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19 <h2 id="FS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q49">Q. 49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q50">Q. 50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q51">Q. 51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q52">Q. 52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q53">Q. 53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q54">Q. 54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
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20 <div id="FS_Q49" class="div3">
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21 <h3 id="FS_Q49-p0.1">Q. 49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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22 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
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23 <p id="FS_Q49-p2"> After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly
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24 of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated
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25 of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues
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26 and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts.
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27 </p><p id="FS_Q49-p3"> Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third,
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28 the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another.
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29 </p><p id="FS_Q49-p4"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q49-p5"><a href="#FS_Q49_A1"> (1) Whether habit is a quality?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p6"><a href="#FS_Q49_A2"> (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p7"><a href="#FS_Q49_A3"> (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p8"><a href="#FS_Q49_A4"> (4) Of the necessity of habit.</a></p>
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30 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 pr."><a name="35593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35593]
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31 Iª-IIae q. 49 pr.</span></a> Post actus et passiones,
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32 considerandum est de principiis humanorum actuum. Et primo, de
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33 principiis intrinsecis; secundo, de principiis extrinsecis.
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34 Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de
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35 potentiis in prima parte dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus
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36 considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de
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37 virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, qui sunt
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38 humanorum actuum principia. Circa ipsos autem habitus in generali,
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39 quatuor consideranda sunt, primo quidem, de ipsa substantia
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40 habituum, secundo, de subiecto eorum; tertio, de causa
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41 generationis, augmenti et corruptionis ipsorum; quarto, de
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42 distinctione ipsorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
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43 habitus sit qualitas. Secundo, utrum sit determinata species
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44 qualitatis. Tertio, utrum habitus importet ordinem ad actum.
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45 Quarto, de necessitate habitus.</p></div></div></div>
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46 <div id="FS_Q49_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A1-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 1. Whether habit is a quality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p2">
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47 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the
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48 verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as
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49 "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
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50 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35594] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
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51 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit qualitas. Dicit enim
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52 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>hoc nomen
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53 habitus dictum est ab hoc verbo quod est habere</i>. Sed habere non
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54 solum pertinet ad qualitatem, sed ad alia genera, dicimur enim
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55 habere etiam quantitatem, et pecuniam, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo
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56 habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p3">
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57 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi).
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58 But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality.
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59 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35595] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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60 habitus ponitur unum praedicamentum; ut patet in libro
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61 praedicamentorum. Sed unum praedicamentum non continetur sub alio.
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62 Ergo habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p4">
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63 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the
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64 order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore
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65 habit is not a quality.
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66 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35596] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a>
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67 <i>Praeterea, omnis habitus est dispositio</i>, ut dicitur in
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68 praedicamentis. Sed dispositio est ordo habentis partes, ut dicitur
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69 in V Metaphys. Hoc autem pertinet ad praedicamentum situs. Ergo
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70 habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p5">
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71 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change."
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72 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35597] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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73 est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod habitus est
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74 qualitas de difficili mobilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p6">
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75 <b>I answer that,</b> This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,
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76 inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation
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77 [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
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78 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p7"> Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various
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79 predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the
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80 various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there
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81 seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that
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82 which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which
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83 there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there
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84 are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion:
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85 thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says
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86 (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had";
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87 as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which
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88 are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit
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89 between clothing and the man who is clothed."
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90 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p8"> But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit
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91 is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text.
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92 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself
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93 or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say
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94 that habit is a quality.
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95 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 co."><a name="35598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35598] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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96 dicendum quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo
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97 quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo,
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98 secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid
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99 habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in
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100 seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est
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101 quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod
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102 habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post
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103 praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera
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104 consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia
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105 huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse
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106 distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter
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107 habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel
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108 quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est
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109 aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur
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110 aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est
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111 aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum
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112 actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens,
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113 et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V
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114 Metaphys., quod <i>habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis
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115 et habiti</i>, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo
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116 in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur
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117 praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys.,
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118 quod <i>inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est
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119 habitus medius</i>. Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua
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120 dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste
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121 modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus
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122 quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit
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123 quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male
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124 disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas
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125 habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu. Unde dicendum
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126 est quod habitus est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p9">
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127 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
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128 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35599] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
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129 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habere communiter
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130 sumpto, sic enim est commune ad multa genera, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p10">
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131 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had:
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132 and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
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133 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35600] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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134 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod
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135 intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sic
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136 enim est quoddam praedicamentum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p11">
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137 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher
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138 goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying
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139 this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when
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140 he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is
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141 the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation
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142 and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes
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143 perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
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144 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35601] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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145 dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius
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146 habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem
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147 philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum
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148 potentiam, aut secundum speciem. In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in
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149 commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones.
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150 Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet
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151 ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem
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152 dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in
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153 praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et
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154 virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit
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155 perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et
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156 virtus complete.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A2-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 2. Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p2">
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157 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said
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158 <a href="#FS_Q49_A1" id="FS_Q49_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this
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159 happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner,
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160 in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct
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161 species of quality.
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162 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35602] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
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163 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit determinata species
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164 qualitatis. Quia, ut dictum est, habitus, secundum quod est
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165 qualitas, dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur
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166 dispositum. Sed hoc contingit secundum quamlibet qualitatem, nam et
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167 secundum figuram contingit aliquid bene vel male esse dispositum,
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168 et similiter secundum calorem et frigus, et secundum omnia
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169 huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est determinata species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p3">
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170 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits,
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171 just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality.
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172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35603] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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173 philosophus, in praedicamentis, caliditatem et frigiditatem dicit
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174 esse dispositiones vel habitus, sicut aegritudinem et sanitatem.
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175 Sed calor et frigus sunt in tertia specie qualitatis. Ergo habitus
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176 vel dispositio non distinguuntur ab aliis speciebus qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p4">
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177 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion.
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178 Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus,"
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179 as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not
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180 to be a distinct species of quality.
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181 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35604] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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182 difficile mobile non est differentia pertinens ad genus qualitatis,
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183 sed magis pertinet ad motum vel passionem. Nullum autem genus
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184 determinatur ad speciem per differentiam alterius generis; sed
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185 oportet differentias per se advenire generi, ut philosophus dicit,
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186 in VII Metaphys. Ergo, cum habitus dicatur esse qualitas difficile
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187 mobilis, videtur quod non sit determinata species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p5">
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188 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition."
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189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35605] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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190 est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod <i>una species
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191 qualitatis est habitus et dispositio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p6">
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192 <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality.
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193 Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that
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194 some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious,
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195 being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are
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196 adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities,
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197 some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality:
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198 while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted,
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199 we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is
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200 the shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes,
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201 and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious
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202 but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the
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203 more natural is always first.
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204 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p7"> Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly
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205 speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure
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206 determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance
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207 with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called
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208 quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined
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209 to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher
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210 (Metaph. v, text. 19).
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211 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p8"> Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject,
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212 or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to
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213 quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species
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214 of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of
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215 good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or
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216 slowly transitory.
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217 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p9"> But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species
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218 of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory
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219 or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions
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220 have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.
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221 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p10"> On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species
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222 of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the
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223 soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed
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224 in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause
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225 why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness,
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226 whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph.
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227 v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by
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228 "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature,
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229 it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration
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230 in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.
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231 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 co."><a name="35606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35606] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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232 dicendum quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor
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233 species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum. Quarum quidem
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234 specierum differentias sic assignat Simplicius, in commento
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235 praedicamentorum, dicens quod <i>qualitatum quaedam sunt naturales,
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236 quae secundum naturam insunt, et semper, quaedam autem sunt
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237 adventitiae, quae ab extrinseco efficiuntur, et possunt amitti. Et
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238 haec quidem</i>, quae sunt adventitiae, <i>sunt habitus et
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239 dispositiones, secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes.
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240 Naturalium autem qualitatum quaedam sunt secundum id quod aliquid
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241 est in potentia, et sic est secunda species qualitatis. Quaedam
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242 vero secundum quod aliquid est in actu, et hoc vel in profundum,
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243 vel secundum superficiem. Si in profundum quidem, sic est tertia
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244 species qualitatis, secundum vero superficiem, est quarta species
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245 qualitatis, sicut figura et forma, quae est figura animati</i>. Sed
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246 ista distinctio specierum qualitatis inconveniens videtur. Sunt
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247 enim multae figurae et qualitates passibiles non naturales, sed
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248 adventitiae, et multae dispositiones non adventitiae, sed
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249 naturales, sicut sanitas et pulchritudo et huiusmodi. Et praeterea
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250 hoc non convenit ordini specierum, semper enim quod naturalius est,
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251 prius est. Et ideo aliter accipienda est distinctio dispositionum
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252 et habituum ab aliis qualitatibus. Proprie enim qualitas importat
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253 quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus,
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254 super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat
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255 quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. Et ideo sicut id
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256 secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse
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257 substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita
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258 id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse
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259 accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam
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260 differentia, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphys. Modus autem
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261 sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi
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262 vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et
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263 passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et
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264 forma; vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel
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265 determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species
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266 qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est sine
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267 motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem
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268 qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel
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269 tarde transiens. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum
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270 actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie
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271 qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel
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272 difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. Non
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273 autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel
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274 mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum
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275 autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et
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276 determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam
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277 speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim
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278 philosophus, in VII Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et
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279 corporis, quod sunt <i>dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum;
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280 dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia
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281 ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid</i>,
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282 ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum
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283 et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua
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284 natura est finis generationis et motus. Unde in V Metaphys.
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285 philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam
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286 aliquis disponitur bene vel male. Et in II Ethic. dicit quod
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287 <i>habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel
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288 male</i>. Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet
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289 rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali.
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290 Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus
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291 ponitur prima species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p11">
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292 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality
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293 except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must
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294 consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said
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295 to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a
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296 thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as
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297 they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and
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298 color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability
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299 to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species
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300 of
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301 quality.
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302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35607] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
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303 ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum
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304 est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in
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305 ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad
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306 rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est
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307 finis. Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non
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308 dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad
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309 naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde
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310 et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod
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311 considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei,
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312 pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones, nam figura, prout convenit
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313 naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et
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314 frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad
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315 sanitatem. Et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a
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316 philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary
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317 on the Predicaments.
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318 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35608] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet
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319 solutio ad secundum. Licet a quibusdam aliter solvatur, ut
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320 Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p13">
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321 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This difference, "difficult to change," does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition.
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322 Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition
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323 of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so
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324 called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect
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325 within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so
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326 as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition
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327 becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern
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328 genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily
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329 lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason
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330 of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this
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331 sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for
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332 in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason
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333 of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while
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334 the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have
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335 a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that
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336 he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition"
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337 does not.
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338 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p14"> Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong
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339 to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless
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340 designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take
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341 accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are
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342 designated.
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343 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35609] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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344 dicendum quod ista differentia, difficile mobile, non diversificat
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345 habitum ab aliis speciebus qualitatis, sed a dispositione.
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346 Dispositio autem dupliciter accipitur, uno modo, secundum quod est
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347 genus habitus, nam in V Metaphys. dispositio ponitur in definitione
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348 habitus; alio modo, secundum quod est aliquid contra habitum
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349 divisum. Et potest intelligi dispositio proprie dicta condividi
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350 contra habitum, dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut perfectum et
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351 imperfectum in eadem specie, ut scilicet dispositio dicatur,
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352 retinens nomen commune, quando imperfecte inest, ita quod de facile
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353 amittitur; habitus autem, quando perfecte inest, ut non de facili
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354 amittatur. Et sic dispositio fit habitus, sicut puer fit vir. Alio
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355 modo possunt distingui sicut diversae species unius generis
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356 subalterni, ut dicantur dispositiones illae qualitates primae
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357 speciei, quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili
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358 amittantur, quia habent causas transmutabiles, ut aegritudo et
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359 sanitas; habitus vero dicuntur illae qualitates quae secundum suam
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360 rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur, quia habent
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361 causas immobiles, sicut scientiae et virtutes. Et secundum hoc
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362 dispositio non fit habitus. Et hoc videtur magis consonum
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363 intentioni Aristotelis. Unde ad huius distinctionis probationem
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364 inducit communem loquendi consuetudinem, secundum quam qualitates
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365 quae secundum rationem suam sunt facile mobiles, si ex aliquo
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366 accidenti difficile mobiles reddantur, habitus dicuntur, et e
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367 converso est de qualitatibus quae secundum suam rationem sunt
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368 difficile mobiles; nam si aliquis imperfecte habeat scientiam, ut
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369 de facili possit ipsam amittere, magis dicitur disponi ad scientiam
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370 quam scientiam habere. Ex quo patet quod nomen habitus
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371 diuturnitatem quandam importat; non autem nomen dispositionis. Nec
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372 impeditur quin secundum hoc facile et difficile mobile sint
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373 specificae differentiae, propter hoc quod ista pertinent ad
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374 passionem et motum, et non ad genus qualitatis. Nam istae
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375 differentiae, quamvis per accidens videantur se habere ad
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376 qualitatem, designant tamen proprias et per se differentias
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377 qualitatum. Sicut etiam in genere substantiae frequenter
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378 accipiuntur differentiae accidentales loco substantialium,
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379 inquantum per eas designantur principia essentialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A3-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 3. Whether habit implies order to an act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p2">
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380 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher
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381 says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise
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382 than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act.
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383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35610] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
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384 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non importet ordinem ad actum.
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385 Unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est actu. Sed philosophus
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386 dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>cum aliquis fit sciens secundum
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387 habitum, est etiam tunc in potentia, aliter tamen quam ante
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388 addiscere</i>. Ergo habitus non importat habitudinem principii ad
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389 actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p3">
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390 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put
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391 in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially.
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392 Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is
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393 posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of
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394 quality.
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395 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35611] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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396 illud quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per se convenit illi.
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397 Sed esse principium actionis ponitur in definitione potentiae; ut
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398 patet in V Metaphys. Ergo esse principium actus per se convenit
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399 potentiae. Quod autem est per se, est primum in unoquoque genere.
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400 Si ergo etiam habitus sit principium actus, sequitur quod sit
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401 posterior quam potentia. Et sic non erit prima species qualitatis
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402 habitus vel dispositio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p4">
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403 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore
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404 it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act.
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405 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35612] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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406 sanitas quandoque est habitus, et similiter macies et pulchritudo.
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407 Sed ista non dicuntur per ordinem ad actum. Non ergo est de ratione
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408 habitus quod sit principium actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p5">
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409 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says
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410 (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will."
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411 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35613] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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412 est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod
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413 <i>habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est</i>. Et Commentator
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414 dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>habitus est quo quis agit cum
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415 voluerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A3-p6">
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416 <b>I answer that,</b> To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which
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417 the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential
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418 to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature,
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419 which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an
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420 operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not
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421 only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive
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422 to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that
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423 which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something
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424 else, that is to the end.
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425 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A3-p7"> But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation
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426 to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the
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427 nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally
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428 implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a
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429 principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act.
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430 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 co."><a name="35614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35614] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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431 dicendum quod habere ordinem ad actum potest competere habitui et
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432 secundum rationem habitus; et secundum rationem subiecti in quo est
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433 habitus. Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui
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434 aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut
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435 importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum
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436 quod convenit vel non convenit. Sed natura rei, quae est finis
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437 generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est
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438 operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per
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439 operationem. Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam
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440 naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est
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441 finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem. Unde et in V Metaphys.
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442 dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam
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443 bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum
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444 suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem. Sed sunt
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445 quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et
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446 principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est,
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447 habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei. Si
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448 igitur natura rei in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad
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449 actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad
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450 actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut
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451 sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus qui est alicuius potentiae
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452 ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p8">
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453 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in
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454 a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is
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455 explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.
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456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35615] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
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457 ergo dicendum quod habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est
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458 qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed
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459 est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur
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460 actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de
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461 anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p9">
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462 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which
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463 power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.
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464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35616] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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465 dicendum quod non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam,
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466 sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam
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467 respicit potentia; ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus
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468 quam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p10">
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469 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature
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470 is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1),
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471 that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies
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472 to other habits.
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473 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35617] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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474 dicendum quod sanitas dicitur habitus, vel habitualis dispositio,
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475 in ordine ad naturam, sicut dictum est. Inquantum tamen natura est
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476 principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum. Unde
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477 philosophus dicit, in X de historia Animal., quod homo dicitur
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478 sanus, vel membrum aliquod, quando potest facere operationem sani.
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479 Et est simile in aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A4-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 4. Whether habits are necessary?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p2">
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480 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated
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481 above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being.
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482 Therefore there is no necessity for habits.
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483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35618] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
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484 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium esse habitus.
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485 Habitus enim sunt quibus aliquid disponitur bene vel male ad
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486 aliquid, sicut dictum est. Sed per suam formam aliquid bene vel
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487 male disponitur, nam secundum formam aliquid est bonum, sicut et
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488 ens. Ergo nulla necessitas est habituum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p3">
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489 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers,
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490 without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits.
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491 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35619] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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492 habitus importat ordinem ad actum. Sed potentia importat principium
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493 actus sufficienter, nam et potentiae naturales absque habitibus
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494 sunt principia actuum. Ergo non fuit necessarium habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p4">
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495 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit.
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496 Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.
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497 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35620] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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498 sicut potentia se habet ad bonum et malum, ita et habitus, et sicut
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499 potentia non semper agit, ita nec habitus. Existentibus igitur
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500 potentiis, superfluum fuit habitum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p5">
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501 <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the
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502 nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits.
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503 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35621] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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504 est quod habitus sunt perfectiones quaedam, ut dicitur in VII
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505 Physic. Sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat
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506 rationem finis. Ergo necessarium fuit habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p6">
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507 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
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508 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition
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509 a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary.
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510 The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should
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511 be related to it as
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512 potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance
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513 is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case
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514 in God.
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515 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p7"> The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination
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516 in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but
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517 in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due
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518 relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is
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519 not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the
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520 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A2" id="FS_Q49_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[56], A[2]</a>, there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the
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521 heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.
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522 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p8"> The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things
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523 should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation.
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524 Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called
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525 dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as
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526 health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability.
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527 For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order
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528 of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 3).
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529 Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their
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530 relative
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531 adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.
