunt nobis delectabiles, quia bene | |
| 5075 pati ab alio est delectabile. Alio modo, secundum quod per | |
| 5076 operationes aliorum efficitur nobis aliqua cognitio vel aestimatio | |
| 5077 proprii boni. Et propter hoc homines delectantur in hoc quod | |
| 5078 laudantur vel honorantur ab aliis, quia scilicet per hoc accipiunt | |
| 5079 aestimationem in seipsis aliquod bonum esse. Et quia ista | |
| 5080 aestimatio fortius generatur ex testimonio bonorum et sapientum, | |
| 5081 ideo in horum laudibus et honoribus homines magis delectantur. Et | |
| 5082 quia adulator est apparens laudator, propter hoc etiam adulationes | |
| 5083 quibusdam sunt delectabiles. Et quia amor est alicuius boni, et | |
| 5084 admiratio est alicuius magni, idcirco amari ab aliis, et in | |
| 5085 admiratione haberi, est delectabile; inquantum per hoc fit homini | |
| 5086 aestimatio propriae bonitatis vel magnitudinis, in quibus aliquis | |
| 5087 delectatur. Tertio modo, inquantum ipsae operationes aliorum, si | |
| 5088 sint bonae, aestimantur ut bonum proprium, propter vim amoris, qui | |
| 5089 facit aestimare amicum quasi eundem sibi. Et propter odium, quod | |
| 5090 facit aestimare bonum alterius esse sibi contrarium, efficitur mala | |
| 5091 operatio inimici delectabilis. Unde dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, quod | |
| 5092 <i>caritas non gaudet super iniquitate, congaudet autem | |
| 5093 veritati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p7"> | |
| 5094 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way; | |
| 5095 or by affection, as in the third way. | |
| 5096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34932] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5097 ergo dicendum quod operatio alterius potest esse mihi coniuncta vel | |
| 5098 per effectum, sicut in primo modo; vel per apprehensionem, sicut in | |
| 5099 secundo modo; vel per affectionem, sicut in tertio modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p8"> | |
| 5100 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument avails for the third mode, but not for the first two. | |
| 5101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34933] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5102 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad tertium modum, non | |
| 5103 autem quantum ad duos primos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A5-p9"> | |
| 5104 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives | |
| 5105 pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by | |
| 5106 love. | |
| 5107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34934] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5108 dicendum quod operationes aliorum etsi non procedant ex habitibus | |
| 5109 qui in me sunt, causant tamen in me aliquid delectabile; vel | |
| 5110 faciunt mihi aestimationem sive apprehensionem proprii habitus; vel | |
| 5111 procedunt ex habitu illius qui est unum mecum per amorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A6-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 6. Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p2"> | |
| 5112 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's | |
| 5113 proper good, as stated above ( | |
| 5114 <a href="#FS_Q32_A1" id="FS_Q32_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore it seems | |
| 5115 to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure. | |
| 5116 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34935] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 5117 sic proceditur. Videtur quod benefacere alteri non sit | |
| 5118 delectationis causa. Delectatio enim causatur ex consecutione | |
| 5119 proprii boni, sicut supra dictum est. Sed benefacere non pertinet | |
| 5120 ad consecutionem proprii boni, sed magis ad emissionem. Ergo magis | |
| 5121 videtur esse causa tristitiae quam delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p3"> | |
| 5122 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is a | |
| 5123 mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone | |
| 5124 takes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not | |
| 5125 a cause of pleasure. | |
| 5126 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34936] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5127 philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>illiberalitas | |
| 5128 connaturalior est hominibus quam prodigalitas</i>. Sed ad | |
| 5129 prodigalitatem pertinet benefacere aliis, ad illiberalitatem autem | |
| 5130 pertinet desistere a benefaciendo. Cum ergo operatio connaturalis | |
| 5131 sit delectabilis unicuique, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., videtur | |
| 5132 quod benefacere aliis non sit causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p4"> | |
| 5133 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such | |
| 5134 as overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, | |
| 5135 11). Therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure. | |
| 5136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34937] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5137 contrarii effectus ex contrariis causis procedunt. Sed quaedam quae | |
| 5138 pertinent ad malefacere, sunt naturaliter homini delectabilia, | |
| 5139 sicut vincere, redarguere vel increpare alios, et etiam punire, | |
| 5140 quantum ad iratos, ut dicit philosophus in I Rhetoric. Ergo | |
| 5141 benefacere magis est causa tristitiae quam delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p5"> | |
| 5142 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers." | |
| 5143 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34938] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5144 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod <i>largiri et | |
| 5145 auxiliari amicis aut extraneis, est delectabilissimum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p6"> | |
| 5146 <b>I answer that,</b> Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred | |
| 5147 on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, | |
| 5148 we take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of | |
| 5149 the end; as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either | |
| 5150 from God or from man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to | |
| 5151 another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing | |
| 5152 good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof | |
| 5153 he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their children, and in their own works, as being things | |
| 5154 on which | |
| 5155 they bestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual inclination to do good, by reason of which doing | |
| 5156 good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others. The third principle is | |
| 5157 the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for | |
| 5158 a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure. | |
| 5159 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 co."><a name="34939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34939] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5160 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est benefacere alteri, potest | |
| 5161 tripliciter esse delectationis causa. Uno modo, per comparationem | |
| 5162 ad effectum, quod est bonum in altero constitutum. Et secundum hoc, | |
| 5163 inquantum bonum alterius reputamus quasi nostrum bonum, propter | |
| 5164 unionem amoris, delectamur in bono quod per nos fit aliis, | |
| 5165 praecipue amicis, sicut in bono proprio. Alio modo, per | |
| 5166 comparationem ad finem, sicut cum aliquis, per hoc quod alteri | |
| 5167 benefacit, sperat consequi aliquod bonum sibi ipsi, vel a Deo vel | |
| 5168 ab homine. Spes autem delectationis est causa. Tertio modo, per | |
| 5169 comparationem ad principium. Et sic hoc quod est benefacere alteri, | |
| 5170 potest esse delectabile per comparationem ad triplex principium. | |
| 5171 Quorum unum est facultas benefaciendi, et secundum hoc, benefacere | |
| 5172 alteri fit delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini quaedam | |
| 5173 imaginatio abundantis boni in seipso existentis, ex quo possit | |
| 5174 aliis communicare. Et ideo homines delectantur in filiis et in | |
| 5175 propriis operibus, sicut quibus communicant proprium bonum. Aliud | |
| 5176 principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit | |
| 5177 alicui connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis. | |
| 5178 Tertium principium est motivum, puta cum aliquis movetur ab aliquo | |
| 5179 quem diligit, ad benefaciendum alicui, omnia enim quae facimus vel | |
| 5180 patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor praecipua | |
| 5181 causa delectationis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p7"> | |
| 5182 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of | |
| 5183 sadness; for instance when it is excessive. | |
| 5184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34940] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5185 ergo dicendum quod emissio, inquantum est indicativa proprii boni, | |
| 5186 est delectabilis. Sed inquantum evacuat proprium bonum potest esse | |
| 5187 contristans; sicut quando est immoderata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p8"> | |
| 5188 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature. | |
| 5189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34941] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5190 dicendum quod prodigalitas habet immoderatam emissionem, quae | |
| 5191 repugnat naturae. Et ideo prodigalitas dicitur esse contra | |
| 5192 naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A6-p9"> | |
| 5193 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's own | |
| 5194 good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man | |
| 5195 to appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility | |
| 5196 of winning it, afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, | |
| 5197 in so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine | |
| 5198 himself to be wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as | |
| 5199 by scolding and reproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to an angry | |
| 5200 man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous hurt: | |
| 5201 for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying | |
| 5202 back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is | |
| 5203 not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good. | |
| 5204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34942] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5205 dicendum quod vincere, redarguere et punire, non est delectabile | |
| 5206 inquantum est in malum alterius, sed inquantum pertinet ad proprium | |
| 5207 bonum, quod plus homo amat quam odiat malum alterius. Vincere enim | |
| 5208 est delectabile naturaliter, inquantum per hoc homini fit | |
| 5209 aestimatio propriae excellentiae. Et propter hoc, omnes ludi in | |
| 5210 quibus est concertatio, et in quibus potest esse victoria, sunt | |
| 5211 maxime delectabiles, et universaliter omnes concertationes, | |
| 5212 secundum quod habent spem victoriae. Redarguere autem et increpare | |
| 5213 potest esse dupliciter delectationis causa. Uno modo, inquantum | |
| 5214 facit homini imaginationem propriae sapientiae et excellentiae, | |
| 5215 increpare enim et corripere est sapientum et maiorum alio modo, | |
| 5216 secundum quod aliquis, increpando et reprehendendo, alteri | |
| 5217 benefacit, quod est delectabile, ut dictum est. Irato autem est | |
| 5218 delectabile punire, inquantum videtur removere apparentem | |
| 5219 minorationem, quae videtur esse ex praecedenti laesione. Cum enim | |
| 5220 aliquis est ab aliquo laesus, videtur per hoc ab illo minoratus | |
| 5221 esse, et ideo appetit ab hac minoratione liberari per retributionem | |
| 5222 laesionis. Et sic patet quod benefacere alteri per se potest esse | |
| 5223 delectabile, sed malefacere alteri non est delectabile, nisi | |
| 5224 inquantum videtur pertinere ad proprium bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A7-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 7. Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p2"> | |
| 5225 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. | |
| 5226 But "it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than | |
| 5227 likeness, is a cause of pleasure. | |
| 5228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34943] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum | |
| 5229 sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa | |
| 5230 delectationis. Principari enim et praeesse quandam dissimilitudinem | |
| 5231 importat. Sed principari et praeesse naturaliter est delectabile, | |
| 5232 ut dicitur in I Rhetoric. Ergo dissimilitudo magis est causa | |
| 5233 delectationis quam similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p3"> | |
| 5234 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures, | |
| 5235 as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure. | |
| 5236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34944] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5237 nihil magis est dissimile delectationi quam tristitia. Sed illi qui | |
| 5238 patiuntur tristitias, maxime sequuntur delectationes, ut dicitur in | |
| 5239 VII Ethic. Ergo dissimilitudo est magis causa delectationis quam | |
| 5240 similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p4"> | |
| 5241 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated | |
| 5242 with food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure. | |
| 5243 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34945] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5244 illi qui sunt repleti aliquibus delectabilibus, non delectantur in | |
| 5245 eis, sed magis fastidiunt ea, sicut patet in repletione ciborum. | |
| 5246 Non ergo similitudo est delectationis causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p5"> | |
| 5247 <b>On the contrary,</b> Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated ( | |
| 5248 <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q32_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure. | |
| 5249 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34946] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5250 est quod similitudo est causa amoris, ut dictum est supra. Amor | |
| 5251 autem est causa delectationis. Ergo similitudo est causa | |
| 5252 delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q32_A7-p6"> | |
| 5253 <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, | |
| 5254 as stated above ( | |
| 5255 <a href="#FS_Q27_A3" id="FS_Q32_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>). And if that which is like us does not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man | |
| 5256 in respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes | |
| 5257 disgust or sadness, not as being like and | |
| 5258 one with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us. | |
| 5259 </p><p id="FS_Q32_A7-p7"> Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, | |
| 5260 by a kind of excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous | |
| 5261 good or any bodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's own good: thus a potter dislikes | |
| 5262 other potters, not because they are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or | |
| 5263 profits, which he seeks as his own good. | |
| 5264 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 co."><a name="34947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34947] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5265 dicendum quod similitudo est quaedam unitas, unde id quod est | |
| 5266 simile, inquantum est unum, est delectabile, sicut et amabile, ut | |
| 5267 supra dictum est. Et si quidem id quod est simile, proprium bonum | |
| 5268 non corrumpat, sed augeat, est simpliciter delectabile, puta homo | |
| 5269 homini, et iuvenis iuveni. Si vero sit corruptivum proprii boni, | |
| 5270 sic per accidens efficitur fastidiosum vel contristans; non quidem | |
| 5271 inquantum est simile et unum, sed inquantum corrumpit id quod est | |
| 5272 magis unum. Quod autem aliquid simile corrumpat proprium bonum, | |
| 5273 contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia corrumpit mensuram proprii | |
| 5274 boni per quendam excessum, bonum enim, praecipue corporale, ut | |
| 5275 sanitas, in quadam commensuratione consistit. Et propter hoc, | |
| 5276 superabundantes cibi, vel quaelibet delectationes corporales, | |
| 5277 fastidiuntur. Alio modo, per directam contrarietatem ad proprium | |
| 5278 bonum, sicut figuli abominantur alios figulos, non inquantum sunt | |
| 5279 figuli, sed inquantum per eos amittunt excellentiam propriam, sive | |
| 5280 proprium lucrum, quae appetunt sicut proprium bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p8"> | |
| 5281 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since ruler and subject are in communion with one another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is | |
| 5282 conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they | |
| 5283 belong to men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another | |
| 5284 reason is that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is | |
| 5285 pleasant. | |
| 5286 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34948] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5287 ergo dicendum quod, cum sit quaedam communicatio principantis ad | |
| 5288 subiectum, est ibi quaedam similitudo. Tamen secundum quandam | |
| 5289 excellentiam, eo quod principari et praeesse pertinent ad | |
| 5290 excellentiam proprii boni, sapientum enim et meliorum est | |
| 5291 principari et praeesse. Unde per hoc fit homini propriae bonitatis | |
| 5292 imaginatio. Vel quia per hoc quod homo principatur et praeest, | |
| 5293 aliis benefacit, quod est delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p9"> | |
| 5294 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is sorrowful: | |
| 5295 because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so | |
| 5296 far as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more | |
| 5297 sought than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall state | |
| 5298 later on ( | |
| 5299 <a href="#FS_Q35_A5" id="FS_Q32_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[5]</a>). And this explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and movement. For | |
| 5300 this reason also young people are most inclined to seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject, | |
| 5301 while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: | |
| 5302 because his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. | |
| 5303 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34949] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5304 dicendum quod id in quo delectatur tristatus, etsi non sit simile | |
| 5305 tristitiae, est tamen simile homini contristato. Quia tristitiae | |
| 5306 contrariantur proprio bono eius qui tristatur. Et ideo appetitur | |
| 5307 delectatio ab his qui in tristitia sunt, ut conferens ad proprium | |
| 5308 bonum, inquantum est medicativa contrarii. Et ista est causa quare | |
| 5309 delectationes corporales, quibus sunt contrariae quaedam | |
| 5310 tristitiae, magis appetuntur, quam delectationes intellectuales, | |
| 5311 quae non habent contrarietatem tristitiae, ut infra dicetur. Exinde | |
| 5312 etiam est quod omnia animalia naturaliter appetunt delectationem, | |
| 5313 quia semper animal laborat per sensum et motum. Et propter hoc | |
| 5314 etiam iuvenes maxime delectationes appetunt; propter multas | |
| 5315 transmutationes in eis existentes, dum sunt in statu augmenti. Et | |
| 5316 etiam melancholici vehementer appetunt delectationes, ad | |
| 5317 expellendum tristitiam, quia corpus eorum quasi pravo humore | |
| 5318 corroditur, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A7-p10"> | |
| 5319 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and consequently | |
| 5320 gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man. | |
| 5321 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34950] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5322 dicendum quod bona corporalia in quadam mensura consistunt, et ideo | |
| 5323 superexcessus similium corrumpit proprium bonum. Et propter hoc | |
| 5324 efficitur fastidiosum et contristans, inquantum contrariatur bono | |
| 5325 proprio hominis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q32_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q32_A8-p0.1">Q. 32. A. 8. Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p2"> | |
| 5326 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something, | |
| 5327 as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure. | |
| 5328 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34951] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum | |
| 5329 sic proceditur. Videtur quod admiratio non sit causa delectationis. | |
| 5330 Admirari enim est ignorantis naturae, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed | |
| 5331 ignorantia non est delectabilis, sed magis scientia. Ergo admiratio | |
| 5332 non est causa delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p3"> | |
| 5333 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning | |
| 5334 of Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says | |
| 5335 (Ethic. x, 7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises | |
| 5336 from an operation which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders | |
| 5337 rather than causes pleasure. | |
| 5338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34952] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5339 admiratio est principium sapientiae, quasi via ad inquirendum | |
| 5340 veritatem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. <i>Sed delectabilius | |
| 5341 est contemplari iam cognita, quam inquirere ignota</i>, ut | |
| 5342 philosophus dicit in X Ethic., cum hoc habeat difficultatem et | |
| 5343 impedimentum, illud autem non habeat; delectatio autem causatur ex | |
| 5344 operatione non impedita, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo admiratio | |
| 5345 non est causa delectationis, sed magis delectationem impedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p4"> | |
| 5346 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. | |
| 5347 But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of | |
| 5348 pleasure. | |
| 5349 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34953] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5350 unusquisque in consuetis delectatur, unde operationes habituum per | |
| 5351 consuetudinem acquisitorum, sunt delectabiles. Sed consueta non | |
| 5352 sunt admirabilia, ut dicit Augustinus, super Ioan. Ergo admiratio | |
| 5353 contrariatur causae delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p5"> | |
| 5354 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure. | |
| 5355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34954] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5356 est quod philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod admiratio est | |
| 5357 delectationis causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p6"> | |
| 5358 <b>I answer that,</b> It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above ( | |
| 5359 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q32_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very | |
| 5360 increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which | |
| 5361 is loved, since it was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a | |
| 5362 kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, | |
| 5363 or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes | |
| 5364 a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance | |
| 5365 things that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to | |
| 5366 pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper | |
| 5367 and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered | |
| 5368 from great danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. | |
| 5369 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 co."><a name="34955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34955] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5370 dicendum quod adipisci desiderata est delectabile, ut supra dictum | |
| 5371 est. Et ideo quanto alicuius rei amatae magis crescit desiderium, | |
| 5372 tanto magis per adeptionem crescit delectatio. Et etiam in ipso | |
| 5373 augmento desiderii fit augmentum delectationis, secundum quod fit | |
| 5374 etiam spes rei amatae; sicut supra dictum est quod ipsum desiderium | |
| 5375 ex spe est delectabile. Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam | |
| 5376 sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et | |
| 5377 ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit | |
| 5378 cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa | |
| 5379 delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi | |
| 5380 cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat. Et propter hoc omnia | |
| 5381 mirabilia sunt delectabilia, sicut quae sunt rara, et omnes | |
| 5382 repraesentationes rerum, etiam quae in se non sunt delectabiles; | |
| 5383 gaudet enim anima in collatione unius ad alterum, quia conferre | |
| 5384 unum alteri est proprius et connaturalis actus rationis, ut | |
| 5385 philosophus dicit in sua poetica. Et propter hoc etiam <i>liberari | |
| 5386 a magnis periculis magis est delectabile, quia est admirabile</i>, | |
| 5387 ut dicitur in I Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p7"> | |
| 5388 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and | |
| 5389 in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to | |
| 5390 another reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be.] | |
| 5391 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34956] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5392 ergo dicendum quod admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet | |
| 5393 ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet desiderium addiscendi causam; et | |
| 5394 inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem | |
| 5395 non aestimabat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p8"> | |
| 5396 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more | |
| 5397 perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more | |
| 5398 pleasing than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, it happens that research is sometimes more | |
| 5399 pleasing accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater | |
| 5400 desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning | |
| 5401 things for the first time. | |
| 5402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34957] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5403 dicendum quod delectatio duo habet, scilicet quietem in bono, et | |
| 5404 huiusmodi quietis perceptionem. Quantum igitur ad primum, cum sit | |
| 5405 perfectius contemplari veritatem cognitam quam inquirere ignotam, | |
| 5406 contemplationes rerum scitarum, per se loquendo, sunt magis | |
| 5407 delectabiles quam inquisitiones rerum ignotarum. Tamen per | |
| 5408 accidens, quantum ad secundum, contingit quod inquisitiones sunt | |
| 5409 quandoque delectabiliores, secundum quod ex maiori desiderio | |
| 5410 procedunt, desiderium autem maius excitatur ex perceptione | |
| 5411 ignorantiae. Unde maxime homo delectatur in his quae de novo | |
| 5412 invenit aut addiscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q32_A8-p9"> | |
| 5413 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of | |
| 5414 rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in | |
| 5415 so far as they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely | |
| 5416 in things that are new," as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation | |
| 5417 causes more perfect pleasure. | |
| 5418 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 32 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34958] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5419 dicendum quod ea quae sunt consueta, sunt delectabilia ad | |
| 5420 operandum, inquantum sunt quasi connaturalia. Sed tamen ea quae | |
| 5421 sunt rara, possunt esse delectabilia, vel ratione cognitionis, quia | |
| 5422 desideratur eorum scientia, inquantum sunt mira; vel ratione | |
| 5423 operationis, <i>quia ex desiderio magis inclinatur mens ad hoc quod | |
| 5424 intense in novitate operetur</i>, ut dicitur in X Ethic.; | |
| 5425 perfectior enim operatio causat perfectiorem delectationem.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 5426 <div id="FS_Q33" class="div3"> | |
| 5427 <h3 id="FS_Q33-p0.1">Q. 33. OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 5428 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 5429 <p id="FS_Q33-p2"> We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q33-p3"><a href="#FS_Q33_A1"> (1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p4"><a href="#FS_Q33_A2"> (2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p5"><a href="#FS_Q33_A3"> (3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q33-p6"><a href="#FS_Q33_A4"> (4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?</a></p> | |
| 5430 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 pr."><a name="34959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34959] | |
| 5431 Iª-IIae q. 33 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 5432 effectibus delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, | |
| 5433 utrum delectationis sit dilatare. Secundo, utrum delectatio causet | |
| 5434 sui sitim, vel desiderium. Tertio, utrum delectatio impediat usum | |
| 5435 rationis. Quarto, utrum delectatio perficiat operationem.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 5436 <div id="FS_Q33_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A1-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 1. Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2"> | |
| 5437 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the | |
| 5438 Apostle ( | |
| 5439 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:11</a>): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written ( | |
| 5440 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.96" target="asv">Ps. 118:96</a>) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore | |
| 5441 expansion is not an effect of pleasure. | |
| 5442 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34960] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5443 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dilatatio non sit effectus | |
| 5444 delectationis. Dilatatio enim videtur ad amorem magis pertinere, | |
| 5445 secundum quod dicit apostolus, II ad Cor. VI, <i>cor nostrum | |
| 5446 dilatatum est</i>. Unde et de praecepto caritatis in Psalmo CXVIII, | |
| 5447 dicitur, <i>latum mandatum tuum nimis</i>. Sed delectatio est alia | |
| 5448 passio ab amore. Ergo dilatatio non est effectus delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p3"> | |
| 5449 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not | |
| 5450 yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure. | |
| 5451 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34961] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5452 ex hoc quod aliquid dilatatur, efficitur capacius ad recipiendum. | |
| 5453 Sed receptio pertinet ad desiderium, quod est rei nondum habitae. | |
| 5454 Ergo dilatatio magis videtur pertinere ad desiderium quam ad | |
| 5455 delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p4"> | |
| 5456 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that which | |
| 5457 we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does | |
| 5458 not pertain to pleasure. | |
| 5459 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34962] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5460 constrictio dilatationi opponitur. Sed constrictio videtur ad | |
| 5461 delectationem pertinere, nam illud constringimus quod firmiter | |
| 5462 volumus retinere; et talis est affectio appetitus circa rem | |
| 5463 delectantem. Ergo dilatatio ad delectationem non pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5"> | |
| 5464 <b>On the contrary,</b> In order to express joy, it is written ( | |
| 5465 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.60.5" target="asv">Is. 60:5</a>): "Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged." Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" | |
| 5466 as being derived from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ( | |
| 5467 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[31], A[3]</a>, ad 3). | |
| 5468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34963] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5469 est quod, ad expressionem gaudii, dicitur Isaiae LX, <i>videbis, et | |
| 5470 affluens, et mirabitur et dilatabitur cor tuum</i>. Ipsa etiam | |
| 5471 delectatio ex dilatatione nomen accepit ut laetitia nominetur sicut | |
| 5472 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p6"> | |
| 5473 <b>I answer that,</b> Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically. | |
| 5474 Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite | |
| 5475 for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable | |
| 5476 good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a | |
| 5477 certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or | |
| 5478 expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable | |
| 5479 object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure, | |
| 5480 as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure. | |
| 5481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 co."><a name="34964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34964] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5482 dicendum quod latitudo est quaedam dimensio magnitudinis | |
| 5483 corporalis, unde in affectionibus animae non nisi secundum | |
| 5484 metaphoram dicitur. Dilatatio autem dicitur quasi motus ad | |
| 5485 latitudinem. Et competit delectationi secundum duo quae ad | |
| 5486 delectationem requiruntur. Quorum unum est ex parte apprehensivae | |
| 5487 virtutis, quae apprehendit coniunctionem alicuius boni | |
| 5488 convenientis. Ex hac autem apprehensione apprehendit se homo | |
| 5489 perfectionem quandam adeptum, quae est spiritualis magnitudo, et | |
| 5490 secundum hoc, animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari, | |
| 5491 seu dilatari. Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae | |
| 5492 assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens | |
| 5493 ei ad eam interius capiendam. Et sic dilatatur affectus hominis per | |
| 5494 delectationem, quasi se tradens ad continendum interius rem | |
| 5495 delectantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p7"> | |
| 5496 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different things according to | |
| 5497 different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection | |
| 5498 of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. On the | |
| 5499 other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more | |
| 5500 ample in itself so as to become more capacious. | |
| 5501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34965] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5502 ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae dicuntur metaphorice, | |
| 5503 idem diversis attribui secundum diversas similitudines. Et secundum | |
| 5504 hoc, dilatatio pertinet ad amorem ratione cuiusdam extensionis, | |
| 5505 inquantum affectus amantis ad alios extenditur, ut curet non solum | |
| 5506 quae sua sunt, sed quae aliorum. Ad delectationem vero pertinet | |
| 5507 dilatatio, inquantum aliquid in seipso ampliatur, ut quasi capacius | |
| 5508 reddatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p8"> | |
| 5509 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the | |
| 5510 presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure | |
| 5511 in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end of desire. | |
| 5512 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34966] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5513 dicendum quod desiderium habet quidem aliquam ampliationem ex | |
| 5514 imaginatione rei desideratae, sed multo magis ex praesentia rei iam | |
| 5515 delectantis. Quia magis praebet se animus rei iam delectanti, quam | |
| 5516 rei non habitae desideratae, cum delectatio sit finis | |
| 5517 desiderii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A1-p9"> | |
| 5518 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that | |
| 5519 he may enjoy it perfectly. | |
| 5520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34967] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5521 dicendum quod ille qui delectatur, constringit quidem rem | |
| 5522 delectantem, dum ei fortiter inhaeret, sed cor suum ampliat, ut | |
| 5523 perfecte delectabili fruatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A2-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 2. Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2"> | |
| 5524 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But pleasure | |
| 5525 is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as stated above ( | |
| 5526 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; | |
| 5527 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q33_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire. | |
| 5528 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34968] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5529 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non causet desiderium sui | |
| 5530 ipsius. Omnis enim motus cessat, cum pervenerit ad quietem. Sed | |
| 5531 delectatio est quasi quaedam quies motus desiderii, ut supra dictum | |
| 5532 est. Cessat ergo motus desiderii, cum ad delectationem pervenerit. | |
| 5533 Non ergo delectatio causat desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p3"> | |
| 5534 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since | |
| 5535 desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure | |
| 5536 does not cause desire for itself. | |
| 5537 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34969] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5538 oppositum non est causa sui oppositi. Sed delectatio quodammodo | |
| 5539 desiderio opponitur, ex parte obiecti, nam desiderium est boni non | |
| 5540 habiti, delectatio vero boni iam habiti. Ergo delectatio non causat | |
| 5541 desiderium sui ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p4"> | |
| 5542 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire. | |
| 5543 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34970] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5544 fastidium desiderio repugnat. Sed delectatio plerumque causat | |
| 5545 fastidium. Non ergo facit sui desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p5"> | |
| 5546 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( | |
| 5547 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes | |
| 5548 pleasures of the body. | |
| 5549 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34971] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5550 est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, <i>qui biberit ex hac aqua, | |
| 5551 sitiet iterum</i>, per aquam autem significatur, secundum | |
| 5552 Augustinum, delectatio corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p6"> | |
| 5553 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst, | |
| 5554 or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, | |
| 5555 as excluding distaste. | |
| 5556 </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p7"> Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; | |
| 5557 provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the | |
| 5558 appetite in respect of something actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed: | |
| 5559 and this may be on the part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing | |
| 5560 possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it | |
| 5561 successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with | |
| 5562 the first part of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all | |
| 5563 bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some | |
| 5564 movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses a thing | |
| 5565 which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this | |
| 5566 life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; | |
| 5567 in which sense we may understand the words of | |
| 5568 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv"> Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that drink me shall yet thirst." | |
| 5569 </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p8"> On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more | |
| 5570 than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by | |
| 5571 reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted; | |
| 5572 as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in | |
| 5573 bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed | |
| 5574 the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest | |
| 5575 delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily | |
| 5576 powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those words of | |
| 5577 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv"> | |
| 5578 Ecclus. 24:29 | |
| 5579 </a>: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written | |
| 5580 ( | |
| 5581 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>) that they "desire to look at Him." | |
| 5582 </p><p id="FS_Q33_A2-p9"> Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural | |
| 5583 tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced | |
| 5584 the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure, | |
| 5585 but distaste: for instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion. | |
| 5586 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 co."><a name="34972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34972] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5587 dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, | |
| 5588 secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria. | |
| 5589 Item sitis, vel desiderium, potest dupliciter accipi, uno modo, | |
| 5590 proprie, secundum quod importat appetitum rei non habitae; alio | |
| 5591 modo, communiter, secundum quod importat exclusionem fastidii. | |
| 5592 Secundum quidem igitur quod est in actu, delectatio non causat | |
| 5593 sitim vel desiderium sui ipsius, per se loquendo, sed solum per | |
| 5594 accidens, si tamen sitis vel desiderium dicatur rei non habitae | |
| 5595 appetitus, nam delectatio est affectio appetitus circa rem | |
| 5596 praesentem. Sed contingit rem praesentem non perfecte haberi. Et | |
| 5597 hoc potest esse vel ex parte rei habitae, vel ex parte habentis. Ex | |
| 5598 parte quidem rei habitae, eo quod res habita non est tota simul, | |
| 5599 unde successive recipitur, et dum aliquis delectatur in eo quod | |
| 5600 habet, desiderat potiri eo quod restat; sicut qui audit primam | |
| 5601 partem versus, et in hoc delectatur, desiderat alteram partem | |
| 5602 versus audire, ut Augustinus dicit, IV Confess. Et hoc modo omnes | |
| 5603 fere delectationes corporales faciunt sui ipsarum sitim, quousque | |
| 5604 consummentur, eo quod tales delectationes consequuntur aliquem | |
| 5605 motum, sicut patet in delectationibus ciborum. Ex parte autem | |
| 5606 ipsius habentis, sicut cum aliquis aliquam rem in se perfectam | |
| 5607 existentem, non statim perfecte habet, sed paulatim acquirit. Sicut | |
| 5608 in mundo isto, percipientes aliquid imperfecte de divina | |
| 5609 cognitione, delectamur; et ipsa delectatio excitat sitim vel | |
| 5610 desiderium perfectae cognitionis; secundum quod potest intelligi | |
| 5611 quod habetur Eccli. XXIV, <i>qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient</i>. Si | |
| 5612 vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus | |
| 5613 tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt | |
| 5614 sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum. Delectationes enim corporales, | |
| 5615 quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam | |
| 5616 naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in | |
| 5617 delectatione ciborum. Et propter hoc, quando aliquis iam pervenit | |
| 5618 ad perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus, fastidit eas, et | |
| 5619 quandoque appetit aliquas alias. Sed delectationes spirituales non | |
| 5620 superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem, sed perficiunt naturam. Unde | |
| 5621 cum pervenitur ad consummationem in ipsis, tunc sunt magis | |
| 5622 delectabiles, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum operationi | |
| 5623 contemplativae adiunguntur aliquae operationes virtutum | |
| 5624 corporalium, quae per assiduitatem operandi lassantur. Et per hunc | |
| 5625 etiam modum potest intelligi quod dicitur Eccli. XXIV <i>qui bibit | |
| 5626 me, adhuc sitiet</i>. Quia etiam de Angelis, qui perfecte Deum | |
| 5627 cognoscunt, et delectantur in ipso, dicitur I Petri I, quod | |
| 5628 <i>desiderant in eum conspicere</i>. Si vero consideretur | |
| 5629 delectatio prout est in memoria et non in actu, sic per se nata est | |
| 5630 causare sui ipsius sitim et desiderium, quando scilicet homo redit | |
| 5631 ad illam dispositionem in qua erat sibi delectabile quod | |
| 5632 praeteriit. Si vero immutatus sit ab illa dispositione, memoria | |
| 5633 delectationis non causat in eo delectationem, sed fastidium, sicut | |
| 5634 pleno existenti memoria cibi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p10"> | |
| 5635 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed, | |
| 5636 ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether. | |
| 5637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34973] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5638 ergo dicendum quod, quando delectatio est perfecta, tunc habet | |
| 5639 omnimodam quietem, et cessat motus desiderii tendentis in non | |
| 5640 habitum. Sed quando imperfecte habetur, tunc non omnino cessat | |
| 5641 motus desiderii tendentis in non habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p11"> | |
| 5642 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it | |
| 5643 may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time. | |
| 5644 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34974] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5645 dicendum quod id quod imperfecte habetur, secundum quid habetur, et | |
| 5646 secundum quid non habetur. Et ideo simul de eo potest esse et | |
| 5647 desiderium et delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A2-p12"> | |
| 5648 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as stated above. | |
| 5649 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34975] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5650 dicendum quod delectationes alio modo causant fastidium, et alio | |
| 5651 modo desiderium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A3-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 3. Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p2"> | |
| 5652 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason: | |
| 5653 wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; | |
| 5654 and it is written ( | |
| 5655 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it | |
| 5656 helps rather than hinders the use of | |
| 5657 reason. | |
| 5658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34976] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5659 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non impediat usum rationis. | |
| 5660 Quies enim maxime confert ad debitum rationis usum, unde dicitur in | |
| 5661 VII Physic., quod in sedendo et quiescendo fit anima sciens et | |
| 5662 prudens; et Sap. VIII, <i>intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum | |
| 5663 illa</i>, scilicet sapientia. Sed delectatio est quaedam quies. | |
| 5664 Ergo non impedit, sed magis iuvat rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p3"> | |
| 5665 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are not in the same subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in | |
| 5666 the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of | |
| 5667 reason. | |
| 5668 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34977] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5669 ea quae non sunt in eodem, etiam si sint contraria, non se | |
| 5670 impediunt. Sed delectatio est in parte appetitiva, usus autem | |
| 5671 rationis in parte apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio non impedit | |
| 5672 rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p4"> | |
| 5673 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power | |
| 5674 moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use | |
| 5675 of reason. | |
| 5676 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34978] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5677 quod impeditur ab alio, videtur quodammodo transmutari ab ipso. Sed | |
| 5678 usus apprehensivae virtutis magis movet delectationem quam a | |
| 5679 delectatione moveatur, est enim causa delectationis. Ergo | |
| 5680 delectatio non impedit usum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p5"> | |
| 5681 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence." | |
| 5682 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34979] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5683 est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectatio | |
| 5684 corrumpit existimationem prudentiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q33_A3-p6"> | |
| 5685 <b>I answer that,</b> As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources | |
| 5686 are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one | |
| 5687 takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because | |
| 5688 we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters | |
| 5689 activity. | |
| 5690 </p><p id="FS_Q33_A3-p7"> On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as | |
| 5691 we have just observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is | |
| 5692 either weakened in respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily pleasure be great, | |
| 5693 either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else it hinders | |
| 5694 it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary | |
| 5695 to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but | |
| 5696 not the speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together | |
| 5697 equal to two right angles." In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: | |
| 5698 in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in | |
| 5699 proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances | |
| 5700 hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered. | |
| 5701 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 co."><a name="34980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34980] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5702 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., delectationes propriae | |
| 5703 adaugent operationes, extraneae vero impediunt. Est ergo quaedam | |
| 5704 delectatio quae habetur de ipso actu rationis, sicut cum aliquis | |
| 5705 delectatur in contemplando vel ratiocinando. Et talis delectatio | |
| 5706 non impedit usum rationis, sed ipsum adiuvat, quia illud attentius | |
| 5707 operamur in quo delectamur; attentio autem adiuvat operationem. Sed | |
| 5708 delectationes corporales impediunt usum rationis triplici ratione. | |
| 5709 Primo quidem, ratione distractionis. Quia, sicut iam dictum est, ad | |
| 5710 ea in quibus delectamur, multum attendimus, cum autem attentio | |
| 5711 fortiter inhaeserit alicui rei, debilitatur circa alias res, vel | |
| 5712 totaliter ab eis revocatur. Et secundum hoc, si delectatio | |
| 5713 corporalis fuerit magna, vel totaliter impediet usum rationis, ad | |
| 5714 se intentionem animi attrahendo; vel multum impediet. Secundo, | |
| 5715 ratione contrarietatis. Quaedam enim delectationes, maxime | |
| 5716 superexcedentes, sunt contra ordinem rationis. Et per hunc modum | |
| 5717 philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectationes corporales | |
| 5718 corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae, non autem existimationem | |
| 5719 speculativam</i>, cui non contrariantur, <i>puta quod triangulus | |
| 5720 habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis</i>. Secundum autem | |
| 5721 primum modum, utramque impedit. Tertio modo, secundum quandam | |
| 5722 ligationem, inquantum scilicet ad delectationem corporalem sequitur | |
| 5723 quaedam transmutatio corporalis, maior etiam quam in aliis | |
| 5724 passionibus, quanto vehementius afficitur appetitus ad rem | |
| 5725 praesentem quam ad rem absentem. Huiusmodi autem corporales | |
| 5726 perturbationes impediunt usum rationis, sicut patet in vinolentis, | |
| 5727 qui habent usum rationis ligatum vel impeditum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p8"> | |
| 5728 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason; | |
| 5729 but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason. | |
| 5730 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34981] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5731 ergo dicendum quod delectatio corporalis habet quidem quietem | |
| 5732 appetitus in delectabili, quae quies interdum contrariatur rationi; | |
| 5733 sed ex parte corporis, semper habet transmutationem. Et quantum ad | |
| 5734 utrumque, impedit rationis usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p9"> | |
| 5735 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when | |
| 5736 the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part. | |
| 5737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34982] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5738 dicendum quod vis appetitiva et apprehensiva sunt quidem diversae | |
| 5739 partes, sed unius animae. Et ideo cum intentio animae vehementer | |
| 5740 applicatur ad actum unius, impeditur ab actu contrario | |
| 5741 alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A3-p10"> | |
| 5742 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through | |
| 5743 a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination | |
| 5744 and of the other sensitive powers. | |
| 5745 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34983] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5746 dicendum quod usus rationis requirit debitum usum imaginationis et | |
| 5747 aliarum virium sensitivarum, quae utuntur organo corporali. Et ideo | |
| 5748 ex transmutatione corporali usus rationis impeditur, impedito actu | |
| 5749 virtutis imaginativae et aliarum sensitivarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q33_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q33_A4-p0.1">Q. 33. A. 4. Whether pleasure perfects operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p2"> | |
| 5750 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure | |
| 5751 hinders the use of reason, as stated above | |
| 5752 <a href="#FS_Q33_A3" id="FS_Q33_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation. | |
| 5753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34984] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 5754 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non perficiat operationem. | |
| 5755 Omnis enim humana operatio ab usu rationis dependet. Sed delectatio | |
| 5756 impedit usum rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo delectatio non perficit, | |
| 5757 sed debilitat operationem humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p3"> | |
| 5758 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its essence | |
| 5759 or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation. | |
| 5760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34985] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5761 nihil est perfectivum sui ipsius, vel suae causae. Sed delectatio | |
| 5762 est operatio, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., quod oportet ut | |
| 5763 intelligatur vel essentialiter, vel causaliter. Ergo delectatio non | |
| 5764 perficit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p4"> | |
| 5765 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation | |
| 5766 is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above ( | |
| 5767 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A2" id="FS_Q33_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the Philosopher | |
| 5768 (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure | |
| 5769 does not perfect operation. | |
| 5770 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34986] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5771 si delectatio perficit operationem, aut perficit ipsam sicut finis, | |
| 5772 aut sicut forma, aut sicut agens. Sed non sicut finis, quia | |
| 5773 operationes non quaeruntur propter delectationem, sed magis e | |
| 5774 converso, ut supra dictum est. Nec iterum per modum efficientis, | |
| 5775 quia magis operatio est causa efficiens delectationis. Nec iterum | |
| 5776 sicut forma, non enim perficit delectatio operationem ut habitus | |
| 5777 quidam, secundum philosophum, in X Ethic. Delectatio ergo non | |
| 5778 perficit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p5"> | |
| 5779 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation." | |
| 5780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34987] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5781 est quod dicitur ibidem, quod delectatio operationem perficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p6"> | |
| 5782 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a | |
| 5783 thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense | |
| 5784 the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it": that is to say, inasmuch | |
| 5785 as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, | |
| 5786 denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher | |
| 5787 says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does": but it | |
| 5788 does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries | |
| 5789 it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, | |
| 5790 and hinder those that are not appropriate." | |
| 5791 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 co."><a name="34988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34988] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5792 dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter operationem perficit. Uno modo, | |
| 5793 per modum finis, non quidem secundum quod finis dicitur id propter | |
| 5794 quod aliquid est; sed secundum quod omne bonum completive | |
| 5795 superveniens, potest dici finis. Et secundum hoc dicit philosophus, | |
| 5796 in X Ethic., quod <i>delectatio perficit operationem sicut quidam | |
| 5797 superveniens finis</i>, inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est | |
| 5798 operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat | |
| 5799 quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito. Secundo modo, ex | |
| 5800 parte causae agentis. Non quidem directe, quia philosophus dicit, | |
| 5801 in X Ethic., quod <i>perficit delectatio operationem, non sicut | |
| 5802 medicus sanum, sed sicut sanitas</i>. Indirecte autem, inquantum | |
| 5803 scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius | |
| 5804 attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur. Et secundum hoc | |
| 5805 dicitur in X Ethic., quod <i>delectationes adaugent proprias | |
| 5806 operationes, et impediunt extraneas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p7"> | |
| 5807 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of reason, | |
| 5808 but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises | |
| 5809 from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason. | |
| 5810 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34989] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5811 ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio impedit actum rationis, sed | |
| 5812 delectatio corporalis; quae non consequitur actum rationis, sed | |
| 5813 actum concupiscibilis, qui per delectationem augetur. Delectatio | |
| 5814 autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis | |
| 5815 usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p8"> | |
| 5816 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And | |
| 5817 in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated | |
| 5818 above. | |
| 5819 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34990] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5820 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in II Physic., contingit quod duo sibi | |
| 5821 invicem sunt causa, ita quod unum sit causa efficiens, et aliud | |
| 5822 causa finalis alterius. Et per hunc modum, operatio causat | |
| 5823 delectationem sicut causa efficiens; delectatio autem perficit | |
| 5824 operationem per modum finis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q33_A4-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 33 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34991] Iª-IIae q. 33 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5825 patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 5826 <div id="FS_Q34" class="div3"> | |
| 5827 <h3 id="FS_Q34-p0.1">Q. 34. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 5828 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 5829 <p id="FS_Q34-p2"> We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q34-p3"><a href="#FS_Q34_A1"> (1) Whether every pleasure is evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p4"><a href="#FS_Q34_A2"> (2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p5"><a href="#FS_Q34_A3"> (3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q34-p6"><a href="#FS_Q34_A4"> (4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?</a></p> | |
| 5830 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 pr."><a name="34992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34992] | |
| 5831 Iª-IIae q. 34 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 5832 bonitate et malitia delectationum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | |
| 5833 Primo, utrum omnis delectatio sit mala. Secundo, dato quod non, | |
| 5834 utrum omnis delectatio sit bona. Tertio, utrum aliqua delectatio | |
| 5835 sit optimum. Quarto, utrum delectatio sit mensura vel regula | |
| 5836 secundum quam iudicetur bonum vel malum in moralibus.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 5837 <div id="FS_Q34_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A1-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 1. Whether every pleasure is evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p2"> | |
| 5838 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil | |
| 5839 in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence | |
| 5840 and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are | |
| 5841 the greatest of all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, | |
| 5842 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of conjugal intercourse, | |
| 5843 the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty." Therefore pleasure | |
| 5844 is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil. | |
| 5845 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34993] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5846 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit mala. Illud enim | |
| 5847 quod corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, videtur esse | |
| 5848 secundum se malum, quia bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, | |
| 5849 ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed delectatio | |
| 5850 corrumpit prudentiam, et impedit rationis usum, et tanto magis, | |
| 5851 quanto delectationes sunt maiores. Unde in delectationibus | |
| 5852 venereis, quae sunt maximae, impossibile est aliquid intelligere, | |
| 5853 ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et Hieronymus etiam dicit, super Matth., | |
| 5854 quod <i>illo tempore quo coniugales actus geruntur, praesentia | |
| 5855 sancti spiritus non dabitur, etiam si propheta esse videatur qui | |
| 5856 officio generationis obsequitur</i>. Ergo delectatio est secundum | |
| 5857 se malum. Ergo omnis delectatio mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p3"> | |
| 5858 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be | |
| 5859 avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle | |
| 5860 says ( | |
| 5861 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas | |
| 5862 the man who is master of himself does not. Therefore | |
| 5863 pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided. | |
| 5864 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34994] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5865 illud quod fugit virtuosus, et prosequitur deficiens a virtute, | |
| 5866 videtur esse secundum se malum, et fugiendum, quia, ut dicitur in X | |
| 5867 Ethic., <i>virtuosus est quasi mensura et regula humanorum | |
| 5868 actuum</i>; et apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. II, <i>spiritualis | |
| 5869 iudicat omnia</i>. Sed pueri et bestiae, in quibus non est virtus, | |
| 5870 prosequuntur delectationes, fugit autem eas temperatus. Ergo | |
| 5871 delectationes secundum se sunt malae, et fugiendae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p4"> | |
| 5872 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure. | |
| 5873 Therefore pleasure is not something good. | |
| 5874 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34995] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> | |
| 5875 <i>Praeterea, virtus et ars sunt circa difficile et bonum</i>, ut | |
| 5876 dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla ars ordinata est ad delectationem. | |
| 5877 Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p5"> | |
| 5878 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 5879 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "Delight in the Lord." Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil. | |
| 5880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34996] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 5881 est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, <i>delectare in domino</i>. Cum | |
| 5882 igitur ad nihil mali auctoritas divina inducat, videtur quod non | |
| 5883 omnis delectatio sit mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p6"> | |
| 5884 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took | |
| 5885 account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers | |
| 5886 did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they | |
| 5887 held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone | |
| 5888 to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. | |
| 5889 Because, since none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are | |
| 5890 found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead | |
| 5891 of listening to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great weight, | |
| 5892 example moves more than words. | |
| 5893 </p><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p7"> We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power | |
| 5894 in some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for this assertion. The first | |
| 5895 is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or | |
| 5896 disagreement with reason, as stated above ( | |
| 5897 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q34_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>): just as in the order of | |
| 5898 nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the | |
| 5899 natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, | |
| 5900 when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its | |
| 5901 nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower | |
| 5902 appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant | |
| 5903 from reason and the law of God. | |
| 5904 </p><p id="FS_Q34_A1-p8"> The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined | |
| 5905 to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires | |
| 5906 of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions | |
| 5907 evil. | |
| 5908 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 co."><a name="34997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34997] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 5909 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., aliqui posuerunt omnes | |
| 5910 delectationes esse malas. Cuius ratio videtur fuisse, quia | |
| 5911 intentionem suam referebant ad solas delectationes sensibiles et | |
| 5912 corporales, quae sunt magis manifestae, nam et in ceteris | |
| 5913 intelligibilia a sensibilibus antiqui philosophi non distinguebant, | |
| 5914 nec intellectum a sensu, ut dicitur in libro de anima. | |
| 5915 Delectationes autem corporales ut dicitur in libro de anima. | |
| 5916 Delectationes autem corporales arbitrabantur dicendum omnes esse | |
| 5917 malas, ut sic homines, qui ad delectationes immoderatas sunt proni, | |
| 5918 a delectationibus se retrahentes, ad medium virtutis perveniant. | |
| 5919 Sed haec existimatio non fuit conveniens. Cum enim nullus possit | |
| 5920 vivere sine aliqua sensibili et corporali delectatione, si illi qui | |
| 5921 docent omnes delectationes esse malas, deprehendantur aliquas | |
| 5922 delectationes suscipere; magis homines ad delectationes erunt | |
| 5923 proclives exemplo operum, verborum doctrina praetermissa. In | |
| 5924 operationibus enim et passionibus humanis, in quibus experientia | |
| 5925 plurimum valet, magis movent exempla quam verba. Dicendum est ergo | |
| 5926 aliquas delectationes esse bonas, et aliquas esse malas. Est enim | |
| 5927 delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et | |
| 5928 consequens aliquam operationem. Unde huius ratio duplex accipi | |
| 5929 potest. Una quidem ex parte boni in quo aliquis quiescens | |
| 5930 delectatur. Bonum enim et malum in moralibus dicitur secundum quod | |
| 5931 convenit rationi vel discordat ab ea, ut supra dictum est, sicut in | |
| 5932 rebus naturalibus aliquid dicitur naturale ex eo quod naturae | |
| 5933 convenit, innaturale vero ex eo quod est a natura discordans. Sicut | |
| 5934 igitur in naturalibus est quaedam quies naturalis, quae scilicet | |
| 5935 est in eo quod convenit naturae, ut cum grave quiescit deorsum; et | |
| 5936 quaedam innaturalis, quae est in eo quod repugnat naturae, sicut | |
| 5937 cum grave quiescit sursum, ita et in moralibus est quaedam | |
| 5938 delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior | |
| 5939 requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod | |
| 5940 quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei. Alia ratio | |
| 5941 accipi potest ex parte operationum, quarum quaedam sunt bonae, et | |
| 5942 quaedam malae. Operationibus autem magis sunt affines | |
| 5943 delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae | |
| 5944 tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum | |
| 5945 operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae; multo magis | |
| 5946 delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero | |
| 5947 malae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p9"> | |
| 5948 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy | |
| 5949 prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above | |
| 5950 (Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure | |
| 5951 morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the | |
| 5952 pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in | |
| 5953 this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken | |
| 5954 according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that | |
| 5955 although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither | |
| 5956 a | |
| 5957 mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as | |
| 5958 stated in the | |
| 5959 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q98_A2" id="FS_Q34_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[98], A[2]</a> the case was different in the state of innocence. | |
| 5960 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34998] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 5961 ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, delectationes quae sunt | |
| 5962 de actu rationis, non impediunt rationem, neque corrumpunt | |
| 5963 prudentiam; sed delectationes extraneae, cuiusmodi sunt | |
| 5964 delectationes corporales. Quae quidem rationis usum impediunt, | |
| 5965 sicut supra dictum est, et per contrarietatem appetitus, qui | |
| 5966 quiescit in eo quod repugnat rationi, et ex hoc habet delectatio | |
| 5967 quod sit moraliter mala, vel secundum quandam ligationem rationis, | |
| 5968 sicut in concubitu coniugali delectatio, quamvis sit in eo quod | |
| 5969 convenit rationi, tamen impedit rationis usum, propter corporalem | |
| 5970 transmutationem adiunctam. Sed ex hoc non consequitur malitiam | |
| 5971 moralem, sicut nec somnus quo ligatur usus rationis, moraliter est | |
| 5972 malus, si sit secundum rationem receptus, nam et ipsa ratio hoc | |
| 5973 habet, ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur. Dicimus tamen quod | |
| 5974 huiusmodi ligamentum rationis ex delectatione in actu coniugali, | |
| 5975 etsi non habeat malitiam moralem, quia non est peccatum mortale nec | |
| 5976 veniale; provenit tamen ex quadam morali malitia, scilicet ex | |
| 5977 peccato primi parentis, nam hoc in statu innocentiae non erat, ut | |
| 5978 patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p10"> | |
| 5979 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children | |
| 5980 and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite, | |
| 5981 which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them. | |
| 5982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34999] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5983 dicendum quod temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed | |
| 5984 immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes. Quod autem pueri et | |
| 5985 bestiae delectationes prosequantur, non ostendit eas universaliter | |
| 5986 esse malas, quia in eis est naturalis appetitus a Deo, qui movetur | |
| 5987 in id quod est eis conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A1-p11"> | |
| 5988 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on ( | |
| 5989 <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q57_A3" id="FS_Q34_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[3]</a>). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there | |
| 5990 is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. | |
| 5991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35000] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5992 dicendum quod non omnis boni est ars, sed exteriorum factibilium, | |
| 5993 ut infra dicetur. Circa operationes autem et passiones quae sunt in | |
| 5994 nobis, magis est prudentia et virtus quam ars. Et tamen aliqua ars | |
| 5995 est factiva delectationis; scilicet pulmentaria et pigmentaria, ut | |
| 5996 dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A2-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 2. Whether every pleasure is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p2"> | |
| 5997 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in the | |
| 5998 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A6" id="FS_Q34_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[6]</a> there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner | |
| 5999 everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good. | |
| 6000 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35001] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6001 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis delectatio sit bona. Sicut enim | |
| 6002 in primo dictum est, bonum in tria dividitur, scilicet honestum, | |
| 6003 utile et delectabile. Sed honestum omne est bonum; et similiter | |
| 6004 omne utile. Ergo et omnis delectatio est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p3"> | |
| 6005 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But pleasure | |
| 6006 is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure | |
| 6007 is good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore | |
| 6008 every pleasure is good. | |
| 6009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35002] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6010 illud est per se bonum, quod non quaeritur propter aliud, ut | |
| 6011 dicitur in I Ethic. Sed delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, | |
| 6012 ridiculum enim videtur ab aliquo quaerere quare vult delectari. | |
| 6013 Ergo delectatio est per se bonum. Sed quod per se praedicatur de | |
| 6014 aliquo, universaliter praedicatur de eo. Ergo omnis delectatio est | |
| 6015 bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p4"> | |
| 6016 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. | |
| 6017 i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and | |
| 6018 consequently all pleasure is good. | |
| 6019 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35003] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6020 id quod ab omnibus desideratur, videtur esse per se bonum, nam | |
| 6021 bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed omnes | |
| 6022 appetunt aliquam delectationem, etiam pueri et bestiae. Ergo | |
| 6023 delectatio est secundum se bonum. Omnis ergo delectatio est | |
| 6024 bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p5"> | |
| 6025 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 6026 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>): "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." | |
| 6027 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35004] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 6028 est quod dicitur Prov. II, <i>qui laetantur cum malefecerint, et | |
| 6029 exultant in rebus pessimis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p6"> | |
| 6030 <b>I answer that,</b> While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and | |
| 6031 that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good | |
| 6032 simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that | |
| 6033 which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one | |
| 6034 way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural: | |
| 6035 thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. | |
| 6036 In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in | |
| 6037 some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But | |
| 6038 if a man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will | |
| 6039 not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good. | |
| 6040 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 co."><a name="35005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35005] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6041 dicendum quod, sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes | |
| 6042 esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse | |
| 6043 bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. Qui ex hoc | |
| 6044 decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est | |
| 6045 bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc. Simpliciter | |
| 6046 quidem bonum est quod secundum se bonum est. Contingit autem quod | |
| 6047 non est secundum se bonum, esse huic bonum, dupliciter. Uno modo, | |
| 6048 quia est ei conveniens secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est, quae | |
| 6049 tamen non est naturalis, sicut leproso bonum est quandoque comedere | |
| 6050 aliqua venenosa, quae non sunt simpliciter convenientia complexioni | |
| 6051 humanae. Alio modo, quia id quod non est conveniens, aestimatur ut | |
| 6052 conveniens. Et quia delectatio est quies appetitus in bono, si sit | |
| 6053 bonum simpliciter illud in quo quiescit appetitus, erit simpliciter | |
| 6054 delectatio, et simpliciter bona. Si autem non sit bonum | |
| 6055 simpliciter, sed quoad hunc, tunc nec delectatio est simpliciter, | |
| 6056 sed huic, nec simpliciter est bona, sed bona secundum quid, vel | |
| 6057 apparens bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p7"> | |
| 6058 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being | |
| 6059 good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. | |
| 6060 Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason. | |
| 6061 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35006] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6062 ergo dicendum quod honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem, et | |
