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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_iii.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,6125 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.iii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ[27]-43)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q27" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q27-p0.1">THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q27-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of + the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, + the order of the doctrine leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly, the relations of origin; + thirdly, the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27-p3"> Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q27-p4"> (1) Whether there is procession in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q27-p5"> (2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?</p> + <p id="FP_Q27-p6"> (3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides generation.</p> + <p id="FP_Q27-p7"> (4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?</p> + <p id="FP_Q27-p8"> (5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?</p> + <div id="FP_Q27_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q27_A1-p0.1">Whether there is procession in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God. For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is + nothing mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme simplicity. + Therefore in God there is no procession. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as + shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore in God there is no procession. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.42" target="asv">Jn. 8:42</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession. This procession has been differently understood. + Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds + from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. + In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is + contrary to what is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:20</a>). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:19</a>). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as + moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the Father + is called + Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, + and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot of Himself + do anything" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#John.5.19" target="asv">Jn. 5:19</a>); while many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that + both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms + procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession + corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining + within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. + For whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of + the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. + This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p7"> As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, + namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived + from these fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it + is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, + as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible + emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic + Faith understands procession as existing in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, + or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we have explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever + proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more + closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely + is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since + the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is + the very supreme perfection of God ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To proceed from a principle, so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea + of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of + a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of such a principle is included that + of his art; and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the + builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to things created + as the architect is to things designed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q27_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q27_A2-p0.1">Whether any procession in God can be called generation?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no procession in God can be called generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence, + and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation + cannot exist in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. + But no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine existence is self-subsisting ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no generation in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.2.7" target="asv">Ps. 2:7</a>): "This day have I begotten Thee." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The procession of the Word in God is called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning: + one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence + to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living + being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called birth. Not + everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence + a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any + likeness suffice; for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it has + a generic similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same + specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential + to actual life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being whose + life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of + generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the procession of + the + Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation:---from a conjoined principle + (as above described):---by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:---and + exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His existence are the same, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14], A[4]</a>). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word Himself + proceeding is called the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act; + in which sense it is not found in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds within + us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot + be properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands + ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14], A[4]</a>). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds + as subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote + generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth; as is declared + in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was brought + forth." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.24" target="asv">Prov. 8:24</a>). In our way of understanding we use the word "conception" in order to signify + that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no identity of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance + of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated + in God receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject + (which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His + existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from another; not, however, as if He were other + from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding + and the principle of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q27_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q27_A3-p0.1">Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no other procession exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we + admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must + stop at the first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from their + terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine + nature ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html">Q[11], A[4]</a> ), it follows that only one procession exists in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession + of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the + intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.26" target="asv">Jn. 15:26</a>); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.14.16" target="asv">Jn. 14:16</a>). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two processions in God; the procession of the Word, and another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p7"> In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only according to an action which does not tend to anything + external, but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. + The procession of the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within ourselves involves also + another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the + word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there + exists in Him another procession called the procession of love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the agent + in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All that exists in God, is God ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], AA[3]</a>,4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not + outward, and this does not apply to other natures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions + belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession + of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain + order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance + of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch + as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order + between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q27_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q27_A4-p0.1">Whether the procession of love in God is generation?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living + things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise + it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of + love, proceeds as generated and born. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves + its like" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q27_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some + special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession + of love in God is generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the + statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect + and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its + own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but + by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is + by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the + will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p7"> So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name + expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform + an action. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one procession + is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must + be taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, + each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and + intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives + the divine nature, but is not said to be born. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood, + as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, + but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten + is the principle of love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We can name God only from creatures ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special + name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it + can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q27_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q27_A5-p0.1">Whether there are more than two processions in God? </h4> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. + Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of + power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there + must be a procession of goodness in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but + there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there + are more than two processions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In God there are not more than two who proceed---the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, + and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears + to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed + from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the + action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the + Word, and of Love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine + power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object + of the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p9"> Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions; no other processions can be understood in God according + to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, according as God understands and loves His own essence, + truth and goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q27_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q27_A5-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a>), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him + a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby + being manifested His perfect fecundity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q27_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q28" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q28-p0.1">THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q28-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28-p2"> The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q28-p3"> (1) Whether there are real relations in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q28-p4"> (2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it?</p> + <p id="FP_Q28-p5"> (3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other?</p> + <p id="FP_Q28-p6"> (4) The number of these relations.</p> + <div id="FP_Q28_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q28_A1-p0.1">Whether there are real relations in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as + regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in God can + be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, + is the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires + and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does + not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies + for the same reason to the other relations in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of + the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical + relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation + existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is + the Sabellian heresy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only + in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, + in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies + only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of + things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such + relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there + exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, + this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to + another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. + But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, + agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity + of the same nature, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], AA[2]</a>,4), these relations, according to the + divine processions, are necessarily real relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper + meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius + did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode + of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of + relation to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because + such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according + to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically + or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of + identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as + neither is it by relation of identity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation + to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect + and will, as is above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html">Q[14], AA[3]</a>,4; + <a id="FP_Q28_A1-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html">Q[19], A[8]</a>). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is + a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on + God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as + reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation + of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical + relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the + reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related + to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q28_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q28_A2-p0.1">Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all + that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such + things do not refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master + is a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God. + This can only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is + the divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else; whereas this is + repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore relation is not the divine essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the divine + essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore + the distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he + said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p7"> To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points + for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them + as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each + one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true + idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality + is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from + its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are + said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing + related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, + and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p8"> Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; + for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in + creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so + far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its + opposite term. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p9"> Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of + intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it + is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same + as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; + but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to that + of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but + nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of + identity; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same + applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning + of relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; + and this is not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were + comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by + any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various + names imposed by us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the divine perfection contained only what is signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect, being + thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word + "wisdom," it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included + in any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to + God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within + itself the perfection of every genus ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q28_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q28_A3-p0.1">Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with + the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the + relations are not really distinguished from each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. + But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it + make any real distinction of paternity and filiation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore + the relations are not really distinguished from each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, + if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, + which is the error of Sabellius. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is + attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard + of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation + <a id="FP_Q28_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative + opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute---namely, + essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity---but according to that which is relative. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are + identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they + differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still + it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies + reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something + "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless + these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed + according to the procession of one from another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q28_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q28_A4-p0.1">Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God there are not only four real relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it + must be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing + to the object willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above specified. Therefore there are not only four + real relations in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, real relations in God are understood as coming from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible relations + are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an infinite series of real relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ideas in God are eternal ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html">Q[15], A[1]</a>); and are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as above stated. Therefore in God there + are many more eternal relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations + are eternal in God than the above named. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to + the Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens." By the same way + of reasoning there is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and from the Son to the Father, that + of filiation; and thus there are not four relations in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and + passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity + in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be + based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according to + any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html">Q[13], A[7]</a>). Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there + are internal, and not external, processions in God. These processions are two only, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html">Q[27], A[5]</a>), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action + of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is + the relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The procession + of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation + of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding from the + principle is called filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession + is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the + processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In those things in which there is a difference between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can + be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect + and its object are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God understands all other things; and the same applies + to His will and the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds + of relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real + relation; because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action; and not as a thing understood. For when + we understand a stone; that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by another + act understands that he understands the stone, and again by another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of + understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch + as He understands all things by one act alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in + God; but that God knows these many relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Equality and similitude in God are not real relations; but are only logical relations ( + <a id="FP_Q28_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html">Q[42], A[3]</a>, ad 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The way from one term to another and conversely is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we + cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude + this of something absolute, if there were such between them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q28_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q29" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q29-p0.1">THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q29-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29-p2"> Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations, we must now approach the + subject of the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29-p3"> First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons + absolutely first in common; and then singly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29-p4"> The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points: (1) The signification of this word "person"; (2) + the number of the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, + and the like; and (4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29-p5"> Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:(1) The definition of "person."</p> + <p id="FP_Q29-p6"> (2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.</p> + <p id="FP_Q29-p7"> (3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q29-p8"> (4) What does it signify in Him?</p> + <div id="FP_Q29_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q29_A1-p0.1">The definition of "person"</h4> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an + individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something + singular. Therefore person is improperly defined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, substance as placed above in the definition of person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is + the former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance is individual substance; if it stands for second + substance, the word "individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second substances are the "genera" or + "species." Therefore this definition is incorrect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intentional term must not be included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal" + would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing, and "species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since + person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word "individual" which is an intentional + name comes improperly into the definition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," + as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" + ought not to enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is + not properly defined as above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs + to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, + which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this particular subject. And + so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special + name of their own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p8"> Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances + which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; + for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other + substances; and this name is "person." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p9"> Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; + and the term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although this or that singular may not be definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined; + and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines + person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis; + nor is the term "individual" superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality + and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part. + But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is + excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater---that is, by the Word + of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and + when "individual" is added, it is restricted to first substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences + in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are + the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities + if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" + is placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of living things, + which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to + signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines "nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind + of principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called + nature. And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, + is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature is the + specific difference giving its form to each thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from + the special form of a thing. So in the definition of "person," which means the singular in a determined "genus," it is more + correct to use the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from being, which is most common. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its + nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can + the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q29_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q29_A2-p0.1">Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis," "subsistence," and "essence." For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) + that "the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis." But this with us signifies + "person." Therefore "person" is altogether the same as "hypostasis." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person" + and "subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and "subsistence" mean the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek {ousia}, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and + form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called "hypostasis" and "person." Therefore + all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent, + but also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. + Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the same as subsistences. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called {ousiosis}---that is, subsistence. + But neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs from the others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified + by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called + by the Greeks {ousia}, what we may call "essence." In another sense substance means a subject or "suppositum," which subsists + in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name + expressive of an intention; and thus it is called "suppositum." It is also called by three names signifying a reality---that + is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. + For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called "subsistence"; as we say that those things subsist which exist + in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance, + this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called "hypostasis," or "substance." What + these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name "person" signifies in the genus of rational + substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the genus + substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of + that nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and "three subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases." But because the + word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to "hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, + since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was thought + preferable to use "subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the + species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the + form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what + is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For + soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this + man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the + essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity ( + <a id="FP_Q29_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact + that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves + subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. + To substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to + the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius + says (De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does + not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On + this account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and {ousiosis}, or + subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q29_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q29_A3-p0.1">Whether the word "person" should be said of God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare + to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the + oracles." But the name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore "person" is not to be applied + to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies + and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando], since a greater volume of sound is produced through the + cavity in the mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called {prosopa}, as they were placed on the face and covered the + features before the eyes." This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. + Therefore the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word "hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab. + Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in + this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person" should not be said of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as + given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we + proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q29_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html">Q[14], A[12]</a> ); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature." And also because God cannot be called an individual substance, + since the principle of individuation is + matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word "person" + ought not to be attributed to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature---that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since + everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" + is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, + which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when + treating of the names of God ( + <a id="FP_Q29_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the word "person" is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what + the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, + and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would + follow that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of the + Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about + God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the + sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q29_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.20" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:20</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although this name "person" may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs + to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given + to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called "persons." Thence + by some the definition of person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." + And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called + a "person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs + to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it + applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this + word," forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make + people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the + word "substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It may be said that God has a rational "nature," if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, + an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but + only in the sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. + There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted + above + <a id="FP_Q29_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends + this definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q29_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q29_A4-p0.1">Whether this word "person" signifies relation?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De + Trin. vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for person + is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness + in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore + person signifies essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: + "The individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated. Therefore "person" signifies substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation, + it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to person more + strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word "person" signifies relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word "person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of + the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the + words which express relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p8"> Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and + this word "Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative + sense, and especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we say, "Three persons," + or, "one is the person of the Father, another of the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either + absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its + own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from + the heretics being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word "person" in + God signifies both the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly the essence, and relation + indirectly, forasmuch as "person" means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what + is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from + the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as + in the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p9"> To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is + not included in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of "man," and not in the meaning of "animal." + So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question + is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning + of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The individual + in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: + thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, + and which, though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human + person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p10"> Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q29_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html">Q[28], AA[2]</a>,3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, + for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine + person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, + and + such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature + is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; + not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, + and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is + expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we + can say that this signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, + this word "person" was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent + itself to that signification, so that this word "person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first + opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way + of a substance---which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence + is the same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we answer: A + mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the "suppositum," as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. + So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In God the individual---i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass + have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies + to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of divine person, but not in that + of an angelic or of a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal + sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures ( + <a id="FP_Q29_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html">Q[13], A[5]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q29_A4-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q30" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q30-p0.1">THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q30-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30-p2"> We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q30-p3"> (1) Whether there are several persons in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q30-p4"> (2) How many are they?</p> + <p id="FP_Q30-p5"> (3) What the numeral terms signify in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q30-p6"> (4) The community of the term "person."</p> + <div id="FP_Q30_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q30_A1-p0.1">Whether there are several persons in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not several persons in God. For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If + then there are several persons in God, there must be several substances; which appears to be heretical. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less + therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God there is no plurality but of relations ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>). Therefore there cannot be several persons in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is truly one which has no number." But plurality implies number. Therefore + there are not several persons in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and + part in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." Therefore the Father, + and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It follows from what precedes that there are several persons in God. For it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html">Q[29], A[4]</a>) that this word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine nature. It was also established ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html">Q[28], A[1]</a>) that there are several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also several realities subsistent in the + divine nature; which means that there are several persons + in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The definition of "person" includes "substance," not as meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by + the addition of the term "individual." To signify the substance thus understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis." So, + as we say, "Three persons," they say "Three hypostases." We are not, however, accustomed to say Three substances, lest we + be understood to mean three essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification + of the term. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really + distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist, nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that + is, several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist, although they are really distinguished from + each other, as whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties + in God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>). Hence the plurality of persons in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations. + Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not import composition in that of which they are predicated, + as Boethius teaches in the same book. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and + two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being + in Him, and thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered + exists only in the intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things + numbered, in that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of two men, and + two of three; but this does not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the whole Trinity, as we shall + show further on ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html">Q[42], AA[1]</a>, 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q30_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q30_A2-p0.1">Whether there are more than three persons in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are more than three persons in God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality + of the relative properties as stated above + <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But there are four relations in God as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> The nature of God does not differ from His will more than from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, + as love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the + one Who proceeds from His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three persons in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond + other animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not only is there a person proceeding from the will, + and another from the intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are an infinite number of persons + in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine + person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person + another; and so to infinity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, everything within a determinate number is measured, for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, + as we say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy Ghost is immense." Therefore the + persons are not contained within the number three. