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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.iv" class="div2">
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2 <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A4.html"></a>
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3 <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a>
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4 <h2 id="FS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)</h2>
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5 <div id="FS_Q49" class="div3">
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6 <a href="summa.FS.iv.html"></a>
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7 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a>
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8 <h3 id="FS_Q49-p0.1">OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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9 <p id="FS_Q49-p1"></p>
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10 <p id="FS_Q49-p2"> After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly
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11 of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated
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12 of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues
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13 and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts.
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14 </p>
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15 <p id="FS_Q49-p3"> Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third,
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16 the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another.
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17 </p>
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18 <p id="FS_Q49-p4"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
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19 <p id="FS_Q49-p5"> (1) Whether habit is a quality?</p>
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20 <p id="FS_Q49-p6"> (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?</p>
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21 <p id="FS_Q49-p7"> (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?</p>
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22 <p id="FS_Q49-p8"> (4) Of the necessity of habit.</p>
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23 <div id="FS_Q49_A1" class="div4">
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24 <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a>
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25 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a>
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26 <h4 id="FS_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether habit is a quality?</h4>
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27 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p1"></p>
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28 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p2">
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29 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the
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30 verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as
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31 "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
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32 </p>
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33 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p3">
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34 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi).
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35 But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality.
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36 </p>
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37 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p4">
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38 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the
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39 order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore
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40 habit is not a quality.
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41 </p>
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42 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p5">
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43 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change."
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44 </p>
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45 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p6">
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46 <b>I answer that,</b> This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,
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47 inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation
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48 [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
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49 </p>
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50 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p7"> Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various
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51 predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the
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52 various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there
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53 seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that
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54 which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which
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55 there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there
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56 are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion:
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57 thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says
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58 (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had";
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59 as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which
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60 are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit
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61 between clothing and the man who is clothed."
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62 </p>
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63 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p8"> But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit
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64 is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text.
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65 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself
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66 or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say
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67 that habit is a quality.
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68 </p>
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69 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p9">
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70 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
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71 </p>
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72 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p10">
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73 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had:
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74 and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
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75 </p>
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76 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p11">
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77 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher
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78 goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying
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79 this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when
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80 he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is
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81 the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation
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82 and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes
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83 perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
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84 </p>
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85 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p12"></p>
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86 <p id="FS_Q49_A1-p13"></p>
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87 <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a>
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88 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a>
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89 </div>
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90 <div id="FS_Q49_A2" class="div4">
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91 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a>
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92 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a>
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93 <h4 id="FS_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?</h4>
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94 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p1"></p>
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95 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p2">
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96 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said
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97 <a id="FS_Q49_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this
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98 happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner,
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99 in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct
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100 species of quality.
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101 </p>
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102 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p3">
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103 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits,
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104 just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality.
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105 </p>
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106 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p4">
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107 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion.
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108 Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus,"
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109 as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not
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110 to be a distinct species of quality.
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111 </p>
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112 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p5">
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113 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition."
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114 </p>
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115 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p6">
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116 <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality.
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117 Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that
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118 some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious,
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119 being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are
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120 adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities,
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121 some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality:
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122 while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted,
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123 we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is
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124 the shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes,
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125 and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious
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126 but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the
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127 more natural is always first.
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128 </p>
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129 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p7"> Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly
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130 speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure
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131 determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance
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132 with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called
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133 quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined
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134 to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher
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135 (Metaph. v, text. 19).
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136 </p>
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137 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p8"> Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject,
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138 or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to
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139 quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species
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140 of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of
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141 good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or
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142 slowly transitory.
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143 </p>
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144 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p9"> But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species
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145 of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory
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146 or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions
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147 have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.
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148 </p>
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149 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p10"> On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species
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150 of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the
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151 soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed
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152 in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause
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153 why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness,
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154 whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph.
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155 v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by
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156 "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature,
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157 it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration
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158 in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.
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159 </p>
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160 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p11">
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161 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality
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162 except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must
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163 consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said
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164 to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a
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165 thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as
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166 they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and
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167 color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability
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168 to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species
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169 of
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170 quality.
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171 </p>
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112
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172 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary
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173 on the Predicaments.
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174 </p>
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175 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p13">
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176 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This difference, "difficult to change," does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition.
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177 Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition
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178 of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so
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179 called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect
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180 within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so
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181 as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition
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182 becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern
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183 genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily
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184 lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason
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185 of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this
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186 sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for
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187 in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason
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188 of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while
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189 the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have
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190 a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that
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191 he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition"
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192 does not.
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193 </p>
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194 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p14"> Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong
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195 to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless
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196 designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take
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197 accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are
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198 designated.
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199 </p>
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200 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p15"></p>
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201 <p id="FS_Q49_A2-p16"></p>
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202 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a>
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203 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a>
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204 </div>
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205 <div id="FS_Q49_A3" class="div4">
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206 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a>
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207 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a>
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208 <h4 id="FS_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether habit implies order to an act?</h4>
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209 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p1"></p>
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210 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p2">
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211 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher
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212 says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise
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213 than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act.
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214 </p>
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215 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p3">
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216 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put
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217 in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially.
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218 Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is
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219 posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of
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220 quality.
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221 </p>
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222 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p4">
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223 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore
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224 it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act.
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225 </p>
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226 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p5">
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227 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says
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228 (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will."
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229 </p>
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230 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p6">
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231 <b>I answer that,</b> To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which
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232 the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential
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233 to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature,
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234 which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an
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235 operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not
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236 only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive
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237 to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that
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238 which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something
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239 else, that is to the end.
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240 </p>
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241 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p7"> But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation
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242 to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the
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243 nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally
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244 implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a
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245 principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act.
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246 </p>
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247 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p8">
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248 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in
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249 a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is
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250 explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.
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251 </p>
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252 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p9">
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253 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which
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254 power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.
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255 </p>
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256 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p10">
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257 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature
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258 is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1),
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259 that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies
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260 to other habits.
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261 </p>
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262 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p11"></p>
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263 <p id="FS_Q49_A3-p12"></p>
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264 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html"></a>
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265 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a>
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266 </div>
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267 <div id="FS_Q49_A4" class="div4">
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268 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a>
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269 <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a>
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270 <h4 id="FS_Q49_A4-p0.1">Whether habits are necessary?</h4>
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271 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p1"></p>
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272 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p2">
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273 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated
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274 above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being.
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275 Therefore there is no necessity for habits.
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276 </p>
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277 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p3">
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278 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers,
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279 without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits.
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280 </p>
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281 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p4">
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282 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit.
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283 Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.
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284 </p>
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285 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p5">
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286 <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the
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287 nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits.
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288 </p>
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289 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p6">
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290 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
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291 <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition
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292 a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary.
