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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.iii" class="div2">
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2 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
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3 <a href="summa.FP_Q27.html"></a>
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4 <h2 id="FP.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ[27]-43)</h2>
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5 <div id="FP_Q27" class="div3">
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6 <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a>
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7 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
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8 <h3 id="FP_Q27-p0.1">THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
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9 <p id="FP_Q27-p1"></p>
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10 <p id="FP_Q27-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of
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11 the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin,
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12 the order of the doctrine leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly, the relations of origin;
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13 thirdly, the persons.
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14 </p>
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15 <p id="FP_Q27-p3"> Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:</p>
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16 <p id="FP_Q27-p4"> (1) Whether there is procession in God?</p>
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17 <p id="FP_Q27-p5"> (2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?</p>
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18 <p id="FP_Q27-p6"> (3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides generation.</p>
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19 <p id="FP_Q27-p7"> (4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?</p>
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20 <p id="FP_Q27-p8"> (5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?</p>
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21 <div id="FP_Q27_A1" class="div4">
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22 <a href="summa.FP_Q27.html"></a>
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23 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
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24 <h4 id="FP_Q27_A1-p0.1">Whether there is procession in God?</h4>
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25 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p1"></p>
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26 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p2">
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27 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God. For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is
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28 nothing mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in God.
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29 </p>
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30 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p3">
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31 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme simplicity.
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32 Therefore in God there is no procession.
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33 </p>
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34 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p4">
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35 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as
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36 shown above (
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37 <a id="FP_Q27_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore in God there is no procession.
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38 </p>
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39 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p5">
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40 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (
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41 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.42" target="asv">Jn. 8:42</a>).
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42 </p>
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43 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p6">
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44 <b>I answer that,</b> Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession. This procession has been differently understood.
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45 Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds
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46 from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both.
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47 In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is
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48 contrary to what is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God" (
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49 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:20</a>). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (
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50 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:19</a>). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as
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51 moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the Father
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52 is called
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53 Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature,
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54 and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot of Himself
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55 do anything" (
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56 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#John.5.19" target="asv">Jn. 5:19</a>); while many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that
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57 both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms
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58 procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession
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59 corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining
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60 within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent.
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61 For whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of
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62 the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object.
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63 This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice.
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64 </p>
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65 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p7"> As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures,
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66 namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived
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67 from these fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it
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68 is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect,
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69 as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible
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70 emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic
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71 Faith understands procession as existing in God.
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72 </p>
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73 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p8">
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74 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter,
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75 or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we have explained.
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76 </p>
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77 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p9">
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78 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever
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79 proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more
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80 closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely
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81 is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since
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82 the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is
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83 the very supreme perfection of God (
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84 <a id="FP_Q27_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity.
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85 </p>
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86 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p10">
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87 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To proceed from a principle, so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea
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88 of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of
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89 a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of such a principle is included that
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90 of his art; and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the
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91 builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to things created
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92 as the architect is to things designed.
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93 </p>
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94 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p11"></p>
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95 <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p12"></p>
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96 <a href="summa.FP_Q27.html"></a>
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97 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
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98 </div>
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99 <div id="FP_Q27_A2" class="div4">
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100 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
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101 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
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102 <h4 id="FP_Q27_A2-p0.1">Whether any procession in God can be called generation?</h4>
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103 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p1"></p>
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104 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p2">
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105 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no procession in God can be called generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence,
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106 and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation
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107 cannot exist in God.
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108 </p>
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109 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p3">
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110 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained
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111 <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God.
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112 </p>
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113 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p4">
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114 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence.
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115 But no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine existence is self-subsisting (
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116 <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no generation in God.
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117 </p>
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118 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p5">
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119 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
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120 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.2.7" target="asv">Ps. 2:7</a>): "This day have I begotten Thee."
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121 </p>
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122 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p6">
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123 <b>I answer that,</b> The procession of the Word in God is called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning:
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124 one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence
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125 to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living
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126 being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called birth. Not
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127 everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence
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128 a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any
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129 likeness suffice; for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it has
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130 a generic similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same
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131 specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential
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132 to actual life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being whose
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133 life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of
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134 generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the procession of
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135 the
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136 Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation:---from a conjoined principle
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137 (as above described):---by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:---and
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138 exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His existence are the same, as shown above (
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139 <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14], A[4]</a>). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word Himself
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140 proceeding is called the Son.
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141 </p>
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142 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p7">
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143 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act;
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144 in which sense it is not found in God.
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145 </p>
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146 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p8">
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147 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds within
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148 us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot
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149 be properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands
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150 (
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151 <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14], A[4]</a>). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds
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152 as subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote
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153 generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth; as is declared
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154 in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was brought
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155 forth." (
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156 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.24" target="asv">Prov. 8:24</a>). In our way of understanding we use the word "conception" in order to signify
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157 that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no identity of nature.
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158 </p>
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159 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p9">
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160 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance
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161 of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated
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162 in God receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject
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163 (which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His
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164 existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from another; not, however, as if He were other
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165 from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding
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166 and the principle of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (
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167 <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>).
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168 </p>
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169 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p10"></p>
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170 <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p11"></p>
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171 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
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172 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
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173 </div>
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174 <div id="FP_Q27_A3" class="div4">
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175 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
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176 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
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177 <h4 id="FP_Q27_A3-p0.1">Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?</h4>
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178 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p1"></p>
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179 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p2">
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180 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no other procession exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we
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181 admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must
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182 stop at the first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God.
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183 </p>
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184 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p3">
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185 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from their
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186 terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine
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187 nature (
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188 <a id="FP_Q27_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html">Q[11], A[4]</a> ), it follows that only one procession exists in God.
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189 </p>
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190 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p4">
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191 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession
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192 of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the
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193 intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect (
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194 <a id="FP_Q27_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word.
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195 </p>
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196 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p5">
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197 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (
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198 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.26" target="asv">Jn. 15:26</a>); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete"
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199 (
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200 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.14.16" target="asv">Jn. 14:16</a>). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.
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201 </p>
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202 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p6">
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203 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two processions in God; the procession of the Word, and another.
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204 </p>
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205 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p7"> In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only according to an action which does not tend to anything
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206 external, but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect, and of the will.
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207 The procession of the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within ourselves involves also
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208 another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the
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209 word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there
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210 exists in Him another procession called the procession of love.
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211 </p>
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212 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p8">
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213 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the agent
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214 in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will.
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215 </p>
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216 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p9">
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217 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All that exists in God, is God (
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218 <a id="FP_Q27_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], AA[3]</a>,4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not
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219 outward, and this does not apply to other natures.
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220 </p>
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221 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p10">
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222 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions
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223 belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession
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224 of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain
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225 order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance
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226 of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch
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227 as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order
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228 between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.
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229 </p>
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230 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p11"></p>
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231 <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p12"></p>
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232 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
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233 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
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234 </div>
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235 <div id="FP_Q27_A4" class="div4">
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236 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
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237 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html"></a>
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238 <h4 id="FP_Q27_A4-p0.1">Whether the procession of love in God is generation?</h4>
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239 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p1"></p>
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240 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p2">
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241 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living
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242 things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise
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243 it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of
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244 love, proceeds as generated and born.
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245 </p>
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246 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p3">
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247 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves
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248 its like" (
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249 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation.
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250 </p>
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251 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p4">
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252 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some
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253 special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession
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254 of love in God is generation.
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255 </p>
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256 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p5">
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257 <b>On the contrary,</b> Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the
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258 statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding."
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259 </p>
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260 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p6">
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261 <b>I answer that,</b> The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect
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262 and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its
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263 own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but
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264 by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is
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265 by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the
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266 will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object.
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267 </p>
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268 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p7"> So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name
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269 expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform
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270 an action.
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271 </p>
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272 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p8">
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273 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one procession
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274 is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must
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275 be taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence,
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276 each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and
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277 intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives
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278 the divine nature, but is not said to be born.
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279 </p>
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280 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p9">
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281 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood,
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282 as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness,
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283 but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten
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284 is the principle of love.
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285 </p>
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286 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p10">
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287 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We can name God only from creatures (
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288 <a id="FP_Q27_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special
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289 name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it
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290 can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit.
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291 </p>
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292 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p11"></p>
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293 <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p12"></p>
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294 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
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295 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html"></a>
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296 </div>
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297 <div id="FP_Q27_A5" class="div4">
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298 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
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299 <a href="summa.FP_Q28.html"></a>
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300 <h4 id="FP_Q27_A5-p0.1">Whether there are more than two processions in God? </h4>
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301 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p1"></p>
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302 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p2">
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303 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power.
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304 Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of
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305 power.
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306 </p>
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307 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p3">
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308 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there
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309 must be a procession of goodness in God.
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310 </p>
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311 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p4">
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312 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but
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313 there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there
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314 are more than two processions.
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315 </p>
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316 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p5">
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317 <b>On the contrary,</b> In God there are not more than two who proceed---the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions.
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318 </p>
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319 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p6">
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320 <b>I answer that,</b> The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual,
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321 and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears
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322 to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed
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323 from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the
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324 action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the
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325 Word, and of Love.
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326 </p>
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327 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p7">
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328 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine
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329 power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.
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330 </p>
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331 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p8">
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332 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object
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333 of the will.
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334 </p>
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335 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p9"> Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions; no other processions can be understood in God according
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336 to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, according as God understands and loves His own essence,
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337 truth and goodness.
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338 </p>
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339 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p10">
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340 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As above explained (
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341 <a id="FP_Q27_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>;
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342 <a id="FP_Q27_A5-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a>), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him
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343 a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby
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344 being manifested His perfect fecundity.
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345 </p>
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346 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p11"></p>
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347 <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p12"></p>
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348 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
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349 <a href="summa.FP_Q28.html"></a>
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350 </div>
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351 <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a>
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352 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
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353 </div>
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354 <div id="FP_Q28" class="div3">
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355 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html"></a>
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356 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
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357 <h3 id="FP_Q28-p0.1">THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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358 <p id="FP_Q28-p1"></p>
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359 <p id="FP_Q28-p2"> The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry:</p>
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360 <p id="FP_Q28-p3"> (1) Whether there are real relations in God?</p>
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361 <p id="FP_Q28-p4"> (2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it?</p>
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362 <p id="FP_Q28-p5"> (3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other?</p>
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363 <p id="FP_Q28-p6"> (4) The number of these relations.</p>
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364 <div id="FP_Q28_A1" class="div4">
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365 <a href="summa.FP_Q28.html"></a>
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366 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
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367 <h4 id="FP_Q28_A1-p0.1">Whether there are real relations in God?</h4>
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368 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p1"></p>
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369 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p2">
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370 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as
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371 regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in God can
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372 be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.
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373 </p>
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374 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p3">
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375 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost,
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376 is the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires
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377 and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind.
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378 </p>
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379 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p4">
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380 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does
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381 not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies
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382 for the same reason to the other relations in God.
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383 </p>
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384 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p5">
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385 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of
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386 the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical
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387 relations.
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388 </p>
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389 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p6">
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390 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation
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391 existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is
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392 the Sabellian heresy.
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393 </p>
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394 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p7">
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395 <b>I answer that,</b> relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only
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396 in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality,
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397 in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies
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398 only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of
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399 things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such
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400 relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there
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401 exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however,
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402 this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to
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403 another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus.
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404 But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession,
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405 agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity
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406 of the same nature, as above explained (
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407 <a id="FP_Q28_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], AA[2]</a>,4), these relations, according to the
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408 divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
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409 </p>
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410 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p8">
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411 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper
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412 meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius
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413 did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode
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414 of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of
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415 relation to another.
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416 </p>
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417 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p9">
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418 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because
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419 such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according
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420 to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically
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421 or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of
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422 identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as
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423 neither is it by relation of identity.
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424 </p>
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425 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p10">
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426 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation
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427 to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect
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428 and will, as is above explained (
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429 <a id="FP_Q28_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html">Q[14], AA[3]</a>,4;
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430 <a id="FP_Q28_A1-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html">Q[19], A[8]</a>). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is
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431 a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on
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432 God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
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433 </p>
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434 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p11">
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435 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as
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436 reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation
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437 of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical
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438 relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the
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439 reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related
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440 to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God.
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441 </p>
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442 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p12"></p>
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443 <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p13"></p>
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444 <a href="summa.FP_Q28.html"></a>
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445 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
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446 </div>
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447 <div id="FP_Q28_A2" class="div4">
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448 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
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449 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
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450 <h4 id="FP_Q28_A2-p0.1">Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?</h4>
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451 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p1"></p>
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452 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p2">
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453 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all
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454 that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such
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455 things do not refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine essence.
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456 </p>
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457 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p3">
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458 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master
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459 is a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God.
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460 This can only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
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461 </p>
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462 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p4">
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463 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is
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464 the divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else; whereas this is
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465 repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting (
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466 <a id="FP_Q28_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore relation is not the divine essence.
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467 </p>
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468 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p5">
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469 <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the divine
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470 essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore
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471 the distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."
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472 </p>
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473 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p6">
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474 <b>I answer that,</b> It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he
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475 said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.
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476 </p>
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477 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p7"> To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points
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478 for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them
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479 as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each
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480 one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true
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481 idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality
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482 is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from
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483 its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are
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484 said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing
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485 related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject,
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486 and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.
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487 </p>
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488 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p8"> Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence;
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489 for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in
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490 creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so
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491 far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its
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492 opposite term.
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493 </p>
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494 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p9"> Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of
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495 intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it
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496 is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
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497 </p>
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498 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p10">
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499 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same
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500 as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied;
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501 but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to that
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502 of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but
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503 nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of
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504 identity; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity.
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505 </p>
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506 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p11">
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507 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same
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508 applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning
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509 of relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both are one and the same;
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510 and this is not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were
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511 comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained (
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512 <a id="FP_Q28_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by
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513 any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various
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514 names imposed by us.
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515 </p>
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516 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p12">
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517 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the divine perfection contained only what is signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect, being
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518 thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word
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519 "wisdom," it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included
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520 in any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to
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521 God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within
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522 itself the perfection of every genus (
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523 <a id="FP_Q28_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>).
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524 </p>
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525 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p13"></p>
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526 <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p14"></p>
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527 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
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528 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
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|
529 </div>
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530 <div id="FP_Q28_A3" class="div4">
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531 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
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532 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html"></a>
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533 <h4 id="FP_Q28_A3-p0.1">Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?</h4>
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534 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p1"></p>
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535 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p2">
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536 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with
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537 the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the
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538 relations are not really distinguished from each other.
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539 </p>
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540 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p3">
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541 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power.
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542 But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it
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543 make any real distinction of paternity and filiation.
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544 </p>
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545 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p4">
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|
546 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore
|
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547 the relations are not really distinguished from each other.
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|
548 </p>
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549 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p5">
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550 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore,
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551 if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity,
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552 which is the error of Sabellius.
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553 </p>
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554 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p6">
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555 <b>I answer that,</b> The attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
|
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556 attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard
|
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557 of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation
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558 <a id="FP_Q28_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative
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559 opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute---namely,
|
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560 essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity---but according to that which is relative.
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|
561 </p>
|
|
|
562 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p7">
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|
563 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are
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|
564 identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they
|
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565 differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still
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566 it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies
|
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567 reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something
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568 "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless
|
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569 these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.
|
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|
570 </p>
|
|
|
571 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p8">
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|
572 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.
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|
573 </p>
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|
574 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p9">
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|
|
575 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed
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|
576 according to the procession of one from another.
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|
577 </p>
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578 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p10"></p>
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|
|
579 <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p11"></p>
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|
580 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
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581 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html"></a>
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|
|
582 </div>
|
|
|
583 <div id="FP_Q28_A4" class="div4">
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584 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
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585 <a href="summa.FP_Q29.html"></a>
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|
586 <h4 id="FP_Q28_A4-p0.1">Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession?</h4>
|
|
|
587 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p1"></p>
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|
|
588 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p2">
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|
589 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God there are not only four real relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it
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|
590 must be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing
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591 to the object willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above specified. Therefore there are not only four
|
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592 real relations in God.
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|
593 </p>
|
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594 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p3">
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|
|
595 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, real relations in God are understood as coming from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible relations
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|
596 are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an infinite series of real relations.
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|
597 </p>
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598 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p4">
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|
599 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ideas in God are eternal (
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|
|
600 <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html">Q[15], A[1]</a>); and are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as above stated. Therefore in God there
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601 are many more eternal relations.
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|
602 </p>
|
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603 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p5">
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|
604 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations
|
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|
605 are eternal in God than the above named.
|
|
|
606 </p>
|
|
|
607 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p6">
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|
608 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to
|
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|
609 the Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens." By the same way
|
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|
610 of reasoning there is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and from the Son to the Father, that
|
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|
611 of filiation; and thus there are not four relations in God.
|
|
|
612 </p>
|
|
|
613 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p7">
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|
614 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and
|
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|
615 passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity
|
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|
616 in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be
|
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|
617 based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according to
|
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618 any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him (
|
|
|
619 <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html">Q[13], A[7]</a>). Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there
|
|
|
620 are internal, and not external, processions in God. These processions are two only, as above explained (
|
|
|
621 <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html">Q[27], A[5]</a>), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action
|
|
|
622 of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is
|
|
|
623 the relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The procession
|
|
|
624 of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation
|
|
|
625 of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding from the
|
|
|
626 principle is called filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own (
|
|
|
627 <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession
|
|
|
628 is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the
|
|
|
629 processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations.
|
|
|
630 </p>
|
|
|
631 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p8">
|
|
|
632 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In those things in which there is a difference between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can
|
|
|
633 be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect
|
|
|
634 and its object are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God understands all other things; and the same applies
|
|
|
635 to His will and the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds
|
|
|
636 of relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real
|
|
|
637 relation; because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action; and not as a thing understood. For when
|
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|
638 we understand a stone; that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the word.
|
|
|
639 </p>
|
|
|
640 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p9">
|
|
|
641 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by another
|
|
|
642 act understands that he understands the stone, and again by another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of
|
|
|
643 understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch
|
|
|
644 as He understands all things by one act alone.
|
|
|
645 </p>
|
|
|
646 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p10">
|
|
|
647 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in
|
|
|
648 God; but that God knows these many relations.
|
|
|
649 </p>
|
|
|
650 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p11">
|
|
|
651 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Equality and similitude in God are not real relations; but are only logical relations (
|
|
|
652 <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html">Q[42], A[3]</a>, ad 4).
|
|
|
653 </p>
|
|
|
654 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p12">
|
|
|
655 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The way from one term to another and conversely is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we
|
|
|
656 cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude
|
|
|
657 this of something absolute, if there were such between them.
|
|
|
658 </p>
|
|
|
659 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p13"></p>
|
|
|
660 <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p14"></p>
|
|
|
661 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
662 <a href="summa.FP_Q29.html"></a>
|
|
|
663 </div>
|
|
|
664 <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
665 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
666 </div>
|
|
|
667 <div id="FP_Q29" class="div3">
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668 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
669 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
670 <h3 id="FP_Q29-p0.1">THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
671 <p id="FP_Q29-p1"></p>
|
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|
672 <p id="FP_Q29-p2"> Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations, we must now approach the
|
|
|
673 subject of the persons.
|
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|
674 </p>
|
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|
675 <p id="FP_Q29-p3"> First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons
|
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|
676 absolutely first in common; and then singly.
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|
677 </p>
|
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|
678 <p id="FP_Q29-p4"> The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points: (1) The signification of this word "person"; (2)
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679 the number of the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude,
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680 and the like; and (4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.
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|
681 </p>
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|
682 <p id="FP_Q29-p5"> Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:(1) The definition of "person."</p>
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|
683 <p id="FP_Q29-p6"> (2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.</p>
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684 <p id="FP_Q29-p7"> (3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?</p>
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|
685 <p id="FP_Q29-p8"> (4) What does it signify in Him?</p>
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|
686 <div id="FP_Q29_A1" class="div4">
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687 <a href="summa.FP_Q29.html"></a>
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688 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
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689 <h4 id="FP_Q29_A1-p0.1">The definition of "person"</h4>
|
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690 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p1"></p>
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|
691 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p2">
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|
692 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an
|
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|
693 individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something
|
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|
694 singular. Therefore person is improperly defined.
|
|
|
695 </p>
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696 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p3">
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|
697 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, substance as placed above in the definition of person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is
|
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|
698 the former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance is individual substance; if it stands for second
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699 substance, the word "individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second substances are the "genera" or
|
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700 "species." Therefore this definition is incorrect.
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|
701 </p>
|
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702 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p4">
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|
703 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intentional term must not be included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal"
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|
704 would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing, and "species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since
|
|
|
705 person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word "individual" which is an intentional
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|
706 name comes improperly into the definition.
|
|
|
707 </p>
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708 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p5">
|
|
|
709 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally,"
|
|
|
710 as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature"
|
|
|
711 ought not to enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence."
|
|
|
712 </p>
|
|
|
713 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p6">
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|
|
714 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is
|
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715 not properly defined as above.
|
|
|
716 </p>
|
|
|
717 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p7">
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|
718 <b>I answer that,</b> Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs
|
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|
719 to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject,
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|
720 which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this particular subject. And
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721 so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special
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|
722 name of their own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
|
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|
723 </p>
|
|
|
724 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p8"> Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances
|
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|
725 which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves;
|
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|
726 for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other
|
|
|
727 substances; and this name is "person."
|
|
|
728 </p>
|
|
|
729 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p9"> Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance;
|
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|
730 and the term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances.
|
|
|
731 </p>
|
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|
732 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p10">
|
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|
733 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although this or that singular may not be definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined;
|
|
|
734 and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines
|
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735 person.
|
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|
736 </p>
|
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|
737 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p11">
|
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|
738 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis;
|
|
|
739 nor is the term "individual" superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality
|
|
|
740 and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part.
|
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|
741 But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is
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742 excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater---that is, by the Word
|
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|
743 of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and
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|
|
744 when "individual" is added, it is restricted to first substance.
|
|
|
745 </p>
|
|
|
746 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p12">
|
|
|
747 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences
|
|
|
748 in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are
|
|
|
749 the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities
|
|
|
750 if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual"
|
|
|
751 is placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances.
|
|
|
752 </p>
|
|
|
753 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p13">
|
|
|
754 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of living things,
|
|
|
755 which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to
|
|
|
756 signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines "nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind
|
|
|
757 of principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called
|
|
|
758 nature. And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition,
|
|
|
759 is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature is the
|
|
|
760 specific difference giving its form to each thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from
|
|
|
761 the special form of a thing. So in the definition of "person," which means the singular in a determined "genus," it is more
|
|
|
762 correct to use the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from being, which is most common.
|
|
|
763 </p>
|
|
|
764 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p14">
|
|
|
765 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its
|
|
|
766 nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can
|
|
|
767 the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it.
|
|
|
768 </p>
|
|
|
769 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p15"></p>
|
|
|
770 <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p16"></p>
|
|
|
771 <a href="summa.FP_Q29.html"></a>
|
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|
772 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
773 </div>
|
|
|
774 <div id="FP_Q29_A2" class="div4">
|
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|
775 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
776 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
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|
777 <h4 id="FP_Q29_A2-p0.1">Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?</h4>
|
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|
778 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
779 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p2">
|
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|
780 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis," "subsistence," and "essence." For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.)
|
|
|
781 that "the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis." But this with us signifies
|
|
|
782 "person." Therefore "person" is altogether the same as "hypostasis."
|
|
|
783 </p>
|
|
|
784 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p3">
|
|
|
785 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person"
|
|
|
786 and "subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and "subsistence" mean the same.
|
|
|
787 </p>
|
|
|
788 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p4">
|
|
|
789 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek {ousia}, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and
|
|
|
790 form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called "hypostasis" and "person." Therefore
|
|
|
791 all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning.
|
|
|
792 </p>
|
|
|
793 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p5">
|
|
|
794 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent,
|
|
|
795 but also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding.
|
|
|
796 Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the same as subsistences.
|
|
|
797 </p>
|
|
|
798 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p6">
|
|
|
799 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called {ousiosis}---that is, subsistence.
|
|
|
800 But neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs from the others.
|
|
|
801 </p>
|
|
|
802 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p7">
|
|
|
803 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified
|
|
|
804 by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called
|
|
|
805 by the Greeks {ousia}, what we may call "essence." In another sense substance means a subject or "suppositum," which subsists
|
|
|
806 in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name
|
|
|
807 expressive of an intention; and thus it is called "suppositum." It is also called by three names signifying a reality---that
|
|
|
808 is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named.
|
|
|
809 For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called "subsistence"; as we say that those things subsist which exist
|
|
|
810 in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance,
|
|
|
811 this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called "hypostasis," or "substance." What
|
|
|
812 these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name "person" signifies in the genus of rational
|
|
|
813 substances.
|
|
|
814 </p>
|
|
|
815 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p8">
|
|
|
816 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the genus
|
|
|
817 substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of
|
|
|
818 that nature.
|
|
|
819 </p>
|
|
|
820 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p9">
|
|
|
821 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and "three subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases." But because the
|
|
|
822 word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to "hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense,
|
|
|
823 since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was thought
|
|
|
824 preferable to use "subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance."
|
|
|
825 </p>
|
|
|
826 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p10">
|
|
|
827 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the
|
|
|
828 species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the
|
|
|
829 form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what
|
|
|
830 is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For
|
|
|
831 soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this
|
|
|
832 man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the
|
|
|
833 essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity (
|
|
|
834 <a id="FP_Q29_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>).
|
|
|
835 </p>
|
|
|
836 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p11">
|
|
|
837 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact
|
|
|
838 that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves
|
|
|
839 subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things.
|
|
|
840 To substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to
|
|
|
841 the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.
|
|
|
842 </p>
|
|
|
843 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p12">
|
|
|
844 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius
|
|
|
845 says (De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does
|
|
|
846 not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On
|
|
|
847 this account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and {ousiosis}, or
|
|
|
848 subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.
|
|
|
849 </p>
|
|
|
850 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
851 <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p14"></p>
|
|
|
852 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
853 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
854 </div>
|
|
|
855 <div id="FP_Q29_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
856 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
857 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
858 <h4 id="FP_Q29_A3-p0.1">Whether the word "person" should be said of God?</h4>
|
|
|
859 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
860 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p2">
|
|
|
861 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare
|
|
|
862 to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the
|
|
|
863 oracles." But the name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore "person" is not to be applied
|
|
|
864 to God.
|
|
|
865 </p>
|
|
|
866 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p3">
|
|
|
867 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies
|
|
|
868 and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando], since a greater volume of sound is produced through the
|
|
|
869 cavity in the mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called {prosopa}, as they were placed on the face and covered the
|
|
|
870 features before the eyes." This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense.
|
|
|
871 Therefore the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.
|
|
|
872 </p>
|
|
|
873 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p4">
|
|
|
874 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word "hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.
|
|
|
875 Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in
|
|
|
876 this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person" should not be said of God.
|
|
|
877 </p>
|
|
|
878 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p5">
|
|
|
879 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as
|
|
|
880 given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we
|
|
|
881 proved above (
|
|
|
882 <a id="FP_Q29_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html">Q[14], A[12]</a> ); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature." And also because God cannot be called an individual substance,
|
|
|
883 since the principle of individuation is
|
|
|
884 matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word "person"
|
|
|
885 ought not to be attributed to God.
|
|
|
886 </p>
|
|
|
887 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p6">
|
|
|
888 <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost."
|
|
|
889 </p>
|
|
|
890 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p7">
|
|
|
891 <b>I answer that,</b> "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature---that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since
|
|
|
892 everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person"
|
|
|
893 is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also,
|
|
|
894 which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when
|
|
|
895 treating of the names of God (
|
|
|
896 <a id="FP_Q29_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
897 </p>
|
|
|
898 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p8">
|
|
|
899 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the word "person" is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what
|
|
|
900 the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being,
|
|
|
901 and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would
|
|
|
902 follow that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of the
|
|
|
903 Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about
|
|
|
904 God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the
|
|
|
905 sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" (
|
|
|
906 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q29_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.20" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:20</a>).
|
|
|
907 </p>
|
|
|
908 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p9">
|
|
|
909 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although this name "person" may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs
|
|
|
910 to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given
|
|
|
911 to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called "persons." Thence
|
|
|
912 by some the definition of person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity."
|
|
|
913 And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called
|
|
|
914 a "person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs
|
|
|
915 to God.
|
|
|
916 </p>
|
|
|
917 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p10">
|
|
|
918 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it
|
|
|
919 applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this
|
|
|
920 word," forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make
|
|
|
921 people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the
|
|
|
922 word "substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.
|
|
|
923 </p>
|
|
|
924 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p11">
|
|
|
925 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It may be said that God has a rational "nature," if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense,
|
|
|
926 an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but
|
|
|
927 only in the sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence.
|
|
|
928 There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted
|
|
|
929 above
|
|
|
930 <a id="FP_Q29_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends
|
|
|
931 this definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature."
|
|
|
932 </p>
|
|
|
933 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
934 <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
935 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
936 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
937 </div>
|
|
|
938 <div id="FP_Q29_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
939 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
940 <a href="summa.FP_Q30.html"></a>
|
|
|
941 <h4 id="FP_Q29_A4-p0.1">Whether this word "person" signifies relation?</h4>
|
|
|
942 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
943 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p2">
|
|
|
944 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De
|
|
|
945 Trin. vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for person
|
|
|
946 is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son."
|
|
|
947 </p>
|
|
|
948 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p3">
|
|
|
949 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness
|
|
|
950 in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore
|
|
|
951 person signifies essence.
|
|
|
952 </p>
|
|
|
953 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p4">
|
|
|
954 <b>Objection 3:</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this:
|
|
|
955 "The individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated. Therefore "person" signifies substance.
