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19 <h2 id="FP.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q44">Q. 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q45">Q. 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q46">Q. 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
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20 <div id="FP_Q44" class="div3">
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21 <h3 id="FP_Q44-p0.1">Q. 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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22 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
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23 <p id="FP_Q44-p2"> After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration
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24 will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and
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25 government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode
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26 of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.
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27 </p><p id="FP_Q44-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q44-p4"><a href="#FP_Q44_A1"> (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p5"><a href="#FP_Q44_A2"> (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p6"><a href="#FP_Q44_A3"> (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?</a></p><p id="FP_Q44-p7"><a href="#FP_Q44_A4"> (4) Whether He is the final cause of things?</a></p>
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28 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 pr."><a name="30282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30282]
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29 Iª q. 44 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinarum
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30 personarum, considerandum restat de processione creaturarum a Deo.
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31 Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut primo consideretur de
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32 productione creaturarum; secundo, de earum distinctione; tertio, de
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33 conservatione et gubernatione. Circa primum tria sunt consideranda,
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34 primo quidem, quae sit prima causa entium; secundo, de modo
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35 procedendi creaturarum a prima causa; tertio vero, de principio
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36 durationis rerum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
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37 Deus sit causa efficiens omnium entium. Secundo, utrum materia
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38 prima sit creata a Deo, vel sit principium ex aequo coordinatum ei.
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39 Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa exemplaris rerum, vel sint alia
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40 exemplaria praeter ipsum. Quarto, utrum ipse sit causa finalis
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41 rerum.</p></div></div></div>
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42 <div id="FP_Q44_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 1. Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p2">
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43 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
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44 without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing
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45 caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they
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46 can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
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47 God.
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48 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30283] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
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49 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium omne ens esse creatum
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50 a Deo. Nihil enim prohibet inveniri rem sine eo quod non est de
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51 ratione rei, sicut hominem sine albedine. Sed habitudo causati ad
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52 causam non videtur esse de ratione entium quia sine hac possunt
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53 aliqua entia intelligi. Ergo sine hac possunt esse. Ergo nihil
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54 prohibet esse aliqua entia non creata a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p3">
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55 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient
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56 cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are
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57 many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.
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58 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30284] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
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59 hoc aliquid indiget causa efficiente, ut sit. Ergo quod non potest
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60 non esse, non indiget causa efficiente. Sed nullum necessarium
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61 potest non esse, quia quod necesse est esse, non potest non esse.
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62 Cum igitur multa sint necessaria in rebus, videtur quod non omnia
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63 entia sint a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p4">
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64 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by
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65 the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from
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66 their efficient cause.
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67 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30285] Iª q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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68 quorumcumque est aliqua causa, in his potest fieri demonstratio per
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69 causam illam. Sed in mathematicis non fit demonstratio per causam
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70 agentem, ut per philosophum patet, in III Metaphys. Non igitur
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71 omnia entia sunt a Deo sicut a causa agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5">
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72 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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73 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.36" target="asv">Rom. 11:36</a>): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things."
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74 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30286] Iª q. 44 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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75 quod dicitur Rom. XI, <i>ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt
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76 omnia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q44_A1-p6">
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77 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must
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78 be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (
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79 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (
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80 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[11], AA[3]</a>,4) that subsisting being must be
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81 one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all
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82 beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which
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83 are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who
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84 possesses being most perfectly.
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85 </p><p id="FP_Q44_A1-p7"> Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever
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86 is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest
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87 in heat is the cause of all heat.
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88 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 co."><a name="30287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30287] Iª q. 44 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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89 quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse.
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90 Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse
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91 est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut
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92 ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina
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93 simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens.
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94 Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi
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95 unum, sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una,
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96 cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo
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97 quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse.
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98 Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam
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99 participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte,
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100 causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est. Unde et Plato
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101 dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et
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102 Aristoteles dicit, in II Metaphys., quod id quod est maxime ens et
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103 maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri, sicut id quod
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104 maxime calidum est, est causa omnis caliditatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p8">
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105 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on
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106 what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused.
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107 Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since
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108 to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible
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109 for us to find a being uncaused.
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110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30288] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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111 dicendum quod, licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem
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112 entis quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius
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113 ratione, quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens,
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114 sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest
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115 esse, quin sit causatum; sicut nec homo, quin sit risibile. Sed
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116 quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter
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117 hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p9">
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118 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false
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119 in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle
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120 says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an
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121 efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but
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122 because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and
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123 consequent be possible or impossible.
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124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30289] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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125 dicendum quod ex hac ratione quidam moti fuerunt ad ponendum quod
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126 id quod est necessarium non habeat causam, ut dicitur in VIII
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127 Physic. Sed hoc manifeste falsum apparet in scientiis
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128 demonstrativis, in quibus principia necessaria sunt causae
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129 conclusionum necessariarum. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, in V
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130 Metaphys., quod sunt quaedam necessaria quae habent causam suae
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131 necessitatis. Non ergo propter hoc solum requiritur causa agens,
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132 quia effectus potest non esse, sed quia effectus non esset, si
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133 causa non esset. Haec enim conditionalis est vera, sive antecedens
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134 et consequens sint possibilia, sive impossibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A1-p10">
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135 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract
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136 in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although
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137 the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under
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138 the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that
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139 object from its efficient cause.
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140 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30290] Iª q. 44 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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141 dicendum quod mathematica accipiuntur ut abstracta secundum
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142 rationem, cum tamen non sint abstracta secundum esse. Unicuique
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143 autem competit habere causam agentem, secundum quod habet esse.
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144 Licet igitur ea quae sunt mathematica habeant causam agentem, non
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145 tamen secundum habitudinem quam habent ad causam agentem, cadunt
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146 sub consideratione mathematici. Et ideo in scientiis mathematicis
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147 non demonstratur aliquid per causam agentem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 2. Whether primary matter is created by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p2">
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148 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
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149 (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.
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150 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30291] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
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151 proceditur. Videtur quod materia prima non sit creata a Deo. Omne
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152 enim quod fit, componitur ex subiecto et ex aliquo alio, ut dicitur
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153 in I Physic. Sed materiae primae non est aliquod subiectum. Ergo
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154 materia prima non potest esse facta a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p3">
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155 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive
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156 principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from
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157 the other.
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158 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30292] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actio
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159 et passio dividuntur contra se invicem. Sed sicut primum principium
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160 activum est Deus, ita primum principium passivum est materia. Ergo
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161 Deus et materia prima sunt duo principia contra se invicem divisa,
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162 quorum neutrum est ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p4">
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163 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
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164 everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore
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165 it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
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166 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30293] Iª q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
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167 agens agit sibi simile, et sic, cum omne agens agat inquantum est
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168 actu, sequitur quod omne factum aliquo modo sit in actu. Sed
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169 materia prima est tantum in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi. Ergo
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170 contra rationem materiae primae est, quod sit facta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p5">
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171 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh
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172 unto nothing"---viz. primary matter.
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173 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30294] Iª q. 44 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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174 quod dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., duo fecisti, domine, unum
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175 prope te, scilicet Angelum, aliud prope nihil, scilicet materiam
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176 primam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q44_A2-p6">
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177 <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
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178 mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did
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179 not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and
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180 separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated,
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181 they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of
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182 that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter,
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183 which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential
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184 forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according
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185 to
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186 Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its
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187 form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to
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188 a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some
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189 particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others
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190 there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as
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191 "such," but as "beings."
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192 </p><p id="FP_Q44_A2-p7"> Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are
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193 "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs
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194 to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause
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195 of things.
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196 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 co."><a name="30295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30295] Iª q. 44 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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197 quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt
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198 in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores
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199 existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia.
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200 Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi
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201 secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et
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202 densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam
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203 substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas
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204 huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem,
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205 intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes,
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206 distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et
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207 materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem
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208 fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum
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209 transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum
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210 circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem. Sed
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211 considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad
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212 determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per
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213 accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut
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214 homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens
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215 particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel
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216 inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares
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217 assignaverunt. Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens
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218 inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum
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219 secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia.
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220 Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse
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221 causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas
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222 accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales,
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223 sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum
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224 quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam
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225 ab universali causa entium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p8">
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226 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental
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227 or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from
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228 which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.
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229 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30296] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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230 dicendum quod philosophus in I Physic. loquitur de fieri
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231 particulari, quod est de forma in formam, sive accidentalem sive
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232 substantialem nunc autem loquimur de rebus secundum emanationem
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233 earum ab universali principio essendi. A qua quidem emanatione nec
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234 materia excluditur, licet a primo modo factionis excludatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p9">
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235 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first
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236 active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
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237 says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
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238 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30297] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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239 dicendum quod passio est effectus actionis. Unde et rationabile est
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240 quod primum principium passivum sit effectus primi principii
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241 activi, nam omne imperfectum causatur a perfecto. Oportet enim
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242 primum principium esse perfectissimum, ut dicit Aristoteles, in XII
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243 Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A2-p10">
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244 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything
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245 created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if
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246 all that belongs to its being is created.
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247 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30298] Iª q. 44 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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248 dicendum quod ratio illa non ostendit quod materia non sit creata,
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249 sed quod non sit creata sine forma. Licet enim omne creatum sit in
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250 actu, non tamen est actus purus. Unde oportet quod etiam illud quod
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251 se habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse
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252 ipsius pertinet, creatum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 3. Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p2">
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253 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures
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254 are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
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255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30299] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
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256 proceditur. Videtur quod causa exemplaris sit aliquid praeter Deum.
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257 Exemplatum enim habet similitudinem exemplaris. Sed creaturae longe
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258 sunt a divina similitudine. Non ergo Deus est causa exemplaris
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259 earum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p3">
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260 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated
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261 above
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262 <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q44_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in
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263 all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles
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264 of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit
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265 self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars.
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266 Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
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267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30300] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
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268 quod est per participationem, reducitur ad aliquid per se existens,
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269 ut ignitum ad ignem, sicut iam dictum est. Sed quaecumque sunt in
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270 sensibilibus rebus, sunt solum per participationem alicuius
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271 speciei, quod ex hoc patet, quod in nullo sensibilium invenitur
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272 solum id quod ad rationem speciei pertinet, sed adiunguntur
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273 principiis speciei principia individuantia. Oportet ergo ponere
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274 ipsas species per se existentes, ut per se hominem, et per se
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275 equum, et huiusmodi. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Sunt igitur
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276 exemplaria res quaedam extra Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p4">
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277 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because
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278 there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing
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279 in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
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280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30301] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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281 scientiae et definitiones sunt de ipsis speciebus, non secundum
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282 quod sunt in particularibus, quia particularium non est scientia
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283 nec definitio. Ergo sunt quaedam entia, quae sunt entia vel species
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284 non in singularibus. Et haec dicuntur exemplaria. Ergo idem quod
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285 prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p5">
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286 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting
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287 life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
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288 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="30302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30302] Iª q. 44 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
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289 idem videtur per Dionysium, qui dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod
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290 <i>ipsum secundum se esse, prius est eo quod est per se vitam esse,
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291 et eo quod est per se sapientiam esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p6">
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292 <b>On the contrary,</b> The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are
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293 contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.
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294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30303] Iª q. 44 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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295 quod exemplar est idem quod idea. Sed ideae, secundum quod
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296 Augustinus libro octoginta trium quaest. dicit, <i>sunt formae
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297 principales, quae divina intelligentia continentur</i>. Ergo
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298 exemplaria rerum non sunt extra Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p7">
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299 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
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300 exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate
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301 form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily
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302 conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive
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303 determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom
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304 devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine
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305 wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (
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306 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A1" id="FP_Q44_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[1]</a>). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not
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307 apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this
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308 manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar
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309 of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.
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310 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 co."><a name="30304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30304] Iª q. 44 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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311 quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum. Ad cuius
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312 evidentiam, considerandum est quod ad productionem alicuius rei
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313 ideo necessarium est exemplar, ut effectus determinatam formam
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314 consequatur, artifex enim producit determinatam formam in materia,
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315 propter exemplar ad quod inspicit, sive illud sit exemplar ad quod
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316 extra intuetur, sive sit exemplar interius mente conceptum.
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317 Manifestum est autem quod ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatas
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318 formas consequuntur. Haec autem formarum determinatio oportet quod
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319 reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, quae
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320 ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit.
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321 Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes
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322 omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in
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323 mente divina existentes. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum
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324 respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia,
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325 prout eius similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode.
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326 Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. Possunt etiam in
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327 rebus creatis quaedam aliorum exemplaria dici, secundum quod
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328 quaedam sunt ad similitudinem aliorum, vel secundum eandem speciem,
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329 vel secundum analogiam alicuius imitationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p8">
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330 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like
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331 to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material
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332 house is like to the house in the architect's mind.
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333 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30305] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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334 dicendum quod, licet creaturae non pertingant ad hoc quod sint
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335 similes Deo secundum suam naturam, similitudine speciei, ut homo
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336 genitus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad eius similitudinem
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337 secundum repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus
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338 quae est in materia, domui quae est in mente artificis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p9">
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339 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man
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340 is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior
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341 species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
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342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30306] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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343 dicendum quod de ratione hominis est quod sit in materia, et sic
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344 non potest inveniri homo sine materia. Licet igitur hic homo sit
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345 per participationem speciei, non tamen potest reduci ad aliquid
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346 existens per se in eadem specie; sed ad speciem superexcedentem,
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347 sicut sunt substantiae separatae. Et eadem ratio est de aliis
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348 sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p10">
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349 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the
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350 same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active
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351 intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars
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352 in order to be their exemplars.