| 6063 ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit bonum. Delectabile | |
| 6064 autem dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit | |
| 6065 quod non est conveniens rationi. Et ideo non omne delectabile est | |
| 6066 bonum bonitate morali, quae attenditur secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p8"> | |
| 6067 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may | |
| 6068 be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and | |
| 6069 so too with regard to pleasure. | |
| 6070 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35007] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6071 dicendum quod ideo delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est | |
| 6072 quies in fine. Finem autem contingit esse bonum et malum quamvis | |
| 6073 nunquam sit finis nisi secundum quod est bonum quoad hunc. Ita | |
| 6074 etiam est de delectatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A2-p9"> | |
| 6075 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just | |
| 6076 as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily | |
| 6077 good. | |
| 6078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35008] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6079 dicendum quod hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et | |
| 6080 bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut | |
| 6081 contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; | |
| 6082 ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A3-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 3. Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p2"> | |
| 6083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot | |
| 6084 be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being | |
| 6085 established in its own nature, as stated above ( | |
| 6086 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q34_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good. | |
| 6087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35009] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6088 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit optimum. Nulla | |
| 6089 enim generatio est optimum, nam generatio non potest esse ultimus | |
| 6090 finis. Sed delectatio consequitur generationem, nam ex eo quod | |
| 6091 aliquid constituitur in suam naturam, delectatur, ut supra dictum | |
| 6092 est. Ergo nulla delectatio potest esse optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p3"> | |
| 6093 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since | |
| 6094 pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. | |
| 6095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35010] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6096 illud quod est optimum, nullo addito potest fieri melius. Sed | |
| 6097 delectatio aliquo addito fit melior, est enim melior delectatio cum | |
| 6098 virtute quam sine virtute. Ergo delectatio non est optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p4"> | |
| 6099 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself | |
| 6100 is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above | |
| 6101 <a href="#FS_Q34_A2" id="FS_Q34_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. | |
| 6102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35011] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6103 id quod est optimum, est universaliter bonum, sicut per se bonum | |
| 6104 existens, nam quod est per se, est prius et potius eo quod est per | |
| 6105 accidens. Sed delectatio non est universaliter bonum, ut dictum | |
| 6106 est. Ergo delectatio non est optimum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p5"> | |
| 6107 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written | |
| 6108 ( | |
| 6109 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.15.11" target="asv">Ps. 15:11</a>): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end." | |
| 6110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35012] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 6111 beatitudo est optimum, cum sit finis humanae vitae. Sed beatitudo | |
| 6112 non est sine delectatione, dicitur enim in Psalmo XV, <i>adimplebis | |
| 6113 me laetitia cum vultu tuo; delectationes in dextera tua usque in | |
| 6114 finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A3-p6"> | |
| 6115 <b>I answer that,</b> Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that | |
| 6116 all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest | |
| 6117 good. But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure | |
| 6118 consists in a certain movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating | |
| 6119 and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and movement: and from this, since "becoming" and | |
| 6120 movement are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But | |
| 6121 this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the "becoming" | |
| 6122 of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated above ( | |
| 6123 <a href="#FS_Q32_A8" id="FS_Q34_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[8]</a>, ad 2); but also | |
| 6124 in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired. | |
| 6125 </p><p id="FS_Q34_A3-p7"> Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, | |
| 6126 and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human | |
| 6127 things. Now the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above ( | |
| 6128 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q34_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>; | |
| 6129 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q34_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; | |
| 6130 thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to be either God | |
| 6131 Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense | |
| 6132 a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods. | |
| 6133 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 co."><a name="35013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35013] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6134 dicendum quod Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas, | |
| 6135 sicut Stoici; neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam | |
| 6136 esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas; ita tamen quod nulla sit summum | |
| 6137 bonum, vel optimum. Sed quantum ex eius rationibus datur intelligi, | |
| 6138 in duobus deficit. In uno quidem quia, cum videret delectationes | |
| 6139 sensibiles et corporales in quodam motu et generatione consistere, | |
| 6140 sicut patet in repletione ciborum et huiusmodi; aestimavit omnes | |
| 6141 delectationes consequi generationem et motum. Unde, cum generatio | |
| 6142 et motus sint actus imperfecti, sequeretur quod delectatio non | |
| 6143 haberet rationem ultimae perfectionis. Sed hoc manifeste apparet | |
| 6144 falsum in delectationibus intellectualibus. Aliquis enim non solum | |
| 6145 delectatur in generatione scientiae, puta cum addiscit aut miratur, | |
| 6146 sicut supra dictum est; sed etiam in contemplando secundum | |
| 6147 scientiam iam acquisitam. Alio vero modo, quia dicebat optimum | |
| 6148 illud quod est simpliciter summum bonum, quod scilicet est ipsum | |
| 6149 bonum quasi abstractum et non participatum, sicut ipse Deus est | |
| 6150 summum bonum. Nos autem loquimur de optimo in rebus humanis. | |
| 6151 Optimum autem in unaquaque re est ultimus finis. Finis autem, ut | |
| 6152 supra dictum est, dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res, et usus | |
| 6153 rei; sicut finis avari est vel pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae. Et | |
| 6154 secundum hoc, ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui | |
| 6155 est summum bonum simpliciter; vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat | |
| 6156 delectationem quandam in ultimo fine. Et per hunc modum aliqua | |
| 6157 delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p8"> | |
| 6158 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. Accordingly | |
| 6159 nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such. | |
| 6160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35014] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6161 ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio consequitur generationem; | |
| 6162 sed aliquae delectationes consequuntur operationes perfectas, ut | |
| 6163 dictum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam delectationem esse | |
| 6164 optimum, etsi non omnis sit talis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p9"> | |
| 6165 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can | |
| 6166 make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another | |
| 6167 good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies | |
| 6168 it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. | |
| 6169 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35015] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6170 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de optimo simpliciter, per cuius | |
| 6171 participationem omnia sunt bona, unde ex nullius additione fit | |
| 6172 melius. Sed in aliis bonis universaliter verum est quod quodlibet | |
| 6173 bonum ex additione alterius fit melius. Quamvis posset dici quod | |
| 6174 delectatio non est aliquid extraneum ab operatione virtutis, sed | |
| 6175 concomitans ipsam, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A3-p10"> | |
| 6176 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose | |
| 6177 in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science | |
| 6178 is supremely good, but not every science is. | |
| 6179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35016] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6180 dicendum quod delectatio non habet quod sit optimum ex hoc quod est | |
| 6181 delectatio, sed ex hoc quod est perfecta quies in optimo. Unde non | |
| 6182 oportet quod omnis delectatio sit optima, aut etiam bona. Sicut | |
| 6183 aliqua scientia est optima, non tamen omnis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q34_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q34_A4-p0.1">Q. 34. A. 4. Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p2"> | |
| 6184 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is | |
| 6185 the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by | |
| 6186 love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters. | |
| 6187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35017] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 6188 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit mensura vel regula | |
| 6189 boni et mali moralis. <i>Omnia enim mensurantur primo sui | |
| 6190 generis</i>, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio non est | |
| 6191 primum in genere moralium, sed praecedunt ipsam amor et desiderium. | |
| 6192 Non ergo est regula bonitatis et malitiae in moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p3"> | |
| 6193 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all | |
| 6194 movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure | |
| 6195 is not the measure and rule of morals. | |
| 6196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35018] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6197 mensuram et regulam oportet esse uniformem, et ideo motus qui est | |
| 6198 maxime uniformis, est mensura et regula omnium motuum, ut dicitur | |
| 6199 in X Metaphys. Sed delectatio est varia et multiformis, cum quaedam | |
| 6200 earum sint bonae, et quaedam malae. Ergo delectatio non est mensura | |
| 6201 et regula moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p4"> | |
| 6202 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice | |
| 6203 of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, | |
| 6204 and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure | |
| 6205 of moral goodness and malice. | |
| 6206 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35019] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6207 certius iudicium sumitur de effectu per causam, quam e converso. | |
| 6208 Sed bonitas vel malitia operationis est causa bonitatis vel | |
| 6209 malitiae delectationis, quia bonae delectationes sunt quae | |
| 6210 consequuntur bonas operationes, malae autem quae malas, ut dicitur | |
| 6211 in X Ethic. Ergo delectationes non sunt regula et mensura bonitatis | |
| 6212 et malitiae in moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p5"> | |
| 6213 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, commenting on | |
| 6214 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.10" target="asv"> Ps. 7:10 </a>"The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." | |
| 6215 And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [*St. Thomas took "finis" | |
| 6216 as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher), | |
| 6217 "is the architect of | |
| 6218 the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good." | |
| 6219 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35020] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 6220 est quod Augustinus dicit, super illud Psalmi VII, <i>scrutans | |
| 6221 corda et renes Deus, finis curae et cogitationis est delectatio ad | |
| 6222 quam quis nititur pervenire</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in VII | |
| 6223 Ethic., quod <i>delectatio est finis architecton</i>, idest | |
| 6224 principalis, <i>ad quem respicientes, unumquodque hoc quidem malum, | |
| 6225 hoc autem bonum simpliciter dicimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q34_A4-p6"> | |
| 6226 <b>I answer that,</b> Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above ( | |
| 6227 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q34_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[1]</a>); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which | |
| 6228 the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned | |
| 6229 to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, | |
| 6230 who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works. | |
| 6231 </p><p id="FS_Q34_A4-p7"> On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally | |
| 6232 pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in | |
| 6233 accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed. | |
| 6234 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 co."><a name="35021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35021] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6235 dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in | |
| 6236 voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit | |
| 6237 bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro | |
| 6238 fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et | |
| 6239 cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum | |
| 6240 delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus | |
| 6241 vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus | |
| 6242 virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis. Delectationes autem | |
| 6243 appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, | |
| 6244 nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum | |
| 6245 sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis | |
| 6246 secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas | |
| 6247 malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p8"> | |
| 6248 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves | |
| 6249 a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment. | |
| 6250 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35022] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6251 ergo dicendum quod amor et desiderium sunt priora delectatione in | |
| 6252 via generationis. Sed delectatio est prior secundum rationem finis, | |
| 6253 qui in operabilibus habet rationem principii, a quo maxime sumitur | |
| 6254 iudicium, sicut a regula vel mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p9"> | |
| 6255 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure | |
| 6256 can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests | |
| 6257 in evil. | |
| 6258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35023] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6259 dicendum quod omnis delectatio in hoc est uniformis, quod est quies | |
| 6260 in aliquo bono, et secundum hoc potest esse regula vel mensura. Nam | |
| 6261 ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem, | |
| 6262 cuius voluntas quiescit in malo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q34_A4-p10"> | |
| 6263 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above ( | |
| 6264 <a href="#FS_Q33_A4" id="FS_Q34_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[33], A[4]</a>); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on | |
| 6265 its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation. | |
| 6266 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 34 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35024] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6267 dicendum quod, cum delectatio perficiat operationem per modum | |
| 6268 finis, ut supra dictum est; non potest esse operatio perfecte bona, | |
| 6269 nisi etiam adsit delectatio in bono, nam bonitas rei dependet ex | |
| 6270 fine. Et sic quodammodo bonitas delectationis est causa bonitas in | |
| 6271 operatione.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 6272 <div id="FS_Q35" class="div3"> | |
| 6273 <h3 id="FS_Q35-p0.1">Q. 35. OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 6274 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 6275 <p id="FS_Q35-p2"> We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; | |
| 6276 (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice. | |
| 6277 </p><p id="FS_Q35-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q35-p4"><a href="#FS_Q35_A1"> (1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p5"><a href="#FS_Q35_A2"> (2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p6"><a href="#FS_Q35_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p7"><a href="#FS_Q35_A4"> (4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p8"><a href="#FS_Q35_A5"> (5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p9"><a href="#FS_Q35_A6"> (6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p10"><a href="#FS_Q35_A7"> (7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?</a></p><p id="FS_Q35-p11"><a href="#FS_Q35_A8"> (8) Of the species of sorrow.</a></p> | |
| 6278 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 pr."><a name="35025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35025] | |
| 6279 Iª-IIae q. 35 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 6280 dolore et tristitia. Et circa hoc, primo considerandum est de | |
| 6281 tristitia, seu dolore, secundum se; secundo, de causis eius; | |
| 6282 tertio, de effectibus ipsius; quarto, de remediis eius; quinto, de | |
| 6283 bonitate vel malitia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, | |
| 6284 utrum dolor sit passio animae. Secundo, utrum tristitia sit idem | |
| 6285 quod dolor. Tertio, utrum tristitia, seu dolor, sit contraria | |
| 6286 delectationi. Quarto, utrum omnis tristitia omni delectationi | |
| 6287 contrarietur. Quinto, utrum delectationi contemplationis sit aliqua | |
| 6288 tristitia contraria. Sexto, utrum magis fugienda sit tristitia, | |
| 6289 quam delectatio appetenda. Septimo, utrum dolor exterior sit maior | |
| 6290 quam dolor interior. Octavo, de speciebus tristitiae.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 6291 <div id="FS_Q35_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A1-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 1. Whether pain is a passion of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p2"> | |
| 6292 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the | |
| 6293 body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing | |
| 6294 which the soul, by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. | |
| 6295 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35026] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6296 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non sit passio animae. Nulla | |
| 6297 enim passio animae est in corpore. Sed dolor potest esse in | |
| 6298 corpore, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod | |
| 6299 <i>dolor qui dicitur corporis, est corruptio repentina salutis eius | |
| 6300 rei, quam, male utendo, anima corruptioni obnoxiavit</i>. Ergo | |
| 6301 dolor non est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p3"> | |
| 6302 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather | |
| 6303 to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful | |
| 6304 body." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. | |
| 6305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35027] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6306 omnis passio animae pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Sed dolor non | |
| 6307 pertinet ad vim appetitivam, sed magis ad apprehensivam, dicit enim | |
| 6308 Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, quod <i>dolorem in corpore | |
| 6309 facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori</i>. Ergo dolor non est | |
| 6310 passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p4"> | |
| 6311 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather | |
| 6312 to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel | |
| 6313 no pain in being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. | |
| 6314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35028] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6315 omnis passio animae pertinet ad appetitum animalem. Sed dolor non | |
| 6316 pertinet ad appetitum animalem, sed magis ad appetitum naturalem, | |
| 6317 dicit enim Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>nisi aliquod | |
| 6318 bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi esset dolor in | |
| 6319 poena</i>. Ergo dolor non est passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p5"> | |
| 6320 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild | |
| 6321 desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears." [Translation: Conington.] | |
| 6322 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35029] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 6323 est quod Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit dolorem inter passiones | |
| 6324 animae, inducens illud Virgilii, <i>hinc metuunt, cupiunt, | |
| 6325 gaudentque dolentque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p6"> | |
| 6326 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also | |
| 6327 two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some | |
| 6328 good), and perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard | |
| 6329 to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that | |
| 6330 something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects | |
| 6331 of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite. | |
| 6332 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p7"> Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: | |
| 6333 since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to | |
| 6334 the apprehension of another, as stated in the | |
| 6335 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q35_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], AA[1]</a>,3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like | |
| 6336 pleasure, is in the | |
| 6337 intellective or sensitive appetite. | |
| 6338 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A1-p8"> Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as stated above ( | |
| 6339 <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q35_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,3): and especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most | |
| 6340 properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De | |
| 6341 Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment. | |
| 6342 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 co."><a name="35030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35030] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6343 dicendum quod, sicut ad delectationem duo requiruntur, scilicet | |
| 6344 coniunctio boni, et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis; ita etiam ad | |
| 6345 dolorem duo requiruntur, scilicet coniunctio alicuius mali (quod ea | |
| 6346 ratione est malum, quia privat aliquod bonum); et perceptio | |
| 6347 huiusmodi coniunctionis. Quidquid autem coniungitur, si non habeat, | |
| 6348 respectu eius cui coniungitur, rationem boni vel mali, non potest | |
| 6349 causare delectationem vel dolorem. Ex quo patet quod aliquid sub | |
| 6350 ratione boni vel mali, est obiectum delectationis et doloris. Bonum | |
| 6351 autem et malum, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt obiecta appetitus. Unde | |
| 6352 patet quod delectatio et dolor ad appetitum pertinent. Omnis autem | |
| 6353 motus appetitivus, seu inclinatio consequens apprehensionem, | |
| 6354 pertinet ad appetitum intellectivum vel sensitivum, nam inclinatio | |
| 6355 appetitus naturalis non consequitur apprehensionem ipsius | |
| 6356 appetentis, sed alterius, ut in primo dictum est. Cum igitur | |
| 6357 delectatio et dolor praesupponant in eodem subiecto sensum vel | |
| 6358 apprehensionem aliquam, manifestum est quod dolor, sicut et | |
| 6359 delectatio, est in appetitu intellectivo vel sensitivo. Omnis autem | |
| 6360 motus appetitus sensitivi dicitur passio, ut supra dictum est. Et | |
| 6361 praecipue illi qui in defectum sonant. Unde dolor, secundum quod | |
| 6362 est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae, | |
| 6363 sicut molestiae corporales proprie passiones corporis dicuntur. | |
| 6364 Unde et Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, dolorem specialiter | |
| 6365 aegritudinem nominat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p9"> | |
| 6366 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the | |
| 6367 movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super | |
| 6368 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.87.4" target="asv"> Psalm 87:4</a>). | |
| 6369 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35031] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6370 ergo dicendum quod dolor dicitur esse corporis, quia causa doloris | |
| 6371 est in corpore, puta cum patimur aliquod nocivum corpori. Sed motus | |
| 6372 doloris semper est in anima, nam corpus non potest dolere nisi | |
| 6373 dolente anima, ut Augustinus dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p10"> | |
| 6374 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required | |
| 6375 for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure. | |
| 6376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35032] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6377 dicendum quod dolor dicitur esse sensus, non quia sit actus | |
| 6378 sensitivae virtutis, sed quia requiritur ad dolorem corporalem, | |
| 6379 sicut ad delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A1-p11"> | |
| 6380 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because | |
| 6381 nature desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive | |
| 6382 appetite. | |
| 6383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35033] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6384 dicendum quod dolor de amissione boni demonstrat bonitatem naturae, | |
| 6385 non quia dolor sit actus naturalis appetitus, sed quia natura | |
| 6386 aliquid appetit ut bonum, quod cum removeri sentitur, sequitur | |
| 6387 doloris passio in appetitu sensitivo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A2-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 2. Whether sorrow is the same as pain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p2"> | |
| 6388 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering." | |
| 6389 But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain. | |
| 6390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35034] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6391 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non sit dolor. Dicit enim | |
| 6392 Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>dolor in corporibus | |
| 6393 dicitur</i>. Tristitia autem dicitur magis in anima. Ergo tristitia | |
| 6394 non est dolor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p3"> | |
| 6395 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow | |
| 6396 for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain. | |
| 6397 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35035] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6398 dolor non est nisi de praesenti malo. Sed tristitia potest esse de | |
| 6399 praeterito et de futuro, sicut poenitentia est tristitia de | |
| 6400 praeterito, et anxietas de futuro. Ergo tristitia omnino a dolore | |
| 6401 differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p4"> | |
| 6402 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow | |
| 6403 is not pain, and extends to more objects. | |
| 6404 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35036] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6405 dolor non videtur consequi nisi sensum tactus. Sed tristitia potest | |
| 6406 consequi ex omnibus sensibus. Ergo tristitia non est dolor, sed se | |
| 6407 habet in pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p5"> | |
| 6408 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 6409 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.2" target="asv">Rom. 9:2</a>): "I have great sorrow [Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart," thus denoting the same thing | |
| 6410 by sorrow and pain. | |
| 6411 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35037] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 6412 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. IX, <i>tristitia est mihi magna, | |
| 6413 et continuus dolor cordi meo</i>, pro eodem utens tristitia et | |
| 6414 dolore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p6"> | |
| 6415 <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the | |
| 6416 interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the | |
| 6417 exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. | |
| 6418 Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is | |
| 6419 called joy, as stated above ( | |
| 6420 <a href="#FS_Q31_A3" id="FS_Q35_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[3]</a>): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure | |
| 6421 which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior | |
| 6422 apprehension, is called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure. | |
| 6423 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 co."><a name="35038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35038] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6424 dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ex duplici apprehensione causari | |
| 6425 possunt, scilicet ex apprehensione exterioris sensus, et ex | |
| 6426 apprehensione interiori sive intellectus sive imaginationis. | |
| 6427 Interior autem apprehensio ad plura se extendit quam exterior, eo | |
| 6428 quod quaecumque cadunt sub exteriori apprehensione, cadunt sub | |
| 6429 interiori, sed non e converso. Sola igitur illa delectatio quae ex | |
| 6430 interiori apprehensione causatur, gaudium nominatur, ut supra | |
| 6431 dictum est. Et similiter ille solus dolor qui ex apprehensione | |
| 6432 interiori causatur, nominatur tristitia. Et sicut illa delectatio | |
| 6433 quae ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, delectatio quidem | |
| 6434 nominatur, non autem gaudium; ita ille dolor qui ex exteriori | |
| 6435 apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem | |
| 6436 tristitia. Sic igitur tristitia est quaedam species doloris, sicut | |
| 6437 gaudium delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p7"> | |
| 6438 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which | |
| 6439 are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains. | |
| 6440 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35039] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6441 ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi quantum ad usum | |
| 6442 vocabuli, quia dolor magis usitatur in corporalibus doloribus, qui | |
| 6443 sunt magis noti, quam in doloribus spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p8"> | |
| 6444 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. | |
| 6445 Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, | |
| 6446 can only regard something present. | |
| 6447 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35040] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6448 dicendum quod sensus exterior non percipit nisi praesens, vis autem | |
| 6449 cognitiva interior potest percipere praesens, praeteritum et | |
| 6450 futurum. Et ideo tristitia potest esse de praesenti, praeterito et | |
| 6451 futuro, dolor autem corporalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensus | |
| 6452 exterioris, non potest esse nisi de praesenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A2-p9"> | |
| 6453 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in | |
| 6454 so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive | |
| 6455 power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, | |
| 6456 who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the | |
| 6457 other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, | |
| 6458 as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far | |
| 6459 as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting | |
| 6460 bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior | |
| 6461 and | |
| 6462 exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be | |
| 6463 taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above. | |
| 6464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35041] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6465 dicendum quod sensibilia tactus sunt dolorosa, non solum inquantum | |
| 6466 sunt improportionata virtuti apprehensivae, sed etiam inquantum | |
| 6467 contrariantur naturae. Aliorum vero sensuum sensibilia possunt | |
| 6468 quidem esse improportionata virtuti apprehensivae, non tamen | |
| 6469 contrariantur naturae, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus. Unde | |
| 6470 solus homo, qui est animal perfectum in cognitione, delectatur in | |
| 6471 sensibilibus aliorum sensuum secundum se ipsa, alia vero animalia | |
| 6472 non delectantur in eis nisi secundum quod referuntur ad sensibilia | |
| 6473 tactus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo de sensibilibus aliorum | |
| 6474 sensuum non dicitur esse dolor, secundum quod contrariatur | |
| 6475 delectationi naturali, sed magis tristitia, quae contrariatur | |
| 6476 gaudio animali. Sic igitur si dolor accipiatur pro corporali | |
| 6477 dolore, quod usitatius est, dolor ex opposito dividitur contra | |
| 6478 tristitiam, secundum distinctionem apprehensionis interioris et | |
| 6479 exterioris; licet, quantum ad obiecta, delectatio ad plura se | |
| 6480 extendat quam dolor corporalis. Si vero dolor accipiatur | |
| 6481 communiter, sic dolor est genus tristitiae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A3-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 3. Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p2"> | |
| 6482 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow | |
| 6483 can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written ( | |
| 6484 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv">Mat. 5:5</a>): "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not contrary to one another. | |
| 6485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35042] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6486 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor delectationi non contrarietur. | |
| 6487 Unum enim contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed tristitia potest | |
| 6488 esse causa delectationis, dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>beati qui | |
| 6489 lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur</i>. Ergo non sunt | |
| 6490 contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p3"> | |
| 6491 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. | |
| 6492 iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it | |
| 6493 sometimes pleases us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure. | |
| 6494 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35043] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6495 unum contrariorum non denominat aliud. Sed in quibusdam ipse dolor | |
| 6496 vel tristitia est delectabilis, sicut Augustinus dicit, in III | |
| 6497 Confess., quod dolor in spectaculis delectat. Et IV Confess., dicit | |
| 6498 quod <i>fletus amara res est, et tamen quandoque delectat</i>. Ergo | |
| 6499 dolor non contrariatur delectationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p4"> | |
| 6500 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the | |
| 6501 matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The | |
| 6502 Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore pleasure | |
| 6503 and pain are not contrary to one another. | |
| 6504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35044] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6505 unum contrariorum non est materia alterius, quia contraria simul | |
| 6506 esse non possunt. Sed dolor potest esse materia delectationis, | |
| 6507 dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de poenitentia, <i>semper poenitens | |
| 6508 doleat, et de dolore gaudeat</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in IX | |
| 6509 Ethic., quod e converso <i>malus dolet de eo quod delectatus | |
| 6510 est</i>. Ergo delectatio et dolor non sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p5"> | |
| 6511 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the volition | |
| 6512 of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary | |
| 6513 to one another. | |
| 6514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35045] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 6515 est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>laetitia est | |
| 6516 voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus, tristitia autem est | |
| 6517 voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus</i>. Sed consentire et | |
| 6518 dissentire sunt contraria. Ergo laetitia et tristitia sunt | |
| 6519 contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p6"> | |
| 6520 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion | |
| 6521 or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present | |
| 6522 good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another. | |
| 6523 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 co."><a name="35046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35046] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6524 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit X Metaphys., contrarietas | |
| 6525 est differentia secundum formam. Forma autem, seu species, | |
| 6526 passionis et motus sumitur ex obiecto vel termino. Unde, cum | |
| 6527 obiecta delectationis et tristitiae, seu doloris, sint contraria, | |
| 6528 scilicet bonum praesens et malum praesens, sequitur quod dolor et | |
| 6529 delectatio sint contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p7"> | |
| 6530 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way, in | |
| 6531 so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something | |
| 6532 pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, | |
| 6533 in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink | |
| 6534 from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the | |
| 6535 comfort of the future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he merits the | |
| 6536 consolation of eternity. In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain | |
| 6537 it. | |
| 6538 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35047] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6539 ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum contrariorum esse causam | |
| 6540 alterius per accidens. Sic autem tristitia potest esse causa | |
| 6541 delectationis. Uno quidem modo, inquantum tristitia de absentia | |
| 6542 alicuius rei, vel de praesentia contrarii, vehementius quaerit id | |
| 6543 in quo delectetur, sicut sitiens vehementius quaerit delectationem | |
| 6544 potus, ut remedium contra tristitiam quam patitur. Alio modo, | |
| 6545 inquantum ex magno desiderio delectationis alicuius, non recusat | |
| 6546 aliquis tristitias perferre, ut ad illam delectationem perveniat. | |
| 6547 Et utroque modo luctus praesens ad consolationem futurae vitae | |
| 6548 perducit. Quia ex hoc ipso quod homo luget pro peccatis, vel pro | |
| 6549 dilatione gloriae, meretur consolationem aeternam. Similiter etiam | |
| 6550 meretur eam aliquis ex hoc quod, ad ipsam consequendam, non refugit | |
| 6551 labores et angustias propter ipsam sustinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p8"> | |
| 6552 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as | |
| 6553 it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, | |
| 6554 since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. | |
| 6555 And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the | |
| 6556 stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented. | |
| 6557 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35048] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6558 dicendum quod dolor ipse potest esse delectabilis per accidens, | |
| 6559 inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam admirationem, ut in spectaculis; | |
| 6560 vel inquantum facit recordationem rei amatae, et facit percipere | |
| 6561 amorem eius, de cuius absentia doletur. Unde, cum amor sit | |
| 6562 delectabilis, et dolor et omnia quae ex amore consequuntur, | |
| 6563 inquantum in eis sentitur amor, sunt delectabilia. Et propter hoc | |
| 6564 etiam dolores in spectaculis possunt esse delectabiles, inquantum | |
| 6565 in eis sentitur aliquis amor conceptus ad illos qui in spectaculis | |
| 6566 commemorantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A3-p9"> | |
| 6567 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered | |
| 6568 under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: | |
| 6569 that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil. | |
| 6570 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35049] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6571 dicendum quod voluntas et ratio supra suos actus reflectuntur, | |
| 6572 inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione | |
| 6573 boni vel mali. Et hoc modo tristitia potest esse materia | |
| 6574 delectationis, vel e converso, non per se, sed per accidens, | |
| 6575 inquantum scilicet utrumque accipitur in ratione boni vel mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A4-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 4. Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p2"> | |
| 6576 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species | |
| 6577 of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally | |
| 6578 contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too. | |
| 6579 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35050] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 6580 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia omni delectationi | |
| 6581 contrarietur. Sicut enim albedo et nigredo sunt contrariae species | |
| 6582 coloris, ita delectatio et tristitia sunt contrariae species animae | |
| 6583 passionum. Sed albedo et nigredo universaliter sibi opponuntur. | |
| 6584 Ergo etiam delectatio et tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p3"> | |
| 6585 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as | |
| 6586 the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow. | |
| 6587 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35051] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6588 medicinae per contraria fiunt. Sed quaelibet delectatio est | |
| 6589 medicina contra quamlibet tristitiam, ut patet per philosophum, in | |
| 6590 VII Ethic. Ergo quaelibet delectatio cuilibet tristitiae | |
| 6591 contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p4"> | |
| 6592 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. | |
| 6593 x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. | |
| 6594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35052] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6595 contraria sunt quae se invicem impediunt. Sed quaelibet tristitia | |
| 6596 impedit quamlibet delectationem, ut patet per illud quod dicitur X | |
| 6597 Ethic. Ergo quaelibet tristitia cuilibet delectationi | |
| 6598 contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p5"> | |
| 6599 <b>On the contrary,</b> The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the | |
| 6600 same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" ( | |
| 6601 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.15" target="asv">Rom. 12:15</a>). Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. | |
| 6602 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35053] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 6603 contrariorum non est eadem causa. Sed ab eodem habitu procedit quod | |
| 6604 aliquis gaudeat de uno, et tristetur de opposito, <i>ex caritate | |
| 6605 enim contingit gaudere cum gaudentibus, et flere cum flentibus</i>, | |
| 6606 ut dicitur Rom. XII. Ergo non omnis tristitia omni delectationi | |
| 6607 contrariatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p6"> | |
| 6608 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently | |
| 6609 things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and | |
| 6610 injustice. | |
| 6611 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p7"> Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things | |
| 6612 are specified in relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which derive their species from their terms | |
| 6613 or objects. Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species contained under contrary | |
| 6614 genera are not contrary as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or | |
| 6615 fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary | |
| 6616 to one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other | |
| 6617 hand, in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species belonging to contrary | |
| 6618 genera, are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The | |
| 6619 reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white | |
| 6620 thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a certain | |
| 6621 likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident in the case of contradiction, | |
| 6622 which is the principle of opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. | |
| 6623 "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the | |
| 6624 other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white." | |
| 6625 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A4-p8"> Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary | |
| 6626 to one another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation | |
| 6627 and denial are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically | |
| 6628 contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary | |
| 6629 but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of | |
| 6630 a friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and | |
| 6631 sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice | |
| 6632 in good and to sorrow for evil. | |
| 6633 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 co."><a name="35054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35054] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6634 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Metaphys., contrarietas est | |
| 6635 differentia secundum formam. Forma autem est et generalis, et | |
| 6636 specialis. Unde contingit esse aliqua contraria secundum formam | |
| 6637 generis, sicut virtus et vitium; et secundum formam speciei, sicut | |
| 6638 iustitia et iniustitia. Est autem considerandum quod quaedam | |
| 6639 specificantur secundum formas absolutas, sicut substantiae et | |
| 6640 qualitates, quaedam vero specificantur per comparationem ad aliquid | |
| 6641 extra, sicut passiones et motus recipiunt speciem ex terminis sive | |
| 6642 ex obiectis. In his ergo quorum species considerantur secundum | |
| 6643 formas absolutas, contingit quidem species quae continentur sub | |
| 6644 contrariis generibus, non esse contrarias secundum rationem | |
| 6645 speciei, non tamen contingit quod habeant aliquam affinitatem vel | |
| 6646 convenientiam ad invicem. Intemperantia enim et iustitia, quae sunt | |
| 6647 in contrariis generibus, virtute scilicet et vitio, non | |
| 6648 contrariantur ad invicem secundum rationem propriae speciei, nec | |
| 6649 tamen habent aliquam affinitatem vel convenientiam ad invicem. Sed | |
| 6650 in illis quorum species sumuntur secundum habitudinem ad aliquid | |
| 6651 extrinsecum, contingit quod species contrariorum generum non solum | |
| 6652 non sunt contrariae ad invicem, sed etiam habent quandam | |
| 6653 convenientiam et affinitatem ad invicem, eo quod eodem modo se | |
| 6654 habere ad contraria, contrarietatem inducit, sicut accedere ad | |
| 6655 album et accedere ad nigrum habent rationem contrarietatis; sed | |
| 6656 contrario modo se habere ad contraria, habet rationem | |
| 6657 similitudinis, sicut recedere ab albo et accedere ad nigrum. Et hoc | |
| 6658 maxime apparet in contradictione, quae est principium oppositionis, | |
| 6659 nam in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio, sicut | |
| 6660 album et non album; in affirmatione autem unius oppositorum et | |
| 6661 negatione alterius, attenditur convenientia et similitudo, ut si | |
| 6662 dicam nigrum et non album. Tristitia autem et delectatio, cum sint | |
| 6663 passiones, specificantur ex obiectis. Et quidem secundum genus | |
| 6664 suum, contrarietatem habent, nam unum pertinet ad prosecutionem, | |
| 6665 aliud vero ad fugam, <i>quae se habent in appetitu sicut affirmatio | |
| 6666 et negatio in ratione</i>, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et ideo tristia | |
| 6667 et delectatio quae sunt de eodem, habent oppositionem ad invicem | |
| 6668 secundum speciem. Tristitia vero et delectatio de diversis, si | |
| 6669 quidem illa diversa non sint opposita, sed disparata, non habent | |
| 6670 oppositionem ad invicem secundum rationem speciei, sed sunt etiam | |
| 6671 disparatae, sicut tristari de morte amici, et delectari in | |
| 6672 contemplatione. Si vero illa diversa sint contraria, tunc | |
| 6673 delectatio et tristitia non solum non habent contrarietatem | |
| 6674 secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam habent convenientiam et | |
| 6675 affinitatem, sicut gaudere de bono, et tristari de malo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p9"> | |
| 6676 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow | |
| 6677 do: wherefore the comparison does not hold. | |
| 6678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35055] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6679 ergo dicendum quod albedo et nigredo non habent speciem ex | |
| 6680 habitudine ad aliquid exterius, sicut delectatio et tristitia. Unde | |
| 6681 non est eadem ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p10"> | |
| 6682 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now | |
| 6683 it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the | |
| 6684 subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is | |
| 6685 viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And | |
| 6686 therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of | |
| 6687 all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically. | |
| 6688 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35056] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6689 dicendum quod genus sumitur ex materia, ut patet in VIII Metaphys. | |
| 6690 In accidentibus autem loco materiae est subiectum. Dictum est autem | |
| 6691 quod delectatio et tristitia contrariantur secundum genus. Et ideo | |
| 6692 in qualibet tristitia est contraria dispositio subiecti | |
| 6693 dispositioni quae est in qualibet delectatione, nam in qualibet | |
| 6694 delectatione appetitus se habet ut acceptans id quod habet; in | |
| 6695 qualibet autem tristitia se habet ut fugiens. Et ideo ex parte | |
| 6696 subiecti quaelibet delectatio est medicina contra quamlibet | |
| 6697 tristitiam, et quaelibet tristitia est impeditiva cuiuslibet | |
| 6698 delectationis, praecipue tamen quando delectatio tristitiae | |
| 6699 contrariatur etiam secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary | |
| 6700 to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening | |
| 6701 the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort. | |
| 6702 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35057] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet | |
| 6703 solutio ad tertium. Vel aliter dicendum quod, etsi non omnis | |
| 6704 tristitia contrarietur omni delectationi secundum speciem, tamen | |
| 6705 quantum ad effectum contrariantur, nam ex uno confortatur natura | |
| 6706 animalis, ex alio vero quodammodo molestatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A5-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 5. Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p2"> | |
| 6707 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 6708 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>): "The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher | |
| 6709 reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow | |
| 6710 contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. | |
| 6711 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35058] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 6712 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi contemplationis sit | |
| 6713 aliqua tristitia contraria. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII, | |
| 6714 <i>quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem | |
| 6715 stabilem operatur</i>. Sed respicere ad Deum pertinet ad superiorem | |
| 6716 rationem, cuius est contemplationi vacare, secundum Augustinum, in | |
| 6717 XII de Trin. Ergo delectationi contemplationis opponitur | |
| 6718 tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p3"> | |
| 6719 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other | |
| 6720 contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. | |
| 6721 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35059] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6722 contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Si ergo unum contrariorum | |
| 6723 contemplatum est causa delectationis, aliud erit causa tristitiae. | |
| 6724 Et sic delectationi contemplationis erit tristitia contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p4"> | |
| 6725 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the | |
| 6726 Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the | |
| 6727 pleasure of contemplation. | |
| 6728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35060] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6729 sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum, ita obiectum tristitiae est | |
| 6730 malum. Sed contemplatio potest habere mali rationem, dicit enim | |
| 6731 philosophus, in XII Metaphys., quod quaedam inconveniens est | |
| 6732 meditari. Ergo contemplationis delectationi potest esse contraria | |
| 6733 tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p5"> | |
| 6734 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the | |
| 6735 work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore | |
| 6736 in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure. | |
| 6737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="35061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35061] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6738 operatio quaelibet, secundum quod non est impedita, est causa | |
| 6739 delectationis, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic. Sed operatio | |
| 6740 contemplationis potest multipliciter impediri, vel ut totaliter non | |
| 6741 sit, vel ut cum difficultate sit. Ergo in contemplatione potest | |
| 6742 esse tristitia delectationi contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p6"> | |
| 6743 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it is written ( | |
| 6744 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.12.12" target="asv">Eccles. 12:12</a>) "much study is an affliction of the flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure. | |
| 6745 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="35062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35062] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6746 carnis afflictio est causa tristitiae. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. | |
| 6747 ult., <i>frequens meditatio carnis est afflictio</i>. Ergo | |
| 6748 contemplatio habet tristitiam delectationi contrariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p7"> | |
| 6749 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 6750 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness." Now the | |
| 6751 conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. | |
| 6752 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35063] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 6753 est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, <i>non habet amaritudinem conversatio | |
| 6754 illius</i> scilicet sapientiae, <i>nec taedium convictus eius; sed | |
| 6755 laetitiam et gaudium</i>. Conversatio autem et convictus sapientiae | |
| 6756 est per contemplationem. Ergo nulla tristitia est quae sit | |
| 6757 contraria delectationi contemplationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p8"> | |
| 6758 <b>I answer that,</b> The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the | |
| 6759 object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate | |
| 6760 something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation | |
| 6761 be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the | |
| 6762 pleasure of contemplation. | |
| 6763 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p9"> In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes | |
| 6764 pleasure in the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow | |
| 6765 is contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). | |
| 6766 This, however, is to be understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of | |
| 6767 itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is | |
| 6768 no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the | |
| 6769 means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. | |
| 6770 Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a | |
| 6771 man | |
| 6772 takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking | |
| 6773 ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that | |
| 6774 contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated above ( | |
| 6775 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q35_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). | |
| 6776 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p10"> Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of | |
| 6777 an organ, secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, | |
| 6778 directly, as regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ; either from the sensible object | |
| 6779 disagreeing with the normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and the smell | |
| 6780 of something foul; or from the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it | |
| 6781 exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above ( | |
| 6782 <a href="#FS_Q33_A2" id="FS_Q35_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[33], A[2]</a>), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly | |
| 6783 in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above | |
| 6784 that intellectual | |
| 6785 contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of | |
| 6786 the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly | |
| 6787 mingled with contemplation. | |
| 6788 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A5-p11"> Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure | |
| 6789 thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but rather | |
| 6790 is in affinity and in harmony with it, as is evident from what has been said above | |
| 6791 <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q35_A5-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. | |
| 6792 Accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any sorrow | |
| 6793 connected with it save accidentally. | |
| 6794 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 co."><a name="35064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35064] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6795 dicendum quod delectatio contemplationis potest intelligi | |
| 6796 dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod contemplatio sit delectationis | |
| 6797 causa, et non obiectum. Et tunc delectatio non est de ipsa | |
| 6798 contemplatione, sed de re contemplata. Contingit autem contemplari | |
| 6799 aliquid nocivum et contristans, sicut et aliquid conveniens et | |
| 6800 delectans. Unde si sic delectatio contemplationis accipiatur, nihil | |
| 6801 prohibet delectationi contemplationis esse tristitiam contrariam. | |
| 6802 Alio modo potest dici delectatio contemplationis, quia contemplatio | |
| 6803 est eius obiectum et causa, puta cum aliquis delectatur de hoc ipso | |
| 6804 quod contemplatur. Et sic, ut dicit Gregorius Nyssenus, <i>ei | |
| 6805 delectationi quae est secundum contemplationem, non opponitur | |
| 6806 aliqua tristitia</i>. Et hoc idem philosophus dicit, in I Topic. et | |
| 6807 in X Ethic. Sed hoc est intelligendum, per se loquendo. Cuius ratio | |
| 6808 est, quia tristitia per se contrariatur delectationi quae est de | |
| 6809 contrario obiecto, sicut delectationi quae est de calore, | |
| 6810 contrariatur tristitia quae est de frigore. Obiecto autem | |
| 6811 contemplationis nihil est contrarium, contrariorum enim rationes, | |
| 6812 secundum quod sunt apprehensae, non sunt contrariae, sed unum | |
| 6813 contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud. Unde delectationi quae est | |
| 6814 in contemplando, non potest, per se loquendo, esse aliqua tristitia | |
| 6815 contraria. Sed nec etiam habet tristitiam annexam, sicut corporales | |
| 6816 delectationes, quae sunt ut medicinae quaedam contra aliquas | |
| 6817 molestias, sicut aliquis delectatur in potu ex hoc quod anxiatur | |
| 6818 siti, quando autem iam tota sitis est repulsa, etiam cessat | |
| 6819 delectatio potus. Delectatio enim contemplationis non causatur ex | |
| 6820 hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum | |
| 6821 seipsam delectabilis, non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam | |
| 6822 perfecta, ut dictum est. Per accidens autem admiscetur tristitia | |
| 6823 delectationi apprehensionis. Et hoc dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte | |
| 6824 organi; alio modo, ex impedimento apprehensionis. Ex parte quidem | |
| 6825 organi, admiscetur tristitia vel dolor apprehensioni, directe | |
| 6826 quidem in viribus apprehensivis sensitivae partis, quae habent | |
| 6827 organum corporale, vel ex sensibili, quod est contrarium debitae | |
| 6828 complexioni organi, sicut gustus rei amarae et olfactus rei | |
| 6829 foetidae; vel ex continuitate sensibilis convenientis, quod per | |
| 6830 assiduitatem facit superexcrescentiam naturalis habitus, ut supra | |
| 6831 dictum est, et sic redditur apprehensio sensibilis quae prius erat | |
| 6832 delectabilis, taediosa. Sed haec duo directe in contemplatione | |
| 6833 mentis locum non habent, quia mens non habet organum corporale. | |
| 6834 Unde dictum est in auctoritate inducta, quod non habet contemplatio | |
| 6835 mentis nec amaritudinem nec taedium. Sed quia mens humana utitur in | |
| 6836 contemplando viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, in quarum actibus | |
| 6837 accidit lassitudo; ideo indirecte admiscetur aliqua afflictio vel | |
| 6838 dolor contemplationi. Sed neutro modo tristitia contemplationi per | |
| 6839 accidens adiuncta, contrariatur delectationi eius. Nam tristitia | |
| 6840 quae est de impedimento contemplationis, non contrariatur | |
| 6841 delectationi contemplationis, sed magis habet affinitatem et | |
| 6842 convenientiam cum ipsa, ut ex supradictis patet. Tristitia vero vel | |
| 6843 afflictio quae est de lassitudine corporali, non ad idem genus | |
| 6844 refertur, unde est penitus disparata. Et sic manifestum est quod | |
| 6845 delectationi quae est de ipsa contemplatione, nulla tristitia | |
| 6846 contrariatur; nec adiungitur ei aliqua tristitia nisi per | |
| 6847 accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p12"> | |
| 6848 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which | |
| 6849 the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to the love of God. | |
| 6850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35065] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6851 ergo dicendum quod illa tristitia quae est secundum Deum, non est | |
| 6852 de ipsa contemplatione mentis, sed est de aliquo quod mens | |
| 6853 contemplatur, scilicet de peccato, quod mens considerat ut | |
| 6854 contrarium dilectioni divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p13"> | |
| 6855 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are contrary | |
| 6856 in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence | |
| 6857 one and the same science considers contraries. | |
| 6858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35066] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6859 dicendum quod ea quae sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod | |
| 6860 sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim rationes | |
| 6861 contrariorum sunt contrariae, sed magis unum contrarium est ratio | |
| 6862 cognoscendi aliud. Propter quod est una scientia contrariorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p14"> | |
| 6863 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the | |
| 6864 intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation | |
| 6865 of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached. | |
| 6866 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35067] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6867 dicendum quod contemplatio, secundum se, nunquam habet rationem | |
| 6868 mali, cum contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri, quod | |
| 6869 est bonum intellectus, sed per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet | |
| 6870 contemplatio vilioris impedit contemplationem melioris; vel ex | |
| 6871 parte rei contemplatae, ad quam inordinatae appetitus | |
| 6872 afficitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p15"> | |
| 6873 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, | |
| 6874 as stated above. | |
| 6875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="35068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35068] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 6876 dicendum quod tristitia quae est de impedimento contemplationis, | |
| 6877 non contrariatur delectationi contemplationis, sed est ei affinis, | |
| 6878 ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A5-p16"> | |
| 6879 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above. | |
| 6880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="35069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35069] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 6881 dicendum quod afflictio carnis per accidens et indirecte se habet | |
| 6882 ad contemplationem mentis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A6-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 6. Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p2"> | |
| 6883 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There | |
| 6884 is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. | |
| 6885 Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought. | |
| 6886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35070] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 6887 sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis sit fugienda tristitia, quam | |
| 6888 delectatio appetenda. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta | |
| 6889 trium quaest., <i>nemo est qui non magis dolorem fugiat, quam | |
| 6890 appetat voluptatem</i>. Illud autem in quo communiter omnia | |
| 6891 consentiunt, videtur esse naturale. Ergo naturale est et conveniens | |
| 6892 quod plus tristitia fugiatur, quam delectatio appetatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p3"> | |
| 6893 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," | |
| 6894 as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas | |
| 6895 the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore | |
| 6896 sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought. | |
| 6897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35071] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6898 actio contrarii facit ad velocitatem et intensionem motus, aqua | |
| 6899 enim calida citius et fortius congelatur, ut dicit philosophus, in | |
| 6900 libro Meteor. Sed fuga tristitiae est ex contrarietate | |
| 6901 contristantis, appetitus autem delectationis non est ex aliqua | |
| 6902 contrarietate, sed magis procedit ex convenientia delectantis. Ergo | |
| 6903 maior est fuga tristitiae quam appetitus delectationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p4"> | |
| 6904 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more | |
| 6905 virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement | |
| 6906 of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher | |
| 6907 says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised." Therefore | |
| 6908 the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure. | |
| 6909 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35072] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6910 quanto aliquis secundum rationem fortiori passioni repugnat, tanto | |
| 6911 laudabilior est et virtuosior, quia virtus est circa difficile et | |
| 6912 bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed fortis, qui resistit motui quo | |
| 6913 fugitur dolor, est virtuosior quam temperatus, qui resistit motui | |
| 6914 quo appetitur delectatio, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., | |
| 6915 quod fortes et iusti maxime honorantur. Ergo vehementior est motus | |
| 6916 quo fugitur tristitia, quam motus quo appetitur delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p5"> | |
| 6917 <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which | |
| 6918 is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than | |
| 6919 the shunning of sorrow. | |
| 6920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35073] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 6921 bonum est fortius quam malum, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de | |
| 6922 Div. Nom. Sed delectatio est appetibilis propter bonum, quod est | |
| 6923 eius obiectum, fuga autem tristitiae est propter malum. Ergo | |
| 6924 fortior est appetitus delectationis quam fuga tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A6-p6"> | |
| 6925 <b>I answer that,</b> The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure | |
| 6926 is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable | |
| 6927 without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. | |
| 6928 Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore | |
| 6929 desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object | |
| 6930 of pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation | |
| 6931 of good: and that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find | |
| 6932 a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing | |
| 6933 approaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its | |
| 6934 nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore | |
| 6935 the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow. | |
| 6936 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A6-p7"> But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, | |
| 6937 on the part of the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is felt more keenly, when we lack that | |
| 6938 which we love." Now from the lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved good, | |
| 6939 or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in | |
| 6940 possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned, according as love is | |
| 6941 the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which | |
| 6942 cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being | |
| 6943 of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from fear | |
| 6944 of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part | |
| 6945 of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but all. | |
| 6946 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 co."><a name="35074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35074] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 6947 dicendum quod, per se loquendo, appetitus delectationis est fortior | |
| 6948 quam fuga tristitiae. Cuius ratio est, quia causa delectationis est | |
| 6949 bonum conveniens, causa autem doloris sive tristitiae est aliquod | |
| 6950 malum repugnans. Contingit autem aliquod bonum esse conveniens | |
| 6951 absque omni dissonantia, non autem potest esse aliquod malum | |
| 6952 totaliter, absque omni convenientia, repugnans. Unde delectatio | |
| 6953 potest esse integra et perfecta, tristitia autem est semper | |
| 6954 secundum partem. Unde naturaliter maior est appetitus delectationis | |
| 6955 quam fuga tristitiae. Alia vero ratio est, quia bonum, quod est | |
| 6956 obiectum delectationis, propter seipsum appetitur, malum autem, | |
| 6957 quod est obiectum tristitiae, est fugiendum inquantum est privatio | |
| 6958 boni. Quod autem est per se, potius est illo quod est per aliud. | |
| 6959 Cuius etiam signum apparet in motibus naturalibus. Nam omnis motus | |
| 6960 naturalis intensior est in fine, cum appropinquat ad terminum suae | |
| 6961 naturae convenientem, quam in principio, cum recedit a termino suae | |
| 6962 naturae non convenienti, quasi natura magis tendat in id quod est | |
| 6963 sibi conveniens, quam fugiat id quod est sibi repugnans. Unde et | |
| 6964 inclinatio appetitivae virtutis, per se loquendo, vehementius | |
| 6965 tendit in delectationem quam fugiat tristitiam. Sed per accidens | |
| 6966 contingit quod tristitiam aliquis magis fugit, quam delectationem | |
| 6967 appetat. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte apprehensionis. | |
| 6968 Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>amor magis sentitur, cum | |
| 6969 eum prodit indigentia</i>. Ex indigentia autem amati procedit | |
| 6970 tristitia, quae est ex amissione alicuius boni amati, vel ex | |
| 6971 incursu alicuius mali contrarii. Delectatio autem non habet | |
| 6972 indigentiam boni amati, sed quiescit in eo iam adepto. Cum igitur | |
| 6973 amor sit causa delectationis et tristitiae, tanto magis fugitur | |
| 6974 tristitia, quanto magis sentitur amor ex eo quod contrariatur | |
| 6975 amori. Secundo, ex parte causae contristantis, vel dolorem | |
| 6976 inferentis, quae repugnat bono magis amato quam sit bonum illud in | |
| 6977 quo delectamur. Magis enim amamus consistentiam corporis naturalem, | |
| 6978 quam delectationem cibi. Et ideo timore doloris qui provenit ex | |
| 6979 flagellis vel aliis huiusmodi, quae contrariantur bonae | |
| 6980 consistentiae corporis, dimittimus delectationem ciborum vel | |
| 6981 aliorum huiusmodi. Tertio, ex parte effectus, inquantum scilicet | |
| 6982 tristitia impedit non unam tantum delectationem, sed omnes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p8"> | |
| 6983 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And this | |
| 6984 is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear | |
| 6985 of pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all. | |
| 6986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35075] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 6987 ergo dicendum quod illud quod Augustinus dicit, quod <i>dolor magis | |
| 6988 fugitur quam voluptas appetatur</i>, est verum per accidens, et non | |
| 6989 per se. Et hoc patet ex eo quod subdit, <i>quandoquidem videmus | |
| 6990 etiam immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri | |
| 6991 dolorum metu</i>, qui contrariatur vitae, quae maxime amatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p9"> | |
| 6992 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the same with movement from within and movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable | |
| 6993 more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from | |
| 6994 without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, | |
| 6995 as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and | |
| 6996 slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object. | |
| 6997 Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty | |
| 6998 is from without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And | |
| 6999 then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure | |
| 7000 is sought. | |
| 7001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35076] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7002 dicendum quod aliter est in motu qui est ab interiori, et aliter in | |
| 7003 motu qui est ab exteriori. Motus enim qui est ab interiori, magis | |
| 7004 tendit in id quod est conveniens, quam recedat a contrario, sicut | |
| 7005 supra dictum est de motu naturali. Sed motus qui est ab extrinseco, | |
| 7006 intenditur ex ipsa contrarietate, quia unumquodque suo modo nititur | |
| 7007 ad resistendum contrario, sicut ad conservationem sui ipsius. Unde | |
| 7008 motus violentus intenditur in principio, et remittitur in fine. | |
| 7009 Motus autem appetitivae partis est ab intrinseco, cum sit ab anima | |
| 7010 ad res. Et ideo, per se loquendo, magis appetitur delectatio quam | |
| 7011 fugiatur tristitia. Sed motus sensitivae partis est ab exteriori, | |
| 7012 quasi a rebus ad animam. Unde magis sentitur quod est magis | |
| 7013 contrarium. Et sic etiam per accidens, inquantum sensus requiritur | |
| 7014 ad delectationem et tristitiam, magis fugitur tristitia quam | |
| 7015 delectatio appetatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A6-p10"> | |
| 7016 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, | |
| 7017 but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, | |
| 7018 than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus | |
| 7019 life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised | |
| 7020 for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. | |
| 7021 iii, 11. | |
| 7022 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35077] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7023 dicendum quod fortis non laudatur ex eo quod secundum rationem non | |
| 7024 vincitur a dolore vel tristitia quacumque, sed ea quae consistit in | |
| 7025 periculis mortis. Quae quidem tristitia magis fugitur quam | |
| 7026 appetatur delectatio ciborum vel venereorum, circa quam est | |
| 7027 temperantia, sicut vita magis amatur quam cibus vel coitus. Sed | |
| 7028 temperatus magis laudatur ex hoc quod non prosequitur delectationes | |
| 7029 tactus, quam ex hoc quod non fugit tristitias contrarias, ut patet | |
| 7030 in III Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A7-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 7. Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p2"> | |
| 7031 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant | |
| 7032 to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, | |
| 7033 therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been said above | |
| 7034 <a href="#FS_Q35_A6" id="FS_Q35_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, outward pain is greater than interior sorrow. | |
| 7035 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35078] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum | |
| 7036 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor exterior sit maior quam dolor | |
| 7037 cordis interior. Dolor enim exterior causatur ex causa repugnante | |
| 7038 bonae consistentiae corporis, in quo est vita, dolor autem interior | |
| 7039 causatur ex aliqua imaginatione mali. Cum ergo vita magis ametur | |
| 7040 quam imaginatum bonum, videtur, secundum praedicta, quod dolor | |