|
|
|
956 </p>
|
|
|
957 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p5">
|
|
|
958 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation,
|
|
|
959 it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.
|
|
|
960 </p>
|
|
|
961 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p6">
|
|
|
962 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to person more
|
|
|
963 strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word "person" signifies relation.
|
|
|
964 </p>
|
|
|
965 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p7">
|
|
|
966 <b>I answer that,</b> A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word "person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of
|
|
|
967 the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the
|
|
|
968 words which express relation.
|
|
|
969 </p>
|
|
|
970 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p8"> Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and
|
|
|
971 this word "Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative
|
|
|
972 sense, and especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we say, "Three persons,"
|
|
|
973 or, "one is the person of the Father, another of the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either
|
|
|
974 absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its
|
|
|
975 own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from
|
|
|
976 the heretics being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word "person" in
|
|
|
977 God signifies both the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly the essence, and relation
|
|
|
978 indirectly, forasmuch as "person" means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what
|
|
|
979 is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from
|
|
|
980 the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as
|
|
|
981 in the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth.
|
|
|
982 </p>
|
|
|
983 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p9"> To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is
|
|
|
984 not included in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of "man," and not in the meaning of "animal."
|
|
|
985 So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question
|
|
|
986 is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning
|
|
|
987 of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The individual
|
|
|
988 in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature:
|
|
|
989 thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man,
|
|
|
990 and which, though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human
|
|
|
991 person.
|
|
|
992 </p>
|
|
|
993 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p10"> Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above (
|
|
|
994 <a id="FP_Q29_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html">Q[28], AA[2]</a>,3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent,
|
|
|
995 for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine
|
|
|
996 person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance,
|
|
|
997 and
|
|
|
998 such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature
|
|
|
999 is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly;
|
|
|
1000 not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence,
|
|
|
1001 and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is
|
|
|
1002 expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we
|
|
|
1003 can say that this signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence,
|
|
|
1004 this word "person" was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent
|
|
|
1005 itself to that signification, so that this word "person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first
|
|
|
1006 opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.
|
|
|
1007 </p>
|
|
|
1008 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p11">
|
|
|
1009 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way
|
|
|
1010 of a substance---which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence
|
|
|
1011 is the same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are the same.
|
|
|
1012 </p>
|
|
|
1013 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p12">
|
|
|
1014 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we answer: A
|
|
|
1015 mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the "suppositum," as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish.
|
|
|
1016 So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
|
|
|
1017 </p>
|
|
|
1018 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p13">
|
|
|
1019 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In God the individual---i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as above explained.
|
|
|
1020 </p>
|
|
|
1021 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p14">
|
|
|
1022 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass
|
|
|
1023 have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies
|
|
|
1024 to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of divine person, but not in that
|
|
|
1025 of an angelic or of a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal
|
|
|
1026 sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures (
|
|
|
1027 <a id="FP_Q29_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html">Q[13], A[5]</a>).
|
|
|
1028 </p>
|
|
|
1029 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1030 <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p16"></p>
|
|
|
1031 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1032 <a href="summa.FP_Q30.html"></a>
|
|
|
1033 </div>
|
|
|
1034 <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1035 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1036 </div>
|
|
|
1037 <div id="FP_Q30" class="div3">
|
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|
1038 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1039 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1040 <h3 id="FP_Q30-p0.1">THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1041 <p id="FP_Q30-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1042 <p id="FP_Q30-p2"> We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1043 <p id="FP_Q30-p3"> (1) Whether there are several persons in God?</p>
|
|
|
1044 <p id="FP_Q30-p4"> (2) How many are they?</p>
|
|
|
1045 <p id="FP_Q30-p5"> (3) What the numeral terms signify in God?</p>
|
|
|
1046 <p id="FP_Q30-p6"> (4) The community of the term "person."</p>
|
|
|
1047 <div id="FP_Q30_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1048 <a href="summa.FP_Q30.html"></a>
|
|
|
1049 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1050 <h4 id="FP_Q30_A1-p0.1">Whether there are several persons in God?</h4>
|
|
|
1051 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1052 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1053 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not several persons in God. For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If
|
|
|
1054 then there are several persons in God, there must be several substances; which appears to be heretical.
|
|
|
1055 </p>
|
|
|
1056 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1057 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
|
|
|
1058 therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God there is no plurality but of relations (
|
|
|
1059 <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>). Therefore there cannot be several persons in God.
|
|
|
1060 </p>
|
|
|
1061 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1062 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is truly one which has no number." But plurality implies number. Therefore
|
|
|
1063 there are not several persons in God.
|
|
|
1064 </p>
|
|
|
1065 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1066 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and
|
|
|
1067 part in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
|
|
|
1068 </p>
|
|
|
1069 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1070 <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." Therefore the Father,
|
|
|
1071 and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
|
|
|
1072 </p>
|
|
|
1073 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p7">
|
|
|
1074 <b>I answer that,</b> It follows from what precedes that there are several persons in God. For it was shown above (
|
|
|
1075 <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html">Q[29], A[4]</a>) that this word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine nature. It was also established (
|
|
|
1076 <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html">Q[28], A[1]</a>) that there are several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also several realities subsistent in the
|
|
|
1077 divine nature; which means that there are several persons
|
|
|
1078 in God.
|
|
|
1079 </p>
|
|
|
1080 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1081 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The definition of "person" includes "substance," not as meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by
|
|
|
1082 the addition of the term "individual." To signify the substance thus understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis." So,
|
|
|
1083 as we say, "Three persons," they say "Three hypostases." We are not, however, accustomed to say Three substances, lest we
|
|
|
1084 be understood to mean three essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification
|
|
|
1085 of the term.
|
|
|
1086 </p>
|
|
|
1087 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1088 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really
|
|
|
1089 distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist, nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that
|
|
|
1090 is, several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist, although they are really distinguished from
|
|
|
1091 each other, as whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties
|
|
|
1092 in God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other (
|
|
|
1093 <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>). Hence the plurality of persons in God.
|
|
|
1094 </p>
|
|
|
1095 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1096 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations.
|
|
|
1097 Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not import composition in that of which they are predicated,
|
|
|
1098 as Boethius teaches in the same book.
|
|
|
1099 </p>
|
|
|
1100 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p11">
|
|
|
1101 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and
|
|
|
1102 two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being
|
|
|
1103 in Him, and thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered
|
|
|
1104 exists only in the intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things
|
|
|
1105 numbered, in that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of two men, and
|
|
|
1106 two of three; but this does not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the whole Trinity, as we shall
|
|
|
1107 show further on (
|
|
|
1108 <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html">Q[42], AA[1]</a>, 4).
|
|
|
1109 </p>
|
|
|
1110 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1111 <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1112 <a href="summa.FP_Q30.html"></a>
|
|
|
1113 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1114 </div>
|
|
|
1115 <div id="FP_Q30_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1116 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1117 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1118 <h4 id="FP_Q30_A2-p0.1">Whether there are more than three persons in God?</h4>
|
|
|
1119 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1120 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1121 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are more than three persons in God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality
|
|
|
1122 of the relative properties as stated above
|
|
|
1123 <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But there are four relations in God as stated above (
|
|
|
1124 <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in God.
|
|
|
1125 </p>
|
|
|
1126 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1127 <b>Objection 2:</b> The nature of God does not differ from His will more than from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will,
|
|
|
1128 as love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the
|
|
|
1129 one Who proceeds from His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three persons in God.
|
|
|
1130 </p>
|
|
|
1131 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1132 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond
|
|
|
1133 other animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not only is there a person proceeding from the will,
|
|
|
1134 and another from the intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are an infinite number of persons
|
|
|
1135 in God.
|
|
|
1136 </p>
|
|
|
1137 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1138 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine
|
|
|
1139 person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person
|
|
|
1140 another; and so to infinity.
|
|
|
1141 </p>
|
|
|
1142 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1143 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, everything within a determinate number is measured, for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense,
|
|
|
1144 as we say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy Ghost is immense." Therefore the
|
|
|
1145 persons are not contained within the number three.
|
|
|
1146 </p>
|
|
|
1147 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1148 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (
|
|
|
1149 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q30_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.7" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:7</a>). To those who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4), "Three persons." Therefore there are but three
|
|
|
1150 persons in God.
|
|
|
1151 </p>
|
|
|
1152 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1153 <b>I answer that,</b> As was explained above, there can be only three persons in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several
|
|
|
1154 subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from
|
|
|
1155 relative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two persons: and if any relations are not opposite
|
|
|
1156 they must needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are
|
|
|
1157 opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father;
|
|
|
1158 and the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not opposed to each other; therefore these
|
|
|
1159 two cannot belong to one person: hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons; or one must belong
|
|
|
1160 to one person, and the other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them;
|
|
|
1161 for
|
|
|
1162 thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation
|
|
|
1163 are derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person generating
|
|
|
1164 and the person generated proceeded from the person spirating; and this is against what was laid down above (
|
|
|
1165 <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27] , AA[3]</a>,4). We must frequently admit that spiration belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person of the
|
|
|
1166 Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and consequently that procession belongs
|
|
|
1167 to the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above explained. Therefore
|
|
|
1168 only three persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
1169 </p>
|
|
|
1170 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1171 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although there are four relations in God, one of them, spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the
|
|
|
1172 Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a property, because it does not belong to only
|
|
|
1173 one person; nor is it a personal relation---i.e. constituting a person. The three relations---paternity, filiation, and procession---are
|
|
|
1174 called personal properties, constituting as it were the persons; for
|
|
|
1175 paternity is the person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.
|
|
|
1176 </p>
|
|
|
1177 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p10">
|
|
|
1178 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word, proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way
|
|
|
1179 of nature; thus, as above explained (
|
|
|
1180 <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>), the procession of the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But love, as such, does not proceed
|
|
|
1181 as the similitude of that whence it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and therefore the procession
|
|
|
1182 of love
|
|
|
1183 is not called generation in God.
|
|
|
1184 </p>
|
|
|
1185 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p11">
|
|
|
1186 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
|
|
|
1187 something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for
|
|
|
1188 they have no imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real operation---that is, His essence. How
|
|
|
1189 there are in Him two processions was above explained (
|
|
|
1190 <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html">Q[27],
|
|
|
1191 AA[1]
|
|
|
1192 </a>,4).
|
|
|
1193 </p>
|
|
|
1194 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p12">
|
|
|
1195 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if
|
|
|
1196 the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have
|
|
|
1197 one and the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by the personal relations. So goodness belongs
|
|
|
1198 to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the
|
|
|
1199 principle of its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be
|
|
|
1200 joined with the relation of principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from the other persons who are
|
|
|
1201 in God.
|
|
|
1202 </p>
|
|
|
1203 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p13">
|
|
|
1204 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A determinate number, if taken as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a
|
|
|
1205 number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three
|
|
|
1206 persons is the same (
|
|
|
1207 <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html">Q[42], AA[1]</a>,4), and the same is not measured by the same.
|
|
|
1208 </p>
|
|
|
1209 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p14"></p>
|
|
|
1210 <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1211 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1212 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1213 </div>
|
|
|
1214 <div id="FP_Q30_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1215 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1216 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1217 <h4 id="FP_Q30_A3-p0.1">Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?</h4>
|
|
|
1218 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1219 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1220 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every
|
|
|
1221 number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real
|
|
|
1222 in God.
|
|
|
1223 </p>
|
|
|
1224 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1225 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral
|
|
|
1226 terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God.
|
|
|
1227 </p>
|
|
|
1228 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1229 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense,
|
|
|
1230 as plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing
|
|
|
1231 the mind and obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be said that the numeral terms denote something
|
|
|
1232 real in God.
|
|
|
1233 </p>
|
|
|
1234 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1235 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of oneness and of solitude;"
|
|
|
1236 and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God, unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God."
|
|
|
1237 Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove something; and not to denote anything positive.
|
|
|
1238 </p>
|
|
|
1239 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1240 <b>I answer that,</b> The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
|
|
|
1241 meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.
|
|
|
1242 </p>
|
|
|
1243 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p7"> In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a consequence of division. Now division is twofold;
|
|
|
1244 one is material, and is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a species of quantity. Number in this
|
|
|
1245 sense is found only in material things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called formal, and is effected by
|
|
|
1246 opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus,
|
|
|
1247 but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial
|
|
|
1248 things.
|
|
|
1249 </p>
|
|
|
1250 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p8"> Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has
|
|
|
1251 no place in God, asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but remove something from Him. Others,
|
|
|
1252 considering the same kind of multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict sense of the word, but
|
|
|
1253 not in the sense of its genus (as in God there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the
|
|
|
1254 proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.
|
|
|
1255 </p>
|
|
|
1256 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p9"> But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they
|
|
|
1257 could bear only a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as length, breadth, and the like; but that
|
|
|
1258 they are taken from multitude in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to the many of which it is
|
|
|
1259 predicated, as "one" convertible with "being" is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything
|
|
|
1260 to being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the divine unity (
|
|
|
1261 <a id="FP_Q30_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html">Q[11], A[1]</a>); for "one" signifies undivided being. So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus, for instance,
|
|
|
1262 "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things,
|
|
|
1263 multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself.
|
|
|
1264 </p>
|
|
|
1265 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p10"> But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle
|
|
|
1266 of that number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which they are said, and beyond this they add negation
|
|
|
1267 only, as stated (Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So when we say, the essence is one,
|
|
|
1268 the term "one" signifies the essence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the
|
|
|
1269 person undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and their individual undividedness; for
|
|
|
1270 it is of the very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.
|
|
|
1271 </p>
|
|
|
1272 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p11">
|
|
|
1273 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude; hence
|
|
|
1274 in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds
|
|
|
1275 a negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained above.
|
|
|
1276 </p>
|
|
|
1277 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p12">
|
|
|
1278 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God:
|
|
|
1279 unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is
|
|
|
1280 applicable to God.
|
|
|
1281 </p>
|
|
|
1282 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p13">
|
|
|
1283 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "One" does not exclude multitude, but division, which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity,
|
|
|
1284 but division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity
|
|
|
1285 (
|
|
|
1286 <a id="FP_Q30_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html">Q[11], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
1287 </p>
|
|
|
1288 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p14"> It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the
|
|
|
1289 idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not follow that these terms express
|
|
|
1290 this signification alone. For blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not signify the mere
|
|
|
1291 exclusion of blackness.
|
|
|
1292 </p>
|
|
|
1293 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1294 <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p16"></p>
|
|
|
1295 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1296 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1297 </div>
|
|
|
1298 <div id="FP_Q30_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1299 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1300 <a href="summa.FP_Q31.html"></a>
|
|
|
1301 <h4 id="FP_Q30_A4-p0.1">Whether this term "person" can be common to the three persons?</h4>
|
|
|
1302 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1303 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1304 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but
|
|
|
1305 the essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly. Therefore it is not common to all three.
|
|
|
1306 </p>
|
|
|
1307 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1308 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable. But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as
|
|
|
1309 appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (
|
|
|
1310 <a id="FP_Q30_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html">Q[29], A[3]</a>, ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three persons.
|
|
|
1311 </p>
|
|
|
1312 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1313 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it is common either really, or logically. But it is not so really;
|
|
|
1314 otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But
|
|
|
1315 in God there is neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved above (
|
|
|
1316 <a id="FP_Q30_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore this term 'person' is not common to the three.
|
|
|
1317 </p>
|
|
|
1318 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1319 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask, "Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is common
|
|
|
1320 to them.
|
|
|
1321 </p>
|
|
|
1322 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1323 <b>I answer that,</b> The very mode of expression itself shows that this term "person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for
|
|
|
1324 when we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three. Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing,
|
|
|
1325 as if one essence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of the three, as also one essence.
|
|
|
1326 </p>
|
|
|
1327 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p7"> What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those who have examined the subject. Some have called
|
|
|
1328 it a community of exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the word "incommunicable." Others thought it
|
|
|
1329 to be a community of intention, as the definition of person contains the word "individual"; as we say that to be a "species"
|
|
|
1330 is common to horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is not a
|
|
|
1331 name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name
|
|
|
1332 "person" is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and
|
|
|
1333 species, as man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of those common natures,
|
|
|
1334 signified by the terms "genus" or "species." The vague individual thing, as "some man," signifies the common nature with
|
|
|
1335 the determinate mode of existence of singular things---that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from others. But the
|
|
|
1336 name of a designated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies
|
|
|
1337 this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference---that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the individual
|
|
|
1338 on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of singular things; while this name "person" is not given to signify
|
|
|
1339 the
|
|
|
1340 individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine
|
|
|
1341 persons, that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name "person" is common in
|
|
|
1342 idea to the three divine persons.
|
|
|
1343 </p>
|
|
|
1344 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1345 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is founded on a real community.
|
|
|
1346 </p>
|
|
|
1347 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p9">
|
|
|
1348 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many.
|
|
|
1349 </p>
|
|
|
1350 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p10">
|
|
|
1351 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this community is logical and not real, yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or
|
|
|
1352 genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the community of person the same as community of genus or species;
|
|
|
1353 and because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of many
|
|
|
1354 which differ in being.
|
|
|
1355 </p>
|
|
|
1356 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1357 <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1358 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1359 <a href="summa.FP_Q31.html"></a>
|
|
|
1360 </div>
|
|
|
1361 <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1362 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1363 </div>
|
|
|
1364 <div id="FP_Q31" class="div3">
|
|
|
1365 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1366 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1367 <h3 id="FP_Q31-p0.1">OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1368 <p id="FP_Q31-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1369 <p id="FP_Q31-p2"> We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which gives rise to four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1370 <p id="FP_Q31-p3"> (1) Concerning the word "Trinity";</p>
|
|
|
1371 <p id="FP_Q31-p4"> (2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?</p>
|
|
|
1372 <p id="FP_Q31-p5"> (3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be joined to an essential name in God?</p>
|
|
|
1373 <p id="FP_Q31-p6"> (4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?</p>
|
|
|
1374 <p id="FP_Q31-p7"></p>
|
|
|
1375 <div id="FP_Q31_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1376 <a href="summa.FP_Q31.html"></a>
|
|
|
1377 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1378 <h4 id="FP_Q31_A1-p0.1">Whether there is trinity in God?</h4>
|
|
|
1379 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1380 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1381 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity"
|
|
|
1382 does not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the persons: nor does it signify relation;
|
|
|
1383 for it does not express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be applied to God.
|
|
|
1384 </p>
|
|
|
1385 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1386 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as
|
|
|
1387 the unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore
|
|
|
1388 this word "trinity" does not apply to God.
|
|
|
1389 </p>
|
|
|
1390 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1391 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore
|
|
|
1392 neither is there trinity in God.
|
|
|
1393 </p>
|
|
|
1394 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1395 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if
|
|
|
1396 Trinity exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there would be three essential unities;
|
|
|
1397 which is heresy.
|
|
|
1398 </p>
|
|
|
1399 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1400 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the Father.
|
|
|
1401 But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore
|
|
|
1402 the word trinity is not to be applied to God.
|
|
|
1403 </p>
|
|
|
1404 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p7">
|
|
|
1405 <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in Unity is to be revered."
|
|
|
1406 </p>
|
|
|
1407 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1408 <b>I answer that,</b> The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that
|
|
|
1409 we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate
|
|
|
1410 manner.
|
|
|
1411 </p>
|
|
|
1412 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1413 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity" seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity
|
|
|
1414 may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and
|
|
|
1415 on this account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations
|
|
|
1416 themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other;
|
|
|
1417 and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another.
|
|
|
1418 </p>
|
|
|
1419 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1420 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality of the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For "people"
|
|
|
1421 is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective
|
|
|
1422 words; but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also
|
|
|
1423 with this there is unity of essence.
|
|
|
1424 </p>
|
|
|
1425 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p11">
|
|
|
1426 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a proportion
|
|
|
1427 of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion, according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is
|
|
|
1428 not triplicity, but Trinity.
|
|
|
1429 </p>
|
|
|
1430 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p12">
|
|
|
1431 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we do
|
|
|
1432 not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity
|
|
|
1433 of nature; as the "supposita" of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity";
|
|
|
1434 meaning that the nature is in its "supposita."
|
|
|
1435 </p>
|
|
|
1436 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p13">
|
|
|
1437 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself;
|
|
|
1438 since the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the
|
|
|
1439 Trinity is trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be three "supposita" of the Trinity; as
|
|
|
1440 when we say, "God is trine," it follows that there are three "supposita" of the
|
|
|
1441 Godhead.
|
|
|
1442 </p>
|
|
|
1443 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p14"></p>
|
|
|
1444 <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1445 <a href="summa.FP_Q31.html"></a>
|
|
|
1446 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1447 </div>
|
|
|
1448 <div id="FP_Q31_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1449 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1450 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1451 <h4 id="FP_Q31_A2-p0.1">Whether the Son is other than the Father?</h4>
|
|
|
1452 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1453 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1454 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father. For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance.
|
|
|
1455 If, then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says
|
|
|
1456 (De Trin. vii), that when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity."
|
|
|
1457 </p>
|
|
|
1458 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1459 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
|
|
|
1460 Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the
|
|
|
1461 Son are one in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any diversity."
|
|
|
1462 </p>
|
|
|
1463 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1464 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin.
|
|
|
1465 vii) that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other
|
|
|
1466 that the Father.
|
|
|
1467 </p>
|
|
|
1468 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1469 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So
|
|
|
1470 if the Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Father.
|
|
|
1471 </p>
|
|
|
1472 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1473 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says: "There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
|
|
|
1474 the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another; although the Father is one person, the Son another,
|
|
|
1475 and the Holy Ghost another."
|
|
|
1476 </p>
|
|
|
1477 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1478 <b>I answer that,</b> Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance,
|
|
|
1479 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. lvii.</a>], a heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty;
|
|
|
1480 because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful."
|
|
|
1481 Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously between them---namely, the
|
|
|
1482 error of Arius, who placed a
|
|
|
1483 Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of
|
|
|
1484 essence.
|
|
|
1485 </p>
|
|
|
1486 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p8"> Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the
|
|
|
1487 unity of essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the relative opposition. Hence whenever we find
|
|
|
1488 terms of "diversity" or "difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of "diversity" or "difference" are
|
|
|
1489 taken to mean "distinction." But lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the terms
|
|
|
1490 "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid
|
|
|
1491 the use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says
|
|
|
1492 (De Fide i) that "in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead": and according to Hilary, as quoted
|
|
|
1493 above, "in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable."
|
|
|
1494 </p>
|
|
|
1495 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p9"> To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity," lest we take away the communicability of the divine
|
|
|
1496 essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are separate in Godhead."
|
|
|
1497 We must avoid the adjective "only" [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary says in the same book: "We
|
|
|
1498 exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there
|
|
|
1499 is no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity is common to several. We avoid the word "confused,"
|
|
|
1500 lest we take away from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide i): "What is one is not confused;
|
|
|
1501 and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be avoided, lest we take away the
|
|
|
1502 society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God."
|
|
|
1503 </p>
|
|
|
1504 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p10"> This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only a distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly
|
|
|
1505 say that "the Son is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of the divine nature, as He is another person
|
|
|
1506 and another hypostasis.
|
|
|
1507 </p>
|
|
|
1508 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p11">
|
|
|
1509 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Other," being like the name of a particular thing, refers to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason for using
|
|
|
1510 it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance
|
|
|
1511 in the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is another.
|
|
|
1512 </p>
|
|
|
1513 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p12">
|
|
|
1514 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form
|
|
|
1515 of God" (
|
|
|
1516 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.6" target="asv">Phil. 2:6</a>). Therefore the term "difference" does not properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet, Damascene (De
|
|
|
1517 Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
|
|
|
1518 way of form. Hence he says that the
|
|
|
1519 hypostases do not differ from each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But "difference" is taken
|
|
|
1520 for "distinction," as above stated.
|
|
|
1521 </p>
|
|
|
1522 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p13">
|
|
|
1523 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The term "alien" means what is extraneous and dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and therefore
|
|
|
1524 we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that He is anything "alien."
|
|
|
1525 </p>
|
|
|
1526 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p14">
|
|
|
1527 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence
|
|
|
1528 is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject
|
|
|
1529 in the common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the
|
|
|
1530 "suppositum"; whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal
|
|
|
1531 animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say that the Father is other than the
|
|
|
1532 Son, but not something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person.
|
|
|
1533 </p>
|
|
|
1534 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1535 <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p16"></p>
|
|
|
1536 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1537 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1538 </div>
|
|
|
1539 <div id="FP_Q31_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1540 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1541 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1542 <h4 id="FP_Q31_A3-p0.1">Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term in God?</h4>
|
|
|
1543 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1544 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1545 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the
|
|
|
1546 Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another." But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints.
|
|
|
1547 Therefore we cannot say that God is alone.
|
|
|
1548 </p>
|
|
|
1549 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1550 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons
|
|
|
1551 together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God.
|
|
|
1552 But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone." Therefore God cannot
|
|
|
1553 be said to be alone.
|
|
|
1554 </p>
|
|
|
1555 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1556 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate
|
|
|
1557 or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a
|
|
|
1558 father; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, "God alone creates," it would
|
|
|
1559 follow that the "Father alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the
|
|
|
1560 Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential
|
|
|
1561 term in God.
|
|
|
1562 </p>
|
|
|
1563 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1564 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God" (
|
|
|
1565 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>).
|
|
|
1566 </p>
|
|
|
1567 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1568 <b>I answer that,</b> This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one
|
|
|
1569 which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man."
|
|
|
1570 If the term "alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God; for it would mean solitude
|
|
|
1571 in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what
|
|
|
1572 is above stated
|
|
|
1573 <a id="FP_Q31_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no one";
|
|
|
1574 and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other "suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone
|
|
|
1575 writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with
|
|
|
1576 him. In this way nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential
|
|
|
1577 term in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said "God alone is eternal," because nothing but
|
|
|
1578 God is eternal.
|
|
|
1579 </p>
|
|
|
1580 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1581 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist
|
|
|
1582 in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature;
|
|
|
1583 thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would
|
|
|
1584 be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several
|
|
|
1585 persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God; much
|
|
|
1586 less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
|
|
|
1587 </p>
|
|
|
1588 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1589 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
|
|
|
1590 "suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can
|
|
|
1591 be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"---that is, no one else---"runs: and Socrates runs
|
|
|
1592 only"---that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father
|
|
|
1593 is God alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The
|
|
|
1594 Trinity is God Who alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God Who alone is God, if the
|
|
|
1595 relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the "suppositum." So, when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone,
|
|
|
1596 but that the Trinity is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of ages, invisible,
|
|
|
1597 the
|
|
|
1598 only God," as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.
|
|
|
1599 </p>
|
|
|
1600 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1601 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean two
|
|
|
1602 things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or
|
|
|
1603 it can signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though
|
|
|
1604 not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it
|
|
|
1605 follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it
|
|
|
1606 is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for
|
|
|
1607 instance, from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."
|
|
|
1608 </p>
|
|
|
1609 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1610 <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1611 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1612 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1613 </div>
|
|
|
1614 <div id="FP_Q31_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1615 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1616 <a href="summa.FP_Q32.html"></a>
|
|
|
1617 <h4 id="FP_Q31_A4-p0.1">Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?</h4>
|
|
|
1618 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1619 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1620 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our
|
|
|
1621 Lord speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true God" (
|
|
|
1622 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). Therefore the Father alone is true God.
|
|
|
1623 </p>
|
|
|
1624 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1625 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" (
|
|
|
1626 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.27" target="asv">Mat. 11:27</a>); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion
|
|
|
1627 follows.
|
|
|
1628 </p>
|
|
|
1629 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1630 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does
|
|
|
1631 not exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his
|
|
|
1632 hand is not white," or that "man is not white." But one person is in the concept of another; as the Father is in the concept
|
|
|
1633 of the Son; and conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not
|
|
|
1634 exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.
|
|
|
1635 </p>
|
|
|
1636 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1637 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ."
|
|
|
1638 </p>
|
|
|
1639 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1640 <b>On the contrary,</b> This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes two assertions---namely, that the Father is God, and that no other besides
|
|
|
1641 the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore
|
|
|
1642 this is false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.
|
|
|
1643 </p>
|
|
|
1644 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p7">
|
|
|
1645 <b>I answer that,</b> When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude in the
|
|
|
1646 Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several
|
|
|
1647 ways. For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"---that
|
|
|
1648 is, "He who with no other is the Father, is God." In this way Augustine expounds
|
|
|
1649 when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost,
|
|
|
1650 but because they are not the Father together with Him." This, however, is not the usual way of speaking, unless we understand
|
|
|
1651 another implication, as though we said "He who alone is called the Father is God." But in the strict sense the exclusion affects
|
|
|
1652 the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it
|
|
|
1653 in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the
|
|
|
1654 Holy Ghost. But because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person
|
|
|
1655 rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded,
|
|
|
1656 whenever we find it in an authentic work.
|
|
|
1657 </p>
|
|
|
1658 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1659 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole
|
|
|
1660 Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not
|
|
|
1661 excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word "only" excludes another thing, as above explained.
|
|
|
1662 </p>
|
|
|
1663 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p9"> The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost,
|
|
|
1664 by reason of the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i.e.
|
|
|
1665 no man] is not the same as "no man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could not be
|
|
|
1666 excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any
|
|
|
1667 rational nature.
|
|
|
1668 </p>
|
|
|
1669 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p10">
|
|
|
1670 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ
|
|
|
1671 in "suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son differs in "suppositum" from the Father; and so there is no parity.
|
|
|
1672 </p>
|
|
|
1673 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p11">
|
|
|
1674 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the glory
|
|
|
1675 of God the Father."
|
|
|
1676 </p>
|
|
|
1677 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1678 <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1679 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1680 <a href="summa.FP_Q32.html"></a>
|
|
|
1681 </div>
|
|
|
1682 <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1683 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1684 </div>
|
|
|
1685 <div id="FP_Q32" class="div3">
|
|
|
1686 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1687 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1688 <h3 id="FP_Q32-p0.1">THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1689 <p id="FP_Q32-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1690 <p id="FP_Q32-p2"> We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1691 <p id="FP_Q32-p3"> (1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?</p>
|
|
|
1692 <p id="FP_Q32-p4"> (2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?</p>
|
|
|
1693 <p id="FP_Q32-p5"> (3) The number of the notions?</p>
|
|
|
1694 <p id="FP_Q32-p6"> (4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions?</p>
|
|
|
1695 <div id="FP_Q32_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1696 <a href="summa.FP_Q32.html"></a>
|
|
|
1697 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1698 <h4 id="FP_Q32_A1-p0.1">Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?</h4>
|
|
|
1699 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1700 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1701 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge
|
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1702 of God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle
|
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|
1703 says (De Coelo et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"---namely, three---"we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of
|
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1704 one God, surpassing all things created." And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have
|
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1705 read in their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and
|
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1706 the Word was with God, and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the distinction of persons is laid down. We read,
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1707 moreover, in a gloss on
|
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1708 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1" target="asv">Rom. 1</a> and
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1709 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.8" target="asv">Ex. 8</a> that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as regards knowledge of a third person---i.e. of the Holy
|
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1710 Ghost ---and thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise
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1711 Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself its own heat." By which words the generation of the
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1712 Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural
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1713 reason.