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q30_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.7" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:7</a>). To those who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4), "Three persons." Therefore there are but three + persons in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was explained above, there can be only three persons in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several + subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from + relative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two persons: and if any relations are not opposite + they must needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are + opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; + and the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not opposed to each other; therefore these + two cannot belong to one person: hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons; or one must belong + to one person, and the other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them; + for + thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation + are derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person generating + and the person generated proceeded from the person spirating; and this is against what was laid down above ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27] , AA[3]</a>,4). We must frequently admit that spiration belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person of the + Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and consequently that procession belongs + to the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above explained. Therefore + only three persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although there are four relations in God, one of them, spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the + Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a property, because it does not belong to only + one person; nor is it a personal relation---i.e. constituting a person. The three relations---paternity, filiation, and procession---are + called personal properties, constituting as it were the persons; for + paternity is the person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word, proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way + of nature; thus, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>), the procession of the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But love, as such, does not proceed + as the similitude of that whence it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and therefore the procession + of love + is not called generation in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is + something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for + they have no imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real operation---that is, His essence. How + there are in Him two processions was above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html">Q[27], + AA[1] + </a>,4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if + the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have + one and the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by the personal relations. So goodness belongs + to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the + principle of its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be + joined with the relation of principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from the other persons who are + in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A determinate number, if taken as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a + number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three + persons is the same ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html">Q[42], AA[1]</a>,4), and the same is not measured by the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q30_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q30_A3-p0.1">Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every + number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real + in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral + terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, + as plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing + the mind and obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be said that the numeral terms denote something + real in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of oneness and of solitude;" + and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God, unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God." + Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove something; and not to denote anything positive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative + meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p7"> In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a consequence of division. Now division is twofold; + one is material, and is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a species of quantity. Number in this + sense is found only in material things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called formal, and is effected by + opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, + but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial + things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p8"> Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has + no place in God, asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but remove something from Him. Others, + considering the same kind of multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict sense of the word, but + not in the sense of its genus (as in God there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the + proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p9"> But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they + could bear only a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as length, breadth, and the like; but that + they are taken from multitude in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to the many of which it is + predicated, as "one" convertible with "being" is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything + to being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the divine unity ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html">Q[11], A[1]</a>); for "one" signifies undivided being. So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus, for instance, + "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things, + multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p10"> But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle + of that number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which they are said, and beyond this they add negation + only, as stated (Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So when we say, the essence is one, + the term "one" signifies the essence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the + person undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and their individual undividedness; for + it is of the very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude; hence + in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds + a negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God: + unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is + applicable to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "One" does not exclude multitude, but division, which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity, + but division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity + ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html">Q[11], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p14"> It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the + idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not follow that these terms express + this signification alone. For blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not signify the mere + exclusion of blackness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A3-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q30_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q30_A4-p0.1">Whether this term "person" can be common to the three persons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but + the essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly. Therefore it is not common to all three. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable. But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as + appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html">Q[29], A[3]</a>, ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it is common either really, or logically. But it is not so really; + otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But + in God there is neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q30_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore this term 'person' is not common to the three. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask, "Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is common + to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The very mode of expression itself shows that this term "person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for + when we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three. Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, + as if one essence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of the three, as also one essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p7"> What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those who have examined the subject. Some have called + it a community of exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the word "incommunicable." Others thought it + to be a community of intention, as the definition of person contains the word "individual"; as we say that to be a "species" + is common to horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is not a + name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name + "person" is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and + species, as man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of those common natures, + signified by the terms "genus" or "species." The vague individual thing, as "some man," signifies the common nature with + the determinate mode of existence of singular things---that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from others. But the + name of a designated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies + this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference---that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the individual + on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of singular things; while this name "person" is not given to signify + the + individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine + persons, that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name "person" is common in + idea to the three divine persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is founded on a real community. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this community is logical and not real, yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or + genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the community of person the same as community of genus or species; + and because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of many + which differ in being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q30_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q31" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q31-p0.1">OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q31-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31-p2"> We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which gives rise to four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q31-p3"> (1) Concerning the word "Trinity";</p> + <p id="FP_Q31-p4"> (2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?</p> + <p id="FP_Q31-p5"> (3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be joined to an essential name in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q31-p6"> (4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?</p> + <p id="FP_Q31-p7"></p> + <div id="FP_Q31_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q31_A1-p0.1">Whether there is trinity in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" + does not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the persons: nor does it signify relation; + for it does not express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be applied to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as + the unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore + this word "trinity" does not apply to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore + neither is there trinity in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if + Trinity exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there would be three essential unities; + which is heresy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the Father. + But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore + the word trinity is not to be applied to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in Unity is to be revered." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that + we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate + manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity" seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity + may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and + on this account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations + themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; + and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality of the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For "people" + is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective + words; but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also + with this there is unity of essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a proportion + of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion, according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is + not triplicity, but Trinity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we do + not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity + of nature; as the "supposita" of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; + meaning that the nature is in its "supposita." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself; + since the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the + Trinity is trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be three "supposita" of the Trinity; as + when we say, "God is trine," it follows that there are three "supposita" of the + Godhead. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q31_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q31_A2-p0.1">Whether the Son is other than the Father?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father. For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. + If, then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says + (De Trin. vii), that when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the + Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the + Son are one in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any diversity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. + vii) that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other + that the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So + if the Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says: "There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which + the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, + and the Holy Ghost another." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. lvii.</a>], a heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; + because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." + Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously between them---namely, the + error of Arius, who placed a + Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of + essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p8"> Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the + unity of essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the relative opposition. Hence whenever we find + terms of "diversity" or "difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of "diversity" or "difference" are + taken to mean "distinction." But lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the terms + "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid + the use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says + (De Fide i) that "in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead": and according to Hilary, as quoted + above, "in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p9"> To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity," lest we take away the communicability of the divine + essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are separate in Godhead." + We must avoid the adjective "only" [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary says in the same book: "We + exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there + is no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," + lest we take away from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide i): "What is one is not confused; + and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be avoided, lest we take away the + society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p10"> This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only a distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly + say that "the Son is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of the divine nature, as He is another person + and another hypostasis. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Other," being like the name of a particular thing, refers to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason for using + it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance + in the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form + of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.6" target="asv">Phil. 2:6</a>). Therefore the term "difference" does not properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet, Damascene (De + Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by + way of form. Hence he says that the + hypostases do not differ from each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But "difference" is taken + for "distinction," as above stated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The term "alien" means what is extraneous and dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and therefore + we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that He is anything "alien." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence + is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject + in the common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the + "suppositum"; whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal + animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say that the Father is other than the + Son, but not something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A2-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q31_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q31_A3-p0.1">Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the + Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another." But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. + Therefore we cannot say that God is alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons + together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. + But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone." Therefore God cannot + be said to be alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate + or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a + father; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, "God alone creates," it would + follow that the "Father alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the + Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential + term in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one + which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." + If the term "alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God; for it would mean solitude + in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what + is above stated + <a id="FP_Q31_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no one"; + and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other "suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone + writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with + him. In this way nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential + term in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said "God alone is eternal," because nothing but + God is eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist + in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; + thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would + be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several + persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God; much + less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the + "suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can + be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"---that is, no one else---"runs: and Socrates runs + only"---that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father + is God alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The + Trinity is God Who alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God Who alone is God, if the + relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the "suppositum." So, when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone, + but that the Trinity is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of ages, invisible, + the + only God," as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean two + things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or + it can signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though + not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it + follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it + is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for + instance, from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q31_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q31_A4-p0.1">Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our + Lord speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). Therefore the Father alone is true God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q31_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.27" target="asv">Mat. 11:27</a>); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion + follows. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does + not exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his + hand is not white," or that "man is not white." But one person is in the concept of another; as the Father is in the concept + of the Son; and conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not + exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes two assertions---namely, that the Father is God, and that no other besides + the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore + this is false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude in the + Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several + ways. For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"---that + is, "He who with no other is the Father, is God." In this way Augustine expounds + when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, + but because they are not the Father together with Him." This, however, is not the usual way of speaking, unless we understand + another implication, as though we said "He who alone is called the Father is God." But in the strict sense the exclusion affects + the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it + in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the + Holy Ghost. But because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person + rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, + whenever we find it in an authentic work. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole + Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not + excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word "only" excludes another thing, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p9"> The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, + by reason of the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i.e. + no man] is not the same as "no man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could not be + excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any + rational nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ + in "suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son differs in "suppositum" from the Father; and so there is no parity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the glory + of God the Father." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q31_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q32" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q32-p0.1">THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q32-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32-p2"> We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q32-p3"> (1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?