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532 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 co."><a name="35622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35622] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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533 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat
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534 dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem
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535 vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc
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536 disponitur. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid indigeat disponi ad alterum,
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537 tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, ut id quod disponitur, sit alterum
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538 ab eo ad quod disponitur; et sic se habeat ad ipsum ut potentia ad
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539 actum. Unde si aliquid sit cuius natura non sit composita ex
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540 potentia et actu, et cuius substantia sit sua operatio, et ipsum
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541 sit propter seipsum; ibi habitus vel dispositio locum non habet,
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542 sicut patet in Deo. Secundo requiritur quod id quod est in potentia
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543 ad alterum, possit pluribus modis determinari, et ad diversa. Unde
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544 si aliquid sit in potentia ad alterum, ita tamen quod non sit in
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545 potentia nisi ad ipsum, ibi dispositio et habitus locum non habet,
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546 quia tale subiectum ex sua natura habet debitam habitudinem ad
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547 talem actum. Unde si corpus caeleste sit compositum ex materia et
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548 forma, cum illa materia non sit in potentia ad aliam formam, ut in
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549 primo dictum est, non habet ibi locum dispositio vel habitus ad
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550 formam; aut etiam ad operationem, quia natura caelestis corporis
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551 non est in potentia nisi ad unum motum determinatum. Tertio
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552 requiritur quod plura concurrant ad disponendum subiectum ad unum
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553 eorum ad quae est in potentia, quae diversis modis commensurari
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554 possunt, ut sic disponatur bene vel male ad formam vel ad
|
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555 operationem. Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum
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556 unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus
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557 dispositiones vel habitus, sed simplices qualitates, dicimus autem
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558 dispositiones vel habitus sanitatem, pulchritudinem et alia
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559 huiusmodi, quae important quandam commensurationem plurium quae
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560 diversis modis commensurari possunt. Propter quod philosophus
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561 dicit, in V Metaphys., quod <i>habitus est dispositio, et
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562 dispositio est ordo habentis partes vel secundum locum, vel
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563 secundum potentiam, vel secundum speciem</i>; ut supra dictum est.
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564 Quia igitur multa sunt entium ad quorum naturas et operationes
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565 necesse est plura concurrere quae diversis modis commensurari
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566 possunt, ideo necesse est habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p9">
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567 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition.
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568 But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is
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569 limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form
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570 be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be
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571 disposed to its operations by means of habits.
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572 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35623] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
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573 ergo dicendum quod per formam perficitur natura rei, sed oportet
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574 quod in ordine ad ipsam formam disponatur subiectum aliqua
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575 dispositione. Ipsa tamen forma ordinatur ulterius ad operationem,
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576 quae vel est finis, vel via in finem. Et si quidem habeat forma
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577 determinate unam tantum operationem determinatam, nulla alia
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578 dispositio requiritur ad operationem praeter ipsam formam. Si autem
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579 sit talis forma quae possit diversimode operari, sicut est anima;
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580 oportet quod disponatur ad suas operationes per aliquos
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581 habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p10">
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582 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not
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583 a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do
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584 not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation.
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585 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35624] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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586 dicendum quod potentia quandoque se habet ad multa, et ideo oportet
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587 quod aliquo alio determinetur. Si vero sit aliqua potentia quae non
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588 se habeat ad multa, non indiget habitu determinante, ut dictum est.
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589 Et propter hoc vires naturales non agunt operationes suas
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590 mediantibus aliquibus habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt
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591 determinatae ad unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p11">
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592 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (
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593 <a href="#FS_Q54_A3" id="FS_Q49_A4-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined
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594 to good.
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595 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35625] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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596 dicendum quod non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut
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597 infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et
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598 ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad
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599 bonum.</p></div></div></div></div>
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600 <div id="FS_Q50" class="div3">
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601 <h3 id="FS_Q50-p0.1">Q. 50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
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602 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
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603 <p id="FS_Q50-p2"> We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q50-p3"><a href="#FS_Q50_A1"> (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p4"><a href="#FS_Q50_A2"> (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p5"><a href="#FS_Q50_A3"> (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p6"><a href="#FS_Q50_A4"> (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p7"><a href="#FS_Q50_A5"> (5) Whether there is a habit in the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p8"><a href="#FS_Q50_A6"> (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?</a></p>
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604 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 pr."><a name="35626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35626]
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605 Iª-IIae q. 50 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
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606 subiecto habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum in
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607 corpore sit aliquis habitus. Secundo, utrum anima sit subiectum
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608 habitus secundum suam essentiam, vel secundum suam potentiam.
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609 Tertio, utrum in potentiis sensitivae partis possit esse aliquis
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610 habitus. Quarto, utrum in ipso intellectu sit aliquis habitus.
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611 Quinto, utrum in voluntate sit aliquis habitus. Sexto, utrum in
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612 substantiis separatis.</p></div></div></div>
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613 <div id="FS_Q50_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A1-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 1. Whether there is a habit in the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p2">
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614 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby
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615 we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit
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616 in the body.
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617 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35627] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
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618 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in corpore non sit aliquis habitus. Ut
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619 enim Commentator dicit, in III de anima, <i>habitus est quo quis
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620 agit cum voluerit</i>. Sed actiones corporales non subiacent
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621 voluntati, cum sint naturales. Ergo in corpore non potest esse
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622 aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p3">
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623 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition
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624 can be a habit.
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625 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35628] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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626 omnes dispositiones corporales sunt facile mobiles. Sed habitus est
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627 qualitas difficile mobilis. Ergo nulla dispositio corporalis potest
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628 esse habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p4">
|
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629 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is
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630 divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.
|
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631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35629] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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632 omnes dispositiones corporales subiacent alterationi. Sed alteratio
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633 non est nisi in tertia specie qualitatis, quae dividitur contra
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634 habitum. Ergo nullus habitus est in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p5">
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635 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called
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636 habits.
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637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35630] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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638 est quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, sanitatem corporis, vel
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639 infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p6">
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640 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
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641 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], AA[2]</a> seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore
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642 in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation
|
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643 of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those
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644 operations which proceed from
|
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645 its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we
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646 have already said (
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|
647 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations
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648 which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits
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649 are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits
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|
650 are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can
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651 be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations
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652 of the soul.
|
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|
653 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is
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654 related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions.
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655 Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.
|
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|
656 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p8"> On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or
|
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657 dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone.
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658 And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the
|
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|
659 first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy
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660 or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But
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|
661 this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples,
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|
662 as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.
|
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|
663 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 co."><a name="35631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35631] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
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664 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam
|
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|
665 dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam,
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666 vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat
|
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|
667 dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in
|
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|
668 corpore sicut in subiecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a
|
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|
669 naturali qualitate corporis; aut est ab anima movente corpus.
|
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|
670 Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quae sunt a natura, non
|
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|
671 disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt
|
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|
672 determinatae ad unum; dictum est autem quod habitualis dispositio
|
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|
673 requiritur ubi subiectum est in potentia ad multa. Operationes vero
|
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|
674 quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius
|
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|
675 animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem
|
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676 proportionantur operationibus, unde ex similibus actibus similes
|
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|
677 habitus causantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo dispositiones ad
|
|
|
678 tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima. In corpore vero
|
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|
679 possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et
|
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|
680 habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae. Si vero
|
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|
681 loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis
|
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|
682 dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut
|
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|
683 subiectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et
|
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|
684 huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte
|
|
|
685 habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili
|
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|
686 transmutabiles sunt. Alexander vero posuit nullo modo habitum vel
|
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|
687 dispositionem primae speciei esse in corpore, ut Simplicius refert
|
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|
688 in commento Praedicament., sed dicebat primam speciem qualitatis
|
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|
689 pertinere tantum ad animam. Et quod Aristoteles inducit in
|
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|
690 praedicamentis de sanitate et aegritudine, non inducit quasi haec
|
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|
691 pertineant ad primam speciem qualitatis, sed per modum exempli, ut
|
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|
692 sit sensus quod sicut aegritudo et sanitas possunt esse facile vel
|
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|
693 difficile mobiles, ita etiam qualitates primae speciei, quae
|
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|
694 dicuntur habitus et dispositio. Sed patet hoc esse contra
|
|
|
695 intentionem Aristotelis. Tum quia eodem modo loquendi utitur
|
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|
696 exemplificando de sanitate et aegritudine, et de virtute et de
|
|
|
697 scientia. Tum quia in VII Physic. expresse ponit inter habitus
|
|
|
698 pulchritudinem et sanitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p9">
|
|
|
699 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from
|
|
|
700 nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will.
|
|
|
701 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35632] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
702 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod
|
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|
703 est dispositio ad operationem, et de actibus corporis qui sunt a
|
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|
704 natura, non autem de his qui sunt ab anima, quorum principium est
|
|
|
705 voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p10">
|
|
|
706 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they
|
|
|
707 may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot
|
|
|
708 be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply
|
|
|
709 difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And
|
|
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710 therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read
|
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711 in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.
|
|
|
712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35633] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
713 dicendum quod dispositiones corporales non sunt simpliciter
|
|
|
714 difficile mobiles, propter mutabilitatem corporalium causarum.
|
|
|
715 Possunt tamen esse difficile mobiles per comparationem ad tale
|
|
|
716 subiectum, quia scilicet, tali subiecto durante, amoveri non
|
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|
717 possunt, vel quia sunt difficile mobiles per comparationem ad alias
|
|
|
718 dispositiones. Sed qualitates animae sunt simpliciter difficile
|
|
|
719 mobiles, propter immobilitatem subiecti. Et ideo non dicit quod
|
|
|
720 sanitas difficile mobilis simpliciter sit habitus, sed quod est ut
|
|
|
721 habitus, sicut in Graeco habetur. Qualitates autem animae dicuntur
|
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|
722 simpliciter habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p11">
|
|
|
723 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species,
|
|
|
724 in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called
|
|
|
725 passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then
|
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|
726 passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary
|
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|
727 disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas
|
|
|
728 Aristotle puts heat in the third.
|
|
|
729 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p12"> Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit,
|
|
|
730 differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated,
|
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731 and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent.
|
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|
732 But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and
|
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733 if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would
|
|
|
734 be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves
|
|
|
735 of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse
|
|
|
736 participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore
|
|
|
737 we must say otherwise that, as was explained above (
|
|
|
738 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion
|
|
|
739 of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture
|
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|
740 and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions,
|
|
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741 primarily and of
|
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742 themselves.
|
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|
743 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35634] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
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|
744 dicendum quod dispositiones corporales quae sunt in prima specie
|
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|
745 qualitatis, ut quidam posuerunt, differunt a qualitatibus tertiae
|
|
|
746 speciei in hoc, quod qualitates tertiae speciei sunt ut in fieri et
|
|
|
747 ut in motu, unde dicuntur passiones vel passibiles qualitates.
|
|
|
748 Quando autem iam pervenerint ad perfectum, quasi ad speciem, tunc
|
|
|
749 iam sunt in prima specie qualitatis. Sed hoc improbat Simplicius,
|
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|
750 in commento praedicamentorum, quia secundum hoc calefactio esset in
|
|
|
751 tertia specie qualitatis, calor autem in prima, Aristoteles autem
|
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|
752 ponit calorem in tertia. Unde Porphyrius dicit, sicut idem
|
|
|
753 Simplicius refert, quod passio vel passibilis qualitas, et
|
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|
754 dispositio et habitus, differunt in corporibus secundum intensionem
|
|
|
755 et remissionem. Quando enim aliquid recipit caliditatem secundum
|
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|
756 calefieri tantum, non autem ut calefacere possit; tunc est passio,
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757 si sit cito transiens, vel passibilis qualitas, si sit manens.
|
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|
758 Quando autem iam ad hoc perducitur quod potest etiam alterum
|
|
|
759 calefacere, tunc est dispositio, si autem ulterius intantum
|
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|
760 confirmetur quod sit difficile mobilis, tunc erit habitus, ut sic
|
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|
761 dispositio sit quaedam intensio seu perfectio passionis vel
|
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|
762 passibilis qualitatis, habitus autem dispositionis. Sed hoc
|
|
|
763 improbat Simplicius, quia talis intensio et remissio non important
|
|
|
764 diversitatem ex parte ipsius formae, sed ex diversa participatione
|
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|
765 subiecti. Et ita non diversificarentur per hoc species qualitatis.
|
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|
766 Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut supra dictum est,
|
|
|
767 commensuratio ipsarum qualitatum passibilium secundum convenientiam
|
|
|
768 ad naturam, habet rationem dispositionis, et ideo, facta
|
|
|
769 alteratione circa ipsas qualitates passibiles, quae sunt calidum et
|
|
|
770 frigidum, humidum et siccum, fit ex consequenti alteratio secundum
|
|
|
771 aegritudinem et sanitatem. Primo autem et per se non est alteratio
|
|
|
772 secundum huiusmodi habitus et dispositiones.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A2-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 2. Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p2">
|
|
|
773 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions
|
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774 and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (
|
|
|
775 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul
|
|
|
776 is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in
|
|
|
777 respect of its powers.
|
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|
778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35635] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
779 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus sint in anima magis secundum
|
|
|
780 essentiam quam secundum potentiam. Dispositiones enim et habitus
|
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|
781 dicuntur in ordine ad naturam, ut dictum est. Sed natura magis
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|
|
782 attenditur secundum essentiam animae quam secundum potentias, quia
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|
783 anima secundum suam essentiam est natura corporis talis, et forma
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784 eius. Ergo habitus sunt in anima secundum eius essentiam et non
|
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|
785 secundum potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p3">
|
|
|
786 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of
|
|
|
787 accident, as we have said in the
|
|
|
788 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q50_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[1]</a>, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.
|
|
|
789 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35636] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
790 accidentis non est accidens. Habitus autem est quoddam accidens.
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|
791 Sed potentiae animae sunt de genere accidentium, ut in primo dictum
|
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|
792 est. Ergo habitus non est in anima ratione suae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p4">
|
|
|
793 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it
|
|
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794 is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.
|
|
|
795 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35637] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
796 subiectum est prius eo quod est in subiecto. Sed habitus, cum
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|
|
797 pertineat ad primam speciem qualitatis, est prior quam potentia,
|
|
|
798 quae pertinet ad secundam speciem. Ergo habitus non est in potentia
|
|
|
799 animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p5">
|
|
|
800 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.
|
|
|
801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35638] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
802 est quod philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in
|
|
|
803 diversis partibus animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A2-p6">
|
|
|
804 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
|
|
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805 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation
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806 to nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the
|
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807 human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation
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808 to the soul, than in the
|
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809 soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according
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810 to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in
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811 the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (
|
|
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812 <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q110_A4" id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>).
|
|
|
813 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in
|
|
|
814 so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we
|
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815 have said above (
|
|
|
816 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the
|
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817 soul in respect of its powers.
|
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|
818 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 co."><a name="35639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35639] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
819 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat
|
|
|
820 dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam, vel ad operationem. Si
|
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|
821 ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic
|
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822 non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia
|
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823 ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc,
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824 magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per
|
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825 ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus. Sed si
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826 loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse
|
|
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827 particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, <i>ut simus consortes naturae
|
|
|
828 divinae</i>, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam
|
|
|
829 esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur. Si vero
|
|
|
830 accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus
|
|
|
831 inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam
|
|
|
832 operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut
|
|
|
833 supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas
|
|
|
834 potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas
|
|
|
835 potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p8">
|
|
|
836 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a
|
|
|
837 form and nature to which someone is disposed.
|
|
|
838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35640] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
839 ergo dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non
|
|
|
840 sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et
|
|
|
841 natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p9">
|
|
|
842 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject,
|
|
|
843 according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident
|
|
|
844 is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit.
|
|
|
845 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35641] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
846 dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis.
|
|
|
847 Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subiectum
|
|
|
848 secundum quod est sub uno accidente, intelligitur esse subiectum
|
|
|
849 alterius. Et sic dicitur unum accidens esse subiectum alterius, ut
|
|
|
850 superficies coloris. Et hoc modo potest potentia esse subiectum
|
|
|
851 habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p10">
|
|
|
852 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation
|
|
|
853 to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does
|
|
|
854 not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence
|
|
|
855 of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes
|
|
|
856 precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation
|
|
|
857 and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
|
|
|
858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35642] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
859 dicendum quod habitus praemittitur potentiae, secundum quod
|
|
|
860 importat dispositionem ad naturam, potentia autem semper importat
|
|
|
861 ordinem ad operationem, quae est posterior, cum natura sit
|
|
|
862 operationis principium. Sed habitus cuius potentia est subiectum,
|
|
|
863 non importat ordinem ad naturam, sed ad operationem. Unde est
|
|
|
864 posterior potentia. Vel potest dici quod habitus praeponitur
|
|
|
865 potentiae sicut completum incompleto, et actus potentiae. Actus
|
|
|
866 enim naturaliter est prior; quamvis potentia sit prior ordine
|
|
|
867 generationis et temporis, ut dicitur in VII et IX Metaphys.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A3-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 3. Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p2">
|
|
|
868 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational
|
|
|
869 part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to
|
|
|
870 put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part.
|
|
|
871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35643] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
872 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis sensitivae partis non
|
|
|
873 possit esse aliquis habitus. Sicut enim potentia nutritiva pars est
|
|
|
874 irrationalis, ita et sensitiva. Sed in potentiis nutritivae partis
|
|
|
875 non ponitur aliquis habitus. Ergo nec in potentiis sensitivae
|
|
|
876 partis aliquis habitus debet poni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p3">
|
|
|
877 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is
|
|
|
878 no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (
|
|
|
879 <a href="#FS_Q49_A3" id="FS_Q50_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.
|
|
|
880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35644] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
881 sensitivae partes sunt communes nobis et brutis. Sed in brutis non
|
|
|
882 sunt aliqui habitus, quia non est in eis voluntas, quae in
|
|
|
883 definitione habitus ponitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in potentiis
|
|
|
884 sensitivis non sunt aliqui habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p4">
|
|
|
885 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it
|
|
|
886 virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals,
|
|
|
887 which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part.
|
|
|
888 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35645] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
889 habitus animae sunt scientiae et virtutes, et sicut scientia
|
|
|
890 refertur ad vim apprehensivam, ita virtus ad vim appetitivam. Sed
|
|
|
891 in potentiis sensitivis non sunt aliquae scientiae, cum scientia
|
|
|
892 sit universalium, quae vires sensitivae apprehendere non possunt.
|
|
|
893 Ergo etiam nec habitus virtutum in partibus sensitivis esse
|
|
|
894 possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p5">
|
|
|
895 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part."
|
|
|
896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35646] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
897 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod aliquae virtutes,
|
|
|
898 scilicet temperantia et fortitudo, sunt irrationabilium
|
|
|
899 partium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p6">
|
|
|
900 <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according
|
|
|
901 as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as
|
|
|
902 nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can
|
|
|
903 be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.