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1714 </p>
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1715 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p3">
|
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|
1716 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can
|
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1717 be found for any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite
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1718 goodness of God, who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; while some are moved by the
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1719 consideration that "no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership." Augustine
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1720 proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind;
|
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1721 and we have followed him in this (
|
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1722 <a id="FP_Q32_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html">Q[27] , AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.
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1723 </p>
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1724 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p4">
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1725 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the
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1726 divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.
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1727 </p>
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1728 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p5">
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1729 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And Ambrose says
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1730 (De Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent." But the trinity
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1731 of the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession (
|
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1732 <a id="FP_Q32_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary
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1733 reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.
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1734 </p>
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1735 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p6">
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1736 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (
|
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1737 <a id="FP_Q32_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], AA[4]</a>,12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge
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1738 of God, as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know of God that only which of necessity belongs
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1739 to Him as the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental
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1740 principle in treating of God as above (
|
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1741 <a id="FP_Q32_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, and not
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1742 to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but
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1743 not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason,
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1744 derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as
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1745 regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason;
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1746 wherefore the Apostle says that "faith is of things that appear not" (
|
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1747 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>), and the same Apostle says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes
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1748 of this world; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden" (
|
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1749 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:6,7</a>). Secondly, as regards the utility of
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1750 drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent,
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1751 he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on
|
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1752 such grounds.
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1753 </p>
|
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1754 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p7"> Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the authority;
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1755 while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible. Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div.
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1756 Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the truth of the word"---i.e.
|
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1757 "the sacred word, we too follow this rule."
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1758 </p>
|
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1759 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p8">
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1760 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The philosophers did not know the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as paternity,
|
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1761 filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words, "We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the
|
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1762 world"---i.e. the philosophers---"knew" (
|
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1763 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:6</a>). Nevertheless, they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to
|
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1764 the Son,
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1765 goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this number," etc., we must not take it
|
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1766 as if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number in their
|
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1767 sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, "In
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1768 the beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all
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1769 things,
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1770 and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said
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1771 to have failed in the third sign---that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they deviated from the goodness
|
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1772 appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God" (
|
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1773 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1" target="asv">Rom. 1</a>); or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe,
|
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1774 they consequently maintained
|
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1775 the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called "mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea
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1776 of all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate substance
|
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1777 which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which
|
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1778 was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad," etc.,
|
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|
1779 this
|
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|
1780 does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the world. For
|
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1781 one God produced one world by reason of His love for Himself.
|
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1782 </p>
|
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1783 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p9">
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1784 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some
|
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1785 principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always
|
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1786 of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming
|
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1787 an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in
|
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|
1788 astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of
|
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1789 the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might
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1790 explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the
|
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1791 Trinity; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is
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1792 adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is manifested
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1793 also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite
|
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1794 goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity
|
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1795 it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires
|
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1796 partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order
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1797 to have the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as
|
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1798 the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive
|
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1799 at knowledge, and not conversely.
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1800 </p>
|
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1801 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p10">
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|
1802 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two reason why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of
|
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1803 creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things
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1804 by necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not because He needed
|
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1805 them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of
|
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1806 His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there
|
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1807 be light," to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that it was good," to show proof of the divine love.
|
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1808 The same is also found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly concerning the
|
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1809 salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.
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1810 </p>
|
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1811 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p11"></p>
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1812 <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p12"></p>
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1813 <a href="summa.FP_Q32.html"></a>
|
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1814 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
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1815 </div>
|
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1816 <div id="FP_Q32_A2" class="div4">
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1817 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
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1818 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
|
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1819 <h4 id="FP_Q32_A2-p0.1">Whether there are notions in God?</h4>
|
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1820 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p1"></p>
|
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|
1821 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p2">
|
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|
1822 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God there are no notions. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God
|
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1823 but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there
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1824 are none in God.
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1825 </p>
|
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1826 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p3">
|
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1827 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern
|
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1828 the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the
|
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1829 notions: for instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what belongs to the persons be so predicated;
|
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1830 for example, we do not say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten.
|
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1831 Therefore there do not exist notions in God.
|
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|
1832 </p>
|
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|
1833 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p4">
|
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|
1834 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition:
|
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1835 for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions
|
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1836 in God.
|
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|
1837 </p>
|
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|
1838 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p5">
|
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|
1839 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three properties;
|
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1840 i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional." Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God.
|
|
|
1841 </p>
|
|
|
1842 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p6">
|
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|
1843 <b>I answer that,</b> Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and wherever
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1844 there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your kindness"---i.e.
|
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|
1845 you who are kind---so when we speak of paternity in God, we mean God the Father.
|
|
|
1846 </p>
|
|
|
1847 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p7"> But, as shown above (
|
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|
1848 <a id="FP_Q32_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>, ad 1), the use of concrete and abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine simplicity; forasmuch as
|
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|
1849 we always name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence,
|
|
|
1850 considered in itself, and therefore, our human intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own mode, that
|
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|
1851 is in so far as they are found in sensible objects,
|
|
|
1852 whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent
|
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|
1853 things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by abstract names, to express their simplicity;
|
|
|
1854 whereas, to express their subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.
|
|
|
1855 </p>
|
|
|
1856 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p8"> But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom
|
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|
1857 and wise; but the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity and Father.
|
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|
1858 </p>
|
|
|
1859 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p9"> Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father,
|
|
|
1860 the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask: "Whereby are They one God? and whereby are
|
|
|
1861 They three persons?" as we answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be some abstract terms whereby
|
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|
1862 we may answer that the persons are distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an abstract
|
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|
1863 term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine essence is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the property
|
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|
1864 as "Whereby."
|
|
|
1865 </p>
|
|
|
1866 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p10"> The second motive is because one person in God is related to two persons---namely, the person of the Father to the person
|
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1867 of the Son and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son
|
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|
1868 also and the Holy Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, since relation alone multiplies
|
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1869 the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it be said with
|
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|
1870 Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the Father
|
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|
1871 is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations.
|
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|
1872 For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically
|
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1873 different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the relation of lord and father must differ
|
|
|
1874 according to the difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His creatures by one specific
|
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|
1875 relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence there is
|
|
|
1876 no parity.
|
|
|
1877 </p>
|
|
|
1878 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p11"> Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the creature (
|
|
|
1879 <a id="FP_Q32_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html">Q[28], A[1]</a>,3); while there is no reason against our admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there must be a real
|
|
|
1880 relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, whereby
|
|
|
1881 they are related to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to
|
|
|
1882 the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be separately
|
|
|
1883 signified in the abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.
|
|
|
1884 </p>
|
|
|
1885 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p12">
|
|
|
1886 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of notions,
|
|
|
1887 as the abstract is contained in the concrete.
|
|
|
1888 </p>
|
|
|
1889 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p13">
|
|
|
1890 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God the notions have their significance not after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the persons
|
|
|
1891 are known; although in God these notions or relations are real, as stated above (
|
|
|
1892 <a id="FP_Q32_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html">Q[28], A[1]</a>). Therefore whatever has order to any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; forasmuch as this is against
|
|
|
1893 their mode of signification. Hence we cannot say that paternity begets, or creates,
|
|
|
1894 or is wise, or is intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any act, but simply remove created conditions
|
|
|
1895 from God, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also on
|
|
|
1896 account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions; for we can
|
|
|
1897 say that paternity is God, and that paternity is the Father.
|
|
|
1898 </p>
|
|
|
1899 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p14">
|
|
|
1900 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the persons are simple, still without prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be abstractedly
|
|
|
1901 signified, as above explained.
|
|
|
1902 </p>
|
|
|
1903 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1904 <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p16"></p>
|
|
|
1905 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
1906 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1907 </div>
|
|
|
1908 <div id="FP_Q32_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1909 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1910 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1911 <h4 id="FP_Q32_A3-p0.1">Whether there are five notions?</h4>
|
|
|
1912 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1913 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1914 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not five notions. For the notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished
|
|
|
1915 from each other. But the relations in God are only four (
|
|
|
1916 <a id="FP_Q32_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>). Therefore the notions are only four in number.
|
|
|
1917 </p>
|
|
|
1918 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1919 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called
|
|
|
1920 the Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary; which cannot be allowed.
|
|
|
1921 </p>
|
|
|
1922 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1923 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as
|
|
|
1924 in the person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common spiration. Either these three notions really
|
|
|
1925 differ, or not. If they really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of several things. But if they
|
|
|
1926 differ only logically, it follows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that we can
|
|
|
1927 say that as the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the common reality, so common spiration is paternity;
|
|
|
1928 which is not to be admitted. Therefore there are not five notions.
|
|
|
1929 </p>
|
|
|
1930 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1931 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It seems that there are more; because as the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion
|
|
|
1932 of innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.
|
|
|
1933 </p>
|
|
|
1934 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1935 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost
|
|
|
1936 to proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion
|
|
|
1937 common to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
1938 </p>
|
|
|
1939 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1940 <b>I answer that,</b> A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their origin:
|
|
|
1941 and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two
|
|
|
1942 modes a person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known by the fact that He is from another; but by
|
|
|
1943 the fact that He is from no one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called
|
|
|
1944 "innascibility." As the source of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known
|
|
|
1945 by the notion of "paternity"; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the notion of "common spiration." The Son
|
|
|
1946 can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is known by "filiation"; and also by another person proceeding from Him,
|
|
|
1947 the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as the Father is known, by "common spiration." The Holy Ghost can be
|
|
|
1948 known by
|
|
|
1949 the fact that He is from another, or from others; thus He is known by "procession"; but not by the fact that another is from
|
|
|
1950 Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him.
|
|
|
1951 </p>
|
|
|
1952 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p8"> Therefore, there are
|
|
|
1953 Five notions in God: "innascibility,"
|
|
|
1954 "paternity," "filiation," "common spiration," and "procession." Of these only four are relations, for "innascibility" is not
|
|
|
1955 a relation, except by reduction, as will appear later (
|
|
|
1956 <a id="FP_Q32_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html">Q[33], A[4]</a>, ad 3). Four only are properties. For "common spiration" is not a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three are
|
|
|
1957 personal notions---i.e. constituting persons, "paternity," "filiation," and "procession." "Common
|
|
|
1958 spiration" and "innascibility" are called notions of Persons, but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on (
|
|
|
1959 <a id="FP_Q32_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>, ad 1).
|
|
|
1960 </p>
|
|
|
1961 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1962 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Besides the four relations, another notion must be admitted, as above explained.
|
|
|
1963 </p>
|
|
|
1964 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p10">
|
|
|
1965 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The divine essence is signified as a reality; and likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions are
|
|
|
1966 signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons,
|
|
|
1967 nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.
|
|
|
1968 </p>
|
|
|
1969 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p11">
|
|
|
1970 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the real plurality in God is founded only on relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they are
|
|
|
1971 not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor again are they predicated of each other, because they are
|
|
|
1972 different ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge, although we do
|
|
|
1973 say that knowledge is power.
|
|
|
1974 </p>
|
|
|
1975 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p12">
|
|
|
1976 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since Person implies dignity, as stated above (
|
|
|
1977 <a id="FP_Q32_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a> ) we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His
|
|
|
1978 dignity, as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one.
|
|
|
1979 </p>
|
|
|
1980 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p13">
|
|
|
1981 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son
|
|
|
1982 agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on which a notion is based must be something special;
|
|
|
1983 thus no parity of reasoning exists.
|
|
|
1984 </p>
|
|
|
1985 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
1986 <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p15"></p>
|
|
|
1987 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1988 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1989 </div>
|
|
|
1990 <div id="FP_Q32_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1991 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1992 <a href="summa.FP_Q33.html"></a>
|
|
|
1993 <h4 id="FP_Q32_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?</h4>
|
|
|
1994 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1995 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1996 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful to have various contrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3):
|
|
|
1997 "No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity": to which mystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary
|
|
|
1998 opinions must be in some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions of the notions.
|
|
|
1999 </p>
|
|
|
2000 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2001 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore
|
|
|
2002 neither can there be about the notions.
|
|
|
2003 </p>
|
|
|
2004 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2005 <b>On the contrary,</b> The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore different opinions of the notions are permissible.
|
|
|
2006 </p>
|
|
|
2007 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2008 <b>I answer that,</b> Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and
|
|
|
2009 unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy,
|
|
|
2010 especially if it be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial of it involves as a consequence something
|
|
|
2011 against faith; as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana,
|
|
|
2012 for it follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such things anyone may have a false opinion without danger
|
|
|
2013 of heresy, before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences against faith, and particularly if no
|
|
|
2014 obstinacy be shown; whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow against
|
|
|
2015 faith, then the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as heretical which were
|
|
|
2016 formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now more manifest.
|
|
|
2017 </p>
|
|
|
2018 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p6"> So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at
|
|
|
2019 variance with faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing or thinking that consequences
|
|
|
2020 against the faith would follow, he would lapse into heresy.
|
|
|
2021 </p>
|
|
|
2022 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p7"> By what has been said all the objections may be solved.</p>
|
|
|
2023 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p8"></p>
|
|
|
2024 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
2025 <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2026 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2027 <a href="summa.FP_Q33.html"></a>
|
|
|
2028 </div>
|
|
|
2029 <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2030 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2031 </div>
|
|
|
2032 <div id="FP_Q33" class="div3">
|
|
|
2033 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2034 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2035 <h3 id="FP_Q33-p0.1">OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2036 <p id="FP_Q33-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2037 <p id="FP_Q33-p2"> We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
2038 <p id="FP_Q33-p3"> (1) Whether the Father is the Principle?</p>
|
|
|
2039 <p id="FP_Q33-p4"> (2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name "Father"?</p>
|
|
|
2040 <p id="FP_Q33-p5"> (3) Whether "Father" in God is said personally before it is said essentially?</p>
|
|
|
2041 <p id="FP_Q33-p6"> (4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?</p>
|
|
|
2042 <div id="FP_Q33_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2043 <a href="summa.FP_Q33.html"></a>
|
|
|
2044 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2045 <h4 id="FP_Q33_A1-p0.1">Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?</h4>
|
|
|
2046 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2047 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2048 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Father cannot be called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are
|
|
|
2049 the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore
|
|
|
2050 we must not say that He is the principle of the Son.
|
|
|
2051 </p>
|
|
|
2052 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2053 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows
|
|
|
2054 that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which appears false.
|
|
|
2055 </p>
|
|
|
2056 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2057 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in God there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore
|
|
|
2058 in speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.
|
|
|
2059 </p>
|
|
|
2060 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2061 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is the Principle of the whole Deity."
|
|
|
2062 </p>
|
|
|
2063 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2064 <b>I answer that,</b> The word "principle" signifies only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we
|
|
|
2065 call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.
|
|
|
2066 </p>
|
|
|
2067 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2068 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle" indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use
|
|
|
2069 the word "cause," but only "principle." The reason is because "principle" is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more
|
|
|
2070 common than "element." For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the principle, but not the cause.
|
|
|
2071 Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (
|
|
|
2072 <a id="FP_Q33_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html">Q[13], A[11]</a>), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term "cause" seems
|
|
|
2073 to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word "principle." For in all
|
|
|
2074 kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas
|
|
|
2075 we use the term "principle" even in things which have no such difference, but have only a
|
|
|
2076 certain order to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that the first part
|
|
|
2077 of a line is the principle of a line.
|
|
|
2078 </p>
|
|
|
2079 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2080 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom
|
|
|
2081 with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father something of authority by reason of His being the principle,
|
|
|
2082 still we do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of
|
|
|
2083 error. In this way, Hilary says (De Trin. ix): "By authority of the Giver, the Father
|
|
|
2084 is the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is give."
|
|
|
2085 </p>
|
|
|
2086 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2087 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this word principle, as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify priority,
|
|
|
2088 but origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above (
|
|
|
2089 <a id="FP_Q33_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">Q[13], A[8]</a>).
|
|
|
2090 </p>
|
|
|
2091 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2092 <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2093 <a href="summa.FP_Q33.html"></a>
|
|
|
2094 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2095 </div>
|
|
|
2096 <div id="FP_Q33_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
2097 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2098 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2099 <h4 id="FP_Q33_A2-p0.1">Whether this name "Father" is properly the name of a divine person?</h4>
|
|
|
2100 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2101 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2102 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly the name of a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies relation.
|
|
|
2103 Moreover "person" is an individual substance. Therefore this name "Father" is not properly a name signifying a Person.
|
|
|
2104 </p>
|
|
|
2105 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2106 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term
|
|
|
2107 is more properly applied to God, as stated above (
|
|
|
2108 <a id="FP_Q33_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html">Q[13], A[11]</a>). Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Father.
|
|
|
2109 </p>
|
|
|
2110 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2111 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or
|
|
|
2112 offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word
|
|
|
2113 in God is not properly called Father.
|
|
|
2114 </p>
|
|
|
2115 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2116 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply
|
|
|
2117 to creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it
|
|
|
2118 proceeds, not only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name "Father" taken from generation does not seem to be
|
|
|
2119 the proper name of any divine person.
|
|
|
2120 </p>
|
|
|
2121 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2122 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
2123 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.88.27" target="asv">Ps. 88:27</a>): "He shall cry out to me: Thou art my Father."
|
|
|
2124 </p>
|
|
|
2125 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2126 <b>I answer that,</b> The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and
|
|
|
2127 soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular
|
|
|
2128 body; and by these is this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person
|
|
|
2129 of the Father from all other persons. Hence this name "Father," whereby paternity is
|
|
|
2130 signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father.
|
|
|
2131 </p>
|
|
|
2132 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2133 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this name "father" among us does not signify a person, but the relation
|
|
|
2134 of a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in God the relation signified by the name "Father"
|
|
|
2135 is a subsisting person. Hence, as above explained (
|
|
|
2136 <a id="FP_Q33_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html">Q[29], A[4]</a>), this name "person" in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature.
|
|
|
2137 </p>
|
|
|
2138 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2139 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now
|
|
|
2140 generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore
|
|
|
2141 the name "Father" is more expressive as regards the divine person than genitor or begettor.
|
|
|
2142 </p>
|
|
|
2143 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2144 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something
|
|
|
2145 subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.
|
|
|
2146 </p>
|
|
|
2147 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p11">
|
|
|
2148 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The terms "generation" and "paternity" like the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as
|
|
|
2149 regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the Apostle says, "I bend my knee to
|
|
|
2150 the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named" (
|
|
|
2151 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.14" target="asv">Eph. 3:14</a>). This is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the
|
|
|
2152 term which is the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect
|
|
|
2153 is the generation; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a generator
|
|
|
2154 to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten
|
|
|
2155 is numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows that
|
|
|
2156 generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction
|
|
|
2157 exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity.
|
|
|
2158 </p>
|
|
|
2159 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2160 <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2161 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2162 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2163 </div>
|
|
|
2164 <div id="FP_Q33_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2165 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2166 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2167 <h4 id="FP_Q33_A3-p0.1">Whether this name "Father" is applied to God, firstly as a personal name?</h4>
|
|
|
2168 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2169 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2170 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied to God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common
|
|
|
2171 precedes the particular. But this name "Father" as a personal name, belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential
|
|
|
2172 sense it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father" to the whole Trinity. Therefore "Father" comes first as an
|
|
|
2173 essential name before its personal sense.
|
|
|
2174 </p>
|
|
|
2175 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2176 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem
|
|
|
2177 to be of the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's;
|
|
|
2178 since, according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the creature and to the Son. Therefore "Father" in God
|
|
|
2179 is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally.
|
|
|
2180 </p>
|
|
|
2181 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2182 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by
|
|
|
2183 reason of filiation or generation, according to
|
|
|
2184 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.15" target="asv"> Col. 1:15</a>: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Therefore paternity taken in a personal sense
|
|
|
2185 is not prior to, but has the same concept as, paternity taken essentially.
|
|
|
2186 </p>
|
|
|
2187 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2188 <b>On the contrary,</b> The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the creature
|
|
|
2189 in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the
|
|
|
2190 creature.
|
|
|
2191 </p>
|
|
|
2192 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2193 <b>I answer that,</b> A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which only
|
|
|
2194 partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to
|
|
|
2195 the signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things. Hence this name "lion" is applied
|
|
|
2196 first to the animal containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so called,
|
|
|
2197 before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it
|
|
|
2198 is said by way of similitude.
|
|
|
2199 </p>
|
|
|
2200 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p7"> Now it is manifest from the foregoing (
|
|
|
2201 <a id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
2202 <a id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>), that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the
|
|
|
2203 nature and glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner,
|
|
|
2204 since the Creator and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain likeness, which is the more
|
|
|
2205 perfect the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some creatures, by reason only
|
|
|
2206 of a trace, for instance of irrational creatures, according to
|
|
|
2207 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Job.38.28" target="asv"> Job 38:28</a>: "Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?" Of some, namely, the rational creature (He is the Father),
|
|
|
2208 by reason of the likeness of His image, according to
|
|
|
2209 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.6" target="asv"> Dt. 32:6</a>: "Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and created thee?" And
|
|
|
2210 of others He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of
|
|
|
2211 eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received, according to
|
|
|
2212 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.16" target="asv"> Rom. 8:16,17</a>: "The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also." Lastly, He is the
|
|
|
2213 Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to
|
|
|
2214 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.6" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.2" target="asv"> Rom.
|
|
|
2215 5:2
|
|
|
2216 </a>: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore it is plain that "paternity" is applied to God first,
|
|
|
2217 as importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to creatures.
|
|
|
2218 </p>
|
|
|
2219 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2220 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in the
|
|
|
2221 understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but
|
|
|
2222 not conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper terms which import personal relations;
|
|
|
2223 because the person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production
|
|
|
2224 of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood to proceed from the artist before the
|
|
|
2225 thing designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father
|
|
|
2226 before the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear
|
|
|
2227 from the words of
|
|
|
2228 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of His
|
|
|
2229 Son."
|
|
|
2230 </p>
|
|
|
2231 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2232 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To "receive" is said to be common to the creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote
|
|
|
2233 similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First
|
|
|
2234 Born among many brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the image of the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses
|
|
|
2235 a position of singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as
|
|
|
2236 Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only begotten (
|
|
|
2237 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv">Jn. 1:18</a>): "The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared unto us."
|
|
|
2238 </p>
|
|
|
2239 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p10"> From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.</p>
|
|
|
2240 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2241 <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2242 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2243 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2244 </div>
|
|
|
2245 <div id="FP_Q33_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
2246 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2247 <a href="summa.FP_Q34.html"></a>
|
|
|
2248 <h4 id="FP_Q33_A4-p0.1">Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?</h4>
|
|
|
2249 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2250 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2251 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which
|
|
|
2252 it is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it only removes something. Therefore it does not signify
|
|
|
2253 a property of the Father.
|
|
|
2254 </p>
|
|
|
2255 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2256 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not
|
|
|
2257 begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten
|
|
|
2258 belongs also to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a privative sense, as every privation
|
|
|
2259 signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that
|
|
|
2260 the Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be.
|
|
|
2261 </p>
|
|
|
2262 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2263 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance;
|
|
|
2264 therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance.
|
|
|
2265 Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.
|
|
|
2266 </p>
|
|
|
2267 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2268 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there
|
|
|
2269 is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another. Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.
|
|
|
2270 </p>
|
|
|
2271 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2272 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as the Father is the principle of the person begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his
|
|
|
2273 opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to
|
|
|
2274 be unproceeding.
|
|
|
2275 </p>
|
|
|
2276 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p7">
|
|
|
2277 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one ---that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten---namely, by the property in
|
|
|
2278 each one respectively of innascibility and origin."
|
|
|
2279 </p>
|
|
|
2280 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p8">
|
|
|
2281 <b>I answer that,</b> As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before
|
|
|
2282 or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the
|
|
|
2283 Son.
|
|
|
2284 </p>
|
|
|
2285 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p9"> Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one way as the first "principle," by reason of its having
|
|
|
2286 a relation to what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a "first" principle by reason of its not being
|
|
|
2287 from another. Thus therefore the Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards the persons proceeding
|
|
|
2288 from Himself. But as the principle, not from a principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another;
|
|
|
2289 and this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word "begotten."
|
|
|
2290 </p>
|
|
|
2291 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p10">
|
|
|
2292 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not a negative
|
|
|
2293 term only, but either that it means both these things together---namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the
|
|
|
2294 principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does
|
|
|
2295 not seem true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from
|
|
|
2296 paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is included in the common. For source and authority signify
|
|
|
2297 in God nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports
|
|
|
2298 the negation of passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the same meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow
|
|
|
2299 that "unbegotten" is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are notified by negations; as, for
|
|
|
2300 instance,
|
|
|
2301 a point is defined as what has no part.
|
|
|
2302 </p>
|
|
|
2303 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p11">
|
|
|
2304 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is unbegotten,"
|
|
|
2305 that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may be taken in a kind of privation sense, but not as implying any imperfection.
|
|
|
2306 For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even though
|
|
|
2307 it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a stone be
|
|
|
2308 called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so called
|
|
|
2309 when something has not what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In
|
|
|
2310 a third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in which sense, privation imports an imperfection.
|
|
|
2311 In this sense, "unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second sense,
|
|
|
2312 meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the same nature is begotten. In this
|
|
|
2313 sense the term "unbegotten" can be applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper to the Father alone,
|
|
|
2314 it must be further understood that the name "unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another person; so
|
|
|
2315 that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in
|
|
|
2316 the term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from another; and not only that He is not from another by way only
|
|
|
2317 of generation. In this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by procession,
|
|
|
2318 as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it is in the Son or in the
|
|
|
2319 Holy Ghost from another---namely, from the Father.
|
|
|
2320 </p>
|
|
|
2321 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p12">
|
|
|
2322 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9), "unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus it applies
|
|
|
2323 to the substance, for thereby does the created substance differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is
|
|
|
2324 not begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man"
|
|
|
2325 is reduced to the genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality.
|
|
|
2326 Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father
|
|
|
2327 unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by relation; that is, as the relation of Son is
|
|
|
2328 denied of the Father.
|
|
|
2329 </p>
|
|
|
2330 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p13">
|
|
|
2331 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In every genus there must be something first; so in the divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from
|
|
|
2332 another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine
|
|
|
2333 natures. Hence Hilary says (De Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two innascibles." And this especially because,
|
|
|
2334 did two innascibles exist, one would not be from the other, and they would not be
|
|
|
2335 distinguished by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature.
|
|
|
2336 </p>
|
|
|
2337 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p14">
|
|
|
2338 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The property of the Father, whereby He is not from another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the
|
|
|
2339 Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost; both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special
|
|
|
2340 name, as stated above (
|
|
|
2341 <a id="FP_Q33_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>, ad 3), and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied of the Father
|
|
|
2342 that He is begotten,
|
|
|
2343 although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession of the
|
|
|
2344 Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the person begotten.
|
|
|
2345 </p>
|
|
|
2346 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p15"></p>
|
|
|
2347 <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p16"></p>
|
|
|
2348 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2349 <a href="summa.FP_Q34.html"></a>
|
|
|
2350 </div>
|
|
|
2351 <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2352 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2353 </div>
|
|
|
2354 <div id="FP_Q34" class="div3">
|
|
|
2355 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2356 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2357 <h3 id="FP_Q34-p0.1">OF THE PERSON OF THE SON (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2358 <p id="FP_Q34-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2359 <p id="FP_Q34-p2"> We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son---namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea
|
|
|
2360 of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image.
|
|
|
2361 </p>
|
|
|
2362 <p id="FP_Q34-p3"> Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
2363 <p id="FP_Q34-p4"> (1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?</p>
|
|
|
2364 <p id="FP_Q34-p5"> (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?</p>
|
|
|
2365 <p id="FP_Q34-p6"> (3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?</p>
|
|
|
2366 <div id="FP_Q34_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2367 <a href="summa.FP_Q34.html"></a>
|
|
|
2368 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2369 <h4 id="FP_Q34_A1-p0.1">Whether Word in God is a personal name?</h4>
|
|
|
2370 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2371 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2372 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father
|
|
|
2373 and Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (
|
|
|
2374 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q34_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.1" target="asv">Jn. 1:1</a>), "In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a personal name in God.
|
|
|
2375 </p>
|
|
|
2376 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2377 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), "The Word is knowledge with love;" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx),
|
|
|
2378 "To speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought." But knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms
|
|
|
2379 in God. Therefore Word is not a personal term in God.
|
|
|
2380 </p>
|
|
|
2381 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2382 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son
|
|
|
2383 is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise,
|
|
|
2384 each one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God, and not in a personal sense.
|
|
|
2385 </p>
|
|
|
2386 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2387 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is something made. For it is said, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms
|
|
|
2388 which do His Word" (
|
|
|
2389 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q34_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.8" target="asv">Ps. 148:8</a>). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God.
|
|
|
2390 </p>
|
|
|
2391 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2392 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is." But
|
|
|
2393 the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word.