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293 The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should
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294 be related to it as
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295 potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance
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296 is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case
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297 in God.
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298 </p>
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299 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p7"> The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination
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300 in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but
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301 in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due
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302 relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is
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303 not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the
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304 <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A2.html">FP, Q[56], A[2]</a>, there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the
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305 heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.
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306 </p>
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307 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p8"> The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things
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308 should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation.
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309 Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called
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310 dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as
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311 health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability.
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312 For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order
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313 of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 3).
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314 Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their
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315 relative
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316 adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.
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317 </p>
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318 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p9">
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319 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition.
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320 But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is
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321 limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form
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322 be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be
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323 disposed to its operations by means of habits.
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324 </p>
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325 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p10">
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326 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not
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327 a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do
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328 not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation.
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329 </p>
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330 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p11">
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331 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (
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332 <a id="FS_Q49_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html">Q[54], A[3]</a>): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined
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333 to good.
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334 </p>
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335 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p12"></p>
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336 <p id="FS_Q49_A4-p13"></p>
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337 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html"></a>
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338 <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a>
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339 </div>
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340 <a href="summa.FS.iv.html"></a>
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341 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html"></a>
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342 </div>
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343 <div id="FS_Q50" class="div3">
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344 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a>
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345 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a>
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346 <h3 id="FS_Q50-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
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347 <p id="FS_Q50-p1"></p>
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348 <p id="FS_Q50-p2"> We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
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349 <p id="FS_Q50-p3"> (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?</p>
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350 <p id="FS_Q50-p4"> (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</p>
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351 <p id="FS_Q50-p5"> (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?</p>
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352 <p id="FS_Q50-p6"> (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?</p>
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353 <p id="FS_Q50-p7"> (5) Whether there is a habit in the will?</p>
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354 <p id="FS_Q50-p8"> (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?</p>
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355 <div id="FS_Q50_A1" class="div4">
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356 <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a>
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357 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a>
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358 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A1-p0.1">Whether there is a habit in the body?</h4>
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359 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p1"></p>
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360 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p2">
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361 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby
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362 we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit
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363 in the body.
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364 </p>
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365 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p3">
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366 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition
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367 can be a habit.
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368 </p>
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369 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p4">
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370 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is
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371 divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.
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372 </p>
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373 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p5">
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374 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called
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375 habits.
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376 </p>
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377 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p6">
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378 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
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379 <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], AA[2]</a> seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore
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380 in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation
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381 of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those
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382 operations which proceed from
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383 its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we
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384 have already said (
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385 <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations
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386 which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits
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387 are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits
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388 are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can
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389 be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations
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390 of the soul.
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391 </p>
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392 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is
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393 related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions.
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394 Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.
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395 </p>
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396 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p8"> On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or
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397 dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone.
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398 And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the
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399 first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy
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400 or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But
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401 this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples,
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402 as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.
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403 </p>
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404 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p9">
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405 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from
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406 nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will.
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407 </p>
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408 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p10">
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409 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they
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410 may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot
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411 be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply
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412 difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And
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413 therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read
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414 in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.
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415 </p>
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416 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p11">
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417 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species,
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418 in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called
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419 passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then
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420 passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary
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421 disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas
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422 Aristotle puts heat in the third.
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423 </p>
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424 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p12"> Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit,
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425 differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated,
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426 and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent.
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427 But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and
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428 if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would
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429 be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves
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430 of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse
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431 participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore
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432 we must say otherwise that, as was explained above (
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433 <a id="FS_Q50_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion
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434 of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture
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435 and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions,
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436 primarily and of
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437 themselves.
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438 </p>
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439 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p13"></p>
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440 <p id="FS_Q50_A1-p14"></p>
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441 <a href="summa.FS_Q50.html"></a>
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442 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a>
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443 </div>
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444 <div id="FS_Q50_A2" class="div4">
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445 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a>
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446 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a>
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447 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A2-p0.1">Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</h4>
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448 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p1"></p>
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449 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p2">
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450 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions
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451 and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (
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452 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul
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453 is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in
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454 respect of its powers.
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455 </p>
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456 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p3">
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457 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of
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458 accident, as we have said in the
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459 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A1.html">FP, Q[77], A[1]</a>, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.
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460 </p>
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461 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p4">
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462 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it
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463 is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.
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464 </p>
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465 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p5">
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466 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.
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467 </p>
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468 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p6">
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469 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
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470 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation
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471 to nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the
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472 human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation
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473 to the soul, than in the
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474 soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according
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475 to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in
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476 the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (
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477 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>).
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478 </p>
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479 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in
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480 so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we
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481 have said above (
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482 <a id="FS_Q50_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the
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483 soul in respect of its powers.
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484 </p>
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485 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p8">
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486 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a
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487 form and nature to which someone is disposed.
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488 </p>
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489 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p9">
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490 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject,
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491 according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident
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492 is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit.
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493 </p>
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494 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p10">
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495 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation
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496 to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does
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497 not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence
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498 of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes
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499 precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation
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500 and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
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501 </p>
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502 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p11"></p>
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503 <p id="FS_Q50_A2-p12"></p>
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504 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a>
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505 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a>
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506 </div>
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507 <div id="FS_Q50_A3" class="div4">
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508 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a>
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509 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a>
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510 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A3-p0.1">Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?</h4>
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511 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p1"></p>
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512 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p2">
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513 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational
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514 part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to
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515 put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part.
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516 </p>
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517 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p3">
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518 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is
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519 no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (
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520 <a id="FS_Q50_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html">Q[49], A[3]</a>). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.
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521 </p>
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522 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p4">
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523 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it
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524 virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals,
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525 which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part.
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526 </p>
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527 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p5">
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528 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part."
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529 </p>
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530 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p6">
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531 <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according
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532 as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as
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533 nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can
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534 be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.
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535 </p>
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536 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p7">
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537 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits
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538 in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them:
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539 for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
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540 </p>
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541 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p8">
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542 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals
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543 act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain
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544 dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom
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545 to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can
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546 admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts,
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547 deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we
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548 say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of
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549 using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no
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550 habits in them.
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551 </p>
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552 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p9">
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553 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57:
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|
554 but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is
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555 more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since
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556 in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at
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557 the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby
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558 man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom
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559 conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.
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560 </p>
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|
561 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p10"> On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are
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562 ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are
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563 no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.
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|
564 </p>
|
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565 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p11"></p>
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566 <p id="FS_Q50_A3-p12"></p>
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567 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A2.html"></a>
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568 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a>
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|
569 </div>
|
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|
570 <div id="FS_Q50_A4" class="div4">
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571 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a>
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572 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a>
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573 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A4-p0.1">Whether there is any habit in the intellect?</h4>
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574 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p1"></p>
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575 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p2">
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576 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above
|
|
|
577 <a id="FS_Q50_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But
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578 the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit.