|
|
|
904 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 co."><a name="35647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35647] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
905 dicendum quod vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno
|
|
|
906 modo, secundum quod operantur ex instinctu naturae; alio modo,
|
|
|
907 secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod
|
|
|
908 operantur ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et
|
|
|
909 natura. Et ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui
|
|
|
910 habitus, ita etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex
|
|
|
911 instinctu naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex
|
|
|
912 imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt. Et sic possunt
|
|
|
913 in eis esse aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid
|
|
|
914 disponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p7">
|
|
|
915 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits
|
|
|
916 in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them:
|
|
|
917 for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
|
|
|
918 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35648] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
919 ergo dicendum quod vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire
|
|
|
920 imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus. Sed vires
|
|
|
921 sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse
|
|
|
922 possunt aliqui habitus; nam secundum quod obediunt rationi,
|
|
|
923 quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p8">
|
|
|
924 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals
|
|
|
925 act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain
|
|
|
926 dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom
|
|
|
927 to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can
|
|
|
928 admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts,
|
|
|
929 deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we
|
|
|
930 say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of
|
|
|
931 using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no
|
|
|
932 habits in them.
|
|
|
933 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35649] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
934 dicendum quod vires sensitivae in brutis animalibus non operantur
|
|
|
935 ex imperio rationis; sed si sibi relinquantur bruta animalia,
|
|
|
936 operantur ex instinctu naturae. Et sic in brutis animalibus non
|
|
|
937 sunt aliqui habitus ordinati ad operationes. Sunt tamen in eis
|
|
|
938 aliquae dispositiones in ordine ad naturam, ut sanitas et
|
|
|
939 pulchritudo. Sed quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam
|
|
|
940 consuetudinem disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic vel aliter, hoc
|
|
|
941 modo in brutis animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt, unde
|
|
|
942 Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>videmus
|
|
|
943 immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri dolorum
|
|
|
944 metu, quod cum in earum consuetudinem verterit, domitae et
|
|
|
945 mansuetae vocantur</i>. Deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum
|
|
|
946 voluntatis, quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi, quod
|
|
|
947 videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere. Et ideo, proprie loquendo,
|
|
|
948 in eis habitus esse non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A3-p9">
|
|
|
949 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57:
|
|
|
950 but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is
|
|
|
951 more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since
|
|
|
952 in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at
|
|
|
953 the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby
|
|
|
954 man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom
|
|
|
955 conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.
|
|
|
956 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A3-p10"> On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are
|
|
|
957 ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are
|
|
|
958 no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.
|
|
|
959 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35650] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
960 dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu
|
|
|
961 rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales
|
|
|
962 apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo
|
|
|
963 magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis
|
|
|
964 quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis
|
|
|
965 appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex
|
|
|
966 imperio rationis. Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus
|
|
|
967 sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos
|
|
|
968 homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde
|
|
|
969 etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod <i>consuetudo
|
|
|
970 multum operatur ad bene memorandum</i>, quia etiam istae vires
|
|
|
971 moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis. Vires autem
|
|
|
972 apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non
|
|
|
973 sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem
|
|
|
974 suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra
|
|
|
975 corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus
|
|
|
976 imperantibus motum ipsorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A4-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 4. Whether there is any habit in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p2">
|
|
|
977 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above
|
|
|
978 <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q50_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But
|
|
|
979 the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit.
|
|
|
980 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35651] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
981 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in intellectu non sint aliqui habitus.
|
|
|
982 Habitus enim operationibus conformantur, ut dictum est. Sed
|
|
|
983 operationes hominis sunt communes animae et corpori, ut dicitur in
|
|
|
984 I de anima. Ergo et habitus. Sed intellectus non est actus
|
|
|
985 corporis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus non est
|
|
|
986 subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p3">
|
|
|
987 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter,
|
|
|
988 is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at
|
|
|
989 the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form.
|
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|
990 Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the
|
|
|
991 same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which
|
|
|
992 is composed of soul and body.
|
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|
993 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35652] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
994 omne quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed
|
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|
995 id quod est forma sine materia, est actus tantum, quod autem est
|
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|
996 compositum ex forma et materia, habet potentiam et actum simul.
|
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|
997 Ergo in eo quod est forma tantum, non potest esse aliquid quod sit
|
|
|
998 simul in potentia et actu, sed solum in eo quod est compositum ex
|
|
|
999 materia et forma. Sed intellectus est forma sine materia. Ergo
|
|
|
1000 habitus, qui habet potentiam simul cum actu, quasi medium inter
|
|
|
1001 utrumque existens, non potest esse in intellectu; sed solum in
|
|
|
1002 coniuncto, quod est compositum ex anima et corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1003 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text.
|
|
|
1004 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore
|
|
|
1005 also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of
|
|
|
1006 knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act
|
|
|
1007 of some part of the body.
|
|
|
1008 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35653] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1009 habitus est dispositio secundum quam aliquis bene vel male
|
|
|
1010 disponitur ad aliquid, ut dicitur in V Metaph. Sed quod aliquis
|
|
|
1011 bene vel male sit dispositus ad actum intellectus, provenit ex
|
|
|
1012 aliqua corporis dispositione, unde etiam in II de anima dicitur
|
|
|
1013 quod <i>molles carne bene aptos mente videmus</i>. Ergo habitus
|
|
|
1014 cognoscitivi non sunt in intellectu, qui est separatus; sed in
|
|
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1015 aliqua potentia quae est actus alicuius partis corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1016 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the
|
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1017 intellective part of the soul.
|
|
|
1018 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35654] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
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1019 est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam
|
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|
1020 et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva
|
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1021 parte animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p6">
|
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1022 <b>I answer that,</b> concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [*
|
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1023 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A2" id="FS_Q50_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior
|
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1024 sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly
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|
|
1025 in that, which, being only one, would be common
|
|
|
1026 to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ
|
|
|
1027 from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers,
|
|
|
1028 which differ in various men.
|
|
|
1029 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p7"> Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers
|
|
|
1030 are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues,
|
|
|
1031 which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive
|
|
|
1032 powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when
|
|
|
1033 the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars
|
|
|
1034 by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the
|
|
|
1035 intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way
|
|
|
1036 as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by
|
|
|
1037 which the
|
|
|
1038 intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary
|
|
|
1039 to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand
|
|
|
1040 and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect
|
|
|
1041 itself.
|
|
|
1042 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 co."><a name="35655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35655] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1043 dicendum quod circa habitus cognoscitivos diversimode sunt aliqui
|
|
|
1044 opinati. Quidam enim, ponentes intellectum possibilem esse unum in
|
|
|
1045 omnibus hominibus, coacti sunt ponere quod habitus cognoscitivi non
|
|
|
1046 sunt in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus interioribus sensitivis.
|
|
|
1047 Manifestum est enim quod homines in habitibus diversificantur, unde
|
|
|
1048 non possunt habitus cognoscitivi directe poni in eo quod, unum
|
|
|
1049 numero existens, est omnibus hominibus commune. Unde si intellectus
|
|
|
1050 possibilis sit unus numero omnium hominum, habitus scientiarum,
|
|
|
1051 secundum quos homines diversificantur, non poterunt esse in
|
|
|
1052 intellectu possibili sicut in subiecto, sed erunt in viribus
|
|
|
1053 interioribus sensitivis, quae sunt diversae in diversis. Sed ista
|
|
|
1054 positio, primo quidem, est contra intentionem Aristotelis.
|
|
|
1055 Manifestum est enim quod vires sensitivae non sunt rationales per
|
|
|
1056 essentiam, sed solum per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic.
|
|
|
1057 Philosophus autem ponit intellectuales virtutes, quae sunt
|
|
|
1058 sapientia, scientia et intellectus, in eo quod est rationale per
|
|
|
1059 essentiam. Unde non sunt in viribus sensitivis, sed in ipso
|
|
|
1060 intellectu. Expresse etiam dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus
|
|
|
1061 possibilis, cum sic fiat singula, idest cum reducatur in actum
|
|
|
1062 singulorum per species intelligibiles, tunc fit secundum actum eo
|
|
|
1063 modo quo sciens dicitur esse in actu, quod quidem accidit cum
|
|
|
1064 aliquis possit operari per seipsum, scilicet considerando. Est
|
|
|
1065 quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut
|
|
|
1066 ante addiscere aut invenire. Ipse ergo intellectus possibilis est
|
|
|
1067 in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non
|
|
|
1068 considerat. Secundo etiam, haec positio est contra rei veritatem.
|
|
|
1069 Sicut enim eius est potentia cuius est operatio, ita etiam eius est
|
|
|
1070 habitus cuius est operatio. Intelligere autem et considerare est
|
|
|
1071 proprius actus intellectus. Ergo et habitus quo consideratur, est
|
|
|
1072 proprie in ipso intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1073 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain
|
|
|
1074 extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul
|
|
|
1075 only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate,
|
|
|
1076 as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a
|
|
|
1077 disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to
|
|
|
1078 be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object.
|
|
|
1079 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p9"> Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in
|
|
|
1080 De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text.
|
|
|
1081 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of
|
|
|
1082 the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the
|
|
|
1083 subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the
|
|
|
1084 "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.
|
|
|
1085 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35656] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1086 ergo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt, ut Simplicius refert in
|
|
|
1087 commento praedicamentorum, quod quia omnis operatio hominis est
|
|
|
1088 quodammodo coniuncti, ut philosophus dicit in I de anima; ideo
|
|
|
1089 nullus habitus est animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et per hoc
|
|
|
1090 sequitur quod nullus habitus sit in intellectu, cum intellectus sit
|
|
|
1091 separatus, ut ratio proposita procedebat. Sed ista ratio non cogit.
|
|
|
1092 Habitus enim non est dispositio obiecti ad potentiam, sed magis
|
|
|
1093 dispositio potentiae ad obiectum, unde habitus oportet quod sit in
|
|
|
1094 ipsa potentia quae est principium actus, non autem in eo quod
|
|
|
1095 comparatur ad potentiam sicut obiectum. Ipsum autem intelligere non
|
|
|
1096 dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis,
|
|
|
1097 ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad
|
|
|
1098 intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima.
|
|
|
1099 Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex
|
|
|
1100 parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est
|
|
|
1101 commune animae et corpori. Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus
|
|
|
1102 possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum
|
|
|
1103 habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit
|
|
|
1104 intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum
|
|
|
1105 habituum intellectualium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p10">
|
|
|
1106 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible"
|
|
|
1107 intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and
|
|
|
1108 perfect act.
|
|
|
1109 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35657] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1110 dicendum quod, sicut potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae
|
|
|
1111 corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui
|
|
|
1112 possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse
|
|
|
1113 habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum
|
|
|
1114 perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p11">
|
|
|
1115 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the
|
|
|
1116 good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand.
|
|
|
1117 And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect.
|
|
|
1118 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35658] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1119 dicendum quod, quia vires apprehensivae interius praeparant
|
|
|
1120 intellectui possibili proprium obiectum; ideo ex bona dispositione
|
|
|
1121 harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur
|
|
|
1122 homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus
|
|
|
1123 secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in
|
|
|
1124 intellectu possibili.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A5-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 5. Whether any habit is in the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p2">
|
|
|
1125 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species,
|
|
|
1126 by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is
|
|
|
1127 not the subject of habit.
|
|
|
1128 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35659] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
1129 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in voluntate non sit aliquis habitus.
|
|
|
1130 Habitus enim qui in intellectu est, sunt species intelligibiles,
|
|
|
1131 quibus intelligit actu. Sed voluntas non operatur per aliquas
|
|
|
1132 species. Ergo voluntas non est subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p3">
|
|
|
1133 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an
|
|
|
1134 active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above (
|
|
|
1135 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q50_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no habit in the will.
|
|
|
1136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35660] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1137 in intellectu agente non ponitur aliquis habitus, sicut in
|
|
|
1138 intellectu possibili, quia est potentia activa. Sed voluntas est
|
|
|
1139 maxime potentia activa, quia movet omnes potentias ad suos actus,
|
|
|
1140 ut supra dictum est. Ergo in ipsa non est aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p4">
|
|
|
1141 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing.
|
|
|
1142 But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in
|
|
|
1143 the will.
|
|
|
1144 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35661] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1145 in potentiis naturalibus non est aliquis habitus, quia ex sua
|
|
|
1146 natura sunt ad aliquid determinatae. Sed voluntas ex sua natura
|
|
|
1147 ordinatur ad hoc quod tendat in bonum ordinatum ratione. Ergo in
|
|
|
1148 voluntate non est aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p5">
|
|
|
1149 <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v,
|
|
|
1150 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
|
|
|
1151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35662] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1152 est quod iustitia est habitus quidam. Sed iustitia est in
|
|
|
1153 voluntate, est enim iustitia <i>habitus secundum quem aliqui volunt
|
|
|
1154 et operantur iusta</i>, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo voluntas est
|
|
|
1155 subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p6">
|
|
|
1156 <b>I answer that,</b> Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will
|
|
|
1157 is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit
|
|
|
1158 whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related
|
|
|
1159 to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above
|
|
|
1160
|
|
|
1161 <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
|
|
|
1162 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 co."><a name="35663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35663] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1163 dicendum quod omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad
|
|
|
1164 agendum, indiget habitu quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Voluntas
|
|
|
1165 autem, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum
|
|
|
1166 ordinari. Et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo
|
|
|
1167 bene disponatur ad suum actum. Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus
|
|
|
1168 apparet quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout
|
|
|
1169 habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7">
|
|
|
1170 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive
|
|
|
1171 power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing
|
|
|
1172 but a certain inclination, as we have said above (
|
|
|
1173 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>;
|
|
|
1174 <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[22], A[2]</a>). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the
|
|
|
1175 nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life,
|
|
|
1176 that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has
|
|
|
1177 a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there
|
|
|
1178 be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
|
|
|
1179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35664] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1180 ergo dicendum quod, sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est
|
|
|
1181 similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi
|
|
|
1182 appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum, cum nihil
|
|
|
1183 aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut
|
|
|
1184 supra dictum est. Ad ea ergo ad quae sufficienter inclinatur per
|
|
|
1185 naturam ipsius potentiae, non indiget aliqua qualitate inclinante.
|
|
|
1186 Sed quia necessarium est ad finem humanae vitae, quod vis
|
|
|
1187 appetitiva inclinetur in aliquid determinatum, ad quod non
|
|
|
1188 inclinatur ex natura potentiae, quae se habet ad multa et diversa;
|
|
|
1189 ideo necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus
|
|
|
1190 appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur
|
|
|
1191 habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p8">
|
|
|
1192 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved
|
|
|
1193 (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs
|
|
|
1194 to that which is somehow in potentiality.
|
|
|
1195 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35665] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1196 dicendum quod intellectus agens est agens tantum, et nullo modo
|
|
|
1197 patiens. Sed voluntas, et quaelibet vis appetitiva, est movens
|
|
|
1198 motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo non est similis ratio de
|
|
|
1199 utroque, nam esse susceptivum habitus convenit ei quod est
|
|
|
1200 quodammodo in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p9">
|
|
|
1201 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways,
|
|
|
1202 the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more
|
|
|
1203 promptly.
|
|
|
1204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35666] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1205 dicendum quod voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiae inclinatur in bonum
|
|
|
1206 rationis. Sed quia hoc bonum multipliciter diversificatur,
|
|
|
1207 necessarium est ut ad aliquod determinatum bonum rationis voluntas
|
|
|
1208 per aliquem habitum inclinetur, ad hoc quod sequatur promptior
|
|
|
1209 operatio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A6-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 6. Whether there are habits in the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p2">
|
|
|
1210 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It
|
|
|
1211 is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels)
|
|
|
1212 after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign
|
|
|
1213 to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
|
|
|
1214 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35667] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
|
|
|
1215 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sint habitus. Dicit
|
|
|
1216 enim maximus, Commentator Dionysii, in VII cap. de Cael. Hier., non
|
|
|
1217 convenit arbitrari virtutes intellectuales, idest spirituales, more
|
|
|
1218 accidentium, quemadmodum et in nobis sunt, in divinis
|
|
|
1219 intellectibus, scilicet Angelis, esse, ut aliud in alio sit sicut
|
|
|
1220 in subiecto, accidens enim omne illinc repulsum est. Sed omnis
|
|
|
1221 habitus est accidens. Ergo in Angelis non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p3">
|
|
|
1222 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other
|
|
|
1223 things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another
|
|
|
1224 [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means
|
|
|
1225 of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds:
|
|
|
1226 "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified
|
|
|
1227 of itself."
|
|
|
1228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35668] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1229 sicut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Cael. Hier., <i>sanctae
|
|
|
1230 caelestium essentiarum dispositiones super omnia alia Dei bonitatem
|
|
|
1231 participant</i>. Sed semper quod est per se, est prius et potius eo
|
|
|
1232 quod est per aliud. Ergo Angelorum essentiae per seipsas
|
|
|
1233 perficiuntur ad conformitatem Dei. Non ergo per aliquos habitus. Et
|
|
|
1234 haec videtur esse ratio maximi, qui ibidem subdit, <i>si enim hoc
|
|
|
1235 esset, non utique maneret in semetipsa harum essentia, nec
|
|
|
1236 deificari per se, quantum foret possibile, valuisset</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p4">
|
|
|
1237 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that
|
|
|
1238 which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
|
|
|
1239 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35669] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1240 habitus est dispositio quaedam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed
|
|
|
1241 dispositio, ut ibidem dicitur, est ordo habentis partes. Cum ergo
|
|
|
1242 Angeli sint simplices substantiae, videtur quod in eis non sint
|
|
|
1243 dispositiones et habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p5">
|
|
|
1244 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring
|
|
|
1245 of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits."
|
|
|
1246 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35670] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1247 est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli
|
|
|
1248 primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio
|
|
|
1249 sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p6">
|
|
|
1250 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence
|
|
|
1251 Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential,
|
|
|
1252 through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which
|
|
|
1253 is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For
|
|
|
1254 everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
|
|
|
1255 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p7"> Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said (
|
|
|
1256 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are
|
|
|
1257 immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and
|
|
|
1258 any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still
|
|
|
1259 some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them,
|
|
|
1260 so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance
|
|
|
1261 are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual
|
|
|
1262 substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in
|
|
|
1263 itself."
|
|
|
1264 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p8"> However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the
|
|
|
1265 lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect
|
|
|
1266 of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is
|
|
|
1267 not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for
|
|
|
1268 this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has.
