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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.iv" class="div2">
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2 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a>
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3 <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a>
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74
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4 <h2 id="FP.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)</h2>
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64
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5 <div id="FP_Q44" class="div3">
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6 <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a>
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7 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
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8 <h3 id="FP_Q44-p0.1">THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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9 <p id="FP_Q44-p1"></p>
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10 <p id="FP_Q44-p2"> After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration
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11 will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and
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12 government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode
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13 of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.
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14 </p>
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15 <p id="FP_Q44-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
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16 <p id="FP_Q44-p4"> (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?</p>
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17 <p id="FP_Q44-p5"> (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?</p>
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18 <p id="FP_Q44-p6"> (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?</p>
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19 <p id="FP_Q44-p7"> (4) Whether He is the final cause of things?</p>
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20 <div id="FP_Q44_A1" class="div4">
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21 <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a>
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22 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
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23 <h4 id="FP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?</h4>
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24 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p1"></p>
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25 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p2">
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26 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
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27 without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing
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28 caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they
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29 can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
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30 God.
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31 </p>
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32 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p3">
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33 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient
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34 cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are
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35 many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.
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36 </p>
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37 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p4">
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38 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by
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39 the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from
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40 their efficient cause.
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41 </p>
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42 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p5">
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43 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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44 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.36" target="asv">Rom. 11:36</a>): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things."
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45 </p>
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46 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p6">
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47 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must
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48 be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (
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49 <a id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (
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50 <a id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], AA[3]</a>,4) that subsisting being must be
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51 one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all
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52 beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which
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53 are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who
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54 possesses being most perfectly.
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55 </p>
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56 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p7"> Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever
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57 is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest
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58 in heat is the cause of all heat.
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59 </p>
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60 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p8">
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61 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on
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62 what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused.
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63 Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since
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64 to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible
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65 for us to find a being uncaused.
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66 </p>
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67 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p9">
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68 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false
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69 in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle
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70 says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an
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71 efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but
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72 because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and
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73 consequent be possible or impossible.
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74 </p>
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75 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p10">
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76 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract
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77 in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although
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78 the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under
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79 the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that
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80 object from its efficient cause.
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81 </p>
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82 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p11"></p>
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83 <p id="FP_Q44_A1-p12"></p>
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84 <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a>
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85 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
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86 </div>
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87 <div id="FP_Q44_A2" class="div4">
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88 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
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89 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
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90 <h4 id="FP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Whether primary matter is created by God?</h4>
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91 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p1"></p>
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92 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p2">
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93 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
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94 (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.
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95 </p>
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96 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p3">
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97 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive
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98 principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from
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99 the other.
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100 </p>
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101 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p4">
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102 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
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103 everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore
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104 it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
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105 </p>
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106 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p5">
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107 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh
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108 unto nothing"---viz. primary matter.
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109 </p>
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110 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p6">
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111 <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
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112 mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did
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113 not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and
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114 separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated,
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115 they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of
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116 that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter,
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117 which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential
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118 forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according
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119 to
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120 Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its
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121 form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to
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122 a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some
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123 particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others
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124 there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as
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125 "such," but as "beings."
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126 </p>
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127 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p7"> Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are
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128 "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs
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129 to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause
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130 of things.
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131 </p>
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132 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p8">
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133 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental
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134 or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from
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135 which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.
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136 </p>
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137 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p9">
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138 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first
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139 active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
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140 says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
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141 </p>
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142 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p10">
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143 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything
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144 created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if
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145 all that belongs to its being is created.
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146 </p>
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147 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p11"></p>
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148 <p id="FP_Q44_A2-p12"></p>
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149 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
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150 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
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151 </div>
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152 <div id="FP_Q44_A3" class="div4">
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153 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
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154 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a>
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155 <h4 id="FP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?</h4>
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156 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p1"></p>
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157 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p2">
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158 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures
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159 are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
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160 </p>
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161 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p3">
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162 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated
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163 above
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164 <a id="FP_Q44_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in
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165 all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles
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166 of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit
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167 self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars.
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168 Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
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169 </p>
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170 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p4">
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171 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because
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172 there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing
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173 in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
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174 </p>
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175 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p5">
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176 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting
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177 life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
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178 </p>
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179 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p6">
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180 <b>On the contrary,</b> The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are
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181 contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.