| 7041 exterior sit maior quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p3"> | |
| 7042 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; | |
| 7043 whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow. | |
| 7044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35079] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7045 res magis movet quam rei similitudo. Sed dolor exterior provenit ex | |
| 7046 reali coniunctione alicuius contrarii, dolor autem interior ex | |
| 7047 similitudine contrarii apprehensa. Ergo maior est dolor exterior | |
| 7048 quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p4"> | |
| 7049 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain | |
| 7050 than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow. | |
| 7051 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35080] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7052 causa ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed dolor exterior habet fortiores | |
| 7053 effectus, facilius enim homo moritur propter dolores exteriores | |
| 7054 quam propter dolorem interiorem. Ergo exterior dolor est maior, et | |
| 7055 magis fugitur, quam dolor interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p5"> | |
| 7056 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( | |
| 7057 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.17" target="asv">Ecclus. 25:17</a>): "The sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman is all evil." Therefore, just | |
| 7058 as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses every | |
| 7059 outward wound. | |
| 7060 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35081] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7061 est quod dicitur Eccli. XXV, <i>omnis plaga tristitia cordis est, | |
| 7062 et omnis malitia nequitia mulieris</i>. Ergo, sicut nequitia | |
| 7063 mulieris alias nequitias superat, ut ibi intenditur; ita tristitia | |
| 7064 cordis omnem plagam exteriorem excedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A7-p6"> | |
| 7065 <b>I answer that,</b> Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive | |
| 7066 power, as stated above | |
| 7067 <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q35_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the cause, | |
| 7068 which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant | |
| 7069 to the body; while the | |
| 7070 cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense, | |
| 7071 chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason. | |
| 7072 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A7-p7"> If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite | |
| 7073 to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly. Because inward pain arises from something | |
| 7074 being repugnant to the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite, through | |
| 7075 being repugnant to the body. Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another. | |
| 7076 Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because | |
| 7077 the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently | |
| 7078 inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward | |
| 7079 pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in | |
| 7080 a | |
| 7081 manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then | |
| 7082 the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever | |
| 7083 is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended | |
| 7084 by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the | |
| 7085 heart is every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart. | |
| 7086 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 co."><a name="35082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35082] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7087 dicendum quod dolor interior et exterior in uno conveniunt, et in | |
| 7088 duobus differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod uterque est motus | |
| 7089 appetitivae virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Differunt autem secundum | |
| 7090 illa duo quae ad tristitiam et delectationem requiruntur, scilicet | |
| 7091 secundum causam, quae est bonum vel malum coniunctum; et secundum | |
| 7092 apprehensionem. Causa enim doloris exterioris est malum coniunctum | |
| 7093 quod repugnat corpori, causa autem interioris doloris est malum | |
| 7094 coniunctum quod repugnat appetitui. Dolor etiam exterior sequitur | |
| 7095 apprehensionem sensus, et specialiter tactus, dolor autem interior | |
| 7096 sequitur apprehensionem interiorem, imaginationis scilicet vel | |
| 7097 etiam rationis. Si ergo comparatur causa interioris doloris ad | |
| 7098 causam exterioris, una per se pertinet ad appetitum, cuius est | |
| 7099 uterque dolor, alia vero per aliud. Nam dolor interior est ex hoc | |
| 7100 quod aliquid repugnat ipsi appetitui, exterior autem dolor, ex hoc | |
| 7101 quod repugnat appetitui quia repugnat corpori. Semper autem quod | |
| 7102 est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud. Unde ex parte ista, | |
| 7103 dolor interior praeeminet dolori exteriori. Similiter etiam ex | |
| 7104 parte apprehensionis. Nam apprehensio rationis et imaginationis | |
| 7105 altior est quam apprehensio sensu tactus. Unde simpliciter et per | |
| 7106 se loquendo, dolor interior potior est quam dolor exterior. Cuius | |
| 7107 signum est, quod etiam dolores exteriores aliquis voluntarie | |
| 7108 suscipit, ut evitet interiorem dolorem. Et inquantum non repugnat | |
| 7109 dolor exterior interiori appetitui, fit quodammodo delectabilis et | |
| 7110 iucundus interiori gaudio. Quandoque tamen dolor exterior est cum | |
| 7111 interiori dolore, et tunc dolor augetur. Non solum enim interior | |
| 7112 dolor est maior quam exterior, sed etiam universalior. Quidquid | |
| 7113 enim est repugnans corpori, potest esse repugnans interiori | |
| 7114 appetitui; et quidquid apprehenditur sensu, potest apprehendi | |
| 7115 imaginatione et ratione; sed non convertitur. Et ideo signanter in | |
| 7116 auctoritate adducta dicitur, omnis plaga tristitia cordis est, quia | |
| 7117 etiam dolores exteriorum plagarum sub interiori cordis tristitia | |
| 7118 comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p8"> | |
| 7119 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must | |
| 7120 not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain | |
| 7121 is compared to the appetite. | |
| 7122 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="35083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35083] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7123 ergo dicendum quod dolor interior potest etiam esse de his quae | |
| 7124 contrariantur vitae. Et sic comparatio doloris interioris ad | |
| 7125 exteriorem non est accipienda secundum diversa mala quae sunt causa | |
| 7126 doloris, sed secundum diversam comparationem huius causae doloris | |
| 7127 ad appetitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p9"> | |
| 7128 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness | |
| 7129 itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its | |
| 7130 likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused | |
| 7131 by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward | |
| 7132 apprehension. | |
| 7133 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="35084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35084] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7134 dicendum quod tristitia interior non procedit ex similitudine rei | |
| 7135 apprehensa, sicut ex causa, non enim homo tristatur interius de | |
| 7136 ipsa similitudine apprehensa, sed de re cuius est similitudo. Quae | |
| 7137 quidem res tanto perfectius apprehenditur per aliquam | |
| 7138 similitudinem, quanto similitudo est magis immaterialis et | |
| 7139 abstracta. Et ideo dolor interior, per se loquendo, est maior, | |
| 7140 tanquam de maiori malo existens; propter hoc quod interiori | |
| 7141 apprehensione magis cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10"> | |
| 7142 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive | |
| 7143 conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more | |
| 7144 material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective. For this reason, as | |
| 7145 stated above ( | |
| 7146 <a href="#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>; | |
| 7147 <a href="#FS_Q31_A5" id="FS_Q35_A7-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[31], | |
| 7148 A[5] | |
| 7149 </a> ), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than | |
| 7150 from inward pain. | |
| 7151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="35085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35085] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7152 dicendum quod immutationes corporales magis causantur ex dolore | |
| 7153 exteriori, tum quia causa doloris exterioris est corrumpens | |
| 7154 coniunctum corporaliter, quod exigit apprehensio tactus. Tum etiam | |
| 7155 quia sensus exterior est magis corporalis quam sensus interior, | |
| 7156 sicut et appetitus sensitivus quam intellectivus. Et propter hoc, | |
| 7157 ut supra dictum est, ex motu appetitus sensitivi magis corpus | |
| 7158 immutatur. Et similiter ex dolore exteriori, magis quam ex dolore | |
| 7159 interiori.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q35_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q35_A8-p0.1">Q. 35. A. 8. Whether there are only four species of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p2"> | |
| 7160 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, | |
| 7161 distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls "anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary | |
| 7162 to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow. | |
| 7163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35086] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum | |
| 7164 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter quatuor | |
| 7165 tristitiae species assignet, quae sunt acedia, achthos (vel | |
| 7166 anxietas secundum Gregorium Nyssenum), misericordia et invidia. | |
| 7167 Tristitia enim delectationi opponitur. Sed delectationis non | |
| 7168 assignantur aliquae species. Ergo nec tristitiae species debent | |
| 7169 assignari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p3"> | |
| 7170 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are "indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, | |
| 7171 9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient. | |
| 7172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35087] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7173 poenitentia est quaedam species tristitiae. Similiter etiam Nemesis | |
| 7174 et zelus, ut dicit philosophus, II Rhetoric. Quae quidem sub his | |
| 7175 speciebus non comprehenduntur. Ergo insufficiens est eius praedicta | |
| 7176 divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p4"> | |
| 7177 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to | |
| 7178 one another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] "torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the | |
| 7179 sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs." But it is possible for one | |
| 7180 to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed | |
| 7181 down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is correct. | |
| 7182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35088] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7183 omnis divisio debet esse per opposita. Sed praedicta non habent | |
| 7184 oppositionem ad invicem. Nam secundum Gregorium <i>acedia est | |
| 7185 tristitia vocem amputans; anxietas vero est tristitia aggravans; | |
| 7186 invidia vero est tristitia in alienis bonis; misericordia autem est | |
| 7187 tristitia in alienis malis</i>. Contingit autem aliquem tristari et | |
| 7188 de alienis malis, et de alienis bonis et simul cum hoc interius | |
| 7189 aggravari, et exterius vocem amittere. Ergo praedicta divisio non | |
| 7190 est conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p5"> | |
| 7191 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] and of Damascene. | |
| 7192 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35089] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7193 est auctoritas utriusque, scilicet Gregorii Nysseni et | |
| 7194 Damasceni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q35_A8-p6"> | |
| 7195 <b>I answer that,</b> It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two | |
| 7196 ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." | |
| 7197 Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing | |
| 7198 may be added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that | |
| 7199 genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the | |
| 7200 genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a species | |
| 7201 of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: | |
| 7202 thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a | |
| 7203 foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles | |
| 7204 of mathematics are applied to natural matter. | |
| 7205 </p><p id="FS_Q35_A8-p7"> In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow | |
| 7206 to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect. For | |
| 7207 the proper object of sorrow is "one's own evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through | |
| 7208 one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, | |
| 7209 considered, however, as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's | |
| 7210 good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have "envy." The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain "flight | |
| 7211 of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, | |
| 7212 by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence | |
| 7213 it is also called "perplexity." If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which | |
| 7214 belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in | |
| 7215 the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements | |
| 7216 the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated | |
| 7217 in | |
| 7218 Polit. i, 1. | |
| 7219 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 co."><a name="35090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35090] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7220 dicendum quod ad rationem speciei pertinet quod se habeat ex | |
| 7221 additione ad genus. Sed generi potest aliquid addi dupliciter. Uno | |
| 7222 modo, quod per se ad ipsum pertinet, et virtute continetur in ipso, | |
| 7223 sicut rationale additur animali. Et talis additio facit veras | |
| 7224 species alicuius generis, ut per philosophum patet, in VII et VIII | |
| 7225 Metaphys. Aliquid vero additur generi quasi aliquid extraneum a | |
| 7226 ratione ipsius, sicut si album animali addatur, vel aliquid | |
| 7227 huiusmodi. Et talis additio non facit veras species generis, | |
| 7228 secundum quod communiter loquimur de genere et speciebus. Interdum | |
| 7229 tamen dicitur aliquid esse species alicuius generis propter hoc | |
| 7230 quod habet aliquid extraneum ad quod applicatur generis ratio, | |
| 7231 sicut carbo et flamma dicuntur esse species ignis, propter | |
| 7232 applicationem naturae ignis ad materiam alienam. Et simili modo | |
| 7233 loquendi dicuntur astrologia et perspectiva species mathematicae, | |
| 7234 inquantum principia mathematica applicantur ad materiam naturalem. | |
| 7235 Et hoc modo loquendi assignantur hic species tristitiae, per | |
| 7236 applicationem rationis tristitiae ad aliquid extraneum. Quod quidem | |
| 7237 extraneum accipi potest vel ex parte causae, obiecti; vel ex parte | |
| 7238 effectus. Proprium enim obiectum tristitiae est proprium malum. | |
| 7239 Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum | |
| 7240 alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic | |
| 7241 est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum | |
| 7242 tamen aestimatur ut proprium. Vel quantum ad utrumque, quia neque | |
| 7243 est de proprio, neque de malo, sed de bono alieno, inquantum tamen | |
| 7244 bonum alienum aestimatur ut proprium malum, et sic est invidia. | |
| 7245 Proprius autem effectus tristitiae consistit in quadam fuga | |
| 7246 appetitus. Unde extraneum circa effectum tristitiae, potest accipi | |
| 7247 quantum ad alterum tantum, quia scilicet tollitur fuga, et sic est | |
| 7248 anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod | |
| 7249 refugium, unde alio nomine dicitur angustia. Si vero intantum | |
| 7250 procedat talis aggravatio, ut etiam exteriora membra immobilitet ab | |
| 7251 opere, quod pertinet ad acediam; sic erit extraneum quantum ad | |
| 7252 utrumque, quia nec est fuga, nec est in appetitu. Ideo autem | |
| 7253 specialiter acedia dicitur vocem amputare, quia vox inter omnes | |
| 7254 exteriores motus magis exprimit interiorem conceptum et affectum, | |
| 7255 non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in aliis animalibus, ut dicitur | |
| 7256 in I Polit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p8"> | |
| 7257 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; | |
| 7258 for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). | |
| 7259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35091] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7260 ergo dicendum quod delectatio causatur ex bono, quod uno modo | |
| 7261 dicitur. Et ideo delectationis non assignantur tot species sicut | |
| 7262 tristitiae, quae causatur ex malo, quod multifariam contingit, ut | |
| 7263 dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p9"> | |
| 7264 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. Jealousy | |
| 7265 and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later ( | |
| 7266 <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q35_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[36], A[2]</a>). | |
| 7267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35092] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7268 dicendum quod poenitentia est de malo proprio, quod per se est | |
| 7269 obiectum tristitiae. Unde non pertinet ad has species. Zelus vero | |
| 7270 et Nemesis sub invidia continentur, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q35_A8-p10"> | |
| 7271 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This division is not according to opposite species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion | |
| 7272 of sorrow is applied, as stated above. | |
| 7273 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 35 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35093] Iª-IIae q. 35 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7274 dicendum quod divisio ista non sumitur secundum oppositiones | |
| 7275 specierum, sed secundum diversitatem extraneorum ad quae trahitur | |
| 7276 ratio tristitiae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 7277 <div id="FS_Q36" class="div3"> | |
| 7278 <h3 id="FS_Q36-p0.1">Q. 36. OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 7279 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 7280 <p id="FS_Q36-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q36-p3"><a href="#FS_Q36_A1"> (1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p4"><a href="#FS_Q36_A2"> (2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p5"><a href="#FS_Q36_A3"> (3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?</a></p><p id="FS_Q36-p6"><a href="#FS_Q36_A4"> (4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?</a></p> | |
| 7281 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 pr."><a name="35094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35094] | |
| 7282 Iª-IIae q. 36 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 7283 causis tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum | |
| 7284 causa doloris sit bonum amissum, vel magis malum coniunctum. | |
| 7285 Secundo, utrum concupiscentia sit causa doloris. Tertio, utrum | |
| 7286 appetitus unitatis sit causa doloris. Quarto, utrum potestas cui | |
| 7287 resisti non potest, sit causa doloris.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 7288 <div id="FS_Q36_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A1-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 1. Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p2"> | |
| 7289 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De | |
| 7290 viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused | |
| 7291 by the loss of some good. | |
| 7292 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35095] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7293 sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum amissum sit magis causa doloris | |
| 7294 quam malum coniunctum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de octo | |
| 7295 quaestionibus Dulcitii, dolorem esse de amissione bonorum | |
| 7296 temporalium. Eadem ergo ratione, quilibet dolor ex amissione | |
| 7297 alicuius boni contingit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3"> | |
| 7298 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it was said above ( | |
| 7299 <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a>) that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, | |
| 7300 as stated above ( | |
| 7301 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; | |
| 7302 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.3" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[1]</a>; | |
| 7303 <a href="#FS_Q35_A3" id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.4" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[3]</a>). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good. | |
| 7304 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35096] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7305 supra dictum est quod dolor qui delectationi contrariatur, est de | |
| 7306 eodem de quo est delectatio. Sed delectatio est de bono, sicut | |
| 7307 supra dictum est. Ergo dolor est principaliter de amissione | |
| 7308 boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p4"> | |
| 7309 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. | |
| 7310 But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present. | |
| 7311 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35097] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7312 secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, amor est causa tristitiae, | |
| 7313 sicut et aliarum affectionum animae. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum. | |
| 7314 Ergo dolor vel tristitia magis respicit bonum amissum quam malum | |
| 7315 coniunctum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p5"> | |
| 7316 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow." | |
| 7317 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35098] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7318 est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod <i>expectatum malum | |
| 7319 timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p6"> | |
| 7320 <b>I answer that,</b> If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. | |
| 7321 For, as stated in the | |
| 7322 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A10" id="FS_Q36_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[14], A[10]</a> and | |
| 7323 <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q36_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[3]</a>, evil is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in | |
| 7324 this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But | |
| 7325 sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect | |
| 7326 of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary." | |
| 7327 Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, | |
| 7328 the present evil or the good which is lost. | |
| 7329 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p7"> Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in | |
| 7330 natural things; the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural movements, we | |
| 7331 observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal | |
| 7332 is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place, | |
| 7333 and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity | |
| 7334 itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is | |
| 7335 the reason for its downward tendency. | |
| 7336 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A1-p8"> Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind | |
| 7337 of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards the evil | |
| 7338 that is present. On the other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and therefore, | |
| 7339 forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or | |
| 7340 pain, than the good which is lost. | |
| 7341 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 co."><a name="35099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35099] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7342 dicendum quod, si hoc modo se haberent privationes in apprehensione | |
| 7343 animae, sicut se habent in ipsis rebus, ista quaestio nullius | |
| 7344 momenti esse videretur. Malum enim, ut in primo libro habitum est, | |
| 7345 est privatio boni, privatio autem, in rerum natura, nihil est aliud | |
| 7346 quam carentia oppositi habitus, secundum hoc ergo, idem esset | |
| 7347 tristari de bono amisso, et de malo habito. Sed tristitia est motus | |
| 7348 appetitus apprehensionem sequentis. In apprehensione autem ipsa | |
| 7349 privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur ens rationis. | |
| 7350 Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et | |
| 7351 ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat | |
| 7352 principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum. Et quia motus | |
| 7353 appetitus animalis hoc modo se habet in operibus animae, sicut | |
| 7354 motus naturalis in rebus naturalibus; ex consideratione naturalium | |
| 7355 motuum veritas accipi potest. Si enim accipiamus in motibus | |
| 7356 naturalibus accessum et recessum, accessus per se respicit id quod | |
| 7357 est conveniens naturae; recessus autem per se respicit id quod est | |
| 7358 contrarium; sicut grave per se recedit a loco superiori, accedit | |
| 7359 autem naturaliter ad locum inferiorem. Sed si accipiamus causam | |
| 7360 utriusque motus, scilicet gravitatem, ipsa gravitas per prius | |
| 7361 inclinat ad locum deorsum, quam retrahat a loco sursum, a quo | |
| 7362 recedit ut deorsum tendat. Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus | |
| 7363 appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio | |
| 7364 autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per | |
| 7365 prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita | |
| 7366 tristitia respicit malum coniunctum. Sed causa delectationis et | |
| 7367 tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic | |
| 7368 ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est | |
| 7369 causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum | |
| 7370 amissum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p9"> | |
| 7371 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine | |
| 7372 says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods. | |
| 7373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35100] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7374 ergo dicendum quod ipsa amissio boni apprehenditur sub ratione | |
| 7375 mali, sicut et amissio mali apprehenditur sub ratione boni. Et ideo | |
| 7376 Augustinus dicit dolorem provenire ex amissione temporalium | |
| 7377 bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p10"> | |
| 7378 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular | |
| 7379 thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation | |
| 7380 of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the | |
| 7381 same thing under a contrary aspect. | |
| 7382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35101] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7383 dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ei contrarius respiciunt idem, | |
| 7384 sed sub contraria ratione, nam si delectatio est de praesentia | |
| 7385 alicuius, tristitia est de absentia eiusdem. In uno autem | |
| 7386 contrariorum includitur privatio alterius, ut patet in X Metaphys. | |
| 7387 Et inde est quod tristitia quae est de contrario, est quodammodo de | |
| 7388 eodem sub contraria ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A1-p11"> | |
| 7389 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many movements arise from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, | |
| 7390 but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature. | |
| 7391 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35102] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7392 dicendum quod, quando ex una causa proveniunt multi motus, non | |
| 7393 oportet quod omnes principalius respiciant illud quod principalius | |
| 7394 respicit causa, sed primus tantum. Unusquisque autem aliorum | |
| 7395 principalius respicit illud quod est ei conveniens secundum | |
| 7396 propriam rationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A2-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 2. Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p2"> | |
| 7397 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above | |
| 7398 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement | |
| 7399 towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. | |
| 7400 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35103] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7401 sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit causa doloris | |
| 7402 seu tristitiae. Tristitia enim per se respicit malum, ut dictum | |
| 7403 est. Concupiscentia autem est motus quidam appetitus in bonum. | |
| 7404 Motus autem qui est in unum contrarium, non est causa motus qui | |
| 7405 respicit aliud contrarium. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa | |
| 7406 doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p3"> | |
| 7407 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire | |
| 7408 is something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. | |
| 7409 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35104] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7410 dolor, secundum Damascenum, est de praesenti, concupiscentia autem | |
| 7411 est de futuro. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p4"> | |
| 7412 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says | |
| 7413 (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. | |
| 7414 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35105] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7415 id quod est per se delectabile, non est causa doloris. Sed | |
| 7416 concupiscentia est secundum seipsam delectabilis, ut philosophus | |
| 7417 dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris seu | |
| 7418 tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p5"> | |
| 7419 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their | |
| 7420 way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause | |
| 7421 of sorrow. | |
| 7422 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35106] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7423 est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., <i>subintrantibus | |
| 7424 ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites | |
| 7425 subinferuntur error et dolor</i>. Sed ignorantia est causa erroris. | |
| 7426 Ergo concupiscentia est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A2-p6"> | |
| 7427 <b>I answer that,</b> Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above | |
| 7428 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on | |
| 7429 the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy | |
| 7430 body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting | |
| 7431 from gravity. | |
| 7432 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A2-p7"> Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said | |
| 7433 above | |
| 7434 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, | |
| 7435 is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection | |
| 7436 of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive | |
| 7437 movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle | |
| 7438 is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire | |
| 7439 is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine | |
| 7440 often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he | |
| 7441 says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. | |
| 7442 Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the | |
| 7443 movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for | |
| 7444 the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more | |
| 7445 for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire | |
| 7446 to have. | |
| 7447 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 co."><a name="35107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35107] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7448 dicendum quod tristitia est motus quidam appetitus animalis. Motus | |
| 7449 autem appetitivus habet, sicut dictum est, similitudinem appetitus | |
| 7450 naturalis. Cuius duplex causa assignari potest, una per modum | |
| 7451 finis; alia sicut unde est principium motus. Sicut descensionis | |
| 7452 corporis gravis causa sicut finis, est locus deorsum, principium | |
| 7453 autem motus est inclinatio naturalis, quae est ex gravitate. Causa | |
| 7454 autem motus appetitivi per modum finis, est eius obiectum. Et sic | |
| 7455 supra dictum est quod causa doloris seu tristitiae est malum | |
| 7456 coniunctum. Causa autem sicut unde est principium talis motus, est | |
| 7457 interior inclinatio appetitus. Qui quidem per prius inclinatur ad | |
| 7458 bonum; et ex consequenti ad repudiandum malum contrarium. Et ideo | |
| 7459 huiusmodi motus appetitivi primum principium est amor, qui est | |
| 7460 prima inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, secundum autem | |
| 7461 principium est odium, quod est inclinatio prima appetitus ad malum | |
| 7462 fugiendum. Sed quia concupiscentia vel cupiditas est primus | |
| 7463 effectus amoris, quo maxime delectamur, ut supra dictum est; ideo | |
| 7464 frequenter Augustinus cupiditatem vel concupiscentiam pro amore | |
| 7465 ponit, ut etiam supra dictum est. Et hoc modo concupiscentiam dicit | |
| 7466 esse universalem causam doloris. Sed ipsa concupiscentia, secundum | |
| 7467 propriam rationem considerata, est interdum causa doloris. Omne | |
| 7468 enim quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium | |
| 7469 motui. Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est | |
| 7470 contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa | |
| 7471 tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali | |
| 7472 ablatione, tristamur. Universalis autem causa doloris esse non | |
| 7473 potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in | |
| 7474 quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p8"> | |
| 7475 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated | |
| 7476 above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that | |
| 7477 regard evil. | |
| 7478 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35108] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7479 ergo dicendum quod inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, est | |
| 7480 causa inclinationis appetitus ad malum fugiendum, sicut dictum est. | |
| 7481 Et ex hoc contingit quod motus appetitivi qui respiciunt bonum, | |
| 7482 ponuntur causa motuum appetitus qui respiciunt malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p9"> | |
| 7483 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is desired, though really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may | |
| 7484 say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow. | |
| 7485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35109] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7486 dicendum quod illud quod concupiscitur, etsi realiter sit futurum, | |
| 7487 est tamen quodammodo praesens, inquantum speratur. Vel potest dici | |
| 7488 quod, licet ipsum bonum concupitum sit futurum, tamen impedimentum | |
| 7489 praesentialiter apponitur, quod dolorem causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A2-p10"> | |
| 7490 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the | |
| 7491 presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow. | |
| 7492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35110] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7493 dicendum quod concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes | |
| 7494 adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum | |
| 7495 appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A3-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 3. Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p2"> | |
| 7496 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion," | |
| 7497 which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin | |
| 7498 version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and | |
| 7499 pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. | |
| 7500 Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is the | |
| 7501 cause of multitude. | |
| 7502 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35111] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7503 sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus unitatis non sit causa | |
| 7504 doloris. Dicit enim philosophus, in X Ethic., quod haec opinio, | |
| 7505 quae posuit repletionem esse causam delectationis, et incisionem | |
| 7506 causam tristitiae, videtur esse facta ex delectationibus et | |
| 7507 tristitiis quae sunt circa cibum. Sed non omnis delectatio vel | |
| 7508 tristitia est huiusmodi. Ergo appetitus unitatis non est causa | |
| 7509 universalis doloris, cum repletio ad unitatem pertineat, incisio | |
| 7510 vero multitudinem inducat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p3"> | |
| 7511 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would | |
| 7512 be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous. | |
| 7513 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35112] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7514 quaelibet separatio unitati opponitur. Si ergo dolor causaretur ex | |
| 7515 appetitu unitatis, nulla separatio esset delectabilis. Quod patet | |
| 7516 esse falsum in separatione omnium superfluorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p4"> | |
| 7517 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, | |
| 7518 since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather | |
| 7519 than the craving for separation, as causing sorrow. | |
| 7520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35113] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7521 eadem ratione appetimus coniunctionem boni, et remotionem mali. Sed | |
| 7522 sicut coniunctio pertinet ad unitatem, cum sit unio quaedam; ita | |
| 7523 separatio est contrarium unitati. Ergo appetitus unitatis non magis | |
| 7524 debet poni causa doloris quam appetitus separationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p5"> | |
| 7525 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire | |
| 7526 unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?" | |
| 7527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35114] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7528 est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, <i>quod ex | |
| 7529 dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis | |
| 7530 animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis. | |
| 7531 Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel | |
| 7532 corruptionis impatiens?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p6"> | |
| 7533 <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted | |
| 7534 as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, | |
| 7535 the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. | |
| 7536 Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and | |
| 7537 therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity. | |
| 7538 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 co."><a name="35115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35115] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7539 dicendum quod eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est | |
| 7540 causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis, vel amor, causa doloris | |
| 7541 ponendus est. Bonum enim uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate | |
| 7542 consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex | |
| 7543 quibus consistit eius perfectio, unde et Platonici posuerunt unum | |
| 7544 esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque | |
| 7545 appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor | |
| 7546 vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus | |
| 7547 unitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p7"> | |
| 7548 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither | |
| 7549 does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher | |
| 7550 from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further | |
| 7551 pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather | |
| 7552 than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity | |
| 7553 in which the perfection of nature consists. | |
| 7554 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35116] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7555 ergo dicendum quod non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum | |
| 7556 illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non | |
| 7557 cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut | |
| 7558 quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per | |
| 7559 hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles, sicut repleti | |
| 7560 cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio, | |
| 7561 sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum | |
| 7562 constitueret. Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet | |
| 7563 unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p8"> | |
| 7564 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some | |
| 7565 union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object. | |
| 7566 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35117] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7567 dicendum quod separatio potest esse delectabilis, vel inquantum | |
| 7568 removetur illud quod est contrarium perfectioni rei, vel inquantum | |
| 7569 separatio habet aliquam unionem adiunctam, puta sensibilis ad | |
| 7570 sensum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A3-p9"> | |
| 7571 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the | |
| 7572 desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is. | |
| 7573 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35118] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7574 dicendum quod separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, | |
| 7575 inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi | |
| 7576 separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus | |
| 7577 unitatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q36_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q36_A4-p0.1">Q. 36. A. 4. Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p2"> | |
| 7578 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent | |
| 7579 is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow. | |
| 7580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35119] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 7581 sic proceditur. Videtur quod potestas maior non debeat poni causa | |
| 7582 doloris. Quod enim est in potestate agentis, nondum est praesens, | |
| 7583 sed futurum. Dolor autem est de malo praesenti. Ergo potestas maior | |
| 7584 non est causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p3"> | |
| 7585 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power | |
| 7586 should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. | |
| 7587 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35120] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7588 nocumentum illatum est causa doloris. Sed nocumentum potest inferri | |
| 7589 etiam a potestate minore. Ergo potestas maior non debet poni causa | |
| 7590 doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p4"> | |
| 7591 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something | |
| 7592 external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. | |
| 7593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35121] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7594 causae appetitivorum motuum sunt interiores inclinationes animae. | |
| 7595 Potestas autem maior est aliquid exterius. Ergo non debet poni | |
| 7596 causa doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p5"> | |
| 7597 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the | |
| 7598 body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body." | |
| 7599 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35122] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7600 est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, <i>in animo | |
| 7601 dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore | |
| 7602 dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p6"> | |
| 7603 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 7604 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q36_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, a present evil, is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, | |
| 7605 should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to | |
| 7606 be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action | |
| 7607 of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine | |
| 7608 reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow. | |
| 7609 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p7"> But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination | |
| 7610 there will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its | |
| 7611 downward tendency, its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it. | |
| 7612 </p><p id="FS_Q36_A4-p8"> Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective | |
| 7613 inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite | |
| 7614 remains. And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power": for were | |
| 7615 it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure. | |
| 7616 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 co."><a name="35123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35123] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7617 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, malum coniunctum est causa | |
| 7618 doloris vel tristitiae per modum obiecti. Id ergo quod est causa | |
| 7619 coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae. | |
| 7620 Manifestum est autem hoc esse contra inclinationem appetitus, ut | |
| 7621 malo praesentialiter inhaereat. Quod autem est contra inclinationem | |
| 7622 alicuius, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicuius fortioris. | |
| 7623 Et ideo potestas maior ponitur esse causa doloris ab Augustino. Sed | |
| 7624 sciendum est quod, si potestas fortior intantum invalescat quod | |
| 7625 mutet contrariam inclinationem in inclinationem propriam, iam non | |
| 7626 erit aliqua repugnantia vel violentia, sicut quando agens fortius, | |
| 7627 corrumpendo corpus grave, aufert ei inclinationem qua tendit | |
| 7628 deorsum; et tunc ferri sursum non est ei violentum, sed naturale. | |
| 7629 Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod | |
| 7630 auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non | |
| 7631 sequitur dolor vel tristitia, sed tunc solum sequitur, quando | |
| 7632 remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium. Et inde est quod | |
| 7633 Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat | |
| 7634 dolorem, si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non | |
| 7635 sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p9"> | |
| 7636 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive | |
| 7637 evil. | |
| 7638 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35124] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7639 ergo dicendum quod maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod | |
| 7640 est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu, dum | |
| 7641 scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p10"> | |
| 7642 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict | |
| 7643 some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow. | |
| 7644 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35125] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7645 dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquam potestatem quae non est maior | |
| 7646 simpliciter, esse maiorem quantum ad aliquid. Et secundum hoc, | |
| 7647 aliquod nocumentum inferre potest. Si autem nullo modo maior esset, | |
| 7648 nullo modo posset nocere. Unde non posset causam doloris | |
| 7649 inferre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q36_A4-p11"> | |
| 7650 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is | |
| 7651 thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow. | |
| 7652 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 36 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35126] Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7653 dicendum quod exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum | |
| 7654 appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti. Et hoc modo | |
| 7655 potestas maior ponitur causa doloris.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 7656 <div id="FS_Q37" class="div3"> | |
| 7657 <h3 id="FS_Q37-p0.1">Q. 37. OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 7658 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 7659 <p id="FS_Q37-p2"> We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q37-p3"><a href="#FS_Q37_A1"> (1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p4"><a href="#FS_Q37_A2"> (2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p5"><a href="#FS_Q37_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q37-p6"><a href="#FS_Q37_A4"> (4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?</a></p> | |
| 7660 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 pr."><a name="35127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35127] | |
| 7661 Iª-IIae q. 37 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 7662 effectibus doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | |
| 7663 Primo, utrum dolor auferat facultatem addiscendi. Secundo, utrum | |
| 7664 aggravatio animi sit effectus tristitiae vel doloris. Tertio, utrum | |
| 7665 tristitia vel dolor debilitet omnem operationem. Quarto, utrum | |
| 7666 tristitia noceat corpori magis quam aliae passiones animae.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 7667 <div id="FS_Q37_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A1-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 1. Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p2"> | |
| 7668 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn. For it is written ( | |
| 7669 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.9" target="asv">Is. 26:9</a>): "When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice": and further on (verse | |
| 7670 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with them." But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow | |
| 7671 in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning. | |
| 7672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35128] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7673 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non auferat facultatem | |
| 7674 addiscendi. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXVI, <i>cum feceris iudicia tua in | |
| 7675 terra, iustitiam discent omnes habitatores orbis</i>. Et infra, | |
| 7676 <i>in tribulatione murmuris doctrina tua eis</i>, sed ex iudiciis | |
| 7677 Dei, et tribulatione, sequitur dolor seu tristitia in cordibus | |
| 7678 hominum. Ergo dolor vel tristitia non tollit, sed magis auget | |
| 7679 facultatem addiscendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3"> | |
| 7680 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( | |
| 7681 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.9" target="asv">Is. 28:9</a>): "Whom shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that | |
| 7682 are drawn away from the breasts," i.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure; since sorrow | |
| 7683 hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and ( | |
| 7684 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:29</a>) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great | |
| 7685 delights." Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the faculty of learning. | |
| 7686 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35129] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7687 Isaiae XXVIII, dicitur, <i>quem docebit scientiam? Et quem | |
| 7688 intelligere faciet auditum? Ablactatos a lacte, avulsos ab | |
| 7689 uberibus</i> idest a delectationibus. Sed dolor et tristitia maxime | |
| 7690 tollunt delectationes, impedit enim tristitia omnem delectationem, | |
| 7691 ut dicitur in VII Ethic.; et Eccli. XI dicitur quod <i>malitia | |
| 7692 unius horae oblivionem facit luxuriae maximae</i>. Ergo dolor non | |
| 7693 tollit, sed magis praebet facultatem addiscendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p4"> | |
| 7694 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated above ( | |
| 7695 <a href="#FS_Q35_A7" id="FS_Q37_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[7]</a>). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain. | |
| 7696 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35130] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7697 tristitia interior praeeminet dolori exteriori, ut supra dictum | |
| 7698 est. Sed simul cum tristitia potest homo addiscere. Ergo multo | |
| 7699 magis simul cum dolore corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p5"> | |
| 7700 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to | |
| 7701 turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, | |
| 7702 because it required undivided attention." | |
| 7703 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35131] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7704 est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., <i>quanquam acerrimo | |
| 7705 dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo | |
| 7706 volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus | |
| 7707 impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q37_A1-p6"> | |
| 7708 <b>I answer that,</b> Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the | |
| 7709 soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power: because the | |
| 7710 soul, being one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the | |
| 7711 soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is | |
| 7712 incompatible therewith. | |
| 7713 </p><p id="FS_Q37_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing | |
| 7714 to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident that | |
| 7715 in order to learn anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in | |
| 7716 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.4" target="asv"> Prov. 2:4,5</a>: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou | |
| 7717 understand learning" [Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from | |
| 7718 learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that | |
| 7719 which he knew already. However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning | |
| 7720 or for considering: because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from | |
| 7721 turning entirely to the pain. | |
| 7722 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 co."><a name="35132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35132] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7723 dicendum quod, quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae | |
| 7724 radicantur, necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer | |
| 7725 trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione | |
| 7726 alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio. Et | |
| 7727 propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel | |
| 7728 magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod | |
| 7729 magnam attentionem requirat. Manifestum est autem quod dolor | |
| 7730 sensibilis maxime trahit ad se intentionem animae, quia naturaliter | |
| 7731 unumquodque tota intentione tendit ad repellendum contrarium, sicut | |
| 7732 etiam in rebus naturalibus apparet. Similiter etiam manifestum est | |
| 7733 quod ad addiscendum aliquid de novo, requiritur studium et conatus | |
| 7734 cum magna intentione, ut patet per illud quod dicitur Prov. II, | |
| 7735 <i>si quaesieris sapientiam quasi pecuniam, et sicut thesauros | |
| 7736 effoderis eam, tunc intelliges disciplinam</i>. Et ideo si sit | |
| 7737 dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit. Et | |
| 7738 tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo | |
| 7739 aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit. In hoc tamen | |
| 7740 attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet | |
| 7741 ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis | |
| 7742 retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p8"> | |
| 7743 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard | |
| 7744 to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, "in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt | |
| 7745 to be taught by God. | |
| 7746 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35133] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7747 ergo dicendum quod tristitia moderata, quae excludit evagationem | |
| 7748 animi, potest conferre ad disciplinam suscipiendam, et praecipue | |
| 7749 eorum per quae homo sperat se posse a tristitia liberari. Et hoc | |
| 7750 modo in tribulatione murmuris homines doctrinam Dei magis | |
| 7751 recipiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p9"> | |
| 7752 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, | |
| 7753 wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless | |
| 7754 pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural | |
| 7755 body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot | |
| 7756 water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, | |
| 7757 it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, | |
| 7758 it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether. | |
| 7759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35134] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7760 dicendum quod tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt | |
| 7761 animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII | |
| 7762 Ethic. dicitur quod <i>impossibile est in ipsa delectatione | |
| 7763 venereorum, aliquid intelligere</i>. Sed tamen dolor magis trahit | |
| 7764 ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio, sicut etiam videmus in | |
| 7765 rebus naturalibus, quod actio corporis naturalis magis intenditur | |
| 7766 in contrarium; sicut aqua calefacta magis patitur a frigido, ut | |
| 7767 fortius congeletur. Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata, | |
| 7768 per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert | |
| 7769 superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si | |
| 7770 intendatur, totaliter aufert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A1-p10"> | |
| 7771 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: and | |
| 7772 yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is | |
| 7773 a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow | |
| 7774 be very intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for | |
| 7775 the first time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel). | |
| 7776 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35135] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7777 dicendum quod dolor exterior accidit ex laesione corporali, et ita | |
| 7778 magis habet transmutationem corporalem adiunctam quam dolor | |
| 7779 interior, qui tamen est maior secundum illud quod est formale in | |
| 7780 dolore, quod est ex parte animae. Et ideo dolor corporalis magis | |
| 7781 impedit contemplationem, quae requirit omnimodam quietem, quam | |
| 7782 dolor interior. Et tamen etiam dolor interior, si multum | |
| 7783 intendatur, ita trahit intentionem, ut non possit homo de novo | |
| 7784 aliquid addiscere. Unde et Gregorius propter tristitiam intermisit | |
| 7785 Ezechielis expositionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A2-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 2. Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p2"> | |
| 7786 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 7787 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:11</a>): "Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you: yea, | |
| 7788 defence, yea indignation," etc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being | |
| 7789 depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow. | |
| 7790 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35136] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7791 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aggravatio animi non sit effectus | |
| 7792 tristitiae. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII, <i>ecce hoc | |
| 7793 ipsum, contristari vos secundum Deum, quantam in vobis operatur | |
| 7794 sollicitudinem, sed defensionem, sed indignationem,</i> et cetera. | |
| 7795 Sed sollicitudo et indignatio ad quandam erectionem animi | |
| 7796 pertinent, quae aggravationi opponitur. Non ergo aggravatio est | |
| 7797 effectus tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p3"> | |
| 7798 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression | |
| 7799 but contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow. | |
| 7800 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35137] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7801 tristitia delectationi opponitur. Sed effectus delectationis est | |
| 7802 dilatatio, cui non opponitur aggravatio, sed constrictio. Ergo | |
| 7803 effectus tristitiae non debet poni aggravatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p4"> | |
| 7804 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle ( | |
| 7805 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:7</a>): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is | |
| 7806 weighed down by something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer. Therefore depression should not | |
| 7807 be reckoned an effect of sorrow. | |
| 7808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35138] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7809 ad tristitiam pertinet absorbere, ut patet per illud quod apostolus | |
| 7810 dicit, II ad Cor. II, <i>ne forte abundantiori tristitia | |
| 7811 absorbeatur qui est eiusmodi</i>. Sed quod aggravatur, non | |
| 7812 absorbetur, quinimmo sub aliquo ponderoso deprimitur; quod autem | |
| 7813 absorbetur, intra absorbens includitur. Ergo aggravatio non debet | |
| 7814 poni effectus tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p5"> | |
| 7815 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow." | |
| 7816 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35139] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7817 est quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt tristitiam | |
| 7818 aggravantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6"> | |
| 7819 <b>I answer that,</b> The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason | |
| 7820 that the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed | |
| 7821 to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his | |
| 7822 own movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said above ( | |
| 7823 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; | |
| 7824 <a href="#FS_Q25_A4" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[25], A[4]</a>; | |
| 7825 <a href="#FS_Q36_A1" id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[36], A[1]</a>) that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, | |
| 7826 depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause | |
| 7827 of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for | |
| 7828 the present, it | |
| 7829 fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, | |
| 7830 the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul | |
| 7831 is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes even the external movement of the | |
| 7832 body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied. | |
| 7833 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 co."><a name="35140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35140] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7834 dicendum quod effectus passionum animae quandoque metaphorice | |
| 7835 nominantur, secundum similitudinem sensibilium corporum, eo quod | |
| 7836 motus appetitus animalis sunt similes inclinationibus appetitus | |
| 7837 naturalis. Et per hunc modum fervor attribuitur amori, dilatatio | |
| 7838 delectationi, et aggravatio tristitiae. Dicitur enim homo | |
| 7839 aggravari, ex eo quod aliquo pondere impeditur a proprio motu. | |
| 7840 Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod tristitia contingit ex | |
| 7841 aliquo malo praesenti. Quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui | |
| 7842 voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo | |
| 7843 quod vult. Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut | |
| 7844 auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod | |
| 7845 in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult; remanet tamen motus ad | |
| 7846 repellendum nocivum contristans. Si vero superexcrescat vis mali | |
| 7847 intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur | |
| 7848 etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac | |
| 7849 divertere valeat. Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus | |
| 7850 corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p7"> | |
| 7851 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness | |
| 7852 of sin. | |
| 7853 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35141] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 7854 ergo dicendum quod illa erectio animi provenit ex tristitia quae | |
| 7855 est secundum Deum, propter spem adiunctam de remissione | |
| 7856 peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p8"> | |
| 7857 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, through | |
| 7858 being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were. | |
| 7859 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35142] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7860 dicendum quod, quantum ad motum appetitivum pertinet, ad idem | |
| 7861 refertur constrictio et aggravatio. Ex hoc enim quod aggravatur | |
| 7862 animus, ut ad exteriora libere progredi non possit, ad seipsum | |
| 7863 retrahitur, quasi in seipso constrictus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A2-p9"> | |
| 7864 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus | |
| 7865 also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken | |
| 7866 literally, appear to exclude one another. | |
| 7867 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35143] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7868 dicendum quod tristitia absorbere hominem dicitur, quando sic | |
| 7869 totaliter vis contristantis mali afficit animam, ut omnem spem | |
| 7870 evasionis excludat. Et sic etiam eodem modo aggravat et absorbet. | |
| 7871 Quaedam enim se consequuntur in his quae metaphorice dicuntur, quae | |
| 7872 sibi repugnare videntur, si secundum proprietatem accipiantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A3-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 3. Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p2"> | |
| 7873 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage | |
| 7874 of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore the Apostle says ( | |
| 7875 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.15" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:15</a>): "Carefully study to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed." Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance | |
| 7876 to work, but helps one to work well. | |
| 7877 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35144] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7878 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non impediat omnem | |
| 7879 operationem. Sollicitudo enim ex tristitia causatur, ut patet per | |
| 7880 auctoritatem apostoli inductam. Sed sollicitudo adiuvat ad bene | |
| 7881 operandum, unde apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, <i>sollicite cura | |
| 7882 teipsum exhibere operarium inconfusibilem</i>. Ergo tristitia non | |
| 7883 impedit operationem, sed magis adiuvat ad bene operandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p3"> | |
| 7884 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore | |
| 7885 sorrow does too. | |
| 7886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35145] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7887 tristitia causat in multis concupiscentiam, ut dicitur in VII | |
| 7888 Ethic. Sed concupiscentia facit ad intensionem operationis. Ergo et | |
| 7889 tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p4"> | |
| 7890 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing | |
| 7891 is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow. | |
| 7892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35146] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7893 sicut quaedam operationes propriae sunt gaudentium, ita etiam | |
| 7894 quaedam operationes his qui tristantur, sicut lugere. Sed | |
| 7895 unumquodque augetur ex sibi convenienti. Ergo aliquae operationes | |
| 7896 non impediuntur, sed meliorantur propter tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p5"> | |
| 7897 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it" (Ethic. | |
| 7898 x, 5). | |
| 7899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35147] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7900 est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit | |
| 7901 operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p6"> | |
| 7902 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 7903 <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q37_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, sorrow at times does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal or external; but certain | |
| 7904 movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being | |
| 7905 the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which | |
| 7906 we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The | |
| 7907 reason for this is that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the | |
| 7908 action must of necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and | |
| 7909 cause: and such action must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the more | |
| 7910 one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result | |
| 7911 from | |
| 7912 that sorrow. | |
| 7913 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 co."><a name="35148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35148] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7914 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, tristitia quandoque non ita | |
| 7915 aggravat vel absorbet animum, ut omnem motum interiorem et | |
| 7916 exteriorem excludat; sed aliqui motus quandoque ex ipsa tristitia | |
| 7917 causantur. Sic ergo operatio ad tristitiam dupliciter potest | |
| 7918 comparari. Uno modo, sicut ad id de quo est tristitia. Et sic | |
| 7919 tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod | |
| 7920 cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus | |
| 7921 cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia. Cuius ratio est, quia | |
| 7922 voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de | |
| 7923 qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur. Alio | |
| 7924 modo comparatur operatio ad tristitiam sicut ad principium et | |
| 7925 causam. Et sic necesse est quod operatio talis ex tristitia | |
| 7926 augeatur, sicut quanto aliquis magis tristatur de re aliqua, tanto | |
| 7927 magis conatur ad expellendam tristitiam, dummodo remaneat spes | |
| 7928 expellendi, alioquin nullus motus vel operatio ex tristitia | |
| 7929 causaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A3-p7"> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35149] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 7930 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q37_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q37_A4-p0.1">Q. 37. A. 4. Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p2"> | |
| 7931 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things | |
| 7932 which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of | |
| 7933 colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body. | |
| 7934 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35150] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 7935 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non inferat maxime corpori | |
| 7936 nocumentum. Tristitia enim habet esse spirituale in anima. Sed ea | |
| 7937 quae habent tantum esse spirituale, non causant transmutationem | |
| 7938 corporalem, sicut patet de intentionibus colorum quae sunt in aere, | |
| 7939 a quibus nullum corpus coloratur. Ergo tristitia non facit aliquod | |
| 7940 corporale nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p3"> | |
| 7941 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But | |
| 7942 bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above ( | |
| 7943 <a href="#FS_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q37_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. | |
| 7944 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35151] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7945 si facit aliquod corporale nocumentum, hoc non est nisi inquantum | |
| 7946 habet corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed corporalis | |
| 7947 transmutatio invenitur in omnibus animae passionibus, ut supra | |
| 7948 dictum est. Ergo non magis tristitia quam aliae animae passiones, | |
| 7949 corpori nocet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p4"> | |
| 7950 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great | |
| 7951 harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the | |
| 7952 cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. | |
| 7953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35152] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7954 philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>irae et concupiscentiae | |
| 7955 quibusdam insanias faciunt</i>, quod videtur esse maximum | |
| 7956 nocumentum, cum ratio sit excellentissimum eorum quae sunt in | |
| 7957 homine. Desperatio etiam videtur esse magis nociva quam tristitia, | |
| 7958 cum sit causa tristitiae. Ergo tristitia non magis nocet corpori | |
| 7959 quam aliae animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5"> | |
| 7960 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 7961 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.22" target="asv">Prov. 17:22</a>): "A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and ( | |
| 7962 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.20" target="asv">Prov. 25:20</a>): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and ( | |
| 7963 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:19</a>): "Of sadness cometh death." | |
| 7964 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35153] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 7965 est quod dicitur Prov. XVII, <i>animus gaudens aetatem floridam | |
| 7966 facit, spiritus tristis exsiccat ossa</i>. Et Prov. XXV, <i>sicut | |
| 7967 tinea vestimento, et vermis ligno, ita tristitia viri nocet | |
| 7968 cordi</i>. Et Eccli. XXXVIII, <i>a tristitia festinat mors</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q37_A4-p6"> | |
| 7969 <b>I answer that,</b> Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's | |
| 7970 life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with | |
| 7971 the other passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts | |
| 7972 of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed | |
| 7973 measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the | |
| 7974 measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it | |
| 7975 will be repugnant to life in respect of its species. | |
| 7976 </p><p id="FS_Q37_A4-p7"> Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is | |
| 7977 in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter | |
| 7978 is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not | |
| 7979 repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: | |
| 7980 such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be | |
| 7981 excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight | |
| 7982 or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore | |
| 7983 they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present | |
| 7984 evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil. | |
| 7985 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 co."><a name="35154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35154] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 7986 dicendum quod tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis | |
| 7987 corpori nocet. Cuius ratio est, quia tristitia repugnat humanae | |
| 7988 vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus; et non solum quantum ad | |
| 7989 mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones. Consistit | |
| 7990 enim humana vita in quadam motione, quae a corde in cetera membra | |
| 7991 diffunditur, quae quidem motio convenit naturae humanae secundum | |
| 7992 aliquam determinatam mensuram. Si ergo ista motio procedat ultra | |
| 7993 mensuram debitam, repugnabit humanae vitae secundum quantitatis | |
| 7994 mensuram; non autem secundum similitudinem speciei. Si autem | |
| 7995 impediatur processus huius motionis, repugnabit vitae secundum suam | |
| 7996 speciem. Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod | |
| 7997 transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis | |
| 7998 et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis, sicut in | |
| 7999 omnibus materia proportionatur formae. Illae ergo animae passiones | |
| 8000 quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non | |
| 8001 repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare | |
| 8002 secundum quantitatem, ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi. | |
| 8003 Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed | |
| 8004 propter excessum possunt nocere. Passiones autem quae important | |
| 8005 motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali | |
| 8006 motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem | |
| 8007 motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent, sicut timor et desperatio, et | |
| 8008 prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, | |
| 8009 cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p8"> | |
| 8010 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. | |
| 8011 Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are | |
| 8012 not naturally moved by the soul. | |
| 8013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35155] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8014 ergo dicendum quod, quia anima naturaliter movet corpus, | |
| 8015 spiritualis motus animae naturaliter est causa transmutationis | |
| 8016 corporalis. Nec est simile de spiritualibus intentionibus, quae non | |
| 8017 habent naturaliter ordinem movendi alia corpora, quae non sunt nata | |
| 8018 moveri ab anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p9"> | |
| 8019 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies | |
| 8020 a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above. | |
| 8021 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35156] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8022 dicendum quod aliae passiones habent transmutationem corporalem | |
| 8023 conformem, secundum suam speciem, motioni vitali, sed tristitia | |
| 8024 contrariam, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q37_A4-p10"> | |
| 8025 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one | |