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353 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30307] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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354 dicendum quod, licet quaelibet scientia et definitio sit solum
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355 entium, non tamen oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo,
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356 quem intellectus habet in intelligendo. Nos enim, per virtutem
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357 intellectus agentis, abstrahimus species universales a
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358 particularibus conditionibus, non tamen oportet quod universalia
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359 praeter particularia subsistant, ut particularium exemplaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A3-p11">
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360 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes
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361 the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
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362 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="30308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30308] Iª q. 44 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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363 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius, XI cap. de Div. Nom., per se
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364 vitam et per se sapientiam quandoque nominat ipsum Deum, quandoque
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365 virtutes ipsis rebus datas, non autem quasdam subsistentes res,
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366 sicut antiqui posuerunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q44_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q44_A4-p0.1">Q. 44. A. 4. Whether God is the final cause of all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p2">
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367 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
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368 needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
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369 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="30309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30309] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
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370 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa finalis omnium. Agere
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371 enim propter finem videtur esse alicuius indigentis fine. Sed Deus
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372 nullo est indigens. Ergo non competit sibi agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p3">
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373 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
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374 because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore
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375 He is not the final cause of all things.
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376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="30310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30310] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, finis
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377 generationis et forma generati et agens non incidunt in idem
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378 numero, ut dicitur in II Physic., quia finis generationis est forma
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379 generati. Sed Deus est primum agens omnium. Non ergo est causa
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380 finalis omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p4">
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381 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not
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382 the end of all things.
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383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="30311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30311] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, finem
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384 omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia neque omnia ipsum
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385 cognoscunt. Deus ergo non est omnium finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p5">
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386 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows
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387 that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
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388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="30312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30312] Iª q. 44 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
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389 finalis causa est prima causarum. Si igitur Deus sit causa agens et
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390 causa finalis, sequitur quod in eo sit prius et posterius. Quod est
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391 impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6">
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392 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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393 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q44_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord has made all things for Himself."
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394 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 s. c."><a name="30313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30313] Iª q. 44 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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395 quod dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>universa propter semetipsum operatus est
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396 dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p7">
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397 <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless
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398 it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively.
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399 For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some
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400 things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect
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401 agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the
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402 First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which
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403 is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection
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404 and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.
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405 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 co."><a name="30314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30314] Iª q. 44 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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406 quod omne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non
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407 magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. Est autem idem finis
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408 agentis et patientis, inquantum huiusmodi, sed aliter et aliter,
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409 unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod
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410 patiens intendit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et
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411 patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta, et his convenit quod etiam
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412 in agendo intendant aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est
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413 agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicuius
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414 finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est
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415 eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam
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416 perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis
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417 divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p8">
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418 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong
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419 to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for
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420 His own goodness.
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421 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="30315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30315] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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422 dicendum quod agere propter indigentiam non est nisi agentis
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423 imperfecti, quod natum est agere et pati. Sed hoc Deo non competit.
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424 Et ideo ipse solus est maxime liberalis, quia non agit propter suam
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425 utilitatem, sed solum propter suam bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p9">
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426 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator,
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427 which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
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428 since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
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429 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="30316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30316] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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430 dicendum quod forma generati non est finis generationis nisi
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431 inquantum est similitudo formae generantis, quod suam similitudinem
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432 communicare intendit. Alioquin forma generati esset nobilior
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433 generante, cum finis sit nobilior his quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p10">
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434 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or
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435 natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness
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436 to God.
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437 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="30317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30317] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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438 dicendum quod omnia appetunt Deum ut finem, appetendo quodcumque
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439 bonum, sive appetitu intelligibili, sive sensibili, sive naturali,
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440 qui est sine cognitione, quia nihil habet rationem boni et
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441 appetibilis, nisi secundum quod participat Dei similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q44_A4-p11">
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442 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows
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443 that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things
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444 in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.
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445 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 44 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="30318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30318] Iª q. 44 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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446 dicendum quod, cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis
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447 omnium rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod primum
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448 principium omnium rerum sit unum tantum secundum rem. Nihil tamen
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449 prohibet in eo considerari multa secundum rationem, quorum quaedam
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450 prius cadunt in intellectu nostro quam alia.</p></div></div></div></div>
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451 <div id="FP_Q45" class="div3">
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452 <h3 id="FP_Q45-p0.1">Q. 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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453 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
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454 <p id="FP_Q45-p2"> The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and
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455 includes eight points of inquiry:
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456 </p><p id="FP_Q45-p3"><a href="#FP_Q45_A1"> (1) What is creation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p4"><a href="#FP_Q45_A2"> (2) Whether God can create anything?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p5"><a href="#FP_Q45_A3"> (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p6"><a href="#FP_Q45_A4"> (4) To what things it belongs to be created?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p7"><a href="#FP_Q45_A5"> (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p8"><a href="#FP_Q45_A6"> (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p9"><a href="#FP_Q45_A7"> (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q45-p10"><a href="#FP_Q45_A8"> (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?</a></p>
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457 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 pr."><a name="30319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30319]
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458 Iª q. 45 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de modo emanationis
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459 rerum a primo principio, qui dicitur creatio. De qua quaeruntur
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460 octo. Primo, quid sit creatio. Secundo, utrum Deus possit aliquid
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461 creare. Tertio, utrum creatio sit aliquod ens in rerum natura.
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462 Quarto, cui competit creari. Quinto, utrum solius Dei sit creare.
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463 Sexto, utrum commune sit toti Trinitati, aut proprium alicuius
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464 personae. Septimo, utrum vestigium aliquod Trinitatis sit in rebus
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465 creatis. Octavo, utrum opus creationis admisceatur in operibus
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466 naturae et voluntatis.</p></div></div></div>
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467 <div id="FP_Q45_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 1. Whether to create is to make something from nothing?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p2">
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468 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To
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469 make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already."
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470 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30320] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
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471 proceditur. Videtur quod creare non sit ex nihilo aliquid facere.
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472 Dicit enim Augustinus, contra adversarium legis et prophetarum,
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473 <i>facere est quod omnino non erat, creare vero est ex eo quod iam
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474 erat educendo aliquid constituere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p3">
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475 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good,
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476 and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among
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477 all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
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478 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30321] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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479 nobilitas actionis et motus ex terminis consideratur. Nobilior
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480 igitur est actio quae ex bono in bonum est, et ex ente in ens, quam
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481 quae est ex nihilo in aliquid. Sed creatio videtur esse nobilissima
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482 actio, et prima inter omnes actiones. Ergo non est ex nihilo in
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483 aliquid, sed magis ex ente in ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p4">
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484 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say
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485 that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create
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486 is not to make something from nothing.
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487 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30322] Iª q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, haec
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488 praepositio ex importat habitudinem alicuius causae, et maxime
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489 materialis; sicut cum dicimus quod statua fit ex aere. Sed nihil
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490 non potest esse materia entis, nec aliquo modo causa eius. Ergo
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491 creare non est ex nihilo aliquid facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5">
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492 <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text of
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493 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing."
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494 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30323] Iª q. 45 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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495 quod super illud Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum</i>
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496 etc., dicit Glossa quod creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p6">
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497 <b>I answer that,</b> As said above (
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498 <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being
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499 from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular
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500 emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man,"
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501 and white from "not-white."
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502 Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being
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503 should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is
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504 from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is
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505 "nothing."
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506 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 co."><a name="30324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30324] Iª q. 45 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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507 quod, sicut supra dictum est, non solum oportet considerare
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508 emanationem alicuius entis particularis ab aliquo particulari
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509 agente, sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae
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510 est Deus, et hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis.
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511 Quod autem procedit secundum emanationem particularem, non
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512 praesupponitur emanationi, sicut, si generatur homo, non fuit prius
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513 homo, sed homo fit ex non homine, et album ex non albo. Unde, si
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514 consideretur emanatio totius entis universalis a primo principio,
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515 impossibile est quod aliquod ens praesupponatur huic emanationi.
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516 Idem autem est nihil quod nullum ens. Sicut igitur generatio
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517 hominis est ex non ente quod est non homo, ita creatio, quae est
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518 emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p7">
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519 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when
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520 we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
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|
521 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30325] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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522 dicendum quod Augustinus aequivoce utitur nomine creationis,
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523 secundum quod creari dicuntur ea quae in melius reformantur, ut cum
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524 dicitur aliquis creari in episcopum. Sic autem non loquimur hic de
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525 creatione, sed sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p8">
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|
526 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more
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527 perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding
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528 to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because
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529 the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the
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530 privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which
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531 is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because
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|
532 the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being.
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533 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30326] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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534 dicendum quod mutationes accipiunt speciem et dignitatem non a
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535 termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem. Tanto ergo perfectior et
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536 prior est aliqua mutatio, quanto terminus ad quem illius mutationis
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537 est nobilior et prior; licet terminus a quo, qui opponitur termino
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538 ad quem, sit imperfectior. Sicut generatio simpliciter est nobilior
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539 et prior quam alteratio, propter hoc quod forma substantialis est
|
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540 nobilior quam forma accidentalis, tamen privatio substantialis
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541 formae, quae est terminus a quo in generatione, est imperfectior
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542 quam contrarium, quod est terminus a quo in alteratione. Et
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543 similiter creatio est perfectior et prior quam generatio et
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544 alteratio, quia terminus ad quem est tota substantia rei. Id autem
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545 quod intelligitur ut terminus a quo, est simpliciter non ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A1-p9">
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546 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only
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547 order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition
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548 "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first
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549 sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and
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550 its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It
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551 is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does
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552 not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the
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553 first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the
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554 material
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555 cause, which is denied.
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556 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30327] Iª q. 45 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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557 dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, haec
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558 praepositio ex non designat causam materialem, sed ordinem tantum;
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559 sicut cum dicitur, ex mane fit meridies, idest, post mane fit
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560 meridies. Sed intelligendum est quod haec praepositio ex potest
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561 includere negationem importatam in hoc quod dico nihil, vel includi
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562 ab ea. Si primo modo, tunc ordo remanet affirmatus, et ostenditur
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563 ordo eius, quod est ad non esse praecedens. Si vero negatio
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564 includat praepositionem, tunc ordo negatur, et est sensus, fit ex
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565 nihilo, idest non fit ex aliquo; sicut si dicatur, iste loquitur de
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566 nihilo, quia non loquitur de aliquo. Et utroque modo verificatur,
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567 cum dicitur ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Sed primo modo, haec
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568 praepositio ex importat ordinem, ut dictum est, secundo modo,
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569 importat habitudinem causae materialis, quae negatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 2. Whether God can create anything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p2">
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570 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers
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571 considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the
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572 contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation
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573 and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from
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574 nothing, or create.
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575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30328] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
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576 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid creare. Quia
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577 secundum philosophum, I Physic., antiqui philosophi acceperunt ut
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578 communem conceptionem animi, ex nihilo nihil fieri. Sed potentia
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579 Dei non se extendit ad contraria primorum principiorum; utpote quod
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580 Deus faciat quod totum non sit maius sua parte, vel quod affirmatio
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581 et negatio sint simul vera. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid ex nihilo
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582 facere, vel creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p3">
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583 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
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584 creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the
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585 act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God.
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586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30329] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
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587 creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere, ergo creari est aliquid fieri.
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588 Sed omne fieri est mutari. Ergo creatio est mutatio. Sed omnis
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589 mutatio est ex subiecto aliquo, ut patet per definitionem motus,
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590 nam motus est actus existentis in potentia. Ergo est impossibile
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591 aliquid a Deo ex nihilo fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p4">
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592 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same
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593 time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already
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594 is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming
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595 precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which
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596 the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.
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597 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30330] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
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598 factum est, necesse est aliquando fieri. Sed non potest dici quod
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599 illud quod creatur, simul fiat et factum sit, quia in
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600 permanentibus, quod fit, non est, quod autem factum est, iam est;
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601 simul ergo aliquid esset et non esset. Ergo, si aliquid fit, fieri
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602 eius praecedit factum esse. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi
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603 praeexistat subiectum in quo sustentetur ipsum fieri. Ergo
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604 impossibile est aliquid fieri ex nihilo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p5">
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605 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not
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606 happen that something is made from nothing.
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607 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="30331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30331] Iª q. 45 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
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608 infinitam distantiam non est pertransire. Sed infinita distantia
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609 est inter ens et nihil. Ergo non contingit ex nihilo aliquid
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610 fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6">
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611 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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612 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
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613 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30332] Iª q. 45 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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614 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
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615 terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7">
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616 <b>I answer that,</b> Not only is it impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created
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617 by God, as appears from what has been said (
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618 <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is
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619 not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action
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620 of art,
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621 but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If
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622 therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him.
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623 Now it has been shown above (
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624 <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that
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625 God brings things into being from nothing.
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626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 co."><a name="30333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30333] Iª q. 45 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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627 quod non solum non est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari, sed
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628 necesse est ponere a Deo omnia creata esse, ut ex praemissis
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629 habetur. Quicumque enim facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit
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630 praesupponitur actioni eius, et non producitur per ipsam actionem,
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631 sicut artifex operatur ex rebus naturalibus, ut ex ligno et aere,
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632 quae per artis actionem non causantur, sed causantur per actionem
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633 naturae. Sed et ipsa natura causat res naturales quantum ad formam,
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634 sed praesupponit materiam. Si ergo Deus non ageret nisi ex aliquo
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635 praesupposito, sequeretur quod illud praesuppositum non esset
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636 causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra quod nihil potest esse
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637 in entibus quod non sit a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius
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638 esse. Unde necesse est dicere quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse
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639 producit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p8">
|
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640 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ancient philosophers, as is said above (
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641 <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their
|
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642 action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation
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643 from the universal principle of things.