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182 </p>
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183 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p7">
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184 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
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185 exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate
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186 form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily
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187 conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive
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188 determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom
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189 devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine
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190 wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (
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191 <a id="FP_Q44_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html">Q[15], A[1]</a>). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not
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192 apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this
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193 manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar
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194 of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.
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195 </p>
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196 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p8">
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197 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like
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198 to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material
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199 house is like to the house in the architect's mind.
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200 </p>
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201 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p9">
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202 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man
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203 is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior
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204 species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
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205 </p>
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206 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p10">
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207 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the
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208 same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active
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209 intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars
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210 in order to be their exemplars.
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211 </p>
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212 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p11">
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213 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes
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214 the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
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215 </p>
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216 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p12"></p>
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217 <p id="FP_Q44_A3-p13"></p>
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218 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
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219 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a>
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220 </div>
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221 <div id="FP_Q44_A4" class="div4">
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222 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
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223 <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a>
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224 <h4 id="FP_Q44_A4-p0.1">Whether God is the final cause of all things?</h4>
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225 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p1"></p>
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226 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p2">
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227 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
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228 needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
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229 </p>
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230 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p3">
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231 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
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232 because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore
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233 He is not the final cause of all things.
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234 </p>
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235 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p4">
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236 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not
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237 the end of all things.
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238 </p>
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239 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p5">
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240 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows
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241 that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
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242 </p>
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243 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p6">
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244 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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245 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord has made all things for Himself."
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246 </p>
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247 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p7">
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248 <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless
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249 it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively.
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250 For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some
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251 things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect
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252 agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the
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253 First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which
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254 is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection
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255 and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.
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256 </p>
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257 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p8">
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258 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong
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259 to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for
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260 His own goodness.
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261 </p>
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262 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p9">
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263 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator,
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264 which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
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265 since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
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266 </p>
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267 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p10">
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268 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or
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269 natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness
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270 to God.
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271 </p>
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272 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p11">
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273 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows
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274 that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things
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275 in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.
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276 </p>
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277 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p12"></p>
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278 <p id="FP_Q44_A4-p13"></p>
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279 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
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280 <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a>
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281 </div>
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282 <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a>
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283 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
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284 </div>
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285 <div id="FP_Q45" class="div3">
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286 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a>
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287 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
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288 <h3 id="FP_Q45-p0.1">THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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289 <p id="FP_Q45-p1"></p>
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290 <p id="FP_Q45-p2"> The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and
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291 includes eight points of inquiry:
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292 </p>
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293 <p id="FP_Q45-p3"> (1) What is creation?</p>
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294 <p id="FP_Q45-p4"> (2) Whether God can create anything?</p>
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295 <p id="FP_Q45-p5"> (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?</p>
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296 <p id="FP_Q45-p6"> (4) To what things it belongs to be created?</p>
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297 <p id="FP_Q45-p7"> (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</p>
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298 <p id="FP_Q45-p8"> (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?</p>
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299 <p id="FP_Q45-p9"> (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?</p>
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300 <p id="FP_Q45-p10"> (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?</p>
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301 <div id="FP_Q45_A1" class="div4">
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302 <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a>
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303 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
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304 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Whether to create is to make something from nothing?</h4>
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305 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p1"></p>
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306 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p2">
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307 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To
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308 make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already."
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309 </p>
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310 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p3">
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311 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good,
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312 and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among
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313 all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
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314 </p>
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315 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p4">
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316 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say
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317 that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create
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318 is not to make something from nothing.
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319 </p>
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320 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p5">
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321 <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text of
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322 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing."
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323 </p>
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324 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p6">
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325 <b>I answer that,</b> As said above (
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326 <a id="FP_Q45_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being
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327 from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular
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328 emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man,"
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329 and white from "not-white."
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330 Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being
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331 should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is
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332 from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is
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333 "nothing."
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334 </p>
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335 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p7">
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336 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when
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337 we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
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338 </p>
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339 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p8">
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340 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more
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341 perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding
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342 to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because
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343 the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the
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344 privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which
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345 is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because
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346 the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being.
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347 </p>
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348 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p9">
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349 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only
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350 order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition
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351 "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first
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352 sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and
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353 its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It
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354 is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does
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355 not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the
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356 first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the
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357 material
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358 cause, which is denied.