|
|
|
2394 </p>
|
|
|
2395 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2396 <b>I answer that,</b> The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an essential name.
|
|
|
2397 </p>
|
|
|
2398 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p8"> To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth
|
|
|
2399 sense it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by
|
|
|
2400 the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word---that is, the vocal
|
|
|
2401 sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound
|
|
|
2402 signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination, as stated
|
|
|
2403 in De Anima ii, text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal
|
|
|
2404 sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and
|
|
|
2405 chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior
|
|
|
2406 concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds
|
|
|
2407 of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that "word" is called "the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved,
|
|
|
2408 and understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;" which is the first kind. "Again," he says, "the word is what is not pronounced
|
|
|
2409 by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart;" which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the word is the angel"---that
|
|
|
2410 is, the messenger "of intelligence;" which is the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which
|
|
|
2411 is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, "this is the word I have said," or "which the king has commanded,"
|
|
|
2412 alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command.
|
|
|
2413 </p>
|
|
|
2414 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p9"> Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever
|
|
|
2415 can understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already
|
|
|
2416 see some likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word." The concept itself of the heart has of
|
|
|
2417 its own nature to proceed from something other than itself---namely, from the knowledge of the one
|
|
|
2418 conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which
|
|
|
2419 belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin (
|
|
|
2420 <a id="FP_Q34_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], AA[3]</a>,4,5). Hence the term "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally.
|
|
|
2421 </p>
|
|
|
2422 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p10">
|
|
|
2423 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to
|
|
|
2424 maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the
|
|
|
2425 Word proceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the Father. For the interior
|
|
|
2426 word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within
|
|
|
2427 him. But supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be
|
|
|
2428 called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word,
|
|
|
2429 or it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called
|
|
|
2430 a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies
|
|
|
2431 the
|
|
|
2432 interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes
|
|
|
2433 said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally.
|
|
|
2434 </p>
|
|
|
2435 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p11">
|
|
|
2436 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that which
|
|
|
2437 emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as
|
|
|
2438 it is made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of understanding which is to the
|
|
|
2439 actual intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding
|
|
|
2440 does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that
|
|
|
2441 word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for
|
|
|
2442 what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is "begotten wisdom;" for
|
|
|
2443 it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called "begotten knowledge." Thus can also be
|
|
|
2444 explained how "to speak" is in God "to see by thought," forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought.
|
|
|
2445 Still the term "thought" does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): "Therefore do we
|
|
|
2446 speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming
|
|
|
2447 the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless." For thought consists properly
|
|
|
2448 in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does
|
|
|
2449 not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation."
|
|
|
2450 </p>
|
|
|
2451 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p12">
|
|
|
2452 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as the Word
|
|
|
2453 is not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So
|
|
|
2454 Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is understood as not alone in God, but as being with
|
|
|
2455 that very Word, without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking." On the other
|
|
|
2456 hand, "to be spoken" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by
|
|
|
2457 the word. Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken;
|
|
|
2458 whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For
|
|
|
2459 the Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives
|
|
|
2460 the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is "spoken" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the intellect of a man
|
|
|
2461 by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term "speak" improperly for
|
|
|
2462 the act of understanding; whereas they really differ from each other; for "to understand" means only the habitude of the intelligent
|
|
|
2463 agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our
|
|
|
2464 intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete
|
|
|
2465 identity, because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same, as was proved above (
|
|
|
2466 <a id="FP_Q34_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14], AA[4]</a>,5). Whereas to "speak" means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is nothing but to utter a word. But
|
|
|
2467 by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is
|
|
|
2468 manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who utters the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person
|
|
|
2469 understands and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.
|
|
|
2470 </p>
|
|
|
2471 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p13">
|
|
|
2472 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures
|
|
|
2473 are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom;
|
|
|
2474 as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word.
|
|
|
2475 </p>
|
|
|
2476 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p14"></p>
|
|
|
2477 <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p15"></p>
|
|
|
2478 <a href="summa.FP_Q34.html"></a>
|
|
|
2479 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2480 </div>
|
|
|
2481 <div id="FP_Q34_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
2482 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2483 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2484 <h4 id="FP_Q34_A2-p0.1">Whether "Word" is the Son's proper name?</h4>
|
|
|
2485 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2486 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2487 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not
|
|
|
2488 signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.
|
|
|
2489 </p>
|
|
|
2490 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2491 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from
|
|
|
2492 the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
|
|
|
2493 </p>
|
|
|
2494 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2495 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper
|
|
|
2496 name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned.
|
|
|
2497 </p>
|
|
|
2498 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2499 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs
|
|
|
2500 to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.
|
|
|
2501 </p>
|
|
|
2502 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2503 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is said of the Son (
|
|
|
2504 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q34_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>): "Bearing all things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's
|
|
|
2505 Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son.
|
|
|
2506 </p>
|
|
|
2507 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2508 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we understand the Son alone."
|
|
|
2509 </p>
|
|
|
2510 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2511 <b>I answer that,</b> "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it signifies
|
|
|
2512 an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son;
|
|
|
2513 and this procession is called generation, as we have shown above (
|
|
|
2514 <a id="FP_Q34_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God.
|
|
|
2515 </p>
|
|
|
2516 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2517 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our
|
|
|
2518 nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an
|
|
|
2519 effect of His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be something subsistent; for whatever is in the
|
|
|
2520 nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of
|
|
|
2521 God is substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are activities if the soul."
|
|
|
2522 </p>
|
|
|
2523 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2524 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being uttered,
|
|
|
2525 as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from
|
|
|
2526 Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
|
|
|
2527 </p>
|
|
|
2528 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p11">
|
|
|
2529 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the term "Word" the same property is comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and
|
|
|
2530 Son express the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is signified by different names, which are
|
|
|
2531 attributed to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is
|
|
|
2532 called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that
|
|
|
2533 He is altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is called the Word. All these
|
|
|
2534 truths cannot be expressed by only one name.
|
|
|
2535 </p>
|
|
|
2536 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p12">
|
|
|
2537 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God
|
|
|
2538 essentially, as stated above (
|
|
|
2539 <a id="FP_Q34_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], AA[2]</a>,4). Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as producing a Word, but as the
|
|
|
2540 Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished
|
|
|
2541 from the
|
|
|
2542 principle of the Word only by relation.
|
|
|
2543 </p>
|
|
|
2544 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p13">
|
|
|
2545 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things by the word of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of
|
|
|
2546 the Word. Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word,
|
|
|
2547 things are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely
|
|
|
2548 and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that
|
|
|
2549 everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word,
|
|
|
2550 because He manifests the Son.
|
|
|
2551 </p>
|
|
|
2552 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p14"></p>
|
|
|
2553 <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
2554 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2555 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2556 </div>
|
|
|
2557 <div id="FP_Q34_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2558 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2559 <a href="summa.FP_Q35.html"></a>
|
|
|
2560 <h4 id="FP_Q34_A3-p0.1">Whether the name "Word" imports relation to creatures?</h4>
|
|
|
2561 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2562 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2563 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures,
|
|
|
2564 is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures.
|
|
|
2565 </p>
|
|
|
2566 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2567 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time; as "Lord" and "Creator." But Word is said of God
|
|
|
2568 from eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.
|
|
|
2569 </p>
|
|
|
2570 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2571 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows
|
|
|
2572 that the Word proceeds from the creature.
|
|
|
2573 </p>
|
|
|
2574 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2575 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to
|
|
|
2576 creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many.
|
|
|
2577 </p>
|
|
|
2578 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2579 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not
|
|
|
2580 know beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be
|
|
|
2581 false.
|
|
|
2582 </p>
|
|
|
2583 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p7">
|
|
|
2584 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to
|
|
|
2585 those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power."
|
|
|
2586 </p>
|
|
|
2587 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2588 <b>I answer that,</b> Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind
|
|
|
2589 is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different
|
|
|
2590 things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one only Word is expressive
|
|
|
2591 not only of the Father, but of all creatures.
|
|
|
2592 </p>
|
|
|
2593 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p9"> And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative,
|
|
|
2594 so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures; and
|
|
|
2595 therefore it is said (
|
|
|
2596 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q34_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.9" target="asv">Ps. 32:9</a>): "He spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes.
|
|
|
2597 </p>
|
|
|
2598 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p10">
|
|
|
2599 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature.
|
|
|
2600 Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is
|
|
|
2601 implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence
|
|
|
2602 is included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the
|
|
|
2603 Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation
|
|
|
2604 to creatures.
|
|
|
2605 </p>
|
|
|
2606 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p11">
|
|
|
2607 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the
|
|
|
2608 action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time.
|
|
|
2609 But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent---as
|
|
|
2610 to know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of
|
|
|
2611 relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to
|
|
|
2612 creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action
|
|
|
2613 of God passing into exterior effect.
|
|
|
2614 </p>
|
|
|
2615 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p12">
|
|
|
2616 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is
|
|
|
2617 not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures.
|
|
|
2618 </p>
|
|
|
2619 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p13">
|
|
|
2620 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God;
|
|
|
2621 and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation
|
|
|
2622 to creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there is only one Word in God,
|
|
|
2623 and that is a personal one.
|
|
|
2624 </p>
|
|
|
2625 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p14">
|
|
|
2626 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less than
|
|
|
2627 does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings,
|
|
|
2628 but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings.
|
|
|
2629 </p>
|
|
|
2630 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p15"></p>
|
|
|
2631 <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p16"></p>
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2632 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
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2633 <a href="summa.FP_Q35.html"></a>
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2634 </div>
|
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|
2635 <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html"></a>
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2636 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
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2637 </div>
|
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|
2638 <div id="FP_Q35" class="div3">
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2639 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
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2640 <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
|
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2641 <h3 id="FP_Q35-p0.1">OF THE IMAGE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
|
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|
2642 <p id="FP_Q35-p1"></p>
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|
2643 <p id="FP_Q35-p2"> We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
2644 <p id="FP_Q35-p3"> (1) Whether Image in God is said personally?</p>
|
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|
2645 <p id="FP_Q35-p4"> (2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?</p>
|
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|
2646 <div id="FP_Q35_A1" class="div4">
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2647 <a href="summa.FP_Q35.html"></a>
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2648 <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
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2649 <h4 id="FP_Q35_A1-p0.1">Whether image in God is said personally?</h4>
|
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2650 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p1"></p>
|
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|
2651 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p2">
|
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|
2652 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that image is not said personally of God. For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead
|
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|
2653 of the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one." Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.
|
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|
2654 </p>
|
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|
2655 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p3">
|
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|
2656 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): "An image is a like species of that which it represents." But species or form is said of
|
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|
2657 God essentially. Therefore so also is Image.
|
|
|
2658 </p>
|
|
|
2659 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2660 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies "before" and "after." But in the divine persons there is no "before"
|
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|
2661 and "after." Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.
|
|
|
2662 </p>
|
|
|
2663 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p5">
|
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|
2664 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "What is more absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself?" Therefore the Image
|
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2665 in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name.
|
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|
2666 </p>
|
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2667 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p6">
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|
2668 <b>I answer that,</b> Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only similitude
|
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|
2669 of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we
|
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|
2670 see that the species of different animals are of different figures; but not of different colors. Hence if the color of anything
|
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|
2671 is depicted on a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise
|
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|
2672 depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is enough for an image, which requires also the idea of
|
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|
2673 origin; because, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): "One egg is not the image of another, because it is not derived
|
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|
2674 from it." Therefore for a true image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or at least in specific
|
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2675 sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name "Image" is a personal
|
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2676 name.
|
|
|
2677 </p>
|
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|
2678 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p7">
|
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|
2679 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything proceeds,
|
|
|
2680 is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the
|
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|
2681 name of Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.
|
|
|
2682 </p>
|
|
|
2683 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2684 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Species," as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this sense
|
|
|
2685 image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has
|
|
|
2686 a like form.
|
|
|
2687 </p>
|
|
|
2688 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2689 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but only assimilation.
|
|
|
2690 </p>
|
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|
2691 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p10"></p>
|
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|
2692 <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p11"></p>
|
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|
2693 <a href="summa.FP_Q35.html"></a>
|
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|
2694 <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2695 </div>
|
|
|
2696 <div id="FP_Q35_A2" class="div4">
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2697 <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
|
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2698 <a href="summa.FP_Q36.html"></a>
|
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|
2699 <h4 id="FP_Q35_A2-p0.1">Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?</h4>
|
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|
2700 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2701 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2702 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), "The Holy
|
|
|
2703 Ghost is the Image of the Son." Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone.
|
|
|
2704 </p>
|
|
|
2705 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2706 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs
|
|
|
2707 to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image
|
|
|
2708 does not belong to the Son alone.
|
|
|
2709 </p>
|
|
|
2710 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2711 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is also called the image of God, according to
|
|
|
2712 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q35_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>, "The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image and the glory of God." Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.
|
|
|
2713 </p>
|
|
|
2714 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2715 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): "The Son alone is the Image of the Father."
|
|
|
2716 </p>
|
|
|
2717 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2718 <b>I answer that,</b> The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors
|
|
|
2719 attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as
|
|
|
2720 in the words, "Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures" (
|
|
|
2721 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q35_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.15" target="asv">Col. 1:15</a>) and again: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance." (
|
|
|
2722 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q35_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb.
|
|
|
2723 1:3
|
|
|
2724 </a>).
|
|
|
2725 </p>
|
|
|
2726 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p7"> Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not in nature only, but also in the notion of principle:
|
|
|
2727 whereas the Holy Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion. This, however, does not seem to suffice.
|
|
|
2728 Because as it is not by reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God, as Augustine says (De
|
|
|
2729 Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason thereof do we consider) that similitude which is essential to image.
|
|
|
2730 Hence others say that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the Son, because there cannot be an image of an image;
|
|
|
2731 nor of the Father, because again the image must be immediately related to that which it is the image; and the Holy Ghost is
|
|
|
2732 related to the Father through the Son; nor again is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then there would be one
|
|
|
2733 image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for the
|
|
|
2734 Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we shall explain further on (
|
|
|
2735 <a id="FP_Q35_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html">Q[36], A[4]</a> ). Hence there is nothing to prevent there being one Image of the Father and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one; since
|
|
|
2736 even man is one image of the whole Trinity.
|
|
|
2737 </p>
|
|
|
2738 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p8"> Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives
|
|
|
2739 the nature of the Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be "born"; so, although He receives the
|
|
|
2740 likeness of the Father, He is not called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is essential to word to be like
|
|
|
2741 species with that whence it proceeds; whereas this does not essentially belong to love, although it may belong to
|
|
|
2742 that love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love.
|
|
|
2743 </p>
|
|
|
2744 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2745 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude.
|
|
|
2746 </p>
|
|
|
2747 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2748 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above explained.
|
|
|
2749 </p>
|
|
|
2750 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p11">
|
|
|
2751 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific nature;
|
|
|
2752 as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way it is found in something of a different nature, as the king's
|
|
|
2753 image on the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the second sense man is called the image of God;
|
|
|
2754 and therefore in order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in
|
|
|
2755 man, man is not simply called the image, but "to the image," whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection.
|
|
|
2756 But it cannot be said that the Son of God is "to the image," because He is the perfect Image of the Father.
|
|
|
2757 </p>
|
|
|
2758 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2759 <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2760 <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2761 <a href="summa.FP_Q36.html"></a>
|
|
|
2762 </div>
|
|
|
2763 <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2764 <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2765 </div>
|
|
|
2766 <div id="FP_Q36" class="div3">
|
|
|
2767 <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2768 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2769 <h3 id="FP_Q36-p0.1">OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2770 <p id="FP_Q36-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2771 <p id="FP_Q36-p2"> We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost, Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the
|
|
|
2772 Love and Gift of God. Concerning the name "Holy Ghost" there are four points of inquiry:
|
|
|
2773 </p>
|
|
|
2774 <p id="FP_Q36-p3"> (1) Whether this name, "Holy Ghost," is the proper name of one divine Person?</p>
|
|
|
2775 <p id="FP_Q36-p4"> (2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds from the Father and the Son?</p>
|
|
|
2776 <p id="FP_Q36-p5"> (3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?</p>
|
|
|
2777 <p id="FP_Q36-p6"> (4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?</p>
|
|
|
2778 <div id="FP_Q36_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2779 <a href="summa.FP_Q36.html"></a>
|
|
|
2780 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2781 <h4 id="FP_Q36_A1-p0.1">Whether this name "Holy Ghost" is the proper name of one divine person?</h4>
|
|
|
2782 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2783 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2784 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the
|
|
|
2785 three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of 'Holy Ghost' [*It should be borne in mind that the word
|
|
|
2786 "ghost" is the old English equivalent for the Latin "spiritus," whether in the sense of "breath" or "blast," or in the sense
|
|
|
2787 of "spirit," as an immaterial substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole,
|
|
|
2788 Psalter x, 7), "The Gost of Storms" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter "Trubled gost is sacrifice of God" (Prose Psalter,
|
|
|
2789 A.D. 1325), and "Oure wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre" (More, "Comfort against Tribulation");
|
|
|
2790 and in our modern expression of "giving up the ghost." As applied to God, and not specially to the third Holy Person, we have
|
|
|
2791 an example from Maunder, "Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good." (See Oxford Dictionary).] is common
|
|
|
2792 to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin. viii) shows that the "Spirit of God" sometimes means the Father, as in the words
|
|
|
2793 of
|
|
|
2794 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.61.1" target="asv"> Is. 61:1</a>: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" and sometimes the Son, as when the Son says: "In the Spirit of God I cast out devils"
|
|
|
2795 (
|
|
|
2796 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.28" target="asv">Mat. 12:28</a>), showing that He cast out devils by His own natural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of
|
|
|
2797 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.28" target="asv"> Joel 2:28</a>: "I will pour out of My Spirit
|
|
|
2798 over all flesh." Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the proper name of a divine person.
|
|
|
2799 </p>
|
|
|
2800 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2801 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms, as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not
|
|
|
2802 a relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine Person.
|
|
|
2803 </p>
|
|
|
2804 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2805 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is
|
|
|
2806 spoken of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give
|
|
|
2807 to them" (
|
|
|
2808 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Num.11.17" target="asv">Num. 11:17</a>) and also "The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" (
|
|
|
2809 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 2:15</a>). Therefore "Holy Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a divine Person.
|
|
|
2810 </p>
|
|
|
2811 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2812 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
2813 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.7" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:7</a>): "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As Augustine says (De Trin. vii,
|
|
|
2814 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons." Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person.
|
|
|
2815 </p>
|
|
|
2816 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2817 <b>I answer that,</b> While there are two processions in God, one of these, the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as stated above
|
|
|
2818 (
|
|
|
2819 <a id="FP_Q36_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27] , A[4]</a>, ad 3). Hence the relations also which follow from this procession are without a name (
|
|
|
2820 <a id="FP_Q36_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>): for which reason the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But as some names are accommodated by the
|
|
|
2821 usual mode of speaking to signify the aforesaid
|
|
|
2822 relations, as when we use the names of procession and spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the notional
|
|
|
2823 acts than the relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy Ghost" is by the use
|
|
|
2824 of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the fact
|
|
|
2825 that the person who is called "Holy Ghost" has something in common with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin.
|
|
|
2826 xv, 17; v, 11), "Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which both are called in common.
|
|
|
2827 For the Father also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy." Secondly, from the
|
|
|
2828 proper signification of the name. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we call
|
|
|
2829 the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover towards the
|
|
|
2830 object loved. Further, holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine person proceeds
|
|
|
2831 by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most properly named "The Holy Ghost."
|
|
|
2832 </p>
|
|
|
2833 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2834 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the immateriality
|
|
|
2835 of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this term
|
|
|
2836 to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word "holy" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if
|
|
|
2837 Holy Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of
|
|
|
2838 the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above
|
|
|
2839 explained.
|
|
|
2840 </p>
|
|
|
2841 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2842 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate a relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it
|
|
|
2843 is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including
|
|
|
2844 a relation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus].
|
|
|
2845 </p>
|
|
|
2846 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2847 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the name Son we understand that relation only which is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but
|
|
|
2848 in the name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a
|
|
|
2849 moving power. But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore
|
|
|
2850 we can say "our Father," and "our Spirit"; but we cannot say "our Son."
|
|
|
2851 </p>
|
|
|
2852 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2853 <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2854 <a href="summa.FP_Q36.html"></a>
|
|
|
2855 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2856 </div>
|
|
|
2857 <div id="FP_Q36_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
2858 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2859 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2860 <h4 id="FP_Q36_A2-p0.1">Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son?</h4>
|
|
|
2861 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2862 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2863 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to
|
|
|
2864 say anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles." But
|
|
|
2865 in the Sacred Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; but only that He proceeds from the Father,
|
|
|
2866 as appears from
|
|
|
2867 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.26" target="asv"> Jn. 15:26</a>: "The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the
|
|
|
2868 Father." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
|
|
|
2869 </p>
|
|
|
2870 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2871 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can. vii) we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver,
|
|
|
2872 who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and glorified." Therefore it should not be added in
|
|
|
2873 our Creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema.
|
|
|
2874 </p>
|
|
|
2875 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2876 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of
|
|
|
2877 the Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him the Spirit of the Son." Therefore the Holy
|
|
|
2878 Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
|
|
|
2879 </p>
|
|
|
2880 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2881 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of
|
|
|
2882 St. Andrew: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ,
|
|
|
2883 and in the one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
|
|
|
2884 the Son.
|
|
|
2885 </p>
|
|
|
2886 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2887 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath [spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word. Therefore
|
|
|
2888 the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
|
|
|
2889 </p>
|
|
|
2890 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2891 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the
|
|
|
2892 Son.
|
|
|
2893 </p>
|
|
|
2894 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2895 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in things perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But
|
|
|
2896 it is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De
|
|
|
2897 Process. Spir. Sancti, ii): "The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the Father; but each in a different way; one
|
|
|
2898 by Birth, the other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another." And
|
|
|
2899 further on he says: "For even if for no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice."
|
|
|
2900 Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.
|
|
|
2901 </p>
|
|
|
2902 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2903 <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."
|
|
|
2904 </p>
|
|
|
2905 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2906 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished
|
|
|
2907 from Him; as appears from what has been said above (
|
|
|
2908 <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>;
|
|
|
2909 <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow
|
|
|
2910 that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that
|
|
|
2911 is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons
|
|
|
2912 are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch
|
|
|
2913 as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related
|
|
|
2914 to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons,
|
|
|
2915 but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only,
|
|
|
2916 whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be
|
|
|
2917 the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the
|
|
|
2918 person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But
|
|
|
2919 this
|
|
|
2920 is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other
|
|
|
2921 by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved
|
|
|
2922 above (
|
|
|
2923 <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A44.html">Q[28], A[44]</a>). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore
|
|
|
2924 we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the
|
|
|
2925 Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.
|
|
|
2926 </p>
|
|
|
2927 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p11"> Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above (
|
|
|
2928 <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], AA[2]</a>,4;
|
|
|
2929 <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>), that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must
|
|
|
2930 proceed from a word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also in this way it
|
|
|
2931 is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
|
|
|
2932 Son.
|
|
|
2933 </p>
|
|
|
2934 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p12"> We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed
|
|
|
2935 from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for instance one smith produces many knives distinct
|
|
|
2936 from each other materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction
|
|
|
2937 we always find that some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures
|
|
|
2938 produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the
|
|
|
2939 Son and the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature,
|
|
|
2940 whereby one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such
|
|
|
2941 a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is impossible.
|
|
|
2942 </p>
|
|
|
2943 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p13"> Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant
|
|
|
2944 that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father "through the Son." Some of them are said also
|
|
|
2945 to concede that "He is from the Son"; or that "He flows from the Son," but not that He proceeds; which seems to come from
|
|
|
2946 ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is
|
|
|
2947 the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin;
|
|
|
2948 as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source, and likewise in everything else.
|
|
|
2949 Hence, granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
|
|
|
2950 Son.
|
|
|
2951 </p>
|
|
|
2952 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p14">
|
|
|
2953 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We ought not to say about God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although
|
|
|
2954 we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the
|
|
|
2955 sense of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost, "He will glorify Me, because He shall receive
|
|
|
2956 of Mine" (
|
|
|
2957 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.14" target="asv">Jn. 16:14</a>). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that
|
|
|
2958 whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive term; except only as regards what
|
|
|
2959 belongs to the opposite relations, whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For when the Lord says,
|
|
|
2960 "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father," the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we say that
|
|
|
2961 the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not
|
|
|
2962 thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed
|
|
|
2963 to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is the Son.
|
|
|
2964 </p>
|
|
|
2965 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p15">
|
|
|
2966 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council
|
|
|
2967 at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained
|
|
|
2968 in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council
|
|
|
2969 of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated together in the
|
|
|
2970 council of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything wanting in
|
|
|
2971 the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what those fathers had understood of
|
|
|
2972 the matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not
|
|
|
2973 proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on,
|
|
|
2974 when
|
|
|
2975 certain errors rose up, another council [*Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was explicitly
|
|
|
2976 defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless
|
|
|
2977 the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.
|
|
|
2978 </p>
|
|
|
2979 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p16">
|
|
|
2980 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian
|
|
|
2981 creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him,
|
|
|
2982 among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by
|
|
|
2983 some that while Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son,
|
|
|
2984 neither do those words of his express a denial thereof.
|
|
|
2985 </p>
|
|
|
2986 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p17">
|
|
|
2987 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son
|
|
|
2988 also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son
|
|
|
2989 as the love of the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature of Christ, by reason of what is written:
|
|
|
2990 "On whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who
|
|
|
2991 baptizes" (
|
|
|
2992 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A2-p17.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.33" target="asv">Jn. 1:33</a>).
|
|
|
2993 </p>
|
|
|
2994 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p18">
|
|
|
2995 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it
|
|
|
2996 would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word, whence proceeds love.
|
|
|
2997 </p>
|
|
|
2998 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p19">
|
|
|
2999 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds
|
|
|
3000 from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because
|
|
|
3001 whatever is from the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property of filiation; for the Son is not from
|
|
|
3002 Himself, although He is from the Father.
|
|
|
3003 </p>
|
|
|
3004 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p20">
|
|
|
3005 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other;
|
|
|
3006 but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from
|
|
|
3007 the Father and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other, as explained above, and
|
|
|
3008 in
|
|
|
3009 <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p20.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27.html">Q[27].</a>
|
|
|
3010 </p>
|
|
|
3011 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p21"></p>
|
|
|
3012 <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p22"></p>
|
|
|
3013 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3014 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3015 </div>
|
|
|
3016 <div id="FP_Q36_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
3017 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3018 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3019 <h4 id="FP_Q36_A3-p0.1">Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?</h4>
|
|
|
3020 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3021 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p2">
|
|
|
3022 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through
|
|
|
3023 another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not
|
|
|
3024 proceed immediately; which seems to be unfitting.
|
|
|
3025 </p>
|
|
|
3026 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p3">
|
|
|
3027 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account
|
|
|
3028 of the Father. But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from
|
|
|
3029 the Son.
|
|
|
3030 </p>
|
|
|
3031 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p4">
|
|
|
3032 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows
|
|
|
3033 that the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal,
|
|
|
3034 which is heretical.
|
|
|
3035 </p>
|
|
|
3036 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p5">
|
|
|
3037 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the
|
|
|
3038 bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can never say that the Son spirates the
|
|
|
3039 Holy Ghost through the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son.
|
|
|
3040 </p>
|
|
|
3041 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p6">
|
|
|
3042 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father---namely
|
|
|
3043 Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten."
|
|
|
3044 </p>
|
|
|
3045 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p7">
|
|
|
3046 <b>I answer that,</b> Whenever one is said to act through another, this preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause
|
|
|
3047 or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered
|
|
|
3048 by the preposition "through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and in that case it is the cause of
|
|
|
3049 why the agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or
|
|
|
3050 motive. It is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love of gain. It is a formal cause when
|
|
|
3051 we say that he works through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes,
|
|
|
3052 however, that which is covered by this preposition "through" is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing
|
|
|
3053 done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the
|
|
|
3054 cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this
|
|
|
3055 effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition "through" sometimes denotes direct authority,
|
|
|
3056 as when we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through
|
|
|
3057 the king.
|
|
|
3058 </p>
|
|
|
3059 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p8"> Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father
|
|
|
3060 spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, which has the same
|
|
|
3061 meaning.
|
|
|
3062 </p>
|
|
|
3063 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p9">
|
|
|
3064 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In every action two things are to be considered, the "suppositum" acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance,
|
|
|
3065 fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there
|
|
|
3066 is no mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost
|
|
|
3067 proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
|
|
|
3068 Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the
|
|
|
3069 Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his mother,
|
|
|
3070 who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession
|
|
|
3071 of the divine persons.
|
|
|
3072 </p>
|
|
|
3073 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p10">
|
|
|
3074 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that
|
|
|
3075 He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son;
|
|
|
3076 whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds
|
|
|
3077 equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or
|
|
|
3078 properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father.
|
|
|
3079 </p>
|
|
|
3080 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p11">
|
|
|
3081 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son),
|
|
|
3082 so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost
|
|
|
3083 proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal.
|
|
|
3084 </p>
|
|
|
3085 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p12">
|
|
|
3086 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When anyone is said to work through anything, the converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the mallet
|
|
|
3087 works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place
|
|
|
3088 to act, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act, but only to be made to act, and hence
|
|
|
3089 it is used only as an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the
|
|
|
3090 king, although this preposition "through" denotes a medium, for the more a "suppositum" is prior in action, so much the more
|
|
|
3091 is its power immediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect.
|
|
|
3092 Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a
|
|
|
3093 medium according to the order of the subject's acting, the king is said to work through the bailiff; but according to the
|
|
|
3094 order
|
|
|
3095 of powers, the bailiff is said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the bailiff's action its
|
|
|
3096 effect. Now there is no order of power between Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that the Father
|
|
|
3097 spirates through the Son; and not conversely.