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644 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30334] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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645 dicendum quod antiqui philosophi, sicut supra dictum est, non
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646 consideraverunt nisi emanationem effectuum particularium a causis
|
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647 particularibus, quas necesse est praesupponere aliquid in sua
|
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648 actione, et secundum hoc erat eorum communis opinio, ex nihilo
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649 nihil fieri. Sed tamen hoc locum non habet in prima emanatione ab
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650 universali rerum principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p9">
|
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651 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different
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652 now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
|
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653 motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial
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654 change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
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655 substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding,
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656 so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide
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657 as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that
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658 when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of
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659 signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (
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660 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q45_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing.
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661 And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make"
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662 and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
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663 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30335] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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664 dicendum quod creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum
|
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665 intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est, quod aliquid
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666 idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius, nam quandoque est idem ens
|
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667 actu, aliter se habens nunc et prius, sicut in motibus secundum
|
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|
668 quantitatem et qualitatem et ubi; quandoque vero est idem ens in
|
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|
669 potentia tantum, sicut in mutatione secundum substantiam, cuius
|
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|
670 subiectum est materia. Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota
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|
671 substantia rerum, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens
|
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672 nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si
|
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673 intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse.
|
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|
674 Sed cum actio et passio conveniant in substantia motus, et
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675 differant solum secundum habitudines diversas, ut dicitur in III
|
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|
676 Physic., oportet quod, subtracto motu, non remaneant nisi diversae
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|
677 habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia modus significandi
|
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678 sequitur modum intelligendi, ut dictum est, creatio significatur
|
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|
679 per modum mutationis, et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex
|
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680 nihilo aliquid facere. Quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc
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681 conveniant quam mutare et mutari, quia facere et fieri important
|
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|
682 habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed
|
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|
683 mutationem ex consequenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p10">
|
|
|
684 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the
|
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685 term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is
|
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686 not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being
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687 made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was
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688 not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time.
|
|
|
689 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30336] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
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|
690 dicendum quod in his quae fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et
|
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|
691 factum esse, sive talis factio sit terminus motus, sicut
|
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|
692 illuminatio (nam simul aliquid illuminatur et illuminatum est);
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|
693 sive non sit terminus motus, sicut simul formatur verbum in corde
|
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|
694 et formatum est. Et in his, quod fit, est, sed cum dicitur fieri,
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|
695 significatur ab alio esse, et prius non fuisse. Unde, cum creatio
|
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|
696 sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A2-p11">
|
|
|
697 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
|
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698 plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms.
|
|
|
699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="30337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30337] Iª q. 45 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
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|
700 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit ex falsa imaginatione, ac si
|
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|
701 sit aliquod infinitum medium inter nihilum et ens, quod patet esse
|
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702 falsum. Procedit autem falsa haec imaginatio ex eo quod creatio
|
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|
703 significatur ut quaedam mutatio inter duos terminos existens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 3. Whether creation is anything in the creature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p2">
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704 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the
|
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705 creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in
|
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706 the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively
|
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707 is not anything in the creature.
|
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|
708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30338] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
|
|
|
709 proceditur. Videtur quod creatio non sit aliquid in creatura. Sicut
|
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|
710 enim creatio passive accepta attribuitur creaturae, ita creatio
|
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|
711 active accepta attribuitur creatori. Sed creatio active accepta non
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712 est aliquid in creatore, quia sic sequeretur quod in Deo esset
|
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713 aliquid temporale. Ergo creatio passive accepta non est aliquid in
|
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714 creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p3">
|
|
|
715 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
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716 since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for
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717 the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the
|
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718 creature.
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|
719 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30339] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
|
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|
720 est medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed creatio significatur
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721 ut medium inter utrumque, non enim est creator, cum non sit
|
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722 aeterna; neque creatura, quia oporteret eadem ratione aliam ponere
|
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723 creationem qua ipsa crearetur, et sic in infinitum. Creatio ergo
|
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724 non est aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p4">
|
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725 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
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726 is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and
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727 also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while
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728 the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
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729 and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
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730 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30340] Iª q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
|
|
|
731 creatio est aliquid praeter substantiam creatam, oportet quod sit
|
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732 accidens eius. Omne autem accidens est in subiecto. Ergo res creata
|
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733 esset subiectum creationis. Et sic idem esset subiectum creationis
|
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734 et terminus. Quod est impossibile, quia subiectum prius est
|
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735 accidente, et conservat accidens; terminus autem posterius est
|
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736 actione et passione cuius est terminus, et eo existente cessat
|
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737 actio et passio. Igitur ipsa creatio non est aliqua res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p5">
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738 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental
|
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739 form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental
|
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740 form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole
|
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741 substance, something in the thing created.
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742 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30341] Iª q. 45 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, maius
|
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743 est fieri aliquid secundum totam substantiam, quam secundum formam
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744 substantialem vel accidentalem. Sed generatio simpliciter vel
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745 secundum quid, qua fit aliquid secundum formam substantialem vel
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746 accidentalem, est aliquid in generato. Ergo multo magis creatio,
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747 qua fit aliquid secundum totam substantiam, est aliquid in
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748 creato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p6">
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749 <b>I answer that,</b> Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement,
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750 or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in
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751 the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all
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752 beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when
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753 movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the
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754 creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement,
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755 is implied a relation to the principle of motion.
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756 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 co."><a name="30342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30342] Iª q. 45 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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757 quod creatio ponit aliquid in creato secundum relationem tantum.
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758 Quia quod creatur, non fit per motum vel per mutationem. Quod enim
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759 fit per motum vel mutationem, fit ex aliquo praeexistenti, quod
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760 quidem contingit in productionibus particularibus aliquorum entium;
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761 non autem potest hoc contingere in productione totius esse a causa
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762 universali omnium entium, quae est Deus. Unde Deus, creando,
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763 producit res sine motu. Subtracto autem motu ab actione et
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764 passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde
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765 relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam
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766 ad creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in passione quae est
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767 cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p7">
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768 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God
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769 relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God
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770 is a real relation, as was said above (
|
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771 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A7" id="FP_Q45_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[7]</a>) in treating of the divine names.
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772 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30343] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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773 dicendum quod creatio active significata significat actionem
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774 divinam, quae est eius essentia cum relatione ad creaturam. Sed
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775 relatio in Deo ad creaturam non est realis, sed secundum rationem
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776 tantum. Relatio vero creaturae ad Deum est relatio realis, ut supra
|
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777 dictum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p8">
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778 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover
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779 and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive
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780 creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations,
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781 or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other
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782 relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above (
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783 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q42_A1" id="FP_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[42], A[1]</a>, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons.
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784 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30344] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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785 dicendum quod, quia creatio significatur ut mutatio, sicut dictum
|
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786 est; mutatio autem media quodammodo est inter movens et motum, ideo
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787 etiam creatio significatur ut media inter creatorem et creaturam.
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788 Tamen creatio passive accepta est in creatura, et est creatura.
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789 Neque tamen oportet quod alia creatione creetur, quia relationes,
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790 cum hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid dicantur, non referuntur per
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791 aliquas alias relationes, sed per seipsas; sicut etiam supra dictum
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792 est, cum de aequalitate personarum ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A3-p9">
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793 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and
|
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794 is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the
|
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795 part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the
|
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796 creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature
|
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797 to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
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798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30345] Iª q. 45 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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799 dicendum quod creationis, secundum quod significatur ut mutatio,
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800 creatura est terminus, sed secundum quod vere est relatio, creatura
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801 est eius subiectum, et prius ea in esse, sicut subiectum accidente.
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802 Sed habet quandam rationem prioritatis ex parte obiecti ad quod
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803 dicitur, quod est principium creaturae. Neque tamen oportet quod,
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804 quandiu creatura sit, dicatur creari, quia creatio importat
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805 habitudinem creaturae ad creatorem cum quadam novitate seu
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806 incoeptione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 4. Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p2">
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807 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv)
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808 it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly
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809 speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.
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810 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="30346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30346] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
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811 proceditur. Videtur quod creari non sit proprium compositorum et
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812 subsistentium. Dicitur enim in libro de causis, prima rerum
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813 creatarum est esse. Sed esse rei creatae non est subsistens. Ergo
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814 creatio proprie non est subsistentis et compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p3">
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815 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
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816 component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
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817 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="30347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30347] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
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818 creatur est ex nihilo. Composita autem non sunt ex nihilo, sed ex
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819 suis componentibus. Ergo compositis non convenit creari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p4">
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820 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
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821 natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore
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822 matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
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823 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="30348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30348] Iª q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
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824 proprie producitur per primam emanationem, quod supponitur in
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825 secunda, sicut res naturalis per generationem naturalem, quae
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826 supponitur in operatione artis. Sed illud quod supponitur in
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827 generatione naturali, est materia. Ergo materia est quae proprie
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828 creatur, et non compositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5">
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829 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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830 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation
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831 belongs to them.
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832 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 s. c."><a name="30349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30349] Iª q. 45 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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833 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
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834 terram</i>. Caelum autem et terra sunt res compositae subsistentes.
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835 Ergo horum proprie est creatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p6">
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836 <b>I answer that,</b> To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (
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837 <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q45_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever
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838 being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate
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839 substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has
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840 being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they
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841 themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it.
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842 Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being."
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843 Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they
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844 ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
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845 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 co."><a name="30350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30350] Iª q. 45 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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846 quod creari est quoddam fieri, ut dictum est. Fieri autem ordinatur
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847 ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus
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848 convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus, sive
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849 sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separatae; sive sint composita,
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850 sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim proprie convenit esse, quod
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851 habet esse; et hoc est subsistens in suo esse. Formae autem et
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852 accidentia, et alia huiusmodi, non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint,
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853 sed quia eis aliquid est; ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ea
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854 subiectum est album. Unde, secundum philosophum, accidens magis
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855 proprie dicitur entis quam ens. Sicut igitur accidentia et formae,
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856 et huiusmodi, quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam
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857 entia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata. Proprie vero
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858 creata sunt subsistentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p7">
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859 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but
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860 to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because
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861 it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above
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862 <a href="#FP_Q45_A1" id="FP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible
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863 thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
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864 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="30351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30351] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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865 dicendum quod, cum dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, ly esse
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866 non importat subiectum creatum; sed importat propriam rationem
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867 obiecti creationis. Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum, quod est
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868 ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creatio sit emanatio totius
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869 esse ab ente universali, ut dictum est. Et est similis modus
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870 loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum visibile est color,
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871 quamvis illud quod proprie videtur, sit coloratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p8">
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872 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite"
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873 is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.
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874 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="30352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30352] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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875 dicendum quod creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositae ex
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876 principiis praeexistentibus, sed compositum sic dicitur creari,
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877 quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A4-p9">
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878 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation
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879 is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
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880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="30353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30353] Iª q. 45 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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881 dicendum quod ratio illa non probat quod sola materia creetur; sed
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882 quod materia non sit nisi ex creatione. Nam creatio est productio
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883 totius esse, et non solum materiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 5. Whether it belongs to God alone to create?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p2">
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884 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
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885 what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless
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886 can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance
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887 like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it
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888 has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
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889 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="30354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30354] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
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890 proceditur. Videtur quod non solius Dei sit creare. Quia secundum
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891 philosophum, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere. Sed
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892 creaturae immateriales sunt perfectiores creaturis materialibus,
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893 quae faciunt sibi simile, ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat
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894 hominem. Ergo substantia immaterialis potest facere substantiam
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895 sibi similem. Sed substantia immaterialis non potest fieri nisi per
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896 creationem, cum non habeat materiam ex qua fiat. Ergo aliqua
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897 creatura potest creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p3">
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898 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker.
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899 But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which
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900 nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.
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901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="30355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30355] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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902 quanto maior est resistentia ex parte facti, tanto maior virtus
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903 requiritur in faciente. Sed plus resistit contrarium quam nihil.
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904 Ergo maioris virtutis est aliquid facere ex contrario, quod tamen
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905 creatura facit; quam aliquid facere ex nihilo. Multo magis igitur
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906 creatura hoc facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p4">
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907 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we
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908 proved above when treating of the infinity of God (
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909 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q45_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary
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910 to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
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911 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="30356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30356] Iª q. 45 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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912 virtus facientis consideratur secundum mensuram eius quod fit. Sed
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913 ens creatum est finitum, ut supra probatum est, cum de Dei
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914 infinitate ageretur. Ergo ad producendum per creationem aliquid
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915 creatum, non requiritur nisi virtus finita. Sed habere virtutem
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916 finitam non est contra rationem creaturae. Ergo non est impossibile
|
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917 creaturam creare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p5">
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918 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
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919 creatures.
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920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 s. c."><a name="30357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30357] Iª q. 45 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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921 quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quod neque boni neque mali
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922 Angeli possunt esse creatores alicuius rei. Multo minus igitur
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923 aliae creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p6">
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924 <b>I answer that,</b> It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes
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925 <a href="#FP_Q45_A1" id="FP_Q45_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and
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926 prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first
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927 and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither
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928 intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely,
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929 not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
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930 </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p7"> It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally,
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931 inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that
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932 although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause,
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933 can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after
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934 itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies.
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935 And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that
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936 the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power.
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937 </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p8"> But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause,
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938 except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore
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939 it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain
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940 instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its
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941 own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating
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942 is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally
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943 to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent.
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944 So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that
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945 is, ministerially.
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946 </p><p id="FP_Q45_A5-p9"> And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it
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947 requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.