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359 </p>
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360 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p10"></p>
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361 <p id="FP_Q45_A1-p11"></p>
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362 <a href="summa.FP_Q45.html"></a>
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363 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
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364 </div>
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365 <div id="FP_Q45_A2" class="div4">
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366 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
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367 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
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368 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Whether God can create anything?</h4>
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369 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p1"></p>
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370 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p2">
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371 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers
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372 considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the
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373 contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation
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374 and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from
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375 nothing, or create.
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376 </p>
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377 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p3">
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378 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
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379 creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the
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380 act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God.
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381 </p>
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382 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p4">
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383 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same
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384 time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already
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385 is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming
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386 precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which
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387 the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.
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388 </p>
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389 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p5">
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390 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not
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391 happen that something is made from nothing.
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392 </p>
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393 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p6">
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394 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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395 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
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396 </p>
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397 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p7">
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398 <b>I answer that,</b> Not only is it impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created
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399 by God, as appears from what has been said (
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400 <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is
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401 not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action
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402 of art,
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403 but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If
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404 therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him.
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405 Now it has been shown above (
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406 <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that
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407 God brings things into being from nothing.
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408 </p>
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409 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p8">
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410 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ancient philosophers, as is said above (
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411 <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their
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412 action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation
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413 from the universal principle of things.
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414 </p>
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415 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p9">
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416 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different
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417 now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
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418 motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial
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419 change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
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420 substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding,
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421 so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide
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422 as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that
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423 when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of
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424 signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (
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425 <a id="FP_Q45_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing.
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426 And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make"
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427 and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
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428 </p>
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429 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p10">
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430 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the
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431 term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is
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432 not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being
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433 made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was
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434 not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time.
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435 </p>
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436 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p11">
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437 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
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438 plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms.
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439 </p>
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440 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p12"></p>
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441 <p id="FP_Q45_A2-p13"></p>
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442 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
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443 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
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444 </div>
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445 <div id="FP_Q45_A3" class="div4">
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446 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
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447 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
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448 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Whether creation is anything in the creature?</h4>
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449 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p1"></p>
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450 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p2">
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451 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the
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452 creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in
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453 the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively
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454 is not anything in the creature.
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455 </p>
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456 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p3">
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457 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
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458 since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for
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459 the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the
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460 creature.
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461 </p>
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462 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p4">
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463 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
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464 is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and
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465 also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while
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466 the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
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467 and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
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468 </p>
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469 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p5">
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470 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental
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471 form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental
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472 form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole
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473 substance, something in the thing created.
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474 </p>
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475 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p6">
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476 <b>I answer that,</b> Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement,
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477 or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in
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478 the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all
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479 beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when
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480 movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the
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481 creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement,
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482 is implied a relation to the principle of motion.
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483 </p>
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484 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p7">
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485 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God
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486 relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God
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487 is a real relation, as was said above (
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488 <a id="FP_Q45_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html">Q[13], A[7]</a>) in treating of the divine names.
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489 </p>
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490 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p8">
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491 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover
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492 and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive
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493 creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations,
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494 or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other
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495 relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above (
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496 <a id="FP_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html">Q[42], A[1]</a>, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons.
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497 </p>
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498 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p9">
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499 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and
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500 is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the
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501 part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the
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502 creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature
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503 to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
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504 </p>
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505 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p10"></p>
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506 <p id="FP_Q45_A3-p11"></p>
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507 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
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508 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
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509 </div>
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510 <div id="FP_Q45_A4" class="div4">
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511 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
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512 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
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513 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?</h4>
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514 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p1"></p>
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515 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p2">
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516 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv)
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517 it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly
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518 speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.
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519 </p>
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520 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p3">
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521 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
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522 component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
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523 </p>
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524 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p4">
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525 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
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526 natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore
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527 matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
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528 </p>
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529 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p5">
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530 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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531 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation
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532 belongs to them.
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533 </p>
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534 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p6">
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535 <b>I answer that,</b> To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (
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536 <a id="FP_Q45_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever
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537 being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate
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538 substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has
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539 being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they
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540 themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it.
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541 Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being."
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542 Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they
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543 ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
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544 </p>
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545 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p7">
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546 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but
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547 to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because
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548 it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above
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549 <a id="FP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible
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550 thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
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551 </p>
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552 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p8">
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553 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite"
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554 is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.