|
|
|
1269 And therefore, as we said in the
|
|
|
1270 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q50_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[55], A[1]</a>, so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard
|
|
|
1271 to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself,
|
|
|
1272 and other things according to the mode of its
|
|
|
1273 substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
|
|
|
1274 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p9"> But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order
|
|
|
1275 to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard
|
|
|
1276 to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them
|
|
|
1277 they are made like to God.
|
|
|
1278 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p10"> But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 co."><a name="35671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35671] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1279 dicendum quod quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus; sed
|
|
|
1280 quaecumque dicuntur de eis, essentialiter dicuntur. Unde maximus,
|
|
|
1281 post praedicta verba quae induximus, dicit, <i>habitudines earum,
|
|
|
1282 atque virtutes quae in eis sunt, essentiales sunt, propter
|
|
|
1283 immaterialitatem</i>. Et hoc etiam Simplicius dicit, in commento
|
|
|
1284 praedicamentorum, <i>sapientia quae est in anima, habitus est, quae
|
|
|
1285 autem in intellectu, substantia. Omnia enim quae sunt divina, et
|
|
|
1286 per se sufficientia sunt, et in seipsis existentia</i>. Quae quidem
|
|
|
1287 positio partim habet veritatem, et partim continet falsitatem.
|
|
|
1288 Manifestum est enim ex praemissis quod subiectum habitus non est
|
|
|
1289 nisi ens in potentia. Considerantes igitur praedicti commentatores
|
|
|
1290 quod Angeli sunt substantiae immateriales, et quod non est in illis
|
|
|
1291 potentia materiae; secundum hoc, ab eis habitum excluserunt, et
|
|
|
1292 omne accidens. Sed quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia
|
|
|
1293 materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum
|
|
|
1294 est proprium Dei); ideo inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia,
|
|
|
1295 intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri. Sed quia potentia
|
|
|
1296 materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius
|
|
|
1297 rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est
|
|
|
1298 utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum,
|
|
|
1299 quod <i>habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui
|
|
|
1300 sunt hic habitibus; sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et
|
|
|
1301 immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa</i>. Circa
|
|
|
1302 huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et
|
|
|
1303 aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit
|
|
|
1304 infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium
|
|
|
1305 intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum
|
|
|
1306 sensibilium, et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu.
|
|
|
1307 Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in
|
|
|
1308 genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam, non autem sicut
|
|
|
1309 actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius
|
|
|
1310 potentiae, et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est
|
|
|
1311 superior. Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in
|
|
|
1312 potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species
|
|
|
1313 intelligibiles ad operationem propriam, sed inquantum est actu, per
|
|
|
1314 essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere, ad minus seipsum, et alia
|
|
|
1315 secundum modum suae substantiae, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, et
|
|
|
1316 tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior. Sed quia nullus Angelus
|
|
|
1317 pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter
|
|
|
1318 hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem,
|
|
|
1319 indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes
|
|
|
1320 respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse
|
|
|
1321 deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur. Habitus autem qui sunt
|
|
|
1322 dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint
|
|
|
1323 immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p11">
|
|
|
1324 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents.
|
|
|
1325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35672] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1326 ergo dicendum quod verbum maximi intelligendum est de habitibus et
|
|
|
1327 accidentibus materialibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p12">
|
|
|
1328 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves,
|
|
|
1329 as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far
|
|
|
1330 do they need to have habits.
|
|
|
1331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35673] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1332 dicendum quod quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam
|
|
|
1333 essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos
|
|
|
1334 entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam; ideo
|
|
|
1335 inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum
|
|
|
1336 necesse est in eis ponere habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p13">
|
|
|
1337 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several
|
|
|
1338 species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.
|
|
|
1339 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35674] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1340 dicendum quod in Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes
|
|
|
1341 secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species
|
|
|
1342 perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.</p></div></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1343 <div id="FS_Q51" class="div3">
|
|
|
1344 <h3 id="FS_Q51-p0.1">Q. 51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1345 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
|
|
|
1346 <p id="FS_Q51-p2"> We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as
|
|
|
1347 to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
|
|
|
1348 </p><p id="FS_Q51-p3"><a href="#FS_Q51_A1"> (1) Whether any habit is from nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p4"><a href="#FS_Q51_A2"> (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p5"><a href="#FS_Q51_A3"> (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p6"><a href="#FS_Q51_A4"> (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</a></p>
|
|
|
1349 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 pr."><a name="35675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35675]
|
|
|
1350 Iª-IIae q. 51 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
|
|
|
1351 habituum. Et primo, quantum ad generationem ipsorum; secundo,
|
|
|
1352 quantum ad augmentum; tertio, quantum ad diminutionem et
|
|
|
1353 corruptionem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis
|
|
|
1354 habitus sit a natura. Secundo, utrum aliquis habitus ex actibus
|
|
|
1355 causetur. Tertio, utrum per unum actum possit generari habitus.
|
|
|
1356 Quarto, utrum aliqui habitus sint in hominibus infusi a Deo.</p></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1357 <div id="FS_Q51_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A1-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 1. Whether any habit is from nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1358 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will.
|
|
|
1359 But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
|
|
|
1360 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35676] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1361 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus sit a natura. Eorum
|
|
|
1362 enim quae sunt a natura, usus non subiacet voluntati. Sed habitus
|
|
|
1363 est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator, in III de
|
|
|
1364 anima. Ergo habitus non est a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1365 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the
|
|
|
1366 habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.
|
|
|
1367 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35677] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1368 natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Sed potentiae
|
|
|
1369 animae sunt a natura. Si igitur habitus potentiarum a natura
|
|
|
1370 essent, habitus et potentia essent unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1371 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (
|
|
|
1372 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q51_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is
|
|
|
1373 clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
|
|
|
1374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35678] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1375 natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed habitus sunt necessarii ad
|
|
|
1376 bene operandum, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur habitus aliqui
|
|
|
1377 essent a natura, videtur quod natura non deficeret quin omnes
|
|
|
1378 habitus necessarios causaret. Patet autem hoc esse falsum. Ergo
|
|
|
1379 habitus non sunt a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1380 <b>On the contrary,</b> In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore
|
|
|
1381 also first principles are said to be known naturally.
|
|
|
1382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35679] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1383 est quod in VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus
|
|
|
1384 principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur
|
|
|
1385 naturaliter cognita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1386 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural
|
|
|
1387 to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural
|
|
|
1388 to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again,
|
|
|
1389 in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first,
|
|
|
1390 because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle.
|
|
|
1391 For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine,
|
|
|
1392 health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
|
|
|
1393 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p7"> Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either
|
|
|
1394 of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without
|
|
|
1395 it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude,
|
|
|
1396 it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the
|
|
|
1397 individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic
|
|
|
1398 principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.
|
|
|
1399 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p8"> But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]),
|
|
|
1400 may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific
|
|
|
1401 nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect
|
|
|
1402 of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it
|
|
|
1403 happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen,
|
|
|
1404 since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said
|
|
|
1405 in the
|
|
|
1406 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[55], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
1407 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A3" id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[3]</a>.
|
|
|
1408 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p9"> There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic
|
|
|
1409 principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive
|
|
|
1410 powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual
|
|
|
1411 nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the
|
|
|
1412 understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that
|
|
|
1413 man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part:
|
|
|
1414 and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know except
|
|
|
1415 through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end
|
|
|
1416 of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.
|
|
|
1417 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p10"> But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from
|
|
|
1418 the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for
|
|
|
1419 the operation of the intellect.
|
|
|
1420 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p11"> In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance
|
|
|
1421 of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries
|
|
|
1422 of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit,
|
|
|
1423 does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers.
|
|
|
1424 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p12"> But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings.
|
|
|
1425 For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like.
|
|
|
1426 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 co."><a name="35680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35680] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1427 dicendum quod aliquid potest esse naturale alicui dupliciter. Uno
|
|
|
1428 modo, secundum naturam speciei, sicut naturale est homini esse
|
|
|
1429 risibile, et igni ferri sursum. Alio modo, secundum naturam
|
|
|
1430 individui, sicut naturale est Socrati vel Platoni esse aegrotativum
|
|
|
1431 vel sanativum, secundum propriam complexionem. Rursus, secundum
|
|
|
1432 utramque naturam potest dici aliquid naturale dupliciter, uno modo,
|
|
|
1433 quia totum est a natura; alio modo, quia secundum aliquid est a
|
|
|
1434 natura, et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio. Sicut cum
|
|
|
1435 aliquis sanatur per seipsum, tota sanitas est a natura, cum autem
|
|
|
1436 aliquis sanatur auxilio medicinae, sanitas partim est a natura,
|
|
|
1437 partim ab exteriori principio. Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu
|
|
|
1438 secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel
|
|
|
1439 naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse
|
|
|
1440 naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur
|
|
|
1441 humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est
|
|
|
1442 naturalis secundum naturam speciei. Sed quia talis dispositio
|
|
|
1443 quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi
|
|
|
1444 dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam
|
|
|
1445 individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a
|
|
|
1446 natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio, sicut
|
|
|
1447 dictum est de his qui sanantur per artem. Sed habitus qui est
|
|
|
1448 dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut
|
|
|
1449 dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam
|
|
|
1450 speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam
|
|
|
1451 speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum
|
|
|
1452 sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem
|
|
|
1453 naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale
|
|
|
1454 principium. Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse
|
|
|
1455 habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis
|
|
|
1456 siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles
|
|
|
1457 naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo
|
|
|
1458 dictum est. Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales,
|
|
|
1459 tanquam partim a natura existentes et partim ab exteriori
|
|
|
1460 principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in
|
|
|
1461 appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus
|
|
|
1462 naturalis secundum inchoationem, et secundum naturam speciei, et
|
|
|
1463 secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, ex
|
|
|
1464 parte ipsius animae, sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse
|
|
|
1465 habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis,
|
|
|
1466 convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est
|
|
|
1467 pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est
|
|
|
1468 in ceteris. Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non
|
|
|
1469 potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas.
|
|
|
1470 Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod
|
|
|
1471 cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu. Secundum vero
|
|
|
1472 naturam individui, est aliquis habitus cognoscitivus secundum
|
|
|
1473 inchoationem naturalis, inquantum unus homo, ex dispositione
|
|
|
1474 organorum, est magis aptus ad bene intelligendum quam alius,
|
|
|
1475 inquantum ad operationem intellectus indigemus virtutibus
|
|
|
1476 sensitivis. In appetitivis autem potentiis non est aliquis habitus
|
|
|
1477 naturalis secundum inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, quantum ad
|
|
|
1478 ipsam substantiam habitus, sed solum quantum ad principia quaedam
|
|
|
1479 ipsius, sicut principia iuris communis dicuntur esse seminalia
|
|
|
1480 virtutum. Et hoc ideo, quia inclinatio ad obiecta propria, quae
|
|
|
1481 videtur esse inchoatio habitus, non pertinet ad habitum, sed magis
|
|
|
1482 pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum. Sed ex parte corporis,
|
|
|
1483 secundum naturam individui, sunt aliqui habitus appetitivi secundum
|
|
|
1484 inchoationes naturales. Sunt enim quidam dispositi ex propria
|
|
|
1485 corporis complexione ad castitatem vel mansuetudinem, vel ad
|
|
|
1486 aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p13">
|
|
|
1487 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.
|
|
|
1488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35681] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1489 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de natura secundum quod
|
|
|
1490 dividitur contra rationem et voluntatem, cum tamen ipsa ratio et
|
|
|
1491 voluntas ad naturam hominis pertineant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p14">
|
|
|
1492 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance,
|
|
|
1493 with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would
|
|
|
1494 have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the
|
|
|
1495 actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel
|
|
|
1496 knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels'
|
|
|
1497 intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the
|
|
|
1498 Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so
|
|
|
1499 it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
|
|
|
1500 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35682] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1501 dicendum quod aliquid etiam naturaliter potest superaddi potentiae,
|
|
|
1502 quod tamen ad ipsam potentiam pertinere non potest. Sicut in
|
|
|
1503 Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod
|
|
|
1504 sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus
|
|
|
1505 omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur,
|
|
|
1506 oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde
|
|
|
1507 sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod
|
|
|
1508 esset similitudo et actus omnium. Unde oportet quod superaddantur
|
|
|
1509 potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae
|
|
|
1510 sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem
|
|
|
1511 divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt
|
|
|
1512 intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt. Et sic patet quod
|
|
|
1513 non omne id quod pertinet ad habitum naturalem, potest ad potentiam
|
|
|
1514 pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p15">
|
|
|
1515 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not,
|
|
|
1516 as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural.
|
|
|
1517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35683] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1518 dicendum quod natura non aequaliter se habet ad causandas omnes
|
|
|
1519 diversitates habituum, quia quidam possunt causari a natura, quidam
|
|
|
1520 non, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non sequitur, si aliqui habitus
|
|
|
1521 sint naturales, quod omnes sint naturales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A2-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 2. Whether any habit is caused by acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1522 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (
|
|
|
1523 <a href="#FS_Q49_A1" id="FS_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[1]</a>). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts,
|
|
|
1524 does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts.
|
|
|
1525 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35684] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1526 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus possit ex actu causari.
|
|
|
1527 Habitus enim est qualitas quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Omnis autem
|
|
|
1528 qualitas causatur in aliquo subiecto, inquantum est alicuius
|
|
|
1529 receptivum. Cum igitur agens ex hoc quod agit, non recipiat
|
|
|
1530 aliquid, sed magis ex se emittat; videtur quod non possit aliquis
|
|
|
1531 habitus in agente ex propriis actibus generari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1532 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or
|
|
|
1533 cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If
|
|
|
1534 therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and
|
|
|
1535 passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8.
|
|
|
1536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35685] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1537 illud in quo causatur aliqua qualitas, movetur ad qualitatem illam,
|
|
|
1538 sicut patet in re calefacta vel infrigidata, quod autem producit
|
|
|
1539 actum causantem qualitatem, movet, ut patet de calefaciente vel
|
|
|
1540 infrigidante. Si igitur in aliquo causaretur habitus per actum sui
|
|
|
1541 ipsius, sequeretur quod idem esset movens et motum, agens et
|
|
|
1542 patiens. Quod est impossibile, ut dicitur in VII Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1543 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as
|
|
|
1544 is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes
|
|
|
1545 the habit.
|
|
|
1546 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35686] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1547 effectus non potest esse nobilior sua causa. Sed habitus est
|
|
|
1548 nobilior quam actus praecedens habitum, quod patet ex hoc, quod
|
|
|
1549 nobiliores actus reddit. Ergo habitus non potest causari ab actu
|
|
|
1550 praecedente habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1551 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.
|
|
|
1552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35687] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1553 est quod philosophus, in II Ethic., docet habitus virtutum et
|
|
|
1554 vitiorum ex actibus causari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1555 <b>I answer that,</b> In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle
|
|
|
1556 of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed
|
|
|
1557 or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the
|
|
|
1558 passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the
|
|
|
1559 appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and
|
|
|
1560 further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident
|
|
|
1561 proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle,
|
|
|
1562 but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and
|
|
|
1563 moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed
|
|
|
1564 in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in
|
|
|
1565 the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect,
|
|
|
1566 according as it is moved by first propositions.
|
|
|
1567 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 co."><a name="35688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35688] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1568 dicendum quod in agente quandoque est solum activum principium sui
|
|
|
1569 actus, sicut in igne est solum principium activum calefaciendi. Et
|
|
|
1570 in tali agente non potest aliquis habitus causari ex proprio actu,
|
|
|
1571 et inde est quod res naturales non possunt aliquid consuescere vel
|
|
|
1572 dissuescere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Invenitur autem aliquod agens
|
|
|
1573 in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in
|
|
|
1574 actibus humanis. Nam actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi
|
|
|
1575 appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante
|
|
|
1576 obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur
|
|
|
1577 de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per
|
|
|
1578 se notam. Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui
|
|
|
1579 habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium,
|
|
|
1580 sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod
|
|
|
1581 patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis, unde ex
|
|
|
1582 multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia
|
|
|
1583 passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum
|
|
|
1584 moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur
|
|
|
1585 a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum
|
|
|
1586 quod movetur a primis propositionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1587 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something
|
|
|
1588 from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
|
|
|
1589 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35689] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1590 ergo dicendum quod agens, inquantum est agens, non recipit aliquid.
|
|
|
1591 Sed inquantum agit motum ab alio, sic recipit aliquid a movente, et
|
|
|
1592 sic causatur habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1593 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself
|
|
|
1594 as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.
|
|
|
1595 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35690] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1596 dicendum quod idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum.
|
|
|
1597 Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in
|
|
|
1598 VIII Physic. probatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1599 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle
|
|
|
1600 than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced
|
|
|
1601 in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than
|
|
|
1602 the science of conclusions.
|
|
|
1603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35691] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1604 dicendum quod actus praecedens habitum inquantum procedit a
|
|
|
1605 principio activo, procedit a nobiliori principio quam sit habitus
|
|
|
1606 generatus, sicut ipsa ratio est nobilius principium quam sit
|
|
|
1607 habitus virtutis moralis in vi appetitiva per actuum consuetudines
|
|
|
1608 generatus; et intellectus principiorum est nobilius principium quam
|
|
|
1609 scientia conclusionum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A3-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 3. Whether a habit can be caused by one act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1610 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit
|
|
|
1611 of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.
|
|
|
1612 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35692] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1613 sic proceditur. Videtur quod per unum actum possit habitus
|
|
|
1614 generari. Demonstratio enim actus rationis est. Sed per unam
|
|
|
1615 demonstrationem causatur scientia quae est habitus conclusionis
|
|
|
1616 unius. Ergo habitus potest causari ex uno actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1617 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by
|
|
|
1618 multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit.
|
|
|
1619 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35693] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1620 sicut contingit actus crescere per multiplicationem, ita contingit
|
|
|
1621 actum crescere per intensionem. Sed multiplicatis actibus,
|
|
|
1622 generatur habitus. Ergo etiam si multum intendatur unus actus,
|
|
|
1623 poterit esse causa generativa habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1624 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act
|
|
|
1625 can cause a habit.
|
|
|
1626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35694] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1627 sanitas et aegritudo sunt habitus quidam. Sed ex uno actu contingit
|
|
|
1628 hominem vel sanari vel infirmari. Ergo unus actus potest habitum
|
|
|
1629 causare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1630 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short
|
|
|
1631 time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13).
|
|
|
1632 Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.