| 8026 of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason | |
| 8027 of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives | |
| 8028 man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a | |
| 8029 prey to melancholy or madness. | |
| 8030 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 37 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35157] Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8031 dicendum quod ex leviori causa impeditur usus rationis quam | |
| 8032 corrumpatur vita, cum videamus multas aegritudines usum rationis | |
| 8033 tollere, quae nondum adimunt vitam. Et tamen timor et ira maxime | |
| 8034 nocumentum corporale afferunt ex permixtione tristitiae, propter | |
| 8035 absentiam eius quod cupitur. Ipsa etiam tristitia quandoque | |
| 8036 rationem aufert, sicut patet in his qui propter dolorem in | |
| 8037 melancholiam vel in maniam incidunt.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 8038 <div id="FS_Q38" class="div3"> | |
| 8039 <h3 id="FS_Q38-p0.1">Q. 38. OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 8040 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 8041 <p id="FS_Q38-p2"> We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q38-p3"><a href="#FS_Q38_A1"> (1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p4"><a href="#FS_Q38_A2"> (2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p5"><a href="#FS_Q38_A3"> (3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p6"><a href="#FS_Q38_A4"> (4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q38-p7"><a href="#FS_Q38_A5"> (5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?</a></p> | |
| 8042 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 pr."><a name="35158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35158] | |
| 8043 Iª-IIae q. 38 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 8044 remediis doloris seu tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. | |
| 8045 Primo, utrum dolor vel tristitia mitigetur per quamlibet | |
| 8046 delectationem. Secundo, utrum mitigetur per fletum. Tertio, utrum | |
| 8047 per compassionem amicorum. Quarto, utrum per contemplationem | |
| 8048 veritatis. Quinto, utrum per somnum et balnea.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 8049 <div id="FS_Q38_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A1-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 1. Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p2"> | |
| 8050 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far | |
| 8051 as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; | |
| 8052 as stated above ( | |
| 8053 <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a> ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow. | |
| 8054 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35159] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8055 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non quaelibet delectatio mitiget | |
| 8056 quemlibet dolorem seu tristitiam. Non enim delectatio tristitiam | |
| 8057 mitigat, nisi inquantum ei contrariatur, medicinae enim fiunt per | |
| 8058 contraria, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed non quaelibet delectatio | |
| 8059 contrariatur cuilibet tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non | |
| 8060 quaelibet delectatio mitigat quamlibet tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p3"> | |
| 8061 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, | |
| 8062 "the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every pleasure assuages sorrow. | |
| 8063 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35160] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8064 illud quod causat tristitiam, non mitigat tristitiam. Sed aliquae | |
| 8065 delectationes causant tristitiam, quia, ut dicitur in IX Ethic., | |
| 8066 <i>malus tristatur quoniam delectatus est</i>. Non ergo omnis | |
| 8067 delectatio mitigat tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p4"> | |
| 8068 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, | |
| 8069 now dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those | |
| 8070 things which united us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing | |
| 8071 united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures | |
| 8072 become burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow. | |
| 8073 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35161] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8074 Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod ipse fugit de patria, in qua | |
| 8075 conversari solitus erat cum amico suo iam mortuo, <i>minus enim | |
| 8076 quaerebant eum oculi eius, ubi videre non solebant</i>. Ex quo | |
| 8077 accipi potest quod illa in quibus nobis amici mortui vel absentes | |
| 8078 communicaverunt, efficiuntur nobis, de eorum morte vel absentia | |
| 8079 dolentibus, onerosa. Sed maxime communicaverunt nobis in | |
| 8080 delectationibus. Ergo ipsae delectationes efficiuntur nobis | |
| 8081 dolentibus onerosae. Non ergo quaelibet delectatio mitigat | |
| 8082 quamlibet tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p5"> | |
| 8083 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, | |
| 8084 provided it be intense." | |
| 8085 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35162] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 8086 est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>expellit | |
| 8087 delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si | |
| 8088 sit fortis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p6"> | |
| 8089 <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been said above ( | |
| 8090 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a> ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite. | |
| 8091 Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to | |
| 8092 a non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore | |
| 8093 just as | |
| 8094 all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings | |
| 8095 relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever. | |
| 8096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 co."><a name="35163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35163] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8097 dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, delectatio est quaedam | |
| 8098 quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod | |
| 8099 repugnat appetitui. Unde sic se habet delectatio ad tristitiam in | |
| 8100 motibus appetitivis, sicut se habet in corporibus quies ad | |
| 8101 fatigationem, quae accidit ex aliqua transmutatione innaturali, nam | |
| 8102 et ipsa tristitia fatigationem quandam, seu aegritudinem | |
| 8103 appetitivae virtutis importat. Sicut igitur quaelibet quies | |
| 8104 corporis remedium affert contra quamlibet fatigationem, ex | |
| 8105 quacumque causa innaturali provenientem; ita quaelibet delectatio | |
| 8106 remedium affert ad mitigandam quamlibet tristitiam, ex quocumque | |
| 8107 procedat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p7"> | |
| 8108 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above ( | |
| 8109 <a href="#FS_Q35_A4" id="FS_Q38_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[4]</a>). And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure. | |
| 8110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35164] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8111 ergo dicendum quod, licet non omnis delectatio contrarietur omni | |
| 8112 tristitiae secundum speciem, contrariatur tamen secundum genus, ut | |
| 8113 supra dictum est. Et ideo ex parte dispositionis subiecti, | |
| 8114 quaelibet tristitia per quamlibet delectationem mitigari | |
| 8115 potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p8"> | |
| 8116 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as | |
| 8117 wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures. | |
| 8118 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35165] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8119 dicendum quod delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in | |
| 8120 praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de | |
| 8121 malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur | |
| 8122 per contrarias delectationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A1-p9"> | |
| 8123 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When there are two causes inclining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and more | |
| 8124 persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with | |
| 8125 a deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence, | |
| 8126 inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. | |
| 8127 Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory | |
| 8128 of the past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives | |
| 8129 out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures." | |
| 8130 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35166] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8131 dicendum quod, quando sunt duae causae ad contrarios motus | |
| 8132 inclinantes, utraque alteram impedit, et tamen illa finaliter | |
| 8133 vincit, quae fortior est et diuturnior. In eo autem qui tristatur | |
| 8134 de his in quibus simul cum amico mortuo vel absente delectari | |
| 8135 consuevit, duae causae in contrarium moventes inveniuntur. Nam mors | |
| 8136 vel absentia amici recogitata, inclinat ad dolorem, bonum autem | |
| 8137 praesens inclinat ad delectationem. Unde utrumque per alterum | |
| 8138 minuitur. Sed tamen, quia fortius movet sensus praesentis quam | |
| 8139 memoria praeteriti, et amor sui ipsius quam amor alterius | |
| 8140 diuturnius manet; inde est quod finaliter delectatio tristitiam | |
| 8141 expellit. Unde post pauca subdit ibidem Augustinus quod | |
| 8142 <i>pristinis generibus delectationum cedebat dolor eius</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A2-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 2. Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p2"> | |
| 8143 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect | |
| 8144 of sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow. | |
| 8145 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35167] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8146 sic proceditur. Videtur quod fletus non mitiget tristitiam. Nullus | |
| 8147 enim effectus diminuit suam causam. Sed fletus, vel gemitus, est | |
| 8148 effectus tristitiae. Ergo non minuit tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p3"> | |
| 8149 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy. | |
| 8150 Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow. | |
| 8151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35168] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8152 sicut fletus vel gemitus est effectus tristitiae, ita risus est | |
| 8153 effectus laetitiae. Sed risus non minuit laetitiam. Ergo fletus non | |
| 8154 mitigat tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p4"> | |
| 8155 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases | |
| 8156 sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that tears do not assuage sorrow. | |
| 8157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35169] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8158 in fletu repraesentatur nobis malum contristans. Sed imaginatio rei | |
| 8159 contristantis auget tristitiam, sicut imaginatio rei delectantis | |
| 8160 auget laetitiam. Ergo videtur quod fletus non mitiget | |
| 8161 tristitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p5"> | |
| 8162 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some | |
| 8163 little refreshment." | |
| 8164 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35170] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 8165 est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod quando dolebat de | |
| 8166 morte amici, <i>in solis gemitibus et lacrimis erat ei aliquantula | |
| 8167 requies</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p6"> | |
| 8168 <b>I answer that,</b> Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we | |
| 8169 keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed | |
| 8170 as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show | |
| 8171 of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, | |
| 8172 because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans | |
| 8173 are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated | |
| 8174 above | |
| 8175 <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans. | |
| 8176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 co."><a name="35171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35171] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8177 dicendum quod lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam. | |
| 8178 Et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia omne nocivum interius | |
| 8179 clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae | |
| 8180 circa ipsum, sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae | |
| 8181 intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor | |
| 8182 minuitur. Et propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis, | |
| 8183 exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel | |
| 8184 etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia. Secundo, quia semper operatio | |
| 8185 conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est | |
| 8186 delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes | |
| 8187 convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei | |
| 8188 delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget | |
| 8189 tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum | |
| 8190 et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p7"> | |
| 8191 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man. | |
| 8192 For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him | |
| 8193 that sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For | |
| 8194 this reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid | |
| 8195 contrariety. | |
| 8196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35172] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8197 ergo dicendum quod ipsa habitudo causae ad effectum contrariatur | |
| 8198 habitudini contristantis ad contristatum, nam omnis effectus est | |
| 8199 conveniens suae causae, et per consequens est ei delectabilis; | |
| 8200 contristans autem contrariatur contristato. Et ideo effectus | |
| 8201 tristitiae habet contrariam habitudinem ad contristatum, quam | |
| 8202 contristans ad ipsum. Et propter hoc, mitigatur tristitia per | |
| 8203 effectum tristitiae, ratione contrarietatis praedictae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p8"> | |
| 8204 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because | |
| 8205 in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter | |
| 8206 and the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it. | |
| 8207 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35173] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8208 dicendum quod habitudo effectus ad causam est similis habitudini | |
| 8209 delectantis ad delectatum, quia utrobique convenientia invenitur. | |
| 8210 Omne autem simile auget suum simile. Et ideo per risum et alios | |
| 8211 effectus laetitiae augetur laetitia, nisi forte per accidens, | |
| 8212 propter excessum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A2-p9"> | |
| 8213 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very fact | |
| 8214 that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of | |
| 8215 pleasure. For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry | |
| 8216 for it, as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. | |
| 8217 iii, 27). | |
| 8218 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35174] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8219 dicendum quod imaginatio rei contristantis, quantum est de se, nata | |
| 8220 est augere tristitiam, sed ex hoc ipso quod homo imaginatur quod | |
| 8221 facit illud quod convenit sibi secundum talem statum, consurgit | |
| 8222 inde quaedam delectatio. Et eadem ratione, si alicui subrepat risus | |
| 8223 in statu in quo videtur sibi esse lugendum, ex hoc ipso dolet, | |
| 8224 tanquam faciat id quod non convenit, ut Tullius dicit, in III de | |
| 8225 Tuscul. quaestionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A3-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 3. Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p2"> | |
| 8226 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. | |
| 8227 Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled | |
| 8228 and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater. | |
| 8229 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35175] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8230 sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor amici compatientis non mitiget | |
| 8231 tristitiam. Contrariorum enim contrarii sunt effectus. Sed sicut | |
| 8232 Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., <i>quando cum multis gaudetur, in | |
| 8233 singulis uberius est gaudium, quia fervere faciunt se, et | |
| 8234 inflammantur ex alterutro</i>. Ergo, pari ratione, quando multi | |
| 8235 simul tristantur, videtur quod sit maior tristitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p3"> | |
| 8236 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the | |
| 8237 sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, | |
| 8238 a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase. | |
| 8239 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35176] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8240 hoc requirit amicitia, ut amoris vicem quis rependat, ut Augustinus | |
| 8241 dicit, IV Confess. Sed amicus condolens dolet de dolore amici | |
| 8242 dolentis. Ergo ipse dolor amici condolentis est causa amico prius | |
| 8243 dolenti de proprio malo, alterius doloris. Et sic, duplicato | |
| 8244 dolore, videtur tristitia crescere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p4"> | |
| 8245 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other | |
| 8246 self" (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the | |
| 8247 friend with whom he sympathizes. | |
| 8248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35177] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8249 omne malum amici est contristans, sicut et malum proprium, nam | |
| 8250 amicus est alter ipse. Sed dolor est quoddam malum. Ergo dolor | |
| 8251 amici condolentis auget tristitiam amico cui condoletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p5"> | |
| 8252 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them. | |
| 8253 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35178] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 8254 est quod philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod in tristitiis amicus | |
| 8255 condolens consolatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p6"> | |
| 8256 <b>I answer that,</b> When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates | |
| 8257 a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof | |
| 8258 we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were | |
| 8259 bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load | |
| 8260 of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason | |
| 8261 is because when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated | |
| 8262 above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above | |
| 8263 <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend. | |
| 8264 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 co."><a name="35179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35179] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8265 dicendum quod naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est | |
| 8266 consolativus. Cuius duplicem rationem tangit philosophus in IX | |
| 8267 Ethic. Quarum prima est quia, cum ad tristitiam pertineat | |
| 8268 aggravare, habet rationem cuiusdam oneris, a quo aliquis aggravatus | |
| 8269 alleviari conatur. Cum ergo aliquis videt de sua tristitia alios | |
| 8270 contristatos, fit ei quasi quaedam imaginatio quod illud onus alii | |
| 8271 cum ipso ferant, quasi conantes ad ipsum ab onere alleviandum et | |
| 8272 ideo levius fert tristitiae onus, sicut etiam in portandis oneribus | |
| 8273 corporalibus contingit. Secunda ratio, et melior, est quia per hoc | |
| 8274 quod amici contristantur ei, percipit se ab eis amari; quod est | |
| 8275 delectabile, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio | |
| 8276 mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus | |
| 8277 condolens tristitiam mitiget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p7"> | |
| 8278 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful. | |
| 8279 Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause. | |
| 8280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35180] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8281 ergo dicendum quod in utroque amicitia manifestatur, scilicet et | |
| 8282 quod congaudet gaudenti, et quod condolet dolenti. Et ideo utrumque | |
| 8283 ratione causae redditur delectabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p8"> | |
| 8284 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to | |
| 8285 pleasure. | |
| 8286 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35181] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8287 dicendum quod ipse dolor amici secundum se contristaret. Sed | |
| 8288 consideratio causae eius, quae est amor, magis delectat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A3-p9"> And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35182] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 8289 patet responsio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A4-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 4. Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p2"> | |
| 8290 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written ( | |
| 8291 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q38_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv">Eccles. 1:18</a>): "He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore | |
| 8292 the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. | |
| 8293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35183] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 8294 sic proceditur. Videtur quod contemplatio veritatis non mitiget | |
| 8295 dolorem. Dicitur enim Eccle. I, <i>qui addit scientiam, addit et | |
| 8296 dolorem</i>. Sed scientia ad contemplationem veritatis pertinet. | |
| 8297 Non ergo contemplatio veritatis mitigat dolorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p3"> | |
| 8298 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle | |
| 8299 of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the | |
| 8300 contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow. | |
| 8301 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35184] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8302 contemplatio veritatis ad intellectum speculativum pertinet. Sed | |
| 8303 intellectus speculativus non movet, ut dicitur in III de anima. Cum | |
| 8304 igitur gaudium et dolor sint quidam motus animi, videtur quod | |
| 8305 contemplatio veritatis nihil faciat ad mitigationem doloris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p4"> | |
| 8306 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect. | |
| 8307 Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses. | |
| 8308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35185] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8309 remedium aegritudinis apponendum est ubi est aegritudo. Sed | |
| 8310 contemplatio veritatis est in intellectu. Non ergo mitigat dolorem | |
| 8311 corporalem, qui est in sensu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p5"> | |
| 8312 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should | |
| 8313 not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me." | |
| 8314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35186] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 8315 est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., <i>videbatur mihi, si se | |
| 8316 ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me | |
| 8317 sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo | |
| 8318 toleraturum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6"> | |
| 8319 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure assuages | |
| 8320 pain as stated above | |
| 8321 <a href="#FS_Q38_A1" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom. | |
| 8322 And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according | |
| 8323 to | |
| 8324 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.2" target="asv"> James | |
| 8325 1:2 | |
| 8326 </a>: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily | |
| 8327 tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I | |
| 8328 walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.] | |
| 8329 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 co."><a name="35187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35187] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8330 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in contemplatione veritatis | |
| 8331 maxima delectatio consistit. Omnis autem delectatio dolorem | |
| 8332 mitigat, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo contemplatio veritatis | |
| 8333 mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius | |
| 8334 aliquis est amator sapientiae. Et ideo homines ex contemplatione | |
| 8335 divina et futurae beatitudinis, in tribulationibus gaudent; | |
| 8336 secundum illud Iacobi I, <i>omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, | |
| 8337 cum in tentationes varias incideritis</i>. Et quod est amplius, | |
| 8338 etiam inter corporis cruciatus huiusmodi gaudium invenitur, | |
| 8339 <i>sicut Tiburtius martyr, cum nudatis plantis super ardentes | |
| 8340 prunas incederet, dixit, videtur mihi quod super roseos flores | |
| 8341 incedam, in nomine Iesu Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p7"> | |
| 8342 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; | |
| 8343 or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the | |
| 8344 things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure. | |
| 8345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35188] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8346 ergo dicendum quod qui addit scientiam, addit dolorem, vel propter | |
| 8347 difficultatem et defectum inveniendae veritatis, vel propter hoc, | |
| 8348 quod per scientiam homo cognoscit multa quae voluntati | |
| 8349 contrariantur. Et sic ex parte rerum cognitarum, scientia dolorem | |
| 8350 causat, ex parte autem contemplationis veritatis, | |
| 8351 delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p8"> | |
| 8352 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation | |
| 8353 itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him. | |
| 8354 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35189] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8355 dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non movet animum ex parte | |
| 8356 rei speculatae, movet tamen animum ex parte ipsius speculationis, | |
| 8357 quae est quoddam bonum hominis, et naturaliter delectabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A4-p9"> | |
| 8358 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, | |
| 8359 which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses. | |
| 8360 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35190] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8361 dicendum quod in viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad | |
| 8362 inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in | |
| 8363 superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in | |
| 8364 sensu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q38_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q38_A5-p0.1">Q. 38. A. 5. Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p2"> | |
| 8365 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. | |
| 8366 Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow. | |
| 8367 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35191] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 8368 sic proceditur. Videtur quod somnus et balneum non mitigent | |
| 8369 tristitiam. Tristitia enim in anima consistit. Sed somnus et | |
| 8370 balneum ad corpus pertinent. Non ergo aliquid faciunt ad | |
| 8371 mitigationem tristitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p3"> | |
| 8372 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with | |
| 8373 the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated above | |
| 8374 <a href="#FS_Q38_A4" id="FS_Q38_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like. | |
| 8375 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35192] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8376 idem effectus non videtur causari ex contrariis causis. Sed | |
| 8377 huiusmodi, cum sint corporalia, repugnant contemplationi veritatis, | |
| 8378 quae est causa mitigationis tristitiae, ut dictum est. Non ergo per | |
| 8379 huiusmodi tristitia mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p4"> | |
| 8380 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies | |
| 8381 as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore | |
| 8382 they do not assuage sorrow. | |
| 8383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35193] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8384 tristitia et dolor, secundum quod pertinent ad corpus, in quadam | |
| 8385 transmutatione cordis consistunt. Sed huiusmodi remedia magis | |
| 8386 videntur pertinere ad exteriores sensus et membra, quam ad | |
| 8387 interiorem cordis dispositionem. Non ergo per huiusmodi tristitia | |
| 8388 mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p5"> | |
| 8389 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from | |
| 8390 the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not | |
| 8391 a little assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the | |
| 8392 Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired | |
| 8393 limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow." | |
| 8394 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35194] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 8395 est quod Augustinus dicit, IX Confess., <i>audieram balnei nomen | |
| 8396 inde dictum, quod anxietatem pellat ex animo</i> et infra, | |
| 8397 <i>dormivi, et evigilavi, et non parva ex parte mitigatum inveni | |
| 8398 dolorem meum</i>. Et inducit quod in hymno Ambrosii dicitur, quod | |
| 8399 <i>quies artus solutos reddit laboris usui, mentesque fessas | |
| 8400 allevat, luctusque solvit anxios</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6"> | |
| 8401 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 8402 <a href="#FS_Q37_A4" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[4]</a>), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever restores | |
| 8403 the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such remedies, from the | |
| 8404 very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure | |
| 8405 consists, as stated above ( | |
| 8406 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q38_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). Therefore, since every | |
| 8407 pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies. | |
| 8408 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 co."><a name="35195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35195] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8409 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tristitia secundum suam | |
| 8410 speciem repugnat vitali motioni corporis. Et ideo illa quae | |
| 8411 reformant naturam corporalem in debitum statum vitalis motionis, | |
| 8412 repugnant tristitiae, et ipsam mitigant. Per hoc etiam quod | |
| 8413 huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex | |
| 8414 his delectatio, hoc enim est quod delectationem facit, ut supra | |
| 8415 dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per | |
| 8416 huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p7"> | |
| 8417 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow. | |
| 8418 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35196] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8419 ergo dicendum quod ipsa debita corporis dispositio, inquantum | |
| 8420 sentitur, delectationem causat, et per consequens tristitiam | |
| 8421 mitigat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p8"> | |
| 8422 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( | |
| 8423 <a href="#FS_Q31_A8" id="FS_Q38_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[8]</a>), one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should | |
| 8424 be assuaged by causes which hinder one another. | |
| 8425 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35197] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8426 dicendum quod delectationum una aliam impedit, ut supra dictum est, | |
| 8427 et tamen omnis delectatio tristitiam mitigat. Unde non est | |
| 8428 inconveniens quod ex causis se invicem impedientibus tristitia | |
| 8429 mitigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q38_A5-p9"> | |
| 8430 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated | |
| 8431 in De Causa Mot. Animal. xi. | |
| 8432 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 38 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35198] Iª-IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8433 dicendum quod omnis bona dispositio corporis redundat quodammodo ad | |
| 8434 cor, sicut ad principium et finem corporalium motionum, ut dicitur | |
| 8435 in libro de causa motus animalium.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 8436 <div id="FS_Q39" class="div3"> | |
| 8437 <h3 id="FS_Q39-p0.1">Q. 39. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 8438 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 8439 <p id="FS_Q39-p2"> We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q39-p3"><a href="#FS_Q39_A1"> (1) Whether all sorrow is evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p4"><a href="#FS_Q39_A2"> (2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p5"><a href="#FS_Q39_A3"> (3) Whether it can be a useful good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q39-p6"><a href="#FS_Q39_A4"> (4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?</a></p> | |
| 8440 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 pr."><a name="35199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35199] | |
| 8441 Iª-IIae q. 39 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 8442 bonitate et malitia doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur | |
| 8443 quatuor. Primo, utrum omnis tristitia sit malum. Secundo, utrum | |
| 8444 possit esse bonum honestum. Tertio, utrum possit esse bonum utile. | |
| 8445 Quarto, utrum dolor corporis sit summum malum.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 8446 <div id="FS_Q39_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A1-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 1. Whether all sorrow is evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p2"> | |
| 8447 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from | |
| 8448 its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil. | |
| 8449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35200] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8450 sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis tristitia sit mala. Dicit enim | |
| 8451 Gregorius Nyssenus, <i>omnis tristitia malum est, sui ipsius | |
| 8452 natura</i>. Sed quod naturaliter est malum, semper et ubique est | |
| 8453 malum. Ergo omnis tristitia est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p3"> | |
| 8454 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in Ethic. | |
| 8455 vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil. | |
| 8456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35201] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8457 illud quod omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, est malum. Sed tristitiam | |
| 8458 omnes fugiunt, etiam virtuosi, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., | |
| 8459 <i>etsi prudens non intendat delectari, tamen intendit non | |
| 8460 tristari</i>. Ergo tristitia est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p4"> | |
| 8461 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow | |
| 8462 in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul. | |
| 8463 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35202] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8464 sicut malum corporale est obiectum et causa doloris corporalis, ita | |
| 8465 malum spirituale est obiectum et causa tristitiae spiritualis. Sed | |
| 8466 omnis dolor corporalis est malum corporis. Ergo omnis tristitia | |
| 8467 spiritualis est malum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p5"> | |
| 8468 <b>On the contrary,</b> Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, | |
| 8469 it is written ( | |
| 8470 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>), that "they were glad when they had done evil." Therefore sorrow for evil is good. | |
| 8471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35203] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 8472 tristitia de malo contrariatur delectationi de malo. Sed delectatio | |
| 8473 de malo est mala, unde in detestationem quorundam dicitur Prov. II, | |
| 8474 quod <i>laetantur cum malefecerint</i>. Ergo tristitia de malo est | |
| 8475 bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p6"> | |
| 8476 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the | |
| 8477 mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the | |
| 8478 appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to | |
| 8479 be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. | |
| 8480 Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain | |
| 8481 on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it | |
| 8482 not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition | |
| 8483 of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. | |
| 8484 viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, | |
| 8485 he could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things individually---for | |
| 8486 actions are concerned about individuals---that which is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as that | |
| 8487 which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and likewise above ( | |
| 8488 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A6" id="FS_Q39_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[6]</a>). | |
| 8489 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 co."><a name="35204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35204] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8490 dicendum quod aliquid esse bonum vel malum, potest dici dupliciter. | |
| 8491 Uno modo, simpliciter et secundum se. Et sic omnis tristitia est | |
| 8492 quoddam malum, hoc enim ipsum quod est appetitum hominis anxiari de | |
| 8493 malo praesenti, rationem mali habet; impeditur enim per hoc quies | |
| 8494 appetitus in bono. Alio modo dicitur aliquid bonum vel malum, ex | |
| 8495 suppositione alterius, sicut verecundia dicitur esse bonum, ex | |
| 8496 suppositione alicuius turpis commissi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sic | |
| 8497 igitur, supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem | |
| 8498 pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat. Quod | |
| 8499 enim non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel | |
| 8500 non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque | |
| 8501 istorum est malum manifeste. Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, | |
| 8502 supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor. Et hoc est | |
| 8503 quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>adhuc est bonum | |
| 8504 quod dolet amissum bonum, nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in | |
| 8505 natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena</i>. Sed quia | |
| 8506 sermones morales sunt in singularibus, quorum sunt operationes, | |
| 8507 illud quod est ex suppositione bonum, debet bonum iudicari, sicut | |
| 8508 quod est ex suppositione voluntarium, iudicatur voluntarium, ut | |
| 8509 dicitur in III Ethic., et supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p7"> | |
| 8510 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject | |
| 8511 that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not | |
| 8512 shun the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily | |
| 8513 evil is the proof of the goodness of nature. | |
| 8514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35205] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8515 ergo dicendum quod Gregorius Nyssenus loquitur de tristitia ex | |
| 8516 parte mali tristantis, non autem ex parte sentientis et repudiantis | |
| 8517 malum. Et ex hac etiam parte omnes fugiunt tristitiam, inquantum | |
| 8518 fugiunt malum, sed sensum et refutationem mali non fugiunt. Et sic | |
| 8519 etiam dicendum est de dolore corporali, nam sensus et recusatio | |
| 8520 mali corporalis attestatur naturae bonae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A1-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35206] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet | |
| 8521 responsio ad secundum et tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A2-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 2. Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p2"> | |
| 8522 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine | |
| 8523 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of | |
| 8524 entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. | |
| 8525 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35207] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8526 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non habeat rationem boni | |
| 8527 honesti. Quod enim ad Inferos deducit, contrariatur honesto. Sed | |
| 8528 sicut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>Iacob hoc | |
| 8529 timuisse videtur, ne nimia tristitia sic perturbaretur, ut non ad | |
| 8530 requiem beatorum iret, sed ad Inferos peccatorum</i>. Ergo | |
| 8531 tristitia non habet rationem boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p3"> | |
| 8532 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says ( | |
| 8533 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. | |
| 8534 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35208] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8535 bonum honestum habet rationem laudabilis et meritorii. Sed | |
| 8536 tristitia diminuit rationem laudis et meriti, dicit enim apostolus, | |
| 8537 II ad Cor. IX, <i>unusquisque prout destinavit in corde suo, non ex | |
| 8538 tristitia aut ex necessitate</i>. Ergo tristitia non est bonum | |
| 8539 honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p4"> | |
| 8540 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will." | |
| 8541 But not to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence | |
| 8542 whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the | |
| 8543 will, as stated above ( | |
| 8544 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A9" id="FS_Q39_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[9]</a>), it seems that sorrow is | |
| 8545 incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous. | |
| 8546 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35209] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8547 sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>tristitia est de his | |
| 8548 quae, nobis nolentibus, accidunt</i>. Sed non velle ea quae | |
| 8549 praesentialiter fiunt, est habere voluntatem repugnantem | |
| 8550 ordinationi divinae, cuius providentiae subiacent omnia quae | |
| 8551 aguntur. Ergo, cum conformitas humanae voluntatis ad divinam | |
| 8552 pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis, ut supra dictum est; videtur | |
| 8553 quod tristitia contrarietur rectitudini voluntatis. Et sic non | |
| 8554 habet rationem honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p5"> | |
| 8555 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from | |
| 8556 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv"> Mat. 5:5</a>: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good. | |
| 8557 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35210] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 8558 omne quod meretur praemium vitae aeternae, habet rationem honesti. | |
| 8559 Sed tristitia est huiusmodi, ut patet per id quod dicitur Matth. V, | |
| 8560 <i>beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur</i>. Ergo tristitia | |
| 8561 est bonum honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p6"> | |
| 8562 <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. For it has been said above | |
| 8563 <a href="#FS_Q39_A1" id="FS_Q39_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, | |
| 8564 are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing | |
| 8565 that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right | |
| 8566 judgment of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every | |
| 8567 virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow | |
| 8568 may be a virtuous good. | |
| 8569 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 co."><a name="35211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35211] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8570 dicendum quod, secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, | |
| 8571 potest esse bonum honestum. Dictum est enim quod tristitia est | |
| 8572 bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali. Quae quidem duo in | |
| 8573 dolore corporali, attestantur bonitati naturae, ex qua provenit | |
| 8574 quod sensus sentit, et natura refugit laesivum, quod causat | |
| 8575 dolorem. In interiori vero tristitia, cognitio mali quandoque | |
| 8576 quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis; et recusatio mali est per | |
| 8577 voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum. Omne autem bonum | |
| 8578 honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis | |
| 8579 et voluntatis. Unde manifestum est quod tristitia potest habere | |
| 8580 rationem boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p7"> | |
| 8581 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good; | |
| 8582 but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good. | |
| 8583 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35212] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8584 ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae regulari debent secundum | |
| 8585 regulam rationis, quae est radix boni honesti. Quam transcendit | |
| 8586 immoderata tristitia, de qua loquitur Augustinus. Et ideo recedit a | |
| 8587 ratione boni honesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p8"> | |
| 8588 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse | |
| 8589 reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; | |
| 8590 for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully. | |
| 8591 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35213] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8592 dicendum quod, sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et | |
| 8593 ratione recta, quae detestatur malum; ita tristitia de bono | |
| 8594 procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quae detestatur bonum. | |
| 8595 Et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti, | |
| 8596 sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A2-p9"> | |
| 8597 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen---such as sins. Consequently | |
| 8598 a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen | |
| 8599 actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves: | |
| 8600 but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated | |
| 8601 above ( | |
| 8602 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A10" id="FS_Q39_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[10]</a>). | |
| 8603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35214] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8604 dicendum quod aliqua praesentialiter eveniunt, quae non fiunt Deo | |
| 8605 volente, sed Deo permittente, sicut peccata. Unde voluntas | |
| 8606 repugnans peccato existenti vel in se vel in alio, non discordat a | |
| 8607 voluntate Dei. Mala vero poenalia praesentialiter contingunt, etiam | |
| 8608 Deo volente. Non tamen exigitur ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quod ea | |
| 8609 secundum se homo velit, sed solum quod non contranitatur ordini | |
| 8610 divinae iustitiae, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A3-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 3. Whether sorrow can be a useful good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p2"> | |
| 8611 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written ( | |
| 8612 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:25</a>): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." | |
| 8613 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35215] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8614 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non possit esse bonum utile. | |
| 8615 Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, <i>multos occidit tristitia, et non est | |
| 8616 utilitas in illa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p3"> | |
| 8617 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow | |
| 8618 is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. | |
| 8619 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35216] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8620 electio est de eo quod est utile ad finem aliquem. Sed tristitia | |
| 8621 non est eligibilis, quinimmo <i>idem sine tristitia, quam cum | |
| 8622 tristitia, est magis eligendum</i>, ut dicitur in III Topic. Ergo | |
| 8623 tristitia non est bonum utile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p4"> | |
| 8624 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," | |
| 8625 as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. | |
| 8626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35217] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> | |
| 8627 <i>Praeterea, omnis res est propter suam operationem</i>, ut | |
| 8628 dicitur in II de coelo. Sed tristitia impedit operationem, ut | |
| 8629 dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo tristitia non habet rationem boni | |
| 8630 utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p5"> | |
| 8631 <b>On the contrary,</b> The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to | |
| 8632 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.5" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:5, </a> "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow is useful. | |
| 8633 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35218] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 8634 sapiens non quaerit nisi utilia. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, | |
| 8635 <i>cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia</i>. | |
| 8636 Ergo tristitia est utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q39_A3-p6"> | |
| 8637 <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present | |
| 8638 evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement | |
| 8639 arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, | |
| 8640 if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may | |
| 8641 be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, | |
| 8642 sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says ( | |
| 8643 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:9</a>): "I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is | |
| 8644 to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being | |
| 8645 attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the | |
| 8646 case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to | |
| 8647 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.3" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:3</a>: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of | |
| 8648 all." | |
| 8649 </p><p id="FS_Q39_A3-p7"> Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because | |
| 8650 the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the | |
| 8651 good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for | |
| 8652 evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly. | |
| 8653 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 co."><a name="35219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35219] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8654 dicendum quod ex malo praesenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus. | |
| 8655 Unus quidem est quo appetitus contrariatur malo praesenti. Et ex | |
| 8656 ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est | |
| 8657 praesens, non potest non esse praesens. Secundus motus consurgit in | |
| 8658 appetitu ad fugiendum vel repellendum malum contristans. Et quantum | |
| 8659 ad hoc, tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est | |
| 8660 fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter. Uno modo, propter | |
| 8661 seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum; sicut peccatum. Et | |
| 8662 ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat | |
| 8663 peccatum, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, <i>gaudeo, non | |
| 8664 quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad | |
| 8665 poenitentiam</i>. Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit | |
| 8666 secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali; dum vel homo nimis | |
| 8667 inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod | |
| 8668 malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus. Et secundum hoc, | |
| 8669 tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur | |
| 8670 Eccle. VII, <i>melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum | |
| 8671 convivii, in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum</i>. Ideo | |
| 8672 autem tristitia in omni fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur | |
| 8673 fugiendi causa. Nam ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est, ipsam | |
| 8674 autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes | |
| 8675 appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono | |
| 8676 facit ut bonum avidius quaeratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut | |
| 8677 malum vehementius fugiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p8"> | |
| 8678 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, | |
| 8679 and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above ( | |
| 8680 <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q39_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[2]</a>). | |
| 8681 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35220] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8682 ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa intelligitur de immoderata | |
| 8683 tristitia, quae animum absorbet. Huiusmodi enim tristitia | |
| 8684 immobilitat animum, et impedit fugam mali, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p9"> | |
| 8685 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to | |
| 8686 be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful. | |
| 8687 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35221] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8688 dicendum quod, sicut quodlibet eligibile fit minus eligibile | |
| 8689 propter tristitiam, ita quodlibet fugiendum redditur magis | |
| 8690 fugiendum propter tristitiam. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia est | |
| 8691 utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A3-p10"> | |
| 8692 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly. | |
| 8693 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35222] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8694 dicendum quod tristitia de operatione aliqua, impedit operationem, | |
| 8695 sed tristitia de cessatione operationis, facit avidius operari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q39_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q39_A4-p0.1">Q. 39. A. 4. Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p2"> | |
| 8696 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain | |
| 8697 pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil. | |
| 8698 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35223] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 8699 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia sit summum malum. Optimo | |
| 8700 enim opponitur pessimum, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed quaedam | |
| 8701 delectatio est optimum, quae scilicet pertinet ad felicitatem. Ergo | |
| 8702 aliqua tristitia est summum malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3"> | |
| 8703 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever | |
| 8704 he will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above ( | |
| 8705 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>, OBJ[5]; | |
| 8706 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A8" id="FS_Q39_A4-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[5], A[8]</a>, OBJ[3]). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening | |
| 8707 contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain | |
| 8708 is man's greatest evil. | |
| 8709 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35224] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8710 beatitudo est summum bonum hominis, quia est ultimus hominis finis. | |
| 8711 Sed beatitudo consistit in hoc quod homo habeat quidquid velit, et | |
| 8712 nihil mali velit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo summum bonum hominis | |
| 8713 est impletio voluntatis ipsius. Sed tristitia consistit in hoc quod | |
| 8714 accidit aliquid contra voluntatem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de | |
| 8715 Civ. Dei. Ergo tristitia est summum malum hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p4"> | |
| 8716 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body | |
| 8717 is the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil | |
| 8718 of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's | |
| 8719 greatest good is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain." | |
| 8720 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35225] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8721 Augustinus sic argumentatur in Soliloq., <i>ex duabus partibus | |
| 8722 compositi sumus, ex anima scilicet et corpore, quarum pars deterior | |
| 8723 corpus est. Summum autem bonum est melioris partis optimum, summum | |
| 8724 autem malum, pessimum deterioris. Est autem optimum in animo | |
| 8725 sapientia, in corpore pessimum dolor. Summum igitur bonum hominis | |
| 8726 est sapere, summum malum dolere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p5"> | |
| 8727 <b>On the contrary,</b> Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated in the | |
| 8728 <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A6" id="FS_Q39_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[6]</a>. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For | |
| 8729 Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont | |
| 8730 to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." | |
| 8731 Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil. | |
| 8732 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35226] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 8733 culpa est magis malum quam poena, ut in primo habitum est. Sed | |
| 8734 tristitia seu dolor pertinet ad poenam peccati; sicut frui rebus | |
| 8735 mutabilibus est malum culpae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de | |
| 8736 vera religione, <i>quis est dolor qui dicitur animi, nisi carere | |
| 8737 mutabilibus rebus quibus fruebatur, aut frui se posse speraverat? | |
| 8738 Et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum, idest peccatum, et poena | |
| 8739 peccati</i>. Ergo tristitia seu dolor non est summum malum | |
| 8740 hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p6"> | |
| 8741 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is | |
| 8742 truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil | |
| 8743 cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, | |
| 8744 or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really | |
| 8745 good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it | |
| 8746 is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. | |
| 8747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 co."><a name="35227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35227] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8748 dicendum quod impossibile est aliquam tristitiam seu dolorem esse | |
| 8749 summum hominis malum. Omnis enim tristitia seu dolor aut est de hoc | |
| 8750 quod est vere malum, aut est de aliquo apparenti malo, quod est | |
| 8751 vere bonum. Dolor autem seu tristitia quae est de vere malo, non | |
| 8752 potest esse summum malum, est enim aliquid eo peius, scilicet vel | |
| 8753 non iudicare esse malum illud quod vere est malum, vel etiam non | |
| 8754 refutare illud. Tristitia autem vel dolor qui est de apparenti | |
| 8755 malo, quod est vere bonum, non potest esse summum malum, quia peius | |
| 8756 esset omnino alienari a vero bono. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua | |
| 8757 tristitia vel dolor sit summum hominis malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p7"> | |
| 8758 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order | |
| 8759 of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal | |
| 8760 of which they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better. | |
| 8761 Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated ( | |
| 8762 <a href="#FS_Q34_A3" id="FS_Q39_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[34], | |
| 8763 A[3] | |
| 8764 </a>): whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil. | |
| 8765 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35228] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8766 ergo dicendum quod duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et | |
| 8767 tristitiae, scilicet iudicium verum de bono et malo; et ordo | |
| 8768 debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum. Et sic | |
| 8769 patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cuius | |
| 8770 privationem potest fieri deterius. Sed non in omni delectatione est | |
| 8771 aliquod malum, per cuius remotionem possit fieri melius. Unde | |
| 8772 delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum, eo modo quo | |
| 8773 supra dictum est, tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis | |
| 8774 malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p8"> | |
| 8775 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; | |
| 8776 because it has an admixture of good. | |
| 8777 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35229] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8778 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est voluntatem repugnare malo, est | |
| 8779 quoddam bonum. Et propter hoc, tristitia vel dolor non potest esse | |
| 8780 summum malum, quia habet aliquam permixtionem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q39_A4-p9"> | |
| 8781 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," | |
| 8782 as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil | |
| 8783 to the body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius | |
| 8784 Celsus]. | |
| 8785 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35230] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8786 dicendum quod peius est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori. | |
| 8787 Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. | |
| 8788 Unde maius malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum | |
| 8789 corporis. Unde non est efficax, ratio, quam Augustinus inducit non | |
| 8790 ex sensu suo sed ex sensu alterius.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 8791 <div id="FS_Q40" class="div3"> | |
| 8792 <h3 id="FS_Q40-p0.1">Q. 40. OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 8793 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 8794 <p id="FS_Q40-p2"> We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there | |
| 8795 are eight points of inquiry: | |
| 8796 </p><p id="FS_Q40-p3"><a href="#FS_Q40_A1"> (1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p4"><a href="#FS_Q40_A2"> (2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p5"><a href="#FS_Q40_A3"> (3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p6"><a href="#FS_Q40_A4"> (4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p7"><a href="#FS_Q40_A5"> (5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p8"><a href="#FS_Q40_A6"> (6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p9"><a href="#FS_Q40_A7"> (7) Concerning the order of hope to love;</a></p><p id="FS_Q40-p10"><a href="#FS_Q40_A8"> (8) Whether love conduces to action?</a></p> | |
| 8797 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 pr."><a name="35231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35231] | |
| 8798 Iª-IIae q. 40 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de | |
| 8799 passionibus irascibilis, et primo, de spe et desperatione; secundo, | |
| 8800 de timore et audacia; tertio, de ira. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. | |
| 8801 Primo, utrum spes sit idem quod desiderium vel cupiditas. Secundo, | |
| 8802 utrum spes sit in vi apprehensiva, vel in vi appetitiva. Tertio, | |
| 8803 utrum spes sit in brutis animalibus. Quarto, utrum spei | |
| 8804 contrarietur desperatio. Quinto, utrum causa spei sit experientia. | |
| 8805 Sexto, utrum in iuvenibus et ebriosis spes abundet. Septimo, de | |
| 8806 ordine spei ad amorem. Octavo, utrum spes conferat ad | |
| 8807 operationem.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 8808 <div id="FS_Q40_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A1-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 1. Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p2"> | |
| 8809 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. | |
| 8810 But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore | |
| 8811 hope is the same as cupidity or desire. | |
| 8812 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35232] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8813 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes sit idem quod desiderium sive | |
| 8814 cupiditas. Spes enim ponitur una quatuor principalium passionum. | |
| 8815 Sed Augustinus, enumerans quatuor principales passiones, ponit | |
| 8816 cupiditatem loco spei, ut patet in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo spes est | |
| 8817 idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p3"> | |
| 8818 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, | |
| 8819 viz. the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire. | |
| 8820 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35233] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8821 passiones differunt secundum obiecta. Sed idem est obiectum spei, | |
| 8822 et cupiditatis sive desiderii, scilicet bonum futurum. Ergo spes | |
| 8823 est idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p4"> | |
| 8824 <b>Objection 3:</b> If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever | |
| 8825 is accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to | |
| 8826 a future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire | |
| 8827 or cupidity. | |
| 8828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35234] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur | |
| 8829 quod spes addit supra desiderium possibilitatem adipiscendi bonum | |
| 8830 futurum, contra, id quod per accidens se habet ad obiectum, non | |
| 8831 variat speciem passionis. Sed possibile se habet per accidens ad | |
| 8832 bonum futurum, quod est obiectum cupiditatis vel desiderii, et | |
| 8833 spei. Ergo spes non est passio specie differens a desiderio vel | |
| 8834 cupiditate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p5"> | |
| 8835 <b>On the contrary,</b> To different powers belong different species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity | |
| 8836 is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity. | |
| 8837 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35235] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 8838 diversarum potentiarum sunt diversae passiones specie differentes. | |
| 8839 Sed spes est in irascibili; desiderium autem et cupiditas in | |
| 8840 concupiscibili. Ergo spes differt specie a desiderio seu | |
| 8841 cupiditate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p6"> | |
| 8842 <b>I answer that,</b> The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it | |
| 8843 is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards | |
| 8844 evil. Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, | |
| 8845 hope differs from joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something | |
| 8846 arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any | |
| 8847 time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs | |
| 8848 to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible | |
| 8849 to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair. It | |
| 8850 is | |
| 8851 therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, | |
| 8852 moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as | |
| 8853 stated above ( | |
| 8854 <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q40_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>). | |
| 8855 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 co."><a name="35236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35236] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8856 dicendum quod species passionis ex obiecto consideratur circa | |
| 8857 obiectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem, | |
| 8858 quod sit bonum, non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono. | |
| 8859 Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo. Secundo, ut sit | |
| 8860 futurum, non enim spes est de praesenti iam habito. Et per hoc | |
| 8861 differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono praesenti. Tertio, | |
| 8862 requiritur quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile, | |
| 8863 non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum, quod statim est | |
| 8864 in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel | |
| 8865 cupiditate, quae est de bono futuro absolute, unde pertinet ad | |
| 8866 concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem. Quarto, quod illud | |
| 8867 arduum sit possibile adipisci, non enim aliquis sperat id quod | |
| 8868 omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a | |
| 8869 desperatione. Sic ergo patet quod spes differt a desiderio, sicut | |
| 8870 differunt passiones irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et | |
| 8871 propter hoc, spes praesupponit desiderium, sicut et omnes passiones | |
| 8872 irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis, ut supra | |
| 8873 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p7"> | |
| 8874 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is | |
| 8875 reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise. | |
| 8876 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35237] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8877 ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit cupiditatem loco spei, propter | |
| 8878 hoc quod utrumque respicit bonum futurum, et quia bonum quod non | |
| 8879 est arduum, quasi nihil reputatur; ut sic cupiditas maxime videatur | |
| 8880 tendere in bonum arduum, in quod etiam tendit spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p8"> | |
| 8881 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above. | |
| 8882 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35238] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8883 dicendum quod obiectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum | |
| 8884 arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A1-p9"> | |
| 8885 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to | |
| 8886 another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in the | |
| 8887 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q40_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the | |
| 8888 appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under | |
| 8889 the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from | |
| 8890 despair according to the difference of possible and impossible. | |
| 8891 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35239] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8892 dicendum quod obiectum spei non tantum addit possibilitatem super | |
| 8893 obiectum desiderii, sed etiam arduitatem, quae ad aliam potentiam | |
| 8894 facit spem pertinere, scilicet ad irascibilem, quae respicit | |
| 8895 arduum, ut in primo dictum est. Possibile autem et impossibile non | |
| 8896 omnino per accidens se habent ad obiectum appetitivae virtutis. Nam | |
| 8897 appetitus est principium motionis, nihil autem movetur ad aliquid | |
| 8898 nisi sub ratione possibilis; nullus enim movetur ad id quod | |
| 8899 existimat impossibile adipisci. Et propter hoc, spes differt a | |
| 8900 desperatione secundum differentiam possibilis et impossibilis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A2-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 2. Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p2"> | |
| 8901 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says | |
| 8902 ( | |
| 8903 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.25" target="asv">Rom. 8:25</a>): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, | |
| 8904 which we exercise by "looking out." Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power. | |
| 8905 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35240] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8906 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam. Spes | |
| 8907 enim videtur esse expectatio quaedam, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. | |
| 8908 VIII, <i>si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam | |
| 8909 expectamus</i>. Sed expectatio videtur ad vim cognitivam pertinere, | |
| 8910 cuius est exspectare. Ergo spes ad cognitivam pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p3"> | |
| 8911 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope | |
| 8912 and to be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope | |
| 8913 does too. | |
| 8914 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35241] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8915 idem est, ut videtur, spes quod fiducia, unde et sperantes | |
| 8916 confidentes vocamus, quasi pro eodem utentes eo quod est confidere | |
| 8917 et sperare. Sed fiducia, sicut et fides, videtur ad vim cognitivam | |
| 8918 pertinere. Ergo et spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p4"> | |
| 8919 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the | |
| 8920 cognitive power. | |
| 8921 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35242] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8922 certitudo est proprietas cognitivae virtutis. Sed certitudo | |
| 8923 attribuitur spei. Ergo spes ad vim cognitivam pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p5"> | |
| 8924 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope regards good, as stated above | |
| 8925 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, | |
| 8926 but to the appetitive power. | |
| 8927 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35243] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 8928 spes est de bono, sicut dictum est. Bonum autem, inquantum | |
| 8929 huiusmodi, non est obiectum cognitivae, sed appetitivae virtutis. | |
| 8930 Ergo spes non pertinet ad cognitivam, sed ad appetitivam | |
| 8931 virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p6"> | |
| 8932 <b>I answer that,</b> Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power; since | |
| 8933 movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by | |
| 8934 the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive | |
| 8935 power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite | |
| 8936 various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind | |
| 8937 of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise | |
| 8938 from the apprehension of something present and of something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something considered | |
| 8939 as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive | |
| 8940 power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the | |
| 8941 appetite to such a good. | |
| 8942 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 co."><a name="35244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35244] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 8943 dicendum quod, cum spes importet extensionem quandam appetitus in | |
| 8944 bonum, manifeste pertinet ad appetitivam virtutem, motus enim ad | |
| 8945 res pertinet proprie ad appetitum. Actio vero virtutis cognitivae | |
| 8946 perficitur non secundum motum cognoscentis ad res, sed potius | |
| 8947 secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Sed quia vis | |
| 8948 cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum; | |
| 8949 secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi | |
| 8950 motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex | |
| 8951 apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali, et similiter | |
| 8952 alius motus ex apprehensione praesentis et futuri, absoluti et | |
| 8953 ardui, possibilis et impossibilis. Et secundum hoc, spes est motus | |
| 8954 appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardui | |
| 8955 possibilis adipisci, scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi | |
| 8956 obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p7"> | |
| 8957 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in | |
| 8958 two ways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is | |
| 8959 not said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get | |
| 8960 by another's help as though to await [exspectare] implied keeping one's eyes on another | |
| 8961 [ex alio spectare], in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends | |
| 8962 to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to | |
| 8963 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.51.10" target="asv"> Ecclus. 51:10, </a> "I looked for the succor of men." Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding | |
| 8964 inspection of the cognitive power. | |
| 8965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35245] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 8966 ergo dicendum quod, quia spes respicit ad bonum possibile, insurgit | |
| 8967 dupliciter homini motus spei, sicut dupliciter est ei aliquid | |
| 8968 possibile, scilicet secundum propriam virtutem, et secundum | |
| 8969 virtutem alterius. Quod ergo aliquis sperat per propriam virtutem | |
| 8970 adipisci, non dicitur expectare, sed sperare tantum. Sed proprie | |
| 8971 dicitur expectare quod sperat ex auxilio virtutis alienae, ut | |
| 8972 dicatur exspectare quasi ex alio spectare, inquantum scilicet vis | |
| 8973 apprehensiva praecedens non solum respicit ad bonum quod intendit | |
| 8974 adipisci, sed etiam ad illud cuius virtute adipisci sperat; | |
| 8975 secundum illud Eccli. li, <i>respiciens eram ad adiutorium | |
| 8976 hominum</i>. Motus ergo spei quandoque dicitur expectatio, propter | |
| 8977 inspectionem virtutis cognitivae praecedentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p8"> | |
| 8978 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; | |
| 8979 and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because | |
| 8980 the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better | |
| 8981 known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the | |
| 8982 appetite. | |
| 8983 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35246] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8984 dicendum quod illud quod homo desiderat, et aestimat se posse | |
| 8985 adipisci, credit se adepturum, et ex tali fide in cognitiva | |
| 8986 praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur. | |