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555 </p>
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556 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p9">
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557 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation
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558 is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
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559 </p>
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560 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p10"></p>
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561 <p id="FP_Q45_A4-p11"></p>
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562 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
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563 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
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564 </div>
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565 <div id="FP_Q45_A5" class="div4">
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566 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
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567 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a>
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568 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</h4>
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569 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p1"></p>
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570 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p2">
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571 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
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572 what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless
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573 can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance
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574 like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it
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575 has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
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576 </p>
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577 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p3">
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578 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker.
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579 But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which
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580 nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.
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581 </p>
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582 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p4">
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583 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we
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584 proved above when treating of the infinity of God (
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585 <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary
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586 to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
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587 </p>
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588 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p5">
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589 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
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590 creatures.
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591 </p>
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592 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p6">
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593 <b>I answer that,</b> It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes
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594 <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and
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595 prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first
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596 and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither
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597 intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely,
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598 not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
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599 </p>
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600 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p7"> It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally,
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601 inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that
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602 although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause,
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603 can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after
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604 itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies.
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605 And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that
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606 the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power.
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607 </p>
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608 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p8"> But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause,
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609 except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore
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610 it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain
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611 instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its
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612 own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating
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613 is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally
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614 to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent.
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615 So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that
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616 is, ministerially.
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617 </p>
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618 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p9"> And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it
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619 requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.
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620 </p>
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621 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p10">
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622 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying
|
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623 it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause
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624 of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate
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625 matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man
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626 participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own
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627 being, as we have said above (
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|
628 <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it
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629 is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in
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630 an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything
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631 whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore
|
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632 an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards
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633 some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x).
|
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634 In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (
|
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|
635 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.15" target="asv">Eph. 3:15</a>): "From whom all
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636 paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless
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637 something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.
|
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|
638 </p>
|
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639 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p11">
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640 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality.
|
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|
641 And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce,
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|
642 as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions,
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|
643 whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act;
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644 and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a
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|
645 much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of
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646 much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
|
|
|
647 </p>
|
|
|
648 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p12">
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|
|
649 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made;
|
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|
650 for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite
|
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|
651 power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater
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|
652 power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the
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653 potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is
|
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|
654 infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural
|
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655 agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any
|
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656 more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above (
|
|
|
657 <a id="FP_Q45_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), it follows that no creature can
|
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|
658 create.
|
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|
659 </p>
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660 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p13"></p>
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661 <p id="FP_Q45_A5-p14"></p>
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662 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
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663 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
664 </div>
|
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|
665 <div id="FP_Q45_A6" class="div4">
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666 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
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667 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a>
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668 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A6-p0.1">Whether to create is proper to any person?</h4>
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|
669 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p1"></p>
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|
670 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p2">
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|
671 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect
|
|
|
672 is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and
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|
673 is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds
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|
674 in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of
|
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|
675 the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
|
|
|
676 </p>
|
|
|
677 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p3">
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|
678 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
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679 difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons.
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|
680 But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed
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|
681 that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
|
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|
682 Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation
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683 of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.
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684 </p>
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685 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p4">
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686 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
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687 this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power,
|
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688 goodness and wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought
|
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689 not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished
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690 in creating according to relations and processions.
|
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|
691 </p>
|
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692 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p5">
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693 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.
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694 </p>
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695 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p6">
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696 <b>I answer that,</b> To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle
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697 of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create
|
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|
698 belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not
|
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699 proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.
|
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|
700 </p>
|
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|
701 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of
|
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702 things. For as was said above (
|
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|
703 <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>;
|
|
|
704 <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman
|
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|
705 is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the
|
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|
706 love of
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707 his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through
|
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708 His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch
|
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709 as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
|
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|
710 </p>
|
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|
711 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p8">
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|
712 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.
|
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|
713 </p>
|
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|
714 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p9">
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|
715 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son
|
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|
716 receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common
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|
717 to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from
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718 both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not
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719 receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (
|
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|
720 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through"
|
|
|
721 usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both,
|
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|
722 is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for
|
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|
723 this particular
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724 appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (
|
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|
725 <a id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html">Q[39], A[8]</a>, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to
|
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726 be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through
|
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|
727 Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which
|
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728 belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior
|
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729 movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.