|
|
|
3098 </p>
|
|
|
3099 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3100 <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
3101 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3102 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3103 </div>
|
|
|
3104 <div id="FP_Q36_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
3105 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
|
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|
3106 <a href="summa.FP_Q37.html"></a>
|
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|
3107 <h4 id="FP_Q36_A4-p0.1">Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?</h4>
|
|
|
3108 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3109 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p2">
|
|
|
3110 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
|
|
|
3111 the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself,
|
|
|
3112 as He is one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property, for it is clear that one property
|
|
|
3113 cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
|
|
|
3114 and the Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3115 </p>
|
|
|
3116 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p3">
|
|
|
3117 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity,
|
|
|
3118 because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor again do we designate the unity of property, because
|
|
|
3119 if one property were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of
|
|
|
3120 His two properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,
|
|
|
3121 which cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3122 </p>
|
|
|
3123 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p4">
|
|
|
3124 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle
|
|
|
3125 as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son.
|
|
|
3126 </p>
|
|
|
3127 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3128 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father.
|
|
|
3129 But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and
|
|
|
3130 if the one is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the
|
|
|
3131 Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3132 </p>
|
|
|
3133 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3134 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one
|
|
|
3135 principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for this word "principle" stands either
|
|
|
3136 for the person of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it is false. Therefore this proposition also
|
|
|
3137 is false, that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3138 </p>
|
|
|
3139 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p7">
|
|
|
3140 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows
|
|
|
3141 that they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle
|
|
|
3142 of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3143 </p>
|
|
|
3144 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p8">
|
|
|
3145 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the
|
|
|
3146 Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii)
|
|
|
3147 that "the Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors." Therefore the Father and the Son are
|
|
|
3148 not one principle of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3149 </p>
|
|
|
3150 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p9">
|
|
|
3151 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3152 </p>
|
|
|
3153 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p10">
|
|
|
3154 <b>I answer that,</b> The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since
|
|
|
3155 there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are
|
|
|
3156 one principle of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3157 </p>
|
|
|
3158 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p11"> Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because,
|
|
|
3159 they declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not signify "person," but "property," it must be taken
|
|
|
3160 as an adjective; and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot properly be said that the
|
|
|
3161 Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the
|
|
|
3162 meaning should be: They are one principle---that is, in one and the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that
|
|
|
3163 the Father is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost---namely, in two ways. Therefore, we must say that, although
|
|
|
3164 this word "principle" signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words "father" and "son"
|
|
|
3165 even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the
|
|
|
3166 Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word "God"; so they are one principle
|
|
|
3167 of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word "principle."
|
|
|
3168 </p>
|
|
|
3169 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p12">
|
|
|
3170 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative
|
|
|
3171 power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason
|
|
|
3172 against one property being in two "supposita" that possess one common nature. But if we consider the "supposita" of the spiration,
|
|
|
3173 then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as
|
|
|
3174 distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both.
|
|
|
3175 </p>
|
|
|
3176 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p13">
|
|
|
3177 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the proposition "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is the
|
|
|
3178 form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several
|
|
|
3179 principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.
|
|
|
3180 </p>
|
|
|
3181 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p14">
|
|
|
3182 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence.
|
|
|
3183 Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father
|
|
|
3184 than is the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3185 </p>
|
|
|
3186 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p15">
|
|
|
3187 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These two propositions, "The Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not the
|
|
|
3188 Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the
|
|
|
3189 Father and the Son are one principle, this word "principle" has not determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately
|
|
|
3190 for two persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of "figure of speech" as the
|
|
|
3191 argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate.
|
|
|
3192 </p>
|
|
|
3193 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p16">
|
|
|
3194 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This proposition is also true:---The one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word "principle"
|
|
|
3195 does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above explained.
|
|
|
3196 </p>
|
|
|
3197 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p17">
|
|
|
3198 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> There is no reason against saying that the Father and the Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands
|
|
|
3199 confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together.
|
|
|
3200 </p>
|
|
|
3201 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p18">
|
|
|
3202 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Some say that although the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of
|
|
|
3203 the distinction of "supposita," as also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good
|
|
|
3204 as to the name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above
|
|
|
3205 explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct
|
|
|
3206 persons, but as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective, and spirator a
|
|
|
3207 substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of the "supposita" but not
|
|
|
3208 two spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the "supposita" but substantives
|
|
|
3209 from themselves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that "the Holy ghost is from the Father and the
|
|
|
3210 Son
|
|
|
3211 as His authors," this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective.
|
|
|
3212 </p>
|
|
|
3213 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p19"></p>
|
|
|
3214 <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p20"></p>
|
|
|
3215 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3216 <a href="summa.FP_Q37.html"></a>
|
|
|
3217 </div>
|
|
|
3218 <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3219 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3220 </div>
|
|
|
3221 <div id="FP_Q37" class="div3">
|
|
|
3222 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3223 <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3224 <h3 id="FP_Q37-p0.1">OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3225 <p id="FP_Q37-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3226 <p id="FP_Q37-p2"> We now inquire concerning the name "Love," on which arise two points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
3227 <p id="FP_Q37-p3"> (1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?</p>
|
|
|
3228 <p id="FP_Q37-p4"> (2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?</p>
|
|
|
3229 <div id="FP_Q37_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
3230 <a href="summa.FP_Q37.html"></a>
|
|
|
3231 <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3232 <h4 id="FP_Q37_A1-p0.1">Whether "Love" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?</h4>
|
|
|
3233 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3234 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3235 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father,
|
|
|
3236 Son and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should
|
|
|
3237 not be called Charity, and all together one Charity." But no name which is predicated in the singular of each person and of
|
|
|
3238 all together, is a proper name of a person. Therefore this name, "Love," is not the proper
|
|
|
3239 name of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3240 </p>
|
|
|
3241 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3242 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action
|
|
|
3243 passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3244 </p>
|
|
|
3245 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3246 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force." But a bond is
|
|
|
3247 a medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from
|
|
|
3248 the Father and the Son, as was shown above (
|
|
|
3249 <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html">Q[36], A[2]</a>), it seems that He is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son.
|
|
|
3250 </p>
|
|
|
3251 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3252 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love,
|
|
|
3253 He must be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.
|
|
|
3254 </p>
|
|
|
3255 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3256 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): "The Holy Ghost Himself is Love."
|
|
|
3257 </p>
|
|
|
3258 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p7">
|
|
|
3259 <b>I answer that,</b> The name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost;
|
|
|
3260 as Word is the proper name of the Son.
|
|
|
3261 </p>
|
|
|
3262 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p8"> To see this we must know that since as shown above (
|
|
|
3263 <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], AA[2]</a>,3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by
|
|
|
3264 way of the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known to us, we have been able to apply
|
|
|
3265 more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of
|
|
|
3266 the will. Hence, we
|
|
|
3267 are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations following from this procession
|
|
|
3268 which are called "procession" and "spiration," as stated above (
|
|
|
3269 <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>, ad 3), and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider
|
|
|
3270 them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands
|
|
|
3271 a conception of the
|
|
|
3272 object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak,
|
|
|
3273 of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also
|
|
|
3274 the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not
|
|
|
3275 only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover.
|
|
|
3276 As
|
|
|
3277 regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object
|
|
|
3278 understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual
|
|
|
3279 conception---namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does
|
|
|
3280 not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and
|
|
|
3281 the
|
|
|
3282 term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other
|
|
|
3283 hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love," which express the relation of the lover
|
|
|
3284 to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object
|
|
|
3285 loved, produced in the lover by fact that he loves---to the principle of that impression, or "vice versa." And therefore,
|
|
|
3286 on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if we
|
|
|
3287 were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom begotten."
|
|
|
3288 </p>
|
|
|
3289 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p9"> It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of
|
|
|
3290 the essence, as "understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the
|
|
|
3291 relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is understood the "love proceeding,"
|
|
|
3292 and by "to love" is understood "the spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name
|
|
|
3293 of the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to beget."
|
|
|
3294 </p>
|
|
|
3295 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p10">
|
|
|
3296 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the divine essence, as was said above (here and
|
|
|
3297 <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html">Q[24], A[2]</a>, ad 4).
|
|
|
3298 </p>
|
|
|
3299 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p11">
|
|
|
3300 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although to understand, and to will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions
|
|
|
3301 that remain in the agents, as stated above (
|
|
|
3302 <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14], A[4]</a>), yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves
|
|
|
3303 is something that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation
|
|
|
3304 to
|
|
|
3305 the thing expressed by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there is more than this; because both
|
|
|
3306 Word and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for something
|
|
|
3307 else; we do not mean anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as also in the Word
|
|
|
3308 is imported the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word.
|
|
|
3309 </p>
|
|
|
3310 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p12">
|
|
|
3311 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself
|
|
|
3312 and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the
|
|
|
3313 Son, and conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one
|
|
|
3314 another, it necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from
|
|
|
3315 both. As regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards
|
|
|
3316 the aforesaid relation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from both.
|
|
|
3317 </p>
|
|
|
3318 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p13">
|
|
|
3319 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As it does not belong to the Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as the word
|
|
|
3320 proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to
|
|
|
3321 Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term; because He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as
|
|
|
3322 the one whence love proceeds.
|
|
|
3323 </p>
|
|
|
3324 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p14"></p>
|
|
|
3325 <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p15"></p>
|
|
|
3326 <a href="summa.FP_Q37.html"></a>
|
|
|
3327 <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3328 </div>
|
|
|
3329 <div id="FP_Q37_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
3330 <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3331 <a href="summa.FP_Q38.html"></a>
|
|
|
3332 <h4 id="FP_Q37_A2-p0.1">Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?</h4>
|
|
|
3333 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3334 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p2">
|
|
|
3335 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves
|
|
|
3336 that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding,
|
|
|
3337 as explained above (
|
|
|
3338 <a id="FP_Q37_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>). Therefore the Father and the Son do not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3339 </p>
|
|
|
3340 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p3">
|
|
|
3341 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the proposition, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost," this word "love" is to be taken either
|
|
|
3342 essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same way we might say that "the Father
|
|
|
3343 understands by the Son"; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like manner, it might be said that "the Father
|
|
|
3344 and the Son spirate by the Holy Ghost," or that "the Father generates by the Son."
|
|
|
3345 Therefore in no way is this proposition true: "'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost."
|
|
|
3346 </p>
|
|
|
3347 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p4">
|
|
|
3348 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy
|
|
|
3349 Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the "Father begets
|
|
|
3350 Himself," or that "He spirates Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that "He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost," if "to
|
|
|
3351 love" is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy
|
|
|
3352 Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false: "The Father
|
|
|
3353 loves the Son by the Holy Ghost."
|
|
|
3354 </p>
|
|
|
3355 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p5">
|
|
|
3356 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begetter."
|
|
|
3357 </p>
|
|
|
3358 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p6">
|
|
|
3359 <b>I answer that,</b> A difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost,"
|
|
|
3360 since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the
|
|
|
3361 Father and the Son; which cannot be admitted.
|
|
|
3362 </p>
|
|
|
3363 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p7"> In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost";
|
|
|
3364 and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that "the Father is wise by
|
|
|
3365 the Wisdom begotten." Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that "the Father loves the
|
|
|
3366 Son by the Holy Ghost"---that is, "by His essential Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others
|
|
|
3367 further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, "the Holy Ghost is the sign that
|
|
|
3368 the Father loves the Son"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that this ablative
|
|
|
3369 must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the
|
|
|
3370 Son formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect;
|
|
|
3371 and
|
|
|
3372 these approach nearer to the truth.
|
|
|
3373 </p>
|
|
|
3374 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p8"> To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness,
|
|
|
3375 and "man" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the
|
|
|
3376 relation of form. So when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is to be construed as having relation
|
|
|
3377 to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated
|
|
|
3378 from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action---that
|
|
|
3379 is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although
|
|
|
3380 heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers
|
|
|
3381 with the flower, although the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this
|
|
|
3382 way, therefore, we must say that since in God "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken
|
|
|
3383 essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. Hence Augustine
|
|
|
3384 says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by
|
|
|
3385 the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense
|
|
|
3386 it means nothing else than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers.
|
|
|
3387 As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself,
|
|
|
3388 and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.
|
|
|
3389 </p>
|
|
|
3390 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p9">
|
|
|
3391 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent
|
|
|
3392 by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the
|
|
|
3393 Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.
|
|
|
3394 </p>
|
|
|
3395 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p10">
|
|
|
3396 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the idea of an action includes a determined effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action,
|
|
|
3397 and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the
|
|
|
3398 idea of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated
|
|
|
3399 from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree
|
|
|
3400 produces the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports
|
|
|
3401 only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or begets by the Son. But we can say
|
|
|
3402 that the Father speaks by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, "and speaks by the speaking," as by a notional act; forasmuch
|
|
|
3403 as "to speak" imports a determinate person proceeding; since "to speak" means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken in
|
|
|
3404 a
|
|
|
3405 notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by the person
|
|
|
3406 proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act.
|
|
|
3407 </p>
|
|
|
3408 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p11">
|
|
|
3409 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken
|
|
|
3410 in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person, but also the person produced, by way of love, which
|
|
|
3411 has relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as
|
|
|
3412 the Word "begotten" adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves
|
|
|
3413 Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby
|
|
|
3414 the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word
|
|
|
3415 and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding
|
|
|
3416 and loving all creatures.
|
|
|
3417 </p>
|
|
|
3418 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3419 <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3420 <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3421 <a href="summa.FP_Q38.html"></a>
|
|
|
3422 </div>
|
|
|
3423 <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3424 <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3425 </div>
|
|
|
3426 <div id="FP_Q38" class="div3">
|
|
|
3427 <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3428 <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3429 <h3 id="FP_Q38-p0.1">OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3430 <p id="FP_Q38-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3431 <p id="FP_Q38-p2"> There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there are two points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
3432 <p id="FP_Q38-p3"> (1) Whether "Gift" can be a personal name?</p>
|
|
|
3433 <p id="FP_Q38-p4"> (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?</p>
|
|
|
3434 <div id="FP_Q38_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
3435 <a href="summa.FP_Q38.html"></a>
|
|
|
3436 <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3437 <h4 id="FP_Q38_A1-p0.1">Whether "Gift" is a personal name?</h4>
|
|
|
3438 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3439 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3440 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of "Gift"
|
|
|
3441 does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that "the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift,
|
|
|
3442 that He also gives Himself as God." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
|
|
|
3443 </p>
|
|
|
3444 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3445 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the
|
|
|
3446 Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
|
|
|
3447 </p>
|
|
|
3448 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3449 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift
|
|
|
3450 implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is
|
|
|
3451 not a personal name.
|
|
|
3452 </p>
|
|
|
3453 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3454 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said
|
|
|
3455 of God from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
|
|
|
3456 </p>
|
|
|
3457 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3458 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but
|
|
|
3459 the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is "Gift."
|
|
|
3460 </p>
|
|
|
3461 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p7">
|
|
|
3462 <b>I answer that,</b> The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and
|
|
|
3463 to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to
|
|
|
3464 be his. Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as possessed
|
|
|
3465 by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in
|
|
|
3466 this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by
|
|
|
3467 a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The
|
|
|
3468 rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding,
|
|
|
3469 so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person.
|
|
|
3470 Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from
|
|
|
3471 above; for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can "be given," and can
|
|
|
3472 be a "gift."
|
|
|
3473 </p>
|
|
|
3474 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p8">
|
|
|
3475 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction , in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin.
|
|
|
3476 Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free
|
|
|
3477 man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): "What is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say,
|
|
|
3478 and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase,
|
|
|
3479 "this is this one's," can be understood in several senses. In one way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract.
|
|
|
3480 xxix); and in that sense "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost
|
|
|
3481 gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift
|
|
|
3482 is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third sense "this is this one's"
|
|
|
3483 through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far
|
|
|
3484 as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal
|
|
|
3485 name.
|
|
|
3486 </p>
|
|
|
3487 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p9">
|
|
|
3488 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first sense, as being the Father's by way of identity.
|
|
|
3489 </p>
|
|
|
3490 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p10">
|
|
|
3491 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Gift as a personal name in God does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to
|
|
|
3492 whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained.
|
|
|
3493 </p>
|
|
|
3494 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p11">
|
|
|
3495 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift
|
|
|
3496 from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to
|
|
|
3497 the creature; but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the essence is included in the idea of person, as
|
|
|
3498 stated above (
|
|
|
3499 <a id="FP_Q38_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html">Q[34], A[3]</a>).
|
|
|
3500 </p>
|
|
|
3501 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3502 <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3503 <a href="summa.FP_Q38.html"></a>
|
|
|
3504 <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3505 </div>
|
|
|
3506 <div id="FP_Q38_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
3507 <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3508 <a href="summa.FP_Q39.html"></a>
|
|
|
3509 <h4 id="FP_Q38_A2-p0.1">Whether "Gift" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?</h4>
|
|
|
3510 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3511 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p2">
|
|
|
3512 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as
|
|
|
3513 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q38_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.9.16" target="asv"> Is. 9:16 </a>says: "A Son is give to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3514 </p>
|
|
|
3515 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p3">
|
|
|
3516 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3517 Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3518 </p>
|
|
|
3519 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p4">
|
|
|
3520 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "God's Gift"
|
|
|
3521 only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3522 </p>
|
|
|
3523 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p5">
|
|
|
3524 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As 'to be born' is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be
|
|
|
3525 the Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds
|
|
|
3526 from Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3527 </p>
|
|
|
3528 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p6">
|
|
|
3529 <b>I answer that,</b> Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
3530 </p>
|
|
|
3531 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p7"> In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)---i.e. a thing
|
|
|
3532 which is not given with the intention of a return---and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason
|
|
|
3533 of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him
|
|
|
3534 well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the
|
|
|
3535 nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above
|
|
|
3536 (
|
|
|
3537 <a id="FP_Q38_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>;
|
|
|
3538 <a id="FP_Q38_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html">Q[37], A[1]</a>), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many particular
|
|
|
3539 gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ."
|
|
|
3540 </p>
|
|
|
3541 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p8">
|
|
|
3542 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of
|
|
|
3543 its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
|
|
|
3544 as love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father's love,
|
|
|
3545 according to the words, "God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son"
|
|
|
3546 (
|
|
|
3547 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q38_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.16" target="asv">Jn. 3:16</a>).
|
|
|
3548 </p>
|
|
|
3549 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p9">
|
|
|
3550 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin
|
|
|
3551 of the Holy Ghost---that is, His procession.
|
|
|
3552 </p>
|
|
|
3553 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p10">
|
|
|
3554 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because
|
|
|
3555 "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it
|
|
|
3556 has been given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
|
|
|
3557 </p>
|
|
|
3558 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3559 <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3560 <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3561 <a href="summa.FP_Q39.html"></a>
|
|
|
3562 </div>
|
|
|
3563 <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3564 <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3565 </div>
|
|
|
3566 <div id="FP_Q39" class="div3">
|
|
|
3567 <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3568 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3569 <h3 id="FP_Q39-p0.1">OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3570 <p id="FP_Q39-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3571 <p id="FP_Q39-p2"> Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference
|
|
|
3572 to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other.
|
|
|
3573 </p>
|
|
|
3574 <p id="FP_Q39-p3"> As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
3575 <p id="FP_Q39-p4"> (1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?</p>
|
|
|
3576 <p id="FP_Q39-p5"> (2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?</p>
|
|
|
3577 <p id="FP_Q39-p6"> (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular?</p>
|
|
|
3578 <p id="FP_Q39-p7"> (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?</p>
|
|
|
3579 <p id="FP_Q39-p8"> (5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract?</p>
|
|
|
3580 <p id="FP_Q39-p9"> (6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names?</p>
|
|
|
3581 <p id="FP_Q39-p10"> (7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?</p>
|
|
|
3582 <p id="FP_Q39-p11"> (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?</p>
|
|
|
3583 <div id="FP_Q39_A1" class="div4">
|
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|
3584 <a href="summa.FP_Q39.html"></a>
|
|
|
3585 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3586 <h4 id="FP_Q39_A1-p0.1">Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?</h4>
|
|
|
3587 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3588 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3589 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or "suppositum,"
|
|
|
3590 there can be only one "suppositum" of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things
|
|
|
3591 which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three
|
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|
3592 persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (
|
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|
3593 <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>;
|
|
|
3594
|
|
|
3595 <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Therefore essence is not the same as person.
|
|
|
3596 </p>
|
|
|
3597 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3598 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and
|
|
|
3599 negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are
|
|
|
3600 not the same.
|
|
|
3601 </p>
|
|
|
3602 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3603 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or "hypostasis."
|
|
|
3604 Therefore person is not the same as essence.
|
|
|
3605 </p>
|
|
|
3606 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3607 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father."
|
|
|
3608 </p>
|
|
|
3609 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3610 <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (
|
|
|
3611 <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as "suppositum," which in intellectual substances is
|
|
|
3612 nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the
|
|
|
3613 essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin.
|
|
|
3614 i), "relation multiplies the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they
|
|
|
3615 held the relations to be "adjacent"; considering only in the relations the idea of "reference to another," and not the relations
|
|
|
3616 as realities. But as it was shown above (
|
|
|
3617 <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html">Q[28], A[2]</a>) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God
|
|
|
3618 essence is not really distinct from person;
|
|
|
3619 and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (
|
|
|
3620 <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html">Q[29], A[4]</a>), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom
|
|
|
3621 really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of
|
|
|
3622 that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.
|
|
|
3623 </p>
|
|
|
3624 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p7">
|
|
|
3625 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There cannot be a distinction of "suppositum" in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because
|
|
|
3626 in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between
|
|
|
3627 them they distinguish the "supposita"; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not
|
|
|
3628 distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.
|
|
|
3629 </p>
|
|
|
3630 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p8">
|
|
|
3631 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed
|
|
|
3632 of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.
|
|
|
3633 </p>
|
|
|
3634 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p9">
|
|
|
3635 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained (
|
|
|
3636 <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], AA[1]</a>,3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals
|
|
|
3637 are called "subjects," "supposita," or "hypostases." So the divine persons are named "supposita" or "hypostases," but not
|
|
|
3638 as if there really existed any real "supposition" or "subjection."
|
|
|
3639 </p>
|
|
|
3640 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3641 <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3642 <a href="summa.FP_Q39.html"></a>
|
|
|
3643 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3644 </div>
|
|
|
3645 <div id="FP_Q39_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
3646 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3647 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3648 <h4 id="FP_Q39_A2-p0.1">Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?</h4>
|
|
|
3649 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3650 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p2">
|
|
|
3651 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son
|
|
|
3652 and Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the
|
|
|
3653 three persons are not of one essence.
|
|
|
3654 </p>
|
|
|
3655 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p3">
|
|
|
3656 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius
|
|
|
3657 (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not
|
|
|
3658 be asserted.
|
|
|
3659 </p>
|
|
|
3660 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p4">
|
|
|
3661 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of
|
|
|
3662 one nature.
|
|
|
3663 </p>
|
|
|
3664 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p5">
|
|
|
3665 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore
|
|
|
3666 it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence.
|
|
|
3667 </p>
|
|
|
3668 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p6">
|
|
|
3669 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia],"
|
|
|
3670 lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition,
|
|
|
3671 denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]."
|
|
|
3672 </p>
|
|
|
3673 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p7">
|
|
|
3674 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence
|
|
|
3675 or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the
|
|
|
3676 Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a
|
|
|
3677 third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not be said that
|
|
|
3678 the three persons are of one substance.
|
|
|
3679 </p>
|
|
|
3680 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p8">
|
|
|
3681 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word {homoousion}, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means
|
|
|
3682 that the three persons are of one essence.
|
|
|
3683 </p>
|
|
|
3684 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p9">
|
|
|
3685 <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained (
|
|
|
3686 <a id="FP_Q39_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], AA[1]</a>,2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but
|
|
|
3687 in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge,
|
|
|
3688 the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the
|
|
|
3689 "suppositum" of the form; so also in
|
|
|
3690 God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say
|
|
|
3691 that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not
|
|
|
3692 say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That
|
|
|
3693 woman is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied,
|
|
|
3694 and
|
|
|
3695 the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided
|
|
|
3696 that these genitives be understood as designating the form.
|
|
|
3697 </p>
|
|
|
3698 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p10">
|
|
|
3699 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not for the essence.
|
|
|
3700 </p>
|
|
|
3701 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p11">
|
|
|
3702 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless
|
|
|
3703 we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the Father are one (
|
|
|
3704 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.10.30" target="asv">Jn. 10:30</a>)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (
|
|
|
3705 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#John.10.38" target="asv">Jn. 10:38</a>)"; and there are many other texts of the same import.
|
|
|
3706 </p>
|
|
|
3707 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p12">
|
|
|
3708 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be
|
|
|
3709 of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence"
|
|
|
3710 which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than
|
|
|
3711 by saying they are "of one nature."
|
|
|
3712 </p>
|
|
|
3713 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p13">
|
|
|
3714 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue
|
|
|
3715 of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish
|
|
|
3716 to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying
|
|
|
3717 the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great
|
|
|
3718 virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"---that
|
|
|
3719 is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person,
|
|
|
3720 it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate
|
|
|
3721 the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are "of one
|
|
|
3722 essence."
|
|
|
3723 </p>
|
|
|
3724 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p14">
|
|
|
3725 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient
|
|
|
3726 or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing
|
|
|
3727 can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things.
|
|
|
3728 So, when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as having the
|
|
|
3729 habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from
|
|
|
3730 the same essence."
|
|
|
3731 </p>
|
|
|
3732 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p15">
|
|
|
3733 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do
|
|
|
3734 not think them holy. So if some misunderstand {homoousion}, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness
|
|
|
3735 of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to
|
|
|
3736 both Father and Son."
|
|
|
3737 </p>
|
|
|
3738 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p16"></p>
|
|
|
3739 <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p17"></p>
|
|
|
3740 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3741 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3742 </div>
|
|
|
3743 <div id="FP_Q39_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
3744 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3745 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3746 <h4 id="FP_Q39_A3-p0.1">Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?</h4>
|
|
|
3747 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3748 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p2">
|
|
|
3749 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that essential names, as the name "God," should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but
|
|
|
3750 in the plural. For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God signifies "one that has Godhead." But the three persons
|
|
|
3751 are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are "three Gods."
|
|
|
3752 </p>
|
|
|
3753 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p3">
|
|
|
3754 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further,
|
|
|
3755 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv"> Gn. 1:1, </a> where it is said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may be rendered
|
|
|
3756 "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several
|
|
|
3757 Gods," and not "one" God.
|
|
|
3758 </p>
|
|
|
3759 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p4">
|
|
|
3760 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons
|
|
|
3761 in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father,
|
|
|
3762 Son and Holy Ghost." Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons.
|
|
|
3763 </p>
|
|
|
3764 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p5">
|
|
|
3765 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has Deity," so also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in
|
|
|
3766 an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are "three Gods."
|
|
|
3767 </p>
|
|
|
3768 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p6">
|
|
|
3769 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
3770 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God."
|
|
|
3771 </p>
|
|
|
3772 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p7">
|
|
|
3773 <b>I answer that,</b> Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives.
|
|
|
3774 Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those
|
|
|
3775 which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives
|
|
|
3776 signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something
|
|
|
3777 by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity
|
|
|
3778 or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But
|
|
|
3779 as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity
|
|
|
3780 and plurality of adjectives depends upon their "supposita." In creatures, one form does not exist in several
|
|
|
3781 "supposita" except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives,
|
|
|
3782 they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or
|
|
|
3783 an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form,
|
|
|
3784 as above explained
|
|
|
3785 <a id="FP_Q39_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (
|
|
|
3786 <a id="FP_Q39_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>;
|
|
|
3787 <a id="FP_Q39_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html">Q[11], A[4]</a>). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular,
|
|
|
3788 and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do
|
|
|
3789 not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three "supposita" of human nature
|
|
|
3790 there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine
|
|
|
3791 Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated
|
|
|
3792 of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of "supposita." For we say there are three "existent" or three "wise"
|
|
|
3793 beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense" beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if
|
|
|
3794 taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal being," as Athanasius declares.
|
|
|
3795 </p>
|
|
|
3796 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p8">
|
|
|
3797 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the name "God" signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name
|
|
|
3798 "God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are "three having
|
|
|
3799 Godhead," it does not follow that there are three Gods.
|
|
|
3800 </p>
|
|
|
3801 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p9">
|
|
|
3802 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of "supposita" the Greeks said "three
|
|
|
3803 hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance,"
|
|
|
3804 lest plurality be referred to the substance.
|
|
|
3805 </p>
|
|
|
3806 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p10">
|
|
|
3807 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in
|
|
|
3808 the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the
|
|
|
3809 passage quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme."
|
|
|
3810 </p>
|
|
|
3811 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p11">
|
|
|
3812 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The form signified by the word "person" is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities---that
|
|
|
3813 is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost---it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but
|
|
|
3814 in the plural.
|
|
|
3815 </p>
|
|
|
3816 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3817 <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3818 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3819 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3820 </div>
|
|
|
3821 <div id="FP_Q39_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
3822 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3823 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3824 <h4 id="FP_Q39_A4-p0.1">Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?</h4>
|
|
|
3825 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3826 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p2">
|
|
|
3827 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For,
|
|
|
3828 as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for." But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for
|
|
|
3829 it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained
|
|
|
3830 <a id="FP_Q39_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.
|
|
|
3831 </p>
|
|
|
3832 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p3">
|
|
|
3833 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense
|
|
|
3834 signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot,"
|
|
|
3835 this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.
|
|
|
3836 </p>
|
|
|
3837 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p4">
|
|
|
3838 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget,"
|
|
|
3839 because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows
|
|
|
3840 that there are two Gods.
|
|
|
3841 </p>
|
|
|
3842 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3843 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself;
|
|
|
3844 for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God.
|
|
|
3845 Therefore it is false to say, "God begot God."
|
|
|
3846 </p>
|
|
|
3847 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3848 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father,
|
|
|
3849 then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false.
|
|
|
3850 Therefore it cannot be said that "God begot God."
|
|
|
3851 </p>
|
|
|
3852 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p7">
|
|
|
3853 <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Creed it is said, "God of God."