|
|
|
1633 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35695] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1634 est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>una hirundo ver
|
|
|
1635 non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una
|
|
|
1636 dies, nec paucum tempus. Sed beatitudo est operatio secundum
|
|
|
1637 habitum perfectae virtutis</i>, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo habitus
|
|
|
1638 virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum
|
|
|
1639 actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1640 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already
|
|
|
1641 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q51_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused
|
|
|
1642 in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at
|
|
|
1643 once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming
|
|
|
1644 it entirely, it may impress
|
|
|
1645 its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power
|
|
|
1646 in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act,
|
|
|
1647 what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely
|
|
|
1648 overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the
|
|
|
1649 habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.
|
|
|
1650 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 co."><a name="35696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35696] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1651 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, habitus per actum generatur
|
|
|
1652 inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo. Ad
|
|
|
1653 hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod
|
|
|
1654 activum totaliter vincat passivum. Unde videmus quod, quia ignis
|
|
|
1655 non potest statim vincere suum combustibile, non statim inflammat
|
|
|
1656 ipsum, sed paulatim abiicit contrarias dispositiones, ut sic
|
|
|
1657 totaliter vincens ipsum, similitudinem suam ipsi imprimat.
|
|
|
1658 Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non
|
|
|
1659 totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo
|
|
|
1660 quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa;
|
|
|
1661 iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum
|
|
|
1662 secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias. Unde ex hoc non
|
|
|
1663 totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in
|
|
|
1664 pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et
|
|
|
1665 ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per
|
|
|
1666 multos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p7"> But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See
|
|
|
1667 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A2" id="FS_Q51_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a> ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular
|
|
|
1668 reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is
|
|
|
1669 possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one
|
|
|
1670 act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm
|
|
|
1671 assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many
|
|
|
1672 acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act
|
|
|
1673 of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same
|
|
|
1674 acts
|
|
|
1675 need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et
|
|
|
1676 Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle
|
|
|
1677 is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.
|
|
|
1678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod
|
|
|
1679 duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud
|
|
|
1680 autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio
|
|
|
1681 particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa.
|
|
|
1682 Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno
|
|
|
1683 actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio
|
|
|
1684 per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter
|
|
|
1685 conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex
|
|
|
1686 multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam
|
|
|
1687 ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile
|
|
|
1688 est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum
|
|
|
1689 possibilem. Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas,
|
|
|
1690 necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter
|
|
|
1691 memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et
|
|
|
1692 reminiscentia, dicit quod <i>meditatio confirmat memoriam</i>.
|
|
|
1693 Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si
|
|
|
1694 activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis
|
|
|
1695 statim inducit sanitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p8"> Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35697] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
|
|
|
1696 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A4-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 4. Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1697 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some,
|
|
|
1698 He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.
|
|
|
1699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35698] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1700 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus hominibus infundatur a
|
|
|
1701 Deo. Deus enim aequaliter se habet ad omnes. Si igitur quibusdam
|
|
|
1702 infundit habitus aliquos, omnibus eos infunderet. Quod patet esse
|
|
|
1703 falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1704 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence
|
|
|
1705 to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above
|
|
|
1706
|
|
|
1707 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q51_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
|
|
|
1708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35699] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1709 Deus operatur in omnibus secundum modum qui convenit naturae
|
|
|
1710 ipsorum, quia divinae providentiae est naturam salvare, ut dicit
|
|
|
1711 Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed habitus in homine naturaliter
|
|
|
1712 causantur ex actibus, ut dictum est. Non ergo causat Deus in
|
|
|
1713 hominibus aliquos habitus absque actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1714 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit
|
|
|
1715 is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the
|
|
|
1716 other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a
|
|
|
1717 habit is not infused into man by God.
|
|
|
1718 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35700] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1719 si aliquis habitus a Deo infunditur, per illum habitum homo potest
|
|
|
1720 multos actus producere. Sed ex illis actibus causatur similis
|
|
|
1721 habitus, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sequitur ergo duos habitus
|
|
|
1722 eiusdem speciei esse in eodem, unum acquisitum, et alterum infusum.
|
|
|
1723 Quod videtur esse impossibile, non enim duae formae unius speciei
|
|
|
1724 possunt esse in eodem subiecto. Non ergo habitus aliquis infunditur
|
|
|
1725 homini a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1726 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (
|
|
|
1727 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:5</a>): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits
|
|
|
1728 are infused into man by God.
|
|
|
1729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35701] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1730 est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>implevit eum dominus spiritu
|
|
|
1731 sapientiae et intellectus</i>. Sed sapientia et intellectus quidam
|
|
|
1732 habitus sunt. Ergo aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1733 <b>I answer that,</b> Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons.
|
|
|
1734 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p7"> The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human
|
|
|
1735 nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (
|
|
|
1736 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q51_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those
|
|
|
1737 habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except
|
|
|
1738 by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
|
|
|
1739 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p8"> The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in
|
|
|
1740 the
|
|
|
1741 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FS_Q51_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature
|
|
|
1742 could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can
|
|
|
1743 be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the
|
|
|
1744 science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.
|
|
|
1745 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 co."><a name="35702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35702] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1746 dicendum quod duplici ratione aliqui habitus homini a Deo
|
|
|
1747 infunduntur. Prima ratio est, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo
|
|
|
1748 bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui
|
|
|
1749 est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est. Et
|
|
|
1750 quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur
|
|
|
1751 secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi
|
|
|
1752 finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales
|
|
|
1753 habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina,
|
|
|
1754 sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus. Alia ratio est, quia
|
|
|
1755 Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis
|
|
|
1756 causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad
|
|
|
1757 ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali
|
|
|
1758 causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari; ita etiam quandoque,
|
|
|
1759 ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus
|
|
|
1760 qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit
|
|
|
1761 scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per
|
|
|
1762 studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita
|
|
|
1763 perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p9">
|
|
|
1764 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives
|
|
|
1765 certain things to some, which He does not give to others.
|
|
|
1766 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35703] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1767 ergo dicendum quod Deus, quantum ad suam naturam, aequaliter se
|
|
|
1768 habet ad omnes, sed secundum ordinem suae sapientiae certa ratione
|
|
|
1769 quaedam tribuit aliquibus, quae non tribuit aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p10">
|
|
|
1770 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from
|
|
|
1771 this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.
|
|
|
1772 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35704] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1773 dicendum quod hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum
|
|
|
1774 eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari
|
|
|
1775 non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod
|
|
|
1776 naturae convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p11">
|
|
|
1777 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies
|
|
|
1778 of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he
|
|
|
1779 had before.
|
|
|
1780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35705] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1781 dicendum quod actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant
|
|
|
1782 aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut
|
|
|
1783 medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant
|
|
|
1784 aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.</p></div></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1785 <div id="FS_Q52" class="div3">
|
|
|
1786 <h3 id="FS_Q52-p0.1">Q. 52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1787 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
|
|
|
1788 <p id="FS_Q52-p2"> We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q52-p3"><a href="#FS_Q52_A1"> (1) Whether habits increase?</a></p><p id="FS_Q52-p4"><a href="#FS_Q52_A2"> (2) Whether they increase by addition?</a></p><p id="FS_Q52-p5"><a href="#FS_Q52_A3"> (3) Whether each act increases the habit?</a></p>
|
|
|
1789 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 pr."><a name="35706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35706]
|
|
|
1790 Iª-IIae q. 52 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
|
|
|
1791 augmento habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum
|
|
|
1792 habitus augeantur. Secundo, utrum augeantur per additionem. Tertio,
|
|
|
1793 utrum quilibet actus augeat habitum.</p></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1794 <div id="FS_Q52_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A1-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 1. Whether habits increase?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1795 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the
|
|
|
1796 genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.
|
|
|
1797 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35707] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1798 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus augeri non possint. Augmentum
|
|
|
1799 enim est circa quantitatem, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed habitus non
|
|
|
1800 sunt in genere quantitatis, sed in genere qualitatis. Ergo circa
|
|
|
1801 eos augmentum esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1802 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems
|
|
|
1803 that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
|
|
|
1804 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35708] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1805 habitus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed
|
|
|
1806 perfectio, cum importet finem et terminum, non videtur posse
|
|
|
1807 recipere magis et minus. Ergo habitus augeri non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1808 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more
|
|
|
1809 hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits
|
|
|
1810 cannot increase.
|
|
|
1811 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35709] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1812 in his quae recipiunt magis et minus, contingit esse alterationem,
|
|
|
1813 alterari enim dicitur quod de minus calido fit magis calidum. Sed
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1814 in habitibus non est alteratio, ut probatur in VII Physic. Ergo
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1815 habitus augeri non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5">
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1816 <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (
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1817 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.5" target="asv">Lk. 17:5</a>): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase.
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1818 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35710] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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1819 est quod fides est quidam habitus, et tamen augetur, unde discipuli
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1820 domino dicunt, domine, adauge nobis fidem, ut habetur Luc. XVII.
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1821 Ergo habitus augentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p6">
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1822 <b>I answer that,</b> Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things,
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1823 on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal
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1824 quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain
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1825 quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so
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1826 also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things
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1827 which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).
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1828 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p7"> Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of
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1829 the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself,
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1830 thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider
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1831 the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
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1832 "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form
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1833 has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature,
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1834 and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
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1835 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p8"> In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as
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1836 Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits
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1837 themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness,
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1838 on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves
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1839 were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect
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1840 of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes
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1841 to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding
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1842 opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that
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1843 some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible
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1844 of more or less, but that material forms are.
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1845 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p9"> In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species,
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1846 must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under
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1847 the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher
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1848 says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
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1849 subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself,
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1850 or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature,
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1851 which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation
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1852 to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species
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1853 from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless
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1854 they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive
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1855 their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on
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1856 account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to
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1857 the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may
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1858 be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence
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1859 the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
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1860 always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health."
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1861 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p10"> Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were
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1862 given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a
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1863 quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
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1864 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p11"> But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities
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1865 and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that
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1866 substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is
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1867 participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of
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1868 substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity,
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1869 therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text.
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1870 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are
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1871 further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect
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1872 of their participation by the subject.
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1873 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p12"> Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives
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1874 its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that
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1875 a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for
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1876 this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii,
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1877 text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in
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1878 respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material
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1879 dispositions, "more or less are found in substance."
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1880 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p13"> Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form,
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1881 it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as
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1882 varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be
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1883 said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
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1884 three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
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1885 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p14"> This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible
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1886 of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles":
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1887 to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate
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1888 it in its indivisibility.
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1889 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p15"> It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text.
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1890 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself:
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1891 thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly,
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1892 in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more
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1893 in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition
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1894 do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility.
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1895 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p16"> We shall say further on (
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1896 <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q52_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a>) how it is with the virtues.
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1897 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 co."><a name="35711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35711] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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1898 dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia,
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1899 a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles
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1900 transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res
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1901 corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt. Dicitur autem in
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1902 quantitatibus corporeis aliquid magnum, secundum quod ad debitam
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1903 perfectionem quantitatis perducitur, unde aliqua quantitas
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1904 reputatur magna in homine, quae non reputatur magna in elephante.
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1905 Unde et in formis dicimus aliquid magnum, ex hoc quod est
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1906 perfectum. Et quia bonum habet rationem perfecti, propter hoc <i>in
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1907 his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius</i>,
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1908 ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin. Perfectio autem formae
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1909 dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsam formam;
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1910 alio modo, secundum quod subiectum participat formam. Inquantum
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1911 igitur attenditur perfectio formae secundum ipsam formam, sic
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1912 dicitur ipsa esse parva vel magna; puta magna vel parva sanitas vel
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1913 scientia. Inquantum vero attenditur perfectio formae secundum
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1914 participationem subiecti, dicitur magis et minus; puta magis vel
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1915 minus album vel sanum. Non autem ista distinctio procedit secundum
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1916 hoc, quod forma habeat esse praeter materiam aut subiectum, sed
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1917 quia alia est consideratio eius secundum rationem speciei suae, et
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1918 alia secundum quod participatur in subiecto. Secundum hoc igitur,
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1919 circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum, fuerunt
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1920 quatuor opiniones apud philosophos, ut Simplicius narrat in
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1921 commento praedicamentorum. Plotinus enim et alii Platonici ponebant
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1922 ipsas qualitates et habitus suscipere magis et minus, propter hoc
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1923 quod materiales erant, et ex hoc habebant indeterminationem
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1924 quandam, propter materiae infinitatem. Alii vero in contrarium
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1925 ponebant quod ipsae qualitates et habitus secundum se non
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1926 recipiebant magis et minus; sed qualia dicuntur magis et minus,
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1927 secundum diversam participationem; puta quod iustitia non dicatur
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1928 magis et minus, sed iustum. Et hanc opinionem tangit Aristoteles in
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1929 praedicamentis. Tertia fuit opinio Stoicorum, media inter has.
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1930 Posuerunt enim quod aliqui habitus secundum se recipiunt magis et
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1931 minus, sicuti artes; quidam autem non, sicut virtutes. Quarta
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1932 opinio fuit quorundam dicentium quod qualitates et formae
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1933 immateriales non recipiunt magis et minus, materiales autem
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1934 recipiunt. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum
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1935 est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse
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1936 fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud
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1937 attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab
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1938 illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel
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1939 perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII
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1940 Metaphys., quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio
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1941 vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel
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1942 quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui,
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1943 sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se
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1944 considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus
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1945 excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor
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1946 et albedo, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates quae non dicuntur in
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1947 ordine ad aliud, et multo magis substantia, quae est per se ens.
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1948 Illa vero quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur,
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1949 possunt secundum seipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et
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1950 nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod
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1951 ordinantur, ex quo recipiunt speciem. Sicut motus secundum se est
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1952 intensior et remissior, et tamen remanet eadem species, propter
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1953 unitatem termini, ex quo specificatur. Et idem potest considerari
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1954 in sanitate, nam corpus pertingit ad rationem sanitatis, secundum
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1955 quod habet dispositionem convenientem naturae animalis, cui possunt
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1956 dispositiones diversae convenientes esse; unde potest variari
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1957 dispositio in plus vel in minus, et tamen semper remanet ratio
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1958 sanitatis. Unde philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod <i>sanitas
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1959 ipsa recipit magis et minus, non enim eadem est commensuratio in
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1960 omnibus, neque in uno et eodem semper; sed remissa permanet sanitas
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1961 usque ad aliquid</i>. Huiusmodi autem diversae dispositiones vel
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1962 commensurationes sanitatis se habent secundum excedens et excessum,
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1963 unde si nomen sanitatis esset impositum soli perfectissimae
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1964 commensurationi, tunc ipsa sanitas non diceretur maior vel minor.
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1965 Sic igitur patet qualiter aliqua qualitas vel forma possit secundum
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1966 seipsam augeri vel minui, et qualiter non. Si vero consideremus
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1967 qualitatem vel formam secundum participationem subiecti, sic etiam
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1968 inveniuntur quaedam qualitates et formae recipere magis et minus,
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1969 et quaedam non. Huiusmodi autem diversitatis causam Simplicius
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1970 assignat ex hoc, quod substantia secundum seipsam non potest
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1971 recipere magis et minus, quia est ens per se. Et ideo omnis forma
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1972 quae substantialiter participatur in subiecto, caret intensione et
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1973 remissione, unde in genere substantiae nihil dicitur secundum magis
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1974 et minus. Et quia quantitas propinqua est substantiae, et figura
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1975 etiam consequitur quantitatem; inde est quod neque etiam in istis
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1976 dicitur aliquid secundum magis aut minus. Unde philosophus dicit,
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1977 in VII Physic., quod cum aliquid accipit formam et figuram, non
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1978 dicitur alterari, sed magis fieri. Aliae vero qualitates, quae sunt
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1979 magis distantes a substantia, et coniunguntur passionibus et
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1980 actionibus, recipiunt magis et minus secundum participationem
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1981 subiecti. Potest autem et magis explicari huiusmodi diversitatis
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1982 ratio. Ut enim dictum est, id a quo aliquid habet speciem, oportet
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1983 manere fixum et stans in indivisibili. Duobus igitur modis potest
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1984 contingere quod forma non participatur secundum magis et minus. Uno
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1985 modo, quia participans habet speciem secundum ipsam. Et inde est
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1986 quod nulla forma substantialis participatur secundum magis et
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1987 minus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod,
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1988 sicut numerus non habet magis neque minus, sic neque substantia
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1989 quae est secundum speciem, idest quantum ad participationem formae
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1990 specificae; sed si quidem quae cum materia, idest, secundum
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1991 materiales dispositiones invenitur magis et minus in substantia.
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1992 Alio modo potest contingere ex hoc quod ipsa indivisibilitas est de
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1993 ratione formae, unde oportet quod, si aliquid participet formam
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1994 illam, quod participet illam secundum rationem indivisibilitatis.
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1995 Et inde est quod species numeri non dicuntur secundum magis et
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1996 minus, quia unaquaeque species in eis constituitur per
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1997 indivisibilem unitatem. Et eadem ratio est de speciebus quantitatis
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1998 continuae quae secundum numeros accipiuntur ut bicubitum et
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1999 tricubitum; et de relationibus, ut duplum et triplum; et de
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2000 figuris, ut trigonum et tetragonum. Et hanc rationem ponit
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2001 Aristoteles in praedicamentis, ubi, assignans rationem quare
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2002 figurae non recipiunt magis et minus, dicit, <i>quae quidem enim
|
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2003 recipiunt trigoni rationem et circuli, similiter trigona vel
|
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2004 circuli sunt</i>, quia scilicet indivisibilitas est de ipsa eorum
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2005 ratione, unde quaecumque participant rationem eorum, oportet quod
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2006 indivisibiliter participent. Sic igitur patet quod, cum habitus et
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2007 dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, ut dicitur in
|
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2008 VII Physic., dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et
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2009 dispositionibus considerari. Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur
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2010 maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad
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2011 plura vel pauciora se extendit. Alio modo, secundum participationem
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2012 subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis
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2013 recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex
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2014 natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat
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2015 speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit
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2016 indivisibilitatem. Quomodo autem circa virtutes se habeat, infra
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2017 dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p17">
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|
2018 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the
|
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|
2019 word "growth," the term of which is something great.
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|
2020 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35712] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
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2021 ergo dicendum quod, sicut nomen magnitudinis derivatur a
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2022 quantitatibus corporalibus ad intelligibiles perfectiones formarum;
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2023 ita etiam et nomen augmenti, cuius terminus est magnum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p18">
|
|
|
2024 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject
|
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|
2025 its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore
|
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2026 there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.
|
|
|
2027 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35713] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
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|
2028 dicendum quod habitus quidem perfectio est, non tamen talis
|
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2029 perfectio quae sit terminus sui subiecti, puta dans ei esse
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2030 specificum. Neque etiam in sui ratione terminum includit, sicut
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2031 species numerorum. Unde nihil prohibet quin recipiat magis et
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2032 minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p19">
|
|
|
2033 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first
|
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2034 species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness.