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579 </p>
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580 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p3">
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581 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter,
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|
582 is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at
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583 the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form.
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|
584 Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the
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585 same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which
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586 is composed of soul and body.
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|
587 </p>
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588 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p4">
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589 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text.
|
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|
590 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore
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591 also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of
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592 knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act
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593 of some part of the body.
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|
594 </p>
|
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|
595 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p5">
|
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|
596 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the
|
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597 intellective part of the soul.
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|
598 </p>
|
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|
599 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p6">
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|
600 <b>I answer that,</b> concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [*
|
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|
601 <a id="FS_Q50_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior
|
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602 sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly
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603 in that, which, being only one, would be common
|
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604 to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ
|
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|
605 from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers,
|
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|
606 which differ in various men.
|
|
|
607 </p>
|
|
|
608 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p7"> Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers
|
|
|
609 are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues,
|
|
|
610 which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive
|
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611 powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when
|
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|
612 the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars
|
|
|
613 by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the
|
|
|
614 intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way
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|
|
615 as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by
|
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|
616 which the
|
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|
617 intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary
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618 to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand
|
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619 and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect
|
|
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620 itself.
|
|
|
621 </p>
|
|
|
622 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p8">
|
|
|
623 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain
|
|
|
624 extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul
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|
625 only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate,
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|
626 as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a
|
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627 disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to
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628 be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object.
|
|
|
629 </p>
|
|
|
630 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p9"> Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in
|
|
|
631 De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text.
|
|
|
632 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of
|
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633 the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the
|
|
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634 subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the
|
|
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635 "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.
|
|
|
636 </p>
|
|
|
637 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p10">
|
|
|
638 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible"
|
|
|
639 intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and
|
|
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640 perfect act.
|
|
|
641 </p>
|
|
|
642 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p11">
|
|
|
643 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the
|
|
|
644 good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand.
|
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645 And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect.
|
|
|
646 </p>
|
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647 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p12"></p>
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648 <p id="FS_Q50_A4-p13"></p>
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649 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html"></a>
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650 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a>
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|
|
651 </div>
|
|
|
652 <div id="FS_Q50_A5" class="div4">
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653 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a>
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654 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a>
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|
|
655 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A5-p0.1">Whether any habit is in the will?</h4>
|
|
|
656 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p1"></p>
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|
|
657 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p2">
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|
658 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species,
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659 by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is
|
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660 not the subject of habit.
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|
661 </p>
|
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|
662 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p3">
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|
663 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an
|
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664 active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above (
|
|
|
665 <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no habit in the will.
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|
|
666 </p>
|
|
|
667 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p4">
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|
668 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing.
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669 But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in
|
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670 the will.
|
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|
671 </p>
|
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672 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p5">
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673 <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v,
|
|
|
674 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
|
|
|
675 </p>
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676 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p6">
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677 <b>I answer that,</b> Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will
|
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678 is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit
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679 whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related
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680 to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above
|
|
|
681
|
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682 <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
|
|
|
683 </p>
|
|
|
684 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p7">
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685 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive
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686 power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing
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687 but a certain inclination, as we have said above (
|
|
|
688 <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>;
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689 <a id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html"> Q[22], A[2]</a>). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the
|
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690 nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life,
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691 that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has
|
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692 a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there
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693 be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
|
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|
694 </p>
|
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695 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p8">
|
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696 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved
|
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|
697 (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs
|
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698 to that which is somehow in potentiality.
|
|
|
699 </p>
|
|
|
700 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p9">
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701 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways,
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702 the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more
|
|
|
703 promptly.
|
|
|
704 </p>
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705 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p10"></p>
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706 <p id="FS_Q50_A5-p11"></p>
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707 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html"></a>
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708 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a>
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709 </div>
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710 <div id="FS_Q50_A6" class="div4">
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711 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a>
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712 <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a>
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713 <h4 id="FS_Q50_A6-p0.1">Whether there are habits in the angels?</h4>
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|
|
714 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p1"></p>
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|
715 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p2">
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|
716 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It
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717 is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels)
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718 after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign
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719 to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
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|
|
720 </p>
|
|
|
721 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p3">
|
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722 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other
|
|
|
723 things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another
|
|
|
724 [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means
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725 of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds:
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|
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726 "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified
|
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727 of itself."
|
|
|
728 </p>
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729 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p4">
|
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730 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that
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|
|
731 which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
|
|
|
732 </p>
|
|
|
733 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p5">
|
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|
734 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring
|
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|
735 of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits."
|
|
|
736 </p>
|
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|
737 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p6">
|
|
|
738 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence
|
|
|
739 Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential,
|
|
|
740 through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which
|
|
|
741 is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For
|
|
|
742 everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
|
|
|
743 </p>
|
|
|
744 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p7"> Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said (
|
|
|
745 <a id="FS_Q50_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are
|
|
|
746 immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and
|
|
|
747 any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still
|
|
|
748 some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them,
|
|
|
749 so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance
|
|
|
750 are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual
|
|
|
751 substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in
|
|
|
752 itself."
|
|
|
753 </p>
|
|
|
754 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p8"> However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the
|
|
|
755 lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect
|
|
|
756 of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is
|
|
|
757 not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for
|
|
|
758 this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has.
|
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|
759 And therefore, as we said in the
|
|
|
760 <a id="FS_Q50_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A1.html">FP, Q[55], A[1]</a>, so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard
|
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|
761 to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself,
|
|
|
762 and other things according to the mode of its
|
|
|
763 substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
|
|
|
764 </p>
|
|
|
765 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p9"> But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order
|
|
|
766 to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard
|
|
|
767 to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them
|
|
|
768 they are made like to God.
|
|
|
769 </p>
|
|
|
770 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p10"> But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.</p>
|
|
|
771 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p11">
|
|
|
772 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents.
|
|
|
773 </p>
|
|
|
774 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p12">
|
|
|
775 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves,
|
|
|
776 as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far
|
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|
777 do they need to have habits.
|
|
|
778 </p>
|
|
|
779 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p13">
|
|
|
780 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several
|
|
|
781 species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.
|
|
|
782 </p>
|
|
|
783 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p14"></p>
|
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|
784 <p id="FS_Q50_A6-p15"></p>
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|
785 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html"></a>
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786 <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a>
|
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|
787 </div>
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788 <a href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html"></a>
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789 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"></a>
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790 </div>
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791 <div id="FS_Q51" class="div3">
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792 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a>
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793 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a>
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|
794 <h3 id="FS_Q51-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
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|
795 <p id="FS_Q51-p1"></p>
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|
796 <p id="FS_Q51-p2"> We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as
|
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|
797 to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
|
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|
798 </p>
|
|
|
799 <p id="FS_Q51-p3"> (1) Whether any habit is from nature?</p>
|
|
|
800 <p id="FS_Q51-p4"> (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?</p>
|
|
|
801 <p id="FS_Q51-p5"> (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?</p>
|
|
|
802 <p id="FS_Q51-p6"> (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</p>
|
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|
803 <div id="FS_Q51_A1" class="div4">
|
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804 <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a>
|
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|
805 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a>
|
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|
806 <h4 id="FS_Q51_A1-p0.1">Whether any habit is from nature?</h4>
|
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|
807 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
808 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p2">
|
|
|
809 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will.