| 8987 Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione praecedente, sicut | |
| 8988 effectus ex causa magis nota, magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva | |
| 8989 suum actum quam actum appetitivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A2-p9"> | |
| 8990 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone | |
| 8991 is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite | |
| 8992 derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it. | |
| 8993 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35247] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8994 dicendum quod certitudo attribuitur motui non solum appetitus | |
| 8995 sensitivi, sed etiam appetitus naturalis, sicut dicitur quod lapis | |
| 8996 certitudinaliter tendit deorsum. Et hoc propter infallibilitatem | |
| 8997 quam habet ex certitudine cognitionis quae praecedit motum | |
| 8998 appetitus sensitivi, vel etiam naturalis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A3-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 3. Whether hope is in dumb animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p2"> | |
| 8999 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. | |
| 9000 ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and | |
| 9001 does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. | |
| 9002 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35248] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9003 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in brutis animalibus non sit spes. | |
| 9004 Spes enim est de futuro bono, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed cognoscere | |
| 9005 futurum non pertinet ad animalia bruta, quae habent solum | |
| 9006 cognitionem sensitivam, quae non est futurorum. Ergo spes non est | |
| 9007 in brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p3"> | |
| 9008 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the | |
| 9009 true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb | |
| 9010 animals, since they have no mind. | |
| 9011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35249] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9012 obiectum spei est bonum possibile adipisci. Sed possibile et | |
| 9013 impossibile sunt quaedam differentiae veri et falsi, quae solum | |
| 9014 sunt in mente, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. Ergo spes non | |
| 9015 est in brutis animalibus, in quibus non est mens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p4"> | |
| 9016 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things | |
| 9017 unseen: "for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" ( | |
| 9018 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. | |
| 9019 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35250] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9020 Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur | |
| 9021 visis. Sed spes non est de eo quod videtur, <i>nam quod videt quis, | |
| 9022 quid sperat?</i> Ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Ergo spes non est in brutis | |
| 9023 animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p5"> | |
| 9024 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also. | |
| 9025 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35251] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 9026 spes est passio irascibilis. Sed in brutis animalibus est | |
| 9027 irascibilis. Ergo et spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6"> | |
| 9028 <b>I answer that,</b> The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb | |
| 9029 animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to | |
| 9030 catch it: whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it. Because as stated above | |
| 9031 ( | |
| 9032 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>; | |
| 9033 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[26], A[1]</a>; | |
| 9034 <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the apprehension | |
| 9035 of an intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will. But there is a difference, in | |
| 9036 that the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural appetite | |
| 9037 results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as | |
| 9038 does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the actions of | |
| 9039 irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions | |
| 9040 of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals. | |
| 9041 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 co."><a name="35252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35252] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9042 dicendum quod interiores passiones animalium ex exterioribus | |
| 9043 motibus deprehendi possunt. Ex quibus apparet quod in animalibus | |
| 9044 brutis est spes. Si enim canis videat leporem, aut accipiter avem, | |
| 9045 nimis distantem, non movetur ad ipsam, quasi non sperans se eam | |
| 9046 posse adipisci, si autem sit in propinquo, movetur, quasi sub spe | |
| 9047 adipiscendi. Ut enim supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus | |
| 9048 brutorum animalium, et etiam appetitus naturalis rerum | |
| 9049 insensibilium, sequuntur apprehensionem alicuius intellectus, sicut | |
| 9050 et appetitus naturae intellectivae, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed in | |
| 9051 hoc est differentia, quod voluntas movetur ex apprehensione | |
| 9052 intellectus coniuncti, sed motus appetitus naturalis sequitur | |
| 9053 apprehensionem intellectus separati, qui naturam instituit; et | |
| 9054 similiter appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, quae etiam | |
| 9055 quodam instinctu naturali agunt. Unde in operibus brutorum | |
| 9056 animalium, et aliarum rerum naturalium, apparet similis processus | |
| 9057 sicut et in operibus artis. Et per hunc modum in animalibus brutis | |
| 9058 est spes et desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p7"> | |
| 9059 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as though | |
| 9060 it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future. | |
| 9061 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35253] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9062 ergo dicendum quod, quamvis bruta animalia non cognoscant futurum, | |
| 9063 tamen ex instinctu naturali movetur animal ad aliquid in futurum, | |
| 9064 ac si futurum praevideret. Huiusmodi enim instinctus est eis | |
| 9065 inditus ab intellectu divino praevidente futura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p8"> | |
| 9066 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of hope is not the possible as differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate | |
| 9067 to a subject. The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the possible given in | |
| 9068 Metaph. v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have just mentioned. | |
| 9069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35254] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9070 dicendum quod obiectum spei non est possibile, prout est quaedam | |
| 9071 differentia veri, sic enim consequitur habitudinem praedicati ad | |
| 9072 subiectum. Sed obiectum spei est possibile quod dicitur secundum | |
| 9073 aliquam potentiam. Sic enim distinguitur possibile in V Metaphys., | |
| 9074 scilicet in duo possibilia praedicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A3-p9"> | |
| 9075 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the thing which is future does not come under the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present, | |
| 9076 an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future. | |
| 9077 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35255] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9078 dicendum quod, licet id quod est futurum, non cadat sub visu; tamen | |
| 9079 ex his quae videt animal in praesenti, movetur eius appetitus in | |
| 9080 aliquod futurum vel prosequendum vel vitandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A4-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 4. Whether despair is contrary to hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p2"> | |
| 9081 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. Because "to one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear | |
| 9082 is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope. | |
| 9083 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35256] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 9084 sic proceditur. Videtur quod desperatio non sit contraria spei. Uni | |
| 9085 enim unum est contrarium, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed spei | |
| 9086 contrariatur timor. Non ergo contrariatur ei desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p3"> | |
| 9087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards | |
| 9088 the good, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair. | |
| 9089 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35257] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9090 contraria videntur esse circa idem. Sed spes et desperatio non sunt | |
| 9091 circa idem, nam spes respicit bonum, desperatio autem est propter | |
| 9092 aliquod malum impeditivum adeptionis boni. Ergo spes non | |
| 9093 contrariatur desperationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p4"> | |
| 9094 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair | |
| 9095 seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to hope, which implies movement of stretching | |
| 9096 out towards the hoped-for good. | |
| 9097 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35258] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9098 motui contrariatur motus, quies vero opponitur motui ut privatio. | |
| 9099 Sed desperatio magis videtur importare immobilitatem quam motum. | |
| 9100 Ergo non contrariatur spei, quae importat motum extensionis in | |
| 9101 bonum speratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p5"> | |
| 9102 <b>On the contrary,</b> The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes]. | |
| 9103 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35259] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9104 est quod desperatio nominatur per contrarium spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6"> | |
| 9105 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 9106 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>), there is a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone | |
| 9107 is to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according to approach and | |
| 9108 withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above ( | |
| 9109 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q40_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>). Now the object of | |
| 9110 hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the light of something | |
| 9111 attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, | |
| 9112 it has the character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an impossibility | |
| 9113 they disperse." And this is how despair stands in regard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: and | |
| 9114 consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach. | |
| 9115 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 co."><a name="35260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35260] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9116 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in mutationibus invenitur | |
| 9117 duplex contrarietas. Una secundum accessum ad contrarios terminos, | |
| 9118 et talis contrarietas sola invenitur in passionibus | |
| 9119 concupiscibilis, sicut amor et odium contrariantur. Alio modo, per | |
| 9120 accessum et per recessum respectu eiusdem termini, et talis | |
| 9121 contrarietas invenitur in passionibus irascibilis, sicut supra | |
| 9122 dictum est. Obiectum autem spei, quod est bonum arduum, habet | |
| 9123 quidem rationem attractivi, prout consideratur cum possibilitate | |
| 9124 adipiscendi, et sic tendit in ipsum spes, quae importat quendam | |
| 9125 accessum. Sed secundum quod consideratur cum impossibilitate | |
| 9126 obtinendi, habet rationem repulsivi, quia, ut dicitur in III | |
| 9127 Ethic., <i>cum ventum fuerit ad aliquid impossibile, tunc homines | |
| 9128 discedunt</i>. Et sic respicit hoc obiectum desperatio. Unde | |
| 9129 importat motum cuiusdam recessus. Et propter hoc, contrariatur spei | |
| 9130 sicut recessus accessui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p7"> | |
| 9131 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the irascible | |
| 9132 passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety | |
| 9133 of approach and withdrawal. | |
| 9134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35261] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9135 ergo dicendum quod timor contrariatur spei secundum contrarietatem | |
| 9136 obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali, haec enim contrarietas invenitur | |
| 9137 in passionibus irascibilis, secundum quod derivantur a passionibus | |
| 9138 concupiscibilis. Sed desperatio contrariatur ei solum secundum | |
| 9139 contrarietatem accessus et recessus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p8"> | |
| 9140 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible | |
| 9141 to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good. | |
| 9142 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35262] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9143 dicendum quod desperatio non respicit malum sub ratione mali, sed | |
| 9144 per accidens quandoque respicit malum, inquantum facit | |
| 9145 impossibilitatem adipiscendi. Potest autem esse desperatio ex solo | |
| 9146 superexcessu boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A4-p9"> | |
| 9147 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed impossible | |
| 9148 to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire | |
| 9149 to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is the object of desire. | |
| 9150 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35263] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9151 dicendum quod desperatio non importat solam privationem spei; sed | |
| 9152 importat quendam recessum a re desiderata, propter aestimatam | |
| 9153 impossibilitatem adipiscendi. Unde desperatio praesupponit | |
| 9154 desiderium, sicut et spes, de eo enim quod sub desiderio nostro non | |
| 9155 cadit, neque spem neque desperationem habemus. Et propter hoc | |
| 9156 etiam, utrumque eorum est de bono, quod sub desiderio cadit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A5-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 5. Whether experience is a cause of hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p2"> | |
| 9157 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher | |
| 9158 says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs experience and time." But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the | |
| 9159 appetite, as stated above | |
| 9160 <a href="#FS_Q40_A2" id="FS_Q40_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope. | |
| 9161 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35264] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 9162 sic proceditur. Videtur quod experientia non sit causa spei. | |
| 9163 Experientia enim ad vim cognitivam pertinet, unde philosophus | |
| 9164 dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus intellectualis indiget | |
| 9165 experimento et tempore</i>. Spes autem non est in vi cognitiva, sed | |
| 9166 in appetitiva, ut dictum est. Ergo experientia non est causa | |
| 9167 spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p3"> | |
| 9168 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old are slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems | |
| 9169 to follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive of opposites. Therefore experience is | |
| 9170 not a cause of hope. | |
| 9171 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35265] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9172 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>senes sunt difficilis | |
| 9173 spei, propter experientiam</i>, ex quo videtur quod experientia sit | |
| 9174 causa defectus spei. Sed non est idem causa oppositorum. Ergo | |
| 9175 experientia non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p4"> | |
| 9176 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to have something to say about everything, without leaving anything | |
| 9177 out, is sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to point to great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. | |
| 9178 Therefore inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope. | |
| 9179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35266] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9180 philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod <i>de omnibus enuntiare | |
| 9181 aliquid, et nihil praetermittere, quandoque est signum | |
| 9182 stultitiae</i>. Sed quod homo tentet omnia, ad magnitudinem spei | |
| 9183 pertinere videtur, stultitia autem provenit ex inexperientia. Ergo | |
| 9184 inexperientia videtur esse magis causa spei quam experientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p5"> | |
| 9185 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which | |
| 9186 seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope. | |
| 9187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35267] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9188 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>aliqui sunt | |
| 9189 bonae spei, propter multoties et multos vicisse</i>, quod ad | |
| 9190 experientiam pertinet. Ergo experientia est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q40_A5-p6"> | |
| 9191 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 9192 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either | |
| 9193 because it makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is caused | |
| 9194 by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man | |
| 9195 acquires the faculty of doing something | |
| 9196 easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do that which he is sure | |
| 9197 of having learned well." | |
| 9198 </p><p id="FS_Q40_A5-p7"> In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching | |
| 9199 and persuasion may be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far as it makes him reckon something | |
| 9200 possible, which before his experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope: | |
| 9201 because just as it makes a man think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely, | |
| 9202 experience makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope | |
| 9203 in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope. | |
| 9204 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 co."><a name="35268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35268] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9205 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, spei obiectum est bonum | |
| 9206 futurum arduum possibile adipisci. Potest ergo aliquid esse causa | |
| 9207 spei, vel quia facit homini aliquid esse possibile, vel quia facit | |
| 9208 eum existimare aliquid esse possibile. Primo modo est causa spei | |
| 9209 omne illud quod auget potestatem hominis, sicut divitiae, | |
| 9210 fortitudo, et, inter cetera, etiam experientia, nam per | |
| 9211 experientiam homo acquirit facultatem aliquid de facili faciendi, | |
| 9212 et ex hoc sequitur spes. Unde Vegetius dicit, in libro de re | |
| 9213 militari, <i>nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse | |
| 9214 confidit</i>. Alio modo est causa spei omne illud quod facit alicui | |
| 9215 existimationem quod aliquid sit sibi possibile. Et hoc modo et | |
| 9216 doctrina, et persuasio quaelibet potest esse causa spei. Et sic | |
| 9217 etiam experientia est causa spei, inquantum scilicet per | |
| 9218 experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sit sibi | |
| 9219 possibile, quod impossibile ante experientiam reputabat. Sed per | |
| 9220 hunc modum experientia potest etiam esse causa defectus spei. Quia | |
| 9221 sicut per experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid sibi sit | |
| 9222 possibile, quod reputabat impossibile; ita e converso per | |
| 9223 experientiam fit homini existimatio quod aliquid non sit sibi | |
| 9224 possibile, quod possibile existimabat. Sic ergo experientia est | |
| 9225 causa spei duobus modis, causa autem defectus spei, uno modo. Et | |
| 9226 propter hoc, magis dicere possumus eam esse causam spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p8"> | |
| 9227 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom, | |
| 9228 which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it | |
| 9229 shows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope. | |
| 9230 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35269] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9231 ergo dicendum quod experientia in operabilibus non solum causat | |
| 9232 scientiam; sed etiam causat quendam habitum, propter consuetudinem, | |
| 9233 qui facit operationem faciliorem. Sed et ipsa virtus intellectualis | |
| 9234 facit ad potestatem facile operandi, demonstrat enim aliquid esse | |
| 9235 possibile. Et sic causat spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p9"> | |
| 9236 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence | |
| 9237 he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them." | |
| 9238 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35270] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9239 dicendum quod in senibus est defectus spei propter experientiam, | |
| 9240 inquantum experientia facit existimationem impossibilis. Unde | |
| 9241 ibidem subditur quod eis multa evenerunt in deterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A5-p10"> | |
| 9242 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to | |
| 9243 judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes | |
| 9244 lack of hope. | |
| 9245 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35271] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9246 dicendum quod stultitia et inexperientia possunt esse causa spei | |
| 9247 quasi per accidens, removendo scilicet scientiam per quam vere | |
| 9248 existimatur aliquid esse non possibile. Unde ea ratione | |
| 9249 inexperientia est causa spei, qua experientia est causa defectus | |
| 9250 spei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A6-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 6. Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p2"> | |
| 9251 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so | |
| 9252 that it is compared to an anchor ( | |
| 9253 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.19" target="asv">Heb. 6:19</a>). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness | |
| 9254 are not causes of hope. | |
| 9255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35272] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 9256 sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuventus et ebrietas non sint causa | |
| 9257 spei. Spes enim importat quandam certitudinem et firmitatem, unde | |
| 9258 ad Heb. VI, spes comparatur ancorae. Sed iuvenes et ebrii deficiunt | |
| 9259 a firmitate, habent enim animum de facili mutabilem. Ergo iuventus | |
| 9260 et ebrietas non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p3"> | |
| 9261 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above | |
| 9262 <a href="#FS_Q40_A5" id="FS_Q40_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore | |
| 9263 they are not causes of hope. | |
| 9264 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35273] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9265 ea quae augent potestatem, maxime sunt causa spei, ut supra dictum | |
| 9266 est. Sed iuventus et ebrietas quandam infirmitatem habent | |
| 9267 adiunctam. Ergo non sunt causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p4"> | |
| 9268 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above | |
| 9269 <a href="#FS_Q40_A5" id="FS_Q40_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope. | |
| 9270 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35274] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9271 experientia est causa spei, ut dictum est. Sed iuvenibus | |
| 9272 experientia deficit. Ergo iuventus non est causa spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p5"> | |
| 9273 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope." | |
| 9274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35275] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9275 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>inebriati sunt | |
| 9276 bene sperantes</i>. Et in II Rhetoric. dicitur quod <i>iuvenes sunt | |
| 9277 bonae spei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p6"> | |
| 9278 <b>I answer that,</b> Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered | |
| 9279 from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated | |
| 9280 above | |
| 9281 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q40_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope | |
| 9282 of the future, it has little to remember and | |
| 9283 lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: | |
| 9284 and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. | |
| 9285 Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible | |
| 9286 to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing | |
| 9287 possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink---viz. heat and high spirits, | |
| 9288 on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons | |
| 9289 attempt everything and are full of hope. | |
| 9290 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 co."><a name="35276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35276] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9291 dicendum quod iuventus est causa spei propter tria, ut philosophus | |
| 9292 dicit in II Rhetoric. Et haec tria possunt accipi secundum tres | |
| 9293 conditiones boni quod est obiectum spei, quod est futurum, et | |
| 9294 arduum, et possibile, ut dictum est. Iuvenes enim multum habent de | |
| 9295 futuro, et parum de praeterito. Et ideo, quia memoria est | |
| 9296 praeteriti, spes autem futuri; parum habent de memoria, sed multum | |
| 9297 vivunt in spe. Iuvenes etiam, propter caliditatem naturae, habent | |
| 9298 multos spiritus, et ita in eis cor ampliatur. Ex amplitudine autem | |
| 9299 cordis est quod aliquis ad ardua tendat. Et ideo iuvenes sunt | |
| 9300 animosi et bonae spei. Similiter etiam illi qui non sunt passi | |
| 9301 repulsam, nec experti impedimenta in suis conatibus, de facili | |
| 9302 reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Unde et iuvenes, propter | |
| 9303 inexperientiam impedimentorum et defectuum, de facili reputant | |
| 9304 aliquid sibi possibile. Et ideo sunt bonae spei. Duo etiam istorum | |
| 9305 sunt in ebriis, scilicet caliditas et multiplicatio spirituum, | |
| 9306 propter vinum; et iterum inconsideratio periculorum vel defectuum. | |
| 9307 Et propter eandem rationem etiam omnes stulti, et deliberatione non | |
| 9308 utentes, omnia tentant, et sunt bonae spei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p7"> | |
| 9309 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think | |
| 9310 that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for. | |
| 9311 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35277] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9312 ergo dicendum quod in iuvenibus et in ebriis licet non sit firmitas | |
| 9313 secundum rei veritatem, est tamen in eis secundum eorum | |
| 9314 aestimationem, reputant enim se firmiter assecuturos illud quod | |
| 9315 sperant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p8"> In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady | |
| 9316 in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings. | |
| 9317 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35278] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter | |
| 9318 dicendum ad secundum, quod iuvenes et ebrii habent quidem | |
| 9319 infirmitatem secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum eorum | |
| 9320 existimationem, habent potestatem; quia suos defectus non | |
| 9321 cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A6-p9"> | |
| 9322 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3). | |
| 9323 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35279] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9324 dicendum quod non solum experientia, sed etiam inexperientia est | |
| 9325 quodammodo causa spei, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A7-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 7. Whether hope is a cause of love?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p2"> | |
| 9326 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first | |
| 9327 of the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause | |
| 9328 love. | |
| 9329 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35280] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum | |
| 9330 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit causa amoris. Quia | |
| 9331 secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, prima affectionum animae est | |
| 9332 amor. Sed spes est quaedam affectio animae. Amor ergo praecedit | |
| 9333 spem. Non ergo spes causat amorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p3"> | |
| 9334 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above ( | |
| 9335 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q40_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause. | |
| 9336 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35281] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9337 desiderium praecedit spem. Sed desiderium causatur ex amore, ut | |
| 9338 dictum est. Ergo etiam spes sequitur amorem. Non ergo causat | |
| 9339 ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p4"> | |
| 9340 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above ( | |
| 9341 <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[3]</a>). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope. | |
| 9342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35282] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9343 spes causat delectationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed delectatio non | |
| 9344 est nisi de bono amato. Ergo amor praecedit spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p5"> | |
| 9345 <b>On the contrary,</b> The gloss commenting on | |
| 9346 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2, </a> "Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets charity." But charity is love. | |
| 9347 Therefore love is caused by hope. | |
| 9348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35283] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9349 est quod Matth. I, super illud, Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac autem | |
| 9350 genuit Iacob, dicit Glossa, <i>idest, fides spem, spes | |
| 9351 caritatem</i>. Caritas autem est amor. Ergo amor causatur a | |
| 9352 spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p6"> | |
| 9353 <b>I answer that,</b> Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is | |
| 9354 something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, | |
| 9355 not through ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us. | |
| 9356 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 co."><a name="35284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35284] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9357 dicendum quod spes duo respicere potest. Respicit enim sicut | |
| 9358 obiectum, bonum speratum. Sed quia bonum speratum est arduum | |
| 9359 possibile; aliquando autem fit aliquod arduum possibile nobis, non | |
| 9360 per nos, sed per alios; ideo spes etiam respicit illud per quod fit | |
| 9361 nobis aliquid possibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p7"> In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which | |
| 9362 we desire and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, | |
| 9363 and not vice versa. Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards | |
| 9364 him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope | |
| 9365 in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by | |
| 9366 another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him. | |
| 9367 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum | |
| 9368 speratum, spes ex amore causatur, non enim est spes nisi de bono | |
| 9369 desiderato et amato. Inquantum vero spes respicit illum per quem | |
| 9370 fit aliquid nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e | |
| 9371 converso. Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse | |
| 9372 provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum, et sic | |
| 9373 incipimus ipsum amare. Ex hoc autem quod amamus aliquem, non | |
| 9374 speramus de eo, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet credimus nos | |
| 9375 redamari ab ipso. Unde amari ab aliquo facit nos sperare de eo, sed | |
| 9376 amor eius causatur ex spe quam de eo habemus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A7-p8"> Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 7 ad arg."><a name="35285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35285] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 7 ad arg.</span></a> Et per | |
| 9377 haec patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q40_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q40_A8-p0.1">Q. 40. A. 8. Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p2"> | |
| 9378 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence | |
| 9379 which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action. | |
| 9380 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35286] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum | |
| 9381 sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non adiuvet operationem, sed | |
| 9382 magis impediat. Ad spem enim securitas pertinet. Sed securitas | |
| 9383 parit negligentiam, quae impedit operationem. Ergo spes impedit | |
| 9384 operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3"> | |
| 9385 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above ( | |
| 9386 <a href="#FS_Q37_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[37], A[3]</a>). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written ( | |
| 9387 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv">Prov. 13:12</a>): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action. | |
| 9388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35287] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9389 tristitia impedit operationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed spes | |
| 9390 quandoque causat tristitiam, dicitur enim Prov. XIII, <i>spes quae | |
| 9391 differtur, affligit animam</i>. Ergo spes impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4"> | |
| 9392 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above | |
| 9393 <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written ( | |
| 9394 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.2.26" target="asv">2 Kings 2:26</a>), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action. | |
| 9395 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35288] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9396 desperatio contrariatur spei, ut dictum est. Sed desperatio, maxime | |
| 9397 in rebus bellicis, adiuvat operationem, dicitur enim II Reg. II, | |
| 9398 quod <i>periculosa res est desperatio</i>. Ergo spes facit | |
| 9399 contrarium effectum, impediendo scilicet operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p5"> | |
| 9400 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 9401 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:10</a>) that "he that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to all other actions. | |
| 9402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35289] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9403 est quod dicitur I ad Cor. IX, quod <i>qui arat, debet arare in spe | |
| 9404 fructus percipiendi</i>. Et eadem ratio est in omnibus aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6"> | |
| 9405 <b>I answer that,</b> Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its | |
| 9406 object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought | |
| 9407 that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, | |
| 9408 on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above ( | |
| 9409 <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[32], | |
| 9410 A[3] | |
| 9411 </a>), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above ( | |
| 9412 <a href="#FS_Q33_A4" id="FS_Q40_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[33], A[4]</a>). Therefore hope is conducive to action. | |
| 9413 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 co."><a name="35290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35290] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9414 dicendum quod spes per se habet quod adiuvet operationem, | |
| 9415 intendendo ipsam. Et hoc ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex ratione sui | |
| 9416 obiecti, quod est bonum arduum possibile. Existimatio enim ardui | |
| 9417 excitat attentionem, existimatio vero possibilis non retardat | |
| 9418 conatum. Unde sequitur quod homo intente operetur propter spem. | |
| 9419 Secundo vero, ex ratione sui effectus. Spes enim, ut supra dictum | |
| 9420 est, causat delectationem, quae adiuvat operationem, ut supra | |
| 9421 dictum est. Unde spes operationem adiuvat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p7"> | |
| 9422 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear | |
| 9423 rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: | |
| 9424 whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon | |
| 9425 as difficult. | |
| 9426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35291] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9427 ergo dicendum quod spes respicit bonum consequendum, securitas | |
| 9428 autem respicit malum vitandum. Unde securitas magis videtur opponi | |
| 9429 timori, quam ad spem pertinere. Et tamen securitas non causat | |
| 9430 negligentiam, nisi inquantum diminuit existimationem ardui, in quo | |
| 9431 etiam diminuitur ratio spei. Illa enim in quibus homo nullum | |
| 9432 impedimentum timet, quasi iam non reputantur ardua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p8"> | |
| 9433 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above ( | |
| 9434 <a href="#FS_Q32_A3" id="FS_Q40_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[3]</a>, ad 2). | |
| 9435 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35292] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9436 dicendum quod spes per se causat delectationem, sed per accidens | |
| 9437 est ut causet tristitiam, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q40_A8-p9"> | |
| 9438 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive | |
| 9439 less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove | |
| 9440 dangerous to the foe. | |
| 9441 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 40 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35293] Iª-IIae q. 40 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9442 dicendum quod desperatio in bello fit periculosa, propter aliquam | |
| 9443 spem adiunctam. Illi enim qui desperant de fuga, debilitantur in | |
| 9444 fugiendo, sed sperant mortem suam vindicare. Et ideo ex hac spe | |
| 9445 acrius pugnant, unde periculosi hostibus fiunt.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 9446 <div id="FS_Q41" class="div3"> | |
| 9447 <h3 id="FS_Q41-p0.1">Q. 41. OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 9448 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 9449 <p id="FS_Q41-p2"> We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: | |
| 9450 (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: | |
| 9451 </p><p id="FS_Q41-p3"><a href="#FS_Q41_A1"> (1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p4"><a href="#FS_Q41_A2"> (2) Whether fear is a special passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p5"><a href="#FS_Q41_A3"> (3) Whether there is a natural fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q41-p6"><a href="#FS_Q41_A4"> (4) Of the species of fear.</a></p> | |
| 9452 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 pr."><a name="35294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35294] | |
| 9453 Iª-IIae q. 41 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est, | |
| 9454 primo, de timore; et secundo, de audacia. Circa timorem | |
| 9455 consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ipso timore; secundo, de | |
| 9456 obiecto eius; tertio, de causa ipsius; quarto, de effectu. Circa | |
| 9457 primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum timor sit passio animae. | |
| 9458 Secundo, utrum sit specialis passio. Tertio, utrum sit aliquis | |
| 9459 timor naturalis. Quarto, de speciebus timoris.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 9460 <div id="FS_Q41_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A1-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 1. Whether fear is a passion of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p2"> | |
| 9461 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by | |
| 9462 way of {systole}"---i.e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature." But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. | |
| 9463 ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion. | |
| 9464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35295] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9465 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit passio animae. Dicit | |
| 9466 enim Damascenus, in libro III, quod timor est virtus secundum | |
| 9467 systolen idest contractionem, essentiae desiderativa. Sed nulla | |
| 9468 virtus est passio, ut probatur in II Ethic. Ergo timor non est | |
| 9469 passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p3"> | |
| 9470 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something | |
| 9471 future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion. | |
| 9472 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35296] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9473 omnis passio est effectus ex praesentia agentis proveniens. Sed | |
| 9474 timor non est de aliquo praesenti, sed de futuro, ut Damascenus | |
| 9475 dicit in II libro. Ergo timor non est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p4"> | |
| 9476 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. | |
| 9477 But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion | |
| 9478 of the soul. | |
| 9479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35297] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9480 omnis passio animae est motus appetitus sensitivi, qui sequitur | |
| 9481 apprehensionem sensus. Sensus autem non est apprehensivus futuri, | |
| 9482 sed praesentis. Cum ergo timor sit de malo futuro, videtur quod non | |
| 9483 sit passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p5"> | |
| 9484 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul. | |
| 9485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35298] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9486 est quod Augustinus, in XIV de Civ. Dei, enumerat timorem inter | |
| 9487 alias animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p6"> | |
| 9488 <b>I answer that,</b> Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above | |
| 9489 (Q[22] ), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power---i.e. of a power whose object is compared | |
| 9490 to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are | |
| 9491 passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive | |
| 9492 power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied | |
| 9493 by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration. | |
| 9494 Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil. | |
| 9495 Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation---i.e. contraction---as | |
| 9496 Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore | |
| 9497 it has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards | |
| 9498 future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil. | |
| 9499 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 co."><a name="35299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35299] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9500 dicendum quod, inter ceteros animae motus, post tristitiam, timor | |
| 9501 magis rationem obtinet passionis. Ut enim supra dictum est, ad | |
| 9502 rationem passionis primo quidem pertinet quod sit motus passivae | |
| 9503 virtutis, ad quam scilicet comparetur suum obiectum per modum | |
| 9504 activi moventis, eo quod passio est effectus agentis. Et per hunc | |
| 9505 modum, etiam sentire et intelligere dicuntur pati. Secundo, magis | |
| 9506 proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivae virtutis. Et adhuc magis | |
| 9507 proprie, motus appetitivae virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui | |
| 9508 fit cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et adhuc propriissime illi | |
| 9509 motus passiones dicuntur, qui important aliquod nocumentum. | |
| 9510 Manifestum est autem quod timor, cum sit de malo, ad appetitivam | |
| 9511 potentiam pertinet, quae per se respicit bonum et malum. Pertinet | |
| 9512 autem ad appetitum sensitivum, fit enim cum quadam transmutatione, | |
| 9513 scilicet cum contractione, ut Damascenus dicit. Et importat etiam | |
| 9514 habitudinem ad malum, secundum quod malum habet quodammodo | |
| 9515 victoriam super aliquod bonum. Unde verissime sibi competit ratio | |
| 9516 passionis. Tamen post tristitiam, quae est de malo praesenti, nam | |
| 9517 timor est de malo futuro, quod non ita movet sicut praesens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p7"> | |
| 9518 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles | |
| 9519 of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit. | |
| 9520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35300] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9521 ergo dicendum quod virtus nominat quoddam principium actionis, et | |
| 9522 ideo, inquantum interiores motus appetitivae virtutis sunt | |
| 9523 principia exteriorum actuum, dicuntur virtutes. Philosophus autem | |
| 9524 negat passionem esse virtutem quae est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p8"> | |
| 9525 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the | |
| 9526 agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which | |
| 9527 is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul. | |
| 9528 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35301] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9529 dicendum quod, sicut passio corporis naturalis provenit ex | |
| 9530 corporali praesentia agentis, ita passio animae provenit ex animali | |
| 9531 praesentia agentis, absque praesentia corporali vel reali, | |
| 9532 inquantum scilicet malum quod est futurum realiter, est praesens | |
| 9533 secundum apprehensionem animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A1-p9"> | |
| 9534 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope | |
| 9535 for a future good, or to fear a future evil. | |
| 9536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35302] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9537 dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit futurum, sed ex eo quod | |
| 9538 apprehendit praesens, animal naturali instinctu movetur ad | |
| 9539 sperandum futurum bonum, vel timendum futurum malum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A2-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 2. Whether fear is a special passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p2"> | |
| 9540 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught | |
| 9541 by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i.e. sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of empty | |
| 9542 joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special | |
| 9543 but a general passion. | |
| 9544 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35303] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9545 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit specialis passio. Dicit | |
| 9546 enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>quem non | |
| 9547 exanimat metus, nec cupiditas eum vastat, nec aegritudo</i>, idest | |
| 9548 tristitia, <i>macerat, nec ventilat gestiens et vana laetitia</i>. | |
| 9549 Ex quo videtur quod, remoto timore, omnes aliae passiones | |
| 9550 removentur. Non ergo passio est specialis, sed generalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p3"> | |
| 9551 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial | |
| 9552 are in the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to | |
| 9553 many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. | |
| 9554 Therefore it is not a special passion. | |
| 9555 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35304] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9556 philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>ita se habet in appetitu | |
| 9557 prosecutio et fuga, sicut in intellectu affirmatio et negatio</i>. | |
| 9558 Sed negatio non est aliquid speciale in intellectu, sicut nec | |
| 9559 affirmatio, sed aliquid commune ad multa. Ergo nec fuga in | |
| 9560 appetitu. Sed nihil est aliud timor quam fuga quaedam mali. Ergo | |
| 9561 timor non est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p4"> | |
| 9562 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: | |
| 9563 since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that | |
| 9564 fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( | |
| 9565 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q41_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different | |
| 9566 powers. | |
| 9567 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35305] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9568 si timor esset passio specialis, praecipue in irascibili esset. Est | |
| 9569 autem timor etiam in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II | |
| 9570 Rhetoric., quod timor est tristitia quaedam, et Damascenus dicit | |
| 9571 quod timor est virtus desiderativa, tristitia autem et desiderium | |
| 9572 sunt in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Non est ergo passio | |
| 9573 specialis, cum pertineat ad diversas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p5"> | |
| 9574 <b>On the contrary,</b> Fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15). | |
| 9575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35306] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9576 est quod condividitur aliis passionibus animae; ut patet per | |
| 9577 Damascenum, in II libro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p6"> | |
| 9578 <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object. | |
| 9579 Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; | |
| 9580 so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul. | |
| 9581 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 co."><a name="35307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35307] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9582 dicendum quod passiones animae recipiunt speciem ex obiectis. Unde | |
| 9583 specialis passio est quae habet speciale obiectum. Timor autem | |
| 9584 habet speciale obiectum, sicut et spes. Sicut enim obiectum spei | |
| 9585 est bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci; ita obiectum timoris | |
| 9586 est malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest. Unde timor est | |
| 9587 specialis passio animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p7"> | |
| 9588 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of | |
| 9589 this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general | |
| 9590 passion. | |
| 9591 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35308] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9592 ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones animae derivantur ex uno | |
| 9593 principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem. | |
| 9594 Et ratione huius connexionis, remoto timore, removentur aliae | |
| 9595 passiones animae, non ideo quia sit passio generalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p8"> | |
| 9596 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be | |
| 9597 something common, yet fear is a special passion. | |
| 9598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35309] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9599 dicendum quod non omnis fuga appetitus est timor, sed fuga ab | |
| 9600 aliquo speciali obiecto, ut dictum est. Et ideo, licet fuga sit | |
| 9601 quoddam generale, tamen timor est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9"> | |
| 9602 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost | |
| 9603 unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, | |
| 9604 as stated above ( | |
| 9605 <a href="#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object | |
| 9606 of fear causes sorrow when | |
| 9607 present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is | |
| 9608 either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the | |
| 9609 desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident | |
| 9610 from what has been said above ( | |
| 9611 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>; | |
| 9612 <a href="#FS_Q29_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.3" shape="rect"> Q[29], A[2]</a>; | |
| 9613 <a href="#FS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.4" shape="rect"> | |
| 9614 Q[36], A[2] | |
| 9615 </a>). | |
| 9616 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35310] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9617 dicendum quod timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim | |
| 9618 respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, | |
| 9619 ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur | |
| 9620 a passionibus concupiscibilis et ad eas terminantur, ut supra | |
| 9621 dictum est; ideo timori attribuuntur ea quae sunt concupiscibilis. | |
| 9622 Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum obiectum, timoris est | |
| 9623 contristans, si praesens fuerit, unde et philosophus dicit ibidem | |
| 9624 quod timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel | |
| 9625 contristativi. Similiter et desiderium attribuitur a Damasceno | |
| 9626 timori, quia, sicut spes oritur a desiderio boni ita timor ex fuga | |
| 9627 mali; fuga autem mali oritur ex desiderio boni, ut ex supra dictis | |
| 9628 patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A3-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 3. Whether there is a natural fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p2"> | |
| 9629 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through | |
| 9630 the soul refusing to be severed from the body." | |
| 9631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35311] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9632 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor aliquis sit naturalis. Dicit | |
| 9633 enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod <i>est quidam timor naturalis, | |
| 9634 nolente anima dividi a corpore</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p3"> | |
| 9635 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). | |
| 9636 Therefore there is also a natural fear. | |
| 9637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35312] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9638 timor ex amore oritur, ut dictum est. Sed est aliquis amor | |
| 9639 naturalis, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo etiam est | |
| 9640 aliquis timor naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4"> | |
| 9641 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above ( | |
| 9642 <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[4]</a>, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from | |
| 9643 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.18" target="asv"> Rom. 4:18, </a> where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear | |
| 9644 of nature. | |
| 9645 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35313] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9646 timor opponitur spei, ut supra dictum est. Sed est aliqua spes | |
| 9647 naturae, ut patet per id quod dicitur Rom. IV, de Abraham, quod | |
| 9648 contra spem naturae, in spem gratiae credidit. Ergo etiam est | |
| 9649 aliquis timor naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p5"> | |
| 9650 <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is | |
| 9651 no natural fear. | |
| 9652 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35314] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 9653 ea quae sunt naturalia, communiter inveniuntur in rebus animatis et | |
| 9654 inanimatis. Sed timor non invenitur in rebus inanimatis. Ergo timor | |
| 9655 non est naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p6"> | |
| 9656 <b>I answer that,</b> A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely | |
| 9657 accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, | |
| 9658 and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines | |
| 9659 thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated | |
| 9660 above ( | |
| 9661 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[1]</a>), the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, | |
| 9662 even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the | |
| 9663 animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural. | |
| 9664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 co."><a name="35315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35315] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9665 dicendum quod aliquis motus dicitur naturalis, quia ad ipsum | |
| 9666 inclinat natura. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quod totum | |
| 9667 perficitur a natura, absque aliqua operatione apprehensivae | |
| 9668 virtutis, sicut moveri sursum est motus naturalis ignis, et augeri | |
| 9669 est motus naturalis animalium et plantarum. Alio modo dicitur motus | |
| 9670 naturalis, ad quem natura inclinat, licet non perficiatur nisi per | |
| 9671 apprehensionem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, motus cognitivae et | |
| 9672 appetitivae virtutis reducuntur in naturam, sicut in principium | |
| 9673 primum. Et per hunc modum, etiam ipsi actus apprehensivae virtutis, | |
| 9674 ut intelligere, sentire et memorari, et etiam motus appetitus | |
| 9675 animalis, quandoque dicuntur naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7"> And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the | |
| 9676 diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks | |
| 9677 from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," | |
| 9678 which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In | |
| 9679 this sense we have stated above ( | |
| 9680 <a href="#FS_Q26_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[26], A[1]</a>; | |
| 9681 <a href="#FS_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[30], A[3]</a>; | |
| 9682 <a href="#FS_Q31_A7" id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.3" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[7]</a>) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural. | |
| 9683 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Et per hunc modum potest | |
| 9684 dici timor naturalis. Et distinguitur a timore non naturali, | |
| 9685 secundum diversitatem obiecti. Est enim, ut philosophus dicit in II | |
| 9686 Rhetoric., timor de malo corruptivo, quod natura refugit propter | |
| 9687 naturale desiderium essendi, et talis timor dicitur naturalis. Est | |
| 9688 iterum de malo contristativo, quod non repugnat naturae, sed | |
| 9689 desiderio appetitus, et talis timor non est naturalis. Sicut etiam | |
| 9690 supra amor, concupiscentia et delectatio distincta sunt per | |
| 9691 naturale et non naturale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8"> But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be | |
| 9692 natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred, | |
| 9693 desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to | |
| 9694 be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire | |
| 9695 and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain | |
| 9696 movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge | |
| 9697 is essential to these passions (thus we have said | |
| 9698 <a href="#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">, Q[31], AA[1]</a>,3; | |
| 9699 <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q41_A3-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be | |
| 9700 said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural | |
| 9701 inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary | |
| 9702 evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate | |
| 9703 beings. | |
| 9704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed secundum primam acceptionem | |
| 9705 naturalis, sciendum est quod quaedam de passionibus animae | |
| 9706 quandoque dicuntur naturales, ut amor, desiderium et spes, aliae | |
| 9707 vero naturales dici non possunt. Et hoc ideo, quia amor et odium, | |
| 9708 desiderium et fuga, important inclinationem quandam ad prosequendum | |
| 9709 bonum et fugiendum malum; quae quidem inclinatio pertinet etiam ad | |
| 9710 appetitum naturalem. Et ideo est amor quidam naturalis, et | |
| 9711 desiderium vel spes potest quodammodo dici etiam in rebus | |
| 9712 naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Sed aliae passiones animae | |
| 9713 important quosdam motus ad quos nullo modo sufficit inclinatio | |
| 9714 naturalis. Vel quia de ratione harum passionum est sensus seu | |
| 9715 cognitio, sicut dictum est quod apprehensio requiritur ad rationem | |
| 9716 delectationis et doloris, unde quae carent cognitione, non possunt | |
| 9717 dici delectari vel dolere. Aut quia huiusmodi motus sunt contra | |
| 9718 rationem inclinationis naturalis, puta quod desperatio refugit | |
| 9719 bonum propter aliquam difficultatem; et timor refugit impugnationem | |
| 9720 mali contrarii, ad quod est inclinatio naturalis. Et ideo huiusmodi | |
| 9721 passiones nullo modo attribuuntur rebus inanimatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A3-p9"><b>Reply to the Objections</b> are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35316] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 9722 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q41_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q41_A4-p0.1">Q. 41. A. 4. Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p2"> | |
| 9723 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, | |
| 9724 shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore | |
| 9725 the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above ( | |
| 9726 <a href="#FS_Q35_A8" id="FS_Q41_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Therefore there should only be four | |
| 9727 species of fear corresponding to them. | |
| 9728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35317] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 9729 sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Damascenus assignet sex | |
| 9730 species timoris, scilicet <i>segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, | |
| 9731 admirationem, stuporem, agoniam</i>. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in | |
| 9732 II Rhetoric., <i>timor est de malo contristativo</i>. Ergo species | |
| 9733 timoris debent respondere speciebus tristitiae. Sunt autem quatuor | |
| 9734 species tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo solum debent esse | |
| 9735 quatuor species timoris, eis correspondentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p3"> | |
| 9736 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, | |
| 9737 as stated above | |
| 9738 <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q41_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear. | |
| 9739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35318] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9740 illud quod in actu nostro consistit, nostrae potestati subiicitur. | |
| 9741 Sed timor est de malo quod excedit potestatem nostram, ut dictum | |
| 9742 est. Non ergo segnities et erubescentia et verecundia, quae | |
| 9743 respiciunt operationem nostram, debent poni species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p4"> | |
| 9744 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is of the future, as stated above ( | |
| 9745 <a href="#FS_Q41_A1" id="FS_Q41_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>, 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore | |
| 9746 shame is not a species of fear. | |
| 9747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35319] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9748 timor est de futuro, ut dictum est. Sed verecundia est de turpi | |
| 9749 actu iam commisso, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Ergo verecundia non | |
| 9750 est species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p5"> | |
| 9751 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore | |
| 9752 amazement and stupor are not species of fear. | |
| 9753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35320] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9754 timor non est nisi de malo. Sed admiratio et stupor sunt de magno | |
| 9755 et insolito, sive bono sive malo. Ergo admiratio et stupor non sunt | |
| 9756 species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p6"> | |
| 9757 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads | |
| 9758 to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear. | |
| 9759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="35321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35321] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9760 philosophi ex admiratione sunt moti ad inquirendum veritatem, ut | |
| 9761 dicitur in principio Metaphys. Timor autem non movet ad | |
| 9762 inquirendum, sed magis ad fugiendum. Ergo admiratio non est species | |
| 9763 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p7"><b>On the contrary,</b> suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35322] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in | |
| 9764 contrarium sufficiat auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q41_A4-p8"> | |
| 9765 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 9766 <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q41_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like | |
| 9767 his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, | |
| 9768 there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much | |
| 9769 toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which | |
| 9770 damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; | |
| 9771 if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame." | |
| 9772 </p><p id="FS_Q41_A4-p9"> On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First | |
| 9773 by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: | |
| 9774 and then there is "amazement." Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before | |
| 9775 us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the | |
| 9776 representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and | |
| 9777 fear of this kind is called "anxiety." | |
| 9778 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 co."><a name="35323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35323] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9779 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod | |
| 9780 excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. | |
| 9781 Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in | |
| 9782 operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus. In operatione autem | |
| 9783 ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor | |
| 9784 gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis | |
| 9785 refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris. Secundo, | |
| 9786 turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu | |
| 9787 committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est | |
| 9788 verecundia. Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, | |
| 9789 triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. | |
| 9790 Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis, cum scilicet aliquis | |
| 9791 considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non | |
| 9792 sufficit. Et sic est admiratio. Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis, | |
| 9793 quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi | |
| 9794 offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est | |
| 9795 stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione. Tertio modo, ratione | |
| 9796 improvisionis, quia scilicet provideri non potest, sicut futura | |
| 9797 infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p10"> | |
| 9798 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and | |
| 9799 for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of | |
| 9800 fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself. | |
| 9801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35324] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9802 ergo dicendum quod illae species tristitiae quae supra positae | |
| 9803 sunt, non accipiuntur secundum diversitatem obiecti, sed secundum | |
| 9804 effectus, et secundum quasdam speciales rationes. Et ideo non | |
| 9805 oportet quod illae species tristitiae respondeant istis speciebus | |
| 9806 timoris, quae accipiuntur secundum divisionem propriam obiecti | |
| 9807 ipsius timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p11"> | |
| 9808 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something | |
| 9809 connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this | |
| 9810 sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear. | |
| 9811 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35325] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9812 dicendum quod operatio secundum quod iam fit, subditur potestati | |
| 9813 operantis. Sed aliquid circa operationem considerari potest | |
| 9814 facultatem operantis excedens, propter quod aliquis refugit | |
| 9815 actionem. Et secundum hoc, segnities, erubescentia et verecundia | |
| 9816 ponuntur species timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p12"> | |
| 9817 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear. | |
| 9818 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35326] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9819 dicendum quod de actu praeterito potest timeri convitium vel | |
| 9820 opprobrium futurum. Et secundum hoc, verecundia est species | |
| 9821 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p13"> | |
| 9822 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which | |
| 9823 arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement | |
| 9824 and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and | |
| 9825 stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to | |
| 9826 external work. | |
| 9827 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35327] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 9828 dicendum quod non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species | |
| 9829 timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de | |
| 9830 malo insolito. Vel potest dici quod, sicut segnities refugit | |
| 9831 laborem exterioris operationis, ita admiratio et stupor refugiunt | |
| 9832 difficultatem considerationis rei magnae et insolitae, sive sit | |
| 9833 bona sive mala, ut hoc modo se habeat admiratio et stupor ad actum | |
| 9834 intellectus, sicut segnities ad exteriorem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q41_A4-p14"> | |
| 9835 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, | |
| 9836 but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore | |
| 9837 amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto. | |
| 9838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 41 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="35328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35328] Iª-IIae q. 41 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 9839 dicendum quod admirans refugit in praesenti dare iudicium de eo | |
| 9840 quod miratur, timens defectum, sed in futurum inquirit. Stupens | |
| 9841 autem timet et in praesenti iudicare, et in futuro inquirere. Unde | |
| 9842 admiratio est principium philosophandi, sed stupor est | |
| 9843 philosophicae considerationis impedimentum.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 9844 <div id="FS_Q42" class="div3"> | |
| 9845 <h3 id="FS_Q42-p0.1">Q. 42. OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 9846 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 9847 <p id="FS_Q42-p2"> We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q42-p3"><a href="#FS_Q42_A1"> (1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p4"><a href="#FS_Q42_A2"> (2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p5"><a href="#FS_Q42_A3"> (3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p6"><a href="#FS_Q42_A4"> (4) Whether fear itself can be feared?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p7"><a href="#FS_Q42_A5"> (5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?</a></p><p id="FS_Q42-p8"><a href="#FS_Q42_A6"> (6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?</a></p> | |
| 9848 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 pr."><a name="35329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35329] | |
| 9849 Iª-IIae q. 42 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 9850 obiecto timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum | |
| 9851 sit obiectum timoris, vel malum. Secundo, utrum malum naturae sit | |
| 9852 obiectum timoris. Tertio, utrum timor sit de malo culpae. Quarto, | |
| 9853 utrum ipse timor timeri possit. Quinto, utrum repentina magis | |
| 9854 timeantur. Sexto, utrum ea contra quae non est remedium, magis | |
| 9855 timeantur.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 9856 <div id="FS_Q42_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A1-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 1. Whether the object of fear is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p2"> | |
| 9857 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what | |
| 9858 we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good | |
| 9859 as its proper object. | |
| 9860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35330] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 9861 sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum sit obiectum timoris. Dicit enim | |
| 9862 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>nihil | |
| 9863 timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non | |
| 9864 adipiscamur speratum</i>. Sed id quod amamus est bonum. Ergo timor | |
| 9865 respicit bonum sicut proprium obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p3"> | |
| 9866 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good | |
| 9867 thing. Therefore good is the object of fear. | |
| 9868 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35331] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9869 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>potestas, et super | |
| 9870 alium ipsum esse, est terribile</i>. Sed huiusmodi est quoddam | |
| 9871 bonum. Ergo bonum est obiectum timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p4"> | |
| 9872 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to fear God, according to | |
| 9873 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.10" target="asv"> Ps. 33:10</a>: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints." Therefore even the good is an object of fear. | |
| 9874 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35332] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9875 in Deo nihil malum esse potest. Sed mandatur nobis ut Deum | |
| 9876 timeamus; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, <i>timete dominum, omnes | |
| 9877 sancti eius</i>. Ergo etiam timor est de bono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p5"> | |
| 9878 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil. | |
| 9879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35333] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9880 est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo | |
| 9881 futuro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p6"> | |
| 9882 <b>I answer that,</b> Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. | |
| 9883 vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies | |
| 9884 pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since | |
| 9885 fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as | |
| 9886 its proper object. | |
| 9887 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p7"> It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil | |
| 9888 causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil | |
| 9889 is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through | |
| 9890 love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we | |
| 9891 love. | |
| 9892 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p8"> In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good | |
| 9893 we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above ( | |
| 9894 <a href="#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q42_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[7]</a>), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired | |
| 9895 good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can | |
| 9896 inflict that evil. In this | |
| 9897 way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power | |
| 9898 of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm. | |
| 9899 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A1-p9"> In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus | |
| 9900 a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others. | |
| 9901 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 co."><a name="35334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35334] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9902 dicendum quod timor est quidam motus appetitivae virtutis. Ad | |
| 9903 virtutem autem appetitivam pertinet prosecutio et fuga, ut dicitur | |
| 9904 in VI Ethic. Est autem prosecutio boni. Fuga autem mali. Unde | |
| 9905 quicumque motus appetitivae virtutis importat prosecutionem, habet | |
| 9906 aliquod bonum pro obiecto, quicumque autem importat fugam, habet | |
| 9907 malum pro obiecto. Unde, cum timor fugam quandam importet, primo et | |
| 9908 per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum. Potest autem | |
| 9909 respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. | |
| 9910 Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per | |
| 9911 malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est | |
| 9912 privativum boni. Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur | |
| 9913 ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et | |
| 9914 secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne | |
| 9915 amittatur bonum amatum. Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut | |
| 9916 causa ipsius, inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest | |
| 9917 inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato. Et ideo, sicut spes, ut | |
| 9918 supra dictum est, ad duo respicit, scilicet ad bonum in quod | |
| 9919 tendit, et ad id per quod sperat se bonum concupitum adipisci; ita | |
| 9920 etiam timor ad duo respicit, scilicet ad malum quod refugit, et ad | |
| 9921 illud bonum quod sua virtute potest infligere malum. Et per hunc | |
| 9922 modum Deus timetur ab homine, inquantum potest infligere poenam, | |
| 9923 vel spiritualem vel corporalem. Per hunc etiam modum timetur | |
| 9924 potestas alicuius hominis, maxime quando est laesa, vel quando est | |
| 9925 iniusta, quia sic in promptu habet nocumentum inferre. Ita etiam | |
| 9926 timetur super alium esse, idest inniti alii, ut scilicet in eius | |
| 9927 potestate sic constitutum nobis nocumentum inferre, sicut ille qui | |