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948 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 co."><a name="30358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30358] Iª q. 45 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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949 quod satis apparet in primo aspectu, secundum praemissa, quod
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950 creare non potest esse propria actio nisi solius Dei. Oportet enim
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951 universaliores effectus in universaliores et priores causas
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952 reducere. Inter omnes autem effectus, universalissimum est ipsum
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953 esse. Unde oportet quod sit proprius effectus primae et
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954 universalissimae causae, quae est Deus. Unde etiam dicitur libro de
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955 causis, quod neque intelligentia vel anima nobilis dat esse, nisi
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956 inquantum operatur operatione divina. Producere autem esse
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957 absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem
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958 creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio
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959 ipsius Dei. Contingit autem quod aliquid participet actionem
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960 propriam alicuius alterius, non virtute propria, sed
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961 instrumentaliter, inquantum agit in virtute alterius; sicut aer per
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962 virtutem ignis habet calefacere et ignire. Et secundum hoc, aliqui
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963 opinati sunt quod, licet creatio sit propria actio universalis
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964 causae, tamen aliqua inferiorum causarum inquantum agit in virtute
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965 primae causae, potest creare. Et sic posuit Avicenna quod prima
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966 substantia separata, creata a Deo, creat aliam post se, et
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967 substantiam orbis, et animam eius; et quod substantia orbis creat
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968 materiam inferiorum corporum. Et secundum hunc etiam modum Magister
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969 dicit, in V dist. IV Sent., quod Deus potest creaturae communicare
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970 potentiam creandi, ut creet per ministerium, non propria
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971 auctoritate. Sed hoc esse non potest. Quia causa secunda
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972 instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi
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973 inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad
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974 effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret secundum
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975 illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra adhiberetur ad agendum, nec
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976 oporteret esse determinata instrumenta determinatarum actionum. Sic
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977 enim videmus quod securis, scindendo lignum, quod habet ex
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978 proprietate suae formae, producit scamni formam, quae est effectus
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979 proprius principalis agentis. Illud autem quod est proprius
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980 effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis,
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981 scilicet esse absolute. Unde non potest aliquid operari dispositive
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982 et instrumentaliter ad hunc effectum, cum creatio non sit ex aliquo
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983 praesupposito, quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis
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984 agentis. Sic igitur impossibile est quod alicui creaturae conveniat
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985 creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter sive per
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986 ministerium. Et hoc praecipue inconveniens est dici de aliquo
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987 corpore, quod creet, cum nullum corpus agat nisi tangendo vel
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988 movendo; et sic requirit in sua actione aliquid praeexistens, quod
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989 possit tangi et moveri; quod est contra rationem creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10">
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990 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying
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991 it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause
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992 of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate
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993 matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man
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994 participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own
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995 being, as we have said above (
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996 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it
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997 is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in
|
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998 an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything
|
|
|
999 whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore
|
|
|
1000 an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards
|
|
|
1001 some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x).
|
|
|
1002 In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (
|
|
|
1003 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.15" target="asv">Eph. 3:15</a>): "From whom all
|
|
|
1004 paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless
|
|
|
1005 something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.
|
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|
1006 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="30359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30359] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1007 dicendum quod aliquod perfectum participans aliquam naturam, facit
|
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|
1008 sibi simile, non quidem producendo absolute illam naturam, sed
|
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|
1009 applicando eam ad aliquid. Non enim hic homo potest esse causa
|
|
|
1010 naturae humanae absolute, quia sic esset causa sui ipsius, sed est
|
|
|
1011 causa quod natura humana sit in hoc homine generato. Et sic
|
|
|
1012 praesupponit in sua actione determinatam materiam per quam est hic
|
|
|
1013 homo. Sed sicut hic homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque
|
|
|
1014 ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi, quia solus
|
|
|
1015 Deus est suum esse, ut supra dictum est. Nullum igitur ens creatum
|
|
|
1016 potest producere aliquod ens absolute, nisi inquantum esse causat
|
|
|
1017 in hoc, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur id per quod aliquid
|
|
|
1018 est hoc, actioni qua facit sibi simile. In substantia autem
|
|
|
1019 immateriali non potest praeintelligi aliquid per quod sit haec,
|
|
|
1020 quia est haec per suam formam, per quam habet esse, cum sint formae
|
|
|
1021 subsistentes. Igitur substantia immaterialis non potest producere
|
|
|
1022 aliam substantiam immaterialem sibi similem, quantum ad esse eius;
|
|
|
1023 sed quantum ad perfectionem aliquam superadditam; sicut si dicamus
|
|
|
1024 quod superior Angelus illuminat inferiorem, ut Dionysius dicit.
|
|
|
1025 Secundum quem modum etiam in caelestibus est paternitas, ut ex
|
|
|
1026 verbis apostoli patet, Ephes. III, <i>ex quo omnis paternitas in
|
|
|
1027 caelo et in terra nominatur</i>. Et ex hoc etiam evidenter apparet
|
|
|
1028 quod nullum ens creatum potest causare aliquid, nisi praesupposito
|
|
|
1029 aliquo. Quod repugnat rationi creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p11">
|
|
|
1030 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality.
|
|
|
1031 And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce,
|
|
|
1032 as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions,
|
|
|
1033 whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act;
|
|
|
1034 and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a
|
|
|
1035 much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of
|
|
|
1036 much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
|
|
|
1037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="30360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30360] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1038 dicendum quod ex contrario fit aliquid per accidens, ut dicitur in
|
|
|
1039 I Physic., per se autem fit aliquid ex subiecto, quod est in
|
|
|
1040 potentia. Contrarium igitur resistit agenti, inquantum impedit
|
|
|
1041 potentiam ab actu in quem intendit reducere agens, sicut ignis
|
|
|
1042 intendit reducere materiam aquae in actum sibi similem, sed
|
|
|
1043 impeditur per formam et dispositiones contrarias, quibus quasi
|
|
|
1044 ligatur potentia ne reducatur in actum. Et quanto magis fuerit
|
|
|
1045 potentia ligata, tanto requiritur maior virtus in agente ad
|
|
|
1046 reducendam materiam in actum. Unde multo maior potentia requiritur
|
|
|
1047 in agente, si nulla potentia praeexistat. Sic ergo patet quod multo
|
|
|
1048 maioris virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex
|
|
|
1049 contrario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A5-p12">
|
|
|
1050 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made;
|
|
|
1051 for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite
|
|
|
1052 power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater
|
|
|
1053 power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the
|
|
|
1054 potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is
|
|
|
1055 infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural
|
|
|
1056 agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any
|
|
|
1057 more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above (
|
|
|
1058 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q45_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>), it follows that no creature can
|
|
|
1059 create.
|
|
|
1060 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="30361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30361] Iª q. 45 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1061 dicendum quod virtus facientis non solum consideratur ex substantia
|
|
|
1062 facti, sed etiam ex modo faciendi, maior enim calor non solum
|
|
|
1063 magis, sed etiam citius calefacit. Quamvis igitur creare aliquem
|
|
|
1064 effectum finitum non demonstret potentiam infinitam, tamen creare
|
|
|
1065 ipsum ex nihilo demonstrat potentiam infinitam. Quod ex praedictis
|
|
|
1066 patet. Si enim tanto maior virtus requiritur in agente, quanto
|
|
|
1067 potentia est magis remota ab actu, oportet quod virtus agentis ex
|
|
|
1068 nulla praesupposita potentia, quale agens est creans, sit infinita,
|
|
|
1069 quia nulla proportio est nullius potentiae ad aliquam potentiam,
|
|
|
1070 quam praesupponit virtus agentis naturalis, sicut et non entis ad
|
|
|
1071 ens. Et quia nulla creatura habet simpliciter potentiam infinitam,
|
|
|
1072 sicut neque esse infinitum, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod
|
|
|
1073 nulla creatura possit creare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A6-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 6. Whether to create is proper to any person?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p2">
|
|
|
1074 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect
|
|
|
1075 is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and
|
|
|
1076 is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds
|
|
|
1077 in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of
|
|
|
1078 the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
|
|
|
1079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="30362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30362] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
|
|
|
1080 proceditur. Videtur quod creare sit proprium alicuius personae.
|
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|
1081 Quod enim est prius, est causa eius quod est post; et perfectum
|
|
|
1082 imperfecti. Sed processio divinae personae est prior quam processio
|
|
|
1083 creaturae, et magis perfecta, quia divina persona procedit in
|
|
|
1084 perfecta similitudine sui principii, creatura vero in imperfecta.
|
|
|
1085 Ergo processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa processionis
|
|
|
1086 rerum. Et sic creare est proprium personae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p3">
|
|
|
1087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
|
|
|
1088 difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons.
|
|
|
1089 But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed
|
|
|
1090 that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
|
|
|
1091 Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation
|
|
|
1092 of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.
|
|
|
1093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="30363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30363] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1094 personae divinae non distinguuntur ab invicem nisi per suas
|
|
|
1095 processiones et relationes. Quidquid igitur differenter attribuitur
|
|
|
1096 divinis personis, hoc convenit eis secundum processiones et
|
|
|
1097 relationes personarum. Sed causalitas creaturarum diversimode
|
|
|
1098 attribuitur divinis personis, nam in symbolo fidei patri
|
|
|
1099 attribuitur quod sit creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium;
|
|
|
1100 filio autem attribuitur quod per eum omnia facta sunt; sed spiritui
|
|
|
1101 sancto, quod sit dominus et vivificator. Causalitas ergo
|
|
|
1102 creaturarum convenit personis secundum processiones et
|
|
|
1103 relationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p4">
|
|
|
1104 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
|
|
|
1105 this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power,
|
|
|
1106 goodness and wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought
|
|
|
1107 not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished
|
|
|
1108 in creating according to relations and processions.
|
|
|
1109 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="30364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30364] Iª q. 45 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
|
|
|
1110 dicatur quod causalitas creaturae attenditur secundum aliquod
|
|
|
1111 attributum essentiale quod appropriatur alicui personae, hoc non
|
|
|
1112 videtur sufficiens. Quia quilibet effectus divinus causatur a
|
|
|
1113 quolibet attributo essentiali, scilicet potentia, bonitate et
|
|
|
1114 sapientia, et sic non magis pertinet ad unum quam ad aliud. Non
|
|
|
1115 deberet ergo aliquis determinatus modus causalitatis attribui uni
|
|
|
1116 personae magis quam alii, nisi distinguerentur in creando secundum
|
|
|
1117 relationes et processiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p5">
|
|
|
1118 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.
|
|
|
1119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 s. c."><a name="30365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30365] Iª q. 45 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1120 quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod communia totius
|
|
|
1121 divinitatis sunt omnia causalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A6-p6">
|
|
|
1122 <b>I answer that,</b> To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle
|
|
|
1123 of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create
|
|
|
1124 belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not
|
|
|
1125 proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.
|
|
|
1126 </p><p id="FP_Q45_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of
|
|
|
1127 things. For as was said above (
|
|
|
1128 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>;
|
|
|
1129 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q45_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman
|
|
|
1130 is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the
|
|
|
1131 love of
|
|
|
1132 his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through
|
|
|
1133 His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch
|
|
|
1134 as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
|
|
|
1135 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 co."><a name="30366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30366] Iª q. 45 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1136 quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse rerum. Cum
|
|
|
1137 autem omne agens agat sibi simile, principium actionis considerari
|
|
|
1138 potest ex actionis effectu, ignis enim est qui generat ignem. Et
|
|
|
1139 ideo creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse, quod est eius
|
|
|
1140 essentia, quae est communis tribus personis. Unde creare non est
|
|
|
1141 proprium alicui personae, sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed tamen
|
|
|
1142 divinae personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent
|
|
|
1143 causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. Ut enim supra ostensum est,
|
|
|
1144 cum de Dei scientia et voluntate ageretur, Deus est causa rerum per
|
|
|
1145 suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum.
|
|
|
1146 Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum, et per amorem
|
|
|
1147 suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum, operatur. Unde et Deus pater
|
|
|
1148 operatus est creaturam per suum verbum, quod est filius; et per
|
|
|
1149 suum amorem, qui est spiritus sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones
|
|
|
1150 personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum
|
|
|
1151 includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et
|
|
|
1152 voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p8">
|
|
|
1153 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.
|
|
|
1154 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="30367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30367] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1155 dicendum quod processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa
|
|
|
1156 creationis sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9">
|
|
|
1157 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son
|
|
|
1158 receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common
|
|
|
1159 to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from
|
|
|
1160 both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not
|
|
|
1161 receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (
|
|
|
1162 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through"
|
|
|
1163 usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both,
|
|
|
1164 is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for
|
|
|
1165 this particular
|
|
|
1166 appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (
|
|
|
1167 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q39_A8" id="FP_Q45_A6-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[39], A[8]</a>, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to
|
|
|
1168 be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through
|
|
|
1169 Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which
|
|
|
1170 belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior
|
|
|
1171 movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.