|
|
|
810 But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
|
|
|
811 </p>
|
|
|
812 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p3">
|
|
|
813 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the
|
|
|
814 habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.
|
|
|
815 </p>
|
|
|
816 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p4">
|
|
|
817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (
|
|
|
818 <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is
|
|
|
819 clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
|
|
|
820 </p>
|
|
|
821 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p5">
|
|
|
822 <b>On the contrary,</b> In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore
|
|
|
823 also first principles are said to be known naturally.
|
|
|
824 </p>
|
|
|
825 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p6">
|
|
|
826 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural
|
|
|
827 to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural
|
|
|
828 to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again,
|
|
|
829 in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first,
|
|
|
830 because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle.
|
|
|
831 For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine,
|
|
|
832 health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
|
|
|
833 </p>
|
|
|
834 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p7"> Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either
|
|
|
835 of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without
|
|
|
836 it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude,
|
|
|
837 it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the
|
|
|
838 individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic
|
|
|
839 principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.
|
|
|
840 </p>
|
|
|
841 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p8"> But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]),
|
|
|
842 may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific
|
|
|
843 nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect
|
|
|
844 of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it
|
|
|
845 happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen,
|
|
|
846 since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said
|
|
|
847 in the
|
|
|
848 <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">FP, Q[55], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
849 <a id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">FP, Q[84], A[3]</a>.
|
|
|
850 </p>
|
|
|
851 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p9"> There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic
|
|
|
852 principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive
|
|
|
853 powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual
|
|
|
854 nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the
|
|
|
855 understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that
|
|
|
856 man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part:
|
|
|
857 and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know except
|
|
|
858 through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end
|
|
|
859 of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.
|
|
|
860 </p>
|
|
|
861 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p10"> But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from
|
|
|
862 the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for
|
|
|
863 the operation of the intellect.
|
|
|
864 </p>
|
|
|
865 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p11"> In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance
|
|
|
866 of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries
|
|
|
867 of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit,
|
|
|
868 does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers.
|
|
|
869 </p>
|
|
|
870 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p12"> But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings.
|
|
|
871 For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like.
|
|
|
872 </p>
|
|
|
873 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p13">
|
|
|
874 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.
|
|
|
875 </p>
|
|
|
876 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p14">
|
|
|
877 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance,
|
|
|
878 with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would
|
|
|
879 have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the
|
|
|
880 actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel
|
|
|
881 knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels'
|
|
|
882 intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the
|
|
|
883 Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so
|
|
|
884 it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
|
|
|
885 </p>
|
|
|
886 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p15">
|
|
|
887 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not,
|
|
|
888 as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural.
|
|
|
889 </p>
|
|
|
890 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p16"></p>
|
|
|
891 <p id="FS_Q51_A1-p17"></p>
|
|
|
892 <a href="summa.FS_Q51.html"></a>
|
|
|
893 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
894 </div>
|
|
|
895 <div id="FS_Q51_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
896 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
897 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
898 <h4 id="FS_Q51_A2-p0.1">Whether any habit is caused by acts?</h4>
|
|
|
899 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
900 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p2">
|
|
|
901 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (
|
|
|
902 <a id="FS_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A1.html">Q[49], A[1]</a>). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts,
|
|
|
903 does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts.
|
|
|
904 </p>
|
|
|
905 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p3">
|
|
|
906 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or
|
|
|
907 cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If
|
|
|
908 therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and
|
|
|
909 passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8.
|
|
|
910 </p>
|
|
|
911 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p4">
|
|
|
912 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as
|
|
|
913 is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes
|
|
|
914 the habit.
|
|
|
915 </p>
|
|
|
916 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p5">
|
|
|
917 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.
|
|
|
918 </p>
|
|
|
919 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p6">
|
|
|
920 <b>I answer that,</b> In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle
|
|
|
921 of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed
|
|
|
922 or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the
|
|
|
923 passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the
|
|
|
924 appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and
|
|
|
925 further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident
|
|
|
926 proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle,
|
|
|
927 but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and
|
|
|
928 moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed
|
|
|
929 in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in
|
|
|
930 the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect,
|
|
|
931 according as it is moved by first propositions.
|
|
|
932 </p>
|
|
|
933 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p7">
|
|
|
934 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something
|
|
|
935 from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
|
|
|
936 </p>
|
|
|
937 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p8">
|
|
|
938 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself
|
|
|
939 as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.
|
|
|
940 </p>
|
|
|
941 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p9">
|
|
|
942 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle
|
|
|
943 than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced
|
|
|
944 in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than
|
|
|
945 the science of conclusions.
|
|
|
946 </p>
|
|
|
947 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
948 <p id="FS_Q51_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
949 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
950 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
951 </div>
|
|
|
952 <div id="FS_Q51_A3" class="div4">
|
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|
953 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
954 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
955 <h4 id="FS_Q51_A3-p0.1">Whether a habit can be caused by one act?</h4>
|
|
|
956 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
957 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p2">
|
|
|
958 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit
|
|
|
959 of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.
|
|
|
960 </p>
|
|
|
961 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p3">
|
|
|
962 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by
|
|
|
963 multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit.
|
|
|
964 </p>
|
|
|
965 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p4">
|
|
|
966 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act
|
|
|
967 can cause a habit.
|
|
|
968 </p>
|
|
|
969 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p5">
|
|
|
970 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short
|
|
|
971 time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13).
|
|
|
972 Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.
|
|
|
973 </p>
|
|
|
974 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p6">
|
|
|
975 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already
|
|
|
976 <a id="FS_Q51_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused
|
|
|
977 in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at
|
|
|
978 once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming
|
|
|
979 it entirely, it may impress
|
|
|
980 its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power
|
|
|
981 in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act,
|
|
|
982 what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely
|
|
|
983 overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the
|
|
|
984 habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.
|
|
|
985 </p>
|
|
|
986 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p7"> But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See
|
|
|
987 <a id="FS_Q51_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a> ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular
|
|
|
988 reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is
|
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|
989 possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one
|
|
|
990 act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm
|
|
|
991 assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many
|
|
|
992 acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act
|
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|
993 of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same
|
|
|
994 acts
|
|
|
995 need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et
|
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|
996 Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle
|
|
|
997 is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.