|
|
|
3854 </p>
|
|
|
3855 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p8">
|
|
|
3856 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that this name "God" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason
|
|
|
3857 of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity,
|
|
|
3858 which requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is
|
|
|
3859 signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way
|
|
|
3860 of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word
|
|
|
3861 "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others
|
|
|
3862 more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as
|
|
|
3863 does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate
|
|
|
3864 is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified---that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either
|
|
|
3865 for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said:
|
|
|
3866 "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (
|
|
|
3867 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>).
|
|
|
3868 </p>
|
|
|
3869 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p9">
|
|
|
3870 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees
|
|
|
3871 also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several "supposita." So it need not always stand for
|
|
|
3872 the essence it signifies.
|
|
|
3873 </p>
|
|
|
3874 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p10">
|
|
|
3875 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This holds good against those who say that the word "God" does not naturally stand for person.
|
|
|
3876 </p>
|
|
|
3877 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p11">
|
|
|
3878 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "God" stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified
|
|
|
3879 by this word "man"---that is, humanity---is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person,
|
|
|
3880 even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person---that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human
|
|
|
3881 nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the
|
|
|
3882 mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say,
|
|
|
3883 "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"---that is, the divine essence---is really one and common.
|
|
|
3884 So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So,
|
|
|
3885 when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when
|
|
|
3886 we say,
|
|
|
3887 "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that
|
|
|
3888 generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition,
|
|
|
3889 for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator,"
|
|
|
3890 and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say,
|
|
|
3891 "the Father is God the generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that there are many Gods;
|
|
|
3892 for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above
|
|
|
3893 <a id="FP_Q39_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html">(A[3])</a>.
|
|
|
3894 </p>
|
|
|
3895 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p12">
|
|
|
3896 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same
|
|
|
3897 "suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum
|
|
|
3898 se]," forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it means "He begot another from Himself," or it
|
|
|
3899 indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is,
|
|
|
3900 however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot another most like to
|
|
|
3901 Himself." Likewise also it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is another than the Father, as
|
|
|
3902 above explained (
|
|
|
3903 <a id="FP_Q39_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html">Q[31], A[2]</a>), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as this adjective "another" would be understood to apply
|
|
|
3904 to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a
|
|
|
3905 distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken
|
|
|
3906 as a substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and
|
|
|
3907 to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.
|
|
|
3908 </p>
|
|
|
3909 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p13">
|
|
|
3910 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to "God,"
|
|
|
3911 the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father";
|
|
|
3912 and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He
|
|
|
3913 begot God Who is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to
|
|
|
3914 be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative
|
|
|
3915 is false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be
|
|
|
3916 forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus
|
|
|
3917 said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition
|
|
|
3918 can be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the "suppositum." Whence,
|
|
|
3919 in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense
|
|
|
3920 is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears
|
|
|
3921 to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to
|
|
|
3922 negation.
|
|
|
3923 </p>
|
|
|
3924 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p14"></p>
|
|
|
3925 <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p15"></p>
|
|
|
3926 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3927 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3928 </div>
|
|
|
3929 <div id="FP_Q39_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
3930 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3931 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3932 <h4 id="FP_Q39_A5-p0.1">Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?</h4>
|
|
|
3933 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3934 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p2">
|
|
|
3935 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence."
|
|
|
3936 For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly
|
|
|
3937 Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence."
|
|
|
3938 </p>
|
|
|
3939 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p3">
|
|
|
3940 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated.
|
|
|
3941 Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.
|
|
|
3942 </p>
|
|
|
3943 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p4">
|
|
|
3944 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (
|
|
|
3945 <a id="FP_Q39_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). But, as was shown, it is true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true: "Essence begets essence."
|
|
|
3946 </p>
|
|
|
3947 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p5">
|
|
|
3948 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence
|
|
|
3949 can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
|
|
|
3950 </p>
|
|
|
3951 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p6">
|
|
|
3952 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence
|
|
|
3953 is not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not begetting": which cannot be.
|
|
|
3954 </p>
|
|
|
3955 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p7">
|
|
|
3956 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by
|
|
|
3957 begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead.
|
|
|
3958 </p>
|
|
|
3959 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p8">
|
|
|
3960 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since
|
|
|
3961 nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
|
|
|
3962 </p>
|
|
|
3963 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p9">
|
|
|
3964 <b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot essence":
|
|
|
3965 considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because
|
|
|
3966 if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode
|
|
|
3967 of its signification as above stated
|
|
|
3968 <a id="FP_Q39_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Now
|
|
|
3969 although "God" is really the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since
|
|
|
3970 this word "God" signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature
|
|
|
3971 stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for instance,
|
|
|
3972 we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above explained
|
|
|
3973 <a id="FP_Q39_A5-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. The word
|
|
|
3974 "essence," however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract
|
|
|
3975 form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed
|
|
|
3976 to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the
|
|
|
3977 "supposita."
|
|
|
3978 </p>
|
|
|
3979 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p10">
|
|
|
3980 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than
|
|
|
3981 the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus,
|
|
|
3982 for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from
|
|
|
3983 essence"; or "wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, "the Son" who
|
|
|
3984 is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain
|
|
|
3985 order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong
|
|
|
3986 to "supposita." So "nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence."
|
|
|
3987 </p>
|
|
|
3988 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p11">
|
|
|
3989 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct,
|
|
|
3990 which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted
|
|
|
3991 accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not
|
|
|
3992 begotten either directly or accidentally.
|
|
|
3993 </p>
|
|
|
3994 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p12">
|
|
|
3995 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification,
|
|
|
3996 we must speak in a different way about each of them.
|
|
|
3997 </p>
|
|
|
3998 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p13">
|
|
|
3999 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow
|
|
|
4000 that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things
|
|
|
4001 which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
|
|
|
4002 </p>
|
|
|
4003 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p14">
|
|
|
4004 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas
|
|
|
4005 the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is
|
|
|
4006 considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective indicates something added to the "suppositum." Therefore substantive
|
|
|
4007 personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are
|
|
|
4008 really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum"
|
|
|
4009 implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive.
|
|
|
4010 We cannot say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing begetting," or that it is "God
|
|
|
4011 begetting," if "thing" and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no
|
|
|
4012 contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing"
|
|
|
4013 stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
|
|
|
4014 </p>
|
|
|
4015 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p15">
|
|
|
4016 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita," it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when
|
|
|
4017 we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch
|
|
|
4018 as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may
|
|
|
4019 be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also
|
|
|
4020 say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation
|
|
|
4021 and spiration.
|
|
|
4022 </p>
|
|
|
4023 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p16"></p>
|
|
|
4024 <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p17"></p>
|
|
|
4025 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4026 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4027 </div>
|
|
|
4028 <div id="FP_Q39_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
4029 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4030 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
4031 <h4 id="FP_Q39_A6-p0.1">Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?</h4>
|
|
|
4032 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4033 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p2">
|
|
|
4034 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God
|
|
|
4035 is three persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards
|
|
|
4036 any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, "God
|
|
|
4037 is the Trinity," cannot be verified of any one of the "supposita" of the divine
|
|
|
4038 nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, "God is the Trinity," is false.
|
|
|
4039 </p>
|
|
|
4040 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p3">
|
|
|
4041 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for
|
|
|
4042 it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms,
|
|
|
4043 as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name
|
|
|
4044 "God," except in an accidental sense.
|
|
|
4045 </p>
|
|
|
4046 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p4">
|
|
|
4047 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity."
|
|
|
4048 </p>
|
|
|
4049 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p5">
|
|
|
4050 <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained
|
|
|
4051 <a id="FP_Q39_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms
|
|
|
4052 can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as
|
|
|
4053 one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the
|
|
|
4054 essence as if we were to say, "The
|
|
|
4055 essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "God" can of itself stand for the essence,
|
|
|
4056 as above explained (A[4], ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true to
|
|
|
4057 say, "God is the three persons."
|
|
|
4058 </p>
|
|
|
4059 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p6">
|
|
|
4060 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the
|
|
|
4061 universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man"; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject.
|
|
|
4062 On the contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the "supposita"
|
|
|
4063 of the divine nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is
|
|
|
4064 true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction.
|
|
|
4065 </p>
|
|
|
4066 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p7">
|
|
|
4067 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard
|
|
|
4068 to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is
|
|
|
4069 of itself true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by no means accidentally.
|
|
|
4070 </p>
|
|
|
4071 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p8"></p>
|
|
|
4072 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p9"></p>
|
|
|
4073 <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4074 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4075 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
4076 </div>
|
|
|
4077 <div id="FP_Q39_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
4078 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4079 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4080 <h4 id="FP_Q39_A7-p0.1">Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?</h4>
|
|
|
4081 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4082 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p2">
|
|
|
4083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith
|
|
|
4084 should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance
|
|
|
4085
|
|
|
4086 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. lvii.</a>]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for
|
|
|
4087 it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are
|
|
|
4088 appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not
|
|
|
4089 be appropriated to the persons.
|
|
|
4090 </p>
|
|
|
4091 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p3">
|
|
|
4092 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another;
|
|
|
4093 since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially
|
|
|
4094 when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.
|
|
|
4095 </p>
|
|
|
4096 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p4">
|
|
|
4097 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential
|
|
|
4098 attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore
|
|
|
4099 the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
|
|
|
4100 </p>
|
|
|
4101 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p5">
|
|
|
4102 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God" (
|
|
|
4103 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:24</a>).
|
|
|
4104 </p>
|
|
|
4105 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p6">
|
|
|
4106 <b>I answer that,</b> For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For
|
|
|
4107 although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded (
|
|
|
4108 <a id="FP_Q39_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God
|
|
|
4109 are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because
|
|
|
4110 we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we
|
|
|
4111 cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (
|
|
|
4112 <a id="FP_Q39_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine
|
|
|
4113 persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons
|
|
|
4114 by the use of
|
|
|
4115 the essential attributes is called "appropriation."
|
|
|
4116 </p>
|
|
|
4117 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p7"> The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the
|
|
|
4118 things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way
|
|
|
4119 by dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes
|
|
|
4120 feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.
|
|
|
4121 </p>
|
|
|
4122 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p8">
|
|
|
4123 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make
|
|
|
4124 the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather
|
|
|
4125 manifestation of the truth.
|
|
|
4126 </p>
|
|
|
4127 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p9">
|
|
|
4128 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow
|
|
|
4129 that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that
|
|
|
4130 the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together
|
|
|
4131 only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is
|
|
|
4132 called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom;
|
|
|
4133 and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is
|
|
|
4134 His own essence.
|
|
|
4135 </p>
|
|
|
4136 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p10">
|
|
|
4137 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless,
|
|
|
4138 so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated.
|
|
|
4139 Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white.
|
|
|
4140 </p>
|
|
|
4141 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4142 <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4143 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4144 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4145 </div>
|
|
|
4146 <div id="FP_Q39_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
4147 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
4148 <a href="summa.FP_Q40.html"></a>
|
|
|
4149 <h4 id="FP_Q39_A8-p0.1">Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors?</h4>
|
|
|
4150 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4151 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p2">
|
|
|
4152 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says
|
|
|
4153 (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates
|
|
|
4154 three names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image" proper to the Son (
|
|
|
4155 <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html">Q[35], A[2]</a>), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift," which is proper to the Holy Ghost (
|
|
|
4156 <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html">Q[38], A[2]</a>). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity" to the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use"
|
|
|
4157 to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports duration of existence; "species," the principle
|
|
|
4158 of existence; and 'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person.
|
|
|
4159 Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons.
|
|
|
4160 </p>
|
|
|
4161 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p3">
|
|
|
4162 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is
|
|
|
4163 the concord of equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination
|
|
|
4164 from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained (
|
|
|
4165 <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], A[2]</a>, ad 1). But, as he subjoins, "All these three are one by the
|
|
|
4166 Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated
|
|
|
4167 to the Persons.
|
|
|
4168 </p>
|
|
|
4169 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p4">
|
|
|
4170 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness."
|
|
|
4171 Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according
|
|
|
4172 to the text, "Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God" (
|
|
|
4173 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:24</a>). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, "strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him
|
|
|
4174 and healed all" (
|
|
|
4175 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.19" target="asv">Lk. 6:19</a>). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
|
|
|
4176 </p>
|
|
|
4177 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p5">
|
|
|
4178 <b>Objection 4:</b> Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken
|
|
|
4179 in a confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost.'"
|
|
|
4180 This, however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first
|
|
|
4181 among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the
|
|
|
4182 Father, Who is "the principle from no principle."
|
|
|
4183 </p>
|
|
|
4184 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p6">
|
|
|
4185 <b>Objection 5:</b> Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to
|
|
|
4186 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the book of life," according to
|
|
|
4187 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.39.9" target="asv"> Ps. 39:9, </a> "In the beginning of the book it is written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who is My head," also
|
|
|
4188 this word "Who is"; because on the text of
|
|
|
4189 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.65.1" target="asv"> Is. 65:1, </a> "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I
|
|
|
4190 am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
|
|
|
4191 36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son,
|
|
|
4192 Who has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as signifying "a thing from another"; for every book
|
|
|
4193 is written by someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who
|
|
|
4194 am," the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to
|
|
|
4195 you," so also he could have said further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," pointing
|
|
|
4196 out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common
|
|
|
4197 to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
|
|
|
4198 </p>
|
|
|
4199 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p7">
|
|
|
4200 <b>I answer that,</b> Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from
|
|
|
4201 creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken
|
|
|
4202 absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality
|
|
|
4203 is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects.
|
|
|
4204 Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.
|
|
|
4205 </p>
|
|
|
4206 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p8"> According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned
|
|
|
4207 by Hilary applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species" to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
4208 For "eternity" as meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is "a principle
|
|
|
4209 without a principle." Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three
|
|
|
4210 conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion"
|
|
|
4211 or "harmony"; and lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.
|
|
|
4212 </p>
|
|
|
4213 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p9"> The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the
|
|
|
4214 nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): "Where---that is, in the Son---there
|
|
|
4215 is supreme and primal life," etc.
|
|
|
4216 </p>
|
|
|
4217 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p10"> The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image
|
|
|
4218 is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin.
|
|
|
4219 vi, 10), "Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc.
|
|
|
4220 </p>
|
|
|
4221 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p11"> The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene
|
|
|
4222 says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting
|
|
|
4223 in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God," etc.
|
|
|
4224 </p>
|
|
|
4225 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p12"> "Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the "use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the
|
|
|
4226 sense of "to enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully,
|
|
|
4227 as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of
|
|
|
4228 the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that
|
|
|
4229 felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of
|
|
|
4230 the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost,
|
|
|
4231 the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is
|
|
|
4232 clear how "eternity," "species," and "use" are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because,
|
|
|
4233 being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.
|
|
|
4234 </p>
|
|
|
4235 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p13"> The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity"
|
|
|
4236 to the Father, "equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity,
|
|
|
4237 but in different ways. For "unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is
|
|
|
4238 appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without
|
|
|
4239 principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality
|
|
|
4240 is appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle." "Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated
|
|
|
4241 to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says (De
|
|
|
4242 Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are
|
|
|
4243 united by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as
|
|
|
4244 in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity"
|
|
|
4245 is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So
|
|
|
4246 the other persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality in the
|
|
|
4247 Father,
|
|
|
4248 but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle
|
|
|
4249 of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His
|
|
|
4250 equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son.
|
|
|
4251 Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between
|
|
|
4252 the
|
|
|
4253 Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father
|
|
|
4254 and the Son are said to be united.
|
|
|
4255 </p>
|
|
|
4256 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p14"> According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there
|
|
|
4257 is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness." This kind of appropriation is made both
|
|
|
4258 by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is
|
|
|
4259 in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is
|
|
|
4260 the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness
|
|
|
4261 to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent
|
|
|
4262 by reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant
|
|
|
4263 to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to
|
|
|
4264 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.25.4" target="asv"> Is. 25:4</a>: "The
|
|
|
4265 spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not
|
|
|
4266 as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we
|
|
|
4267 say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength.
|
|
|
4268 </p>
|
|
|
4269 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p15"> According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from
|
|
|
4270 Whom, by Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause;
|
|
|
4271 which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by
|
|
|
4272 reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition "by"
|
|
|
4273 [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is
|
|
|
4274 not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, "All things were
|
|
|
4275 made by Him" (
|
|
|
4276 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p15.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>); not that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle." Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form
|
|
|
4277 "by" which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as
|
|
|
4278 wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the
|
|
|
4279 habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to
|
|
|
4280 be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated to the Son. In another
|
|
|
4281 sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting
|
|
|
4282 end;
|
|
|
4283 and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness." Nor need the habitude
|
|
|
4284 of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle without a principle":
|
|
|
4285 because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of
|
|
|
4286 Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power.
|
|
|
4287 </p>
|
|
|
4288 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p16"> Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth" belongs to the intellect, as stated above (
|
|
|
4289 <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the
|
|
|
4290 thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and
|
|
|
4291 not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from
|
|
|
4292 Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge but indirectly it means
|
|
|
4293 life. For, as above explained (
|
|
|
4294 <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">Q[24], A[1]</a>), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although
|
|
|
4295 life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property
|
|
|
4296 of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another
|
|
|
4297 is not of the essence of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply
|
|
|
4298 origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the
|
|
|
4299 Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery
|
|
|
4300 of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes
|
|
|
4301 relate
|
|
|
4302 to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is the
|
|
|
4303 begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although
|
|
|
4304 the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to
|
|
|
4305 can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, "this stone," and
|
|
|
4306 "this
|
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|
4307 ass." So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter
|
|
|
4308 may be designated by the pronoun "this," according to
|
|
|
4309 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p16.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.2" target="asv"> Ex. 15:2</a>: "This is my God, and I will glorify Him."
|
|
|
4310 </p>
|
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|
4311 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p17"></p>
|
|
|
4312 <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p18"></p>
|
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|
4313 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A7.html"></a>
|
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|
4314 <a href="summa.FP_Q40.html"></a>
|
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|
4315 </div>
|
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|
4316 <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
|
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4317 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4318 </div>
|
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|
4319 <div id="FP_Q40" class="div3">
|
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|
4320 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html"></a>
|
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4321 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
4322 <h3 id="FP_Q40-p0.1">OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
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4323 <p id="FP_Q40-p1"></p>
|
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|
4324 <p id="FP_Q40-p2"> We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or properties; and there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
4325 <p id="FP_Q40-p3"> (1) Whether relation is the same as person?</p>
|
|
|
4326 <p id="FP_Q40-p4"> (2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?</p>
|
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|
4327 <p id="FP_Q40-p5"> (3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypostases distinct?</p>
|
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4328 <p id="FP_Q40-p6"> (4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?</p>
|
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4329 <div id="FP_Q40_A1" class="div4">
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4330 <a href="summa.FP_Q40.html"></a>
|
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|
4331 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
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|
4332 <h4 id="FP_Q40_A1-p0.1">Whether relation is the same as person?</h4>
|
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|
4333 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p1"></p>
|
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|
4334 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p2">
|
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|
4335 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God relation is not the same as person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others
|
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|
4336 are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in the person of the Father there is paternity and common
|
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|
4337 spiration. Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the Father and in the Son. Therefore relation
|
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|
4338 is not the same as person.
|
|
|
4339 </p>
|
|
|
4340 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p3">
|
|
|
4341 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person;
|
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|
4342 nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore
|
|
|
4343 relation, or property, is not the same as person in God.
|
|
|
4344 </p>
|
|
|
4345 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p4">
|
|
|
4346 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated
|
|
|
4347 of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting.
|
|
|
4348 Therefore property is not the same as person in God.
|
|
|
4349 </p>
|
|
|
4350 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p5">
|
|
|
4351 <b>On the contrary,</b> in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by paternity.
|
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|
4352 In the same way, the other properties are the same as the persons.
|
|
|
4353 </p>
|
|
|
4354 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p6">
|
|
|
4355 <b>I answer that,</b> Different opinions have been held on this point. Some have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons;
|
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|
4356 and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in"
|
|
|
4357 something, but rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations "assistant," as above explained (
|
|
|
4358 <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html">Q[28], A[2]</a>). But since relation, considered as really existing in
|
|
|
4359 God, is the divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above (
|
|
|
4360 <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html">Q[39], A[1]</a>), relation must necessarily be the same as person.
|
|
|
4361 </p>
|
|
|
4362 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p7"> Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons;
|
|
|
4363 for, they said, there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated above (
|
|
|
4364 <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>). We must, however, say that there are properties in God; as we have shown (
|
|
|
4365 <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>). These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, since the nature of a form
|
|
|
4366 requires it to be "in" that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they
|
|
|
4367 are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God, and yet is God.
|
|
|
4368 </p>
|
|
|
4369 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p8">
|
|
|
4370 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied,
|
|
|
4371 the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real
|
|
|
4372 identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter
|
|
|
4373 and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as
|
|
|
4374 "Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever
|
|
|
4375 is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine
|
|
|
4376 essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For personal properties are the same as the
|
|
|
4377 persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as
|
|
|
4378 paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties
|
|
|
4379 are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence.
|
|
|
4380 Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting
|
|
|
4381 person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above
|
|
|
4382 explained (
|
|
|
4383 <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a> ).
|
|
|
4384 </p>
|
|
|
4385 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p9">
|
|
|
4386 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity,
|
|
|
4387 not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine
|
|
|
4388 and distinguish the persons, but not the essence.
|
|
|
4389 </p>
|
|
|
4390 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p10">
|
|
|
4391 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a "suppositum." Now, properties are not designated
|
|
|
4392 as "supposita," but as forms of "supposita." And so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs
|
|
|
4393 being predicated of the properties.
|
|
|
4394 </p>
|
|
|
4395 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4396 <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4397 <a href="summa.FP_Q40.html"></a>
|
|
|
4398 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4399 </div>
|
|
|
4400 <div id="FP_Q40_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
4401 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4402 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4403 <h4 id="FP_Q40_A2-p0.1">Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?</h4>
|
|
|
4404 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4405 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p2">
|
|
|
4406 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But
|
|
|
4407 the persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by the relation.
|
|
|
4408 </p>
|
|
|
4409 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p3">
|
|
|
4410 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But
|
|
|
4411 "hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
|
|
|
4412 </p>
|
|
|
4413 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p4">
|
|
|
4414 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
|
|
|
4415 Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
|
|
|
4416 </p>
|
|
|
4417 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p5">
|
|
|
4418 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction,
|
|
|
4419 which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle
|
|
|
4420 in God cannot be relation.
|
|
|
4421 </p>
|
|
|
4422 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p6">
|
|
|
4423 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons."
|
|
|
4424 </p>
|
|
|
4425 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p7">
|
|
|
4426 <b>I answer that,</b> In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction.
|
|
|
4427 So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
|
|
|
4428 several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although
|
|
|
4429 these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for
|
|
|
4430 "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by way of the form, as "paternity."
|
|
|
4431 </p>
|
|
|
4432 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p8"> Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin,
|
|
|
4433 so that we may say that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is begotten.
|
|
|
4434 Further, that the relations, or the properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as resulting therefrom;
|
|
|
4435 as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused
|
|
|
4436 by the material principles.
|
|
|
4437 </p>
|
|
|
4438 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p9"> This opinion, however, cannot stand---for two reasons. Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as distinct,
|
|
|
4439 their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both; thus in things created it results from
|
|
|
4440 their matter or their form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means the way from something,
|
|
|
4441 or to something; as generation signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.
|
|
|
4442 Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the
|
|
|
4443 generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a divine
|
|
|
4444 person there is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it
|
|
|
4445 only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because the distinction
|
|
|
4446 of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence remains
|
|
|
4447 undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or
|
|
|
4448 the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons;
|
|
|
4449 as paternity is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it
|
|
|
4450 is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies
|
|
|
4451 proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as "nativity," signifies
|
|
|
4452 the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting the person.
|
|
|
4453 </p>
|
|
|
4454 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p10"> It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although
|
|
|
4455 in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly
|
|
|
4456 by relations; whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter"
|
|
|
4457 or "Begetting" signifies property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation which is
|
|
|
4458 distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term "Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive
|
|
|
4459 and constitutive of the hypostasis.
|
|
|
4460 </p>
|
|
|
4461 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p11">
|
|
|
4462 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them
|
|
|
4463 to be distinguished by the relations.
|
|
|
4464 </p>
|
|
|
4465 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p12">
|
|
|
4466 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards
|
|
|
4467 something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.
|
|
|
4468 </p>
|
|
|
4469 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p13">
|
|
|
4470 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So
|
|
|
4471 the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.
|
|
|
4472 </p>
|
|
|
4473 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p14">
|
|
|
4474 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does
|
|
|
4475 not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word
|
|
|
4476 "another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature.
|
|
|
4477 </p>
|
|
|
4478 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
4479 <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p16"></p>
|
|
|
4480 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4481 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4482 </div>
|
|
|
4483 <div id="FP_Q40_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
4484 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4485 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4486 <h4 id="FP_Q40_A3-p0.1">Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons?</h4>
|
|
|
4487 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4488 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p2">
|
|
|
4489 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that
|
|
|
4490 to which something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken away; as man is something added to animal which
|
|
|
4491 can be understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis; for person is "a hypostasis distinguished
|
|
|
4492 by a property of dignity." Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a
|
|
|
4493 person, the hypostasis remains.
|
|
|
4494 </p>
|
|
|
4495 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p3">
|
|
|
4496 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity,
|
|
|
4497 supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone."
|
|
|
4498 So when paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains "someone"---that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if
|
|
|
4499 property be removed from person, the hypostasis remains.
|
|
|
4500 </p>
|
|
|
4501 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p4">
|
|
|
4502 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son,
|
|
|
4503 nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him.
|
|
|
4504 Therefore, if paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten.
|
|
|
4505 </p>
|
|
|
4506 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p5">
|
|
|
4507 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation be removed,
|
|
|
4508 the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as regards the other persons.
|
|
|
4509 </p>
|
|
|
4510 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p6">
|
|
|
4511 <b>I answer that,</b> Abstraction by the intellect is twofold---when the universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from
|
|
|
4512 man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible
|
|
|
4513 matter. The difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the
|
|
|
4514 particular, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the
|
|
|
4515 difference of rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the intellect, but animal alone remains. But in
|
|
|
4516 the abstraction of the form from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect; as, for instance, if we
|
|
|
4517 abstract the form of a circle from brass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle, and
|
|
|
4518 of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards
|
|
|
4519 the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
|
|
|
4520 6) that "substance is common and hypostasis is particular." So, if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular,
|
|
|
4521 the common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father,
|
|
|
4522 which is, as it were, a particular.
|
|
|
4523 </p>
|
|
|
4524 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p7"> But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of
|
|
|
4525 the hypostases and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's being unbegotten or spirating be mentally
|
|
|
4526 abstracted from the Father, the Father's hypostasis or person remains.
|
|
|
4527 </p>
|
|
|
4528 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p8"> If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal
|
|
|
4529 properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they
|
|
|
4530 carry with them their own "supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself.
|
|
|
4531 For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as
|
|
|
4532 relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained
|
|
|
4533 <a id="FP_Q40_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however, think,
|
|
|
4534 as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father
|
|
|
4535 is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And that the consequent relations
|
|
|
4536 which are to be
|
|
|
4537 regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence, if
|
|
|
4538 these relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the persons, remain.
|
|
|
4539 </p>
|
|
|
4540 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p9"> But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown
|
|
|
4541 above
|
|
|
4542 <a id="FP_Q40_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html">(A[2])</a>; secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab.
|
|
|
4543 Nat.) that, "person is the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, to have hypostasis and not person, it would
|
|
|
4544 be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature, but not the property
|
|
|
4545 from the person.
|
|
|
4546 </p>
|
|
|
4547 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p10">
|
|
|
4548 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all of
|
|
|
4549 which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood
|
|
|
4550 as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer
|
|
|
4551 remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed; for
|
|
|
4552 both person and hypostasis are individual substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially
|
|
|
4553 to both.
|
|
|
4554 </p>
|
|
|
4555 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p11">
|
|
|
4556 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow, however,
|
|
|
4557 that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it does not follow that He is not a person.
|
|
|
4558 </p>
|
|
|
4559 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p12">
|
|
|
4560 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed,
|
|
|
4561 as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being
|
|
|
4562 unbegotten" says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch
|
|
|
4563 as not every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the
|
|
|
4564 hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other persons, but only as distinguished from creatures;
|
|
|
4565 as the Jews understand it.
|
|
|
4566 </p>
|
|
|
4567 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4568 <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4569 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4570 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4571 </div>
|
|
|
4572 <div id="FP_Q40_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
4573 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4574 <a href="summa.FP_Q41.html"></a>
|
|
|
4575 <h4 id="FP_Q40_A4-p0.1">Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?</h4>
|
|
|
4576 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4577 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p2">
|
|
|
4578 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the notional acts are understood before the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i,
|
|
|
4579 D, xxvii) that "the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the Son." So it seems that generation precedes paternity
|
|
|
4580 in the order of intelligence.
|
|
|
4581 </p>
|
|
|
4582 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p3">
|
|
|
4583 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes quantity.
|
|
|
4584 But paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.
|
|
|
4585 </p>
|
|
|
4586 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p4">
|
|
|
4587 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is
|
|
|
4588 so called because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes generation.
|
|
|
4589 </p>
|
|
|
4590 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p5">
|
|
|
4591 <b>On the contrary,</b> Generation is the operation of the person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore in
|
|
|
4592 the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.
|
|
|
4593 </p>
|
|
|
4594 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p6">
|
|
|
4595 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the opinion that the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest them
|
|
|
4596 as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the
|
|
|
4597 notional acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because He begets, He is the Father." A distinction,
|
|
|
4598 however, is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the
|
|
|
4599 divine hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive signification---active, as generation is attributed to the
|
|
|
4600 Father, and spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed
|
|
|
4601 to the Son, and procession to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes
|
|
|
4602 the personal properties of the person proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way to a person
|
|
|
4603 constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal
|
|
|
4604 relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative
|
|
|
4605 property common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly,
|
|
|
4606 as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, as such, is
|
|
|
4607 founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the relation,
|
|
|
4608 as an action presupposes a person acting.