</p> + <p id="FP_Q32-p4"> (2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q32-p5"> (3) The number of the notions?</p> + <p id="FP_Q32-p6"> (4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions?</p> + <div id="FP_Q32_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q32_A1-p0.1">Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge + of God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle + says (De Coelo et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"---namely, three---"we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of + one God, surpassing all things created." And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have + read in their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and + the Word was with God, and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the distinction of persons is laid down. We read, + moreover, in a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1" target="asv">Rom. 1</a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.8" target="asv">Ex. 8</a> that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as regards knowledge of a third person---i.e. of the Holy + Ghost ---and thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise + Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself its own heat." By which words the generation of the + Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural + reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can + be found for any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite + goodness of God, who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; while some are moved by the + consideration that "no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership." Augustine + proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; + and we have followed him in this ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A1.html">Q[27] , AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the + divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And Ambrose says + (De Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent." But the trinity + of the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary + reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], AA[4]</a>,12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge + of God, as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know of God that only which of necessity belongs + to Him as the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental + principle in treating of God as above ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, and not + to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but + not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason, + derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as + regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason; + wherefore the Apostle says that "faith is of things that appear not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>), and the same Apostle says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes + of this world; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:6,7</a>). Secondly, as regards the utility of + drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent, + he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on + such grounds. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p7"> Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the authority; + while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible. Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. + Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the truth of the word"---i.e. + "the sacred word, we too follow this rule." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The philosophers did not know the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as paternity, + filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words, "We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the + world"---i.e. the philosophers---"knew" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:6</a>). Nevertheless, they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to + the Son, + goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this number," etc., we must not take it + as if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number in their + sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, "In + the beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all + things, + and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said + to have failed in the third sign---that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they deviated from the goodness + appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q32_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1" target="asv">Rom. 1</a>); or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe, + they consequently maintained + the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called "mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea + of all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate substance + which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which + was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad," etc., + this + does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the world. For + one God produced one world by reason of His love for Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some + principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always + of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming + an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in + astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of + the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might + explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the + Trinity; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is + adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is manifested + also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite + goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity + it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires + partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order + to have the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as + the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive + at knowledge, and not conversely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two reason why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of + creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things + by necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not because He needed + them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of + His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there + be light," to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that it was good," to show proof of the divine love. + The same is also found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly concerning the + salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q32_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q32_A2-p0.1">Whether there are notions in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God there are no notions. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God + but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there + are none in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern + the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the + notions: for instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what belongs to the persons be so predicated; + for example, we do not say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. + Therefore there do not exist notions in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: + for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions + in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three properties; + i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional." Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and wherever + there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your kindness"---i.e. + you who are kind---so when we speak of paternity in God, we mean God the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p7"> But, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>, ad 1), the use of concrete and abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine simplicity; forasmuch as + we always name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence, + considered in itself, and therefore, our human intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own mode, that + is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, + whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent + things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by abstract names, to express their simplicity; + whereas, to express their subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p8"> But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom + and wise; but the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity and Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p9"> Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, + the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask: "Whereby are They one God? and whereby are + They three persons?" as we answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be some abstract terms whereby + we may answer that the persons are distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an abstract + term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine essence is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the property + as "Whereby." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p10"> The second motive is because one person in God is related to two persons---namely, the person of the Father to the person + of the Son and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son + also and the Holy Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, since relation alone multiplies + the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it be said with + Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the Father + is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations. + For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically + different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the relation of lord and father must differ + according to the difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His creatures by one specific + relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence there is + no parity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p11"> Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the creature ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html">Q[28], A[1]</a>,3); while there is no reason against our admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there must be a real + relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, whereby + they are related to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to + the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be separately + signified in the abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of notions, + as the abstract is contained in the concrete. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God the notions have their significance not after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the persons + are known; although in God these notions or relations are real, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A1.html">Q[28], A[1]</a>). Therefore whatever has order to any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; forasmuch as this is against + their mode of signification. Hence we cannot say that paternity begets, or creates, + or is wise, or is intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any act, but simply remove created conditions + from God, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also on + account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions; for we can + say that paternity is God, and that paternity is the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the persons are simple, still without prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be abstractedly + signified, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A2-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q32_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q32_A3-p0.1">Whether there are five notions?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not five notions. For the notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished + from each other. But the relations in God are only four ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>). Therefore the notions are only four in number. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called + the Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary; which cannot be allowed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as + in the person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common spiration. Either these three notions really + differ, or not. If they really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of several things. But if they + differ only logically, it follows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that we can + say that as the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the common reality, so common spiration is paternity; + which is not to be admitted. Therefore there are not five notions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It seems that there are more; because as the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion + of innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost + to proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion + common to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their origin: + and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two + modes a person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known by the fact that He is from another; but by + the fact that He is from no one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called + "innascibility." As the source of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known + by the notion of "paternity"; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the notion of "common spiration." The Son + can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is known by "filiation"; and also by another person proceeding from Him, + the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as the Father is known, by "common spiration." The Holy Ghost can be + known by + the fact that He is from another, or from others; thus He is known by "procession"; but not by the fact that another is from + Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p8"> Therefore, there are + Five notions in God: "innascibility," + "paternity," "filiation," "common spiration," and "procession." Of these only four are relations, for "innascibility" is not + a relation, except by reduction, as will appear later ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html">Q[33], A[4]</a>, ad 3). Four only are properties. For "common spiration" is not a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three are + personal notions---i.e. constituting persons, "paternity," "filiation," and "procession." "Common + spiration" and "innascibility" are called notions of Persons, but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Besides the four relations, another notion must be admitted, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The divine essence is signified as a reality; and likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions are + signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons, + nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the real plurality in God is founded only on relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they are + not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor again are they predicated of each other, because they are + different ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge, although we do + say that knowledge is power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since Person implies dignity, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q32_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a> ) we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His + dignity, as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son + agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on which a notion is based must be something special; + thus no parity of reasoning exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q32_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q32_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful to have various contrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3): + "No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity": to which mystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary + opinions must be in some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions of the notions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore + neither can there be about the notions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore different opinions of the notions are permissible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and + unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, + especially if it be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial of it involves as a consequence something + against faith; as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, + for it follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such things anyone may have a false opinion without danger + of heresy, before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences against faith, and particularly if no + obstinacy be shown; whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow against + faith, then the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as heretical which were + formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now more manifest. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p6"> So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at + variance with faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing or thinking that consequences + against the faith would follow, he would lapse into heresy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p7"> By what has been said all the objections may be solved.</p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q32_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q31_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q33" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q33-p0.1">OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q33-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33-p2"> We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q33-p3"> (1) Whether the Father is the Principle?</p> + <p id="FP_Q33-p4"> (2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name "Father"?</p> + <p id="FP_Q33-p5"> (3) Whether "Father" in God is said personally before it is said essentially?</p> + <p id="FP_Q33-p6"> (4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?</p> + <div id="FP_Q33_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q33_A1-p0.1">Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Father cannot be called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are + the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore + we must not say that He is the principle of the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows + that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which appears false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in God there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore + in speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is the Principle of the whole Deity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "principle" signifies only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we + call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle" indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use + the word "cause," but only "principle." The reason is because "principle" is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more + common than "element." For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the principle, but not the cause. + Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God ( + <a id="FP_Q33_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html">Q[13], A[11]</a>), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term "cause" seems + to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word "principle." For in all + kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas + we use the term "principle" even in things which have no such difference, but have only a + certain order to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that the first part + of a line is the principle of a line. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom + with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father something of authority by reason of His being the principle, + still we do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of + error. In this way, Hilary says (De Trin. ix): "By authority of the Giver, the Father + is the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is give." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this word principle, as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify priority, + but origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q33_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">Q[13], A[8]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q33_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q33_A2-p0.1">Whether this name "Father" is properly the name of a divine person?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly the name of a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies relation. + Moreover "person" is an individual substance. Therefore this name "Father" is not properly a name signifying a Person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term + is more properly applied to God, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q33_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html">Q[13], A[11]</a>). Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or + offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word + in God is not properly called Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply + to creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it + proceeds, not only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name "Father" taken from generation does not seem to be + the proper name of any divine person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.88.27" target="asv">Ps. 88:27</a>): "He shall cry out to me: Thou art my Father." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and + soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular + body; and by these is this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person + of the Father from all other persons. Hence this name "Father," whereby paternity is + signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this name "father" among us does not signify a person, but the relation + of a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in God the relation signified by the name "Father" + is a subsisting person. Hence, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q33_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html">Q[29], A[4]</a>), this name "person" in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now + generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore + the name "Father" is more expressive as regards the divine person than genitor or begettor. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something + subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The terms "generation" and "paternity" like the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as + regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the Apostle says, "I bend my knee to + the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.14" target="asv">Eph. 3:14</a>). This is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the + term which is the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect + is the generation; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a generator + to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten + is numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows that + generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction + exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q33_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q33_A3-p0.1">Whether this name "Father" is applied to God, firstly as a personal name?