|
|
|
1172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="30368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30368] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1173 dicendum quod, sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus
|
|
|
1174 personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, inquantum filius
|
|
|
1175 accipit naturam divinam a patre, et spiritus sanctus ab utroque;
|
|
|
1176 ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus personis,
|
|
|
1177 ordine tamen quodam eis convenit; nam filius habet eam a patre, et
|
|
|
1178 spiritus sanctus ab utroque. Unde creatorem esse attribuitur patri,
|
|
|
1179 ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De filio autem
|
|
|
1180 dicitur per quem omnia facta sunt, inquantum habet eandem virtutem,
|
|
|
1181 sed ab alio, nam haec praepositio per solet denotare causam mediam,
|
|
|
1182 sive principium de principio. Sed spiritui sancto, qui habet eandem
|
|
|
1183 virtutem ab utroque, attribuitur quod dominando gubernet, et
|
|
|
1184 vivificet quae sunt creata a patre per filium. Potest etiam huius
|
|
|
1185 attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium
|
|
|
1186 attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, patri appropriatur
|
|
|
1187 potentia, quae maxime manifestatur in creatione, et ideo
|
|
|
1188 attribuitur patri creatorem esse. Filio autem appropriatur
|
|
|
1189 sapientia, per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur
|
|
|
1190 de filio, per quem omnia facta sunt. Spiritui sancto autem
|
|
|
1191 appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in
|
|
|
1192 debitos fines, et vivificatio, nam vita in interiori quodam motu
|
|
|
1193 consistit, primum autem movens est finis et bonitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A6-p10">
|
|
|
1194 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally
|
|
|
1195 connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness"
|
|
|
1196 poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
|
|
|
1197 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="30369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30369] Iª q. 45 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1198 dicendum quod, licet quilibet effectus Dei procedat ex quolibet
|
|
|
1199 attributorum, tamen reducitur unusquisque effectus ad illud
|
|
|
1200 attributum, cum quo habet convenientiam secundum propriam rationem,
|
|
|
1201 sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam, et iustificatio impii ad
|
|
|
1202 misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio
|
|
|
1203 vero, quae est productio ipsius substantiae rei, reducitur ad
|
|
|
1204 potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A7-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 7. Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p2">
|
|
|
1205 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through
|
|
|
1206 its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated (
|
|
|
1207 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q45_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures.
|
|
|
1208 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="30370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30370] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
|
|
|
1209 proceditur. Videtur quod in creaturis non sit necesse inveniri
|
|
|
1210 vestigium Trinitatis. Per sua enim vestigia unumquodque investigari
|
|
|
1211 potest. Sed Trinitas personarum non potest investigari ex
|
|
|
1212 creaturis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo vestigia Trinitatis non sunt
|
|
|
1213 in creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p3">
|
|
|
1214 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some
|
|
|
1215 of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity
|
|
|
1216 in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.
|
|
|
1217 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="30371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30371] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1218 quidquid in creatura est, creatum est. Si igitur vestigium
|
|
|
1219 Trinitatis invenitur in creatura secundum aliquas proprietates
|
|
|
1220 suas, et omne creatum habet vestigium Trinitatis, oportet in
|
|
|
1221 unaquaque illarum inveniri etiam vestigium Trinitatis, et sic in
|
|
|
1222 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p4">
|
|
|
1223 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to
|
|
|
1224 the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of
|
|
|
1225 the Trinity but of the unity of essence.
|
|
|
1226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="30372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30372] Iª q. 45 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1227 effectus non repraesentat nisi suam causam. Sed causalitas
|
|
|
1228 creaturarum pertinet ad naturam communem, non autem ad relationes,
|
|
|
1229 quibus personae distinguuntur et numerantur. Ergo in creatura non
|
|
|
1230 invenitur vestigium Trinitatis, sed solum unitatis essentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p5">
|
|
|
1231 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures."
|
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|
1232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 s. c."><a name="30373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30373] Iª q. 45 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1233 quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod <i>Trinitatis vestigium in
|
|
|
1234 creatura apparet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A7-p6">
|
|
|
1235 <b>I answer that,</b> Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause,
|
|
|
1236 but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has
|
|
|
1237 passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents
|
|
|
1238 fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the
|
|
|
1239 representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was
|
|
|
1240 said above
|
|
|
1241 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27" id="FP_Q45_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(Q[27])</a>. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational
|
|
|
1242 creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there
|
|
|
1243 is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.
|
|
|
1244 </p><p id="FP_Q45_A7-p7"> But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are
|
|
|
1245 necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form,
|
|
|
1246 whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents
|
|
|
1247 the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle
|
|
|
1248 from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is
|
|
|
1249 from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He
|
|
|
1250 is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De
|
|
|
1251 Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according
|
|
|
1252 "as it
|
|
|
1253 is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three,
|
|
|
1254 "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing
|
|
|
1255 limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the
|
|
|
1256 other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83,
|
|
|
1257 qu.
|
|
|
1258 18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct
|
|
|
1259 by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
|
|
|
1260 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 co."><a name="30374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30374] Iª q. 45 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1261 quod omnis effectus aliqualiter repraesentat suam causam, sed
|
|
|
1262 diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam causalitatem
|
|
|
1263 causae, non autem formam eius, sicut fumus repraesentat ignem, et
|
|
|
1264 talis repraesentatio dicitur esse repraesentatio vestigii;
|
|
|
1265 vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicuius transeuntis, sed non
|
|
|
1266 qualis sit. Aliquis autem effectus repraesentat causam quantum ad
|
|
|
1267 similitudinem formae eius, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem,
|
|
|
1268 et statua Mercurii Mercurium, et haec est repraesentatio imaginis.
|
|
|
1269 Processiones autem divinarum personarum attenduntur secundum actus
|
|
|
1270 intellectus et voluntatis, sicut supra dictum est, nam filius
|
|
|
1271 procedit ut verbum intellectus, spiritus sanctus ut amor
|
|
|
1272 voluntatis. In creaturis igitur rationalibus, in quibus est
|
|
|
1273 intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per
|
|
|
1274 modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor
|
|
|
1275 procedens. Sed in creaturis omnibus invenitur repraesentatio
|
|
|
1276 Trinitatis per modum vestigii, inquantum in qualibet creatura
|
|
|
1277 inveniuntur aliqua quae necesse est reducere in divinas personas
|
|
|
1278 sicut in causam. Quaelibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et
|
|
|
1279 habet formam per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad
|
|
|
1280 aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quaedam substantia creata,
|
|
|
1281 repraesentat causam et principium, et sic demonstrat personam
|
|
|
1282 patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod
|
|
|
1283 habet quandam formam et speciem, repraesentat verbum; secundum quod
|
|
|
1284 forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod
|
|
|
1285 habet ordinem, repraesentat spiritum sanctum, inquantum est amor,
|
|
|
1286 quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et
|
|
|
1287 ideo dicit Augustinus, in VI Lib. de Trin., quod vestigium
|
|
|
1288 Trinitatis invenitur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum
|
|
|
1289 aliquid est, et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur, et secundum
|
|
|
1290 quod quendam ordinem tenet. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur illa tria,
|
|
|
1291 numerus, pondus et mensura, quae ponuntur Sap. XI, nam mensura
|
|
|
1292 refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis, numerus ad
|
|
|
1293 speciem, pondus ad ordinem. Et ad haec etiam reducuntur alia tria
|
|
|
1294 quae ponit Augustinus, modus species et ordo. Et ea quae ponit in
|
|
|
1295 libro octoginta trium quaest. quod constat, quod discernitur, quod
|
|
|
1296 congruit, constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur
|
|
|
1297 per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci
|
|
|
1298 possunt quaecumque sic dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p8">
|
|
|
1299 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge
|
|
|
1300 of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (
|
|
|
1301 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q45_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>).
|
|
|
1302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="30375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30375] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1303 dicendum quod repraesentatio vestigii attenditur secundum
|
|
|
1304 appropriata, per quem modum ex creaturis in Trinitatem divinarum
|
|
|
1305 personarum veniri potest, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p9">
|
|
|
1306 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor
|
|
|
1307 is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being
|
|
|
1308 is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.
|
|
|
1309 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="30376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30376] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1310 dicendum quod creatura est res proprie subsistens, in qua est
|
|
|
1311 praedicta tria invenire. Neque oportet quod in quolibet eorum quae
|
|
|
1312 ei insunt, haec tria inveniantur, sed secundum ea vestigium rei
|
|
|
1313 subsistenti attribuitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A7-p10">
|
|
|
1314 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above
|
|
|
1315 <a href="#FP_Q45_A6" id="FP_Q45_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>.
|
|
|
1316 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="30377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30377] Iª q. 45 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1317 dicendum quod etiam processiones personarum sunt causa et ratio
|
|
|
1318 creationis aliquo modo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q45_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q45_A8-p0.1">Q. 45. A. 8. Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p2">
|
|
|
1319 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is
|
|
|
1320 produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and
|
|
|
1321 thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation.
|
|
|
1322 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="30378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30378] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
|
|
|
1323 proceditur. Videtur quod creatio admisceatur in operibus naturae et
|
|
|
1324 artis. In qualibet enim operatione naturae et artis producitur
|
|
|
1325 aliqua forma. Sed non producitur ex aliquo, cum non habeat materiam
|
|
|
1326 partem sui. Ergo producitur ex nihilo. Et sic in qualibet
|
|
|
1327 operatione naturae et artis est creatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p3">
|
|
|
1328 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which
|
|
|
1329 is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it
|
|
|
1330 must be produced by creation.
|
|
|
1331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="30379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30379] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1332 effectus non est potior sua causa. Sed in rebus naturalibus non
|
|
|
1333 invenitur aliquid agens nisi forma accidentalis, quae est forma
|
|
|
1334 activa vel passiva. Non ergo per operationem naturae producitur
|
|
|
1335 forma substantialis. Relinquitur igitur quod sit per
|
|
|
1336 creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p4">
|
|
|
1337 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident
|
|
|
1338 in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason
|
|
|
1339 applies to other things.
|
|
|
1340 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="30380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30380] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1341 natura facit sibi simile. Sed quaedam inveniuntur generata in
|
|
|
1342 natura non ab aliquo sibi simili, sicut patet in animalibus
|
|
|
1343 generatis per putrefactionem. Ergo eorum forma non est a natura,
|
|
|
1344 sed a creatione. Et eadem ratio est de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p5">
|
|
|
1345 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow
|
|
|
1346 that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
|
|
|
1347 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="30381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30381] Iª q. 45 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod
|
|
|
1348 non creatur, non est creatura. Si igitur in his quae sunt a natura
|
|
|
1349 non adiungatur creatio, sequitur quod ea quae sunt a natura, non
|
|
|
1350 sunt creaturae. Quod est haereticum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p6">
|
|
|
1351 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.
|
|
|
1352 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 s. c."><a name="30382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30382] Iª q. 45 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1353 quod Augustinus, super Gen. ad Lit., distinguit opus propagationis,
|
|
|
1354 quod est opus naturae, ab opere creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q45_A8-p7">
|
|
|
1355 <b>I answer that,</b> The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but
|
|
|
1356 previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from
|
|
|
1357 not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they
|
|
|
1358 asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or
|
|
|
1359 caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this
|
|
|
1360 opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting,
|
|
|
1361 but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone,
|
|
|
1362 as shown above
|
|
|
1363 <a href="#FP_Q45_A4" id="FP_Q45_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be
|
|
|
1364 "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.
|
|
|
1365 </p><p id="FP_Q45_A8-p8"> Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 co."><a name="30383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30383] Iª q. 45 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1366 quod haec dubitatio inducitur propter formas. Quas quidam posuerunt
|
|
|
1367 non incipere per actionem naturae, sed prius in materia extitisse,
|
|
|
1368 ponentes latitationem formarum. Et hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia
|
|
|
1369 materiae, quia nesciebant distinguere inter potentiam et actum,
|
|
|
1370 quia enim formae praeexistunt in materia in potentia, posuerunt eas
|
|
|
1371 simpliciter praeexistere. Alii vero posuerunt formas dari vel
|
|
|
1372 causari ab agente separato, per modum creationis. Et secundum hoc
|
|
|
1373 cuilibet operationi naturae adiungitur creatio. Sed hoc accidit eis
|
|
|
1374 ex ignorantia formae. Non enim considerabant quod forma naturalis
|
|
|
1375 corporis non est subsistens, sed quo aliquid est, et ideo, cum
|
|
|
1376 fieri et creari non conveniat proprie nisi rei subsistenti, sicut
|
|
|
1377 supra dictum est, formarum non est fieri neque creari, sed
|
|
|
1378 concreata esse. Quod autem proprie fit ab agente naturali, est
|
|
|
1379 compositum, quod fit ex materia. Unde in operibus naturae non
|
|
|
1380 admiscetur creatio, sed praesupponitur ad operationem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p9">
|
|
|
1381 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."
|
|
|
1382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="30384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30384] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1383 dicendum quod formae incipiunt esse in actu, compositis factis, non
|
|
|
1384 quod ipsae fiant per se, sed per accidens tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p10">
|
|
|
1385 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its
|
|
|
1386 like according to quality, but according to species.
|
|
|
1387 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="30385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30385] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1388 dicendum quod qualitates activae in natura agunt in virtute
|
|
|
1389 formarum substantialium. Et ideo agens naturale non solum producit
|
|
|
1390 sibi simile secundum qualitatem, sed secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p11">
|
|
|
1391 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which
|
|
|
1392 they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are
|
|
|
1393 created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper
|
|
|
1394 agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
|
|
|
1395 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="30386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30386] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1396 dicendum quod ad generationem animalium imperfectorum sufficit
|
|
|
1397 agens universale, quod est virtus caelestis, cui assimilantur non
|
|
|
1398 secundum speciem, sed secundum analogiam quandam, neque oportet
|
|
|
1399 dicere quod eorum formae creantur ab agente separato. Ad
|
|
|
1400 generationem vero animalium perfectorum non sufficit agens
|
|
|
1401 universale, sed requiritur agens proprium, quod est generans
|
|
|
1402 univocum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q45_A8-p12">
|
|
|
1403 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are
|
|
|
1404 called creatures.