|
|
|
998 </p>
|
|
|
999 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p8"> Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.</p>
|
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|
1000 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p9"></p>
|
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|
1001 <p id="FS_Q51_A3-p10"></p>
|
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|
1002 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html"></a>
|
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|
1003 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1004 </div>
|
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|
1005 <div id="FS_Q51_A4" class="div4">
|
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1006 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a>
|
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|
1007 <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a>
|
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|
1008 <h4 id="FS_Q51_A4-p0.1">Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</h4>
|
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|
1009 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p1"></p>
|
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|
1010 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p2">
|
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|
1011 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some,
|
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|
1012 He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.
|
|
|
1013 </p>
|
|
|
1014 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1015 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence
|
|
|
1016 to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above
|
|
|
1017
|
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|
1018 <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
|
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|
1019 </p>
|
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|
1020 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1021 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit
|
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|
1022 is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the
|
|
|
1023 other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a
|
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|
1024 habit is not infused into man by God.
|
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|
1025 </p>
|
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|
1026 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1027 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (
|
|
|
1028 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:5</a>): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits
|
|
|
1029 are infused into man by God.
|
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|
1030 </p>
|
|
|
1031 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1032 <b>I answer that,</b> Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons.
|
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|
1033 </p>
|
|
|
1034 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p7"> The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human
|
|
|
1035 nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (
|
|
|
1036 <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">Q[5], A[5]</a>). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those
|
|
|
1037 habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except
|
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|
1038 by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
|
|
|
1039 </p>
|
|
|
1040 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p8"> The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in
|
|
|
1041 the
|
|
|
1042 <a id="FS_Q51_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature
|
|
|
1043 could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can
|
|
|
1044 be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the
|
|
|
1045 science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.
|
|
|
1046 </p>
|
|
|
1047 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p9">
|
|
|
1048 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives
|
|
|
1049 certain things to some, which He does not give to others.
|
|
|
1050 </p>
|
|
|
1051 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p10">
|
|
|
1052 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from
|
|
|
1053 this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.
|
|
|
1054 </p>
|
|
|
1055 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p11">
|
|
|
1056 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies
|
|
|
1057 of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he
|
|
|
1058 had before.
|
|
|
1059 </p>
|
|
|
1060 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p12"></p>
|
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|
1061 <p id="FS_Q51_A4-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1062 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html"></a>
|
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|
1063 <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a>
|
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|
1064 </div>
|
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|
1065 <a href="summa.FS_Q50_A6.html"></a>
|
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1066 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
1067 </div>
|
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|
1068 <div id="FS_Q52" class="div3">
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|
1069 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a>
|
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1070 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
1071 <h3 id="FS_Q52-p0.1">OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
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|
1072 <p id="FS_Q52-p1"></p>
|
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|
1073 <p id="FS_Q52-p2"> We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1074 <p id="FS_Q52-p3"> (1) Whether habits increase?</p>
|
|
|
1075 <p id="FS_Q52-p4"> (2) Whether they increase by addition?</p>
|
|
|
1076 <p id="FS_Q52-p5"> (3) Whether each act increases the habit?</p>
|
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|
1077 <div id="FS_Q52_A1" class="div4">
|
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1078 <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a>
|
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|
1079 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a>
|
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|
1080 <h4 id="FS_Q52_A1-p0.1">Whether habits increase?</h4>
|
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|
1081 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1082 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the
|
|
|
1084 genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.
|
|
|
1085 </p>
|
|
|
1086 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems
|
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|
1088 that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
|
|
|
1089 </p>
|
|
|
1090 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1091 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more
|
|
|
1092 hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits
|
|
|
1093 cannot increase.
|
|
|
1094 </p>
|
|
|
1095 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1096 <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (
|
|
|
1097 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.5" target="asv">Lk. 17:5</a>): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase.
|
|
|
1098 </p>
|
|
|
1099 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1100 <b>I answer that,</b> Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things,
|
|
|
1101 on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal
|
|
|
1102 quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain
|
|
|
1103 quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so
|
|
|
1104 also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things
|
|
|
1105 which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).
|
|
|
1106 </p>
|
|
|
1107 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p7"> Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of
|
|
|
1108 the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself,
|
|
|
1109 thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider
|
|
|
1110 the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
|
|
|
1111 "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form
|
|
|
1112 has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature,
|
|
|
1113 and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
|
|
|
1114 </p>
|
|
|
1115 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p8"> In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as
|
|
|
1116 Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits
|
|
|
1117 themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness,
|
|
|
1118 on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves
|
|
|
1119 were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect
|
|
|
1120 of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes
|
|
|
1121 to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding
|
|
|
1122 opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that
|
|
|
1123 some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible
|
|
|
1124 of more or less, but that material forms are.
|
|
|
1125 </p>
|
|
|
1126 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p9"> In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species,
|
|
|
1127 must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under
|
|
|
1128 the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher
|
|
|
1129 says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
|
|
|
1130 subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself,
|
|
|
1131 or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature,
|
|
|
1132 which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation
|
|
|
1133 to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species
|
|
|
1134 from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless
|
|
|
1135 they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive
|
|
|
1136 their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on
|
|
|
1137 account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to
|
|
|
1138 the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may
|
|
|
1139 be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence
|
|
|
1140 the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
|
|
|
1141 always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health."
|
|
|
1142 </p>
|
|
|
1143 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p10"> Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were
|
|
|
1144 given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a
|
|
|
1145 quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
|
|
|
1146 </p>
|
|
|
1147 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p11"> But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities
|
|
|
1148 and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that
|
|
|
1149 substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is
|
|
|
1150 participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of
|
|
|
1151 substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity,
|
|
|
1152 therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text.
|
|
|
1153 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are
|
|
|
1154 further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect
|
|
|
1155 of their participation by the subject.
|
|
|
1156 </p>
|
|
|
1157 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p12"> Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives
|
|
|
1158 its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that
|
|
|
1159 a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for
|
|
|
1160 this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii,
|
|
|
1161 text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in
|
|
|
1162 respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material
|
|
|
1163 dispositions, "more or less are found in substance."
|
|
|
1164 </p>
|
|
|
1165 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p13"> Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form,
|
|
|
1166 it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as
|
|
|
1167 varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be
|
|
|
1168 said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
|
|
|
1169 three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
|
|
|
1170 </p>
|
|
|
1171 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p14"> This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible
|
|
|
1172 of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles":
|
|
|
1173 to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate
|
|
|
1174 it in its indivisibility.
|
|
|
1175 </p>
|
|
|
1176 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p15"> It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text.
|
|
|
1177 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself:
|
|
|
1178 thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly,
|
|
|
1179 in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more
|
|
|
1180 in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition
|
|
|
1181 do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility.
|
|
|
1182 </p>
|
|
|
1183 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p16"> We shall say further on (
|
|
|
1184 <a id="FS_Q52_A1-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a>) how it is with the virtues.
|
|
|
1185 </p>
|
|
|
1186 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p17">
|
|
|
1187 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the
|
|
|
1188 word "growth," the term of which is something great.