| 9928 est conscius criminis, timetur, ne crimen revelet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to objections</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 1 ad arg."><a name="35335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35335] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 1 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 9929 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A2-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 2. Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p2"> | |
| 9930 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take | |
| 9931 counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature | |
| 9932 is not an object of fear. | |
| 9933 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35336] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9934 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit de malo naturae. Dicit | |
| 9935 enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>timor consiliativos | |
| 9936 facit</i>. Non autem consiliamur de his quae a natura eveniunt, ut | |
| 9937 dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo timor non est de malo naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p3"> | |
| 9938 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object | |
| 9939 of fear, man would needs be always in fear. | |
| 9940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35337] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9941 defectus naturales semper homini imminent, ut mors et alia | |
| 9942 huiusmodi. Si igitur de huiusmodi malis esset timor, oporteret quod | |
| 9943 homo semper esset in timore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p4"> | |
| 9944 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such | |
| 9945 like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and | |
| 9946 yet it seems that it should be. | |
| 9947 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35338] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9948 natura non movet ad contraria. Sed malum naturae provenit ex | |
| 9949 natura. Ergo quod timendo aliquis refugiat huiusmodi malum, non est | |
| 9950 a natura. Timor ergo naturalis non est de malo naturae; ad quem | |
| 9951 tamen hoc malum pertinere videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p5"> | |
| 9952 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature. | |
| 9953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35339] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 9954 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia | |
| 9955 terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p6"> | |
| 9956 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or | |
| 9957 painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary | |
| 9958 to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear. | |
| 9959 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p7"> But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, | |
| 9960 not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and | |
| 9961 other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. | |
| 9962 In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear | |
| 9963 arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the | |
| 9964 future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being | |
| 9965 remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either | |
| 9966 do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very | |
| 9967 far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered | |
| 9968 as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher | |
| 9969 says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of | |
| 9970 a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for | |
| 9971 him." | |
| 9972 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A2-p8"> Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, | |
| 9973 be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared. | |
| 9974 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 co."><a name="35340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35340] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 9975 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor | |
| 9976 provenit <i>ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel | |
| 9977 contristativi</i>. Sicut autem contristativum malum est quod | |
| 9978 contrariatur voluntati; ita corruptivum malum est quod contrariatur | |
| 9979 naturae. Et hoc est malum naturae. Unde de malo naturae potest esse | |
| 9980 timor. Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a | |
| 9981 causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia | |
| 9982 privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut | |
| 9983 mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus. Aliquando vero malum | |
| 9984 naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter | |
| 9985 infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo | |
| 9986 timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex | |
| 9987 phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus; illud quod removet | |
| 9988 futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem. Quod autem non | |
| 9989 appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno | |
| 9990 quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans, hoc enim, propter | |
| 9991 distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel | |
| 9992 parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., <i>quae | |
| 9993 valde longe sunt non timentur, sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur; | |
| 9994 sed quia non prope est, nihil curant</i>. Alio modo aestimatur | |
| 9995 aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter | |
| 9996 necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde | |
| 9997 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>illi qui iam | |
| 9998 decapitantur non timent</i>, videntes sibi necessitatem mortis | |
| 9999 imminere; sed <i>ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam | |
| 10000 spem salutis</i>. Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non | |
| 10001 apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est | |
| 10002 corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe | |
| 10003 evasionis, tunc timebitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p9"> | |
| 10004 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although | |
| 10005 it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about | |
| 10006 avoiding it. | |
| 10007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35341] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10008 ergo dicendum quod malum naturae quandoque non provenit a natura, | |
| 10009 ut dictum est. Secundum tamen quod a natura provenit, etsi non ex | |
| 10010 toto vitari possit, potest tamen differri. Et sub hac spe, potest | |
| 10011 esse consilium de vitatione ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p10"> | |
| 10012 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always | |
| 10013 feared. | |
| 10014 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35342] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10015 dicendum quod malum naturae, etsi semper immineat, non tamen semper | |
| 10016 imminet de propinquo. Et ideo non semper timetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A2-p11"> | |
| 10017 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them | |
| 10018 as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when | |
| 10019 present; fear when threatening in the future. | |
| 10020 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35343] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10021 dicendum quod mors et alii defectus naturae proveniunt a natura | |
| 10022 universali, quibus tamen repugnat natura particularis quantum | |
| 10023 potest. Et sic ex inclinatione particularis naturae, est dolor et | |
| 10024 tristitia de huiusmodi malis, cum sunt praesentia; et timor, si | |
| 10025 immineant in futurum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A3-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 3. Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p2"> | |
| 10026 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. | |
| 10027 ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to | |
| 10028 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear. | |
| 10029 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35344] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10030 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor possit esse de malo culpae. | |
| 10031 Dicit enim Augustinus, super canonicam Ioan., quod <i>timore casto | |
| 10032 timet homo separationem a Deo</i>. Sed nihil separat nos a Deo nisi | |
| 10033 culpa; secundum illud Isaiae LIX. <i>Peccata vestra diviserunt | |
| 10034 inter vos et Deum vestrum</i>. Ergo timor potest esse de malo | |
| 10035 culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p3"> | |
| 10036 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when | |
| 10037 they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also | |
| 10038 fear the evil of sin. | |
| 10039 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35345] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10040 Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod <i>de illis | |
| 10041 timemus, cum futura sunt, de quorum praesentia tristamur</i>. Sed | |
| 10042 de malo culpae potest aliquis dolere vel tristari. Ergo etiam malum | |
| 10043 culpae aliquis potest timere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p4"> | |
| 10044 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. | |
| 10045 ix, 4): and the Apostle says ( | |
| 10046 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.10" target="asv">Gal. 5:10</a>): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin. | |
| 10047 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35346] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10048 spes timori opponitur. Sed spes potest esse de bono virtutis, ut | |
| 10049 patet per philosophum in IX Ethic. Et apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, | |
| 10050 <i>confido de vobis in domino, quod nihil aliud sapietis</i>. Ergo | |
| 10051 etiam timor potest esse de malo culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p5"> | |
| 10052 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ( | |
| 10053 <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q42_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise. | |
| 10054 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="35347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35347] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10055 verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed | |
| 10056 verecundia est de turpi facto. Quod est malum culpae. Ergo et | |
| 10057 timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p6"> | |
| 10058 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow." | |
| 10059 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35348] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10060 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>non omnia mala | |
| 10061 timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q42_A3-p7"> | |
| 10062 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 10063 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q42_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>; | |
| 10064 <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q42_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[41], A[2]</a>), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous | |
| 10065 and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object | |
| 10066 of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause | |
| 10067 of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear. | |
| 10068 </p><p id="FS_Q42_A3-p8"> But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, | |
| 10069 in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell | |
| 10070 in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being | |
| 10071 led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this | |
| 10072 light it is not an object of fear to him. | |
| 10073 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 co."><a name="35349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35349] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10074 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut obiectum spei est | |
| 10075 bonum futurum arduum quod quis potest adipisci; ita timor est de | |
| 10076 malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest | |
| 10077 accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae, | |
| 10078 non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod | |
| 10079 habet causam extrinsecam. Malum autem culpae propriam causam habet | |
| 10080 voluntatem humanam. Et ideo proprie non habet rationem terribilis. | |
| 10081 Sed quia voluntas humana ab aliquo exteriori potest inclinari ad | |
| 10082 peccandum; si illud inclinans habeat magnam vim ad inclinandum, | |
| 10083 secundum hoc poterit esse timor de malo culpae, inquantum est ab | |
| 10084 exteriori causa, puta cum aliquis timet commorari in societate | |
| 10085 malorum, ne ab eis ad peccandum inducatur. Sed proprie loquendo, in | |
| 10086 tali dispositione magis timet homo seductionem quam culpam secundum | |
| 10087 propriam rationem, idest inquantum est voluntaria, sic enim non | |
| 10088 habet ut timeatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p9"> | |
| 10089 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause. | |
| 10090 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35350] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10091 ergo dicendum quod separatio a Deo est quaedam poena consequens | |
| 10092 peccatum, et omnis poena aliquo modo est ab exteriori causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p10"> | |
| 10093 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is | |
| 10094 about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil | |
| 10095 absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with | |
| 10096 the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so | |
| 10097 far as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when | |
| 10098 they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult. | |
| 10099 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35351] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10100 dicendum quod tristitia et timor in uno conveniunt, quia utrumque | |
| 10101 est de malo, differunt autem in duobus. In uno quidem, quia | |
| 10102 tristitia est de malo praesenti, timor de malo futuro. In alio | |
| 10103 vero, quia tristitia, cum sit in concupiscibili, respicit malum | |
| 10104 absolute, unde potest esse de quocumque malo, sive parvo sive | |
| 10105 magno. Timor vero, cum sit in irascibili, respicit malum cum quadam | |
| 10106 arduitate seu difficultate, quae tollitur, inquantum aliquid | |
| 10107 subiacet voluntati. Et ideo non omnia timemus quae sunt futura, de | |
| 10108 quibus tristamur cum sunt praesentia, sed aliqua, quae scilicet | |
| 10109 sunt ardua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p11"> | |
| 10110 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be | |
| 10111 of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: | |
| 10112 and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both | |
| 10113 from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause. | |
| 10114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35352] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10115 dicendum quod spes est de bono quod quis potest adipisci. Potest | |
| 10116 autem aliquis adipisci bonum vel per se, vel per alium, et ideo | |
| 10117 spes potest esse de actu virtutis, qui est in potestate nostra | |
| 10118 constitutus. Sed timor est de malo quod non subiacet nostrae | |
| 10119 potestati, et ideo semper malum quod timetur, est a causa | |
| 10120 extrinseca. Bonum autem quod speratur, potest esse et a causa | |
| 10121 intrinseca, et a causa extrinseca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A3-p12"> | |
| 10122 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above ( | |
| 10123 <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q42_A3-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>, ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is | |
| 10124 due to an extrinsic cause. | |
| 10125 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="35353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35353] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10126 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, verecundia non est timor de | |
| 10127 actu ipso peccati, sed de turpitudine vel ignominia quae | |
| 10128 consequitur ipsum, quae est a causa extrinseca.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A4-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 4. Whether fear itself can be feared?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p2"> | |
| 10129 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus | |
| 10130 a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep | |
| 10131 himself from fear by being afraid: which seems absurd. | |
| 10132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35354] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10133 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor timeri non possit. Omne enim | |
| 10134 quod timetur, timendo custoditur, ne amittatur, sicut ille qui | |
| 10135 timet amittere sanitatem timendo custodit eam. Si igitur timor | |
| 10136 timeatur, timendo se custodiet homo ne timeat. Quod videtur esse | |
| 10137 inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p3"> | |
| 10138 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear. | |
| 10139 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35355] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10140 timor est quaedam fuga. Sed nihil fugit seipsum. Ergo timor non | |
| 10141 timet timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p4"> | |
| 10142 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear. | |
| 10143 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35356] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10144 timor est de futuro. Sed ille qui timet, iam habet timorem. Non | |
| 10145 ergo potest timere timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p5"> | |
| 10146 <b>On the contrary,</b> A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear. | |
| 10147 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35357] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10148 est quod homo potest amare amorem, et dolere de dolore. Ergo etiam, | |
| 10149 pari ratione, potest timere timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p6"> | |
| 10150 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 10151 <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q42_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now | |
| 10152 fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far | |
| 10153 as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object | |
| 10154 of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he | |
| 10155 should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will, in | |
| 10156 so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object | |
| 10157 of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear | |
| 10158 cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same. | |
| 10159 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 co."><a name="35358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35358] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10160 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, illud solum habet rationem | |
| 10161 terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit, non autem quod | |
| 10162 provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa | |
| 10163 extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati. Provenit quidem ex causa | |
| 10164 extrinseca, inquantum est passio quaedam consequens phantasiam | |
| 10165 imminentis mali. Et secundum hoc, potest aliquis timere timorem, ne | |
| 10166 scilicet immineat ei necessitas timendi, propter ingruentiam | |
| 10167 alicuius excellentis mali. Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum | |
| 10168 appetitus inferior obedit rationi, unde homo potest timorem | |
| 10169 repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit | |
| 10170 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Sed quia rationibus | |
| 10171 quas inducit, aliquis posset uti ad ostendendum quod timor nullo | |
| 10172 modo timeatur, ideo ad eas respondendum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p7"> | |
| 10173 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every fear is identically the same; there are various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then, | |
| 10174 prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him | |
| 10175 from the fear which he has not. | |
| 10176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35359] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10177 ergo dicendum quod, non omnis timor est unus timor, sed secundum | |
| 10178 diversa quae timentur, sunt diversi timores. Nihil ergo prohibet | |
| 10179 quin uno timore aliquis praeservet se ab alio timore, et sic | |
| 10180 custodiat se non timentem illo timore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p8"> | |
| 10181 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing | |
| 10182 flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases. | |
| 10183 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35360] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10184 dicendum quod, cum sit alius timor quo timetur malum imminens, et | |
| 10185 alius timor quo timetur ipse timor mali imminentis; non sequitur | |
| 10186 quod idem fugiat seipsum, vel quod sit idem fuga sui ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A4-p9"> | |
| 10187 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object. | |
| 10188 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35361] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10189 dicendum quod propter diversitatem timorum iam dictam, timore | |
| 10190 praesenti potest homo timere futurum timorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A5-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 5. Whether sudden things are especially feared?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p2"> | |
| 10191 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is | |
| 10192 about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil | |
| 10193 things. | |
| 10194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35362] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 10195 sic proceditur. Videtur quod insolita et repentina non sint magis | |
| 10196 terribilia. Sicut enim spes est de bono, ita timor est de malo. Sed | |
| 10197 experientia facit ad augmentum spei in bonis. Ergo etiam facit ad | |
| 10198 augmentum timoris in malis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p3"> | |
| 10199 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and | |
| 10200 cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are | |
| 10201 less to be feared. | |
| 10202 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35363] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10203 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod magis timentur non qui | |
| 10204 acutae sunt irae, sed mites et astuti. Constat autem quod illi qui | |
| 10205 acutae irae sunt, magis habent subitos motus. Ergo ea quae sunt | |
| 10206 subita, sunt minus terribilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p4"> | |
| 10207 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence | |
| 10208 the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that | |
| 10209 the case is different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared less. | |
| 10210 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35364] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10211 quae sunt subita, minus considerari possunt. Sed tanto aliqua magis | |
| 10212 timentur, quanto magis considerantur, unde philosophus dicit, in | |
| 10213 III Ethic., quod <i>aliqui videntur fortes propter ignorantiam, | |
| 10214 qui, si cognoverint quod aliud sit quam suspicantur, fugiunt</i>. | |
| 10215 Ergo repentina minus timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p5"> | |
| 10216 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes | |
| 10217 forethought for their safety." | |
| 10218 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35365] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10219 est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., <i>timor insolita et | |
| 10220 repentina exhorrescit, rebus quae amantur adversantia, dum | |
| 10221 praecavet securitati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p6"> | |
| 10222 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated about | |
| 10223 <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q42_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[41], A[2]), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one | |
| 10224 of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce | |
| 10225 to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, | |
| 10226 the more we consider them, the smaller | |
| 10227 they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. | |
| 10228 iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness | |
| 10229 increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide | |
| 10230 himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise. | |
| 10231 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 co."><a name="35366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35366] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10232 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum timoris est malum | |
| 10233 imminens quod non de facili repelli potest. Hoc autem ex duobus | |
| 10234 contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex debilitate timentis. | |
| 10235 Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et | |
| 10236 repentinum. Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius | |
| 10237 appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis | |
| 10238 considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter | |
| 10239 diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium | |
| 10240 in III de Tusculanis quaest.; ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur | |
| 10241 timor futuri mali. Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum | |
| 10242 facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae | |
| 10243 homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non | |
| 10244 possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p7"> | |
| 10245 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to | |
| 10246 increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, | |
| 10247 therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear. | |
| 10248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35367] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10249 ergo dicendum quod obiectum spei est bonum quod quis potest | |
| 10250 adipisci. Et ideo ea quae augmentant potestatem hominis, nata sunt | |
| 10251 augere spem, et eadem ratione, diminuere timorem, quia timor est de | |
| 10252 malo cui non de facili potest resisti. Quia igitur experientia | |
| 10253 facit hominem magis potentem ad operandum, ideo, sicut auget spem, | |
| 10254 ita diminuit timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p8"> | |
| 10255 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. | |
| 10256 On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, | |
| 10257 cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others. | |
| 10258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35368] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10259 dicendum quod illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et | |
| 10260 ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin | |
| 10261 praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo | |
| 10262 nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex | |
| 10263 improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales | |
| 10264 magis timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A5-p9"> | |
| 10265 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when | |
| 10266 seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his | |
| 10267 wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty | |
| 10268 all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it | |
| 10269 seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance | |
| 10270 if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about. | |
| 10271 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35369] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10272 dicendum quod, per se loquendo, bona vel mala corporalia in | |
| 10273 principio maiora apparent. Cuius ratio est, quia unumquodque magis | |
| 10274 apparet, contrario iuxta se posito. Unde cum aliquis statim a | |
| 10275 paupertate ad divitias transit, propter paupertatem praeexistentem | |
| 10276 divitias magis aestimat, et e contrario divites statim ad | |
| 10277 paupertatem devenientes, eam magis horrent. Et propter hoc, malum | |
| 10278 repentinum magis timetur, quia magis videtur esse malum. Sed potest | |
| 10279 propter aliquod accidens contingere quod magnitudo alicuius mali | |
| 10280 lateat, puta cum hostes se insidiose occultant. Et tunc verum est | |
| 10281 quod malum ex diligenti consideratione fit terribilius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q42_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q42_A6-p0.1">Q. 42. A. 6. Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p2"> | |
| 10282 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear, | |
| 10283 that there be some hope of safety, as stated above | |
| 10284 <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q42_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared at all. | |
| 10285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35370] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 10286 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae non habent remedium, non sint | |
| 10287 magis timenda. Ad timorem enim requiritur quod remaneat aliqua spes | |
| 10288 salutis, ut supra dictum est. Sed in malis quae non habent | |
| 10289 remedium, nulla remanet spes salutis. Ergo talia mala nullo modo | |
| 10290 timentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p3"> | |
| 10291 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death | |
| 10292 to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things | |
| 10293 are not feared most, for which there is no remedy. | |
| 10294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35371] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10295 malo mortis nullum remedium adhiberi potest, non enim, secundum | |
| 10296 naturam, potest esse reditus a morte ad vitam. Non tamen mors | |
| 10297 maxime timetur, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Non ergo ea | |
| 10298 magis timentur quae remedium non habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p4"> | |
| 10299 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: | |
| 10300 nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things | |
| 10301 that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever. Consequently | |
| 10302 they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared. | |
| 10303 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35372] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10304 philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>non est magis bonum quod | |
| 10305 est diuturnius, eo quod est unius diei, neque quod est perpetuum, | |
| 10306 eo quod non est perpetuum</i>. Ergo, eadem ratione, neque maius | |
| 10307 malum. Sed ea quae non habent remedium, non videntur differre ab | |
| 10308 aliis nisi propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem. Ergo propter | |
| 10309 hoc non sunt peiora, vel magis timenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p5"> | |
| 10310 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . | |
| 10311 . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy." | |
| 10312 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35373] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10313 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>omnia timenda | |
| 10314 sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non | |
| 10315 contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p6"> | |
| 10316 <b>I answer that,</b> The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased | |
| 10317 not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above ( | |
| 10318 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q42_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[3]</a>). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase | |
| 10319 of evil. Because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to | |
| 10320 the duration of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil | |
| 10321 doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length | |
| 10322 of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have come, cannot be | |
| 10323 remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they inspire | |
| 10324 the greatest fear. | |
| 10325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 co."><a name="35374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35374] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10326 dicendum quod obiectum timoris est malum, unde illud quod facit ad | |
| 10327 augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non | |
| 10328 solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum | |
| 10329 circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem | |
| 10330 circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur | |
| 10331 facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum | |
| 10332 durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur, unde si pati aliquid in | |
| 10333 tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur | |
| 10334 ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito | |
| 10335 tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum | |
| 10336 augmentum. Mala autem quae, postquam advenerint, non possunt habere | |
| 10337 remedium, vel non de facili, accipiuntur ut perpetua vel diuturna. | |
| 10338 Et ideo maxime redduntur timenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p7"> | |
| 10339 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there | |
| 10340 is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one | |
| 10341 by which an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now. | |
| 10342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35375] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10343 ergo dicendum quod remedium mali est duplex. Unum, per quod | |
| 10344 impeditur futurum malum, ne adveniat. Et tali remedio sublato, | |
| 10345 aufertur spes, et per consequens timor. Unde de tali remedio nunc | |
| 10346 non loquimur. Aliud remedium mali est, quo malum iam praesens | |
| 10347 removetur. Et de tali remedio nunc loquimur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p8"> | |
| 10348 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above | |
| 10349 <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q42_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. | |
| 10350 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35376] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10351 dicendum quod, licet mors sit irremediabile malum, tamen, quia non | |
| 10352 imminet de prope, non timetur, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q42_A6-p9"> | |
| 10353 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is no | |
| 10354 better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature. | |
| 10355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 42 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35377] Iª-IIae q. 42 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10356 dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de per se bono, quod est | |
| 10357 bonum secundum speciem suam. Sic autem non fit aliquid magis bonum | |
| 10358 propter diuturnitatem vel perpetuitatem, sed propter naturam ipsius | |
| 10359 boni.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 10360 <div id="FS_Q43" class="div3"> | |
| 10361 <h3 id="FS_Q43-p0.1">Q. 43. OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 10362 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 10363 <p id="FS_Q43-p2"> We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q43-p3"><a href="#FS_Q43_A1"> (1) Whether love is the cause of fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q43-p4"><a href="#FS_Q43_A2"> (2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?</a></p> | |
| 10364 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 pr."><a name="35378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35378] | |
| 10365 Iª-IIae q. 43 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa | |
| 10366 timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum causa timoris | |
| 10367 sit amor. Secundo, utrum causa timoris sit defectus.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 10368 <div id="FS_Q43_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q43_A1-p0.1">Q. 43. A. 1. Whether love is the cause of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p2"> | |
| 10369 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love | |
| 10370 of charity" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely. | |
| 10371 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35379] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10372 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa timoris. Illud enim | |
| 10373 quod introducit aliquid, est causa eius. Sed timor introducit | |
| 10374 amorem caritatis, ut Augustinus dicit, super canonicam Ioan. Ergo | |
| 10375 timor est causa amoris, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p3"> | |
| 10376 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But | |
| 10377 the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than | |
| 10378 by love. | |
| 10379 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35380] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10380 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>illi maxime timentur, a | |
| 10381 quibus expectamus imminere nobis aliqua mala</i>. Sed per hoc quod | |
| 10382 ab aliquo expectamus malum, magis provocamur ad odium eius quam ad | |
| 10383 amorem. Ergo timor magis causatur ab odio quam ab amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p4"> | |
| 10384 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it has been stated above ( | |
| 10385 <a href="#FS_Q42_A3" id="FS_Q43_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[3]</a>) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost | |
| 10386 heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love. | |
| 10387 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35381] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10388 supra dictum est quod ea quae sunt a nobis ipsis, non habent | |
| 10389 rationem terribilium. Sed ea quae sunt ex amore, maxime proveniunt | |
| 10390 ex intimo cordis. Ergo timor ex amore non causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p5"> | |
| 10391 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when | |
| 10392 we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for." Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently | |
| 10393 love is the cause of fear. | |
| 10394 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35382] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10395 est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., | |
| 10396 <i>nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod | |
| 10397 amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum</i>. | |
| 10398 Omnis ergo timor causatur ex hoc quod aliquid amamus. Amor igitur | |
| 10399 est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q43_A1-p6"> | |
| 10400 <b>I answer that,</b> The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions | |
| 10401 of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever | |
| 10402 is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of | |
| 10403 the object, is a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either | |
| 10404 by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable | |
| 10405 and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension | |
| 10406 of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which | |
| 10407 this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such. | |
| 10408 </p><p id="FS_Q43_A1-p7"> Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and | |
| 10409 difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, | |
| 10410 of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its | |
| 10411 object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his | |
| 10412 loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an | |
| 10413 evil. | |
| 10414 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 co."><a name="35383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35383] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10415 dicendum quod obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam | |
| 10416 formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae | |
| 10417 speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. | |
| 10418 Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae | |
| 10419 per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa | |
| 10420 obiecti, est causa passionis. Contingit autem aliquid esse causam | |
| 10421 obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum | |
| 10422 dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum | |
| 10423 apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud | |
| 10424 quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel | |
| 10425 bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum | |
| 10426 dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio | |
| 10427 secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod | |
| 10428 est ei coniunctum. Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est | |
| 10429 aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non | |
| 10430 potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa | |
| 10431 effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud | |
| 10432 autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est | |
| 10433 causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis. | |
| 10434 Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat | |
| 10435 aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et | |
| 10436 per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8"> | |
| 10437 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( | |
| 10438 <a href="#FS_Q42_A1" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[1]</a>), fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: and | |
| 10439 thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that | |
| 10440 sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments, man keeps | |
| 10441 His commandments, and thus | |
| 10442 begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above ( | |
| 10443 <a href="#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q43_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[40] , A[7]</a>). | |
| 10444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35384] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10445 ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, timor per se et primo | |
| 10446 respicit ad malum, quod refugit, quod opponitur alicui bono amato. | |
| 10447 Et sic per se timor nascitur ex amore. Secundario vero respicit ad | |
| 10448 id per quod provenit tale malum. Et sic per accidens quandoque | |
| 10449 timor inducit amorem, inquantum scilicet homo qui timet puniri a | |
| 10450 Deo, servat mandata eius, et sic incipit sperare, et spes | |
| 10451 introducit amorem, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p9"> | |
| 10452 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we | |
| 10453 begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the beginning. | |
| 10454 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35385] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10455 dicendum quod ille a quo expectantur mala, primo quidem odio | |
| 10456 habetur, sed postquam ab ipso iam incipiunt sperari bona, tunc | |
| 10457 incipit amari. Bonum autem cui contrariatur malum quod timetur, a | |
| 10458 principio amabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A1-p10"> | |
| 10459 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material | |
| 10460 disposition, as stated above. | |
| 10461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35386] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10462 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de eo quod est causa mali | |
| 10463 terribilis per modum efficientis. Amor autem est causa eius per | |
| 10464 modum materialis dispositionis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q43_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q43_A2-p0.1">Q. 43. A. 2. Whether defect is the cause of fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p2"> | |
| 10465 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary | |
| 10466 to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. | |
| 10467 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35387] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10468 sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus non sit causa timoris. Illi | |
| 10469 enim qui potentiam habent, maxime timentur. Sed defectus | |
| 10470 contrariatur potentiae. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p3"> | |
| 10471 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii, | |
| 10472 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. | |
| 10473 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35388] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10474 illi qui iam decapitantur, maxime sunt in defectu. Sed tales non | |
| 10475 timent. Ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa | |
| 10476 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p4"> | |
| 10477 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, | |
| 10478 5). Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. | |
| 10479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35389] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10480 decertare ex fortitudine provenit, non ex defectu. <i>Sed | |
| 10481 decertantes timent eos qui pro eisdem decertant</i>, ut dicitur in | |
| 10482 II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p5"> | |
| 10483 <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet. ii, | |
| 10484 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these. | |
| 10485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35390] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 10486 contrariorum contrariae sunt causae. Sed <i>divitiae, et robur, et | |
| 10487 multitudo amicorum, et potestas, excludunt timorem</i>, ut dicitur | |
| 10488 in II Rhetoric. Ergo ex defectu horum timor causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q43_A2-p6"> | |
| 10489 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 10490 <a href="#FS_Q43_A1" id="FS_Q43_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, fear may be set down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that fears; the other | |
| 10491 is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause | |
| 10492 of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order | |
| 10493 to cause fear, this defect must be according | |
| 10494 to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is | |
| 10495 the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary | |
| 10496 is feared, were entirely absent. | |
| 10497 </p><p id="FS_Q43_A2-p7"> But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the | |
| 10498 cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that | |
| 10499 some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason | |
| 10500 of injustice, either because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by | |
| 10501 him. | |
| 10502 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 co."><a name="35391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35391] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10503 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex causa timoris accipi | |
| 10504 potest, una quidem per modum materialis dispositionis, ex parte | |
| 10505 eius qui timet; alia per modum causae efficientis, ex parte eius | |
| 10506 qui timetur. Quantum igitur ad primum, defectus, per se loquendo, | |
| 10507 est causa timoris, ex aliquo enim defectu virtutis contingit quod | |
| 10508 non possit aliquis de facili repellere imminens malum. Sed tamen ad | |
| 10509 causandum timorem requiritur defectus cum aliqua mensura. Minor | |
| 10510 enim est defectus qui causat timorem futuri mali, quam defectus | |
| 10511 consequens malum praesens, de quo est tristitia. Et adhuc esset | |
| 10512 maior defectus, si totaliter sensus mali auferretur, vel amor boni | |
| 10513 cuius contrarium timetur. Quantum vero ad secundum, virtus et | |
| 10514 robur, per se loquendo, est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquid | |
| 10515 quod apprehenditur ut nocivum, est virtuosum, contingit quod eius | |
| 10516 effectus repelli non potest. Contingit tamen per accidens quod | |
| 10517 aliquis defectus ex ista parte causat timorem, inquantum ex aliquo | |
| 10518 defectu contingit quod aliquis velit nocumentum inferre, puta | |
| 10519 propter iniustitiam, vel quia ante laesus fuit, vel quia timet | |
| 10520 laedi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p8"> | |
| 10521 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause. | |
| 10522 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35392] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10523 ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa timoris ex parte | |
| 10524 causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p9"> | |
| 10525 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are already being executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure | |
| 10526 of fear. | |
| 10527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35393] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10528 dicendum quod illi qui iam decapitantur, sunt in passione | |
| 10529 praesentis mali. Et ideo iste defectus excedit mensuram | |
| 10530 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q43_A2-p10"> | |
| 10531 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account | |
| 10532 of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory. | |
| 10533 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 43 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35394] Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10534 dicendum quod decertantes timent non propter potentiam, qua | |
| 10535 decertare possunt, sed propter defectum potentiae, ex quo contingit | |
| 10536 quod se superaturos non confidunt.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 10537 <div id="FS_Q44" class="div3"> | |
| 10538 <h3 id="FS_Q44-p0.1">Q. 44. OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 10539 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 10540 <p id="FS_Q44-p2"> We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q44-p3"><a href="#FS_Q44_A1"> (1) Whether fear causes contraction?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p4"><a href="#FS_Q44_A2"> (2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p5"><a href="#FS_Q44_A3"> (3) Whether it makes one tremble?</a></p><p id="FS_Q44-p6"><a href="#FS_Q44_A4"> (4) Whether it hinders action?</a></p> | |
| 10541 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 pr."><a name="35395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35395] | |
| 10542 Iª-IIae q. 44 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 10543 effectibus timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum | |
| 10544 timor faciat contractionem. Secundo, utrum faciat consiliativos. | |
| 10545 Tertio, utrum faciat tremorem. Quarto, utrum impediat | |
| 10546 operationem.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 10547 <div id="FS_Q44_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A1-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 1. Whether fear causes contraction?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p2"> | |
| 10548 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn | |
| 10549 inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of | |
| 10550 daring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not | |
| 10551 cause contraction. | |
| 10552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35396] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10553 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non faciat contractionem. | |
| 10554 Contractione enim facta, calor et spiritus ad interiora revocantur. | |
| 10555 Sed ex multitudine caloris et spirituum in interioribus, | |
| 10556 magnificatur cor ad audacter aliquid aggrediendum, ut patet in | |
| 10557 iratis, cuius contrarium in timore accidit. Non ergo timor facit | |
| 10558 contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p3"> | |
| 10559 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, | |
| 10560 as may be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore | |
| 10561 fear does not cause contraction. | |
| 10562 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35397] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10563 multiplicatis spiritibus et calore in interioribus per | |
| 10564 contractionem, sequitur quod homo in vocem prorumpat, ut patet in | |
| 10565 dolentibus. Sed timentes non emittunt vocem, sed magis redduntur | |
| 10566 taciturni. Ergo timor non facit contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p4"> | |
| 10567 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ( | |
| 10568 <a href="#FS_Q41_A4" id="FS_Q44_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[41], A[4]</a>). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But | |
| 10569 blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is not an effect of fear. | |
| 10570 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35398] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10571 verecundia est quaedam species timoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed | |
| 10572 verecundati rubescunt, ut dicit Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest., | |
| 10573 et philosophus in IV Ethic. Rubor autem faciei non attestatur | |
| 10574 contractioni, sed contrario. Non ergo contractio est effectus | |
| 10575 timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p5"> | |
| 10576 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction. | |
| 10577 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35399] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10578 est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod timor est virtus | |
| 10579 secundum systolen, idest secundum contractionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6"> | |
| 10580 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 10581 <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[28], A[5]</a>), in the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation | |
| 10582 is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance | |
| 10583 to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain | |
| 10584 contraction: the reason of which | |
| 10585 is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above ( | |
| 10586 <a href="#FS_Q41_A2" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[41], A[2]</a>). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above ( | |
| 10587 <a href="#FS_Q43_A2" id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[43], A[2]</a>): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear | |
| 10588 there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who is dying that nature | |
| 10589 withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when seized with fear, leave | |
| 10590 the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which pertains | |
| 10591 to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place | |
| 10592 in regard to the body. | |
| 10593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 co."><a name="35400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35400] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10594 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in passionibus animae est | |
| 10595 sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem | |
| 10596 materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri | |
| 10597 proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi | |
| 10598 motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio. Quantum autem ad animalem | |
| 10599 motum appetitus, timor contractionem quandam importat. Cuius ratio | |
| 10600 est, quia timor provenit ex phantasia alicuius mali imminentis quod | |
| 10601 difficile repelli potest, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem aliquid | |
| 10602 difficile possit repelli, provenit ex debilitate virtutis, ut supra | |
| 10603 dictum est. Virtus autem, quanto est debilior, tanto ad pauciora se | |
| 10604 potest extendere. Et ideo ex ipsa imaginatione quae causat timorem, | |
| 10605 sequitur quaedam contractio in appetitu. Sicut etiam videmus in | |
| 10606 morientibus quod natura retrahitur ad interiora, propter | |
| 10607 debilitatem virtutis, et videmus etiam in civitatibus quod, quando | |
| 10608 cives timent, retrahunt se ab exterioribus, et recurrunt, quantum | |
| 10609 possunt, ad interiora. Et secundum similitudinem huius | |
| 10610 contractionis, quae pertinet ad appetitum animalem, sequitur etiam | |
| 10611 in timore ex parte corporis, contractio caloris et spirituum ad | |
| 10612 interiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p7"> | |
| 10613 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner | |
| 10614 parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For | |
| 10615 in those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, | |
| 10616 the inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat | |
| 10617 concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, | |
| 10618 on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the | |
| 10619 imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it: the | |
| 10620 result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away. | |
| 10621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35401] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10622 ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in libro de | |
| 10623 problematibus, licet in timentibus retrahantur spiritus ab | |
| 10624 exterioribus ad interiora, non tamen est idem motus spirituum in | |
| 10625 iratis et timentibus. Nam in iratis, propter calorem et | |
| 10626 subtilitatem spirituum, quae proveniunt ex appetitu vindictae, | |
| 10627 interius fit spirituum motus ab inferioribus ad superiora, et ideo | |
| 10628 congregantur spiritus et calor circa cor. Ex quo sequitur quod | |
| 10629 irati redduntur prompti et audaces ad invadendum. Sed in | |
| 10630 timentibus, propter frigiditatem ingrossantem, spiritus moventur a | |
| 10631 superioribus ad inferiora, quae quidem frigiditas contingit ex | |
| 10632 imaginatione defectus virtutis. Et ideo non multiplicantur calor et | |
| 10633 spiritus circa cor, sed magis a corde refugiunt. Et propter hoc, | |
| 10634 timentes non prompte invadunt, sed magis refugiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p8"> | |
| 10635 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing | |
| 10636 that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. | |
| 10637 Now the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are in pain, their nature | |
| 10638 stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in | |
| 10639 repelling the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated | |
| 10640 together within, they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from | |
| 10641 crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, | |
| 10642 as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward | |
| 10643 direction through the mouth: the result being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes its | |
| 10644 subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7). | |
| 10645 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35402] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10646 dicendum quod naturale est cuilibet dolenti, sive homini sive | |
| 10647 animali, quod utatur quocumque auxilio potest, ad repellendum | |
| 10648 nocivum praesens quod infert dolorem, unde videmus quod animalia | |
| 10649 dolentia percutiunt vel faucibus vel cornibus. Maximum autem | |
| 10650 auxilium ad omnia in animalibus est calor et spiritus. Et ideo in | |
| 10651 dolore natura conservat calorem et spiritum interius, ut hoc utatur | |
| 10652 ad repellendum nocivum. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in libro de | |
| 10653 problematibus, quod multiplicatis introrsum spiritibus et calore, | |
| 10654 necesse est quod emittantur per vocem. Et propter hoc, dolentes vix | |
| 10655 se possunt continere quin clament. Sed in timentibus fit motus | |
| 10656 interioris caloris et spirituum a corde ad inferiora, ut dictum | |
| 10657 est. Et ideo timor contrariatur formationi vocis, quae fit per | |
| 10658 emissionem spirituum ad superiora per os. Et propter hoc, timor | |
| 10659 tacentes facit. Et inde est etiam quod timor trementes facit, ut | |
| 10660 dicit philosophus, in libro de problematibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A1-p9"> | |
| 10661 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there | |
| 10662 is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination | |
| 10663 of death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were threatened by a natural | |
| 10664 death. Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). | |
| 10665 But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. Consequently there results | |
| 10666 a contraction in this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free | |
| 10667 to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body: the result being that | |
| 10668 those who are ashamed blush. | |
| 10669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35403] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10670 dicendum quod pericula mortis non solum contrariantur appetitui | |
| 10671 animali, sed etiam contrariantur naturae. Et propter hoc, in | |
| 10672 huiusmodi timore non solum fit contractio ex parte appetitus, sed | |
| 10673 etiam ex parte naturae corporalis, sic enim disponitur animal ex | |
| 10674 imaginatione mortis contrahens calorem ad interiora, sicut quando | |
| 10675 naturaliter mors imminet. Et inde est quod timentes mortem | |
| 10676 pallescunt, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed malum quod timet | |
| 10677 verecundia, non opponitur naturae, sed solum appetitui animali. Et | |
| 10678 ideo fit quidem contractio secundum appetitum animalem, non autem | |
| 10679 secundum naturam corporalem, sed magis anima, quasi in se | |
| 10680 contracta, vacat ad motionem spirituum et caloris, unde fit eorum | |
| 10681 diffusio ad exteriora. Et propter hoc, verecundati rubescunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A2-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 2. Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p2"> | |
| 10682 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a | |
| 10683 hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of | |
| 10684 reason. Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel. | |
| 10685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35404] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10686 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non faciat consiliativos. Non | |
| 10687 enim est eiusdem consiliativos facere, et consilium impedire. Sed | |
| 10688 timor consilium impedit, omnis enim passio perturbat quietem, quae | |
| 10689 requiritur ad bonum usum rationis. Ergo timor non facit | |
| 10690 consiliativos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p3"> | |
| 10691 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all | |
| 10692 thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, | |
| 10693 but hinders it. | |
| 10694 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35405] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10695 consilium est actus rationis de futuris cogitantis et deliberantis. | |
| 10696 Sed aliquis timor est <i>excutiens cogitata, et mentem a suo loco | |
| 10697 removet</i>, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest. Ergo | |
| 10698 timor non facit consiliativos, sed magis impedit consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p4"> | |
| 10699 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas | |
| 10700 fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, | |
| 10701 than hope is. | |
| 10702 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35406] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10703 sicut consilium adhibetur ad vitanda mala, ita etiam adhibetur ad | |
| 10704 consequenda bona. Sed sicut timor est de malis vitandis, ita spes | |
| 10705 est de bonis consequendis. Ergo timor non facit magis consiliativos | |
| 10706 quam spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p5"> | |
| 10707 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel." | |
| 10708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35407] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10709 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod timor | |
| 10710 consiliativos facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q44_A2-p6"> | |
| 10711 <b>I answer that,</b> A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes | |
| 10712 men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust | |
| 10713 ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult | |
| 10714 to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above ( | |
| 10715 <a href="#FS_Q42_A2" id="FS_Q44_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[2]</a>). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid. | |
| 10716 </p><p id="FS_Q44_A2-p7"> Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion | |
| 10717 makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really | |
| 10718 are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing | |
| 10719 to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel. | |
| 10720 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 co."><a name="35408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35408] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10721 dicendum quod aliquis potest dici consiliativus dupliciter. Uno | |
| 10722 modo, a voluntate seu sollicitudine consiliandi. Et sic timor | |
| 10723 consiliativos facit. Quia, ut philosophus in III Ethic. dicit, | |
| 10724 <i>consiliamur de magnis, in quibus quasi nobis ipsis | |
| 10725 discredimus</i>. Ea autem quae timorem incutiunt, non sunt | |
| 10726 simpliciter mala, sed habent quandam magnitudinem, tum ex eo quod | |
| 10727 apprehenduntur ut quae difficiliter repelli possunt; tum etiam quia | |
| 10728 apprehenduntur ut de prope existentia, sicut iam dictum est. Unde | |
| 10729 homines maxime in timoribus quaerunt consiliari. Alio modo dicitur | |
| 10730 aliquis consiliativus, a facultate bene consiliandi. Et sic nec | |
| 10731 timor, nec aliqua passio consiliativos facit. Quia homini affecto | |
| 10732 secundum aliquam passionem, videtur aliquid vel maius vel minus | |
| 10733 quam sit secundum rei veritatem, sicut amanti videntur ea quae | |
| 10734 amat, meliora; et timenti, ea quae timet, terribiliora. Et sic ex | |
| 10735 defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, | |
| 10736 impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to objections</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35409] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 10737 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p9"> | |
| 10738 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, | |
| 10739 man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear | |
| 10740 be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for | |
| 10741 him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness. | |
| 10742 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35410] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10743 dicendum quod quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo | |
| 10744 secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur. Et ideo quando timor fuerit | |
| 10745 fortis, vult quidem homo consiliari, sed adeo perturbatur in suis | |
| 10746 cogitationibus, quod consilium adinvenire non potest. Si autem sit | |
| 10747 parvus timor, qui sollicitudinem consiliandi inducat, nec multum | |
| 10748 rationem conturbet; potest etiam conferre ad facultatem bene | |
| 10749 consiliandi, ratione sollicitudinis consequentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A2-p10"> | |
| 10750 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he | |
| 10751 despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because | |
| 10752 hope is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that | |
| 10753 fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in | |
| 10754 matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above. | |
| 10755 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35411] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10756 dicendum quod etiam spes facit consiliativos, quia, ut in II | |
| 10757 Rhetoric. philosophus dicit, <i>nullus consiliatur de his de quibus | |
| 10758 desperat</i>; sicut nec de impossibilibus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. | |
| 10759 Timor tamen facit magis consiliativos quam spes. Quia spes est de | |
| 10760 bono, prout possumus ipsum consequi, timor autem de malo, prout vix | |
| 10761 repelli potest, et ita magis respicit rationem difficilis timor | |
| 10762 quam spes. In difficilibus autem, maxime in quibus nobis non | |
| 10763 confidimus, consiliamur, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A3-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 3. Whether fear makes one tremble?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p2"> | |
| 10764 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold | |
| 10765 person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those | |
| 10766 who fear are thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are being led to execution. Therefore | |
| 10767 fear does not cause trembling. | |
| 10768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35412] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10769 sic proceditur. Videtur quod tremor non sit effectus timoris. | |
| 10770 Tremor enim ex frigore accidit, videmus enim infrigidatos tremere. | |
| 10771 Timor autem non videtur causare frigus, sed magis calorem | |
| 10772 desiccantem, cuius signum est quod timentes sitiunt, et praecipue | |
| 10773 in maximis timoribus, sicut patet in illis qui ad mortem ducuntur. | |
| 10774 Ergo timor non causat tremorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p3"> | |
| 10775 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are | |
| 10776 often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause trembling. | |
| 10777 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35413] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10778 emissio superfluitatum ex calore accidit, unde, ut plurimum, | |
| 10779 medicinae laxativae sunt calidae. Sed huiusmodi emissiones | |
| 10780 superfluitatum ex timore frequenter contingunt. Ergo timor videtur | |
| 10781 causare calorem. Et sic non causat tremorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p4"> | |
| 10782 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his | |
| 10783 outward parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trembling in all the external members. | |
| 10784 But such is not the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear. | |
| 10785 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35414] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10786 in timore calor ab exterioribus ad interiora revocatur. Si igitur | |
| 10787 propter huiusmodi revocationem caloris, in exterioribus homo | |
| 10788 tremit; videtur quod similiter in omnibus exterioribus membris | |
| 10789 deberet causari tremor ex timore. Hoc autem non videtur. Non ergo | |
| 10790 tremor corporis est effectus timoris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p5"> | |
| 10791 <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth." | |
| 10792 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35415] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10793 est quod Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod | |
| 10794 <i>terrorem sequitur tremor, et pallor, et dentium | |
| 10795 crepitus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p6"> | |
| 10796 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 10797 <a href="#FS_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q44_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that the | |
| 10798 outer parts become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling | |
| 10799 the members: which lack of power is due to the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, | |
| 10800 as stated in De Anima ii, 4. | |
| 10801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 co."><a name="35416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35416] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10802 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in timore fit quaedam | |
| 10803 contractio ab exterioribus ad interiora, et ideo exteriora frigida | |
| 10804 remanent. Et propter hoc in eis accidit tremor, qui causatur ex | |
| 10805 debilitate virtutis continentis membra, ad huiusmodi autem | |
| 10806 debilitatem maxime facit defectus caloris, qui est instrumentum quo | |
| 10807 anima movet, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p7"> | |
| 10808 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive | |
| 10809 parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, | |
| 10810 and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, | |
| 10811 as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11). | |
| 10812 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35417] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10813 ergo dicendum quod, calore ab exterioribus ad interiora revocato, | |
| 10814 multiplicatur calor interius, et maxime versus inferiora, idest | |
| 10815 circa nutritivam. Et ideo, consumpto humido, consequitur sitis, et | |
| 10816 etiam interdum solutio ventris, et urinae emissio, et quandoque | |
| 10817 etiam seminis. Vel huiusmodi emissio superfluitatum accidit propter | |
| 10818 contractionem ventris et testiculorum, ut philosophus dicit, in | |
| 10819 libro de problematibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35418] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet | |
| 10820 solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A3-p9"> | |
| 10821 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, | |
| 10822 as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially | |
| 10823 in their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through | |
| 10824 their connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For | |
| 10825 the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the knees | |
| 10826 tremble in those who are afraid, according to | |
| 10827 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q44_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.35.3" target="asv">Is. 35:3</a>: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: 'weak'] knees." | |
| 10828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35419] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10829 dicendum quod, quia in timore calor deserit cor, a superioribus ad | |
| 10830 inferiora tendens, ideo timentibus maxime tremit cor, et membra | |
| 10831 quae habent aliquam connexionem ad pectus, ubi est cor. Unde | |
| 10832 timentes maxime tremunt in voce, propter vicinitatem vocalis | |
| 10833 arteriae ad cor. Tremit etiam labium inferius, et tota inferior | |
| 10834 mandibula, propter continuationem ad cor, unde et crepitus dentium | |
| 10835 sequitur. Et eadem ratione brachia et manus tremunt. Vel etiam quia | |
| 10836 huiusmodi membra sunt magis mobilia. Propter quod et genua tremunt | |
| 10837 timentibus; secundum illud Isaiae XXXV, <i>confortate manus | |
| 10838 dissolutas, et genua trementia roborate</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q44_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q44_A4-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 4. Whether fear hinders action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p2"> | |
| 10839 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. | |
| 10840 But fear disturbs reason, as stated above | |
| 10841 <a href="#FS_Q44_A2" id="FS_Q44_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore fear hinders action. | |
| 10842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35420] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10843 sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor impediat operationem. Operatio | |
| 10844 enim maxime impeditur ex perturbatione rationis, quae dirigit in | |
| 10845 opere. Sed timor perturbat rationem, ut dictum est. Ergo timor | |
| 10846 impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p3"> | |
| 10847 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily | |
| 10848 falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. | |
| 10849 Therefore fear hinders action. | |
| 10850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35421] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10851 illi qui faciunt aliquid cum timore, facilius in operando | |
| 10852 deficiunt, sicut si aliquis incedat super trabem in alto positam, | |
| 10853 propter timorem de facili cadit; non autem caderet, si incederet | |
| 10854 super eandem trabem in imo positam, propter defectum timoris. Ergo | |
| 10855 timor impedit operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p4"> | |
| 10856 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too. | |
| 10857 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35422] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10858 pigritia, sive segnities, est quaedam species timoris. Sed pigritia | |
| 10859 impedit operationem. Ergo et timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p5"> | |
| 10860 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 10861 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q44_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.12" target="asv">Phil. 2:12</a>): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore | |
| 10862 fear does not hinder a good action. | |
| 10863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35423] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10864 est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, <i>cum metu et tremore | |
| 10865 vestram salutem operamini</i>, quod non diceret, si timor bonam | |
| 10866 operationem impediret. Timor ergo non impedit bonam | |
| 10867 operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p6"> | |
| 10868 <b>I answer that,</b> Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be | |
| 10869 hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, | |
| 10870 considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, | |
| 10871 of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much | |
| 10872 disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take | |
| 10873 counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even | |
| 10874 on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak. | |
| 10875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 co."><a name="35424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35424] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10876 dicendum quod operatio hominis exterior causatur quidem ab anima | |
| 10877 sicut a primo movente, sed a membris corporeis sicut ab | |
| 10878 instrumentis. Contingit autem operationem impediri et propter | |
| 10879 defectum instrumenti, et propter defectum principalis moventis. Ex | |
| 10880 parte igitur instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se, | |
| 10881 semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, propter defectum | |
| 10882 caloris qui ex timore accidit in exterioribus membris. Sed ex parte | |
| 10883 animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans; | |
| 10884 confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam sollicitudinem, | |
| 10885 et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari. Si vero timor | |
| 10886 tantum increscat quod rationem perturbet, impedit operationem etiam | |