|
|
|
1405 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 45 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="30387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30387] Iª q. 45 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1406 dicendum quod operatio naturae non est nisi ex praesuppositione
|
|
|
1407 principiorum creatorum, et sic ea quae per naturam fiunt, creaturae
|
|
|
1408 dicuntur.</p></div></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1409 <div id="FP_Q46" class="div3">
|
|
|
1410 <h3 id="FP_Q46-p0.1">Q. 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1411 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
|
|
|
1412 <p id="FP_Q46-p2"> Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment:</p><p id="FP_Q46-p3"><a href="#FP_Q46_A1"> (1) Whether creatures always existed?</a></p><p id="FP_Q46-p4"><a href="#FP_Q46_A2"> (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?</a></p><p id="FP_Q46-p5"><a href="#FP_Q46_A3"> (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?</a></p>
|
|
|
1413 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 pr."><a name="30388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30388]
|
|
|
1414 Iª q. 46 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
|
|
|
1415 principio durationis rerum creatarum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
|
|
|
1416 Primo, utrum creaturae semper fuerint. Secundo, utrum eas
|
|
|
1417 incoepisse sit articulus fidei. Tertio, quomodo Deus dicatur in
|
|
|
1418 principio caelum et terram creasse.</p></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1419 <div id="FP_Q46_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 1. Whether the universe of creatures always existed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1420 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything
|
|
|
1421 which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore
|
|
|
1422 the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality
|
|
|
1423 to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from
|
|
|
1424 privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist
|
|
|
1425 without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist:
|
|
|
1426 which is impossible.
|
|
|
1427 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="30389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30389] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
|
|
|
1428 proceditur. Videtur quod universitas creaturarum, quae mundi nomine
|
|
|
1429 nuncupatur, non incoeperit, sed fuerit ab aeterno. Omne enim quod
|
|
|
1430 incoepit esse, antequam fuerit, possibile fuit ipsum esse, alioquin
|
|
|
1431 impossibile fuisset ipsum fieri. Si ergo mundus incoepit esse,
|
|
|
1432 antequam inciperet, possibile fuit ipsum esse. Sed quod possibile
|
|
|
1433 est esse, est materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, quod est per
|
|
|
1434 formam, et ad non esse, quod est per privationem. Si ergo mundus
|
|
|
1435 incoepit esse, ante mundum fuit materia. Sed non potest esse
|
|
|
1436 materia sine forma, materia autem mundi cum forma, est mundus. Fuit
|
|
|
1437 ergo mundus antequam esse inciperet, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1438 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing
|
|
|
1439 extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate
|
|
|
1440 time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time
|
|
|
1441 is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there
|
|
|
1442 are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did
|
|
|
1443 not begin to exist.
|
|
|
1444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="30390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30390] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
|
|
|
1445 quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, quandoque est et quandoque non
|
|
|
1446 est, quia ad quantum se extendit virtus alicuius rei, tandiu est.
|
|
|
1447 Sed omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut sit semper, non enim
|
|
|
1448 virtutem habet ad determinatum durationis tempus. Nullum ergo
|
|
|
1449 incorruptibile quandoque est et quandoque non est. Sed omne quod
|
|
|
1450 incipit esse, quandoque est et quandoque non est. Nullum ergo
|
|
|
1451 incorruptibile incipit esse. Sed multa sunt in mundo
|
|
|
1452 incorruptibilia, ut corpora caelestia, et omnes substantiae
|
|
|
1453 intellectuales. Ergo mundus non incoepit esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1454 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and
|
|
|
1455 also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
|
|
|
1456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="30391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30391] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1457 nullum ingenitum incoepit esse. Sed philosophus probat in I
|
|
|
1458 Physic., quod materia est ingenita; et in I de caelo et mundo, quod
|
|
|
1459 caelum est ingenitum. Non ergo universitas rerum incoepit esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1460 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body
|
|
|
1461 where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world
|
|
|
1462 there was a vacuum; which is impossible.
|
|
|
1463 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="30392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30392] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1464 vacuum est ubi non est corpus, sed possibile est esse. Sed si
|
|
|
1465 mundus incoepit esse, ubi nunc est corpus mundi, prius non fuit
|
|
|
1466 aliquod corpus, et tamen poterat ibi esse, alioquin nunc ibi non
|
|
|
1467 esset. Ergo ante mundum fuit vacuum, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1468 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before.
|
|
|
1469 But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement.
|
|
|
1470 Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.
|
|
|
1471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="30393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30393] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
|
|
|
1472 de novo incipit moveri, nisi per hoc quod movens vel mobile aliter
|
|
|
1473 se habet nunc quam prius. Sed quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius,
|
|
|
1474 movetur. Ergo ante omnem motum de novo incipientem, fuit aliquis
|
|
|
1475 motus. Motus ergo semper fuit. Ergo et mobile, quia motus non est
|
|
|
1476 nisi in mobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p7">
|
|
|
1477 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For
|
|
|
1478 nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable
|
|
|
1479 thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being
|
|
|
1480 changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change,
|
|
|
1481 at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow,
|
|
|
1482 but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because
|
|
|
1483 time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so
|
|
|
1484 the same conclusion follows as before.
|
|
|
1485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="30394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30394] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, omne
|
|
|
1486 movens aut est naturale, aut est voluntarium. Sed neutrum incipit
|
|
|
1487 movere, nisi aliquo motu praeexistente. Natura enim semper eodem
|
|
|
1488 modo operatur. Unde, nisi praecedat aliqua immutatio vel in natura
|
|
|
1489 moventis vel in mobili, non incipiet a movente naturali esse motus,
|
|
|
1490 qui non fuit prius. Voluntas autem absque sui immutatione retardat
|
|
|
1491 facere quod proponit, sed hoc non est nisi per aliquam immutationem
|
|
|
1492 quam imaginatur, ad minus ex parte ipsius temporis. Sicut qui vult
|
|
|
1493 facere domum cras, et non hodie, expectat aliquid futurum cras,
|
|
|
1494 quod hodie non est; et ad minus expectat quod dies hodiernus
|
|
|
1495 transeat, et crastinus adveniat; quod sine mutatione non est, quia
|
|
|
1496 tempus est numerus motus. Relinquitur ergo quod ante omnem motum de
|
|
|
1497 novo incipientem, fuit alius motus. Et sic idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1498 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is
|
|
|
1499 not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no
|
|
|
1500 time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently
|
|
|
1501 neither can movement, the measure of what is time.
|
|
|
1502 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7"><a name="30395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30395] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1503 quidquid est semper in principio et semper in fine, nec incipere
|
|
|
1504 nec desinere potest, quia quod incipit, non est in suo fine; quod
|
|
|
1505 autem desinit, non est in suo principio. Sed tempus semper est in
|
|
|
1506 suo principio et fine, quia nihil est temporis nisi nunc, quod est
|
|
|
1507 finis praeteriti, et principium futuri. Ergo tempus nec incipere
|
|
|
1508 nec desinere potest. Et per consequens nec motus, cuius numerus
|
|
|
1509 tempus est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1510 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,
|
|
|
1511 therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior
|
|
|
1512 in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible.
|
|
|
1513 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8"><a name="30396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30396] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
|
|
|
1514 aut est prior mundo natura tantum, aut duratione. Si natura tantum,
|
|
|
1515 ergo, cum Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus est ab aeterno. Si autem
|
|
|
1516 est prior duratione; prius autem et posterius in duratione
|
|
|
1517 constituunt tempus, ergo ante mundum fuit tempus; quod est
|
|
|
1518 impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1519 <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,
|
|
|
1520 requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by
|
|
|
1521 reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears
|
|
|
1522 from the above (
|
|
|
1523 <a href="#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[2]</a>,3,4). Since therefore God is
|
|
|
1524 eternal, the world is also eternal.
|
|
|
1525 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9"><a name="30397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30397] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1526 posita causa sufficienti, ponitur effectus, causa enim ad quam non
|
|
|
1527 sequitur effectus, est causa imperfecta, indigens alio ad hoc quod
|
|
|
1528 effectus sequatur. Sed Deus est sufficiens causa mundi; et finalis,
|
|
|
1529 ratione suae bonitatis; et exemplaris, ratione suae sapientiae; et
|
|
|
1530 effectiva, ratione suae potentiae; ut ex superioribus patet. Cum
|
|
|
1531 ergo Deus sit ab aeterno, et mundus fuit ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p11">
|
|
|
1532 <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore
|
|
|
1533 the world is eternal.
|
|
|
1534 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10"><a name="30398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30398] Iª q. 46 a. 1 arg. 10</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1535 cuius actio est aeterna, et effectus aeternus. Sed actio Dei est
|
|
|
1536 eius substantia, quae est aeterna. Ergo et mundus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12">
|
|
|
1537 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
1538 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.5" target="asv">Jn. 17:5</a>), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (
|
|
|
1539 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.22" target="asv">Prov. 8:22</a>), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning."
|
|
|
1540 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 s. c."><a name="30399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30399] Iª q. 46 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1541 quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, <i>clarifica me, pater, apud temetipsum,
|
|
|
1542 claritate quam habui priusquam mundus fieret</i>; et Proverb. VIII,
|
|
|
1543 <i>dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam
|
|
|
1544 faceret a principio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p13">
|
|
|
1545 <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (
|
|
|
1546 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will
|
|
|
1547 them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above
|
|
|
1548 (
|
|
|
1549 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q46_A1-p13.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that, absolutely
|
|
|
1550 speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will
|
|
|
1551 that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world
|
|
|
1552 depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot
|
|
|
1553 be proved by demonstration.
|
|
|
1554 </p><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p14"> Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons
|
|
|
1555 of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three
|
|
|
1556 ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras,
|
|
|
1557 Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this
|
|
|
1558 subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is
|
|
|
1559 probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing
|
|
|
1560 to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."
|
|
|
1561 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 co."><a name="30400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30400] Iª q. 46 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1562 nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc quidem ponere non est
|
|
|
1563 impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quod voluntas Dei est causa
|
|
|
1564 rerum. Sic ergo aliqua necesse est esse, sicut necesse est Deum
|
|
|
1565 velle illa, cum necessitas effectus ex necessitate causae
|
|
|
1566 dependeat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ostensum est autem supra quod,
|
|
|
1567 absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum.
|
|
|
1568 Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed
|
|
|
1569 eatenus mundus est, quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi
|
|
|
1570 ex voluntate Dei dependeat sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur
|
|
|
1571 necessarium mundum semper esse. Unde nec demonstrative probari
|
|
|
1572 potest. Nec rationes quas ad hoc Aristoteles inducit, sunt
|
|
|
1573 demonstrativae simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet ad
|
|
|
1574 contradicendum rationibus antiquorum, ponentium mundum incipere
|
|
|
1575 secundum quosdam modos in veritate impossibiles. Et hoc apparet ex
|
|
|
1576 tribus. Primo quidem, quia tam in VIII Physic. quam in I de caelo,
|
|
|
1577 praemittit quasdam opiniones, ut Anaxagorae et Empedoclis et
|
|
|
1578 Platonis, contra quos rationes contradictorias inducit. Secundo,
|
|
|
1579 quia, ubicumque de hac materia loquitur, inducit testimonia
|
|
|
1580 antiquorum, quod non est demonstratoris, sed probabiliter
|
|
|
1581 persuadentis. Tertio, quia expresse dicit in I Lib. Topic., quod
|
|
|
1582 quaedam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus rationes non habemus,
|
|
|
1583 ut utrum mundus sit aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p15">
|
|
|
1584 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter,
|
|
|
1585 but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to
|
|
|
1586 any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed
|
|
|
1587 to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
|
|
|
1588 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="30401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30401] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1589 dicendum quod, antequam mundus esset, possibile fuit mundum esse,
|
|
|
1590 non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quae est materia; sed
|
|
|
1591 secundum potentiam activam Dei. Et etiam secundum quod dicitur
|
|
|
1592 aliquid absolute possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam sed ex
|
|
|
1593 sola habitudine terminorum, qui sibi non repugnant; secundum quod
|
|
|
1594 possibile opponitur impossibili, ut patet per philosophum, in V
|
|
|
1595 Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p16">
|
|
|
1596 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before
|
|
|
1597 it received that power, it did not exist.
|
|
|
1598 </p><p id="FP_Q46_A1-p17"> Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never
|
|
|
1599 began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.
|
|
|
1600 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="30402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30402] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1601 dicendum quod illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper ex quo habet
|
|
|
1602 illam virtutem, non quandoque est et quandoque non est, sed
|
|
|
1603 antequam haberet illam virtutem, non fuit. Unde haec ratio, quae
|
|
|
1604 ponitur ab Aristotele in I de caelo, non concludit simpliciter quod
|
|
|
1605 incorruptibilia non incoeperunt esse, sed quod non incoeperunt esse
|
|
|
1606 per modum naturalem, quo generabilia et corruptibilia incipiunt
|
|
|
1607 esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p18">
|
|
|
1608 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive
|
|
|
1609 its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from
|
|
|
1610 which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin
|
|
|
1611 by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and
|
|
|
1612 heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (
|
|
|
1613 <a href="#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q46_A1-p18.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
|
|
|
1614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="30403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30403] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1615 dicendum quod Aristoteles, in I Physic., probat materiam esse
|
|
|
1616 ingenitam, per hoc quod non habet subiectum de quo sit. In I autem
|
|
|
1617 de caelo et mundo, probat caelum ingenitum, quia non habet
|
|
|
1618 contrarium ex quo generetur. Unde patet quod per utrumque non
|
|
|
1619 concluditur nisi quod materia et caelum non incoeperunt per
|
|
|
1620 generationem, ut quidam ponebant, praecipue de caelo. Nos autem
|
|
|
1621 dicimus quod materia et coelum producta sunt in esse per
|
|
|
1622 creationem, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p19">
|
|
|
1623 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which
|
|
|
1624 there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before
|
|
|
1625 the world was.