|
|
|
1189 </p>
|
|
|
1190 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p18">
|
|
|
1191 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject
|
|
|
1192 its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore
|
|
|
1193 there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.
|
|
|
1194 </p>
|
|
|
1195 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p19">
|
|
|
1196 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first
|
|
|
1197 species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness.
|
|
|
1198 In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension,
|
|
|
1199 an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
|
|
|
1200 </p>
|
|
|
1201 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p20"></p>
|
|
|
1202 <p id="FS_Q52_A1-p21"></p>
|
|
|
1203 <a href="summa.FS_Q52.html"></a>
|
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|
1204 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1205 </div>
|
|
|
1206 <div id="FS_Q52_A2" class="div4">
|
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|
1207 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1208 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1209 <h4 id="FS_Q52_A2-p0.1">Whether habits increases by addition?</h4>
|
|
|
1210 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1211 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1212 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred
|
|
|
1213 to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener.
|
|
|
1214 i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is
|
|
|
1215 no increase without addition.
|
|
|
1216 </p>
|
|
|
1217 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1218 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
|
|
|
1219 instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition.
|
|
|
1220 </p>
|
|
|
1221 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1222 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be
|
|
|
1223 more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less
|
|
|
1224 white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness.
|
|
|
1225 </p>
|
|
|
1226 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1227 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
|
|
|
1228 that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when
|
|
|
1229 they increase.
|
|
|
1230 </p>
|
|
|
1231 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1232 <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question depends on what we have said above
|
|
|
1233 <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on
|
|
|
1234 the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
|
|
|
1235 of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or
|
|
|
1236 less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning,
|
|
|
1237 as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by
|
|
|
1238 an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though
|
|
|
1239 something were added to the form.
|
|
|
1240 </p>
|
|
|
1241 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p7"> For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in
|
|
|
1242 the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated
|
|
|
1243 <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from
|
|
|
1244 being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be
|
|
|
1245 either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man
|
|
|
1246 who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in
|
|
|
1247 the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we
|
|
|
1248 have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing.
|
|
|
1249 </p>
|
|
|
1250 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p8"> Since, however, as stated above
|
|
|
1251 <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For
|
|
|
1252 movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the
|
|
|
1253 same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e.
|
|
|
1254 in so far as the same movement can be executed more
|
|
|
1255 or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions
|
|
|
1256 of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's
|
|
|
1257 participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions.
|
|
|
1258 </p>
|
|
|
1259 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p9"> As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said
|
|
|
1260 to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this
|
|
|
1261 is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of
|
|
|
1262 the subject partaking of them.
|
|
|
1263 </p>
|
|
|
1264 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p10"> How this question affects virtues we shall state further on (
|
|
|
1265 <a id="FS_Q52_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a> ).
|
|
|
1266 </p>
|
|
|
1267 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p11">
|
|
|
1268 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things.
|
|
|
1269 Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated
|
|
|
1270 in Phys. iv, text. 63.
|
|
|
1271 </p>
|
|
|
1272 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p12">
|
|
|
1273 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject
|
|
|
1274 to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further.
|
|
|
1275 </p>
|
|
|
1276 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p13">
|
|
|
1277 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new
|
|
|
1278 form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already
|
|
|
1279 actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action.
|
|
|
1280 </p>
|
|
|
1281 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p14"></p>
|
|
|
1282 <p id="FS_Q52_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1283 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1284 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1285 </div>
|
|
|
1286 <div id="FS_Q52_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1287 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1288 <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a>
|
|
|
1289 <h4 id="FS_Q52_A3-p0.1">Whether every act increases its habit?</h4>
|
|
|
1290 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1291 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1292 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes
|
|
|
1293 of habits, as stated above (
|
|
|
1294 <a id="FS_Q52_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied.
|
|
|
1295 </p>
|
|
|
1296 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1297 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
|
|
|
1298 (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it.
|
|
|
1299 </p>
|
|
|
1300 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1301 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
|
|
|
1302 </p>
|
|
|
1303 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1304 <b>On the contrary,</b> Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
|
|
|
1305 proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit.
|
|
|
1306 </p>
|
|
|
1307 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1308 <b>I answer that,</b> "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
|
|
|
1309 the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is
|
|
|
1310 unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from
|
|
|
1311 one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
|
|
|
1312 </p>
|
|
|
1313 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p7"> But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (
|
|
|
1314 <a id="FS_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A5.html">Q[50], A[5]</a>); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
|
|
|
1315 an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion
|
|
|
1316 to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase
|
|
|
1317 thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually
|
|
|
1318 increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results
|
|
|
1319 at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the
|
|
|
1320 intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
|
|
|
1321 </p>
|
|
|
1322 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p8"> From this it is clear how to solve the objections.</p>
|
|
|
1323 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p9"></p>
|
|
|
1324 <p id="FS_Q52_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1325 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1326 <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a>
|
|
|
1327 </div>
|
|
|
1328 <a href="summa.FS_Q51_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1329 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1330 </div>
|
|
|
1331 <div id="FS_Q53" class="div3">
|
|
|
1332 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1333 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1334 <h3 id="FS_Q53-p0.1">HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1335 <p id="FS_Q53-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1336 <p id="FS_Q53-p2"> We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1337 <p id="FS_Q53-p3"> (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?</p>
|
|
|
1338 <p id="FS_Q53-p4"> (2) Whether it can be diminished?</p>
|
|
|
1339 <p id="FS_Q53-p5"> (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?</p>
|
|
|
1340 <div id="FS_Q53_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1341 <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a>
|
|
|
1342 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1343 <h4 id="FS_Q53_A1-p0.1">Whether a habit can be corrupted?</h4>
|
|
|
1344 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1345 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1346 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant
|
|
|
1347 to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long
|
|
|
1348 as its subject remains.
|
|
|
1349 </p>
|
|
|
1350 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1351 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness
|
|
|
1352 ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through
|
|
|
1353 corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i,
|
|
|
1354 text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary:
|
|
|
1355 since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise
|
|
|
1356 be lost.
|
|
|
1357 </p>
|
|
|
1358 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1359 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by
|
|
|
1360 a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement
|
|
|
1361 of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since
|
|
|
1362 the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
|
|
|
1363 reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted.
|
|
|
1364 For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher
|
|
|
1365 declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning."