|
|
|
4609 </p>
|
|
|
4610 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p7">
|
|
|
4611 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the Master says that "because He begets, He is Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but not
|
|
|
4612 as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary to say conversely that because He is Father He begets.
|
|
|
4613 </p>
|
|
|
4614 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p8">
|
|
|
4615 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but not as constituting a person.
|
|
|
4616 </p>
|
|
|
4617 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p9">
|
|
|
4618 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as constituting
|
|
|
4619 the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes
|
|
|
4620 the personal property of the Father.
|
|
|
4621 </p>
|
|
|
4622 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4623 <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4624 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4625 <a href="summa.FP_Q41.html"></a>
|
|
|
4626 </div>
|
|
|
4627 <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4628 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4629 </div>
|
|
|
4630 <div id="FP_Q41" class="div3">
|
|
|
4631 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4632 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4633 <h3 id="FP_Q41-p0.1">OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
4634 <p id="FP_Q41-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4635 <p id="FP_Q41-p2"> We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise:</p>
|
|
|
4636 <p id="FP_Q41-p3"> (1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?</p>
|
|
|
4637 <p id="FP_Q41-p4"> (2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?</p>
|
|
|
4638 <p id="FP_Q41-p5"> (3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or from something?</p>
|
|
|
4639 <p id="FP_Q41-p6"> (4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?</p>
|
|
|
4640 <p id="FP_Q41-p7"> (5) What this power means?</p>
|
|
|
4641 <p id="FP_Q41-p8"> (6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?</p>
|
|
|
4642 <div id="FP_Q41_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
4643 <a href="summa.FP_Q41.html"></a>
|
|
|
4644 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4645 <h4 id="FP_Q41_A1-p0.1">Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?</h4>
|
|
|
4646 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4647 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p2">
|
|
|
4648 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is
|
|
|
4649 predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action
|
|
|
4650 is one of the ten "genera." Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion.
|
|
|
4651 </p>
|
|
|
4652 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p3">
|
|
|
4653 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance,
|
|
|
4654 or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the
|
|
|
4655 relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts
|
|
|
4656 are not to be attributed to the persons.
|
|
|
4657 </p>
|
|
|
4658 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p4">
|
|
|
4659 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional
|
|
|
4660 acts to be placed in God.
|
|
|
4661 </p>
|
|
|
4662 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p5">
|
|
|
4663 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional
|
|
|
4664 acts are to be placed in God.
|
|
|
4665 </p>
|
|
|
4666 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p6">
|
|
|
4667 <b>I answer that,</b> In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore,
|
|
|
4668 to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional acts to the persons.
|
|
|
4669 </p>
|
|
|
4670 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p7">
|
|
|
4671 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from
|
|
|
4672 Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding
|
|
|
4673 of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God regards the procession of person from person;
|
|
|
4674 wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional;
|
|
|
4675 because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what was above explained (
|
|
|
4676 <a id="FP_Q41_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
4677 </p>
|
|
|
4678 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p8">
|
|
|
4679 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether
|
|
|
4680 the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D, xxvi).
|
|
|
4681 To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything
|
|
|
4682 be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause.
|
|
|
4683 Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object,
|
|
|
4684 is called "passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called
|
|
|
4685 "action." Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds
|
|
|
4686 from some cause or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the personal action
|
|
|
4687 of
|
|
|
4688 the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes
|
|
|
4689 are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner
|
|
|
4690 of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ
|
|
|
4691 from the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons
|
|
|
4692 separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really
|
|
|
4693 the same, differing only in their mode of signification.
|
|
|
4694 </p>
|
|
|
4695 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p9">
|
|
|
4696 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to
|
|
|
4697 God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking,
|
|
|
4698 as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten."
|
|
|
4699 </p>
|
|
|
4700 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4701 <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4702 <a href="summa.FP_Q41.html"></a>
|
|
|
4703 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4704 </div>
|
|
|
4705 <div id="FP_Q41_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
4706 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4707 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4708 <h4 id="FP_Q41_A2-p0.1">Whether the notional acts are voluntary?</h4>
|
|
|
4709 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4710 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p2">
|
|
|
4711 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father
|
|
|
4712 led to beget the Son."
|
|
|
4713 </p>
|
|
|
4714 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p3">
|
|
|
4715 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love" (
|
|
|
4716 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.13" target="asv">Col. 1:13</a>). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.
|
|
|
4717 </p>
|
|
|
4718 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p4">
|
|
|
4719 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore
|
|
|
4720 He proceeds voluntarily.
|
|
|
4721 </p>
|
|
|
4722 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p5">
|
|
|
4723 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore
|
|
|
4724 the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.
|
|
|
4725 </p>
|
|
|
4726 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p6">
|
|
|
4727 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that
|
|
|
4728 He begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii).
|
|
|
4729 </p>
|
|
|
4730 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p7">
|
|
|
4731 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."
|
|
|
4732 </p>
|
|
|
4733 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p8">
|
|
|
4734 <b>I answer that,</b> When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative
|
|
|
4735 designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will---that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can
|
|
|
4736 be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the
|
|
|
4737 Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that
|
|
|
4738 the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God the
|
|
|
4739 Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the book De Synod, it is said:
|
|
|
4740 "If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason
|
|
|
4741 of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while
|
|
|
4742 the will is not determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter
|
|
|
4743 acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself,
|
|
|
4744 such also is its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas understood.
|
|
|
4745 Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and
|
|
|
4746 understanding. So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which
|
|
|
4747 can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature,
|
|
|
4748 whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made
|
|
|
4749 from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking
|
|
|
4750 will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature.
|
|
|
4751 Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son
|
|
|
4752 a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son,
|
|
|
4753 born of God, subsists in the perfect likeness of God."
|
|
|
4754 </p>
|
|
|
4755 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p9">
|
|
|
4756 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the
|
|
|
4757 Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we
|
|
|
4758 ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity---as, for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This
|
|
|
4759 appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for
|
|
|
4760 thus we read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the Father beget
|
|
|
4761 the Son."
|
|
|
4762 </p>
|
|
|
4763 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p10">
|
|
|
4764 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if
|
|
|
4765 love were the principle of the Son's generation.
|
|
|
4766 </p>
|
|
|
4767 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p11">
|
|
|
4768 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God naturally
|
|
|
4769 wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself,
|
|
|
4770 as above explained (
|
|
|
4771 <a id="FP_Q41_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds
|
|
|
4772 by mode of
|
|
|
4773 will.
|
|
|
4774 </p>
|
|
|
4775 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p12">
|
|
|
4776 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally
|
|
|
4777 understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of the divine Word is natural.
|
|
|
4778 </p>
|
|
|
4779 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p13">
|
|
|
4780 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning:
|
|
|
4781 firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause,
|
|
|
4782 when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least,
|
|
|
4783 so well attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary;
|
|
|
4784 because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which
|
|
|
4785 cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the
|
|
|
4786 Son.
|
|
|
4787 </p>
|
|
|
4788 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4789 <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p15"></p>
|
|
|
4790 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4791 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4792 </div>
|
|
|
4793 <div id="FP_Q41_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
4794 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4795 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4796 <h4 id="FP_Q41_A3-p0.1">Whether the notional acts proceed from something?</h4>
|
|
|
4797 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4798 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p2">
|
|
|
4799 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this
|
|
|
4800 will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists
|
|
|
4801 in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is
|
|
|
4802 laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In them nothing diverse or different exists." If the
|
|
|
4803 Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent, receives as
|
|
|
4804 predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he
|
|
|
4805 is made white---it follows that either the Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son,
|
|
|
4806 which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.
|
|
|
4807 </p>
|
|
|
4808 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p3">
|
|
|
4809 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son
|
|
|
4810 from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is
|
|
|
4811 not a material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as
|
|
|
4812 the begetter is the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates,
|
|
|
4813 which was disproved above (
|
|
|
4814 <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html">Q[39], A[5]</a>).
|
|
|
4815 </p>
|
|
|
4816 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p4">
|
|
|
4817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not
|
|
|
4818 another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is
|
|
|
4819 not from the Father's essence.
|
|
|
4820 </p>
|
|
|
4821 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p5">
|
|
|
4822 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said (
|
|
|
4823 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:5</a>), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures": and
|
|
|
4824 further on (
|
|
|
4825 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:14</a>) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was
|
|
|
4826 not begotten from something, but
|
|
|
4827 from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (
|
|
|
4828 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Zech.12.1" target="asv">Zech. 12:1</a>): "Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit
|
|
|
4829 of man within him"; and (
|
|
|
4830 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Amos.4.13" target="asv">Amos 4:13</a>) according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth, and create the spirit."
|
|
|
4831 </p>
|
|
|
4832 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p6">
|
|
|
4833 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says: "God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal
|
|
|
4834 to Himself."
|
|
|
4835 </p>
|
|
|
4836 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p7">
|
|
|
4837 <b>I answer that,</b> The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father's substance. For it was explained above (
|
|
|
4838 <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
4839 <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html">Q[33], AA[2]</a> ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true "generation,"
|
|
|
4840 whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter
|
|
|
4841 makes a bench out of wood,
|
|
|
4842 whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of
|
|
|
4843 nothing, as will be shown later on (
|
|
|
4844 <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html">Q[45], A[1]</a>), not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is produced
|
|
|
4845 by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the
|
|
|
4846 Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to
|
|
|
4847 the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son
|
|
|
4848 of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is
|
|
|
4849 stated (
|
|
|
4850 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:20</a>): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ." Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten.
|
|
|
4851 </p>
|
|
|
4852 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p8"> That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according
|
|
|
4853 to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of God, He
|
|
|
4854 is called the "only begotten," according to
|
|
|
4855 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv"> Jn. 1:18, </a> "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons of adoption
|
|
|
4856 by their similitude to Him, He
|
|
|
4857 is called the "first begotten," according to
|
|
|
4858 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born
|
|
|
4859 of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is
|
|
|
4860 born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine
|
|
|
4861 nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily
|
|
|
4862 follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to
|
|
|
4863 Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above (
|
|
|
4864 <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html">Q[40], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
4865 </p>
|
|
|
4866 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p9">
|
|
|
4867 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle, but
|
|
|
4868 not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced.
|
|
|
4869 But the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.
|
|
|
4870 </p>
|
|
|
4871 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p10">
|
|
|
4872 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this
|
|
|
4873 denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"---that
|
|
|
4874 is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is
|
|
|
4875 the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father."
|
|
|
4876 </p>
|
|
|
4877 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p11"> This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is
|
|
|
4878 essence; but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of"
|
|
|
4879 [de] always denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder, since he is not the consubstantial
|
|
|
4880 cause. We can say, however, that something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no
|
|
|
4881 matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle,
|
|
|
4882 as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not accidental
|
|
|
4883 to another, for we can say that an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is begotten
|
|
|
4884 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the
|
|
|
4885 Son.
|
|
|
4886 </p>
|
|
|
4887 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p12">
|
|
|
4888 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when
|
|
|
4889 we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified
|
|
|
4890 by the preposition, so there is no parity of argument.
|
|
|
4891 </p>
|
|
|
4892 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p13">
|
|
|
4893 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given
|
|
|
4894 by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His
|
|
|
4895 works" (
|
|
|
4896 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:9,10</a>). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created
|
|
|
4897 is a kind of participation of the
|
|
|
4898 uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the
|
|
|
4899 beginning and before the world was I made"---that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as
|
|
|
4900 both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what is generated
|
|
|
4901 receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but
|
|
|
4902 the
|
|
|
4903 creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea
|
|
|
4904 of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the
|
|
|
4905 Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not refer to
|
|
|
4906 the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also
|
|
|
4907 the soul, or any other invisible substance.
|
|
|
4908 </p>
|
|
|
4909 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4910 <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p15"></p>
|
|
|
4911 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4912 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4913 </div>
|
|
|
4914 <div id="FP_Q41_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
4915 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4916 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4917 <h4 id="FP_Q41_A4-p0.1">Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?</h4>
|
|
|
4918 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4919 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p2">
|
|
|
4920 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or
|
|
|
4921 passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we call passive power, as above explained
|
|
|
4922 (
|
|
|
4923 <a id="FP_Q41_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons were not made, as stated above
|
|
|
4924 <a id="FP_Q41_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore in God there is no
|
|
|
4925 power in respect of the notional acts.
|
|
|
4926 </p>
|
|
|
4927 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p3">
|
|
|
4928 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore,
|
|
|
4929 as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power in God.
|
|
|
4930 </p>
|
|
|
4931 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p4">
|
|
|
4932 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which
|
|
|
4933 belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will, as stated above (
|
|
|
4934 <a id="FP_Q41_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>). Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.
|
|
|
4935 </p>
|
|
|
4936 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p5">
|
|
|
4937 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God
|
|
|
4938 the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.
|
|
|
4939 </p>
|
|
|
4940 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p6">
|
|
|
4941 <b>I answer that,</b> As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the
|
|
|
4942 principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle
|
|
|
4943 of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son;
|
|
|
4944 for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every
|
|
|
4945 generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator
|
|
|
4946 the power of spirating.
|
|
|
4947 </p>
|
|
|
4948 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p7">
|
|
|
4949 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has
|
|
|
4950 no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding.
|
|
|
4951 </p>
|
|
|
4952 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p8">
|
|
|
4953 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God
|
|
|
4954 there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary;
|
|
|
4955 and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible that the Son should be
|
|
|
4956 generated.
|
|
|
4957 </p>
|
|
|
4958 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p9">
|
|
|
4959 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe
|
|
|
4960 a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real
|
|
|
4961 distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person
|
|
|
4962 is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God
|
|
|
4963 the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore with
|
|
|
4964 regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or essentially,
|
|
|
4965 we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may ascribe
|
|
|
4966 the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate the
|
|
|
4967 procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot
|
|
|
4968 ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by
|
|
|
4969 different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very essence
|
|
|
4970 which has no principle.
|
|
|
4971 </p>
|
|
|
4972 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4973 <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4974 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4975 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4976 </div>
|
|
|
4977 <div id="FP_Q41_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
4978 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4979 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4980 <h4 id="FP_Q41_A5-p0.1">Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?</h4>
|
|
|
4981 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4982 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p2">
|
|
|
4983 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies
|
|
|
4984 a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17.
|
|
|
4985 But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation.
|
|
|
4986 </p>
|
|
|
4987 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p3">
|
|
|
4988 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore,
|
|
|
4989 the same applies to the power of begetting.
|
|
|
4990 </p>
|
|
|
4991 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p4">
|
|
|
4992 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to
|
|
|
4993 the three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence.
|
|
|
4994 </p>
|
|
|
4995 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p5">
|
|
|
4996 <b>On the contrary,</b> As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore,
|
|
|
4997 also, the power to beget.
|
|
|
4998 </p>
|
|
|
4999 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p6">
|
|
|
5000 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly
|
|
|
5001 called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself,
|
|
|
5002 as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father
|
|
|
5003 has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of
|
|
|
5004 begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter.
|
|
|
5005 </p>
|
|
|
5006 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p7"> Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is
|
|
|
5007 in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot but contain that nature from which
|
|
|
5008 it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God."
|
|
|
5009 </p>
|
|
|
5010 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p8"> We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent.
|
|
|
5011 i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both
|
|
|
5012 equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect
|
|
|
5013 to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual
|
|
|
5014 form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates
|
|
|
5015 would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person
|
|
|
5016 of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which
|
|
|
5017 the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation is the "work of nature,"
|
|
|
5018 not of nature generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting
|
|
|
5019 signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly.
|
|
|
5020 </p>
|
|
|
5021 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p9">
|
|
|
5022 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies
|
|
|
5023 that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that
|
|
|
5024 by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates:
|
|
|
5025 but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and
|
|
|
5026 so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by
|
|
|
5027 which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only of species, as in things
|
|
|
5028 created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the divine essence "is the principle by which the Begetter begets," it
|
|
|
5029 does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine
|
|
|
5030 essence begets.
|
|
|
5031 </p>
|
|
|
5032 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p10">
|
|
|
5033 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the
|
|
|
5034 act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.
|
|
|
5035 </p>
|
|
|
5036 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p11">
|
|
|
5037 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the
|
|
|
5038 "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the
|
|
|
5039 three persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.
|
|
|
5040 </p>
|
|
|
5041 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5042 <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5043 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5044 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5045 </div>
|
|
|
5046 <div id="FP_Q41_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
5047 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5048 <a href="summa.FP_Q42.html"></a>
|
|
|
5049 <h4 id="FP_Q41_A6-p0.1">Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?</h4>
|
|
|
5050 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5051 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p2">
|
|
|
5052 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated
|
|
|
5053 in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget.
|
|
|
5054 But He cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be several Sons in God.
|
|
|
5055 </p>
|
|
|
5056 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p3">
|
|
|
5057 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved
|
|
|
5058 Him not."
|
|
|
5059 </p>
|
|
|
5060 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p4">
|
|
|
5061 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore
|
|
|
5062 God can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son.
|
|
|
5063 </p>
|
|
|
5064 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p5">
|
|
|
5065 <b>On the contrary,</b> In God "that which is possible," and "that which is" do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be
|
|
|
5066 several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical.
|
|
|
5067 </p>
|
|
|
5068 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p6">
|
|
|
5069 <b>I answer that,</b> As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given.
|
|
|
5070 </p>
|
|
|
5071 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p7"> The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are
|
|
|
5072 the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more
|
|
|
5073 than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction:
|
|
|
5074 since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there
|
|
|
5075 can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness.
|
|
|
5076 </p>
|
|
|
5077 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p8"> The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act.
|
|
|
5078 Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding
|
|
|
5079 after the manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
5080 </p>
|
|
|
5081 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p9"> The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said
|
|
|
5082
|
|
|
5083 <a id="FP_Q41_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, and nature is determined to one.
|
|
|
5084 </p>
|
|
|
5085 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p10"> The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire
|
|
|
5086 divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons.
|
|
|
5087 </p>
|
|
|
5088 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p11">
|
|
|
5089 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the
|
|
|
5090 power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that
|
|
|
5091 the Son has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is
|
|
|
5092 the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of
|
|
|
5093 being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son---that is, the power of
|
|
|
5094 being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power
|
|
|
5095 of generation"---that is, a power by which it is generated by some person.
|
|
|
5096 </p>
|
|
|
5097 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p12">
|
|
|
5098 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because
|
|
|
5099 He could not, as we shall see later on (
|
|
|
5100 <a id="FP_Q41_A6-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html">Q[42], A[6]</a>, ad 3).
|
|
|
5101 </p>
|
|
|
5102 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p13">
|
|
|
5103 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained.
|
|
|
5104 Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father.
|
|
|
5105 </p>
|
|
|
5106 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p14"></p>
|
|
|
5107 <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p15"></p>
|
|
|
5108 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5109 <a href="summa.FP_Q42.html"></a>
|
|
|
5110 </div>
|
|
|
5111 <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5112 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5113 </div>
|
|
|
5114 <div id="FP_Q42" class="div3">
|
|
|
5115 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5116 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5117 <h3 id="FP_Q42-p0.1">OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
5118 <p id="FP_Q42-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5119 <p id="FP_Q42-p2"> We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly,
|
|
|
5120 with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.
|
|
|
5121 </p>
|
|
|
5122 <p id="FP_Q42-p3"> (1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?</p>
|
|
|
5123 <p id="FP_Q42-p4"> (2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity?</p>
|
|
|
5124 <p id="FP_Q42-p5"> (3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?</p>
|
|
|
5125 <p id="FP_Q42-p6"> (4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?</p>
|
|
|
5126 <p id="FP_Q42-p7"> (5) Whether the one divine person is in another?</p>
|
|
|
5127 <p id="FP_Q42-p8"> (6) Whether they are equal in power?</p>
|
|
|
5128 <div id="FP_Q42_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
5129 <a href="summa.FP_Q42.html"></a>
|
|
|
5130 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5131 <h4 id="FP_Q42_A1-p0.1">Whether there is equality in God?</h4>
|
|
|
5132 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5133 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p2">
|
|
|
5134 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in
|
|
|
5135 quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous
|
|
|
5136 intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be
|
|
|
5137 equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality
|
|
|
5138 is not becoming to the divine persons.
|
|
|
5139 </p>
|
|
|
5140 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p3">
|
|
|
5141 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said (
|
|
|
5142 <a id="FP_Q42_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html">Q[39], A[2]</a>). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we
|
|
|
5143 may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.
|
|
|
5144 </p>
|
|
|
5145 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p4">
|
|
|
5146 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine
|
|
|
5147 persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly
|
|
|
5148 to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal
|
|
|
5149 to the image." But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the
|
|
|
5150 Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.
|
|
|
5151 </p>
|
|
|
5152 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p5">
|
|
|
5153 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of
|
|
|
5154 the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
|
|
|
5155 </p>
|
|
|
5156 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p6">
|
|
|
5157 <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another."
|
|
|
5158 </p>
|
|
|
5159 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p7">
|
|
|
5160 <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality
|
|
|
5161 signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius
|
|
|
5162 says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the
|
|
|
5163 Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus
|
|
|
5164 involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God,
|
|
|
5165 is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would
|
|
|
5166 not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality
|
|
|
5167 among the divine persons.
|
|
|
5168 </p>
|
|
|
5169 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p8">
|
|
|
5170 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and
|
|
|
5171 has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of "virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some
|
|
|
5172 nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it
|
|
|
5173 is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its
|
|
|
5174 source---that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of
|
|
|
5175 great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great,
|
|
|
5176 but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity
|
|
|
5177 is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by reason of its
|
|
|
5178 form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both
|
|
|
5179 in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer
|
|
|
5180 duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine
|
|
|
5181 (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one
|
|
|
5182 of
|
|
|
5183 them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power."
|
|
|
5184 </p>
|
|
|
5185 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p9">
|
|
|
5186 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes
|
|
|
5187 excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally,
|
|
|
5188 just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more
|
|
|
5189 perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father
|
|
|
5190 and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order
|
|
|
5191 to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius.
|
|
|
5192 </p>
|
|
|
5193 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p10">
|
|
|
5194 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways---namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality
|
|
|
5195 in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is
|
|
|
5196 because the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father,
|
|
|
5197 and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the
|
|
|
5198 Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness
|
|
|
5199 are not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely,
|
|
|
5200 for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.
|
|
|
5201 </p>
|
|
|
5202 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p11"> But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore,
|
|
|
5203 the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say
|
|
|
5204 that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely.
|
|
|
5205 </p>
|
|
|
5206 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p12">
|
|
|
5207 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in
|
|
|
5208 which they are distinct. Now equality implies both ---namely, distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal
|
|
|
5209 to itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness
|
|
|
5210 and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real
|
|
|
5211 relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed
|
|
|
5212 to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would
|
|
|
5213 be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the
|
|
|
5214 personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence.
|
|
|
5215 For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are relative."
|
|
|
5216 </p>
|
|
|
5217 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5218 <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p14"></p>
|
|
|
5219 <a href="summa.FP_Q42.html"></a>
|
|
|
5220 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5221 </div>
|
|
|
5222 <div id="FP_Q42_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
5223 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5224 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5225 <h4 id="FP_Q42_A2-p0.1">Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father?</h4>
|
|
|
5226 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5227 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p2">
|
|
|
5228 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives
|
|
|
5229 twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity.
|
|
|
5230 The second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or
|
|
|
5231 impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The
|
|
|
5232 fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an
|
|
|
5233 accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as
|
|
|
5234 sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the
|
|
|
5235 exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made
|
|
|
5236 of
|
|
|
5237 brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth
|
|
|
5238 is the taking of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the
|
|
|
5239 genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the
|
|
|
5240 mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is
|
|
|
5241 clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from
|
|
|
5242 the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.
|
|
|
5243 </p>
|
|
|
5244 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p3">
|
|
|
5245 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not
|
|
|
5246 eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
5247 </p>
|
|
|
5248 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p4">
|
|
|
5249 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is
|
|
|
5250 existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.
|
|
|
5251 </p>
|
|
|
5252 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p5">
|
|
|
5253 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is
|
|
|
5254 begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in
|
|
|
5255 successive things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect,
|
|
|
5256 which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the
|
|
|
5257 Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.
|
|
|
5258 </p>
|
|
|
5259 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p6">
|
|
|
5260 <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are co-eternal with each other."
|
|
|
5261 </p>
|
|
|
5262 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p7">
|
|
|
5263 <b>I answer that,</b> We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds
|
|
|
5264 from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on
|
|
|
5265 the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free
|
|
|
5266 agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives
|
|
|
5267 to the effect, as stated above (
|
|
|
5268 <a id="FP_Q42_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">Q[41], A[2]</a>), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not
|
|
|
5269 having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man
|
|
|
5270 is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist
|
|
|
5271 simultaneously with its principle when the action is
|
|
|
5272 successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant,
|
|
|
5273 but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said (
|
|
|
5274 <a id="FP_Q42_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">Q[41], A[2]</a>), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity;
|
|
|
5275 and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would
|
|
|
5276 be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible.
|
|
|
5277 Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and
|
|
|
5278 likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.
|
|
|
5279 </p>
|
|
|
5280 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p8">
|
|
|
5281 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine
|
|
|
5282 generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat
|
|
|
5283 supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son
|
|
|
5284 existed always with the Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth;
|
|
|
5285 let the name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents
|
|
|
5286 it more exactly; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality
|
|
|
5287 to act; and this cannot be said of God.
|
|
|
5288 </p>
|
|
|
5289 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p9">
|
|
|
5290 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin.
|
|
|
5291 </p>
|
|
|
5292 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p10">
|
|
|
5293 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however,
|
|
|
5294 is not changed, as stated above (
|
|
|
5295 <a id="FP_Q42_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.
|
|
|
5296 </p>
|
|
|
5297 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p11">
|
|
|
5298 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In time there is something indivisible---namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures---namely, time. But
|
|
|
5299 in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above (
|
|
|
5300 <a id="FP_Q42_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ad 1, A[4] ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express
|
|
|
5301 the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever being born," as
|
|
|
5302 Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super
|
|
|
5303 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.2.7" target="asv"> Ps. 2:7</a>] said, it is better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of
|
|
|
5304 the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said.
|
|
|
5305 </p>
|
|
|
5306 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5307 <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5308 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5309 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5310 </div>
|
|
|
5311 <div id="FP_Q42_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
5312 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5313 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5314 <h4 id="FP_Q42_A3-p0.1">Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?</h4>
|
|
|
5315 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5316 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p2">
|
|
|
5317 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence,
|
|
|
5318 or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore
|
|
|
5319 there is no order of nature in God.
|
|
|
5320 </p>
|
|
|
5321 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p3">
|
|
|
5322 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But
|
|
|
5323 in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine
|
|
|
5324 persons there is no order of nature.
|
|
|
5325 </p>
|
|
|
5326 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p4">
|
|
|
5327 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is
|
|
|
5328 not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.
|
|
|
5329 </p>
|
|
|
5330 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p5">
|
|
|
5331 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of
|
|
|
5332 nature.
|
|
|
5333 </p>
|
|
|
5334 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p6">
|
|
|
5335 <b>On the contrary,</b> Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says.
|
|
|
5336 Therefore in God order exists.
|
|
|
5337 </p>
|
|
|
5338 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p7">
|
|
|
5339 <b>I answer that,</b> Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle---namely, according to site,
|
|
|
5340 as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause---so are there
|
|
|
5341 many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated (
|
|
|
5342 <a id="FP_Q42_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html">Q[33], A[1]</a>): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without
|
|
|
5343 priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior
|
|
|
5344 to another, but whereby one is from another."
|
|
|
5345 </p>
|
|
|
5346 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p8">
|
|
|
5347 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin.
|
|
|
5348 </p>
|
|
|
5349 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p9">
|
|
|
5350 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still
|
|
|
5351 comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations
|
|
|
5352 of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous
|
|
|
5353 in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the
|
|
|
5354 definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the
|
|
|
5355 part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and
|
|
|
5356 reason.
|
|
|
5357 </p>
|
|
|
5358 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p10">
|
|
|
5359 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to
|
|
|
5360 natural origin.
|
|
|
5361 </p>
|
|
|
5362 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p11">
|
|
|
5363 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly
|
|
|
5364 called the order of nature than the order of essence.
|
|
|
5365 </p>
|
|
|
5366 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5367 <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5368 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5369 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5370 </div>
|
|
|
5371 <div id="FP_Q42_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
5372 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5373 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5374 <h4 id="FP_Q42_A4-p0.1">Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?</h4>
|
|
|
5375 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5376 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p2">
|
|
|
5377 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (
|
|
|
5378 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.28" target="asv">Jn. 14:28</a>): "The Father is greater than I"; and the Apostle says (
|
|
|
5379 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>): "The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him."
|
|
|
5380 </p>
|
|
|
5381 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p3">
|
|
|
5382 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not
|
|
|
5383 possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father.
|
|
|
5384 </p>
|
|
|
5385 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p4">
|
|
|
5386 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are
|
|
|
5387 more than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions
|
|
|
5388 are included. Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently
|
|
|
5389 not equal to the Father.
|
|
|
5390 </p>
|
|
|
5391 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p5">
|
|
|
5392 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
5393 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.6" target="asv">Phil. 2:6</a>): "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God."
|
|
|
5394 </p>
|
|
|
5395 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p6">
|
|
|
5396 <b>I answer that,</b> The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature.
|
|
|
5397 Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of
|
|
|
5398 the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation
|
|
|
5399 is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it
|
|
|
5400 follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing
|
|
|
5401 to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes (
|
|
|
5402 <a id="FP_Q42_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
5403 <a id="FP_Q42_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html">Q[33], AA[2]</a> ,3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation
|
|
|
5404 in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a
|
|
|
5405 successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence,
|
|
|
5406 Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): "Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings,
|
|
|
5407 then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature."