|
|
|
1626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="30404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30404] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1627 dicendum quod ad rationem vacui non sufficit in quo nihil est, sed
|
|
|
1628 requiritur quod sit spatium capax corporis, in quo non sit corpus,
|
|
|
1629 ut patet per Aristotelem, in IV Physic. Nos autem dicimus non
|
|
|
1630 fuisse locum aut spatium ante mundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p20">
|
|
|
1631 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas
|
|
|
1632 hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (
|
|
|
1633 <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p20.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[2]</a>, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the
|
|
|
1634 existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal
|
|
|
1635 movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things
|
|
|
1636 began to exist movement also existed.
|
|
|
1637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="30405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30405] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
1638 dicendum quod primus motor semper eodem modo se habuit primum autem
|
|
|
1639 mobile non semper eodem modo se habuit, quia incoepit esse, cum
|
|
|
1640 prius non fuisset. Sed hoc non fuit per mutationem, sed per
|
|
|
1641 creationem, quae non est mutatio, ut supra dictum est. Unde patet
|
|
|
1642 quod haec ratio, quam ponit Aristoteles in VIII Physic., procedit
|
|
|
1643 contra eos qui ponebant mobilia aeterna, sed motum non aeternum; ut
|
|
|
1644 patet ex opinionibus Anaxagorae et Empedoclis. Nos autem ponimus,
|
|
|
1645 ex quo mobilia incoeperunt, semper fuisse motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p21">
|
|
|
1646 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce
|
|
|
1647 an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must
|
|
|
1648 take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else,
|
|
|
1649 and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the
|
|
|
1650 form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter.
|
|
|
1651 Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different
|
|
|
1652 kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say
|
|
|
1653 of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it
|
|
|
1654 presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary
|
|
|
1655 succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as
|
|
|
1656 acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His
|
|
|
1657 action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was
|
|
|
1658 fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it
|
|
|
1659 was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is
|
|
|
1660 not so manifest of what always was.
|
|
|
1661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="30406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30406] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
|
|
|
1662 quod primum agens est agens voluntarium. Et quamvis habuit
|
|
|
1663 voluntatem aeternam producendi aliquem effectum, non tamen produxit
|
|
|
1664 aeternum effectum. Nec est necesse quod praesupponatur aliqua
|
|
|
1665 mutatio, nec etiam propter imaginationem temporis. Aliter enim est
|
|
|
1666 intelligendum de agente particulari, quod praesupponit aliquid, et
|
|
|
1667 causat alterum, et aliter de agente universali, quod producit
|
|
|
1668 totum. Sicut agens particulare producit formam, et praesupponit
|
|
|
1669 materiam, unde oportet quod formam inducat secundum proportionem ad
|
|
|
1670 debitam materiam. Unde rationabiliter in ipso consideratur quod
|
|
|
1671 inducit formam in talem materiam et non in aliam, ex differentia
|
|
|
1672 materiae ad materiam. Sed hoc non rationabiliter consideratur in
|
|
|
1673 Deo, qui simul producit formam et materiam, sed consideratur
|
|
|
1674 rationabiliter in eo, quod ipse producit materiam congruam formae
|
|
|
1675 et fini. Agens autem particulare praesupponit tempus, sicut et
|
|
|
1676 materiam. Unde rationabiliter consideratur in eo, quod agit in
|
|
|
1677 tempore posteriori et non in priori, secundum imaginationem
|
|
|
1678 successionis temporis post tempus. Sed in agente universali, quod
|
|
|
1679 producit rem et tempus, non est considerare quod agat nunc et non
|
|
|
1680 prius, secundum imaginationem temporis post tempus, quasi tempus
|
|
|
1681 praesupponatur eius actioni, sed considerandum est in eo, quod
|
|
|
1682 dedit effectui suo tempus quantum voluit, et secundum quod
|
|
|
1683 conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim
|
|
|
1684 mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus
|
|
|
1685 non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset, omne enim quod non semper
|
|
|
1686 fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de
|
|
|
1687 eo quod semper fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p22">
|
|
|
1688 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning
|
|
|
1689 and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that
|
|
|
1690 any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same
|
|
|
1691 applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as
|
|
|
1692 being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward
|
|
|
1693 this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
|
|
|
1694 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 7"><a name="30407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30407] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum
|
|
|
1695 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., prius et posterius est
|
|
|
1696 in tempore, secundum quod prius et posterius est in motu. Unde
|
|
|
1697 principium et finis accipienda sunt in tempore, sicut et in motu.
|
|
|
1698 Supposita autem aeternitate motus, necesse est quod quodlibet
|
|
|
1699 momentum in motu acceptum sit principium et terminus motus, quod
|
|
|
1700 non oportet, si motus incipiat. Et eadem ratio est de nunc
|
|
|
1701 temporis. Et sic patet quod ratio illa instantis nunc, quod semper
|
|
|
1702 sit principium et finis temporis, praesupponit aeternitatem
|
|
|
1703 temporis et motus. Unde Aristoteles hanc rationem inducit, in VIII
|
|
|
1704 Physic., contra eos qui ponebant aeternitatem temporis, sed
|
|
|
1705 negabant aeternitatem motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p23">
|
|
|
1706 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity.
|
|
|
1707 Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above
|
|
|
1708 heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other
|
|
|
1709 dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.
|
|
|
1710 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 8"><a name="30408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30408] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum
|
|
|
1711 dicendum quod Deus est prior mundo duratione. Sed ly prius non
|
|
|
1712 designat prioritatem temporis, sed aeternitatis. Vel dicendum quod
|
|
|
1713 designat aeternitatem temporis imaginati, et non realiter
|
|
|
1714 existentis. Sicut, cum dicitur, supra caelum nihil est, ly supra
|
|
|
1715 designat locum imaginatum tantum, secundum quod possibile est
|
|
|
1716 imaginari dimensionibus caelestis corporis dimensiones alias
|
|
|
1717 superaddi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24">
|
|
|
1718 <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from
|
|
|
1719 the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (
|
|
|
1720 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>;
|
|
|
1721 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q41_A2" id="FP_Q46_A1-p24.2" shape="rect">Q[41], A[2]</a>). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced
|
|
|
1722 by Him,
|
|
|
1723 except as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare
|
|
|
1724 its author.
|
|
|
1725 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 9"><a name="30409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30409] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum dicendum
|
|
|
1726 quod, sicut effectus sequitur a causa agente naturaliter secundum
|
|
|
1727 modum suae formae, ita sequitur ab agente per voluntatem secundum
|
|
|
1728 formam ab eo praeconceptam et definitam, ut ex superioribus patet.
|
|
|
1729 Licet igitur Deus ab aeterno fuerit sufficiens causa mundi, non
|
|
|
1730 tamen oportet quod ponatur mundus ab eo productus, nisi secundum
|
|
|
1731 quod est in praedefinitione suae voluntatis; ut scilicet habeat
|
|
|
1732 esse post non esse, ut manifestius declaret suum auctorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A1-p25">
|
|
|
1733 <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents
|
|
|
1734 acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore
|
|
|
1735 from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which
|
|
|
1736 has being after not being.
|
|
|
1737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 1 ad 10"><a name="30410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30410] Iª q. 46 a. 1 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum
|
|
|
1738 dicendum quod, posita actione, sequitur effectus secundum
|
|
|
1739 exigentiam formae quae est principium actionis. In agentibus autem
|
|
|
1740 per voluntatem, quod conceptum est et praedefinitum, accipitur ut
|
|
|
1741 forma quae est principium actionis. Ex actione igitur Dei aeterna
|
|
|
1742 non sequitur effectus aeternus, sed qualem Deus voluit, ut scilicet
|
|
|
1743 haberet esse post non esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q46_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 2. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1744 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that
|
|
|
1745 is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world;
|
|
|
1746 indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.
|
|
|
1747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="30411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30411] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
|
|
|
1748 proceditur. Videtur quod mundum incoepisse non sit articulus fidei,
|
|
|
1749 sed conclusio demonstrabilis. Omne enim factum habet principium
|
|
|
1750 suae durationis. Sed demonstrative probari potest quod Deus sit
|
|
|
1751 causa effectiva mundi, et hoc etiam probabiliores philosophi
|
|
|
1752 posuerunt. Ergo demonstrative probari potest quod mundus
|
|
|
1753 incoeperit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1754 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from
|
|
|
1755 something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which
|
|
|
1756 are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world
|
|
|
1757 was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have
|
|
|
1758 begun.
|
|
|
1759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="30412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30412] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
|
|
|
1760 necesse est dicere quod mundus factus est a Deo, aut ergo ex
|
|
|
1761 nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo, quia sic materia mundi
|
|
|
1762 praecessisset mundum; contra quod procedunt rationes Aristotelis
|
|
|
1763 ponentis caelum ingenitum. Ergo oportet dicere quod mundus sit
|
|
|
1764 factus ex nihilo. Et sic habet esse post non esse. Ergo oportet
|
|
|
1765 quod esse incoeperit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1766 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts
|
|
|
1767 by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.
|
|
|
1768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="30413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30413] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
|
|
|
1769 quod operatur per intellectum, a quodam principio operatur, ut
|
|
|
1770 patet in omnibus artificibus. Sed Deus est agens per intellectum.
|
|
|
1771 Ergo a quodam principio operatur mundus igitur, qui est eius
|
|
|
1772 effectus, non fuit semper.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1773 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
|
|
|
1774 fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always
|
|
|
1775 exist.
|
|
|
1776 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="30414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30414] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1777 manifeste apparet artes aliquas, et habitationes regionum, ex
|
|
|
1778 determinatis temporibus incoepisse. Sed hoc non esset, si mundus
|
|
|
1779 semper fuisset. Mundum igitur non semper fuisse manifestum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1780 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
|
|
|
1781 Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
|
|
|
1782 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="30415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30415] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1783 certum est nihil Deo aequari posse. Sed si mundus semper fuisset,
|
|
|
1784 aequipararetur Deo in duratione. Ergo certum est non semper mundum
|
|
|
1785 fuisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1786 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to
|
|
|
1787 pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
|
|
|
1788 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="30416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30416] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, si
|
|
|
1789 mundus semper fuit, infiniti dies praecesserunt diem istum. Sed
|
|
|
1790 infinita non est pertransire. Ergo nunquam fuisset perventum ad
|
|
|
1791 hunc diem, quod est manifeste falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1792 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
|
|
|
1793 series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be
|
|
|
1794 an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
|
|
|
1795 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7"><a name="30417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30417] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, si
|
|
|
1796 mundus fuit aeternus, et generatio fuit ab aeterno. Ergo unus homo
|
|
|
1797 genitus est ab alio in infinitum. Sed pater est causa efficiens
|
|
|
1798 filii, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo in causis efficientibus est
|
|
|
1799 procedere in infinitum, quod improbatur in II Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1800 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal:
|
|
|
1801 therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with
|
|
|
1802 certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.
|
|
|
1803 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8"><a name="30418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30418] Iª q. 46 a. 2 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, si
|
|
|
1804 mundus et generatio semper fuit, infiniti homines praecesserunt.
|
|
|
1805 Sed anima hominis est immortalis. Ergo infinitae animae humanae
|
|
|
1806 nunc essent actu, quod est impossibile. Ergo ex necessitate sciri
|
|
|
1807 potest quod mundus incoeperit; et non sola fide tenetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10">
|
|
|
1808 <b>On the contrary,</b> The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (
|
|
|
1809 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in
|
|
|
1810 one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God
|
|
|
1811 created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated.
|
|
|
1812 Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
|
|
|
1813 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 s. c."><a name="30419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30419] Iª q. 46 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, fidei
|
|
|
1814 articuli demonstrative probari non possunt, <i>quia fides de non
|
|
|
1815 apparentibus est</i>, ut dicitur ad Hebr. XI. Sed Deum esse
|
|
|
1816 creatorem mundi, sic quod mundus incoeperit esse, est articulus
|
|
|
1817 fidei, dicimus enim, credo in unum Deum et cetera. Et iterum,
|
|
|
1818 Gregorius dicit, in Homil. I in Ezech., quod Moyses prophetizavit
|
|
|
1819 de praeterito, dicens in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram;
|
|
|
1820 in quo novitas mundi traditur. Ergo novitas mundi habetur tantum
|
|
|
1821 per revelationem. Et ideo non potest probari demonstrative.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11">
|
|
|
1822 <b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above
|
|
|
1823 of the mystery of the Trinity (
|
|
|
1824 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle
|
|
|
1825 of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence
|
|
|
1826 it is said
|
|
|
1827 that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.
|
|
|
1828 Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot
|
|
|
1829 be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures
|
|
|
1830 is not among these, as was said above (
|
|
|
1831 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q46_A2-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>). But the divine will can be manifested by
|
|
|
1832 revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science.
|
|
|
1833 And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that
|
|
|
1834 are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of
|
|
|
1835 faith.
|
|
|
1836 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 co."><a name="30420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30420] Iª q. 46 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1837 quod mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative
|
|
|
1838 probari non potest, sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum
|
|
|
1839 est. Et huius ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest
|
|
|
1840 demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi. Demonstrationis
|
|
|
1841 enim principium est quod quid est. Unumquodque autem, secundum
|
|
|
1842 rationem suae speciei, abstrahit ab hic et nunc, propter quod
|
|
|
1843 dicitur quod universalia sunt ubique et semper. Unde demonstrari
|
|
|
1844 non potest quod homo, aut caelum, aut lapis non semper fuit.
|
|
|
1845 Similiter etiam neque ex parte causae agentis, quae agit per
|
|
|
1846 voluntatem. Voluntas enim Dei ratione investigari non potest, nisi
|
|
|
1847 circa ea quae absolute necesse est Deum velle, talia autem non sunt
|
|
|
1848 quae circa creaturas vult, ut dictum est. Potest autem voluntas
|
|
|
1849 divina homini manifestari per revelationem, cui fides innititur.