|
|
|
1366 </p>
|
|
|
1367 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1368 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover,
|
|
|
1369 by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
|
|
|
1370 </p>
|
|
|
1371 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1372 <b>I answer that,</b> A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore
|
|
|
1373 a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case
|
|
|
1374 with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted
|
|
|
1375 indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an
|
|
|
1376 incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly
|
|
|
1377 indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above (
|
|
|
1378 <a id="FS_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A3.html">Q[50], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only
|
|
|
1379 on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
|
|
|
1380 </p>
|
|
|
1381 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p7"> We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary,
|
|
|
1382 either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot
|
|
|
1383 be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no contrary;
|
|
|
1384 nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the
|
|
|
1385 "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly
|
|
|
1386 and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by
|
|
|
1387 any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost
|
|
|
1388 by being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of
|
|
|
1389 conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those
|
|
|
1390 very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion
|
|
|
1391 "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is
|
|
|
1392 contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a
|
|
|
1393 true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science."
|
|
|
1394 As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what
|
|
|
1395 we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the
|
|
|
1396 same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to
|
|
|
1397 it
|
|
|
1398 to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever
|
|
|
1399 its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.
|
|
|
1400 </p>
|
|
|
1401 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1402 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature
|
|
|
1403 of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.
|
|
|
1404 </p>
|
|
|
1405 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1406 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason,
|
|
|
1407 as stated above.
|
|
|
1408 </p>
|
|
|
1409 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1410 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove
|
|
|
1411 an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded
|
|
|
1412 by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the
|
|
|
1413 very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted.
|
|
|
1414 Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject
|
|
|
1415 or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does
|
|
|
1416 not.
|
|
|
1417 </p>
|
|
|
1418 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1419 <p id="FS_Q53_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1420 <a href="summa.FS_Q53.html"></a>
|
|
|
1421 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1422 </div>
|
|
|
1423 <div id="FS_Q53_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1424 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1425 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1426 <h4 id="FS_Q53_A2-p0.1">Whether a habit can diminish?</h4>
|
|
|
1427 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1428 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1429 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
|
|
|
1430 either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish.
|
|
|
1431 </p>
|
|
|
1432 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1433 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does
|
|
|
1434 not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals
|
|
|
1435 more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is
|
|
|
1436 accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now
|
|
|
1437 whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text.
|
|
|
1438 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible.
|
|
|
1439 </p>
|
|
|
1440 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1441 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
|
|
|
1442 with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its
|
|
|
1443 inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
|
|
|
1444 </p>
|
|
|
1445 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1446 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore
|
|
|
1447 a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
|
|
|
1448 </p>
|
|
|
1449 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1450 <b>I answer that,</b> Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained (
|
|
|
1451 <a id="FS_Q53_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a>). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as
|
|
|
1452 that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other
|
|
|
1453 hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase.
|
|
|
1454 </p>
|
|
|
1455 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1456 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different
|
|
|
1457 ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through
|
|
|
1458 its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.
|
|
|
1459 </p>
|
|
|
1460 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1461 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that
|
|
|
1462 a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.
|
|
|
1463 </p>
|
|
|
1464 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1465 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take
|
|
|
1466 an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the
|
|
|
1467 subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not
|
|
|
1468 put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but
|
|
|
1469 we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But
|
|
|
1470 if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins
|
|
|
1471 in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining
|
|
|
1472 this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum"
|
|
|
1473 is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence
|
|
|
1474 of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in
|
|
|
1475 certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies
|
|
|
1476 to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish
|
|
|
1477 by a
|
|
|
1478 kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained (
|
|
|
1479 <a id="FS_Q53_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A2.html">Q[52], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
1480 </p>
|
|
|
1481 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1482 <p id="FS_Q53_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1483 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1484 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1485 </div>
|
|
|
1486 <div id="FS_Q53_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1487 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1488 <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a>
|
|
|
1489 <h4 id="FS_Q53_A3-p0.1">Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?</h4>
|
|
|
1490 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1491 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1492 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than
|
|
|
1493 passion-like qualities, as we have explained above (
|
|
|
1494 <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A2.html">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 3;
|
|
|
1495 <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"> Q[50], A[1]</a>). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through
|
|
|
1496 not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot.
|
|
|
1497 Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
|
|
|
1498 </p>
|
|
|
1499 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1500 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
|
|
|
1501 from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from
|
|
|
1502 act.
|
|
|
1503 </p>
|
|
|
1504 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1505 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
|
|
|
1506 time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through
|
|
|
1507 length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
|
|
|
1508 </p>
|
|
|
1509 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1510 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
|
|
|
1511 science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other
|
|
|
1512 habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
|
|
|
1513 </p>
|
|
|
1514 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1515 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
|
|
|
1516 by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It
|
|
|
1517 is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit,
|
|
|
1518 as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened
|
|
|
1519 that habit. For it has been stated
|
|
|
1520 <a id="FS_Q53_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually
|
|
|
1521 undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even
|
|
|
1522 destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident
|
|
|
1523 that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose
|
|
|
1524 the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions
|
|
|
1525 or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination
|
|
|
1526 of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from
|
|
|
1527 act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured
|
|
|
1528 by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition
|
|
|
1529 to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
|
|
|
1530 intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus
|
|
|
1531 the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.
|
|
|
1532 </p>
|
|
|
1533 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1534 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were
|
|
|
1535 to increase.
|
|
|
1536 </p>
|
|
|
1537 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1538 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained
|
|
|
1539 above.
|
|
|
1540 </p>
|
|
|
1541 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1542 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore
|
|
|
1543 in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension.
|
|
|
1544 Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
|
|
|
1545 </p>
|
|
|
1546 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1547 <p id="FS_Q53_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1548 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1549 <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a>
|
|
|
1550 </div>
|
|
|
1551 <a href="summa.FS_Q52_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1552 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1553 </div>
|
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|
1554 <div id="FS_Q54" class="div3">
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1555 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a>
|
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|
1556 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1557 <h3 id="FS_Q54-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1558 <p id="FS_Q54-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1559 <p id="FS_Q54-p2"> We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1560 <p id="FS_Q54-p3"> (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?</p>
|
|
|
1561 <p id="FS_Q54-p4"> (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</p>
|
|
|
1562 <p id="FS_Q54-p5"> (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</p>
|
|
|
1563 <p id="FS_Q54-p6"> (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?</p>
|
|
|
1564 <div id="FS_Q54_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1565 <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a>
|
|
|
1566 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1567 <h4 id="FS_Q54_A1-p0.1">Whether many habits can be in one power?</h4>
|
|
|
1568 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1569 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1570 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the
|
|
|
1571 same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same
|
|
|
1572 thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
|
|
|
1573 one power.
|
|
|
1574 </p>
|
|
|
1575 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1576 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is
|
|
|
1577 the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there
|
|
|
1578 cannot be many habits in one power.
|
|
|
1579 </p>
|
|
|
1580 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1581 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at
|
|
|
1582 the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several
|
|
|
1583 habits cannot be at the same time in one power.
|
|
|
1584 </p>
|
|
|
1585 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1586 <b>On the contrary,</b> The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences.
|
|
|
1587 </p>
|
|
|
1588 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1589 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
1590 <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the
|
|
|
1591 end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since
|
|
|
1592 in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits.