| 10887 ex parte animae. Sed de tali timore apostolus non loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35425] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per haec | |
| 10888 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p8"> | |
| 10889 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured | |
| 10890 to his imagination. | |
| 10891 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35426] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10892 dicendum quod illi qui cadunt de trabe in alto posita, patiuntur | |
| 10893 perturbationem imaginationis, propter timorem casus imaginati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q44_A4-p9"> | |
| 10894 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it | |
| 10895 hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will | |
| 10896 to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears. | |
| 10897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 44 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35427] Iª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10898 dicendum quod omnis timens refugit id quod timet, et ideo, cum | |
| 10899 pigritia sit timor de ipsa operatione, inquantum est laboriosa, | |
| 10900 impedit operationem, quia retrahit voluntatem ab ipsa. Sed timor | |
| 10901 qui est de aliis rebus, intantum adiuvat operationem, inquantum | |
| 10902 inclinat voluntatem ad operandum ea per quae homo effugit id quod | |
| 10903 timet.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 10904 <div id="FS_Q45" class="div3"> | |
| 10905 <h3 id="FS_Q45-p0.1">Q. 45. OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 10906 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 10907 <p id="FS_Q45-p2"> We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q45-p3"><a href="#FS_Q45_A1"> (1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p4"><a href="#FS_Q45_A2"> (2) How is daring related to hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p5"><a href="#FS_Q45_A3"> (3) Of the cause of daring;</a></p><p id="FS_Q45-p6"><a href="#FS_Q45_A4"> (4) Of its effect.</a></p> | |
| 10908 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 pr."><a name="35428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35428] | |
| 10909 Iª-IIae q. 45 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 10910 audacia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum audacia sit | |
| 10911 contraria timori. Secundo, quomodo audacia se habeat ad spem. | |
| 10912 Tertio, de causa audaciae. Quarto, de effectus ipsius.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 10913 <div id="FS_Q45_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A1-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 1. Whether daring is contrary to fear?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p2"> | |
| 10914 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice | |
| 10915 is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear. | |
| 10916 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35429] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10917 sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non contrarietur timori. Dicit | |
| 10918 enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod audacia | |
| 10919 vitium est. Vitium autem virtuti contrariatur. Cum ergo timor non | |
| 10920 sit virtus, sed passio, videtur quod timori non contrarietur | |
| 10921 audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p3"> | |
| 10922 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. | |
| 10923 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35430] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10924 uni unum est contrarium. Sed timori contrariatur spes. Non ergo | |
| 10925 contrariatur ei audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p4"> | |
| 10926 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes | |
| 10927 forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. | |
| 10928 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35431] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10929 unaquaeque passio excludit passionem oppositam. Sed id quod | |
| 10930 excluditur per timorem, est securitas, dicit enim Augustinus, II | |
| 10931 Confess., quod timor securitati praecavet ergo securitas | |
| 10932 contrariatur timori. Non ergo audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p5"> | |
| 10933 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear." | |
| 10934 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35432] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 10935 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>audacia est | |
| 10936 timori contraria</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p6"> | |
| 10937 <b>I answer that,</b> It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is | |
| 10938 farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that | |
| 10939 fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident | |
| 10940 that daring is contrary to fear. | |
| 10941 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 co."><a name="35433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35433] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 10942 dicendum quod de ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, | |
| 10943 ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Illud autem quod maxime distat a timore, | |
| 10944 est audacia, timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius | |
| 10945 victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum | |
| 10946 imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum. Unde | |
| 10947 manifeste timori contrariatur audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p7"> | |
| 10948 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the | |
| 10949 sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides | |
| 10950 this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks | |
| 10951 of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense. | |
| 10952 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35434] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 10953 ergo dicendum quod ira et audacia, et omnium passionum nomina, | |
| 10954 dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo, secundum quod important | |
| 10955 absolute motus appetitus sensitivi in aliquod obiectum bonum vel | |
| 10956 malum, et sic sunt nomina passionum. Alio modo, secundum quod simul | |
| 10957 cum huiusmodi motu important recessum ab ordine rationis, et sic | |
| 10958 sunt nomina vitiorum. Et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus de audacia, | |
| 10959 sed nos loquimur nunc de audacia secundum primum modum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8"> | |
| 10960 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing | |
| 10961 having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above ( | |
| 10962 <a href="#FS_Q23_A2" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[2]</a>; | |
| 10963 <a href="#FS_Q40_A4" id="FS_Q45_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[40], A[4]</a>) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus | |
| 10964 fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of | |
| 10965 approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope. | |
| 10966 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35435] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10967 dicendum quod uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria, sed | |
| 10968 secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic | |
| 10969 dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem | |
| 10970 contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic | |
| 10971 timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et | |
| 10972 recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero | |
| 10973 desperatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A1-p9"> | |
| 10974 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears | |
| 10975 not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety | |
| 10976 implies privation, so daring implies safety. | |
| 10977 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35436] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10978 dicendum quod securitas non significat aliquid contrarium timori, | |
| 10979 sed solam timoris exclusionem, ille enim dicitur esse securus, qui | |
| 10980 non timet. Unde securitas opponitur timori sicut privatio, audacia | |
| 10981 autem sicut contrarium. Et sicut contrarium includit in se | |
| 10982 privationem, ita audacia securitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A2-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 2. Whether daring ensues from hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p2"> | |
| 10983 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, | |
| 10984 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above ( | |
| 10985 <a href="#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope. | |
| 10986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35437] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10987 sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non consequatur spem. Audacia | |
| 10988 enim est respectu malorum et terribilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. | |
| 10989 Spes autem respicit bonum. Ut supra dictum est. Ergo habent diversa | |
| 10990 obiecta, et non sunt unius ordinis. Non ergo audacia consequitur | |
| 10991 spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p3"> | |
| 10992 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, | |
| 10993 despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope. | |
| 10994 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35438] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10995 sicut audacia contrariatur timori, ita desperatio spei. Sed timor | |
| 10996 non sequitur desperationem, quinimmo desperatio excludit timorem. | |
| 10997 Ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Ergo audacia non consequitur | |
| 10998 spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p4"> | |
| 10999 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. | |
| 11000 Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it. | |
| 11001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35439] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11002 audacia intendit quoddam bonum, scilicet victoriam. Sed tendere in | |
| 11003 bonum arduum pertinet ad spem. Ergo audacia est idem spei. Non ergo | |
| 11004 consequitur ad spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p5"> | |
| 11005 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from | |
| 11006 hope. | |
| 11007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35440] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11008 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>illi qui sunt | |
| 11009 bonae spei, sunt audaces</i>. Videtur ergo audacia consequi | |
| 11010 spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6"> | |
| 11011 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have often stated ( | |
| 11012 <a href="#FS_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>; | |
| 11013 <a href="#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>; | |
| 11014 <a href="#FS_Q41_A1" id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[41], A[1]</a>), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either | |
| 11015 of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something | |
| 11016 else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the | |
| 11017 object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; | |
| 11018 and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, | |
| 11019 follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows | |
| 11020 avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil | |
| 11021 to | |
| 11022 fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that | |
| 11023 daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. | |
| 11024 But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good | |
| 11025 he should hope for. | |
| 11026 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 co."><a name="35441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35441] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11027 dicendum quod, sicut iam pluries dictum est, omnes huiusmodi | |
| 11028 passiones animae ad appetitivam potentiam pertinent. Omnis autem | |
| 11029 motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. | |
| 11030 Prosecutio autem vel fuga est alicuius et per se, et per accidens, | |
| 11031 per se quidem est prosecutio boni, fuga vero mali; per accidens | |
| 11032 autem potest prosecutio esse mali, propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, | |
| 11033 et fuga boni, propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Quod autem est per | |
| 11034 accidens, sequitur ad id quod est per se. Et ideo prosecutio mali, | |
| 11035 sequitur prosecutionem boni, sicut et fuga boni sequitur fugam | |
| 11036 mali. Haec autem quatuor pertinent ad quatuor passiones, nam | |
| 11037 prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio | |
| 11038 mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad | |
| 11039 desperationem. Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex | |
| 11040 hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc | |
| 11041 audacter insequitur ipsum. Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, | |
| 11042 ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa | |
| 11043 bonum sperandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p7"> | |
| 11044 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, | |
| 11045 since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which | |
| 11046 pursues good. | |
| 11047 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35442] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11048 ergo dicendum quod ratio sequeretur, si bonum et malum essent | |
| 11049 obiecta non habentia ordinem ad invicem. Sed quia malum habet | |
| 11050 aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio | |
| 11051 habitu; ideo audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae | |
| 11052 insequitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p8"> | |
| 11053 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit | |
| 11054 of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear | |
| 11055 does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is | |
| 11056 strong. | |
| 11057 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35443] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11058 dicendum quod, etsi bonum simpliciter sit prius quam malum, tamen | |
| 11059 fuga per prius debetur malo quam bono, sicut insecutio per prius | |
| 11060 debetur bono quam malo. Et ideo sicut spes est prior quam audacia, | |
| 11061 ita timor est prior quam desperatio. Et sicut ex timore non semper | |
| 11062 sequitur desperatio, sed quando fuerit intensus; ita ex spe non | |
| 11063 semper sequitur audacia, sed quando fuerit vehemens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A2-p9"> | |
| 11064 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; | |
| 11065 yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it | |
| 11066 turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: | |
| 11067 just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring | |
| 11068 cannot be a principal passion. | |
| 11069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35444] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11070 dicendum quod audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est | |
| 11071 bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit | |
| 11072 malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes. Et similiter desperatio | |
| 11073 respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit | |
| 11074 timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius | |
| 11075 effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus. | |
| 11076 Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non | |
| 11077 potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A3-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 3. Whether some defect is a cause of daring?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p2"> | |
| 11078 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine | |
| 11079 are strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. | |
| 11080 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35445] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11081 sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus aliquis sit causa audaciae. | |
| 11082 Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de problematibus, quod <i>amatores | |
| 11083 vini sunt fortes et audaces</i>. Sed ex vino sequitur defectus | |
| 11084 ebrietatis. Ergo audacia causatur ex aliquo defectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p3"> | |
| 11085 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience | |
| 11086 is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. | |
| 11087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35446] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11088 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>inexperti periculorum | |
| 11089 sunt audaces</i>. Sed inexperientia defectus quidam est. Ergo | |
| 11090 audacia ex defectu causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p4"> | |
| 11091 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. | |
| 11092 But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. | |
| 11093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35447] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11094 iniusta passi audaciores esse solent; sicut etiam bestiae cum | |
| 11095 percutiuntur, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed iniustum pati ad | |
| 11096 defectum pertinet. Ergo audacia ex aliquo defectu causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p5"> | |
| 11097 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means | |
| 11098 of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect | |
| 11099 implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining | |
| 11100 to defect is a cause of daring. | |
| 11101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35448] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11102 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod causa audaciae | |
| 11103 est, <i>cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium ut prope | |
| 11104 existentium, timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium</i>. | |
| 11105 Sed id quod pertinet ad defectum, vel pertinet ad salutarium | |
| 11106 remotionem, vel ad terribilium propinquitatem. Ergo nihil quod ad | |
| 11107 defectum pertinet, est causa audaciae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p6"> | |
| 11108 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 11109 <a href="#FS_Q45_A1" id="FS_Q45_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) daring results from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is | |
| 11110 a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, | |
| 11111 and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, | |
| 11112 or by banishing fear; in one way, in the | |
| 11113 part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation. | |
| 11114 </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p7"> On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that | |
| 11115 make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance | |
| 11116 of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means | |
| 11117 of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it | |
| 11118 is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal | |
| 11119 of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that | |
| 11120 he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others. | |
| 11121 </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p8"> On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those | |
| 11122 things which raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose | |
| 11123 heart is small in size, are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural heat is unable | |
| 11124 to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large | |
| 11125 house as well as it does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those whose lungs contain much blood, | |
| 11126 are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that "lovers of wine | |
| 11127 are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": hence it has been said above ( | |
| 11128 <a href="#FS_Q40_A6" id="FS_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[6]</a>) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation | |
| 11129 and | |
| 11130 enlargement of the heart. | |
| 11131 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 co."><a name="35449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35449] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11132 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, audacia consequitur spem, et | |
| 11133 contrariatur timori, unde quaecumque nata sunt causare spem, vel | |
| 11134 excludere timorem, sunt causa audaciae. Quia vero timor et spes, et | |
| 11135 etiam audacia, cum sint passiones quaedam, consistunt in motu | |
| 11136 appetitus et in quadam transmutatione corporali; dupliciter potest | |
| 11137 accipi causa audaciae, sive quantum ad provocationem spei, sive | |
| 11138 quantum ad exclusionem timoris, uno modo quidem, ex parte | |
| 11139 appetitivi motus; alio vero modo, ex parte transmutationis | |
| 11140 corporalis. Ex parte quidem appetitivi motus, qui sequitur | |
| 11141 apprehensionem, provocatur spes causans audaciam, per ea quae | |
| 11142 faciunt nos aestimare quod possibile sit adipisci victoriam; vel | |
| 11143 secundum propriam potentiam, sicut fortitudo corporis, experientia | |
| 11144 in periculis, multitudo pecuniarum, et alia huiusmodi; sive per | |
| 11145 potentiam aliorum, sicut multitudo amicorum vel quorumcumque | |
| 11146 auxiliantium, et praecipue si homo confidat de auxilio divino; | |
| 11147 <i>unde illi qui se bene habent ad divina, audaciores sunt</i>, ut | |
| 11148 etiam philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Timor autem excluditur, | |
| 11149 secundum istum modum, per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium, | |
| 11150 puta quia homo non habet inimicos, quia nulli nocuit, quia non | |
| 11151 videt aliquod periculum imminere; illis enim videntur maxime | |
| 11152 pericula imminere, qui aliis nocuerunt. Ex parte vero | |
| 11153 transmutationis corporalis, causatur audacia per provocationem spei | |
| 11154 et exclusionem timoris, ex his quae faciunt caliditatem circa cor. | |
| 11155 Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de partibus animalium, quod | |
| 11156 <i>illi qui habent parvum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt magis | |
| 11157 audaces; et animalia habentia magnum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt | |
| 11158 timida, quia calor naturalis non tantum potest calefacere magnum | |
| 11159 cor; sicut parvum, sicut ignis non tantum potest calefacere magnam | |
| 11160 domum, sicut parvam</i>. Et in libro de problematibus dicit quod | |
| 11161 <i>habentes pulmonem sanguineum, sunt audaciores, propter | |
| 11162 caliditatem cordis exinde consequentem</i>. Et ibidem dicit quod | |
| 11163 <i>vini amatores sunt magis audaces, propter caliditatem vini</i>, | |
| 11164 unde et supra dictum est quod ebrietas facit ad bonitatem spei, | |
| 11165 caliditas enim cordis repellit timorem, et causat spem, propter | |
| 11166 cordis extensionem et amplificationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p9"> | |
| 11167 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think | |
| 11168 greatly of himself. | |
| 11169 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35450] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11170 ergo dicendum quod ebrietas causat audaciam, non inquantum est | |
| 11171 defectus, sed inquantum facit cordis dilatationem, et inquantum | |
| 11172 etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A3-p10"> | |
| 11173 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as | |
| 11174 through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal | |
| 11175 of the cause of fear gives rise to daring. | |
| 11176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35451] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11177 dicendum quod illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores, | |
| 11178 non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet, propter | |
| 11179 inexperientiam, neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque | |
| 11180 praesentiam periculorum. Et ita, per subtractionem causae timoris, | |
| 11181 sequitur audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p11"> | |
| 11182 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the | |
| 11183 assistance of those who suffer unjustly." | |
| 11184 </p><p id="FS_Q45_A3-p12"> Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, | |
| 11185 real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another. | |
| 11186 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35452] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11187 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., <i>iniustum | |
| 11188 passi redduntur audaciores, quia aestimant quod Deus iniustum | |
| 11189 passis auxilium ferat</i>. Et sic patet quod nullus defectus causat | |
| 11190 audaciam nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam | |
| 11191 aliquam excellentiam, vel veram vel aestimatam, vel ex parte sui | |
| 11192 vel ex parte alterius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q45_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q45_A4-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 4. Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p2"> | |
| 11193 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, | |
| 11194 which is contrary to daring, as stated above | |
| 11195 <a href="#FS_Q45_A1" id="FS_Q45_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[44], A[3]). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are | |
| 11196 not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. | |
| 11197 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35453] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 11198 sic proceditur. Videtur quod audaces non sint promptiores in | |
| 11199 principio quam in ipsis periculis. Tremor enim ex timore causatur, | |
| 11200 qui contrariatur audaciae, ut ex dictis patet. Sed audaces | |
| 11201 quandoque in principio tremunt, ut philosophus dicit, in libro de | |
| 11202 problematibus. Ergo non sunt promptiores in principio quam in ipsis | |
| 11203 periculis existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p3"> | |
| 11204 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. | |
| 11205 But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger | |
| 11206 is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest. | |
| 11207 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35454] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11208 per augmentum obiecti augetur passio, sicut si bonum est amabile, | |
| 11209 et magis bonum est magis amabile. Sed arduum est obiectum audaciae. | |
| 11210 Augmentato ergo arduo, augmentatur audacia. Sed magis fit arduum et | |
| 11211 difficile periculum, quando est praesens. Ergo debet tunc magis | |
| 11212 crescere audacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p4"> | |
| 11213 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that | |
| 11214 "anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring. | |
| 11215 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35455] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11216 ex vulneribus inflictis provocatur ira. Sed ira causat audaciam, | |
| 11217 dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est ausivum. Ergo | |
| 11218 quando iam sunt in ipsis periculis, et percutiuntur, videtur quod | |
| 11219 magis audaces reddantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p5"> | |
| 11220 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of | |
| 11221 dangers they stand aloof." | |
| 11222 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35456] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11223 est quod dicitur in III Ethic., quod <i>audaces praevolantes sunt | |
| 11224 et volentes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q45_A4-p6"> | |
| 11225 <b>I answer that,</b> Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty | |
| 11226 cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that | |
| 11227 it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the | |
| 11228 movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the | |
| 11229 danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way. | |
| 11230 </p><p id="FS_Q45_A4-p7"> On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according | |
| 11231 to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet | |
| 11232 when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less | |
| 11233 than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the | |
| 11234 danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas | |
| 11235 men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above | |
| 11236 <a href="#FS_Q45_A3" id="FS_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. | |
| 11237 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 co."><a name="35457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35457] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11238 dicendum quod audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, | |
| 11239 sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva | |
| 11240 non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, | |
| 11241 sed subitum habet iudicium. Contingit autem quandoque quod secundum | |
| 11242 subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae | |
| 11243 difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt, unde surgit audaciae | |
| 11244 motus ad aggrediendum periculum. Unde quando iam experiuntur ipsum | |
| 11245 periculum, sentiunt maiorem difficultatem quam aestimaverunt. Et | |
| 11246 ideo deficiunt. Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt | |
| 11247 difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis | |
| 11248 aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non | |
| 11249 passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt | |
| 11250 in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum; sed | |
| 11251 quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt. Et ideo magis | |
| 11252 persistunt. Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula | |
| 11253 aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque | |
| 11254 sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem | |
| 11255 spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p8"> | |
| 11256 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, | |
| 11257 as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, | |
| 11258 it withdraws to the inferior parts. | |
| 11259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35458] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11260 ergo dicendum quod etiam in audacibus accidit tremor, propter | |
| 11261 revocationem caloris ab exterioribus ad interiora, sicut etiam in | |
| 11262 timentibus. Sed in audacibus revocatur calor ad cor, in timentibus | |
| 11263 autem, ad inferiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p9"> | |
| 11264 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a | |
| 11265 compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, | |
| 11266 so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if | |
| 11267 the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the | |
| 11268 daring considered to be. | |
| 11269 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35459] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11270 dicendum quod obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde | |
| 11271 augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est | |
| 11272 compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum, | |
| 11273 praesupponit motum spei in bonum. Et ideo si tantum addatur de | |
| 11274 arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus | |
| 11275 audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius | |
| 11276 est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q45_A4-p10"> | |
| 11277 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on ( | |
| 11278 <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q45_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that | |
| 11279 if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring. | |
| 11280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 45 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35460] Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11281 dicendum quod ex laesione non causatur ira, nisi supposita aliqua | |
| 11282 spe, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo si fuerit tantum periculum quod | |
| 11283 excedat spem victoriae, non sequetur ira. Sed verum est quod, si | |
| 11284 ira sequatur, audacia augebitur.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 11285 <div id="FS_Q46" class="div3"> | |
| 11286 <h3 id="FS_Q46-p0.1">Q. 46. OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 11287 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 11288 <p id="FS_Q46-p2"> We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.</p><p id="FS_Q46-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q46-p4"><a href="#FS_Q46_A1"> (1) Whether anger is a special passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p5"><a href="#FS_Q46_A2"> (2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p6"><a href="#FS_Q46_A3"> (3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p7"><a href="#FS_Q46_A4"> (4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p8"><a href="#FS_Q46_A5"> (5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p9"><a href="#FS_Q46_A6"> (6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p10"><a href="#FS_Q46_A7"> (7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q46-p11"><a href="#FS_Q46_A8"> (8) Of the species of anger.</a></p> | |
| 11289 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 pr."><a name="35461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35461] | |
| 11290 Iª-IIae q. 46 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ira. | |
| 11291 Et primo, de ira secundum se; secundo, de causa factiva irae, et | |
| 11292 remedio eius; tertio, de effectu eius. Circa primum quaeruntur | |
| 11293 octo. Primo, utrum ira sit passio specialis. Secundo, utrum | |
| 11294 obiectum irae sit bonum, an malum. Tertio, utrum ira sit in | |
| 11295 concupiscibili. Quarto, utrum ira sit cum ratione. Quinto, utrum | |
| 11296 ira sit naturalior quam concupiscentia. Sexto, utrum ira sit | |
| 11297 gravior quam odium. Septimo, utrum ira solum sit ad illos ad quos | |
| 11298 est iustitia. Octavo, de speciebus irae.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 11299 <div id="FS_Q46_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A1-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 1. Whether anger is a special passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p2"> | |
| 11300 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are | |
| 11301 several passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special passion. | |
| 11302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35462] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11303 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit passio specialis. Ab ira | |
| 11304 enim denominatur potentia irascibilis. Sed huius potentiae non est | |
| 11305 una tantum passio, sed multae. Ergo ira non est una passio | |
| 11306 specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p3"> | |
| 11307 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion | |
| 11308 is contrary to anger, as stated above ( | |
| 11309 <a href="#FS_Q23_A3" id="FS_Q46_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[3]</a>). Therefore anger is not a special passion. | |
| 11310 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35463] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11311 cuilibet passioni speciali est aliquid contrarium; ut patet | |
| 11312 inducenti per singula. Sed irae non est aliqua passio contraria, ut | |
| 11313 supra dictum est. Ergo ira non est passio specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p4"> | |
| 11314 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, | |
| 11315 pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special passion. | |
| 11316 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35464] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11317 una specialis passio non includit aliam. Sed ira includit multas | |
| 11318 passiones, est enim cum tristitia, et cum delectatione, et cum spe, | |
| 11319 ut patet per philosophum, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est passio | |
| 11320 specialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p5"> | |
| 11321 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7). | |
| 11322 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35465] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11323 est quod Damascenus ponit iram specialem passionem. Et similiter | |
| 11324 Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A1-p6"> | |
| 11325 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals. Secondly, | |
| 11326 by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). | |
| 11327 Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains | |
| 11328 many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is | |
| 11329 produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet | |
| 11330 a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes | |
| 11331 are, in a fashion, actually existing therein. | |
| 11332 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A1-p7"> Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above ( | |
| 11333 <a href="#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q46_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may | |
| 11334 be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is the primary root of all the other | |
| 11335 passions, as stated above ( | |
| 11336 <a href="#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q46_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a> ). But, in a | |
| 11337 third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the | |
| 11338 movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, | |
| 11339 as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently | |
| 11340 if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states | |
| 11341 (De Anima iv, 6). | |
| 11342 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 co."><a name="35466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35466] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11343 dicendum quod aliquid dicitur generale dupliciter. Uno modo, per | |
| 11344 praedicationem, sicut animal est generale ad omnia animalia. Alio | |
| 11345 modo, per causam, sicut sol est causa generalis omnium quae | |
| 11346 generantur in his inferioribus, secundum Dionysium, in IV cap. de | |
| 11347 Div. Nom. Sicut enim genus continet multas differentias potestate, | |
| 11348 secundum similitudinem materiae; ita causa agens continet multos | |
| 11349 effectus secundum virtutem activam. Contingit autem aliquem | |
| 11350 effectum ex concursu diversarum causarum produci, et quia omnis | |
| 11351 causa aliquo modo in effectu manet, potest etiam dici, tertio modo, | |
| 11352 quod effectus ex congregatione multarum causarum productus, habet | |
| 11353 quandam generalitatem, inquantum continet multas causas quodammodo | |
| 11354 in actu. Primo ergo modo, ira non est passio generalis, sed | |
| 11355 condivisa aliis passionibus, ut supra dictum est. Similiter autem | |
| 11356 nec secundo modo. Non est enim causa aliarum passionum, sed per | |
| 11357 hunc modum potest dici generalis passio amor, ut patet per | |
| 11358 Augustinum, in XIV libro de Civ. Dei; amor enim est prima radix | |
| 11359 omnium passionum, ut supra dictum est. Sed tertio modo potest ira | |
| 11360 dici passio generalis, inquantum ex concursu multarum passionum | |
| 11361 causatur. Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam | |
| 11362 tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi, | |
| 11363 quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., <i>iratus habet spem | |
| 11364 puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem</i>. Unde si | |
| 11365 fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non | |
| 11366 sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de | |
| 11367 anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p8"> | |
| 11368 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because | |
| 11369 all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent. | |
| 11370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35467] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11371 ergo dicendum quod, vis irascibilis denominatur ab ira, non quia | |
| 11372 omnis motus huius potentiae sit ira, sed quia ad iram terminantur | |
| 11373 omnes motus huius potentiae; et inter alios eius motus, iste est | |
| 11374 manifestior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p9"> | |
| 11375 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of | |
| 11376 evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there | |
| 11377 is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made. | |
| 11378 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35468] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11379 dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ira causatur ex contrariis | |
| 11380 passionibus, scilicet a spe, quae est boni, et a tristitia, quae | |
| 11381 est mali, includit in seipsa contrarietatem, et ideo non habet | |
| 11382 contrarium extra se. Sicut etiam in mediis coloribus non invenitur | |
| 11383 contrarietas, nisi quae est simplicium colorum, ex quibus | |
| 11384 causantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A1-p10"> | |
| 11385 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of | |
| 11386 cause and effect. | |
| 11387 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35469] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11388 dicendum quod ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus | |
| 11389 species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A2-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 2. Whether the object of anger is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p2"> | |
| 11390 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the | |
| 11391 sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has | |
| 11392 the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object. | |
| 11393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35470] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11394 sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum irae sit malum. Dicit enim | |
| 11395 Gregorius Nyssenus quod ira est quasi armigera concupiscentiae, | |
| 11396 inquantum scilicet impugnat id quod concupiscentiam impedit. Sed | |
| 11397 omne impedimentum habet rationem mali. Ergo ira respicit malum | |
| 11398 tanquam obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p3"> | |
| 11399 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as | |
| 11400 its object, as stated above ( | |
| 11401 <a href="#FS_Q29_A1" id="FS_Q46_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[29], A[1]</a>). Therefore anger does also. | |
| 11402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35471] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11403 ira et odium conveniunt in effectu, utriusque enim est inferre | |
| 11404 nocumentum alteri. Sed odium respicit malum tanquam obiectum, ut | |
| 11405 supra dictum est. Ergo etiam et ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p4"> | |
| 11406 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil | |
| 11407 is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger. | |
| 11408 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35472] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11409 ira causatur ex tristitia, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., | |
| 11410 quod ira operatur cum tristitia. Sed tristitiae obiectum est malum. | |
| 11411 Ergo et irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p5"> | |
| 11412 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: | |
| 11413 since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good. | |
| 11414 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p6"> Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the | |
| 11415 object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger. | |
| 11416 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 1"><a name="35473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35473] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11417 est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod ira appetit | |
| 11418 vindictam. Sed appetitus vindictae est appetitus boni, cum vindicta | |
| 11419 ad iustitiam pertineat. Ergo obiectum irae est bonum.</p><p title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 2"><a name="35474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35474] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11420 ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit | |
| 11421 philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est | |
| 11422 bonum. Ergo et irae.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p7"> | |
| 11423 <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing | |
| 11424 in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, | |
| 11425 as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both | |
| 11426 good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows | |
| 11427 and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of | |
| 11428 a complex object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking | |
| 11429 this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some | |
| 11430 good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a | |
| 11431 man | |
| 11432 is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, | |
| 11433 which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, | |
| 11434 as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil. | |
| 11435 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A2-p8"> We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the | |
| 11436 other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, | |
| 11437 as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects | |
| 11438 of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the | |
| 11439 objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable | |
| 11440 to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. | |
| 11441 Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions. | |
| 11442 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 co."><a name="35475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35475] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11443 dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis sequitur actum virtutis | |
| 11444 apprehensivae. Vis autem apprehensiva dupliciter aliquid | |
| 11445 apprehendit, uno modo, per modum incomplexi, sicut cum intelligimus | |
| 11446 quid est homo; alio modo, per modum complexi, sicut cum | |
| 11447 intelligimus album inesse homini. Unde utroque modo vis appetitiva | |
| 11448 potest tendere in bonum et malum. Per modum quidem simplicis et | |
| 11449 incomplexi, cum appetitus simpliciter sequitur vel inhaeret bono, | |
| 11450 vel refugit malum. Et tales motus sunt desiderium et spes, | |
| 11451 delectatio et tristitia, et alia huiusmodi. Per modum autem | |
| 11452 complexi, sicut cum appetitus fertur in hoc quod aliquod bonum vel | |
| 11453 malum insit vel fiat circa alterum, vel tendendo in hoc, vel | |
| 11454 refugiendo ab hoc. Sicut manifeste apparet in amore et odio, amamus | |
| 11455 enim aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod bonum; odimus | |
| 11456 autem aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod malum. Et | |
| 11457 similiter est in ira, quicumque enim irascitur, quaerit vindicari | |
| 11458 de aliquo. Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam | |
| 11459 vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de | |
| 11460 ipsa delectatur, tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, | |
| 11461 sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali. Est | |
| 11462 tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad | |
| 11463 amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta, | |
| 11464 amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut | |
| 11465 cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam | |
| 11466 odire. Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, | |
| 11467 est bonum, vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti. | |
| 11468 Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali, vult | |
| 11469 enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti. Sed ira | |
| 11470 respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam, | |
| 11471 quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem | |
| 11472 nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo | |
| 11473 composita ex contrariis passionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="35476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35476] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 11474 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A3-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 3. Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p2"> | |
| 11475 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of | |
| 11476 "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too. | |
| 11477 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35477] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11478 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit in concupiscibili. Dicit enim | |
| 11479 Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod ira est libido quaedam. | |
| 11480 Sed libido est in concupiscibili. Ergo et ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p3"> | |
| 11481 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred | |
| 11482 is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty. | |
| 11483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35478] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11484 Augustinus dicit, in regula, quod ira crescit in odium. Et Tullius | |
| 11485 dicit, in eodem libro, quod odium est ira inveterata. Sed odium est | |
| 11486 in concupiscibili, sicut amor. Ergo ira est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p4"> | |
| 11487 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up | |
| 11488 of sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion. | |
| 11489 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35479] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11490 Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt quod ira componitur ex | |
| 11491 tristitia et desiderio. Sed utrumque horum est in concupiscibili. | |
| 11492 Ergo ira est in concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p5"> | |
| 11493 <b>On the contrary,</b> The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible | |
| 11494 would not take its name from it. | |
| 11495 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35480] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 11496 vis concupiscibilis est alia ab irascibili. Si igitur ira esset in | |
| 11497 concupiscibili, non denominaretur ab ea vis irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p6"> | |
| 11498 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, | |
| 11499 in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible | |
| 11500 passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated | |
| 11501 <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it | |
| 11502 seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless | |
| 11503 there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the | |
| 11504 Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty. | |
| 11505 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 co."><a name="35481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35481] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11506 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passiones irascibilis in hoc | |
| 11507 differunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, quod obiecta passionum | |
| 11508 concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum absolute; obiecta autem | |
| 11509 passionum irascibilis sunt bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel | |
| 11510 arduitate. Dictum est autem quod ira respicit duo obiecta, scilicet | |
| 11511 vindictam, quam appetit; et eum de quo vindictam quaerit. Et circa | |
| 11512 utrumque quandam arduitatem ira requirit, non enim insurgit motus | |
| 11513 irae, nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrumque existente; | |
| 11514 <i>quaecumque enim nihil sunt, aut modica valde nullo digna | |
| 11515 aestimamus</i>, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Unde | |
| 11516 manifestum est quod ira non est in concupiscibili, sed in | |
| 11517 irascibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p7"> | |
| 11518 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous | |
| 11519 and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this | |
| 11520 sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. | |
| 11521 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35482] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11522 ergo dicendum quod Tullius libidinem nominat appetitum cuiuscumque | |
| 11523 boni futuri non habita discretione ardui vel non ardui. Et secundum | |
| 11524 hoc, ponit iram sub libidine, inquantum est appetitus vindictae. | |
| 11525 Sic autem libido communis est ad irascibilem et | |
| 11526 concupiscibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p8"> | |
| 11527 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by | |
| 11528 becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred. | |
| 11529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35483] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11530 dicendum quod ira dicitur crescere in odium, non quod eadem numero | |
| 11531 passio quae prius fuit ira, postmodum fiat odium per quandam | |
| 11532 inveterationem, sed per quandam causalitatem. Ira enim, per | |
| 11533 diuturnitatem, causat odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A3-p9"> | |
| 11534 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and | |
| 11535 it has been said above ( | |
| 11536 <a href="#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q46_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions. | |
| 11537 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35484] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11538 dicendum quod ira dicitur componi ex tristitia et desiderio, non | |
| 11539 sicut ex partibus, sed sicut ex causis. Dictum est autem supra quod | |
| 11540 passiones concupiscibilis sunt causae passionum irascibilis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A4-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 4. Whether anger requires an act of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p2"> | |
| 11541 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. | |
| 11542 But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not | |
| 11543 require an act of reason. | |
| 11544 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35485] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 11545 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit cum ratione. Ira enim, cum | |
| 11546 sit passio quaedam, est in appetitu sensitivo. Sed appetitus | |
| 11547 sensitivus non sequitur rationis apprehensionem, sed sensitivae | |
| 11548 partis. Ergo ira non est cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p3"> | |
| 11549 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of | |
| 11550 reason. | |
| 11551 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35486] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11552 animalia bruta carent ratione. Et tamen in eis invenitur ira. Ergo | |
| 11553 ira non est cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p4"> | |
| 11554 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason. | |
| 11555 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35487] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11556 ebrietas ligat rationem. Adiuvat autem ad iram. Ergo ira non est | |
| 11557 cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p5"> | |
| 11558 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger listens to reason somewhat." | |
| 11559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35488] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11560 est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>ira consequitur | |
| 11561 rationem aliqualiter</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p6"> | |
| 11562 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 11563 <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, anger is a desire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt | |
| 11564 done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel | |
| 11565 with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore | |
| 11566 anger, in a fashion, requires an act of | |
| 11567 reason. | |
| 11568 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 co."><a name="35489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35489] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11569 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus vindictae. | |
| 11570 Haec autem collationem importat poenae infligendae ad nocumentum | |
| 11571 sibi illatum, unde, in VII Ethic., dicit philosophus quod | |
| 11572 <i>syllogizans quoniam oportet talem oppugnare, irascitur | |
| 11573 confestim</i>. Conferre autem et syllogizare est rationis. Et ideo | |
| 11574 ira est quodammodo cum ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p7"> | |
| 11575 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in | |
| 11576 so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another | |
| 11577 way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. | |
| 11578 xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a | |
| 11579 result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through | |
| 11580 the will. | |
| 11581 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35490] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11582 ergo dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis potest esse cum | |
| 11583 ratione dupliciter. Uno modo, cum ratione praecipiente, et sic | |
| 11584 voluntas est cum ratione; unde et dicitur appetitus rationalis. | |
| 11585 Alio modo, cum ratione denuntiante, et sic ira est cum ratione. | |
| 11586 Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Problemat., quod ira est cum | |
| 11587 ratione, <i>non sicut praecipiente ratione, sed ut manifestante | |
| 11588 iniuriam</i>. Appetitus enim sensitivus immediate rationi non | |
| 11589 obedit, sed mediante voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p8"> | |
| 11590 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements, | |
| 11591 both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above ( | |
| 11592 <a href="#FS_Q40_A3" id="FS_Q46_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[3]</a>). | |
| 11593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35491] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11594 dicendum quod bruta animalia habent instinctum naturalem ex divina | |
| 11595 ratione eis inditum, per quem habent motus interiores et exteriores | |
| 11596 similes motibus rationis, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A4-p9"> | |
| 11597 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens | |
| 11598 not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires | |
| 11599 an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose | |
| 11600 who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: | |
| 11601 but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason. | |
| 11602 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35492] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11603 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., ira audit aliqualiter | |
| 11604 rationem, sicut nuntiantem quod iniuriatum est ei, sed non perfecte | |
| 11605 audit, quia non observat regulam rationis in rependendo vindictam. | |
| 11606 Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur | |
| 11607 impedimentum rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de | |
| 11608 Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes | |
| 11609 de iudicio rationis, non irascuntur, sed quando sunt parum ebrii, | |
| 11610 irascuntur, tanquam habentes iudicium rationis, sed impeditum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A5-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 5. Whether anger is more natural than desire?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p2"> | |
| 11611 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But | |
| 11612 "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, | |
| 11613 in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man. | |
| 11614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35493] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 11615 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit naturalior quam | |
| 11616 concupiscentia. Proprium enim hominis dicitur quod sit animal | |
| 11617 mansuetum natura. Sed mansuetudo opponitur irae, ut dicit | |
| 11618 philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est naturalior quam | |
| 11619 concupiscentia, sed omnino videtur esse contra hominis naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p3"> | |
| 11620 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according | |
| 11621 to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more | |
| 11622 natural than anger. | |
| 11623 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35494] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11624 ratio contra naturam dividitur, ea enim quae secundum rationem | |
| 11625 agunt, non dicimus secundum naturam agere. Sed ira est cum ratione, | |
| 11626 concupiscentia autem sine ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo | |
| 11627 concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p4"> | |
| 11628 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the | |
| 11629 touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance. | |
| 11630 Therefore desire is more natural than anger. | |
| 11631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35495] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11632 ira est appetitus vindictae, concupiscentia autem maxime est | |
| 11633 appetitus delectabilium secundum tactum, scilicet ciborum et | |
| 11634 venereorum. Haec autem sunt magis naturalia homini quam vindicta. | |
| 11635 Ergo concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p5"> | |
| 11636 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is more natural than desire." | |
| 11637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35496] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11638 est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod <i>ira est | |
| 11639 naturalior quam concupiscentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A5-p6"> | |
| 11640 <b>I answer that,</b> By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a | |
| 11641 particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause | |
| 11642 of a passion, as stated above ( | |
| 11643 <a href="#FS_Q36_A2" id="FS_Q46_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[36], A[2]</a>), may be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we consider | |
| 11644 the cause of anger and of | |
| 11645 desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural | |
| 11646 than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance. | |
| 11647 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A5-p7"> If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in | |
| 11648 a manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic, or as | |
| 11649 to the specific nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the generic nature, | |
| 11650 i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from | |
| 11651 this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species | |
| 11652 and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then | |
| 11653 anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher | |
| 11654 says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to | |
| 11655 everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the individual, in respect of | |
| 11656 his particular temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural | |
| 11657 tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies | |
| 11658 result from a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the | |
| 11659 humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner | |
| 11660 incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the | |
| 11661 Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a | |
| 11662 disposition to desire. | |
| 11663 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 co."><a name="35497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35497] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11664 dicendum quod naturale dicitur illud quod causatur a natura, ut | |
| 11665 patet in II Physic. Unde utrum aliqua passio sit magis vel minus | |
| 11666 naturalis, considerari non potest nisi ex causa sua. Causa autem | |
| 11667 passionis, ut supra dictum est, dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, | |
| 11668 ex parte obiecti; alio modo, ex parte subiecti. Si ergo | |
| 11669 consideretur causa irae et concupiscentiae ex parte obiecti, sic | |
| 11670 concupiscentia, et maxime ciborum et venereorum, naturalior est | |
| 11671 quam ira, inquantum ista sunt magis naturalia quam vindicta. Si | |
| 11672 autem consideretur causa irae ex parte subiecti, sic quodammodo ira | |
| 11673 est naturalior, et quodammodo concupiscentia. Potest enim natura | |
| 11674 alicuius hominis considerari vel secundum naturam generis, vel | |
| 11675 secundum naturam speciei, vel secundum complexionem propriam | |
| 11676 individui. Si igitur consideretur natura generis, quae est natura | |
| 11677 huius hominis inquantum est animal; sic naturalior est | |
| 11678 concupiscentia quam ira, quia ex ipsa natura communi habet homo | |
| 11679 quandam inclinationem ad appetendum ea quae sunt conservativa | |
| 11680 vitae, vel secundum speciem vel secundum individuum. Si autem | |
| 11681 consideremus naturam hominis ex parte speciei, scilicet inquantum | |
| 11682 est rationalis; sic ira est magis naturalis homini quam | |
| 11683 concupiscentia, inquantum ira est cum ratione magis quam | |
| 11684 concupiscentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod humanius | |
| 11685 est punire, quod pertinet ad iram, quam mansuetum esse, unumquodque | |
| 11686 enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva. Si vero | |
| 11687 consideretur natura huius individui secundum propriam complexionem, | |
| 11688 sic ira naturalior est quam concupiscentia, quia scilicet | |
| 11689 habitudinem naturalem ad irascendum, quae est ex complexione, magis | |
| 11690 de facili sequitur ira, quam concupiscentia vel aliqua alia passio. | |
| 11691 Est enim homo dispositus ad irascendum, secundum quod habet | |
| 11692 cholericam complexionem, cholera autem, inter alios humores, citius | |
| 11693 movetur; assimilatur enim igni. Et ideo magis est in promptu ut | |
| 11694 ille qui est dispositus secundum naturalem complexionem ad iram, | |
| 11695 irascatur; quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum, quod | |
| 11696 concupiscat. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod | |
| 11697 ira magis traducitur a parentibus in filios, quam | |
| 11698 concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p8"> | |
| 11699 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, | |
| 11700 a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the | |
| 11701 moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches | |
| 11702 to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of | |
| 11703 passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it | |
| 11704 is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury | |
| 11705 which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," | |
| 11706 as stated above (A[4], ad 3). | |
| 11707 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35498] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11708 ergo dicendum quod in homine considerari potest et naturalis | |
| 11709 complexio ex parte corporis, quae est temperata; et ipsa ratio. Ex | |
| 11710 parte igitur complexionis corporalis, naturaliter homo, secundum | |
| 11711 suam speciem, est non habens superexcellentiam neque irae neque | |
| 11712 alicuius alterius passionis, propter temperamentum suae | |
| 11713 complexionis. Alia vero animalia, secundum quod recedunt ab hac | |
| 11714 qualitate complexionis ad dispositionem alicuius complexionis | |
| 11715 extremae, secundum hoc etiam naturaliter disponuntur ad excessum | |
| 11716 alicuius passionis, ut leo ad audaciam, canis ad iram, lepus ad | |
| 11717 timorem, et sic de aliis. Ex parte vero rationis, est naturale | |
| 11718 homini et irasci et mansuetum esse, secundum quod ratio quodammodo | |
| 11719 causat iram, inquantum nuntiat causam irae; et quodammodo sedat | |
| 11720 iram, inquantum iratus non totaliter audit imperium rationis, ut | |
| 11721 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p9"> | |
| 11722 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows | |
| 11723 that it is, in a manner, natural to man. | |
| 11724 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35499] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11725 dicendum quod ipsa ratio pertinet ad naturam hominis. Unde ex hoc | |
| 11726 ipso quod ira est cum ratione, sequitur quod secundum aliquem modum | |
| 11727 sit homini naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A5-p10"> | |
| 11728 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object. | |
| 11729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35500] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11730 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de ira et concupiscentia, ex | |
| 11731 parte obiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A6-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 6. Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p2"> | |
| 11732 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is written ( | |
| 11733 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv">Prov. 27:4</a>) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous | |
| 11734 than hatred. | |
| 11735 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35501] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 11736 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit gravior quam odium. Dicitur | |
| 11737 enim Prov. XXVII, quod <i>ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens | |
| 11738 furor</i>. Odium autem quandoque habet misericordiam. Ergo ira est | |
| 11739 gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p3"> | |
| 11740 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented | |
| 11741 if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and | |
| 11742 be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred. | |
| 11743 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35502] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11744 maius est pati malum et de malo dolere, quam simpliciter pati. Sed | |
| 11745 illi qui habet aliquem odio, sufficit quod ille quem odit, patiatur | |
| 11746 malum, irato autem non sufficit, sed quaerit quod cognoscat illud | |
| 11747 et de illo doleat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira | |
| 11748 est gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p4"> | |
| 11749 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the | |
| 11750 more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above | |
| 11751 | |
| 11752 <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q46_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred. | |
| 11753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35503] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11754 quanto ad constitutionem alicuius plura concurrunt, tanto videtur | |
| 11755 esse stabilius, sicut habitus permanentior est qui ex pluribus | |
| 11756 actibus causatur. Sed ira causatur ex concursu plurium passionum, | |
| 11757 ut supra dictum est, non autem odium. Ergo ira est stabilior et | |
| 11758 gravior quam odium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p5"> | |
| 11759 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam," but anger to "a mote." | |
| 11760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35504] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11761 est quod Augustinus, in regula, odium comparat trabi, iram vero | |
| 11762 festucae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p6"> | |
| 11763 <b>I answer that,</b> The species and nature of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object | |
| 11764 of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he | |
| 11765 is angry. But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes | |
| 11766 evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, | |
| 11767 that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above | |
| 11768 <a href="#FS_Q46_A2" id="FS_Q46_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is evident that | |
| 11769 to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone | |
| 11770 under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity | |
| 11771 with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently | |
| 11772 it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger. | |
| 11773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 co."><a name="35505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35505] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11774 dicendum quod species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto | |
| 11775 pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto, nam sicut | |
| 11776 odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem | |
| 11777 irascitur. Sed non eadem ratione, sed odiens appetit malum inimici, | |
| 11778 inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem | |
| 11779 irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam | |
| 11780 rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum | |
| 11781 est vindicativum. Unde etiam supra dictum est quod odium est per | |
| 11782 applicationem mali ad malum; ira autem per applicationem boni ad | |
| 11783 malum. Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti, | |
| 11784 minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter. | |
| 11785 Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam | |
| 11786 secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur, | |
| 11787 sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in | |
| 11788 ulciscendo. Unde manifestum est quod odium est multo deterius et | |
| 11789 gravius quam ira.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q46_A6-p7"> | |
| 11790 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing | |
| 11791 desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with | |
| 11792 no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the | |
| 11793 Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. | |
| 11794 Hence it is written ( | |
| 11795 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.12.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 12:16</a>): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only | |
| 11796 under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according | |
| 11797 to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased | |
| 11798 if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never | |
| 11799 appeased." | |
| 11800 </p><p id="FS_Q46_A6-p8"> As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, | |
| 11801 through the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear the violence of one provoked?" | |
| 11802 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35506] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11803 ergo dicendum quod in ira et odio duo possunt considerari, scilicet | |
| 11804 ipsum quod desideratur, et intensio desiderii. Quantum igitur ad id | |
| 11805 quod desideratur, ira habet magis misericordiam quam odium. Quia | |
| 11806 enim odium appetit malum alterius secundum se, nulla mensura mali | |
| 11807 satiatur, ea enim quae secundum se appetuntur, sine mensura | |
| 11808 appetuntur, ut philosophus dicit I Politic., sicut avarus divitias. | |
| 11809 Unde dicitur Eccli. XII, <i>inimicus si invenerit tempus, non | |
| 11810 satiabitur sanguine</i>. Sed ira non appetit malum nisi sub ratione | |
| 11811 iusti vindicativi. Unde quando malum illatum excedit mensuram | |
| 11812 iustitiae, secundum aestimationem irascentis, tunc miseretur. Unde | |
| 11813 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>iratus, si fiant multa, | |
| 11814 miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo</i>. Quantum vero ad | |
| 11815 intensionem desiderii, ira magis excludit misericordiam quam odium, | |
| 11816 quia motus irae est impetuosior, propter cholerae inflammationem. | |
| 11817 Unde statim subditur, <i>impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis | |
| 11818 poterit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p9"> | |
| 11819 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance | |
| 11820 is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, | |
| 11821 and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and | |
| 11822 be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the | |
| 11823 other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, | |
| 11824 that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not | |
| 11825 grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4). | |
| 11826 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35507] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11827 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iratus appetit malum alicuius, | |
| 11828 inquantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem fit per | |
| 11829 illationem poenae. Est autem de ratione poenae quod sit contraria | |
| 11830 voluntati, et quod sit afflictiva, et quod pro aliqua culpa | |
| 11831 inferatur. Et ideo iratus hoc appetit, ut ille cui nocumentum | |
| 11832 infert, percipiat, et doleat, et quod cognoscat propter iniuriam | |
| 11833 illatam sibi hoc provenire. Sed odiens de hoc nihil curat, quia | |
| 11834 appetit malum alterius inquantum huiusmodi. Non est autem verum | |
| 11835 quod id de quo quis tristatur, sit peius, iniustitia enim et | |
| 11836 imprudentia, cum sint mala, quia tamen sunt voluntaria, non | |
| 11837 contristant eos quibus insunt, ut dicit philosophus, in II | |
| 11838 Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A6-p10"> | |
| 11839 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause | |
| 11840 prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion | |
| 11841 of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers | |
| 11842 that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is | |
| 11843 more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing | |
| 11844 from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger." | |
| 11845 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35508] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11846 dicendum quod id quod ex pluribus causis causatur, tunc est | |
| 11847 stabilius, quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis, sed una causa | |
| 11848 potest praevalere multis aliis. Odium autem provenit ex | |
| 11849 permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione | |
| 11850 animi propter laesionem illatam, sed odium procedit ex aliqua | |
| 11851 dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et | |
| 11852 nocivum id quod odit. Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam | |
| 11853 dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis | |
| 11854 etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter | |
| 11855 hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>odium est magis | |
| 11856 insanabile quam ira</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A7-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 7. Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p2"> | |
| 11857 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between | |