|
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|
730 </p>
|
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|
731 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p10">
|
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732 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally
|
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733 connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness"
|
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|
734 poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
|
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|
735 </p>
|
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736 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p11"></p>
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737 <p id="FP_Q45_A6-p12"></p>
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738 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
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739 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a>
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740 </div>
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741 <div id="FP_Q45_A7" class="div4">
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742 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a>
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743 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a>
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|
|
744 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A7-p0.1">Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?</h4>
|
|
|
745 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
746 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p2">
|
|
|
747 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through
|
|
|
748 its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated (
|
|
|
749 <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures.
|
|
|
750 </p>
|
|
|
751 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p3">
|
|
|
752 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some
|
|
|
753 of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity
|
|
|
754 in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.
|
|
|
755 </p>
|
|
|
756 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p4">
|
|
|
757 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to
|
|
|
758 the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of
|
|
|
759 the Trinity but of the unity of essence.
|
|
|
760 </p>
|
|
|
761 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p5">
|
|
|
762 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures."
|
|
|
763 </p>
|
|
|
764 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p6">
|
|
|
765 <b>I answer that,</b> Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause,
|
|
|
766 but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has
|
|
|
767 passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents
|
|
|
768 fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the
|
|
|
769 representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was
|
|
|
770 said above
|
|
|
771 <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27.html">(Q[27])</a>. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational
|
|
|
772 creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there
|
|
|
773 is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.
|
|
|
774 </p>
|
|
|
775 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p7"> But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are
|
|
|
776 necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form,
|
|
|
777 whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents
|
|
|
778 the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle
|
|
|
779 from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is
|
|
|
780 from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He
|
|
|
781 is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De
|
|
|
782 Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according
|
|
|
783 "as it
|
|
|
784 is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three,
|
|
|
785 "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing
|
|
|
786 limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the
|
|
|
787 other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83,
|
|
|
788 qu.
|
|
|
789 18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct
|
|
|
790 by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
|
|
|
791 </p>
|
|
|
792 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p8">
|
|
|
793 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge
|
|
|
794 of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (
|
|
|
795 <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>).
|
|
|
796 </p>
|
|
|
797 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p9">
|
|
|
798 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor
|
|
|
799 is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being
|
|
|
800 is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.
|
|
|
801 </p>
|
|
|
802 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p10">
|
|
|
803 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above
|
|
|
804 <a id="FP_Q45_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html">(A[6])</a>.
|
|
|
805 </p>
|
|
|
806 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
807 <p id="FP_Q45_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
808 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
809 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
810 </div>
|
|
|
811 <div id="FP_Q45_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
812 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
813 <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a>
|
|
|
814 <h4 id="FP_Q45_A8-p0.1">Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?</h4>
|
|
|
815 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
816 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p2">
|
|
|
817 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is
|
|
|
818 produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and
|
|
|
819 thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation.
|
|
|
820 </p>
|
|
|
821 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p3">
|
|
|
822 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which
|
|
|
823 is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it
|
|
|
824 must be produced by creation.
|
|
|
825 </p>
|
|
|
826 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p4">
|
|
|
827 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident
|
|
|
828 in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason
|
|
|
829 applies to other things.
|
|
|
830 </p>
|
|
|
831 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p5">
|
|
|
832 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow
|
|
|
833 that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
|
|
|
834 </p>
|
|
|
835 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p6">
|
|
|
836 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.
|
|
|
837 </p>
|
|
|
838 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p7">
|
|
|
839 <b>I answer that,</b> The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but
|
|
|
840 previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from
|
|
|
841 not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they
|
|
|
842 asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or
|
|
|
843 caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this
|
|
|
844 opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting,
|
|
|
845 but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone,
|
|
|
846 as shown above
|
|
|
847 <a id="FP_Q45_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be
|
|
|
848 "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.
|
|
|
849 </p>
|
|
|
850 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p8"> Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.</p>
|
|
|
851 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p9">
|
|
|
852 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."
|
|
|
853 </p>
|
|
|
854 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p10">
|
|
|
855 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its
|
|
|
856 like according to quality, but according to species.
|
|
|
857 </p>
|
|
|
858 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p11">
|
|
|
859 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which
|
|
|
860 they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are
|
|
|
861 created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper
|
|
|
862 agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
|
|
|
863 </p>
|
|
|
864 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p12">
|
|
|
865 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are
|
|
|
866 called creatures.