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2035 In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension,
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2036 an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
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|
|
2037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35714] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
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|
2038 dicendum quod alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae
|
|
|
2039 speciei. In qualitatibus vero primae speciei potest esse alteratio
|
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|
2040 per posterius, facta enim alteratione secundum calidum et frigidum,
|
|
|
2041 sequitur animal alterari secundum sanum et aegrum. Et similiter,
|
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|
2042 facta alteratione secundum passiones appetitus sensitivi, vel
|
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|
2043 secundum vires sensitivas apprehensivas, sequitur alteratio
|
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|
2044 secundum scientias et virtutes, ut dicitur in VII Physic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q52_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A2-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 2. Whether habits increases by addition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p2">
|
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|
2045 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred
|
|
|
2046 to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener.
|
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|
2047 i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is
|
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|
2048 no increase without addition.
|
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|
2049 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35715] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
|
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|
2050 sic proceditur. Videtur quod augmentum habituum fiat per
|
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|
2051 additionem. Nomen enim augmenti, ut dictum est, a quantitatibus
|
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|
2052 corporalibus transfertur ad formas. Sed in quantitatibus
|
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|
2053 corporalibus non fit augmentum sine additione, unde in I de
|
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|
2054 Generat. dicitur quod <i>augmentum est praeexistenti magnitudini
|
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|
2055 additamentum</i>. Ergo et in habitibus non fit augmentum nisi per
|
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|
2056 additionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p3">
|
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|
2057 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
|
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|
2058 instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition.
|
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2059 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35716] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
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2060 habitus non augetur nisi aliquo agente. Sed omne agens aliquid
|
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2061 facit in subiecto patiente, sicut calefaciens facit calorem in ipso
|
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2062 calefacto. Ergo non potest esse augmentum nisi aliqua fiat
|
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|
2063 additio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p4">
|
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|
2064 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be
|
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|
2065 more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less
|
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|
2066 white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness.
|
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2067 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35717] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2068 sicut id quod non est album, est in potentia ad album; ita id quod
|
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|
2069 est minus album, est in potentia ad magis album. Sed id quod non
|
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|
2070 est album, non fit album nisi per adventum albedinis. Ergo id quod
|
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|
2071 est minus album, non fit magis album nisi per aliquam aliam
|
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2072 albedinem supervenientem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p5">
|
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|
2073 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
|
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|
2074 that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when
|
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2075 they increase.
|
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|
2076 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35718] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2077 est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., <i>ex calido fit magis
|
|
|
2078 calidum, nullo facto in materia calido, quod non esset calidum
|
|
|
2079 quando erat minus calidum</i>. Ergo, pari ratione, nec in aliis
|
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|
2080 formis quae augentur, est aliqua additio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p6">
|
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2081 <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question depends on what we have said above
|
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|
2082 <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on
|
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2083 the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
|
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|
2084 of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or
|
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2085 less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning,
|
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|
2086 as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by
|
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2087 an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though
|
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2088 something were added to the form.
|
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2089 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p7"> For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in
|
|
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2090 the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated
|
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|
2091 <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from
|
|
|
2092 being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be
|
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2093 either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man
|
|
|
2094 who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in
|
|
|
2095 the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we
|
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|
2096 have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing.
|
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2097 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p8"> Since, however, as stated above
|
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2098 <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For
|
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2099 movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the
|
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|
2100 same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e.
|
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|
2101 in so far as the same movement can be executed more
|
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|
2102 or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions
|
|
|
2103 of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's
|
|
|
2104 participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions.
|
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|
2105 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p9"> As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said
|
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|
2106 to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this
|
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|
2107 is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of
|
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|
2108 the subject partaking of them.
|
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|
2109 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p10"> How this question affects virtues we shall state further on (
|
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|
2110 <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a> ).
|
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|
2111 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 co."><a name="35719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35719] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
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|
2112 dicendum quod huius quaestionis solutio dependet ex praemissa.
|
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2113 Dictum est enim supra quod augmentum et diminutio in formis quae
|
|
|
2114 intenduntur et remittuntur, accidit uno modo non ex parte ipsius
|
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|
2115 formae secundum se consideratae, sed ex diversa participatione
|
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2116 subiecti. Et ideo huiusmodi augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum,
|
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|
2117 non fit per additionem formae ad formam; sed fit per hoc quod
|
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|
2118 subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem
|
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|
2119 formam. Et sicut per agens quod est actu, fit aliquid actu calidum,
|
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|
2120 quasi de novo incipiens participare formam, non quod fiat ipsa
|
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|
2121 forma, ut probatur VII Metaphys.; ita per actionem intensam ipsius
|
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|
2122 agentis efficitur magis calidum, tanquam perfectius participans
|
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|
2123 formam, non tanquam formae aliquid addatur. Si enim per additionem
|
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|
2124 intelligeretur huiusmodi augmentum in formis, hoc non posset esse
|
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|
2125 nisi vel ex parte ipsius formae, vel ex parte subiecti. Si autem ex
|
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|
2126 parte ipsius formae, iam dictum est quod talis additio vel
|
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|
2127 subtractio speciem variaret; sicut variatur species coloris, quando
|
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|
2128 de pallido fit album. Si vero huiusmodi additio intelligatur ex
|
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|
2129 parte subiecti, hoc non posset esse nisi vel quia aliqua pars
|
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|
2130 subiecti recipit formam quam prius non habebat, ut si dicatur
|
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|
2131 frigus crescere in homine qui prius frigebat in una parte, quando
|
|
|
2132 iam in pluribus partibus friget, vel quia aliquod aliud subiectum
|
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|
2133 additur participans eandem formam, sicut si calidum adiungatur
|
|
|
2134 calido, vel album albo. Sed secundum utrumque istorum duorum
|
|
|
2135 modorum, non dicitur aliquid magis album vel calidum, sed maius.
|
|
|
2136 Sed quia quaedam accidentia augentur secundum seipsa, ut supra
|
|
|
2137 dictum est, in quibusdam eorum fieri potest augmentum per
|
|
|
2138 additionem. Augetur enim motus per hoc quod ei aliquid additur vel
|
|
|
2139 secundum tempus in quo est, vel secundum viam per quam est, et
|
|
|
2140 tamen manet eadem species, propter unitatem termini. Augetur etiam
|
|
|
2141 nihilominus motus per intensionem, secundum participationem
|
|
|
2142 subiecti, inquantum scilicet idem motus potest vel magis vel minus
|
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|
2143 expedite aut prompte fieri. Similiter etiam et scientia potest
|
|
|
2144 augeri secundum seipsam per additionem, sicut cum aliquis plures
|
|
|
2145 conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem
|
|
|
2146 scientiae secundum speciem. Augetur nihilominus scientia in aliquo,
|
|
|
2147 secundum participationem subiecti, per intensionem, prout scilicet
|
|
|
2148 expeditius et clarius unus homo se habet alio in eisdem
|
|
|
2149 conclusionibus considerandis. In habitibus autem corporalibus non
|
|
|
2150 multum videtur fieri augmentum per additionem. Quia non dicitur
|
|
|
2151 animal sanum simpliciter, aut pulchrum, nisi secundum omnes partes
|
|
|
2152 suas sit tale. Quod autem ad perfectiorem commensurationem
|
|
|
2153 perducatur, hoc contingit secundum transmutationem simplicium
|
|
|
2154 qualitatum; quae non augentur nisi secundum intensionem, ex parte
|
|
|
2155 subiecti participantis. Quomodo autem se habeat circa virtutes,
|
|
|
2156 infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p11">
|
|
|
2157 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things.
|
|
|
2158 Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated
|
|
|
2159 in Phys. iv, text. 63.
|
|
|
2160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35720] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2161 ergo dicendum quod etiam in magnitudine corporali contingit
|
|
|
2162 dupliciter esse augmentum. Uno modo, per additionem subiecti ad
|
|
|
2163 subiectum; sicut est in augmento viventium. Alio modo, per solam
|
|
|
2164 intensionem, absque omni additione; sicut est in his quae
|
|
|
2165 rarefiunt, ut dicitur in IV Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p12">
|
|
|
2166 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject
|
|
|
2167 to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further.
|
|
|
2168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35721] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2169 dicendum quod causa augens habitum, facit quidem semper aliquid in
|
|
|
2170 subiecto, non autem novam formam. Sed facit quod subiectum
|
|
|
2171 perfectius participet formam praeexistentem, aut quod amplius se
|
|
|
2172 extendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p13">
|
|
|
2173 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new
|
|
|
2174 form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already
|
|
|
2175 actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action.
|
|
|
2176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35722] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2177 dicendum quod id quod nondum est album, est in potentia ad formam
|
|
|
2178 ipsam, tanquam nondum habens formam, et ideo agens causat novam
|
|
|
2179 formam in subiecto. Sed id quod est minus calidum aut album, non
|
|
|
2180 est in potentia ad formam, cum iam actu formam habeat, sed est in
|
|
|
2181 potentia ad perfectum participationis modum. Et hoc consequitur per
|
|
|
2182 actionem agentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q52_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A3-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 3. Whether every act increases its habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2183 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes
|
|
|
2184 of habits, as stated above (
|
|
|
2185 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q52_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied.
|
|
|
2186 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35723] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2187 sic proceditur. Videtur quod quilibet actus augeat habitum.
|
|
|
2188 Multiplicata enim causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed actus sunt
|
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|
2189 causa habituum aliquorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo habitus
|
|
|
2190 augetur, multiplicatis actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2191 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
|
|
|
2192 (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it.
|
|
|
2193 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35724] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2194 de similibus idem est iudicium. Sed omnes actus ab eodem habitu
|
|
|
2195 procedentes sunt similes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo, si aliqui
|
|
|
2196 actus augeant habitum, quilibet actus augebit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2197 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
|
|
|
2198 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35725] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2199 simile augetur suo simili. Sed quilibet actus est similis habitui a
|
|
|
2200 quo procedit. Ergo quilibet actus auget habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2201 <b>On the contrary,</b> Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
|
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|
2202 proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit.
|
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|
2203 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35726] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
2204 idem non est contrariorum causa. Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic.,
|
|
|
2205 aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum; utpote cum
|
|
|
2206 negligenter fiunt. Ergo non omnis actus habitum auget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2207 <b>I answer that,</b> "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
|
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|
2208 the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is
|
|
|
2209 unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from
|
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|
2210 one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
|
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|
2211 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 co."><a name="35727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35727] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
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|
2212 dicendum quod similes actus similes habitus causant, ut dicitur in
|
|
|
2213 II Ethic. Similitudo autem et dissimilitudo non solum attenditur
|
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|
2214 secundum qualitatem eandem vel diversam; sed etiam secundum eundem
|
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|
2215 vel diversum participationis modum. Est enim dissimile non solum
|
|
|
2216 nigrum albo, sed etiam minus album magis albo, nam etiam motus fit
|
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|
2217 a minus albo in magis album, tanquam ex opposito in oppositum, ut
|
|
|
2218 dicitur in V Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p7"> But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (
|
|
|
2219 <a href="#FS_Q50_A5" id="FS_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[5]</a>); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
|
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|
2220 an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion
|
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|
2221 to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase
|
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|
2222 thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually
|
|
|
2223 increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results
|
|
|
2224 at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the
|
|
|
2225 intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
|
|
|
2226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis
|
|
|
2227 consistit, ut ex supradictis patet; sicut contingit quod aliquis
|
|
|
2228 habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium;
|
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|
2229 ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non
|
|
|
2230 respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus. Si igitur
|
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|
2231 intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel
|
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|
2232 etiam superexcedat; quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit
|
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|
2233 ad augmentum ipsius; ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad
|
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|
2234 similitudinem augmenti animalis. Non enim quodlibet alimentum
|
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|
2235 assumptum actu auget animal, sicut nec quaelibet gutta cavat
|
|
|
2236 lapidem, sed, multiplicato alimento, tandem fit augmentum. Ita
|
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|
2237 etiam, multiplicatis actibus, crescit habitus. Si vero intensio
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|
2238 actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus
|
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|
2239 non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem
|
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2240 ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p8"> From this it is clear how to solve the objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35728] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
|
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2241 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
|
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|
2242 <div id="FS_Q53" class="div3">
|
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|
2243 <h3 id="FS_Q53-p0.1">Q. 53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
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2244 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
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|
2245 <p id="FS_Q53-p2"> We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q53-p3"><a href="#FS_Q53_A1"> (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?</a></p><p id="FS_Q53-p4"><a href="#FS_Q53_A2"> (2) Whether it can be diminished?</a></p><p id="FS_Q53-p5"><a href="#FS_Q53_A3"> (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?</a></p>
|
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2246 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 pr."><a name="35729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35729]
|
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|
2247 Iª-IIae q. 53 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
|
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2248 corruptione et diminutione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
|
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2249 Primo, utrum habitus corrumpi possit. Secundo, utrum possit
|
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2250 diminui. Tertio, de modo corruptionis et diminutionis.</p></div></div></div>
|
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|
2251 <div id="FS_Q53_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A1-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 1. Whether a habit can be corrupted?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p2">
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2252 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant
|
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2253 to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long
|
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2254 as its subject remains.
|
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|
2255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35730] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
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|
2256 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus corrumpi non possit. Habitus
|
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|
2257 enim inest sicut natura quaedam, unde operationes secundum habitum
|
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|
2258 sunt delectabiles. Sed natura non corrumpitur, manente eo cuius est
|
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2259 natura. Ergo neque habitus corrumpi potest, manente subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2260 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness
|
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|
2261 ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through
|
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|
2262 corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i,
|
|
|
2263 text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary:
|
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|
2264 since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise
|
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2265 be lost.
|
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|
2266 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35731] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2267 omnis corruptio formae vel est per corruptionem subiecti, vel est a
|
|
|
2268 contrario, sicut aegritudo corrumpitur corrupto animali, vel etiam
|
|
|
2269 superveniente sanitate. Sed scientia, quae est quidam habitus, non
|
|
|
2270 potest corrumpi per corruptionem subiecti, quia intellectus, qui
|
|
|
2271 est subiectum eius, est substantia quaedam, et non corrumpitur, ut
|
|
|
2272 dicitur in I de anima. Similiter etiam non potest corrumpi a
|
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|
2273 contrario, nam species intelligibiles non sunt ad invicem
|
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|
2274 contrariae, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Ergo habitus scientiae
|
|
|
2275 nullo modo corrumpi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2276 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by
|
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2277 a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement
|
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|
2278 of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since
|
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|
2279 the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
|
|
|
2280 reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted.
|
|
|
2281 For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher
|
|
|
2282 declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning."
|
|
|
2283 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35732] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2284 omnis corruptio est per aliquem motum. Sed habitus scientiae, qui
|
|
|
2285 est in anima, non potest corrumpi per motum per se ipsius animae,
|
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|
2286 quia anima per se non movetur. Movetur autem per accidens per motum
|
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|
2287 corporis. Nulla autem transmutatio corporalis videtur posse
|
|
|
2288 corrumpere species intelligibiles existentes in intellectu, cum
|
|
|
2289 intellectus sit per se locus specierum, sine corpore, unde ponitur
|
|
|
2290 quod nec per senium nec per mortem corrumpuntur habitus. Ergo
|
|
|
2291 scientia corrumpi non potest. Et per consequens, nec habitus
|
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|
2292 virtutis, qui etiam est in anima rationali, et, sicut philosophus
|
|
|
2293 dicit in I Ethic., <i>virtutes sunt permanentiores
|
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2294 disciplinis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2295 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover,
|
|
|
2296 by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
|
|
|
2297 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35733] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2298 est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de longitudine et brevitate
|
|
|
2299 vitae, quod scientiae corruptio est oblivio et deceptio. Peccando
|
|
|
2300 etiam aliquis habitum virtutis amittit. Et ex contrariis actibus
|
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|
2301 virtutes generantur et corrumpuntur, ut dicitur II Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q53_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2302 <b>I answer that,</b> A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore
|
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|
2303 a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case
|
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|
2304 with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted
|
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2305 indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an
|
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2306 incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly
|
|
|
2307 indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above (
|
|
|
2308 <a href="#FS_Q50_A3" id="FS_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only
|
|
|
2309 on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
|
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|
2310 </p><p id="FS_Q53_A1-p7"> We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary,
|
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2311 either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot
|
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|
2312 be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no contrary;
|
|
|
2313 nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the
|
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|
2314 "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly
|
|
|
2315 and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by
|
|
|
2316 any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost
|
|
|
2317 by being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of
|
|
|
2318 conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those
|
|
|
2319 very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion
|
|
|
2320 "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is
|
|
|
2321 contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a
|
|
|
2322 true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science."
|
|
|
2323 As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what
|
|
|
2324 we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the
|
|
|
2325 same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to
|
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|
2326 it
|
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|
2327 to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever
|
|
|
2328 its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.
|
|
|
2329 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 co."><a name="35734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35734] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2330 dicendum quod secundum se dicitur aliqua forma corrumpi per
|
|
|
2331 contrarium suum, per accidens autem, per corruptionem sui subiecti.
|
|
|
2332 Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus cuius subiectum est corruptibile,
|
|
|
2333 et cuius causa habet contrarium, utroque modo corrumpi poterit,
|
|
|
2334 sicut patet de habitibus corporalibus, scilicet sanitate et
|
|
|
2335 aegritudine. Illi vero habitus quorum subiectum est incorruptibile,
|
|
|
2336 non possunt corrumpi per accidens. Sunt tamen habitus quidam qui,
|
|
|
2337 etsi principaliter sint in subiecto incorruptibili, secundario
|
|
|
2338 tamen sunt in subiecto corruptibili, sicut habitus scientiae, qui
|
|
|
2339 principaliter est quidem in intellectu possibili, secundario autem
|
|
|
2340 in viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo
|
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|
2341 ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitus scientiae non potest
|
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|
2342 corrumpi per accidens; sed solum ex parte inferiorum virium
|
|
|
2343 sensitivarum. Est igitur considerandum si possunt huiusmodi habitus
|
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|
2344 per se corrumpi. Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus qui habeat
|
|
|
2345 aliquod contrarium, vel ex parte sua vel ex parte suae causae,
|
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|
2346 poterit per se corrumpi, si vero non habet contrarium, non poterit
|
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|
2347 per se corrumpi. Manifestum est autem quod species intelligibilis
|
|
|
2348 in intellectu possibili existens, non habet aliquid contrarium.