| 11858 man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away | |
| 11859 his pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. | |
| 11860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="35509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35509] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum | |
| 11861 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non solum sit ad illos ad quos est | |
| 11862 iustitia. Non enim est iustitia hominis ad res irrationales. Sed | |
| 11863 tamen homo quandoque irascitur rebus irrationalibus, puta cum | |
| 11864 scriptor ex ira proiicit pennam, vel eques percutit equum. Ergo ira | |
| 11865 non solum est ad illos ad quos est iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p3"> | |
| 11866 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes | |
| 11867 a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written ( | |
| 11868 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.5" target="asv">Ps. 4:5</a>): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice. | |
| 11869 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="35510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35510] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> | |
| 11870 <i>Praeterea, non est iustitia hominis ad seipsum, nec ad ea quae | |
| 11871 sui ipsius sunt</i>, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Sed homo quandoque sibi | |
| 11872 ipsi irascitur, sicut poenitens propter peccatum, unde dicitur in | |
| 11873 Psalmo IV, <i>irascimini, et nolite peccare</i>. Ergo ira non solum | |
| 11874 est ad quos est iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p4"> | |
| 11875 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state | |
| 11876 injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, | |
| 11877 4). Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice. | |
| 11878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="35511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35511] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11879 iustitia et iniustitia potest esse alicuius ad totum aliquod genus, | |
| 11880 vel ad totam aliquam communitatem, puta cum civitas aliquem laesit. | |
| 11881 Sed ira non est ad aliquod genus, sed solum ad aliquod singularium, | |
| 11882 ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non proprie est ad | |
| 11883 quos est iustitia et iniustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p5"> The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 s. c."><a name="35512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35512] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed | |
| 11884 contrarium accipi potest a philosopho in II Rhetoric.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p6"> | |
| 11885 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 11886 <a href="#FS_Q46_A6" id="FS_Q46_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: | |
| 11887 since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. | |
| 11888 the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those | |
| 11889 to whom one is just or unjust. | |
| 11890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 co."><a name="35513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35513] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 11891 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira appetit malum, inquantum | |
| 11892 habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Et ideo ad eosdem est ira, ad | |
| 11893 quos est iustitia et iniustitia. Nam inferre vindictam ad iustitiam | |
| 11894 pertinet, laedere autem aliquem pertinet ad iniustitiam. Unde tam | |
| 11895 ex parte causae, quae est laesio illata ab altero; quam etiam ex | |
| 11896 parte vindictae, quam appetit iratus; manifestum est quod ad eosdem | |
| 11897 pertinet ira, ad quos iustitia et iniustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p7"> | |
| 11898 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid | |
| 11899 of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action. | |
| 11900 Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when | |
| 11901 only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to | |
| 11902 a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against | |
| 11903 anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, | |
| 11904 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above | |
| 11905 all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since | |
| 11906 they can do us no harm. | |
| 11907 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="35514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35514] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 11908 ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira, quamvis sit cum | |
| 11909 ratione, potest tamen etiam esse in brutis animalibus, quae ratione | |
| 11910 carent, inquantum naturali instinctu per imaginationem moventur ad | |
| 11911 aliquid simile operibus rationis. Sic igitur, cum in homine sit et | |
| 11912 ratio et imaginatio, dupliciter in homine potest motus irae | |
| 11913 insurgere. Uno modo, ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem. Et | |
| 11914 sic insurgit aliquis motus irae etiam ad res irrationales et | |
| 11915 inanimatas, secundum similitudinem illius motus qui est in | |
| 11916 animalibus contra quodlibet nocivum. Alio modo, ex ratione | |
| 11917 nuntiante laesionem. Et sic, ut philosophus dicit II Rhetoric., | |
| 11918 <i>nullo modo potest esse ira ad res insensibiles, neque ad | |
| 11919 mortuos</i>. Tum quia non dolent, quod maxime quaerunt irati in eis | |
| 11920 quibus irascuntur. Tum etiam quia non est ad eos vindicta, cum | |
| 11921 eorum non sit iniuriam facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p8"> | |
| 11922 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and | |
| 11923 himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said | |
| 11924 to be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, | |
| 11925 a man is never angry with himself. | |
| 11926 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="35515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35515] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11927 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., <i>quaedam | |
| 11928 metaphorica iustitia et iniustitia est hominis ad seipsum</i>, | |
| 11929 inquantum scilicet ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Et | |
| 11930 secundum hoc etiam homo dicitur de seipso vindictam facere, et per | |
| 11931 consequens sibi ipsi irasci. Proprie autem et per se, non contingit | |
| 11932 aliquem sibi ipsi irasci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A7-p9"> | |
| 11933 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, | |
| 11934 as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises | |
| 11935 from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. | |
| 11936 Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his | |
| 11937 action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. When the | |
| 11938 whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. | |
| 11939 <a href="#FS_Q29_A6" id="FS_Q46_A7-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[29], A[6]</a>]. | |
| 11940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="35516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35516] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11941 dicendum quod philosophus, in II Rhetoric., assignat unam | |
| 11942 differentiam inter odium et iram, quod <i>odium potest esse ad | |
| 11943 aliquod genus, sicut habemus odio omne latronum genus, sed ira non | |
| 11944 est nisi ad aliquod singulare</i>. Cuius ratio est, quia odium | |
| 11945 causatur ex hoc quod qualitas alicuius rei apprehenditur ut | |
| 11946 dissonans nostrae dispositioni, et hoc potest esse vel in | |
| 11947 universali, vel in particulari. Sed ira causatur ex hoc quod | |
| 11948 aliquis nos laesit per suum actum. Actus autem omnes sunt | |
| 11949 singularium. Et ideo ira semper est circa aliquod singulare. Cum | |
| 11950 autem tota civitas nos laeserit, tota civitas computatur sicut unum | |
| 11951 singulare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q46_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q46_A8-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 8. Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p2"> | |
| 11952 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." | |
| 11953 For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because | |
| 11954 "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor | |
| 11955 {kotos} is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these | |
| 11956 are not different species of anger. | |
| 11957 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="35517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35517] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum | |
| 11958 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter assignet | |
| 11959 tres species irae, scilicet fel, maniam et furorem. Nullius enim | |
| 11960 generis species diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens. Sed ista | |
| 11961 tria diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens, <i>principium enim | |
| 11962 motus irae fel vocatur; ira autem permanens dicitur mania; furor | |
| 11963 autem est ira observans tempus in vindictam</i>. Ergo non sunt | |
| 11964 diversae species irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p3"> | |
| 11965 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and | |
| 11966 is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek | |
| 11967 {kotos} [rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself. | |
| 11968 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="35518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35518] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11969 Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., dicit quod <i>excandescentia | |
| 11970 Graece dicitur thymosis; et est ira modo nascens et modo | |
| 11971 desistens</i>. Thymosis autem secundum Damascenum, est idem quod | |
| 11972 furor. Non ergo furor tempus quaerit ad vindictam, sed tempore | |
| 11973 deficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p4"> | |
| 11974 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and | |
| 11975 anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord ( | |
| 11976 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his | |
| 11977 brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly, | |
| 11978 "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since | |
| 11979 it takes no account of utterance. | |
| 11980 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="35519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35519] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11981 Gregorius, XXI Moral., ponit tres gradus irae, scilicet <i>iram | |
| 11982 sine voce, et iram cum voce, et iram cum verbo expresso</i>, | |
| 11983 secundum illa tria quae dominus ponit Matth. V, qui irascitur | |
| 11984 fratri suo, ubi tangitur ira sine voce; et postea subdit, qui | |
| 11985 dixerit fratri suo, raca, ubi tangitur ira cum voce, sed necdum | |
| 11986 pleno verbo formata; et postea dicit, qui autem dixerit fratri suo, | |
| 11987 fatue, ubi expletur vox perfectione sermonis. Ergo insufficienter | |
| 11988 divisit Damascenus iram, nihil ponens ex parte vocis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p5"> | |
| 11989 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.]. | |
| 11990 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 s. c."><a name="35520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35520] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 11991 est auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6"> | |
| 11992 <b>I answer that,</b> The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This | |
| 11993 happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because | |
| 11994 it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs | |
| 11995 to {menis} [ill-will] which is derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part | |
| 11996 of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged | |
| 11997 [* | |
| 11998 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.31" target="asv">Eph. 4:31</a>: "Let all bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls | |
| 11999 some angry persons {akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi} [bitter], because they | |
| 12000 retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they | |
| 12001 never rest until they have retaliated [*Cf. | |
| 12002 <a href="SS_iii.html#SS_Q158_A5" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">SS, Q[158], A[5]</a>]. | |
| 12003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 co."><a name="35521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35521] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12004 dicendum quod tres species irae quas Damascenus ponit, et etiam | |
| 12005 Gregorius Nyssenus, sumuntur secundum ea quae dant irae aliquod | |
| 12006 augmentum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ex | |
| 12007 facilitate ipsius motus, et talem iram vocat fel, quia cito | |
| 12008 accenditur. Alio modo, ex parte tristitiae causantis iram, quae diu | |
| 12009 in memoria manet, et haec pertinet ad maniam, quae a manendo | |
| 12010 dicitur. Tertio, ex parte eius quod iratus appetit, scilicet | |
| 12011 vindictae, et haec pertinet ad furorem, qui nunquam quiescit donec | |
| 12012 puniat. Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., quosdam irascentium vocat | |
| 12013 acutos, quia cito irascuntur; quosdam amaros, quia diu retinent | |
| 12014 iram; quosdam difficiles, quia nunquam quiescunt nisi puniant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p7"> | |
| 12015 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing | |
| 12016 prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof. | |
| 12017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="35522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35522] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12018 ergo dicendum quod omnia illa per quae ira recipit aliquam | |
| 12019 perfectionem, non omnino per accidens se habent ad iram. Et ideo | |
| 12020 nihil prohibet secundum ea species irae assignari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p8"> | |
| 12021 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness | |
| 12022 of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor," | |
| 12023 should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged. | |
| 12024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="35523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35523] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12025 dicendum quod excandescentia, quam Tullius ponit, magis videtur | |
| 12026 pertinere ad primam speciem irae, quae perficitur secundum | |
| 12027 velocitatem irae, quam ad furorem. Nihil autem prohibet ut thymosis | |
| 12028 Graece, quod Latine furor dicitur, utrumque importet, et | |
| 12029 velocitatem ad irascendum et firmitatem propositi ad puniendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q46_A8-p9"> | |
| 12030 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the | |
| 12031 very movement of anger. | |
| 12032 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 46 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="35524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35524] Iª-IIae q. 46 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12033 dicendum quod gradus illi irae distinguuntur secundum effectum | |
| 12034 irae, non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus | |
| 12035 irae.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 12036 <div id="FS_Q47" class="div3"> | |
| 12037 <h3 id="FS_Q47-p0.1">Q. 47. OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies | |
| 12038 in the text, except in A[4].] | |
| 12039 </h3> | |
| 12040 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 12041 <p id="FS_Q47-p2"> We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q47-p3"><a href="#FS_Q47_A1"> (1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p4"><a href="#FS_Q47_A2"> (2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p5"><a href="#FS_Q47_A3"> (3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;</a></p><p id="FS_Q47-p6"><a href="#FS_Q47_A4"> (4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.</a></p> | |
| 12042 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 pr."><a name="35525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35525] | |
| 12043 Iª-IIae q. 47 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa | |
| 12044 effectiva irae, et de remediis eius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur | |
| 12045 quatuor. Primo, utrum semper motivum irae sit aliquid factum contra | |
| 12046 eum qui irascitur. Secundo, utrum sola parvipensio vel despectio | |
| 12047 sit motivum irae. Tertio, de causa irae ex parte irascentis. | |
| 12048 Quarto, de causa irae ex parte eius contra quem aliquis | |
| 12049 irascitur.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 12050 <div id="FS_Q47_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A1-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 1. Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2"> | |
| 12051 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, | |
| 12052 can do nothing against God; since it is written ( | |
| 12053 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>): "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on | |
| 12054 account of sin, according to | |
| 12055 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv"> Ps. 105:40</a>: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always on | |
| 12056 account of something done against him, that a man is angry. | |
| 12057 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35526] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12058 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non semper aliquis irascatur propter | |
| 12059 aliquid contra se factum. Homo enim, peccando, nihil contra Deum | |
| 12060 facere potest, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, <i>si multiplicatae fuerint | |
| 12061 iniquitates tuae, quid facies contra illum?</i> Dicitur tamen Deus | |
| 12062 irasci contra homines propter peccata; secundum illud Psalmi CV, | |
| 12063 <i>iratus est furore dominus in populum suum</i>. Ergo non semper | |
| 12064 aliquis irascitur propter aliquid contra se factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p3"> | |
| 12065 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not | |
| 12066 always angry on account of something done against us. | |
| 12067 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35527] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12068 ira est appetitus vindictae. Sed aliquis appetit vindictam facere | |
| 12069 etiam de his quae contra alios fiunt. Ergo non semper motivum irae | |
| 12070 est aliquid contra nos factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p4"> | |
| 12071 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest | |
| 12072 in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does | |
| 12073 not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry. | |
| 12074 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35528] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12075 sicut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., homines irascuntur | |
| 12076 praecipue contra eos qui despiciunt <i>ea circa quae ipsi maxime | |
| 12077 student, sicut qui student in philosophia, irascuntur contra eos | |
| 12078 qui philosophiam despiciunt</i>, et simile est in aliis. Sed | |
| 12079 despicere philosophiam non est nocere ipsi studenti. Non ergo | |
| 12080 semper irascimur propter id quod contra nos fit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p5"> | |
| 12081 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, | |
| 12082 in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something | |
| 12083 done against him. | |
| 12084 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="35529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35529] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12085 ille qui tacet contra contumeliantem, magis ipsum ad iram provocat, | |
| 12086 ut dicit Chrysostomus. Sed in hoc contra ipsum nihil agit, quod | |
| 12087 tacet. Ergo non semper ira alicuius provocatur propter aliquid quod | |
| 12088 contra ipsum fit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p6"> | |
| 12089 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without | |
| 12090 anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such." | |
| 12091 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35530] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 12092 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira fit semper | |
| 12093 ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum, | |
| 12094 si enim putemus talem esse odimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p7"> | |
| 12095 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 12096 <a href="#FS_Q46_A6" id="FS_Q47_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[6]</a>), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no | |
| 12097 question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: | |
| 12098 for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does | |
| 12099 not affect a man unless in | |
| 12100 some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him. | |
| 12101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 co."><a name="35531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35531] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12102 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi | |
| 12103 alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem locum non | |
| 12104 habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam | |
| 12105 provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam, | |
| 12106 sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita | |
| 12107 etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo | |
| 12108 facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo | |
| 12109 modo sit contra ipsum. Unde sequitur quod motivum irae alicuius | |
| 12110 semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p8"> | |
| 12111 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance | |
| 12112 on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against | |
| 12113 God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; | |
| 12114 which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object | |
| 12115 of God's providence and protection. | |
| 12116 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35532] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12117 ergo dicendum quod ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, | |
| 12118 sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de | |
| 12119 peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective | |
| 12120 potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo | |
| 12121 quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo, | |
| 12122 inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri, | |
| 12123 quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei | |
| 12124 providentia et tutela continetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p9"> | |
| 12125 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in | |
| 12126 some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common. | |
| 12127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35533] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12128 dicendum quod irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam | |
| 12129 appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos | |
| 12130 pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel | |
| 12131 saltem per communionem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p10"> | |
| 12132 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as | |
| 12133 though we ourselves were despised and injured. | |
| 12134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35534] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12135 dicendum quod id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum | |
| 12136 nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque | |
| 12137 despici, et arbitramur nos laesos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A1-p11"> | |
| 12138 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight | |
| 12139 is an action. | |
| 12140 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="35535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35535] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12141 dicendum quod tunc aliquis tacens ad iram provocat iniuriantem, | |
| 12142 quando videtur ex contemptu tacere, quasi parvipendat alterius | |
| 12143 iram. Ipsa autem parvipensio quidam actus est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A2-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 2. Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p2"> | |
| 12144 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we | |
| 12145 are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised | |
| 12146 or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger. | |
| 12147 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35536] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12148 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sola parvipensio vel despectio sit | |
| 12149 motivum irae. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>iniuriam passi, vel | |
| 12150 aestimantes pati, irascimur</i>. Sed homo potest iniuriam pati | |
| 12151 etiam absque despectu vel parvipensione. Ergo non sola parvipensio | |
| 12152 est irae motivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p3"> | |
| 12153 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore | |
| 12154 they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. | |
| 12155 iii, 8). Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger. | |
| 12156 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35537] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12157 eiusdem est appetere honorem, et contristari de parvipensione. Sed | |
| 12158 bruta animalia non appetunt honorem. Ergo non contristantur de | |
| 12159 parvipensione. Et tamen in eis provocatur ira propter hoc quod | |
| 12160 vulnerantur, ut dicit philosophus, in III Ethic. Ergo non sola | |
| 12161 parvipensio videtur esse motivum irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p4"> | |
| 12162 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others | |
| 12163 should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore | |
| 12164 being slighted is not the only motive for being angry. | |
| 12165 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35538] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12166 philosophus, in II Rhetoric., ponit multas alias causas irae, puta | |
| 12167 <i>oblivionem, et exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem | |
| 12168 malorum, impedimentum consequendae propriae voluntatis</i>. Non | |
| 12169 ergo sola parvipensio est provocativum irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p5"> | |
| 12170 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done | |
| 12171 unbecomingly." | |
| 12172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35539] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 12173 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>ira est | |
| 12174 appetitus cum tristitia punitionis, propter apparentem | |
| 12175 parvipensionem non convenienter factam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A2-p6"> | |
| 12176 <b>I answer that,</b> All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful | |
| 12177 treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. | |
| 12178 Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore | |
| 12179 it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only | |
| 12180 for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice. | |
| 12181 Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering | |
| 12182 justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through | |
| 12183 ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury | |
| 12184 from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those | |
| 12185 who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through | |
| 12186 passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion | |
| 12187 takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, | |
| 12188 who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher | |
| 12189 says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because | |
| 12190 they do not seem to have acted slightingly." | |
| 12191 </p><p id="FS_Q47_A2-p7"> The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: because "men think little of things that are not | |
| 12192 worth much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is | |
| 12193 inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight. | |
| 12194 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 co."><a name="35540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35540] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12195 dicendum quod omnes causae irae reducuntur ad parvipensionem. Sunt | |
| 12196 enim tres species parvipensionis, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric., | |
| 12197 scilicet despectus, epereasmus, idest impedimentum voluntatis | |
| 12198 implendae, et contumeliatio, et ad haec tria omnia motiva irae | |
| 12199 reducuntur. Cuius ratio potest accipi duplex. Prima est, quia ira | |
| 12200 appetit nocumentum alterius, inquantum habet rationem iusti | |
| 12201 vindicativi, et ideo intantum quaerit vindictam, inquantum videtur | |
| 12202 esse iusta. Iusta autem vindicta non fit nisi de eo quod est | |
| 12203 iniuste factum, et ideo provocativum ad iram semper est aliquid sub | |
| 12204 ratione iniusti. Unde dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod | |
| 12205 <i>si homines putaverint eos qui laeserunt, esse iuste passos, non | |
| 12206 irascuntur, non enim fit ira ad iustum</i>. Contingit autem | |
| 12207 tripliciter nocumentum alicui inferri, scilicet ex ignorantia, ex | |
| 12208 passione, et ex electione. Tunc autem aliquis maxime iniustum | |
| 12209 facit, quando ex electione vel industria, vel ex certa malitia | |
| 12210 nocumentum infert, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Et ideo maxime irascimur | |
| 12211 contra illos quos putamus ex industria nobis nocuisse. Si enim | |
| 12212 putemus aliquos vel per ignorantiam, vel ex passione nobis | |
| 12213 intulisse iniuriam, vel non irascimur contra eos, vel multo minus, | |
| 12214 agere enim aliquid ex ignorantia vel ex passione, diminuit rationem | |
| 12215 iniuriae, et est quodammodo provocativum misericordiae et veniae. | |
| 12216 Illi autem qui ex industria nocumentum inferunt, ex contemptu | |
| 12217 peccare videntur, et ideo contra eos maxime irascimur. Unde | |
| 12218 philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>his qui propter iram | |
| 12219 aliquid fecerunt, aut non irascimur, aut minus irascimur, non enim | |
| 12220 propter parvipensionem videntur egisse</i>. Secunda ratio est, quia | |
| 12221 parvipensio excellentiae hominis opponitur, quae enim homines | |
| 12222 putant nullo digna esse, parvipendunt, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. | |
| 12223 Ex omnibus autem bonis nostris aliquam excellentiam quaerimus. Et | |
| 12224 ideo quodcumque nocumentum nobis inferatur, inquantum excellentiae | |
| 12225 derogat, videtur ad parvipensionem pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p8"> | |
| 12226 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt | |
| 12227 or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of anger. | |
| 12228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35541] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12229 ergo dicendum quod ex quacumque alia causa aliquis iniuriam | |
| 12230 patiatur quam ex contemptu, illa causa minuit rationem iniuriae. | |
| 12231 Sed solus contemptus, vel parvipensio, rationem irae auget. Et ideo | |
| 12232 est per se causa irascendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p9"> | |
| 12233 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything | |
| 12234 derogatory thereto. | |
| 12235 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35542] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12236 dicendum quod, licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione | |
| 12237 honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quandam excellentiam, et | |
| 12238 irascitur contra ea quae illi excellentiae derogant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A2-p10"> | |
| 12239 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we | |
| 12240 think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, | |
| 12241 this seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem | |
| 12242 to care little about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from | |
| 12243 carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently | |
| 12244 all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger. | |
| 12245 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35543] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12246 dicendum quod omnes illae causae ad quandam parvipensionem | |
| 12247 reducuntur. Oblivio enim parvipensionis est evidens signum, ea enim | |
| 12248 quae magna aestimamus, magis memoriae infigimus. Similiter ex | |
| 12249 quadam parvipensione est quod aliquis non vereatur contristare | |
| 12250 aliquem, denuntiando sibi aliqua tristia. Qui etiam in infortuniis | |
| 12251 alicuius hilaritatis signa ostendit, videtur parum curare de bono | |
| 12252 vel malo eius. Similiter etiam qui impedit aliquem a sui propositi | |
| 12253 assecutione, non propter aliquam utilitatem sibi inde provenientem, | |
| 12254 non videtur multum curare de amicitia eius. Et ideo omnia talia, | |
| 12255 inquantum sunt signa contemptus, sunt provocativa irae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A3-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 3. Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p2"> | |
| 12256 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, | |
| 12257 2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." | |
| 12258 But these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger. | |
| 12259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35544] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12260 sic proceditur. Videtur quod excellentia alicuius non sit causa | |
| 12261 quod facilius irascatur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., | |
| 12262 quod <i>maxime aliqui irascuntur cum tristantur, ut infirmi, et | |
| 12263 egentes, et qui non habent id quod concupiscunt</i>. Sed omnia ista | |
| 12264 ad defectum pertinere videntur. Ergo magis facit pronum ad iram | |
| 12265 defectus quam excellentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p3"> | |
| 12266 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some | |
| 12267 failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, | |
| 12268 they do not trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause | |
| 12269 of a man being angry. | |
| 12270 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35545] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12271 philosophus dicit ibidem quod <i>tunc aliqui maxime irascuntur, | |
| 12272 quando in eis despicitur id de quo potest esse suspicio quod vel | |
| 12273 non insit eis, vel quod insit eis debiliter, sed cum putant se | |
| 12274 multum excellere in illis in quibus despiciuntur, non curant</i>. | |
| 12275 Sed praedicta suspicio ex defectu provenit. Ergo defectus est magis | |
| 12276 causa quod aliquis irascatur, quam excellentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p4"> | |
| 12277 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men | |
| 12278 are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate | |
| 12279 pleasures and well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger. | |
| 12280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35546] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12281 ea quae ad excellentiam pertinent, maxime faciunt homines iucundos | |
| 12282 et bonae spei esse. Sed philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod | |
| 12283 <i>in ludo, in risu, in festo, in prosperitate, in consummatione | |
| 12284 operum, in delectatione non turpi, et in spe optima, homines non | |
| 12285 irascuntur</i>. Ergo excellentia non est causa irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p5"> | |
| 12286 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger. | |
| 12287 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35547] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 12288 est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter | |
| 12289 excellentiam indignantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A3-p6"> | |
| 12290 <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus | |
| 12291 excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above | |
| 12292 <a href="#FS_Q47_A2" id="FS_Q47_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Now it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. | |
| 12293 Consequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all | |
| 12294 angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so | |
| 12295 forth. | |
| 12296 </p><p id="FS_Q47_A3-p7"> Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by | |
| 12297 the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors | |
| 12298 of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who | |
| 12299 are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved. | |
| 12300 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 co."><a name="35548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35548] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12301 dicendum quod causa irae in eo qui irascitur, dupliciter accipi | |
| 12302 potest. Uno modo, secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae. Et sic | |
| 12303 excellentia est causa ut aliquis de facili irascatur. Est enim | |
| 12304 motivum irae iniusta parvipensio, ut dictum est. Constat autem quod | |
| 12305 quanto aliquis est excellentior, iniustius parvipenditur in hoc in | |
| 12306 quo excellit. Et ideo illi qui sunt in aliqua excellentia, maxime | |
| 12307 irascuntur, si parvipendantur, puta si dives parvipenditur in | |
| 12308 pecunia, et rhetor in loquendo, et sic de aliis. Alio modo potest | |
| 12309 considerari causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis | |
| 12310 quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod | |
| 12311 nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae | |
| 12312 ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines | |
| 12313 defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare | |
| 12314 homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius | |
| 12315 irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35549] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 12316 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p9"> | |
| 12317 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and | |
| 12318 therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly | |
| 12319 despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt | |
| 12320 but through ignorance, or some other like cause. | |
| 12321 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35550] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12322 dicendum quod ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum | |
| 12323 excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non | |
| 12324 contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte, | |
| 12325 inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi. | |
| 12326 Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter | |
| 12327 despectum; sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud | |
| 12328 huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A3-p10"> | |
| 12329 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger, | |
| 12330 because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone. | |
| 12331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35551] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12332 dicendum quod omnia illa impediunt iram, inquantum impediunt | |
| 12333 tristitiam. Sed ex alia parte, nata sunt provocare iram, secundum | |
| 12334 quod faciunt hominem inconvenientius despici.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q47_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q47_A4-p0.1">Q. 47. A. 4. Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p2"> | |
| 12335 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. | |
| 12336 ii, 3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with | |
| 12337 them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of | |
| 12338 a person is a reason for being less angry with him. | |
| 12339 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35552] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12340 sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus alicuius non sit causa ut | |
| 12341 contra ipsum facilius irascamur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II | |
| 12342 Rhetoric., quod <i>his qui confitentur et poenitent et humiliantur, | |
| 12343 non irascimur, sed magis ad eos mitescimus. Unde et canes non | |
| 12344 mordent eos qui resident</i>. Sed haec pertinent ad parvitatem et | |
| 12345 defectum. Ergo parvitas alicuius est causa ut ei minus | |
| 12346 irascamur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p3"> | |
| 12347 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does | |
| 12348 not provoke anger against him. | |
| 12349 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35553] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12350 nullus est maior defectus quam mortis. Sed ad mortuos desinit ira. | |
| 12351 Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa provocativa irae contra | |
| 12352 ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p4"> | |
| 12353 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they | |
| 12354 offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written ( | |
| 12355 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.54.13" target="asv">Ps. 54:13</a>): "If my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a person's defect is not a reason for being more | |
| 12356 easily angry with him. | |
| 12357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35554] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12358 nullus aestimat aliquem parvum ex hoc quod est sibi amicus. Sed ad | |
| 12359 amicos, si nos offenderint, vel si non iuverint, magis offendimur, | |
| 12360 unde dicitur in Psalmo LIV, <i>si inimicus meus maledixisset mihi, | |
| 12361 sustinuissem utique</i>. Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa ut | |
| 12362 contra ipsum facilius irascamur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p5"> | |
| 12363 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like | |
| 12364 manner the prince is angry with his subject." | |
| 12365 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35555] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 12366 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>dives | |
| 12367 irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra | |
| 12368 subiectum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q47_A4-p6"> | |
| 12369 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 12370 <a href="#FS_Q47_A2" id="FS_Q47_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3) unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person | |
| 12371 with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For just | |
| 12372 as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. | |
| 12373 Thus a nobleman is angry if he be | |
| 12374 insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant. | |
| 12375 </p><p id="FS_Q47_A4-p7"> If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In | |
| 12376 this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, | |
| 12377 mitigate anger, according to | |
| 12378 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.1" target="asv">Prov. 15:1</a>: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom | |
| 12379 they humble themselves. | |
| 12380 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 co."><a name="35556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35556] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12381 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, indigna despectio est maxime | |
| 12382 provocativa irae. Defectus igitur vel parvitas eius contra quem | |
| 12383 irascimur, facit ad augmentum irae, inquantum auget indignam | |
| 12384 despectionem. Sicut enim quanto aliquis est maior, tanto indignius | |
| 12385 despicitur; ita quanto aliquis est minor, tanto indignius despicit. | |
| 12386 Et ideo nobiles irascuntur si despiciantur a rusticis, vel | |
| 12387 sapientes ab insipientibus, vel domini a servis. Si vero parvitas | |
| 12388 vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non | |
| 12389 auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de | |
| 12390 iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et | |
| 12391 veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, <i>responsio | |
| 12392 mollis frangit iram</i>, inquantum scilicet tales videntur non | |
| 12393 despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35557] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 12394 patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p9"> | |
| 12395 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; | |
| 12396 and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have | |
| 12397 attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses | |
| 12398 the measure of just retaliation. | |
| 12399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35558] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12400 dicendum quod duplex est causa quare ad mortuos cessat ira. Una, | |
| 12401 quia non possunt dolere et sentire, quod maxime quaerunt irati in | |
| 12402 his quibus irascuntur. Alio modo, quia iam videntur ad ultimum | |
| 12403 malorum pervenisse. Unde etiam ad quoscumque graviter laesos cessat | |
| 12404 ira, inquantum eorum malum excedit mensuram iustae | |
| 12405 retributionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q47_A4-p10"> | |
| 12406 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing | |
| 12407 to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us. | |
| 12408 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 47 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35559] Iª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12409 dicendum quod etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse | |
| 12410 magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos, | |
| 12411 si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra | |
| 12412 minores.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 12413 <div id="FS_Q48" class="div3"> | |
| 12414 <h3 id="FS_Q48-p0.1">Q. 48. OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 12415 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 12416 <p id="FS_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q48-p3"><a href="#FS_Q48_A1"> (1) Whether anger causes pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p4"><a href="#FS_Q48_A2"> (2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p5"><a href="#FS_Q48_A3"> (3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q48-p6"><a href="#FS_Q48_A4"> (4) Whether it causes taciturnity?</a></p> | |
| 12417 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 pr."><a name="35560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35560] | |
| 12418 Iª-IIae q. 48 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 12419 effectibus irae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ira | |
| 12420 causet delectationem. Secundo, utrum maxime causet fervorem in | |
| 12421 corde. Tertio, utrum maxime impediat rationis usum. Quarto, utrum | |
| 12422 causet taciturnitatem.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 12423 <div id="FS_Q48_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A1-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 1. Whether anger causes pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p2"> | |
| 12424 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, | |
| 12425 as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure. | |
| 12426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35561] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12427 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet delectationem. | |
| 12428 Tristitia enim delectationem excludit. Sed ira est semper cum | |
| 12429 tristitia, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., <i>omnis qui facit | |
| 12430 aliquid per iram, facit tristatus</i>. Ergo ira non causat | |
| 12431 delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p3"> | |
| 12432 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain": | |
| 12433 whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on | |
| 12434 the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure. | |
| 12435 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35562] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12436 philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>punitio quietat impetum | |
| 12437 irae, delectationem pro tristitia faciens</i>, ex quo potest accipi | |
| 12438 quod delectatio irato provenit ex punitione, punitio autem excludit | |
| 12439 iram. Ergo, adveniente delectatione, ira tollitur. Non est ergo | |
| 12440 effectus delectationi coniunctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p4"> | |
| 12441 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, | |
| 12442 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger. | |
| 12443 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35563] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12444 nullus effectus impedit causam suam, cum sit suae causae conformis. | |
| 12445 Sed delectationes impediunt iram, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo | |
| 12446 delectatio non est effectus irae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p5"> | |
| 12447 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 | |
| 12448 [trl. Pope]). | |
| 12449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35564] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 12450 est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod | |
| 12451 <i>ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum | |
| 12452 crescit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6"> | |
| 12453 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: | |
| 12454 and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in | |
| 12455 the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said ( | |
| 12456 <a href="#FS_Q47_A1" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for | |
| 12457 which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the | |
| 12458 greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding | |
| 12459 sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man | |
| 12460 in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above ( | |
| 12461 <a href="#FS_Q46_A1" id="FS_Q48_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought | |
| 12462 of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much | |
| 12463 about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger. | |
| 12464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 co."><a name="35565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35565] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12465 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., | |
| 12466 delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae | |
| 12467 quaedam contra tristitiam, et ideo quanto per delectationem contra | |
| 12468 maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto | |
| 12469 delectatio magis percipitur; sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, | |
| 12470 delectabilior fit ei potus. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod | |
| 12471 motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante; cui | |
| 12472 quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam. Et ideo ad | |
| 12473 praesentiam vindictae delectatio sequitur, et tanto maior, quanto | |
| 12474 maior fuit tristitia. Si igitur vindicta fuerit praesens realiter, | |
| 12475 fit perfecta delectatio, quae totaliter excludit tristitiam, et per | |
| 12476 hoc quietat motum irae. Sed antequam vindicta sit praesens | |
| 12477 realiter, fit irascenti praesens dupliciter. Uno modo, per spem, | |
| 12478 quia nullus irascitur nisi sperans vindictam, ut supra dictum est. | |
| 12479 Alio modo, secundum continuam cogitationem. Unicuique enim | |
| 12480 concupiscenti est delectabile immorari in cogitatione eorum quae | |
| 12481 concupiscit, propter quod etiam imaginationes somniorum sunt | |
| 12482 delectabiles. Et ideo, cum iratus multum in animo suo cogitet de | |
| 12483 vindicta, ex hoc delectatur. Tamen delectatio non est perfecta, | |
| 12484 quae tollat tristitiam, et per consequens iram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p7"> | |
| 12485 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the | |
| 12486 thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus | |
| 12487 of anger. | |
| 12488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35566] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12489 ergo dicendum quod non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet, sed | |
| 12490 tristatur de illata iniuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata | |
| 12491 et sperata. Unde tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed | |
| 12492 delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p8"> | |
| 12493 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether. | |
| 12494 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35567] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12495 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de delectatione quae causatur | |
| 12496 ex reali praesentia vindictae, quae totaliter tollit iram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A1-p9"> | |
| 12497 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking | |
| 12498 vengeance follows from anger. | |
| 12499 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35568] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12500 dicendum quod delectationes praecedentes impediunt ne sequatur | |
| 12501 tristitia; et per consequens impediunt iram. Sed delectatio de | |
| 12502 vindicta consequitur ipsam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A2-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 2. Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2"> | |
| 12503 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above ( | |
| 12504 <a href="#FS_Q28_A5" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[28], A[5]</a>; | |
| 12505 <a href="#FS_Q37_A2" id="FS_Q48_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[37], A[2]</a>), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more | |
| 12506 powerful than its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor. | |
| 12507 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35569] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12508 sic proceditur. Videtur quod fervor non sit maxime effectus irae. | |
| 12509 Fervor enim, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet ad amorem. Sed amor, | |
| 12510 sicut supra dictum est, principium est et causa omnium passionum. | |
| 12511 Cum ergo causa sit potior effectu, videtur quod ira non faciat | |
| 12512 maxime fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p3"> | |
| 12513 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer | |
| 12514 it lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." | |
| 12515 Therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger. | |
| 12516 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35570] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12517 illa quae de se excitant fervorem, per temporis assiduitatem magis | |
| 12518 augentur, sicut amor diuturnitate convalescit. Sed ira per tractum | |
| 12519 temporis debilitatur, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod | |
| 12520 tempus quietat iram. Ergo ira non proprie causat fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p4"> | |
| 12521 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," | |
| 12522 as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor. | |
| 12523 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35571] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12524 fervor additus fervori, augmentat fervorem. <i>Sed maior ira | |
| 12525 superveniens facit iram mitescere</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in II | |
| 12526 Rhetoric. Ergo ira non causat fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p5"> | |
| 12527 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger is fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of | |
| 12528 the bile." | |
| 12529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35572] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 12530 est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>ira est fervor eius qui circa | |
| 12531 cor est sanguinis, ex evaporatione fellis fiens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p6"> | |
| 12532 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 12533 <a href="#FS_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q48_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>), the bodily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now | |
| 12534 it is evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to | |
| 12535 it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. | |
| 12536 Since then the appetitive movement | |
| 12537 of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great | |
| 12538 force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of | |
| 12539 anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecution, | |
| 12540 which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital | |
| 12541 spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being | |
| 12542 so disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. | |
| 12543 v, 30) "the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the | |
| 12544 countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes | |
| 12545 a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says." | |
| 12546 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 co."><a name="35573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35573] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12547 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, corporalis transmutatio quae est | |
| 12548 in passionibus animae, proportionatur motui appetitus. Manifestum | |
| 12549 est autem quod quilibet appetitus, etiam naturalis, fortius tendit | |
| 12550 in id quod est sibi contrarium, si fuerit praesens, unde videmus | |
| 12551 quod aqua calefacta magis congelatur, quasi frigido vehementius in | |
| 12552 calidum agente. Motus autem appetitivus irae causatur ex aliqua | |
| 12553 iniuria illata, sicut ex quodam contrario iniacente. Et ideo | |
| 12554 appetitus potissime tendit ad repellendum iniuriam per appetitum | |
| 12555 vindictae, et ex hoc sequitur magna vehementia et impetuositas in | |
| 12556 motu irae. Et quia motus irae non est per modum retractionis, cui | |
| 12557 proportionatur frigus; sed magis per modum insecutionis, cui | |
| 12558 proportionatur calor; consequenter fit motus irae causativus | |
| 12559 cuiusdam fervoris sanguinis et spirituum circa cor, quod est | |
| 12560 instrumentum passionum animae. Et exinde est quod, propter magnam | |
| 12561 perturbationem cordis quae est in ira, maxime apparent in iratis | |
| 12562 indicia quaedam in exterioribus membris. Ut enim Gregorius dicit, | |
| 12563 in V Moral., <i>irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus | |
| 12564 tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, | |
| 12565 et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed | |
| 12566 sensus quid loquatur, ignorat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p7"> | |
| 12567 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently | |
| 12568 when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being | |
| 12569 that his heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor | |
| 12570 of love and makes it to be felt more. | |
| 12571 </p><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor | |
| 12572 of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is likened to the warmth | |
| 12573 of the air and of the blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that "love | |
| 12574 springs from the liver," because of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has | |
| 12575 a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to | |
| 12576 the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation | |
| 12577 of the bile whence it takes its name {chole}." | |
| 12578 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35574] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12579 ergo dicendum quod <i>amor ipse non ita sentitur, nisi cum eum | |
| 12580 prodit indigentia</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin. Et ideo | |
| 12581 quando homo patitur detrimentum amatae excellentiae propter | |
| 12582 iniuriam illatam, magis sentitur amor; et ideo ferventius cor | |
| 12583 mutatur ad removendum impedimentum rei amatae; ut sic fervor ipse | |
| 12584 amoris per iram crescat, et magis sentiatur. Et tamen fervor qui | |
| 12585 consequitur calorem, alia ratione pertinet ad amorem, et ad iram. | |
| 12586 Nam fervor amoris est cum quadam dulcedine et lenitate, est enim in | |
| 12587 bonum amatum. Et ideo assimilatur calori aeris et sanguinis, | |
| 12588 propter quod, sanguinei sunt magis amativi; et dicitur quod cogit | |
| 12589 amare iecur, in quo fit quaedam generatio sanguinis. Fervor autem | |
| 12590 irae est cum amaritudine, ad consumendum, quia tendit ad punitionem | |
| 12591 contrarii. Unde assimilatur calori ignis et cholerae, et propter | |
| 12592 hoc Damascenus dicit quod <i>procedit ex evaporatione fellis, et | |
| 12593 fellea nominatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p9"> | |
| 12594 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is | |
| 12595 weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong | |
| 12596 done. Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. | |
| 12597 Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is | |
| 12598 gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love, so long as the | |
| 12599 cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a friend's absence lasts long, | |
| 12600 it seems to make men forget their friendship." But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being | |
| 12601 multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually | |
| 12602 multiplied. | |
| 12603 </p><p id="FS_Q48_A2-p10"> Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent | |
| 12604 having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away. | |
| 12605 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35575] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12606 dicendum quod omne illud cuius causa per tempus diminuitur, necesse | |
| 12607 est quod tempore debilitetur. Manifestum est autem quod memoria | |
| 12608 tempore diminuitur, quae enim antiqua sunt, a memoria de facili | |
| 12609 excidunt. Ira autem causatur ex memoria iniuriae illatae. Et ideo | |
| 12610 causa irae per tempus paulatim diminuitur, quousque totaliter | |
| 12611 tollatur. Maior etiam videtur iniuria quando primo sentitur; et | |
| 12612 paulatim diminuitur eius aestimatio, secundum quod magis receditur | |
| 12613 a praesenti sensu iniuriae. Et similiter etiam est de amore, si | |
| 12614 amoris causa remaneat in sola memoria, unde philosophus dicit, in | |
| 12615 VIII Ethic., quod si <i>diuturna fiat amici absentia, videtur | |
| 12616 amicitiae oblivionem facere</i>. Sed in praesentia amici, semper | |
| 12617 per tempus multiplicatur causa amicitiae, et ideo amicitia crescit. | |
| 12618 Et similiter esset de ira, si continue multiplicaretur causa | |
| 12619 ipsius. Tamen hoc ipsum quod ira cito consumitur, attestatur | |
| 12620 vehementi fervori ipsius. Sicut enim ignis magnus cito extinguitur, | |
| 12621 consumpta materia; ita etiam ira, propter suam vehementiam, cito | |
| 12622 deficit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A2-p11"> | |
| 12623 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with | |
| 12624 another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be | |
| 12625 greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned | |
| 12626 greater, seem to be of little or no account. | |
| 12627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35576] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12628 dicendum quod omnis virtus divisa in plures partes, diminuitur. Et | |
| 12629 ideo quando aliquis iratus alicui, irascitur postmodum alteri, ex | |
| 12630 hoc ipso diminuitur ira ad primum. Et praecipue si ad secundum | |
| 12631 fuerit maior ira, nam iniuria quae excitavit iram ad primum, | |
| 12632 videbitur, comparatione secundae iniuriae, quae aestimatur maior, | |
| 12633 esse parva vel nulla.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A3-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 3. Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p2"> | |
| 12634 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem | |
| 12635 to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason. | |
| 12636 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35577] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12637 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non impediat rationem. Illud enim | |
| 12638 quod est cum ratione, non videtur esse rationis impedimentum. Sed | |
| 12639 ira est cum ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo ira non impedit | |
| 12640 rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p3"> | |
| 12641 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) | |
| 12642 that "an angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; | |
| 12643 for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.). | |
| 12644 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35578] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12645 quanto magis impeditur ratio, tanto diminuitur manifestatio. Sed | |
| 12646 philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., quod <i>iracundus non est | |
| 12647 insidiator, sed manifestus</i>. Ergo ira non videtur impedire usum | |
| 12648 rationis, sicut concupiscentia; quae est insidiosa, ut ibidem | |
| 12649 dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p4"> | |
| 12650 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more | |
| 12651 clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are | |
| 12652 more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored": and so forth. Therefore | |
| 12653 the same cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does | |
| 12654 not hinder the judgment of reason. | |
| 12655 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35579] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12656 iudicium rationis evidentius fit ex adiunctione contrarii, quia | |
| 12657 contraria iuxta se posita magis elucescunt. Sed ex hoc etiam | |
| 12658 crescit ira, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod <i>magis | |
| 12659 homines irascuntur, si contraria praeexistunt, sicut honorati si | |
| 12660 dehonorentur</i>; et sic de aliis. Ergo ex eodem et ira crescit, et | |
| 12661 iudicium rationis adiuvatur. Non ergo ira impedit iudicium | |
| 12662 rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p5"> | |
| 12663 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind." | |
| 12664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35580] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 12665 est quod Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod <i>ira intelligentiae | |
| 12666 lucem subtrahit, cum mentem permovendo confundit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6"> | |
| 12667 <b>I answer that,</b> Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers | |
| 12668 for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that | |
| 12669 any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has | |
| 12670 been stated | |
| 12671 <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that anger, above all, causes a bodily | |
| 12672 disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions, | |
| 12673 anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to | |
| 12674 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.10" target="asv"> Ps. 30:10</a>: "My eye is troubled with wrath." | |
| 12675 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 co."><a name="35581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35581] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12676 dicendum quod mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in | |
| 12677 suo proprio actu; tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam | |
| 12678 viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato; | |
| 12679 necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis | |
| 12680 impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno. Dictum est autem quod | |
| 12681 ira maxime facit perturbationem corporalem circa cor, ita ut etiam | |
| 12682 usque ad exteriora membra derivetur. Unde ira, inter ceteras | |
| 12683 passiones, manifestius impedit iudicium rationis; secundum illud | |
| 12684 Psalmi XXX, <i>conturbatus est in ira oculus meus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p7"> | |
| 12685 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the | |
| 12686 passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of | |
| 12687 the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders | |
| 12688 the judgment of reason. | |
| 12689 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35582] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12690 ergo dicendum quod a ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum | |
| 12691 appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira. Sed perfectum iudicium | |
| 12692 rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte rationem | |
| 12693 audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae | |
| 12694 est materialis in ira. Et quantum ad hoc, impedit iudicium | |
| 12695 rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p8"> | |
| 12696 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without | |
| 12697 thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and | |
| 12698 what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity | |
| 12699 which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man | |
| 12700 (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly." Desire, on the other | |
| 12701 hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame | |
| 12702 and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as | |
| 12703 matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open. | |
| 12704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35583] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12705 dicendum quod iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia | |
| 12706 manifestum sit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste | |
| 12707 operatur, non quaerens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit | |
| 12708 propter impedimentum rationis, quae non potest discernere quid sit | |
| 12709 occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi | |
| 12710 vias. Partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quae pertinet ad | |
| 12711 magnanimitatem, quam facit ira, unde et de magnanimo philosophus | |
| 12712 dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>est manifestus oditor et amator et | |
| 12713 manifeste dicit et operatur</i>. Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse | |
| 12714 latens et insidiosa, quia, ut plurimum, delectabilia quae | |
| 12715 concupiscuntur, habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem, in quibus | |
| 12716 homo vult latere. In his autem quae sunt virilitatis et | |
| 12717 excellentiae, cuiusmodi sunt vindictae, quaerit homo manifestus | |
| 12718 esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A3-p9"> | |
| 12719 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another | |
| 12720 facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or | |
| 12721 wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. | |
| 12722 Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being | |
| 12723 received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, anger is increased | |
| 12724 also. | |
| 12725 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35584] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12726 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus irae a ratione incipit, et | |
| 12727 ideo secundum idem appositio contrarii ad contrarium adiuvat | |
| 12728 iudicium rationis, et auget iram. Cum enim aliquis habet honorem | |
| 12729 vel divitias, et postea incurrit alicuius detrimentum, illud | |
| 12730 detrimentum apparet maius, tum propter vicinitatem contrarii; tum | |
| 12731 quia erat inopinatum. Et ideo causat maiorem tristitiam, sicut | |
| 12732 etiam magna bona ex inopinato venientia, causant maiorem | |
| 12733 delectationem. Et secundum augmentum tristitiae praecedentis, | |
| 12734 consequenter augetur et ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q48_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q48_A4-p0.1">Q. 48. A. 4. Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p2"> | |
| 12735 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger conduces | |
| 12736 to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord ( | |
| 12737 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and " . | |
| 12738 . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity. | |
| 12739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35585] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12740 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet taciturnitatem. | |
| 12741 Taciturnitas enim locutioni opponitur. Sed per crementum irae usque | |
| 12742 ad locutionem pervenitur, ut patet per gradus irae quos dominus | |
| 12743 assignat, Matth. V, dicens, <i>qui irascitur fratri suo; et, qui | |
| 12744 dixerit fratri suo, raca; et, qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue</i>. | |
| 12745 Ergo ira non causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3"> | |
| 12746 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written ( | |
| 12747 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.28" target="asv">Prov. 25:28</a>): "As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking." | |
| 12748 But anger, above all, hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above | |
| 12749 <a href="#FS_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words. Therefore it does not | |
| 12750 cause taciturnity. | |
| 12751 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35586] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12752 ex hoc quod custodia rationis deficit, contingit quod homo | |
| 12753 prorumpat ad verba inordinata, unde dicitur Prov. XXV, <i>sicut | |
| 12754 urbs patens et absque murorum ambitu, ita vir qui non potest | |
| 12755 cohibere in loquendo spiritum suum</i>. Sed ira maxime impedit | |
| 12756 iudicium rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo facit maxime profluere in | |
| 12757 verba inordinata. Non ergo causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4"> | |
| 12758 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( | |
| 12759 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.34" target="asv">Mat. 12:34</a>): "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as stated | |
| 12760 above | |
| 12761 <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore above all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. | |
| 12762 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35587] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12763 Matth. XII dicitur, ex abundantia cordis os loquitur. Sed per iram | |
| 12764 cor maxime perturbatur, ut dictum est. Ergo maxime causat | |
| 12765 locutionem. Non ergo causat taciturnitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p5"> | |
| 12766 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely." | |
| 12767 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35588] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 12768 est quod Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod <i>ira per silentium | |
| 12769 clausa, intra mentem vehementius aestuat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6"> | |
| 12770 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 12771 <a href="#FS_Q48_A3" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[46], A[4]), anger both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects it may cause taciturnity. | |
| 12772 On the part of the reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite in its | |
| 12773 inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes | |
| 12774 when the mind is disturbed, anger, as | |
| 12775 if in judgment, commands silence." On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated above | |
| 12776 <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the | |
| 12777 emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above | |
| 12778 <a href="#FS_Q48_A2" id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, "the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." Consequently anger may cause such a disturbance, | |
| 12779 that | |
| 12780 the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result. | |
| 12781 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 co."><a name="35589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35589] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 12782 dicendum quod ira, sicut iam dictum est, et cum ratione est, et | |
| 12783 impedit rationem. Et ex utraque parte, potest taciturnitatem | |
| 12784 causare. Ex parte quidem rationis, quando iudicium rationis | |
| 12785 intantum viget quod, etsi non cohibeat affectum ab inordinato | |
| 12786 appetitu vindictae, cohibet tamen linguam ab inordinata locutione. | |
| 12787 Unde Gregorius, in V Moral., dicit, <i>aliquando ira perturbato | |
| 12788 animo, quasi ex iudicio, silentium indicit</i>. Ex parte vero | |
| 12789 impedimenti rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, perturbatio irae | |
| 12790 usque ad exteriora membra perducitur; et maxime ad illa membra in | |
| 12791 quibus expressius relucet vestigium cordis, sicut in oculis et in | |
| 12792 facie et in lingua; unde, sicut dictum est, <i>lingua se praepedit, | |
| 12793 facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi</i>. Potest ergo esse tanta | |
| 12794 perturbatio irae, quod omnino impediatur lingua ab usu loquendi. Et | |
| 12795 tunc sequitur taciturnitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p7"> | |
| 12796 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to | |
| 12797 paralyze the tongue and other outward members. | |
| 12798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35590] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 12799 ergo dicendum quod augmentum irae quandoque est usque ad | |
| 12800 impediendum rationem a cohibitione linguae. Quandoque autem ultra | |
| 12801 procedit, usque ad impediendum motum linguae, et aliorum membrorum | |
| 12802 exteriorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35591] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 12803 etiam patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q48_A4-p9"> | |
| 12804 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered | |
| 12805 by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even | |
| 12806 death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds | |
| 12807 to speak. | |
| 12808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 48 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35592] Iª-IIae q. 48 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12809 dicendum quod perturbatio cordis quandoque potest superabundare | |
| 12810 usque ad hoc, quod per inordinatum motum cordis impediatur motus | |
| 12811 exteriorum membrorum. Et tunc causatur taciturnitas, et immobilitas | |
| 12812 exteriorum membrorum, et quandoque etiam mors. Si autem non fuerit | |
| 12813 tanta perturbatio, tunc ex abundantia perturbationis cordis, | |
| 12814 sequitur oris locutio.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 12815 | |
| 12816 | |
| 12817 ` | |
| 12818 </div> | |
| 12819 </body> | |
| 12820 </html> |