|
|
|
1593 Thus, if we take the humors
|
|
|
1594 as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition
|
|
|
1595 of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is
|
|
|
1596 strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion
|
|
|
1597 to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject.
|
|
|
1598 </p>
|
|
|
1599 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again,
|
|
|
1600 there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated
|
|
|
1601 above (
|
|
|
1602 <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (
|
|
|
1603 <a id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act
|
|
|
1604 of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive
|
|
|
1605 power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move
|
|
|
1606 one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits
|
|
|
1607 are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several
|
|
|
1608 habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power.
|
|
|
1609 </p>
|
|
|
1610 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1611 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as
|
|
|
1612 stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity
|
|
|
1613 of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ
|
|
|
1614 generically belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of
|
|
|
1615 objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in
|
|
|
1616 species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that
|
|
|
1617 different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one
|
|
|
1618 genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and
|
|
|
1619 powers.
|
|
|
1620 </p>
|
|
|
1621 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1622 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different
|
|
|
1623 acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power.
|
|
|
1624 </p>
|
|
|
1625 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1626 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power,
|
|
|
1627 but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at
|
|
|
1628 the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes,
|
|
|
1629 save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided
|
|
|
1630 figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things
|
|
|
1631 at the same time "habitually."
|
|
|
1632 </p>
|
|
|
1633 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1634 <p id="FS_Q54_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1635 <a href="summa.FS_Q54.html"></a>
|
|
|
1636 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1637 </div>
|
|
|
1638 <div id="FS_Q54_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1639 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1640 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1641 <h4 id="FS_Q54_A2-p0.1">Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</h4>
|
|
|
1642 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1643 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1644 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
|
|
|
1645 science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by
|
|
|
1646 objects specifically distinct.
|
|
|
1647 </p>
|
|
|
1648 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1649 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both
|
|
|
1650 the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished
|
|
|
1651 by their objects.
|
|
|
1652 </p>
|
|
|
1653 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1654 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue,
|
|
|
1655 if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while,
|
|
|
1656 if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits.
|
|
|
1657 Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects.
|
|
|
1658 </p>
|
|
|
1659 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1660 <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above (
|
|
|
1661 <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a>). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects.
|
|
|
1662 </p>
|
|
|
1663 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1664 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
|
|
|
1665 differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished
|
|
|
1666 from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species.
|
|
|
1667 Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something,
|
|
|
1668 are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying
|
|
|
1669 a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
|
|
|
1670 </p>
|
|
|
1671 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p7"> Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
|
|
|
1672 dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what
|
|
|
1673 follows.
|
|
|
1674 </p>
|
|
|
1675 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1676 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which
|
|
|
1677 may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they
|
|
|
1678 are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one
|
|
|
1679 aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
|
|
|
1680 </p>
|
|
|
1681 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1682 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of
|
|
|
1683 mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g.
|
|
|
1684 by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism
|
|
|
1685 producing science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
|
|
|
1686 consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished.
|
|
|
1687 </p>
|
|
|
1688 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p10">
|
|
|
1689 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative
|
|
|
1690 matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover
|
|
|
1691 the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been
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1692 said (
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1693 <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">Q[18], A[6]</a>;
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1694 <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html"> Q[19],
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1695 A[2]
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1696 </a>, ad 1;
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1697 <a id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q34_A4.html"> Q[34], A[4]</a>).
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1698 </p>
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1699 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p11"></p>
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1700 <p id="FS_Q54_A2-p12"></p>
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1701 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a>
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1702 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a>
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1703 </div>
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1704 <div id="FS_Q54_A3" class="div4">
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1705 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a>
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1706 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a>
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1707 <h4 id="FS_Q54_A3-p0.1">Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</h4>
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1708 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p1"></p>
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1709 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p2">
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1710 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
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1711 contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad.
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1712 </p>
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1713 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p3">
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1714 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference,
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1715 as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being.
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1716 Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
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1717 </p>
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1718 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p4">
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1719 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters
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1720 of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue,
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1721 as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad.
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1722 </p>
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1723 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p5">
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1724 <b>On the contrary,</b> A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
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1725 </p>
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1726 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p6">
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1727 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
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1728 <a id="FS_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation
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1729 to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way
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1730 a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the
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1731 agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which
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1732 disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason,
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1733 whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished
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1734 specifically by the difference of good and bad.
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1735 </p>
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1736 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p7"> Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable
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1737 to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes
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1738 to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher
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1739 nature.
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1740 </p>
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1741 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p8">
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1742 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen
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1743 that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are
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1744 divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something
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1745 good, and another about something bad.
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1746 </p>
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1747 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p9">
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1748 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate
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1749 good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference
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1750 of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature.
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1751 </p>
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1752 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p10">
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1753 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated
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1754 above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which
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1755 is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue.
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1756 </p>
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1757 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p11"></p>
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1758 <p id="FS_Q54_A3-p12"></p>
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1759 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html"></a>
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1760 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a>
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1761 </div>
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1762 <div id="FS_Q54_A4" class="div4">
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1763 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a>
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1764 <a href="summa.FS.v.html"></a>
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1765 <h4 id="FS_Q54_A4-p0.1">Whether one habit is made up of many habits?</h4>
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1766 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p1"></p>
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1767 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p2">
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1768 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems
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1769 to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated
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1770 above (
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1771 <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html">Q[51], A[3]</a>). Therefore one habit is made up of several.
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1772 </p>
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1773 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p3">
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1774 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
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1775 temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
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1776 </p>
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1777 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p4">
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1778 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to
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1779 but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
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1780 </p>
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1781 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p5">
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1782 <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made
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1783 up of many.
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1784 </p>
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1785 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p6">
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1786 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection
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1787 should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so
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1788 far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far
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1789 as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to
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1790 one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above (
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1791 <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3).
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1792 </p>
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1793 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p7"> If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this
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1794 multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality,
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1795 not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation
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1796 to one, whence it derives its unity.
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1797 </p>
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1798 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p8">
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1799 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that
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1800 the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins
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1801 by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities.
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1802 </p>
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1803 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p9">
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1804 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective
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1805 or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4;
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1806 <a id="FS_Q54_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">SS, Q[48])</a>.
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1807 </p>
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1808 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p10">
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1809 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly.
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1810 And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in
|
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1811 him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions
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1812 and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from
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1813 another.
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1814 </p>
|
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1815 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p11"></p>
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1816 <p id="FS_Q54_A4-p12"></p>
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1817 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html"></a>
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1818 <a href="summa.FS.v.html"></a>
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1819 </div>
|
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1820 <a href="summa.FS_Q53_A3.html"></a>
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1821 <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html"></a>
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1822 </div>
|
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1823 <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A4.html"></a>
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1824 <a href="summa.FS_Q49.html"></a>
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1825 `
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112
|
1826 </div>
|