|
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|
2349 Neque iterum intellectui agenti, qui est causa eius, potest aliquid
|
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|
2350 esse contrarium. Unde si aliquis habitus sit in intellectu
|
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|
2351 possibili immediate ab intellectu agente causatus, talis habitus
|
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|
2352 est incorruptibilis et per se et per accidens. Huiusmodi autem sunt
|
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|
2353 habitus primorum principiorum, tam speculabilium quam practicorum,
|
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|
2354 qui nulla oblivione vel deceptione corrumpi possunt, sicut
|
|
|
2355 philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., de prudentia, quod non perditur
|
|
|
2356 per oblivionem. Aliquis vero habitus est in intellectu possibili ex
|
|
|
2357 ratione causatus, scilicet habitus conclusionum, qui dicitur
|
|
|
2358 scientia, cuius causae dupliciter potest aliquid contrarium esse.
|
|
|
2359 Uno modo, ex parte ipsarum propositionum ex quibus ratio procedit,
|
|
|
2360 etenim enuntiationi quae est, bonum est bonum, contraria est ea
|
|
|
2361 quae est, bonum non est bonum, secundum philosophum, in II
|
|
|
2362 Periherm. Alio modo, quantum ad ipsum processum rationis; prout
|
|
|
2363 syllogismus sophisticus opponitur syllogismo dialectico vel
|
|
|
2364 demonstrativo. Sic igitur patet quod per falsam rationem potest
|
|
|
2365 corrumpi habitus verae opinionis, aut etiam scientiae. Unde
|
|
|
2366 philosophus dicit quod deceptio est corruptio scientiae, sicut
|
|
|
2367 supra dictum est. Virtutum vero quaedam sunt intellectuales, quae
|
|
|
2368 sunt in ipsa ratione, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., de quibus est eadem
|
|
|
2369 ratio quae est de scientia vel opinione. Quaedam vero sunt in parte
|
|
|
2370 animae appetitiva, quae sunt virtutes morales, et eadem ratio est
|
|
|
2371 de vitiis oppositis. Habitus autem appetitivae partis causantur per
|
|
|
2372 hoc quod ratio nata est appetitivam partem movere. Unde per
|
|
|
2373 iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet
|
|
|
2374 sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione,
|
|
|
2375 corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2376 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature
|
|
|
2377 of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.
|
|
|
2378 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35735] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2379 ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus
|
|
|
2380 similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum
|
|
|
2381 natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile
|
|
|
2382 removetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2383 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason,
|
|
|
2384 as stated above.
|
|
|
2385 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35736] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2386 dicendum quod, etsi speciebus intelligibilibus non sit aliquid
|
|
|
2387 contrarium, enuntiationibus tamen et processui rationis potest
|
|
|
2388 aliquid esse contrarium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p10">
|
|
|
2389 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove
|
|
|
2390 an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded
|
|
|
2391 by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the
|
|
|
2392 very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted.
|
|
|
2393 Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject
|
|
|
2394 or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does
|
|
|
2395 not.
|
|
|
2396 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35737] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2397 dicendum quod scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum
|
|
|
2398 ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus;
|
|
|
2399 inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis,
|
|
|
2400 quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem. Sed
|
|
|
2401 per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus
|
|
|
2402 scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus. Et similiter
|
|
|
2403 etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur,
|
|
|
2404 virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex
|
|
|
2405 parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus, nam virtutum usus
|
|
|
2406 est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q53_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A2-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 2. Whether a habit can diminish?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2407 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
|
|
|
2408 either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish.
|
|
|
2409 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35738] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2410 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus diminui non possit. Habitus
|
|
|
2411 enim est quaedam qualitas et forma simplex. Simplex autem aut totum
|
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|
2412 habetur, aut totum amittitur. Ergo habitus, etsi corrumpi possit,
|
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|
2413 diminui non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2414 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does
|
|
|
2415 not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals
|
|
|
2416 more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is
|
|
|
2417 accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now
|
|
|
2418 whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text.
|
|
|
2419 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible.
|
|
|
2420 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35739] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2421 omne quod convenit accidenti, convenit eidem secundum se, vel
|
|
|
2422 ratione sui subiecti. Habitus autem secundum seipsum non intenditur
|
|
|
2423 et remittitur, alioquin sequeretur quod aliqua species de suis
|
|
|
2424 individuis praedicaretur secundum magis et minus. Si igitur
|
|
|
2425 secundum participationem subiecti diminui possit, sequeretur quod
|
|
|
2426 aliquid accidat habitui proprium, quod non sit commune ei et
|
|
|
2427 subiecto. Cuicumque autem formae convenit aliquid proprium praeter
|
|
|
2428 suum subiectum, illa forma est separabilis, ut dicitur in I de
|
|
|
2429 anima. Sequitur ergo quod habitus sit forma separabilis, quod est
|
|
|
2430 impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2431 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
|
|
|
2432 with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its
|
|
|
2433 inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
|
|
|
2434 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35740] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2435 ratio et natura habitus, sicut et cuiuslibet accidentis, consistit
|
|
|
2436 in concretione ad subiectum, unde et quodlibet accidens definitur
|
|
|
2437 per suum subiectum. Si igitur habitus secundum seipsum non
|
|
|
2438 intenditur neque remittitur, neque etiam secundum concretionem sui
|
|
|
2439 ad subiectum diminui poterit. Et ita nullo modo diminuetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2440 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore
|
|
|
2441 a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
|
|
|
2442 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35741] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2443 est quod contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Augmentum autem et
|
|
|
2444 diminutio sunt contraria. Cum igitur habitus possit augeri, videtur
|
|
|
2445 quod etiam possit diminui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2446 <b>I answer that,</b> Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained (
|
|
|
2447 <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q53_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[1]</a>). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as
|
|
|
2448 that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other
|
|
|
2449 hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase.
|
|
|
2450 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 co."><a name="35742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35742] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2451 dicendum quod habitus dupliciter diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, ut
|
|
|
2452 ex supradictis patet. Et sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua
|
|
|
2453 generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur, nam
|
|
|
2454 diminutio habitus est quaedam via ad corruptionem, sicut e converso
|
|
|
2455 generatio habitus est quoddam fundamentum augmenti ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2456 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different
|
|
|
2457 ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through
|
|
|
2458 its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.
|
|
|
2459 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35743] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2460 ergo dicendum quod habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma
|
|
|
2461 simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum
|
|
|
2462 diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione
|
|
|
2463 potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest
|
|
|
2464 unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora
|
|
|
2465 extendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2466 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that
|
|
|
2467 a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.
|
|
|
2468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35744] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2469 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsa essentia habitus nullo
|
|
|
2470 modo diminueretur. Hoc autem non ponimus, sed quod quaedam
|
|
|
2471 diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a
|
|
|
2472 participante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2473 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take
|
|
|
2474 an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the
|
|
|
2475 subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not
|
|
|
2476 put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but
|
|
|
2477 we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But
|
|
|
2478 if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins
|
|
|
2479 in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining
|
|
|
2480 this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum"
|
|
|
2481 is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence
|
|
|
2482 of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in
|
|
|
2483 certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies
|
|
|
2484 to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish
|
|
|
2485 by a
|
|
|
2486 kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained (
|
|
|
2487 <a href="#FS_Q52_A2" id="FS_Q53_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
2488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35745] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2489 dicendum quod, quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet
|
|
|
2490 dependentiam ad subiectum secundum suam rationem, aliter tamen et
|
|
|
2491 aliter. Nam accidens significatum in abstracto, importat
|
|
|
2492 habitudinem ad subiectum quae incipit ab accidente, et terminatur
|
|
|
2493 ad subiectum, nam albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album. Et ideo in
|
|
|
2494 definitione accidentis abstracti non ponitur subiectum quasi prima
|
|
|
2495 pars definitionis, quae est genus; sed quasi secunda, quae est
|
|
|
2496 differentia; dicimus enim quod simitas est curvitas nasi. Sed in
|
|
|
2497 concretis incipit habitudo a subiecto, et terminatur ad accidens,
|
|
|
2498 dicitur enim album quod habet albedinem. Propter quod in
|
|
|
2499 definitione huiusmodi accidentis ponitur subiectum tanquam genus,
|
|
|
2500 quod est prima pars definitionis, dicimus enim quod simum est nasus
|
|
|
2501 curvus. Sic igitur id quod convenit accidentibus ex parte subiecti,
|
|
|
2502 non autem ex ipsa ratione accidentis, non attribuitur accidenti in
|
|
|
2503 abstracto, sed in concreto. Et huiusmodi est intensio et remissio
|
|
|
2504 in quibusdam accidentibus, unde albedo non dicitur magis et minus,
|
|
|
2505 sed album. Et eadem ratio est in habitibus et aliis qualitatibus,
|
|
|
2506 nisi quod quidam habitus augentur vel diminuuntur per quandam
|
|
|
2507 additionem, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q53_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A3-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 3. Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2508 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than
|
|
|
2509 passion-like qualities, as we have explained above (
|
|
|
2510 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 3;
|
|
|
2511 <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[50], A[1]</a>). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through
|
|
|
2512 not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot.
|
|
|
2513 Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
|
|
|
2514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35746] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2515 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non corrumpatur aut diminuatur
|
|
|
2516 per solam cessationem ab opere. Habitus enim permanentiores sunt
|
|
|
2517 quam passibiles qualitates, ut ex supradictis apparet. Sed
|
|
|
2518 passibiles qualitates non corrumpuntur neque diminuuntur per
|
|
|
2519 cessationem ab actu, non enim albedo diminuitur si visum non
|
|
|
2520 immutet, neque calor si non calefaciat. Ergo neque habitus
|
|
|
2521 diminuuntur vel corrumpuntur per cessationem ab actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2522 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
|
|
|
2523 from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from
|
|
|
2524 act.
|
|
|
2525 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35747] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2526 corruptio et diminutio sunt quaedam mutationes. Sed nihil mutatur
|
|
|
2527 absque aliqua causa movente. Cum igitur cessatio ab actu non
|
|
|
2528 importet aliquam causam moventem, non videtur quod per cessationem
|
|
|
2529 ab actu possit esse diminutio vel corruptio habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2530 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
|
|
|
2531 time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through
|
|
|
2532 length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
|
|
|
2533 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35748] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2534 habitus scientiae et virtutis sunt in anima intellectiva, quae est
|
|
|
2535 supra tempus. Ea vero quae sunt supra tempus, non corrumpuntur
|
|
|
2536 neque diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem. Ergo neque huiusmodi
|
|
|
2537 habitus corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem, si
|
|
|
2538 diu aliquis absque exercitio permaneat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2539 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
|
|
|
2540 science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other
|
|
|
2541 habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
|
|
|
2542 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35749] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2543 est quod philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit
|
|
|
2544 quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio.
|
|
|
2545 Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio
|
|
|
2546 dissolvit. Et eadem ratione, alii habitus virtutum per cessationem
|
|
|
2547 ab actu diminuuntur vel tolluntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2548 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
|
|
|
2549 by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It
|
|
|
2550 is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit,
|
|
|
2551 as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened
|
|
|
2552 that habit. For it has been stated
|
|
|
2553 <a href="#FS_Q53_A1" id="FS_Q53_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually
|
|
|
2554 undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even
|
|
|
2555 destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident
|
|
|
2556 that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose
|
|
|
2557 the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions
|
|
|
2558 or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination
|
|
|
2559 of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from
|
|
|
2560 act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured
|
|
|
2561 by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition
|
|
|
2562 to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
|
|
|
2563 intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus
|
|
|
2564 the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.
|
|
|
2565 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 co."><a name="35750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35750] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2566 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic., aliquid potest esse
|
|
|
2567 movens dupliciter, uno modo, per se, quod scilicet movet secundum
|
|
|
2568 rationem propriae formae, sicut ignis calefacit; alio modo, per
|
|
|
2569 accidens, sicut id quod removet prohibens. Et hoc modo cessatio ab
|
|
|
2570 actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum
|
|
|
2571 scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel
|
|
|
2572 diminuentes habitum. Dictum est enim quod habitus per se
|
|
|
2573 corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente. Unde quorumcumque
|
|
|
2574 habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet
|
|
|
2575 subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem; huiusmodi habitus
|
|
|
2576 diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam
|
|
|
2577 cessationem ab actu; ut patet et in scientia et in virtute.
|
|
|
2578 Manifestum est enim quod habitus virtutis moralis facit hominem
|
|
|
2579 promptum ad eligendum medium in operationibus et passionibus. Cum
|
|
|
2580 autem aliquis non utitur habitu virtutis ad moderandas passiones
|
|
|
2581 vel operationes proprias, necesse est quod proveniant multae
|
|
|
2582 passiones et operationes praeter modum virtutis, ex inclinatione
|
|
|
2583 appetitus sensitivi, et aliorum quae exterius movent. Unde
|
|
|
2584 corrumpitur virtus, vel diminuitur, per cessationem ab actu.
|
|
|
2585 Similiter etiam est ex parte habituum intellectualium, secundum
|
|
|
2586 quos est homo promptus ad recte iudicandum de imaginatis. Cum
|
|
|
2587 igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt
|
|
|
2588 imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita
|
|
|
2589 quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo
|
|
|
2590 succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte
|
|
|
2591 iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic
|
|
|
2592 per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur
|
|
|
2593 intellectualis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p7">
|
|
|
2594 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were
|
|
|
2595 to increase.
|
|
|
2596 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35751] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2597 ergo dicendum quod ita etiam calor per cessationem a calefaciendo
|
|
|
2598 corrumperetur, si per hoc incresceret frigidum, quod est calidi
|
|
|
2599 corruptivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2600 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained
|
|
|
2601 above.
|
|
|
2602 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35752] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2603 dicendum quod cessatio ab actu est movens ad corruptionem vel
|
|
|
2604 diminutionem, sicut removens prohibens, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2605 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore
|
|
|
2606 in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension.
|
|
|
2607 Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
|
|
|
2608 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35753] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2609 dicendum quod pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra
|
|
|
2610 tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis
|
|
|
2611 cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et
|
|
|
2612 etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV
|
|
|
2613 Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.</p></div></div></div></div>
|
|
|
2614 <div id="FS_Q54" class="div3">
|
|
|
2615 <h3 id="FS_Q54-p0.1">Q. 54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2616 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
|
|
|
2617 <p id="FS_Q54-p2"> We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q54-p3"><a href="#FS_Q54_A1"> (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p4"><a href="#FS_Q54_A2"> (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p5"><a href="#FS_Q54_A3"> (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p6"><a href="#FS_Q54_A4"> (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?</a></p>
|
|
|
2618 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 pr."><a name="35754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35754]
|
|
|
2619 Iª-IIae q. 54 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
|
|
|
2620 distinctione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo,
|
|
|
2621 utrum multi habitus possint esse in una potentia. Secundo, utrum
|
|
|
2622 habitus distinguantur secundum obiecta. Tertio, utrum habitus
|
|
|
2623 distinguantur secundum bonum et malum. Quarto, utrum unus habitus
|
|
|
2624 ex multis habitibus constituatur.</p></div></div></div>
|
|
|
2625 <div id="FS_Q54_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A1-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 1. Whether many habits can be in one power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2626 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the
|
|
|
2627 same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same
|
|
|
2628 thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
|
|
|
2629 one power.
|
|
|
2630 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35755] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2631 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint esse multi habitus in una
|
|
|
2632 potentia. Eorum enim quae secundum idem distinguuntur multiplicato
|
|
|
2633 uno, multiplicatur et aliud. Sed secundum idem potentiae et habitus
|
|
|
2634 distinguuntur, scilicet secundum actus et obiecta. Similiter ergo
|
|
|
2635 multiplicantur. Non ergo possunt esse multi habitus in una
|
|
|
2636 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2637 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is
|
|
|
2638 the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there
|
|
|
2639 cannot be many habits in one power.
|
|
|
2640 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35756] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2641 potentia est virtus quaedam simplex. Sed in uno subiecto simplici
|
|
|
2642 non potest esse diversitas accidentium, quia subiectum est causa
|
|
|
2643 accidentis; ab uno autem simplici non videtur procedere nisi unum.
|
|
|
2644 Ergo in una potentia non possunt esse multi habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2645 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at
|
|
|
2646 the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several
|
|
|
2647 habits cannot be at the same time in one power.
|
|
|
2648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35757] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2649 sicut corpus formatur per figuram, ita potentia formatur per
|
|
|
2650 habitum. Sed unum corpus non potest simul formari diversis figuris.
|
|
|
2651 Ergo neque una potentia potest simul formari diversis habitibus.
|
|
|
2652 Non ergo plures habitus possunt simul esse in una potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2653 <b>On the contrary,</b> The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences.
|
|
|
2654 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35758] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2655 est quod intellectus est una potentia, in qua tamen sunt diversarum
|
|
|
2656 scientiarum habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2657 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
2658 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q54_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the
|
|
|
2659 end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since
|
|
|
2660 in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits.
|
|
|
2661 Thus, if we take the humors
|
|
|
2662 as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition
|
|
|
2663 of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is
|
|
|
2664 strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion
|
|
|
2665 to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject.
|
|
|
2666 </p><p id="FS_Q54_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again,
|
|
|
2667 there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated
|
|
|
2668 above (
|
|
|
2669 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (
|
|
|
2670 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act
|
|
|
2671 of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive
|
|
|
2672 power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move
|
|
|
2673 one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits
|
|
|
2674 are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several
|
|
|
2675 habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power.
|
|
|
2676 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 co."><a name="35759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35759] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2677 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus sunt dispositiones
|
|
|
2678 quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad
|
|
|
2679 naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. Et de illis quidem
|
|
|
2680 habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod
|
|
|
2681 possunt plures esse in uno subiecto, eo quod unius subiecti possunt
|
|
|
2682 diversimode partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus
|
|
|
2683 dicuntur. Sicut, si accipiantur humani corporis partes humores,
|
|
|
2684 prout disponuntur secundum naturam humanam, est habitus vel
|
|
|
2685 dispositio sanitatis, si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi
|
|
|
2686 et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est
|
|
|
2687 fortitudo aut macies, si vero accipiantur membra, ut manus et pes
|
|
|
2688 et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo.
|
|
|
2689 Et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. Si vero
|
|
|
2690 loquamur de habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad opera, qui proprie
|
|
|
2691 pertinent ad potentias; sic etiam contingit unius potentiae esse
|
|
|
2692 habitus plures. Cuius ratio est, quia subiectum habitus est
|
|
|
2693 potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est, potentia enim activa tantum
|
|
|
2694 non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet.