|
|
|
867 </p>
|
|
|
868 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p13"></p>
|
|
|
869 <p id="FP_Q45_A8-p14"></p>
|
|
|
870 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
871 <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a>
|
|
|
872 </div>
|
|
|
873 <a href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
874 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
875 </div>
|
|
|
876 <div id="FP_Q46" class="div3">
|
|
|
877 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
878 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
879 <h3 id="FP_Q46-p0.1">OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
880 <p id="FP_Q46-p1"></p>
|
|
|
881 <p id="FP_Q46-p2"> Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment:</p>
|
|
|
882 <p id="FP_Q46-p3"> (1) Whether creatures always existed?</p>
|
|
|
883 <p id="FP_Q46-p4"> (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?</p>
|
|
|
884 <p id="FP_Q46-p5"> (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?</p>
|
|
|
885 <div id="FP_Q46_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
886 <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a>
|
|
|
887 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
888 <h4 id="FP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Whether the universe of creatures always existed?</h4>
|
|
|
889 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
890 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p2">
|
|
|
891 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything
|
|
|
892 which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore
|
|
|
893 the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality
|
|
|
894 to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from
|
|
|
895 privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist
|
|
|
896 without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist:
|
|
|
897 which is impossible.
|
|
|
898 </p>
|
|
|
899 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p3">
|
|
|
900 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing
|
|
|
901 extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate
|
|
|
902 time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time
|
|
|
903 is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there
|
|
|
904 are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did
|
|
|
905 not begin to exist.
|
|
|
906 </p>
|
|
|
907 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p4">
|
|
|
908 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and
|
|
|
909 also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
|
|
|
910 </p>
|
|
|
911 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p5">
|
|
|
912 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body
|
|
|
913 where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world
|
|
|
914 there was a vacuum; which is impossible.
|
|
|
915 </p>
|
|
|
916 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p6">
|
|
|
917 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before.
|
|
|
918 But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement.
|
|
|
919 Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.
|
|
|
920 </p>
|
|
|
921 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p7">
|
|
|
922 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For
|
|
|
923 nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable
|
|
|
924 thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being
|
|
|
925 changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change,
|
|
|
926 at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow,
|
|
|
927 but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because
|
|
|
928 time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so
|
|
|
929 the same conclusion follows as before.
|
|
|
930 </p>
|
|
|
931 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p8">
|
|
|
932 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is
|
|
|
933 not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no
|
|
|
934 time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently
|
|
|
935 neither can movement, the measure of what is time.
|
|
|
936 </p>
|
|
|
937 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p9">
|
|
|
938 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,
|
|
|
939 therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior
|
|
|
940 in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible.
|
|
|
941 </p>
|
|
|
942 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p10">
|
|
|
943 <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,
|
|
|
944 requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by
|
|
|
945 reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears
|
|
|
946 from the above (
|
|
|
947 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Since therefore God is
|
|
|
948 eternal, the world is also eternal.
|
|
|
949 </p>
|
|
|
950 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p11">
|
|
|
951 <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore
|
|
|
952 the world is eternal.
|
|
|
953 </p>
|
|
|
954 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p12">
|
|
|
955 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
956 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.5" target="asv">Jn. 17:5</a>), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (
|
|
|
957 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning."
|
|
|
958 </p>
|
|
|
959 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p13">
|
|
|
960 <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (
|
|
|
961 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will
|
|
|
962 them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above
|
|
|
963 (
|
|
|
964 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that, absolutely
|
|
|
965 speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will
|
|
|
966 that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world
|
|
|
967 depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot
|
|
|
968 be proved by demonstration.
|
|
|
969 </p>
|
|
|
970 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p14"> Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons
|
|
|
971 of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three
|
|
|
972 ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras,
|
|
|
973 Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this
|
|
|
974 subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is
|
|
|
975 probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing
|
|
|
976 to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."
|
|
|
977 </p>
|
|
|
978 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p15">
|
|
|
979 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter,
|
|
|
980 but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to
|
|
|
981 any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed
|
|
|
982 to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
|
|
|
983 </p>
|
|
|
984 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p16">
|
|
|
985 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before
|
|
|
986 it received that power, it did not exist.
|
|
|
987 </p>
|
|
|
988 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p17"> Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never
|
|
|
989 began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.
|
|
|
990 </p>
|
|
|
991 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p18">
|
|
|
992 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive
|
|
|
993 its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from
|
|
|
994 which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin
|
|
|
995 by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and
|
|
|
996 heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (
|
|
|
997 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p18.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
|
|
|
998 </p>
|
|
|
999 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p19">
|
|
|
1000 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which
|
|
|
1001 there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before
|
|
|
1002 the world was.