|
|
|
1850 Unde mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel
|
|
|
1851 scibile. Et hoc utile est ut consideretur, ne forte aliquis, quod
|
|
|
1852 fidei est demonstrare praesumens, rationes non necessarias inducat,
|
|
|
1853 quae praebeant materiam irridendi infidelibus, existimantibus nos
|
|
|
1854 propter huiusmodi rationes credere quae fidei sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p12">
|
|
|
1855 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For
|
|
|
1856 some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by
|
|
|
1857 proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world
|
|
|
1858 has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible
|
|
|
1859 way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in
|
|
|
1860 the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the
|
|
|
1861 world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts
|
|
|
1862 by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent
|
|
|
1863 must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker
|
|
|
1864 to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily
|
|
|
1865 if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced
|
|
|
1866 the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (
|
|
|
1867 <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
1868 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="30421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30421] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1869 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei,
|
|
|
1870 philosophorum ponentium aeternitatem mundi, duplex fuit opinio.
|
|
|
1871 Quidam enim posuerunt quod substantia mundi non sit a Deo. Et horum
|
|
|
1872 est intollerabilis error; et ideo ex necessitate refellitur. Quidam
|
|
|
1873 autem sic posuerunt mundum aeternum, quod tamen mundum a Deo factum
|
|
|
1874 dixerunt. <i>Non enim mundum temporis volunt habere, sed suae
|
|
|
1875 creationis initium, ut quodam modo vix intelligibili semper sit
|
|
|
1876 factus. Id autem quomodo intelligant, invenerunt</i>, ut idem dicit
|
|
|
1877 in X de Civ. Dei. <i>Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate
|
|
|
1878 semper fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium, quod a
|
|
|
1879 calcante factum nemo dubitaret; sic et mundus semper fuit, semper
|
|
|
1880 existente qui fecit</i>. Et ad hoc intelligendum, considerandum est
|
|
|
1881 quod causa efficiens quae agit per motum, de necessitate praecedit
|
|
|
1882 tempore suum effectum, quia effectus non est nisi in termino
|
|
|
1883 actionis, agens autem omne oportet esse principium actionis. Sed si
|
|
|
1884 actio sit instantanea, et non successiva, non est necessarium
|
|
|
1885 faciens esse prius facto duratione; sicut patet in illuminatione.
|
|
|
1886 Unde dicunt quod non sequitur ex necessitate, si Deus est causa
|
|
|
1887 activa mundi, quod sit prior mundo duratione, quia creatio, qua
|
|
|
1888 mundum produxit, non est mutatio successiva, ut supra dictum
|
|
|
1889 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p13">
|
|
|
1890 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made
|
|
|
1891 after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some
|
|
|
1892 of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).
|
|
|
1893 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="30422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30422] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1894 dicendum quod illi qui ponerent mundum aeternum, dicerent mundum
|
|
|
1895 factum a Deo ex nihilo, non quod factus sit post nihilum, secundum
|
|
|
1896 quod nos intelligimus per nomen creationis; sed quia non est factus
|
|
|
1897 de aliquo. Et sic etiam non recusant aliqui eorum creationis nomen,
|
|
|
1898 ut patet ex Avicenna in sua metaphysica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p14">
|
|
|
1899 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except
|
|
|
1900 as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human
|
|
|
1901 intellect, but not the divine intellect (
|
|
|
1902 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q46_A2-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[14], AA[7]</a>,12).
|
|
|
1903 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="30423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30423] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1904 dicendum quod illa est ratio Anaxagorae, quae ponitur in III
|
|
|
1905 Physic. Sed non de necessitate concludit, nisi de intellectu qui
|
|
|
1906 deliberando investigat quid agendum sit, quod est simile motui.
|
|
|
1907 Talis autem est intellectus humanus, sed non divinus, ut supra
|
|
|
1908 patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p15">
|
|
|
1909 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable
|
|
|
1910 to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents,
|
|
|
1911 were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular
|
|
|
1912 changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.
|
|
|
1913 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="30424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30424] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1914 dicendum quod ponentes aeternitatem mundi, ponunt aliquam regionem
|
|
|
1915 infinities esse mutatam de inhabitabili in habitabilem, et e
|
|
|
1916 converso. Et similiter ponunt quod artes, propter diversas
|
|
|
1917 corruptiones et accidentia, infinities fuerunt inventae, et iterum
|
|
|
1918 corruptae. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in libro Meteor., quod ridiculum
|
|
|
1919 est ex huiusmodi particularibus mutationibus opinionem accipere de
|
|
|
1920 novitate mundi totius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p16">
|
|
|
1921 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because
|
|
|
1922 the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
|
|
|
1923 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="30425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30425] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
1924 dicendum quod, etsi mundus semper fuisset, non tamen parificaretur
|
|
|
1925 Deo in aeternitate, ut dicit Boetius, in fine de Consolat., quia
|
|
|
1926 esse divinum est esse totum simul, absque successione; non autem
|
|
|
1927 sic est de mundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p17">
|
|
|
1928 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there
|
|
|
1929 is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there
|
|
|
1930 is an infinite number of mean terms.
|
|
|
1931 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="30426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30426] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
|
|
|
1932 quod transitus semper intelligitur a termino in terminum.
|
|
|
1933 Quaecumque autem praeterita dies signetur, ab illa usque ad istam
|
|
|
1934 sunt finiti dies, qui pertransiri poterunt. Obiectio autem procedit
|
|
|
1935 ac si, positis extremis, sint media infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p18">
|
|
|
1936 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes
|
|
|
1937 that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and
|
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1938 so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance,
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|
1939 if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
|
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1940 cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after
|
|
|
1941 the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise
|
|
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1942 it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as
|
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|
1943 the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a particular
|
|
|
1944 generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if
|
|
|
1945 the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
|
|
|
1946 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 7"><a name="30427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30427] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum
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|
1947 dicendum quod in causis efficientibus impossibile est procedere in
|
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|
1948 infinitum per se; ut puta si causae quae per se requiruntur ad
|
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|
1949 aliquem effectum, multiplicarentur in infinitum; sicut si lapis
|
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|
1950 moveretur a baculo, et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed per
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|
1951 accidens in infinitum procedere in causis agentibus non reputatur
|
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|
1952 impossibile; ut puta si omnes causae quae in infinitum
|
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1953 multiplicantur, non teneant ordinem nisi unius causae, sed earum
|
|
|
1954 multiplicatio sit per accidens; sicut artifex agit multis martellis
|
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|
1955 per accidens, quia unus post unum frangitur. Accidit ergo huic
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1956 martello, quod agat post actionem alterius martelli. Et similiter
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1957 accidit huic homini, inquantum generat, quod sit generatus ab alio,
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1958 generat enim inquantum homo, et non inquantum est filius alterius
|
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|
1959 hominis; omnes enim homines generantes habent gradum unum in causis
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1960 efficientibus, scilicet gradum particularis generantis. Unde non
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1961 est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum. Esset
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1962 autem impossibile, si generatio huius hominis dependeret ab hoc
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1963 homine, et a corpore elementari, et a sole, et sic in
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1964 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19">
|
|
|
1965 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to
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1966 be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity.
|
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1967 But this was disproved above (
|
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|
1968 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A4" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[4]</a>). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as
|
|
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1969 Augustine says
|
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|
1970 [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls---viz.
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1971 that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters
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1972 will be given later (
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1973 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.2" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>;
|
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|
1974 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A6" id="FP_Q46_A2-p19.3" shape="rect">Q[118], A[6]</a>). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or
|
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|
1975 least some creature, as an
|
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1976 angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
|
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|
1977 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 2 ad 8"><a name="30428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30428] Iª q. 46 a. 2 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum
|
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|
1978 dicendum quod hanc rationem ponentes aeternitatem mundi
|
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|
1979 multipliciter effugiunt quidam enim non reputant impossibile esse
|
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|
1980 infinitas animas actu; ut patet in metaphysica Algazelis, dicentis
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1981 hoc esse infinitum per accidens. Sed hoc improbatum est superius.
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1982 Quidam vero dicunt animam corrumpi cum corpore. Quidam vero quod ex
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1983 omnibus animabus remanet una tantum. Alii vero, ut Augustinus
|
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1984 dicit, posuerunt propter hoc circuitum animarum; ut scilicet animae
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1985 separatae a corporibus, post determinata temporum curricula, iterum
|
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1986 redirent ad corpora. De quibus omnibus in sequentibus est agendum.
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1987 Considerandum tamen quod haec ratio particularis est. Unde posset
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1988 dicere aliquis quod mundus fuit aeternus, vel saltem aliqua
|
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1989 creatura, ut Angelus; non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus
|
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1990 universaliter, an aliqua creatura fuerit ab aeterno.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q46_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q46_A3-p0.1">Q. 46. A. 3. Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p2">
|
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1991 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part
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1992 of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and
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1993 time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning
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1994 of time.
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1995 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="30429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30429] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
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1996 proceditur. Videtur quod creatio rerum non fuit in principio
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1997 temporis. Quod enim non est in tempore, non est in aliquo temporis.
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1998 Sed creatio rerum non fuit in tempore, per creationem enim rerum
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1999 substantia in esse producta est; tempus autem non mensurat
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2000 substantiam rerum, et praecipue incorporalium. Ergo creatio non
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2001 fuit in principio temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p3">
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2002 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies
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2003 a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore,
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2004 since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time.
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2005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="30430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30430] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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2006 philosophus probat quod omne quod fit, fiebat, et sic omne fieri
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2007 habet prius et posterius. In principio autem temporis, cum sit
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2008 indivisibile, non est prius et posterius. Ergo, cum creari sit
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2009 quoddam fieri, videtur quod res non sint creatae in principio
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2010 temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p4">
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2011 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the
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2012 beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.
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2013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="30431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30431] Iª q. 46 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum
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2014 etiam tempus creatum est. Sed non potest creari in principio
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2015 temporis, cum tempus sit divisibile, principium autem temporis
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2016 indivisibile. Non ergo creatio rerum fuit in principio
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2017 temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5">
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2018 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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2019 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
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2020 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 s. c."><a name="30432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30432] Iª q. 46 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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2021 quod Gen. I dicitur, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
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2022 terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6">
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2023 <b>I answer that,</b> The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude
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2024 three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the
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2025 beginning" are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and
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2026 the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son."
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2027 For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated
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2028 to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (
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2029 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning---that is, in the
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2030 Son; according to the word of the Apostle (
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2031 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q46_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv">Col. 1:16</a>), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But others said that corporeal
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2032 things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e.
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2033 before all things---"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean
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2034 heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.
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2035 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 co."><a name="30433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30433] Iª q. 46 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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2036 quod illud verbum Genes. I, <i>in principio creavit Deus caelum et
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2037 terram</i>, tripliciter exponitur, ad excludendum tres errores.
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2038 Quidam enim posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, et tempus non habere
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2039 principium. Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio,
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2040 scilicet temporis. Quidam vero posuerunt duo esse creationis
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2041 principia, unum bonorum, aliud malorum. Et ad hoc excludendum,
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2042 exponitur, in principio, idest in filio. Sicut enim principium
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2043 effectivum appropriatur patri, propter potentiam, ita principium
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2044 exemplare appropriatur filio, propter sapientiam, ut sicut dicitur,
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2045 omnia in sapientia fecisti, ita intelligatur Deum omnia fecisse in
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2046 principio, idest in filio; secundum illud apostoli ad Coloss. I, in
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2047 ipso, scilicet filio, condita sunt universa. Alii vero dixerunt
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2048 corporalia esse creata a Deo mediantibus creaturis spiritualibus.
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2049 Et ad hoc excludendum, exponitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum
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2050 et terram, idest ante omnia. Quatuor enim ponuntur simul creata,
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2051 scilicet caelum Empyreum, materia corporalis (quae nomine terrae
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2052 intelligitur), tempus, et natura angelica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p7">
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2053 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because
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2054 together with time heaven and earth were created.
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2055 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="30434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30434] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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2056 dicendum quod non dicuntur in principio temporis res esse creatae,
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2057 quasi principium temporis sit creationis mensura sed quia simul cum
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2058 tempore caelum et terra creata sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p8">
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2059 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since
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2060 in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in
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2061 the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement
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2062 or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the
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2063 term of movement, as was said above (
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2064 <a href="#FP_Q45_A2" id="FP_Q46_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[45], AA[2]</a>,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before.
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2065 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="30435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30435] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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2066 dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi intelligitur de fieri quod
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2067 est per motum, vel quod est terminus motus. Quia cum in quolibet
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2068 motu sit accipere prius et posterius, ante quodcumque signum in
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2069 motu signato, dum scilicet aliquid est in moveri et fieri, est
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2070 accipere prius, et etiam aliquid post ipsum, quia quod est in
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2071 principio motus, vel in termino, non est in moveri. Creatio autem
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2072 neque est motus neque terminus motus, ut supra dictum est. Unde sic
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2073 aliquid creatur, quod non prius creabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q46_A3-p9">
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2074 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according
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2075 to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins.
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2076 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 46 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="30436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[30436] Iª q. 46 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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2077 dicendum quod nihil fit nisi secundum quod est. Nihil autem est
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2078 temporis nisi nunc. Unde non potest fieri nisi secundum aliquod
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2079 nunc, non quia in ipso primo nunc sit tempus, sed quia ab eo
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2080 incipit tempus.</p></div></div></div></div>
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2081
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2082
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2083 `
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2084 </div>
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2085 </body>
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2086 </html> |