|
|
|
5408 </p>
|
|
|
5409 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p7">
|
|
|
5410 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but in
|
|
|
5411 His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, "Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than
|
|
|
5412 the Father in humanity": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to
|
|
|
5413 Whom the same being is given"; and (De Synod.): "The Son subjects Himself by His
|
|
|
5414 inborn piety"---that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas "creatures are subject by their created weakness."
|
|
|
5415 </p>
|
|
|
5416 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p8">
|
|
|
5417 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (A[1], ad 1),
|
|
|
5418 and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or
|
|
|
5419 dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), "The question
|
|
|
5420 of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how
|
|
|
5421 great, is he?" Therefore, paternity is the Father's dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something absolute,
|
|
|
5422 and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so
|
|
|
5423 the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses
|
|
|
5424 whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue---"the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity," for
|
|
|
5425 there is a transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist
|
|
|
5426 in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver.
|
|
|
5427 </p>
|
|
|
5428 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p9">
|
|
|
5429 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are
|
|
|
5430 one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being.
|
|
|
5431 Persons likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (
|
|
|
5432 <a id="FP_Q42_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html">Q[30], A[4]</a>). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the persons
|
|
|
5433 something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person.
|
|
|
5434 </p>
|
|
|
5435 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5436 <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5437 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5438 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5439 </div>
|
|
|
5440 <div id="FP_Q42_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
5441 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5442 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5443 <h4 id="FP_Q42_A5-p0.1">Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?</h4>
|
|
|
5444 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5445 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p2">
|
|
|
5446 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes
|
|
|
5447 of one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone
|
|
|
5448 who examines each mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.
|
|
|
5449 </p>
|
|
|
5450 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p3">
|
|
|
5451 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that has come out from another is within. But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according
|
|
|
5452 to
|
|
|
5453 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.5.2" target="asv"> Mic. 5:2</a>: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father.
|
|
|
5454 </p>
|
|
|
5455 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p4">
|
|
|
5456 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot
|
|
|
5457 be in the other.
|
|
|
5458 </p>
|
|
|
5459 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p5">
|
|
|
5460 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
5461 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.10" target="asv">Jn. 14:10</a>): "I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me."
|
|
|
5462 </p>
|
|
|
5463 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p6">
|
|
|
5464 <b>I answer that,</b> There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and
|
|
|
5465 according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father
|
|
|
5466 is His own essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's
|
|
|
5467 essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His
|
|
|
5468 own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v),
|
|
|
5469 "The unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the
|
|
|
5470 nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God." It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative
|
|
|
5471 opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word
|
|
|
5472 is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein
|
|
|
5473 contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
5474 </p>
|
|
|
5475 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p7">
|
|
|
5476 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated
|
|
|
5477 by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be
|
|
|
5478 found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that the unity of essence between the principle
|
|
|
5479 and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.
|
|
|
5480 </p>
|
|
|
5481 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p8">
|
|
|
5482 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains
|
|
|
5483 therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.
|
|
|
5484 </p>
|
|
|
5485 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p9">
|
|
|
5486 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in
|
|
|
5487 the other.
|
|
|
5488 </p>
|
|
|
5489 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5490 <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5491 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5492 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5493 </div>
|
|
|
5494 <div id="FP_Q42_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
5495 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5496 <a href="summa.FP_Q43.html"></a>
|
|
|
5497 <h4 id="FP_Q42_A6-p0.1">Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?</h4>
|
|
|
5498 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5499 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p2">
|
|
|
5500 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in power. For it is said (
|
|
|
5501 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.19" target="asv">Jn. 5:19</a>): "The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore
|
|
|
5502 the Father's power is greater than the Son's.
|
|
|
5503 </p>
|
|
|
5504 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p3">
|
|
|
5505 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the
|
|
|
5506 Son according to
|
|
|
5507 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.31" target="asv"> Jn. 14:31</a>: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do I." The Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him
|
|
|
5508 all things that Himself doth" (
|
|
|
5509 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#John.5.20" target="asv">Jn. 5:20</a>). Also, the Son hears: "As I hear, so I judge" (
|
|
|
5510 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p3.3" href="./asv.html#John.5.30" target="asv">Jn. 5:30</a>). Therefore the Father has
|
|
|
5511 greater power than the Son.
|
|
|
5512 </p>
|
|
|
5513 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p4">
|
|
|
5514 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim.
|
|
|
5515 iii, 7), "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot
|
|
|
5516 beget a Son, as proved above (
|
|
|
5517 <a id="FP_Q42_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html">Q[41], A[6]</a>). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him power.
|
|
|
5518 </p>
|
|
|
5519 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p5">
|
|
|
5520 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
5521 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.19" target="asv">Jn. 5:19</a>): "Whatsoever things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner."
|
|
|
5522 </p>
|
|
|
5523 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p6">
|
|
|
5524 <b>I answer that,</b> The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures,
|
|
|
5525 for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above
|
|
|
5526 <a id="FP_Q42_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html">(A[4])</a> that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness---that
|
|
|
5527 is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son
|
|
|
5528 is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both.
|
|
|
5529 </p>
|
|
|
5530 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p7">
|
|
|
5531 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do anything," do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since
|
|
|
5532 it is immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner"; but their meaning is to show that
|
|
|
5533 the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), "The unity of
|
|
|
5534 the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not
|
|
|
5535 act by Himself [a se]."
|
|
|
5536 </p>
|
|
|
5537 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p8">
|
|
|
5538 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing" are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the
|
|
|
5539 Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity
|
|
|
5540 knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature.
|
|
|
5541 </p>
|
|
|
5542 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p9">
|
|
|
5543 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the
|
|
|
5544 Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can
|
|
|
5545 beget; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation signifies a divine relation. So
|
|
|
5546 the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father
|
|
|
5547 possessing power as "giving" signified when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son possesses the power of "receiving,"
|
|
|
5548 signified by saying that He can be begotten.
|
|
|
5549 </p>
|
|
|
5550 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5551 <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5552 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5553 <a href="summa.FP_Q43.html"></a>
|
|
|
5554 </div>
|
|
|
5555 <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5556 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5557 </div>
|
|
|
5558 <div id="FP_Q43" class="div3">
|
|
|
5559 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5560 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5561 <h3 id="FP_Q43-p0.1">THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
5562 <p id="FP_Q43-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5563 <p id="FP_Q43-p2"> We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
5564 <p id="FP_Q43-p3"> (1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?</p>
|
|
|
5565 <p id="FP_Q43-p4"> (2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?</p>
|
|
|
5566 <p id="FP_Q43-p5"> (3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?</p>
|
|
|
5567 <p id="FP_Q43-p6"> (4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?</p>
|
|
|
5568 <p id="FP_Q43-p7"> (5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?</p>
|
|
|
5569 <p id="FP_Q43-p8"> (6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?</p>
|
|
|
5570 <p id="FP_Q43-p9"> (7) Of the visible mission</p>
|
|
|
5571 <p id="FP_Q43-p10"> (8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?</p>
|
|
|
5572 <div id="FP_Q43_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
5573 <a href="summa.FP_Q43.html"></a>
|
|
|
5574 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5575 <h4 id="FP_Q43_A1-p0.1">Whether a divine person can be properly sent?</h4>
|
|
|
5576 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5577 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p2">
|
|
|
5578 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine person
|
|
|
5579 is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by another.
|
|
|
5580 </p>
|
|
|
5581 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p3">
|
|
|
5582 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on
|
|
|
5583 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.16.53" target="asv"> Ezech. 16:53</a>: "What is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent." But in the divine persons there is nothing that is separable, as Hilary
|
|
|
5584 says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one person is not sent by another.
|
|
|
5585 </p>
|
|
|
5586 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p4">
|
|
|
5587 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person,
|
|
|
5588 Who is everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be sent.
|
|
|
5589 </p>
|
|
|
5590 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p5">
|
|
|
5591 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
5592 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.16" target="asv">Jn. 8:16</a>): "I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me."
|
|
|
5593 </p>
|
|
|
5594 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p6">
|
|
|
5595 <b>I answer that,</b> the notion of mission includes two things: the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to the end
|
|
|
5596 whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender: either according
|
|
|
5597 to command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an adviser may be said to send the king to battle;
|
|
|
5598 or according to origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term to
|
|
|
5599 which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there: either because in no way was he present
|
|
|
5600 before in the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus
|
|
|
5601 the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as
|
|
|
5602 meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began
|
|
|
5603 to
|
|
|
5604 exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas "He was" previously "in the world" (
|
|
|
5605 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.1" target="asv">Jn. 1:1</a>).
|
|
|
5606 </p>
|
|
|
5607 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p7">
|
|
|
5608 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel;
|
|
|
5609 forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession
|
|
|
5610 of origin, which is according to equality, as explained above (
|
|
|
5611 <a id="FP_Q43_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html">Q[42], AA[4]</a>,6).
|
|
|
5612 </p>
|
|
|
5613 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p8">
|
|
|
5614 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is necessarily
|
|
|
5615 separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent
|
|
|
5616 neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place
|
|
|
5617 without a separation, having only distinction of origin.
|
|
|
5618 </p>
|
|
|
5619 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p9">
|
|
|
5620 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God.
|
|
|
5621 </p>
|
|
|
5622 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5623 <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5624 <a href="summa.FP_Q43.html"></a>
|
|
|
5625 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5626 </div>
|
|
|
5627 <div id="FP_Q43_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
5628 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5629 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5630 <h4 id="FP_Q43_A2-p0.1">Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?</h4>
|
|
|
5631 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5632 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p2">
|
|
|
5633 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), "The Son is sent as He is begotten." But
|
|
|
5634 the Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.
|
|
|
5635 </p>
|
|
|
5636 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p3">
|
|
|
5637 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the mission
|
|
|
5638 of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal.
|
|
|
5639 </p>
|
|
|
5640 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p4">
|
|
|
5641 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.
|
|
|
5642 </p>
|
|
|
5643 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p5">
|
|
|
5644 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
5645 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.4" target="asv">Gal. 4:4</a>): "When the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son."
|
|
|
5646 </p>
|
|
|
5647 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p6">
|
|
|
5648 <b>I answer that,</b> A certain difference is to be observed in all the words that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express only
|
|
|
5649 relation to the principle, as "procession" and "going forth." Others express the term of procession together with the relation
|
|
|
5650 to the principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as "generation" and "spiration"; for generation is the procession
|
|
|
5651 of the divine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession
|
|
|
5652 of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to the principle, as "mission" and "giving." For
|
|
|
5653 a thing is sent that it may be in something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but that a divine person be possessed
|
|
|
5654 by any creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal.
|
|
|
5655 </p>
|
|
|
5656 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p7"> Hence "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in God; but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal;
|
|
|
5657 whereas "procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally
|
|
|
5658 as God; but temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to His
|
|
|
5659 invisible mission.
|
|
|
5660 </p>
|
|
|
5661 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p8">
|
|
|
5662 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean
|
|
|
5663 that He could be sent because eternally begotten.
|
|
|
5664 </p>
|
|
|
5665 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p9">
|
|
|
5666 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That a divine person may newly exist in anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine
|
|
|
5667 person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called Lord temporally by change of the creature.
|
|
|
5668 </p>
|
|
|
5669 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p10">
|
|
|
5670 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence
|
|
|
5671 mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For
|
|
|
5672 the relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal
|
|
|
5673 and temporal, not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double
|
|
|
5674 term, temporal and eternal.
|
|
|
5675 </p>
|
|
|
5676 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5677 <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5678 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5679 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5680 </div>
|
|
|
5681 <div id="FP_Q43_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
5682 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5683 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5684 <h4 id="FP_Q43_A3-p0.1">Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace?</h4>
|
|
|
5685 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5686 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p2">
|
|
|
5687 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For
|
|
|
5688 the sending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying
|
|
|
5689 grace, the divine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this is the error of those who say that the Holy
|
|
|
5690 Ghost is not given, but that His gifts are given.
|
|
|
5691 </p>
|
|
|
5692 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p3">
|
|
|
5693 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this preposition, "according to," denotes the habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the
|
|
|
5694 gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according to
|
|
|
5695 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5, </a> "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." Therefore it is improperly said
|
|
|
5696 that the divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
|
|
|
5697 </p>
|
|
|
5698 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p4">
|
|
|
5699 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is sent." But the Son is
|
|
|
5700 known not only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and knowledge. Therefore the divine person
|
|
|
5701 is not sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
|
|
|
5702 </p>
|
|
|
5703 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p5">
|
|
|
5704 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a
|
|
|
5705 gift of sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person is not given only according to the gift of
|
|
|
5706 sanctifying grace.
|
|
|
5707 </p>
|
|
|
5708 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p6">
|
|
|
5709 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification." But mission
|
|
|
5710 is a temporal procession. Since then the creature's sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of
|
|
|
5711 the divine person is only by sanctifying grace.
|
|
|
5712 </p>
|
|
|
5713 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p7">
|
|
|
5714 <b>I answer that,</b> The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone;
|
|
|
5715 and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace.
|
|
|
5716 </p>
|
|
|
5717 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p8"> For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the
|
|
|
5718 effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging
|
|
|
5719 to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover.
|
|
|
5720 And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to
|
|
|
5721 this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So
|
|
|
5722 no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying
|
|
|
5723 grace. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace.
|
|
|
5724 </p>
|
|
|
5725 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p9"> Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can
|
|
|
5726 only be according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift
|
|
|
5727 itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.
|
|
|
5728 </p>
|
|
|
5729 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p10">
|
|
|
5730 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself,
|
|
|
5731 but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace;
|
|
|
5732 and yet the divine person Himself is given.
|
|
|
5733 </p>
|
|
|
5734 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p11">
|
|
|
5735 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the divine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy Ghost
|
|
|
5736 is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the
|
|
|
5737 words, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost."
|
|
|
5738 </p>
|
|
|
5739 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p12">
|
|
|
5740 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the Son can be known by us according to other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us
|
|
|
5741 according to those effects.
|
|
|
5742 </p>
|
|
|
5743 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p13">
|
|
|
5744 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence
|
|
|
5745 gratuitous grace is called the "manifestation of the Spirit" (
|
|
|
5746 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given
|
|
|
5747 to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace itself, it would not
|
|
|
5748 be simply
|
|
|
5749 said that the Holy Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term; just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of
|
|
|
5750 the spirit of prophecy, or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying or of working miracles.
|
|
|
5751 </p>
|
|
|
5752 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
5753 <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p15"></p>
|
|
|
5754 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5755 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5756 </div>
|
|
|
5757 <div id="FP_Q43_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
5758 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5759 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5760 <h4 id="FP_Q43_A4-p0.1">Whether the Father can be fittingly sent?</h4>
|
|
|
5761 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5762 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p2">
|
|
|
5763 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given.
|
|
|
5764 But the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father
|
|
|
5765 sends Himself.
|
|
|
5766 </p>
|
|
|
5767 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p3">
|
|
|
5768 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine person is sent according to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us according
|
|
|
5769 to
|
|
|
5770 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.23" target="asv">Jn. 14:23</a>: "We will come to him and make Our abode with him." Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent.
|
|
|
5771 </p>
|
|
|
5772 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p4">
|
|
|
5773 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all, except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify
|
|
|
5774 any person; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as stated above (
|
|
|
5775 <a id="FP_Q43_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html">Q[32], A[3]</a>). Therefore every divine person can be sent.
|
|
|
5776 </p>
|
|
|
5777 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p5">
|
|
|
5778 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), "The Father alone is never described as being sent."
|
|
|
5779 </p>
|
|
|
5780 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p6">
|
|
|
5781 <b>I answer that,</b> The very idea of mission means procession from another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above expounded.
|
|
|
5782 Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son
|
|
|
5783 and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.
|
|
|
5784 </p>
|
|
|
5785 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p7">
|
|
|
5786 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed
|
|
|
5787 by the creature. But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what is given, "to be given" only applies in God to
|
|
|
5788 the Person Who is from another; and the same as regards "being sent."
|
|
|
5789 </p>
|
|
|
5790 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p8">
|
|
|
5791 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the effect of grace is also from the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still
|
|
|
5792 He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when
|
|
|
5793 known by anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He is, or from whom He proceeds."
|
|
|
5794 </p>
|
|
|
5795 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p9">
|
|
|
5796 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in general;
|
|
|
5797 thus "to be from another" is common to two of the notions.
|
|
|
5798 </p>
|
|
|
5799 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5800 <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5801 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5802 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5803 </div>
|
|
|
5804 <div id="FP_Q43_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
5805 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5806 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5807 <h4 id="FP_Q43_A5-p0.1">Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?</h4>
|
|
|
5808 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5809 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p2">
|
|
|
5810 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is according
|
|
|
5811 to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according to
|
|
|
5812 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:11</a>: "One and the same Spirit worketh all things." Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.
|
|
|
5813 </p>
|
|
|
5814 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p3">
|
|
|
5815 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mission of the divine person is according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of
|
|
|
5816 the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held without the gift of charity, according to
|
|
|
5817 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>: "If I should have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith so that I could
|
|
|
5818 move mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore,
|
|
|
5819 since the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent invisibly.
|
|
|
5820 </p>
|
|
|
5821 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p4">
|
|
|
5822 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as expounded above (
|
|
|
5823 <a id="FP_Q43_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4). But the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if both
|
|
|
5824 are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous, since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification.
|
|
|
5825 </p>
|
|
|
5826 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p5">
|
|
|
5827 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of divine Wisdom (
|
|
|
5828 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.10" target="asv">Wis. 9:10</a>): "Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness."
|
|
|
5829 </p>
|
|
|
5830 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p6">
|
|
|
5831 <b>I answer that,</b> The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace, according to
|
|
|
5832 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.23" target="asv"> Jn. 14:23</a>: "We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies
|
|
|
5833 both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son
|
|
|
5834 and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore
|
|
|
5835 belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong
|
|
|
5836 to Him to be from another, and consequently He is not sent.
|
|
|
5837 </p>
|
|
|
5838 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p7">
|
|
|
5839 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the first
|
|
|
5840 Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (
|
|
|
5841 <a id="FP_Q43_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html">Q[38], A[1]</a>), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those,
|
|
|
5842 namely, which belong to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of the Son. Hence Augustine says (De
|
|
|
5843 Trin. iv,
|
|
|
5844 20) that "The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone."
|
|
|
5845 </p>
|
|
|
5846 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p8">
|
|
|
5847 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a likening
|
|
|
5848 of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated
|
|
|
5849 to the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas
|
|
|
5850 the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love.
|
|
|
5851 Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): "The Word we speak of is knowledge with love." Thus the Son is sent not in accordance
|
|
|
5852 with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into
|
|
|
5853 the affection of love, as is said (
|
|
|
5854 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.45" target="asv">Jn. 6:45</a>): "Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath learned, cometh to Me," and (
|
|
|
5855 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.38.4" target="asv">Ps. 38:4</a>): "In my meditation a fire shall flame forth." Thus Augustine plainly
|
|
|
5856 says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." Now perception implies a certain
|
|
|
5857 experimental knowledge; and this is properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia], according
|
|
|
5858 to
|
|
|
5859 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.23" target="asv"> Ecclus. 6:23</a>: "The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name."
|
|
|
5860 </p>
|
|
|
5861 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p9">
|
|
|
5862 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained
|
|
|
5863 <a id="FP_Q43_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, if we speak of mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the Holy
|
|
|
5864 Ghost, as generation is distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the effect of grace, in this sense
|
|
|
5865 the two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are
|
|
|
5866 distinguished in the effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection.
|
|
|
5867 Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying grace, nor
|
|
|
5868 is one person separated from the other.
|
|
|
5869 </p>
|
|
|
5870 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5871 <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5872 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5873 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5874 </div>
|
|
|
5875 <div id="FP_Q43_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
5876 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5877 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
5878 <h4 id="FP_Q43_A6-p0.1">Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?</h4>
|
|
|
5879 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5880 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p2">
|
|
|
5881 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their
|
|
|
5882 share of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is said (
|
|
|
5883 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv">Jn. 7:39</a>): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers
|
|
|
5884 in grace.
|
|
|
5885 </p>
|
|
|
5886 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p3">
|
|
|
5887 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because progress
|
|
|
5888 in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the
|
|
|
5889 invisible mission is not to all who share in grace.
|
|
|
5890 </p>
|
|
|
5891 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p4">
|
|
|
5892 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace. But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas
|
|
|
5893 Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in
|
|
|
5894 grace.
|
|
|
5895 </p>
|
|
|
5896 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p5">
|
|
|
5897 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore
|
|
|
5898 the invisible mission is not to all that have grace.
|
|
|
5899 </p>
|
|
|
5900 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p6">
|
|
|
5901 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27), the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every creature
|
|
|
5902 that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every such creature.
|
|
|
5903 </p>
|
|
|
5904 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p7">
|
|
|
5905 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated (
|
|
|
5906 <a id="FP_Q43_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,4,5), mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before, as occurs to
|
|
|
5907 creatures; or begins to exist where he was before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons.
|
|
|
5908 Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal by
|
|
|
5909 grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent
|
|
|
5910 to all in whom are to be found these two conditions.
|
|
|
5911 </p>
|
|
|
5912 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p8">
|
|
|
5913 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that
|
|
|
5914 the invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men. This was done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets."
|
|
|
5915 Thus the words, "the Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took
|
|
|
5916 place on the day of Pentecost.
|
|
|
5917 </p>
|
|
|
5918 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p9">
|
|
|
5919 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
|
|
|
5920 iv, 20), that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived
|
|
|
5921 according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him." Such invisible mission,
|
|
|
5922 however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new
|
|
|
5923 act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles
|
|
|
5924 or of prophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his
|
|
|
5925 possessions, or to undertake any arduous work.
|
|
|
5926 </p>
|
|
|
5927 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p10">
|
|
|
5928 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made
|
|
|
5929 to them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day
|
|
|
5930 of judgment. Such an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a greater number of objects. To Christ
|
|
|
5931 the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards,
|
|
|
5932 since from the beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.
|
|
|
5933 </p>
|
|
|
5934 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p11">
|
|
|
5935 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments
|
|
|
5936 of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as
|
|
|
5937 directed to its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace
|
|
|
5938 through the sacraments.
|
|
|
5939 </p>
|
|
|
5940 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5941 <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5942 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
5943 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
5944 </div>
|
|
|
5945 <div id="FP_Q43_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
5946 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5947 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
5948 <h4 id="FP_Q43_A7-p0.1">Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?</h4>
|
|
|
5949 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5950 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p2">
|
|
|
5951 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is
|
|
|
5952 said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is
|
|
|
5953 not fittingly sent in a visible manner.
|
|
|
5954 </p>
|
|
|
5955 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p3">
|
|
|
5956 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh.
|
|
|
5957 But the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures
|
|
|
5958 than in others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus
|
|
|
5959 the Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place
|
|
|
5960 in all these things.
|
|
|
5961 </p>
|
|
|
5962 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p4">
|
|
|
5963 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason
|
|
|
5964 of those visible creatures more than any other person.
|
|
|
5965 </p>
|
|
|
5966 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p5">
|
|
|
5967 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind of creature---namely, the human nature. Therefore if the
|
|
|
5968 Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures.
|
|
|
5969 </p>
|
|
|
5970 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p6">
|
|
|
5971 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9).
|
|
|
5972 So visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.
|
|
|
5973 </p>
|
|
|
5974 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p7">
|
|
|
5975 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as invisible
|
|
|
5976 things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible
|
|
|
5977 mission; and to all who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought
|
|
|
5978 likewise to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent
|
|
|
5979 visibly.
|
|
|
5980 </p>
|
|
|
5981 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p8">
|
|
|
5982 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
|
|
|
5983 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.16" target="asv">Mat. 3:16</a>) that, when our Lord was baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.
|
|
|
5984 </p>
|
|
|
5985 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p9">
|
|
|
5986 <b>I answer that,</b> God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible
|
|
|
5987 by visible things, as explained above (
|
|
|
5988 <a id="FP_Q43_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in
|
|
|
5989 a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs;
|
|
|
5990 so was
|
|
|
5991 it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures.
|
|
|
5992 </p>
|
|
|
5993 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p10"> This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost,
|
|
|
5994 Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author
|
|
|
5995 of this sanctification. Thus the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Ghost as the sign of
|
|
|
5996 sanctification.
|
|
|
5997 </p>
|
|
|
5998 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p11">
|
|
|
5999 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said of
|
|
|
6000 that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father.
|
|
|
6001 But the Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into the unity of His person; so that what is
|
|
|
6002 said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the
|
|
|
6003 Father by reason of any visible creature.
|
|
|
6004 </p>
|
|
|
6005 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p12">
|
|
|
6006 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine
|
|
|
6007 says (De Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit
|
|
|
6008 by the spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire, saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy
|
|
|
6009 Ghost the same relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because
|
|
|
6010 it is said, "The rock was Christ" (
|
|
|
6011 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:4</a>). For that rock was already created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it typified; whereas the dove
|
|
|
6012 and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame of the burning
|
|
|
6013 bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth
|
|
|
6014 when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily
|
|
|
6015 appearances of those things was that they might signify, and then pass away." Thus the visible mission is neither displayed
|
|
|
6016 by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New
|
|
|
6017 Testament, wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly,
|
|
|
6018 inasmuch as He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose.
|
|
|
6019 </p>
|
|
|
6020 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p13">
|
|
|
6021 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or
|
|
|
6022 that person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse names, so also can They each one be signified
|
|
|
6023 by different things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.
|
|
|
6024 </p>
|
|
|
6025 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p14">
|
|
|
6026 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible mission
|
|
|
6027 of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification;
|
|
|
6028 whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a purpose,
|
|
|
6029 necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His person, since it
|
|
|
6030 was not assumed or used for the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not required
|
|
|
6031 to last beyond what its use required.
|
|
|
6032 </p>
|
|
|
6033 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p15">
|
|
|
6034 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify
|
|
|
6035 the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign,
|
|
|
6036 on that account the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.
|
|
|
6037 </p>
|
|
|
6038 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p16">
|
|
|
6039 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> It is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is said
|
|
|
6040 (
|
|
|
6041 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p16.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>)---"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"---that is, of the Church. This utility consists in
|
|
|
6042 the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles,
|
|
|
6043 according to
|
|
|
6044 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.3" target="asv"> Heb. 2:3,
|
|
|
6045
|
|
|
6046 </a>"which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard."
|
|
|
6047 </p>
|
|
|
6048 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p17"> Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints
|
|
|
6049 on whom the Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the visible mission made to Christ should show forth
|
|
|
6050 the invisible mission made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of His conception. The visible mission
|
|
|
6051 was directed to Christ at the time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show
|
|
|
6052 forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My
|
|
|
6053 beloved Son" (
|
|
|
6054 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.17" target="asv">Mat. 3:17</a>), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance
|
|
|
6055 of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it was said, "Hear ye Him" (
|
|
|
6056 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.5" target="asv">Mat. 17:5</a>). To the apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing to show forth
|
|
|
6057 the power of their ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they
|
|
|
6058 are forgiven" (
|
|
|
6059 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p17.3" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv">Jn. 20:23</a>): and again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of teaching; whence it is said that, "they began to
|
|
|
6060 speak with divers tongues" (
|
|
|
6061 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p17.4" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.4" target="asv">Acts 2:4</a>). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the visible mission
|
|
|
6062 of the Son was to be
|
|
|
6063 accomplished before that of the Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son manifests the Father. Visible
|
|
|
6064 apparitions of the divine persons were, however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed, cannot be called
|
|
|
6065 visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the
|
|
|
6066 divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.
|
|
|
6067 </p>
|
|
|
6068 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p18"></p>
|
|
|
6069 <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p19"></p>
|
|
|
6070 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
6071 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
6072 </div>
|
|
|
6073 <div id="FP_Q43_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
6074 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
6075 <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a>
|
|
|
6076 <h4 id="FP_Q43_A8-p0.1">Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally?</h4>
|
|
|
6077 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
6078 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p2">
|
|
|
6079 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin.
|
|
|
6080 iv), "The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one." Therefore if a divine person is sent by another, He must be
|
|
|
6081 from that other.
|
|
|
6082 </p>
|
|
|
6083 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p3">
|
|
|
6084 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from
|
|
|
6085 origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending.
|
|
|
6086 </p>
|
|
|
6087 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p4">
|
|
|
6088 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although
|
|
|
6089 He proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only
|
|
|
6090 by the one whence He proceeds.
|
|
|
6091 </p>
|
|
|
6092 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p5">
|
|
|
6093 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to
|
|
|
6094 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.48.16" target="asv">Is. 48:16</a>, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit." But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent
|
|
|
6095 by one from Whom He does not proceed.
|
|
|
6096 </p>
|
|
|
6097 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p6">
|
|
|
6098 <b>I answer that,</b> There are different opinions on this point. Some say that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally;
|
|
|
6099 and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature,
|
|
|
6100 by reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine, however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent
|
|
|
6101 by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the
|
|
|
6102 Son; so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to the person proceeding from
|
|
|
6103 </p>
|
|
|
6104 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p7"> another, whereas to send belongs to each person.</p>
|
|
|
6105 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p8"> There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person is described as being sent, the person Himself existing
|
|
|
6106 from another is designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the divine person. Thus if
|
|
|
6107 the sender be designated as the principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but that person only Who
|
|
|
6108 is the principle of that person who is sent; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by
|
|
|
6109 the Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission,
|
|
|
6110 in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch
|
|
|
6111 as man cannot cause the effect of grace.
|
|
|
6112 </p>
|
|
|
6113 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p9"> The answers to the objections appear from the above.</p>
|
|
|
6114 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p10"></p>
|
|
|
6115 <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p11"></p>
|
|
|
6116 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
6117 <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a>
|
|
|
6118 </div>
|
|
|
6119 <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
6120 <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
6121 </div>
|
|
|
6122 <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
6123 <a href="summa.FP_Q27.html"></a>
|
|
|
6124 `
|
|
|
6125 </div> |