|
|
|
1003 </p>
|
|
|
1004 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p20">
|
|
|
1005 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas
|
|
|
1006 hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (
|
|
|
1007 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p20.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], A[2]</a>, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the
|
|
|
1008 existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal
|
|
|
1009 movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things
|
|
|
1010 began to exist movement also existed.
|
|
|
1011 </p>
|
|
|
1012 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p21">
|
|
|
1013 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce
|
|
|
1014 an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must
|
|
|
1015 take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else,
|
|
|
1016 and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the
|
|
|
1017 form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter.
|
|
|
1018 Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different
|
|
|
1019 kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say
|
|
|
1020 of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it
|
|
|
1021 presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary
|
|
|
1022 succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as
|
|
|
1023 acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His
|
|
|
1024 action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was
|
|
|
1025 fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it
|
|
|
1026 was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is
|
|
|
1027 not so manifest of what always was.
|
|
|
1028 </p>
|
|
|
1029 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p22">
|
|
|
1030 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning
|
|
|
1031 and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that
|
|
|
1032 any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same
|
|
|
1033 applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as
|
|
|
1034 being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward
|
|
|
1035 this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
|
|
|
1036 </p>
|
|
|
1037 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p23">
|
|
|
1038 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity.
|
|
|
1039 Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above
|
|
|
1040 heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other
|
|
|
1041 dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.
|
|
|
1042 </p>
|
|
|
1043 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p24">
|
|
|
1044 <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from
|
|
|
1045 the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (
|
|
|
1046 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>;
|
|
|
1047 <a id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">Q[41], A[2]</a>). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced
|
|
|
1048 by Him,
|
|
|
1049 except as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare
|
|
|
1050 its author.
|
|
|
1051 </p>
|
|
|
1052 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p25">
|
|
|
1053 <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents
|
|
|
1054 acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore
|
|
|
1055 from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which
|
|
|
1056 has being after not being.
|
|
|
1057 </p>
|
|
|
1058 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p26"></p>
|
|
|
1059 <p id="FP_Q46_A1-p27"></p>
|
|
|
1060 <a href="summa.FP_Q46.html"></a>
|
|
|
1061 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1062 </div>
|
|
|
1063 <div id="FP_Q46_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1064 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1065 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1066 <h4 id="FP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?</h4>
|
|
|
1067 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1068 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1069 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that
|
|
|
1070 is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world;
|
|
|
1071 indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.
|
|
|
1072 </p>
|
|
|
1073 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1074 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from
|
|
|
1075 something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which
|
|
|
1076 are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world
|
|
|
1077 was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have
|
|
|
1078 begun.
|
|
|
1079 </p>
|
|
|
1080 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1081 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts
|
|
|
1082 by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.
|
|
|
1083 </p>
|
|
|
1084 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1085 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
|
|
|
1086 fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always
|
|
|
1087 exist.
|
|
|
1088 </p>
|
|
|
1089 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1090 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
|
|
|
1091 Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
|
|
|
1092 </p>
|
|
|
1093 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1094 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to
|
|
|
1095 pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
|
|
|
1096 </p>
|
|
|
1097 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1098 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
|
|
|
1099 series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be
|
|
|
1100 an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
|
|
|
1101 </p>
|
|
|
1102 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1103 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal:
|
|
|
1104 therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with
|
|
|
1105 certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.
|
|
|
1106 </p>
|
|
|
1107 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p10">
|
|
|
1108 <b>On the contrary,</b> The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (
|
|
|
1109 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in
|
|
|
1110 one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God
|
|
|
1111 created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated.
|
|
|
1112 Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
|
|
|
1113 </p>
|
|
|
1114 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p11">
|
|
|
1115 <b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above
|
|
|
1116 of the mystery of the Trinity (
|
|
|
1117 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle
|
|
|
1118 of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence
|
|
|
1119 it is said
|
|
|
1120 that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.
|
|
|
1121 Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot
|
|
|
1122 be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures
|
|
|
1123 is not among these, as was said above (
|
|
|
1124 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>). But the divine will can be manifested by
|
|
|
1125 revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science.
|
|
|
1126 And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that
|
|
|
1127 are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of
|
|
|
1128 faith.