|
|
|
2695 Potentia autem passiva comparatur ad actum determinatum unius
|
|
|
2696 speciei, sicut materia ad formam, eo quod, sicut materia
|
|
|
2697 determinatur ad unam formam per unum agens, ita etiam potentia
|
|
|
2698 passiva a ratione unius obiecti activi determinatur ad unum actum
|
|
|
2699 secundum speciem. Unde sicut plura obiecta possunt movere unam
|
|
|
2700 potentiam passivam, ita una potentia passiva potest esse subiectum
|
|
|
2701 diversorum actuum vel perfectionum secundum speciem. Habitus autem
|
|
|
2702 sunt quaedam qualitates aut formae inhaerentes potentiae, quibus
|
|
|
2703 inclinatur potentia ad determinatos actus secundum speciem. Unde ad
|
|
|
2704 unam potentiam possunt plures habitus pertinere, sicut et plures
|
|
|
2705 actus specie differentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2706 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as
|
|
|
2707 stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity
|
|
|
2708 of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ
|
|
|
2709 generically belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of
|
|
|
2710 objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in
|
|
|
2711 species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that
|
|
|
2712 different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one
|
|
|
2713 genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and
|
|
|
2714 powers.
|
|
|
2715 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35760] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2716 ergo dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus diversitas specierum
|
|
|
2717 est secundum formam, diversitas autem generum est secundum
|
|
|
2718 materiam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. (ea enim sunt diversa genere,
|
|
|
2719 quorum est materia diversa), ita etiam diversitas obiectorum
|
|
|
2720 secundum genus, facit distinctionem potentiarum (unde philosophus
|
|
|
2721 dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>ad ea quae sunt genere altera, sunt
|
|
|
2722 etiam animae particulae aliae</i>); diversitas vero obiectorum
|
|
|
2723 secundum speciem, facit diversitatem actuum secundum speciem, et
|
|
|
2724 per consequens habituum. Quaecumque autem sunt diversa genere, sunt
|
|
|
2725 etiam specie diversa, sed non convertitur. Et ideo diversarum
|
|
|
2726 potentiarum sunt diversi actus specie, et diversi habitus, non
|
|
|
2727 autem oportet quod diversi habitus sint diversarum potentiarum, sed
|
|
|
2728 possunt esse plures unius. Et sicut sunt genera generum, et species
|
|
|
2729 specierum; ita etiam contingit esse diversas species habituum et
|
|
|
2730 potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2731 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different
|
|
|
2732 acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power.
|
|
|
2733 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35761] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2734 dicendum quod potentia, etsi sit quidem simplex secundum essentiam,
|
|
|
2735 est tamen multiplex virtute, secundum quod ad multos actus specie
|
|
|
2736 differentes se extendit. Et ideo nihil prohibet in una potentia
|
|
|
2737 esse multos habitus specie differentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p10">
|
|
|
2738 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power,
|
|
|
2739 but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at
|
|
|
2740 the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes,
|
|
|
2741 save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided
|
|
|
2742 figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things
|
|
|
2743 at the same time "habitually."
|
|
|
2744 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35762] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2745 dicendum quod corpus formatur per figuram sicut per propriam
|
|
|
2746 terminationem, habitus autem non est terminatio potentiae, sed est
|
|
|
2747 dispositio ad actum sicut ad ultimum terminum. Et ideo non possunt
|
|
|
2748 esse unius potentiae simul plures actus, nisi forte secundum quod
|
|
|
2749 unus comprehenditur sub alio, sicut nec unius corporis plures
|
|
|
2750 figurae, nisi secundum quod una est in alia, sicut trigonum in
|
|
|
2751 tetragono. Non enim potest intellectus simul multa actu
|
|
|
2752 intelligere. Potest tamen simul habitu multa scire.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A2-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 2. Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2753 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
|
|
|
2754 science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by
|
|
|
2755 objects specifically distinct.
|
|
|
2756 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35763] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2757 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum
|
|
|
2758 obiecta. Contraria enim sunt specie differentia. Sed idem habitus
|
|
|
2759 scientiae est contrariorum, sicut medicina sani et aegri. Non ergo
|
|
|
2760 secundum obiecta specie differentia, habitus distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2761 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both
|
|
|
2762 the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished
|
|
|
2763 by their objects.
|
|
|
2764 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35764] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2765 diversae scientiae sunt diversi habitus. Sed idem scibile pertinet
|
|
|
2766 ad diversas scientias, sicut terram esse rotundam demonstrat et
|
|
|
2767 naturalis et astrologus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo habitus non
|
|
|
2768 distinguuntur secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2769 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue,
|
|
|
2770 if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while,
|
|
|
2771 if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits.
|
|
|
2772 Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects.
|
|
|
2773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35765] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2774 eiusdem actus est idem obiectum. Sed idem actus potest pertinere ad
|
|
|
2775 diversos habitus virtutum, si ad diversos fines referatur, sicut
|
|
|
2776 dare pecuniam alicui, si sit propter Deum, pertinet ad caritatem;
|
|
|
2777 si vero sit propter debitum solvendum, pertinet ad iustitiam. Ergo
|
|
|
2778 etiam idem obiectum potest ad diversos habitus pertinere. Non ergo
|
|
|
2779 est diversitas habituum secundum diversitatem obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2780 <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above (
|
|
|
2781 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q54_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects.
|
|
|
2782 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35766] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
2783 actus differunt specie secundum diversitatem obiectorum, ut supra
|
|
|
2784 dictum est. Sed habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam ad actus. Ergo
|
|
|
2785 etiam habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2786 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
|
|
|
2787 differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished
|
|
|
2788 from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species.
|
|
|
2789 Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something,
|
|
|
2790 are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying
|
|
|
2791 a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
|
|
|
2792 </p><p id="FS_Q54_A2-p7"> Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
|
|
|
2793 dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what
|
|
|
2794 follows.
|
|
|
2795 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 co."><a name="35767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35767] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2796 dicendum quod habitus et est forma quaedam, et est habitus. Potest
|
|
|
2797 ergo distinctio habituum secundum speciem attendi aut secundum
|
|
|
2798 communem modum quo formae specie distinguuntur; aut secundum
|
|
|
2799 proprium modum distinctionis habituum. Distinguuntur siquidem
|
|
|
2800 formae ad invicem secundum diversa principia activa, eo quod omne
|
|
|
2801 agens facit simile secundum speciem. Habitus autem importat ordinem
|
|
|
2802 ad aliquid. Omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid,
|
|
|
2803 distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur. Est
|
|
|
2804 autem habitus dispositio quaedam ad duo ordinata, scilicet ad
|
|
|
2805 naturam, et ad operationem consequentem naturam. Sic igitur
|
|
|
2806 secundum tria, habitus specie distinguuntur. Uno quidem modo,
|
|
|
2807 secundum principia activa talium dispositionum; alio vero modo,
|
|
|
2808 secundum naturam; tertio vero modo, secundum obiecta specie
|
|
|
2809 differentia; ut per sequentia explicabitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2810 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which
|
|
|
2811 may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they
|
|
|
2812 are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one
|
|
|
2813 aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
|
|
|
2814 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35768] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2815 ergo dicendum quod in distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum,
|
|
|
2816 non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter; sed ratio
|
|
|
2817 obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere. Quamvis autem contraria
|
|
|
2818 specie differant diversitate rerum, tamen eadem ratio est
|
|
|
2819 cognoscendi utrumque, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Et ideo
|
|
|
2820 inquantum conveniunt in una ratione cognoscibilis, pertinent ad
|
|
|
2821 unum habitum cognoscitivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2822 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of
|
|
|
2823 mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g.
|
|
|
2824 by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism
|
|
|
2825 producing science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
|
|
|
2826 consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished.
|
|
|
2827 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35769] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2828 dicendum quod terram esse rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat
|
|
|
2829 naturalis, et per aliud astrologus, astrologus enim hoc demonstrat
|
|
|
2830 per media mathematica, sicut per figuras eclipsium, vel per aliud
|
|
|
2831 huiusmodi; naturalis vero hoc demonstrat per medium naturale, sicut
|
|
|
2832 per motum gravium ad medium, vel per aliud huiusmodi. Tota autem
|
|
|
2833 virtus demonstrationis, quae est syllogismus faciens scire, ut
|
|
|
2834 dicitur in I Poster., dependet ex medio. Et ideo diversa media sunt
|
|
|
2835 sicut diversa principia activa, secundum quae habitus scientiarum
|
|
|
2836 diversificantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2837 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative
|
|
|
2838 matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover
|
|
|
2839 the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been
|
|
|
2840 said (
|
|
|
2841 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[6]</a>;
|
|
|
2842 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[19],
|
|
|
2843 A[2]
|
|
|
2844 </a>, ad 1;
|
|
|
2845 <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q34_A4" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.3" shape="rect"> Q[34], A[4]</a>).
|
|
|
2846 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35770] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2847 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic. et in VII
|
|
|
2848 Ethic., ita se habet finis in operabilibus, sicut principium in
|
|
|
2849 demonstrativis. Et ideo diversitas finium diversificat virtutes
|
|
|
2850 sicut et diversitas activorum principiorum. Sunt etiam ipsi fines
|
|
|
2851 obiecta actuum interiorum, qui maxime pertinent ad virtutes, ut ex
|
|
|
2852 supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A3-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 3. Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2853 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
|
|
|
2854 contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad.
|
|
|
2855 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35771] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2856 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum
|
|
|
2857 bonum et malum. Bonum enim et malum sunt contraria. Sed idem
|
|
|
2858 habitus est contrariorum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo habitus non
|
|
|
2859 distinguuntur secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2860 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference,
|
|
|
2861 as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being.
|
|
|
2862 Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
|
|
|
2863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35772] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2864 bonum convertitur cum ente, et sic, cum sit commune omnibus, non
|
|
|
2865 potest sumi ut differentia alicuius speciei; ut patet per
|
|
|
2866 philosophum in IV Topic. Similiter etiam malum, cum sit privatio et
|
|
|
2867 non ens, non potest esse alicuius entis differentia. Non ergo
|
|
|
2868 secundum bonum et malum possunt habitus specie distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2869 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters
|
|
|
2870 of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue,
|
|
|
2871 as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad.
|
|
|
2872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35773] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2873 circa idem obiectum contingit esse diversos habitus malos, sicut
|
|
|
2874 circa concupiscentias intemperantiam et insensibilitatem, et
|
|
|
2875 similiter etiam plures habitus bonos, scilicet virtutem humanam et
|
|
|
2876 virtutem heroicam sive divinam, ut patet per philosophum in VII
|
|
|
2877 Ethic. Non ergo distinguuntur habitus secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2878 <b>On the contrary,</b> A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
|
|
|
2879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35774] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2880 est quod habitus bonus contrariatur habitui malo, sicut virtus
|
|
|
2881 vitio. Sed contraria sunt diversa secundum speciem. Ergo habitus
|
|
|
2882 differunt specie secundum differentiam boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2883 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
|
|
|
2884 <a href="#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation
|
|
|
2885 to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way
|
|
|
2886 a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the
|
|
|
2887 agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which
|
|
|
2888 disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason,
|
|
|
2889 whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished
|
|
|
2890 specifically by the difference of good and bad.
|
|
|
2891 </p><p id="FS_Q54_A3-p7"> Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable
|
|
|
2892 to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes
|
|
|
2893 to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher
|
|
|
2894 nature.
|
|
|
2895 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 co."><a name="35775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35775] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2896 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur non
|
|
|
2897 solum secundum obiecta et principia activa, sed etiam in ordine ad
|
|
|
2898 naturam. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum
|
|
|
2899 convenientiam ad naturam, vel etiam secundum disconvenientiam ab
|
|
|
2900 ipsa. Et hoc modo distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, nam
|
|
|
2901 habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae
|
|
|
2902 agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non
|
|
|
2903 convenientem naturae. Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae
|
|
|
2904 conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum,
|
|
|
2905 cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant. Et sic
|
|
|
2906 manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus
|
|
|
2907 specie distinguuntur. Alio modo secundum naturam habitus
|
|
|
2908 distinguuntur, ex eo quod habitus unus disponit ad actum
|
|
|
2909 convenientem naturae inferiori; alius autem habitus disponit ad
|
|
|
2910 actum convenientem naturae superiori. Et sic virtus humana, quae
|
|
|
2911 disponit ad actum convenientem naturae humanae, distinguitur a
|
|
|
2912 divina virtute vel heroica, quae disponit ad actum convenientem
|
|
|
2913 cuidam superiori naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2914 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen
|
|
|
2915 that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are
|
|
|
2916 divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something
|
|
|
2917 good, and another about something bad.
|
|
|
2918 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35776] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2919 ergo dicendum quod contrariorum potest esse unus habitus, secundum
|
|
|
2920 quod contraria conveniunt in una ratione. Nunquam tamen contingit
|
|
|
2921 quod habitus contrarii sint unius speciei, contrarietas enim
|
|
|
2922 habituum est secundum contrarias rationes. Et ita secundum bonum et
|
|
|
2923 malum habitus distinguuntur, scilicet inquantum unus habitus est
|
|
|
2924 bonus et alius malus, non autem ex hoc quod unus est boni et alius
|
|
|
2925 mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2926 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate
|
|
|
2927 good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference
|
|
|
2928 of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature.
|
|
|
2929 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35777] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2930 dicendum quod bonum commune omni enti non est differentia
|
|
|
2931 constituens speciem alicuius habitus, sed quoddam bonum
|
|
|
2932 determinatum, quod est secundum convenientiam ad determinatam
|
|
|
2933 naturam, scilicet humanam. Similiter etiam malum quod est
|
|
|
2934 differentia constitutiva habitus, non est privatio pura, sed est
|
|
|
2935 aliquid determinatum repugnans determinatae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p10">
|
|
|
2936 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated
|
|
|
2937 above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which
|
|
|
2938 is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue.
|
|
|
2939 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35778] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2940 dicendum quod plures habitus boni circa idem specie, distinguuntur
|
|
|
2941 secundum convenientiam ad diversas naturas, ut dictum est. Plures
|
|
|
2942 vero habitus mali distinguuntur circa idem agendum secundum
|
|
|
2943 diversas repugnantias ad id quod est secundum naturam, sicut uni
|
|
|
2944 virtuti contrariantur diversa vitia circa eandem materiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A4-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 4. Whether one habit is made up of many habits?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2945 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems
|
|
|
2946 to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated
|
|
|
2947 above (
|
|
|
2948 <a href="#FS_Q51_A3" id="FS_Q54_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[3]</a>). Therefore one habit is made up of several.
|
|
|
2949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35779] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
2950 sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus habitus ex pluribus habitibus
|
|
|
2951 constituatur. Illud enim cuius generatio non simul perficitur, sed
|
|
|
2952 successive, videtur constitui ex pluribus partibus. Sed generatio
|
|
|
2953 habitus non est simul, sed successive ex pluribus actibus, ut supra
|
|
|
2954 habitum est. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex pluribus
|
|
|
2955 habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2956 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
|
|
|
2957 temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
|
|
|
2958 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35780] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2959 ex partibus constituitur totum. Sed uni habitui assignantur multae
|
|
|
2960 partes, sicut Tullius ponit multas partes fortitudinis,
|
|
|
2961 temperantiae et aliarum virtutum. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex
|
|
|
2962 pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2963 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to
|
|
|
2964 but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
|
|
|
2965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35781] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2966 de una sola conclusione potest scientia haberi et actu et habitu.
|
|
|
2967 Sed multae conclusiones pertinent ad unam scientiam totam, sicut ad
|
|
|
2968 geometriam vel arithmeticam. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex
|
|
|
2969 multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2970 <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made
|
|
|
2971 up of many.
|
|
|
2972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35782] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
2973 habitus, cum sit qualitas quaedam, est forma simplex. Sed nullum
|
|
|
2974 simplex constituitur ex pluribus. Ergo unus habitus non
|
|
|
2975 constituitur ex pluribus habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2976 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection
|
|
|
2977 should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so
|
|
|
2978 far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far
|
|
|
2979 as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to
|
|
|
2980 one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above (
|
|
|
2981 <a href="#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3).
|
|
|
2982 </p><p id="FS_Q54_A4-p7"> If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this
|
|
|
2983 multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality,
|
|
|
2984 not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation
|
|
|
2985 to one, whence it derives its unity.
|
|
|
2986 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 co."><a name="35783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35783] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2987 dicendum quod habitus ad operationem ordinatus, de quo nunc
|
|
|
2988 principaliter intendimus, est perfectio quaedam potentiae. Omnis
|
|
|
2989 autem perfectio proportionatur suo perfectibili. Unde sicut
|
|
|
2990 potentia, cum sit una, ad multa se extendit secundum quod
|
|
|
2991 conveniunt in aliquo uno, idest in generali quadam ratione obiecti;
|
|
|
2992 ita etiam habitus ad multa se extendit secundum quod habent ordinem
|
|
|
2993 ad aliquod unum, puta ad unam specialem rationem obiecti, vel unam
|
|
|
2994 naturam, vel unum principium, ut ex supradictis patet. Si igitur
|
|
|
2995 consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic
|
|
|
2996 inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem. Sed quia illa
|
|
|
2997 multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter
|
|
|
2998 respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non
|
|
|
2999 constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat.
|
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|
3000 Non enim unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum,
|
|
|
3001 ex quo habet unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p8">
|
|
|
3002 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that
|
|
|
3003 the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins
|
|
|
3004 by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities.
|
|
|
3005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35784] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
3006 ergo dicendum quod successio in generatione habitus non contingit
|
|
|
3007 ex hoc quod pars eius generetur post partem, sed ex eo quod
|
|
|
3008 subiectum non statim consequitur dispositionem firmam et difficile
|
|
|
3009 mobilem; et ex eo quod primo imperfecte incipit esse in subiecto,
|
|
|
3010 et paulatim perficitur. Sicut etiam est de aliis qualitatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p9">
|
|
|
3011 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective
|
|
|
3012 or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4;
|
|
|
3013 <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q48" id="FS_Q54_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[48])</a>.
|
|
|
3014 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35785] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3015 dicendum quod partes quae singulis virtutibus cardinalibus
|
|
|
3016 assignantur, non sunt partes integrales, ex quibus constituatur
|
|
|
3017 totum sed partes subiectivae sive potentiales, ut infra
|
|
|
3018 patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p10">
|
|
|
3019 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly.
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3020 And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in
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3021 him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions
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3022 and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from
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3023 another.
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3024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35786] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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3025 dicendum quod ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per
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3026 demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum,
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3027 sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem
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3028 scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius
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3029 habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad
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3030 plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius
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3031 scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.</p></div></div></div></div>
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3032
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3033
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3034 `
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3035 </div>
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3036 </body>
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3037 </html>
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