|
|
|
1129 </p>
|
|
|
1130 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p12">
|
|
|
1131 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For
|
|
|
1132 some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by
|
|
|
1133 proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world
|
|
|
1134 has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible
|
|
|
1135 way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in
|
|
|
1136 the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the
|
|
|
1137 world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts
|
|
|
1138 by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent
|
|
|
1139 must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker
|
|
|
1140 to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily
|
|
|
1141 if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced
|
|
|
1142 the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (
|
|
|
1143 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
1144 </p>
|
|
|
1145 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p13">
|
|
|
1146 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made
|
|
|
1147 after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some
|
|
|
1148 of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).
|
|
|
1149 </p>
|
|
|
1150 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p14">
|
|
|
1151 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except
|
|
|
1152 as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human
|
|
|
1153 intellect, but not the divine intellect (
|
|
|
1154 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">Q[14], AA[7]</a>,12).
|
|
|
1155 </p>
|
|
|
1156 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p15">
|
|
|
1157 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable
|
|
|
1158 to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents,
|
|
|
1159 were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular
|
|
|
1160 changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.
|
|
|
1161 </p>
|
|
|
1162 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p16">
|
|
|
1163 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because
|
|
|
1164 the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
|
|
|
1165 </p>
|
|
|
1166 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p17">
|
|
|
1167 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there
|
|
|
1168 is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there
|
|
|
1169 is an infinite number of mean terms.
|
|
|
1170 </p>
|
|
|
1171 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p18">
|
|
|
1172 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes
|
|
|
1173 that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and
|
|
|
1174 so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance,
|
|
|
1175 if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
|
|
|
1176 cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after
|
|
|
1177 the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise
|
|
|
1178 it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as
|
|
|
1179 the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a particular
|
|
|
1180 generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if
|
|
|
1181 the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
|
|
|
1182 </p>
|
|
|
1183 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p19">
|
|
|
1184 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to
|
|
|
1185 be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity.
|
|
|
1186 But this was disproved above (
|
|
|
1187 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html">Q[7], A[4]</a>). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as
|
|
|
1188 Augustine says
|
|
|
1189 [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls---viz.
|
|
|
1190 that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters
|
|
|
1191 will be given later (
|
|
|
1192 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
1193 <a id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A6.html">Q[118], A[6]</a>). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or
|
|
|
1194 least some creature, as an
|
|
|
1195 angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
|
|
|
1196 </p>
|
|
|
1197 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p20"></p>
|
|
|
1198 <p id="FP_Q46_A2-p21"></p>
|
|
|
1199 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1200 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1201 </div>
|
|
|
1202 <div id="FP_Q46_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1203 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1204 <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a>
|
|
|
1205 <h4 id="FP_Q46_A3-p0.1">Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?</h4>
|
|
|
1206 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1207 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1208 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part
|
|
|
1209 of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and
|
|
|
1210 time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning
|
|
|
1211 of time.
|
|
|
1212 </p>
|
|
|
1213 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1214 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies
|
|
|
1215 a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore,
|
|
|
1216 since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time.
|
|
|
1217 </p>
|
|
|
1218 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1219 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the
|
|
|
1220 beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.
|
|
|
1221 </p>
|
|
|
1222 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p5">
|
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1223 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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1224 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
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1225 </p>
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1226 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p6">
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1227 <b>I answer that,</b> The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude
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1228 three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the
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1229 beginning" are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and
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1230 the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son."
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1231 For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated
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1232 to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (
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1233 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning---that is, in the
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1234 Son; according to the word of the Apostle (
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1235 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv">Col. 1:16</a>), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But others said that corporeal
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1236 things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e.
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1237 before all things---"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean
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1238 heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.
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1239 </p>
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1240 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p7">
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1241 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because
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1242 together with time heaven and earth were created.
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1243 </p>
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1244 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p8">
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1245 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since
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1246 in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in
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1247 the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement
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1248 or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the
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1249 term of movement, as was said above (
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1250 <a id="FP_Q46_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A2.html">Q[45], AA[2]</a>,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before.
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1251 </p>
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1252 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p9">
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1253 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according
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1254 to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins.
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1255 </p>
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1256 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p10"></p>
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1257 <p id="FP_Q46_A3-p11"></p>
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1258 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
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1259 <a href="summa.FP.v.html"></a>
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1260 </div>
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1261 <a href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html"></a>
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1262 <a href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
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1263 </div>
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1264 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a>
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1265 <a href="summa.FP_Q44.html"></a>
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1266 `
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1267 </div> |