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied to God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common + precedes the particular. But this name "Father" as a personal name, belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential + sense it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father" to the whole Trinity. Therefore "Father" comes first as an + essential name before its personal sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem + to be of the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's; + since, according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the creature and to the Son. Therefore "Father" in God + is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by + reason of filiation or generation, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.15" target="asv"> Col. 1:15</a>: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Therefore paternity taken in a personal sense + is not prior to, but has the same concept as, paternity taken essentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the creature + in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the + creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which only + partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to + the signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things. Hence this name "lion" is applied + first to the animal containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so called, + before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it + is said by way of similitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p7"> Now it is manifest from the foregoing ( + <a id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>), that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the + nature and glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, + since the Creator and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain likeness, which is the more + perfect the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some creatures, by reason only + of a trace, for instance of irrational creatures, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Job.38.28" target="asv"> Job 38:28</a>: "Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?" Of some, namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), + by reason of the likeness of His image, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.6" target="asv"> Dt. 32:6</a>: "Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and created thee?" And + of others He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of + eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.16" target="asv"> Rom. 8:16,17</a>: "The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also." Lastly, He is the + Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p7.6" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.2" target="asv"> Rom. + 5:2 + </a>: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore it is plain that "paternity" is applied to God first, + as importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in the + understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but + not conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper terms which import personal relations; + because the person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production + of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood to proceed from the artist before the + thing designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father + before the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear + from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of His + Son." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To "receive" is said to be common to the creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote + similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First + Born among many brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the image of the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses + a position of singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as + Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only begotten ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q33_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv">Jn. 1:18</a>): "The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared unto us." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p10"> From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.</p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q33_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q33_A4-p0.1">Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which + it is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it only removes something. Therefore it does not signify + a property of the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not + begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten + belongs also to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a privative sense, as every privation + signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that + the Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance; + therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. + Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there + is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another. Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as the Father is the principle of the person begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his + opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to + be unproceeding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one ---that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten---namely, by the property in + each one respectively of innascibility and origin." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before + or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the + Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p9"> Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one way as the first "principle," by reason of its having + a relation to what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a "first" principle by reason of its not being + from another. Thus therefore the Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards the persons proceeding + from Himself. But as the principle, not from a principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; + and this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word "begotten." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not a negative + term only, but either that it means both these things together---namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the + principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does + not seem true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from + paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is included in the common. For source and authority signify + in God nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports + the negation of passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the same meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow + that "unbegotten" is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are notified by negations; as, for + instance, + a point is defined as what has no part. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is unbegotten," + that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may be taken in a kind of privation sense, but not as implying any imperfection. + For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even though + it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a stone be + called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so called + when something has not what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In + a third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in which sense, privation imports an imperfection. + In this sense, "unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second sense, + meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the same nature is begotten. In this + sense the term "unbegotten" can be applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper to the Father alone, + it must be further understood that the name "unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another person; so + that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in + the term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from another; and not only that He is not from another by way only + of generation. In this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by procession, + as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it is in the Son or in the + Holy Ghost from another---namely, from the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9), "unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus it applies + to the substance, for thereby does the created substance differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is + not begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man" + is reduced to the genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality. + Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father + unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by relation; that is, as the relation of Son is + denied of the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In every genus there must be something first; so in the divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from + another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine + natures. Hence Hilary says (De Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two innascibles." And this especially because, + did two innascibles exist, one would not be from the other, and they would not be + distinguished by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The property of the Father, whereby He is not from another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the + Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost; both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special + name, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q33_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>, ad 3), and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied of the Father + that He is begotten, + although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession of the + Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the person begotten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q33_A4-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q32_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q34" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q34-p0.1">OF THE PERSON OF THE SON (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q34-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q34-p2"> We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son---namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea + of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34-p3"> Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q34-p4"> (1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?</p> + <p id="FP_Q34-p5"> (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?</p> + <p id="FP_Q34-p6"> (3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?</p> + <div id="FP_Q34_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q34_A1-p0.1">Whether Word in God is a personal name?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father + and Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q34_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.1" target="asv">Jn. 1:1</a>), "In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a personal name in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), "The Word is knowledge with love;" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), + "To speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought." But knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms + in God. Therefore Word is not a personal term in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son + is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, + each one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God, and not in a personal sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is something made. For it is said, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms + which do His Word" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q34_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.8" target="asv">Ps. 148:8</a>). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is." But + the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an essential name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p8"> To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth + sense it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by + the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word---that is, the vocal + sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound + signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination, as stated + in De Anima ii, text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal + sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and + chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior + concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds + of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that "word" is called "the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, + and understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;" which is the first kind. "Again," he says, "the word is what is not pronounced + by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart;" which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the word is the angel"---that + is, the messenger "of intelligence;" which is the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which + is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, "this is the word I have said," or "which the king has commanded," + alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p9"> Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever + can understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already + see some likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word." The concept itself of the heart has of + its own nature to proceed from something other than itself---namely, from the knowledge of the one + conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which + belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin ( + <a id="FP_Q34_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], AA[3]</a>,4,5). Hence the term "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to + maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the + Word proceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the Father. For the interior + word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within + him. But supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be + called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word, + or it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called + a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies + the + interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes + said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that which + emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as + it is made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of understanding which is to the + actual intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding + does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that + word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for + what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is "begotten wisdom;" for + it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called "begotten knowledge." Thus can also be + explained how "to speak" is in God "to see by thought," forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought. + Still the term "thought" does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): "Therefore do we + speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming + the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless." For thought consists properly + in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does + not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as the Word + is not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So + Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is understood as not alone in God, but as being with + that very Word, without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking." On the other + hand, "to be spoken" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by + the word. Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; + whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For + the Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives + the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is "spoken" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the intellect of a man + by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term "speak" improperly for + the act of understanding; whereas they really differ from each other; for "to understand" means only the habitude of the intelligent + agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our + intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete + identity, because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same, as was proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q34_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14], AA[4]</a>,5). Whereas to "speak" means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is nothing but to utter a word. But + by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is + manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who utters the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person + understands and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures + are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom; + as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q34_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q34_A2-p0.1">Whether "Word" is the Son's proper name?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not + signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from + the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper + name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs + to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is said of the Son ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q34_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>): "Bearing all things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's + Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we understand the Son alone." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it signifies + an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; + and this procession is called generation, as we have shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q34_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our + nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an + effect of His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be something subsistent; for whatever is in the + nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of + God is substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are activities if the soul." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being uttered, + as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from + Augustine (De Haeres. xi). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the term "Word" the same property is comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and + Son express the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is signified by different names, which are + attributed to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is + called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that + He is altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is called the Word. All these + truths cannot be expressed by only one name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God + essentially, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q34_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], AA[2]</a>,4). Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as producing a Word, but as the + Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished + from the + principle of the Word only by relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things by the word of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of + the Word. Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, + things are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely + and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that + everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, + because He manifests the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q34_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q34_A3-p0.1">Whether the name "Word" imports relation to creatures?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures, + is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time; as "Lord" and "Creator." But Word is said of God + from eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows + that the Word proceeds from the creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to + creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not + know beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be + false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to + those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind + is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different + things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one only Word is expressive + not only of the Father, but of all creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p9"> And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, + so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures; and + therefore it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q34_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.9" target="asv">Ps. 32:9</a>): "He spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature. + Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is + implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence + is included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the + Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation + to creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the + action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. + But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent---as + to know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of + relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to + creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action + of God passing into exterior effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is + not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God; + and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation + to creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, + and that is a personal one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less than + does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, + but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q34_A3-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q33_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q35" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q35-p0.1">OF THE IMAGE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q35-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q35-p2"> We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q35-p3"> (1) Whether Image in God is said personally?</p> + <p id="FP_Q35-p4"> (2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?</p> + <div id="FP_Q35_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q35_A1-p0.1">Whether image in God is said personally?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that image is not said personally of God. For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead + of the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one." Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): "An image is a like species of that which it represents." But species or form is said of + God essentially. Therefore so also is Image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies "before" and "after." But in the divine persons there is no "before" + and "after." Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "What is more absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself?" Therefore the Image + in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only similitude + of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we + see that the species of different animals are of different figures; but not of different colors. Hence if the color of anything + is depicted on a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise + depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is enough for an image, which requires also the idea of + origin; because, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): "One egg is not the image of another, because it is not derived + from it." Therefore for a true image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or at least in specific + sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name "Image" is a personal + name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything proceeds, + is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the + name of Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Species," as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this sense + image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has + a like form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but only assimilation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q35_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q35_A2-p0.1">Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), "The Holy + Ghost is the Image of the Son." Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs + to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image + does not belong to the Son alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is also called the image of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q35_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>, "The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image and the glory of God." Therefore Image is not proper to the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): "The Son alone is the Image of the Father." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors + attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as + in the words, "Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q35_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.15" target="asv">Col. 1:15</a>) and again: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q35_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. + 1:3 + </a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p7"> Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not in nature only, but also in the notion of principle: + whereas the Holy Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion. This, however, does not seem to suffice. + Because as it is not by reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God, as Augustine says (De + Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason thereof do we consider) that similitude which is essential to image. + Hence others say that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the Son, because there cannot be an image of an image; + nor of the Father, because again the image must be immediately related to that which it is the image; and the Holy Ghost is + related to the Father through the Son; nor again is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then there would be one + image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for the + Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we shall explain further on ( + <a id="FP_Q35_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html">Q[36], A[4]</a> ). Hence there is nothing to prevent there being one Image of the Father and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one; since + even man is one image of the whole Trinity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p8"> Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives + the nature of the Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be "born"; so, although He receives the + likeness of the Father, He is not called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is essential to word to be like + species with that whence it proceeds; whereas this does not essentially belong to love, although it may belong to + that love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific nature; + as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way it is found in something of a different nature, as the king's + image on the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the second sense man is called the image of God; + and therefore in order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in + man, man is not simply called the image, but "to the image," whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. + But it cannot be said that the Son of God is "to the image," because He is the perfect Image of the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q35_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q36" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q36-p0.1">OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q36-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36-p2"> We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost, Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the + Love and Gift of God. Concerning the name "Holy Ghost" there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36-p3"> (1) Whether this name, "Holy Ghost," is the proper name of one divine Person?</p> + <p id="FP_Q36-p4"> (2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds from the Father and the Son?</p> + <p id="FP_Q36-p5"> (3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?</p> + <p id="FP_Q36-p6"> (4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?</p> + <div id="FP_Q36_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q36_A1-p0.1">Whether this name "Holy Ghost" is the proper name of one divine person?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the + three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of 'Holy Ghost' [*It should be borne in mind that the word + "ghost" is the old English equivalent for the Latin "spiritus," whether in the sense of "breath" or "blast," or in the sense + of "spirit," as an immaterial substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, + Psalter x, 7), "The Gost of Storms" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter "Trubled gost is sacrifice of God" (Prose Psalter, + A.D. 1325), and "Oure wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre" (More, "Comfort against Tribulation"); + and in our modern expression of "giving up the ghost." As applied to God, and not specially to the third Holy Person, we have + an example from Maunder, "Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good." (See Oxford Dictionary).] is common + to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin. viii) shows that the "Spirit of God" sometimes means the Father, as in the words + of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.61.1" target="asv"> Is. 61:1</a>: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" and sometimes the Son, as when the Son says: "In the Spirit of God I cast out devils" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.28" target="asv">Mat. 12:28</a>), showing that He cast out devils by His own natural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.28" target="asv"> Joel 2:28</a>: "I will pour out of My Spirit + over all flesh." Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the proper name of a divine person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms, as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not + a relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine Person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is + spoken of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give + to them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Num.11.17" target="asv">Num. 11:17</a>) and also "The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 2:15</a>). Therefore "Holy Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a divine Person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.7" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:7</a>): "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As Augustine says (De Trin. vii, + 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons." Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While there are two processions in God, one of these, the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as stated above + ( + <a id="FP_Q36_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27] , A[4]</a>, ad 3). Hence the relations also which follow from this procession are without a name ( + <a id="FP_Q36_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>): for which reason the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But as some names are accommodated by the + usual mode of speaking to signify the aforesaid + relations, as when we use the names of procession and spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the notional + acts than the relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy Ghost" is by the use + of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the fact + that the person who is called "Holy Ghost" has something in common with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin. + xv, 17; v, 11), "Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which both are called in common. + For the Father also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy." Secondly, from the + proper signification of the name. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we call + the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover towards the + object loved. Further, holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine person proceeds + by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most properly named "The Holy Ghost." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the immateriality + of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this term + to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word "holy" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if + Holy Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of + the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above + explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate a relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it + is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including + a relation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus]. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the name Son we understand that relation only which is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but + in the name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a + moving power. But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore + we can say "our Father," and "our Spirit"; but we cannot say "our Son." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q36_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q36_A2-p0.1">Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to + say anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles." But + in the Sacred Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; but only that He proceeds from the Father, + as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.26" target="asv"> Jn. 15:26</a>: "The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the + Father." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can. vii) we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver, + who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and glorified." Therefore it should not be added in + our Creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of + the Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him the Spirit of the Son." Therefore the Holy + Ghost does not proceed from the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of + St. Andrew: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, + and in the one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from + the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath [spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word. Therefore + the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the + Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in things perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But + it is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De + Process. Spir. Sancti, ii): "The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the Father; but each in a different way; one + by Birth, the other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another." And + further on he says: "For even if for no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice." + Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished + from Him; as appears from what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow + that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that + is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons + are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch + as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related + to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, + but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, + whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be + the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the + person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But + this + is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other + by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved + above ( + <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A44.html">Q[28], A[44]</a>). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore + we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the + Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p11"> Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], AA[2]</a>,4; + <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A4.html">Q[28], A[4]</a>), that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must + proceed from a word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also in this way it + is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the + Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p12"> We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed + from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for instance one smith produces many knives distinct + from each other materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction + we always find that some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures + produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the + Son and the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature, + whereby one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such + a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p13"> Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant + that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father "through the Son." Some of them are said also + to concede that "He is from the Son"; or that "He flows from the Son," but not that He proceeds; which seems to come from + ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is + the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; + as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. + Hence, granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the + Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We ought not to say about God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although + we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the + sense of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost, "He will glorify Me, because He shall receive + of Mine" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.14" target="asv">Jn. 16:14</a>). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that + whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive term; except only as regards what + belongs to the opposite relations, whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For when the Lord says, + "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father," the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we say that + the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not + thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed + to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council + at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained + in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council + of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated together in the + council of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything wanting in + the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what those fathers had understood of + the matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not + proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on, + when + certain errors rose up, another council [*Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was explicitly + defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless + the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian + creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him, + among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by + some that while Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, + neither do those words of his express a denial thereof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son + also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son + as the love of the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature of Christ, by reason of what is written: + "On whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who + baptizes" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q36_A2-p17.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.33" target="asv">Jn. 1:33</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it + would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word, whence proceeds love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds + from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because + whatever is from the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property of filiation; for the Son is not from + Himself, although He is from the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other; + but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from + the Father and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other, as explained above, and + in + <a id="FP_Q36_A2-p20.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27.html">Q[27].</a> + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p21"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A2-p22"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q36_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q36_A3-p0.1">Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through + another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not + proceed immediately; which seems to be unfitting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account + of the Father. But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from + the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows + that the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, + which is heretical. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the + bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can never say that the Son spirates the + Holy Ghost through the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father---namely + Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whenever one is said to act through another, this preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause + or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered + by the preposition "through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and in that case it is the cause of + why the agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or + motive. It is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love of gain. It is a formal cause when + we say that he works through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes, + however, that which is covered by this preposition "through" is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing + done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the + cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this + effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition "through" sometimes denotes direct authority, + as when we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through + the king. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p8"> Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father + spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, which has the same + meaning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In every action two things are to be considered, the "suppositum" acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance, + fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there + is no mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost + proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the + Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the + Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his mother, + who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession + of the divine persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that + He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son; + whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds + equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or + properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son), + so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost + proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When anyone is said to work through anything, the converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the mallet + works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place + to act, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act, but only to be made to act, and hence + it is used only as an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the + king, although this preposition "through" denotes a medium, for the more a "suppositum" is prior in action, so much the more + is its power immediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect. + Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a + medium according to the order of the subject's acting, the king is said to work through the bailiff; but according to the + order + of powers, the bailiff is said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the bailiff's action its + effect. Now there is no order of power between Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that the Father + spirates through the Son; and not conversely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q36_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q36_A4-p0.1">Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from + the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, + as He is one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property, for it is clear that one property + cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father + and the Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity, + because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor again do we designate the unity of property, because + if one property were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of + His two properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, + which cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle + as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father. + But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and + if the one is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the + Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one + principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for this word "principle" stands either + for the person of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it is false. Therefore this proposition also + is false, that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows + that they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle + of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the + Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) + that "the Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors." Therefore the Father and the Son are + not one principle of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since + there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are + one principle of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p11"> Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, + they declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not signify "person," but "property," it must be taken + as an adjective; and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot properly be said that the + Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the + meaning should be: They are one principle---that is, in one and the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that + the Father is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost---namely, in two ways. Therefore, we must say that, although + this word "principle" signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words "father" and "son" + even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the + Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word "God"; so they are one principle + of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word "principle." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative + power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason + against one property being in two "supposita" that possess one common nature. But if we consider the "supposita" of the spiration, + then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as + distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the proposition "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is the + form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several + principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence. + Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father + than is the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These two propositions, "The Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not the + Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the + Father and the Son are one principle, this word "principle" has not determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately + for two persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of "figure of speech" as the + argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This proposition is also true:---The one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word "principle" + does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> There is no reason against saying that the Father and the Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands + confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Some say that although the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of + the distinction of "supposita," as also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good + as to the name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above + explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct + persons, but as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective, and spirator a + substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of the "supposita" but not + two spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the "supposita" but substantives + from themselves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that "the Holy ghost is from the Father and the + Son + as His authors," this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p19"></p> + <p id="FP_Q36_A4-p20"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q37" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q37-p0.1">OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q37-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q37-p2"> We now inquire concerning the name "Love," on which arise two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q37-p3"> (1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?</p> + <p id="FP_Q37-p4"> (2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?</p> + <div id="FP_Q37_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q37_A1-p0.1">Whether "Love" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father, + Son and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should + not be called Charity, and all together one Charity." But no name which is predicated in the singular of each person and of + all together, is a proper name of a person. Therefore this name, "Love," is not the proper + name of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action + passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force." But a bond is + a medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from + the Father and the Son, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q36_A2.html">Q[36], A[2]</a>), it seems that He is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, + He must be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): "The Holy Ghost Himself is Love." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost; + as Word is the proper name of the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p8"> To see this we must know that since as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], AA[2]</a>,3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by + way of the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known to us, we have been able to apply + more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of + the will. Hence, we + are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations following from this procession + which are called "procession" and "spiration," as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>, ad 3), and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider + them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands + a conception of the + object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, + of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also + the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not + only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. + As + regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object + understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual + conception---namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does + not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and + the + term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other + hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love," which express the relation of the lover + to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object + loved, produced in the lover by fact that he loves---to the principle of that impression, or "vice versa." And therefore, + on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if we + were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom begotten." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p9"> It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of + the essence, as "understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the + relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is understood the "love proceeding," + and by "to love" is understood "the spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name + of the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to beget." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the divine essence, as was said above (here and + <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html">Q[24], A[2]</a>, ad 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although to understand, and to will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions + that remain in the agents, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q37_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14], A[4]</a>), yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves + is something that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation + to + the thing expressed by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there is more than this; because both + Word and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for something + else; we do not mean anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as also in the Word + is imported the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself + and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the + Son, and conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one + another, it necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from + both. As regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards + the aforesaid relation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As it does not belong to the Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as the word + proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to + Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term; because He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as + the one whence love proceeds. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q37_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q37_A2-p0.1">Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves + that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, + as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q37_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>). Therefore the Father and the Son do not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the proposition, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost," this word "love" is to be taken either + essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same way we might say that "the Father + understands by the Son"; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like manner, it might be said that "the Father + and the Son spirate by the Holy Ghost," or that "the Father generates by the Son." + Therefore in no way is this proposition true: "'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy + Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the "Father begets + Himself," or that "He spirates Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that "He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost," if "to + love" is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy + Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false: "The Father + loves the Son by the Holy Ghost." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begetter." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost," + since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the + Father and the Son; which cannot be admitted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p7"> In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost"; + and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that "the Father is wise by + the Wisdom begotten." Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that "the Father loves the + Son by the Holy Ghost"---that is, "by His essential Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others + further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, "the Holy Ghost is the sign that + the Father loves the Son"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that this ablative + must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the + Son formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect; + and + these approach nearer to the truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p8"> To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness, + and "man" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the + relation of form. So when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is to be construed as having relation + to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated + from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action---that + is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although + heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers + with the flower, although the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this + way, therefore, we must say that since in God "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken + essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. Hence Augustine + says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by + the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense + it means nothing else than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. + As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, + and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent + by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the + Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the idea of an action includes a determined effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action, + and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the + idea of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated + from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree + produces the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports + only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or begets by the Son. But we can say + that the Father speaks by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, "and speaks by the speaking," as by a notional act; forasmuch + as "to speak" imports a determinate person proceeding; since "to speak" means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken in + a + notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by the person + proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken + in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person, but also the person produced, by way of love, which + has relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as + the Word "begotten" adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves + Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby + the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word + and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding + and loving all creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q37_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q36_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q38" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q38-p0.1">OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q38-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q38-p2"> There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q38-p3"> (1) Whether "Gift" can be a personal name?</p> + <p id="FP_Q38-p4"> (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?</p> + <div id="FP_Q38_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q38_A1-p0.1">Whether "Gift" is a personal name?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of "Gift" + does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that "the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, + that He also gives Himself as God." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the + Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift + implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is + not a personal name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said + of God from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but + the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is "Gift." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and + to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to + be his. Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as possessed + by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in + this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by + a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The + rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, + so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person. + Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from + above; for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can "be given," and can + be a "gift." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction , in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin. + Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free + man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): "What is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say, + and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, + "this is this one's," can be understood in several senses. In one way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. + xxix); and in that sense "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost + gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift + is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third sense "this is this one's" + through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far + as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal + name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first sense, as being the Father's by way of identity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Gift as a personal name in God does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to + whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift + from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to + the creature; but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the essence is included in the idea of person, as + stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q38_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q34_A3.html">Q[34], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q38_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q38_A2-p0.1">Whether "Gift" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q38_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.9.16" target="asv"> Is. 9:16 </a>says: "A Son is give to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost. + Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "God's Gift" + only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As 'to be born' is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be + the Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds + from Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p7"> In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)---i.e. a thing + which is not given with the intention of a return---and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason + of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him + well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the + nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above + ( + <a id="FP_Q38_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q38_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q37_A1.html">Q[37], A[1]</a>), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many particular + gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of + its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father + as love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father's love, + according to the words, "God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q38_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.16" target="asv">Jn. 3:16</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin + of the Holy Ghost---that is, His procession. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because + "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it + has been given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q38_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q39" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q39-p0.1">OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q39-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p2"> Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference + to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p3"> As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p4"> (1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?</p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p5"> (2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p6"> (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular?</p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p7"> (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?</p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p8"> (5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract?</p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p9"> (6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names?</p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p10"> (7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q39-p11"> (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?</p> + <div id="FP_Q39_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q39_A1-p0.1">Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or "suppositum," + there can be only one "suppositum" of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things + which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three + persons, as is clear from what is above expounded ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>; + + <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Therefore essence is not the same as person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and + negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are + not the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or "hypostasis." + Therefore person is not the same as essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as "suppositum," which in intellectual substances is + nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the + essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. + i), "relation multiplies the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they + held the relations to be "adjacent"; considering only in the relations the idea of "reference to another," and not the relations + as realities. But as it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html">Q[28], A[2]</a>) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God + essence is not really distinct from person; + and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A4.html">Q[29], A[4]</a>), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom + really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of + that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There cannot be a distinction of "suppositum" in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because + in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between + them they distinguish the "supposita"; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not + distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed + of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], AA[1]</a>,3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals + are called "subjects," "supposita," or "hypostases." So the divine persons are named "supposita" or "hypostases," but not + as if there really existed any real "supposition" or "subjection." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q39_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q39_A2-p0.1">Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son + and Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the + three persons are not of one essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius + (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not + be asserted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of + one nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore + it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia]," + lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, + denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence + or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the + Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a + third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not be said that + the three persons are of one substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word {homoousion}, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means + that the three persons are of one essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], AA[1]</a>,2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but + in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, + the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the + "suppositum" of the form; so also in + God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say + that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not + say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That + woman is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, + and + the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided + that these genitives be understood as designating the form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not for the essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless + we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the Father are one ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.10.30" target="asv">Jn. 10:30</a>)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#John.10.38" target="asv">Jn. 10:38</a>)"; and there are many other texts of the same import. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be + of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" + which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than + by saying they are "of one nature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue + of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish + to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying + the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great + virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"---that + is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, + it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate + the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are "of one + essence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient + or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing + can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. + So, when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as having the + habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from + the same essence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do + not think them holy. So if some misunderstand {homoousion}, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness + of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to + both Father and Son." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A2-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q39_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q39_A3-p0.1">Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that essential names, as the name "God," should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but + in the plural. For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God signifies "one that has Godhead." But the three persons + are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are "three Gods." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv"> Gn. 1:1, </a> where it is said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may be rendered + "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several + Gods," and not "one" God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons + in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, + Son and Holy Ghost." Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has Deity," so also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in + an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are "three Gods." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. + Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those + which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives + signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something + by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity + or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But + as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity + and plurality of adjectives depends upon their "supposita." In creatures, one form does not exist in several + "supposita" except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, + they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or + an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, + as above explained + <a id="FP_Q39_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q39_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html">Q[11], A[4]</a>). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, + and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do + not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three "supposita" of human nature + there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine + Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated + of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of "supposita." For we say there are three "existent" or three "wise" + beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense" beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if + taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal being," as Athanasius declares. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the name "God" signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name + "God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are "three having + Godhead," it does not follow that there are three Gods. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of "supposita" the Greeks said "three + hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance," + lest plurality be referred to the substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in + the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the + passage quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The form signified by the word "person" is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities---that + is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost---it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but + in the plural. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q39_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q39_A4-p0.1">Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For, + as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for." But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for + it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q39_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense + signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," + this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget," + because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows + that there are two Gods. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; + for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. + Therefore it is false to say, "God begot God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, + then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. + Therefore it cannot be said that "God begot God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Creed it is said, "God of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that this name "God" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason + of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, + which requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is + signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way + of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word + "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others + more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as + does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate + is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified---that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either + for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: + "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees + also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several "supposita." So it need not always stand for + the essence it signifies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This holds good against those who say that the word "God" does not naturally stand for person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "God" stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified + by this word "man"---that is, humanity---is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, + even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person---that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human + nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the + mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, + "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"---that is, the divine essence---is really one and common. + So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, + when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when + we say, + "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that + generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, + for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator," + and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, + "the Father is God the generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; + for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q39_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same + "suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum + se]," forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it means "He begot another from Himself," or it + indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, + however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot another most like to + Himself." Likewise also it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is another than the Father, as + above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q31_A2.html">Q[31], A[2]</a>), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as this adjective "another" would be understood to apply + to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a + distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken + as a substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and + to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to "God," + the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; + and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He + begot God Who is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to + be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative + is false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be + forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus + said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition + can be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the "suppositum." Whence, + in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense + is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears + to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to + negation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A4-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q39_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q39_A5-p0.1">Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence." + For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly + Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. + Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). But, as was shown, it is true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true: "Essence begets essence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence + can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence + is not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not begetting": which cannot be. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by + begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since + nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot essence": + considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because + if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode + of its signification as above stated + <a id="FP_Q39_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Now + although "God" is really the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since + this word "God" signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature + stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for instance, + we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above explained + <a id="FP_Q39_A5-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. The word + "essence," however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract + form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed + to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the + "supposita." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than + the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, + for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from + essence"; or "wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, "the Son" who + is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain + order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong + to "supposita." So "nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, + which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted + accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not + begotten either directly or accidentally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, + we must speak in a different way about each of them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow + that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things + which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas + the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is + considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective indicates something added to the "suppositum." Therefore substantive + personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are + really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum" + implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. + We cannot say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing begetting," or that it is "God + begetting," if "thing" and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no + contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" + stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita," it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when + we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch + as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may + be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also + say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation + and spiration. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A5-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q39_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q39_A6-p0.1">Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God + is three persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards + any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, "God + is the Trinity," cannot be verified of any one of the "supposita" of the divine + nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, "God is the Trinity," is false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for + it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, + as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name + "God," except in an accidental sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained + <a id="FP_Q39_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms + can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as + one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the + essence as if we were to say, "The + essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "God" can of itself stand for the essence, + as above explained (A[4], ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true to + say, "God is the three persons." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the + universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man"; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. + On the contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the "supposita" + of the divine nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is + true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard + to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is + of itself true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by no means accidentally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A6-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q39_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q39_A7-p0.1">Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith + should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance + + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. lvii.</a>]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for + it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are + appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not + be appropriated to the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; + since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially + when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential + attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore + the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:24</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For + although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God + are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because + we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we + cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine + persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons + by the use of + the essential attributes is called "appropriation." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p7"> The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the + things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way + by dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes + feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make + the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather + manifestation of the truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow + that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that + the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together + only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is + called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; + and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is + His own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, + so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated. + Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q39_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q39_A8-p0.1">Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says + (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates + three names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image" proper to the Son ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q35_A2.html">Q[35], A[2]</a>), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift," which is proper to the Holy Ghost ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html">Q[38], A[2]</a>). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity" to the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use" + to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports duration of existence; "species," the principle + of existence; and 'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. + Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is + the concord of equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination + from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], A[2]</a>, ad 1). But, as he subjoins, "All these three are one by the + Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated + to the Persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness." + Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according + to the text, "Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:24</a>). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, "strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him + and healed all" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.19" target="asv">Lk. 6:19</a>). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken + in a confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost.'" + This, however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first + among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the + Father, Who is "the principle from no principle." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the book of life," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.39.9" target="asv"> Ps. 39:9, </a> "In the beginning of the book it is written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who is My head," also + this word "Who is"; because on the text of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.65.1" target="asv"> Is. 65:1, </a> "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I + am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. + 36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, + Who has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as signifying "a thing from another"; for every book + is written by someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who + am," the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to + you," so also he could have said further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," pointing + out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common + to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from + creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken + absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality + is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. + Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p8"> According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned + by Hilary applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species" to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. + For "eternity" as meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is "a principle + without a principle." Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three + conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" + or "harmony"; and lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p9"> The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the + nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): "Where---that is, in the Son---there + is supreme and primal life," etc. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p10"> The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image + is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. + vi, 10), "Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p11"> The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene + says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting + in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God," etc. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p12"> "Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the "use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the + sense of "to enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, + as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of + the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that + felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of + the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, + the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is + clear how "eternity," "species," and "use" are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because, + being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p13"> The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" + to the Father, "equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, + but in different ways. For "unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is + appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without + principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality + is appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle." "Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated + to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says (De + Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are + united by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as + in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" + is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So + the other persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality in the + Father, + but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle + of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His + equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. + Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between + the + Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father + and the Son are said to be united. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p14"> According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there + is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness." This kind of appropriation is made both + by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is + in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is + the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness + to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent + by reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant + to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.25.4" target="asv"> Is. 25:4</a>: "The + spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not + as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we + say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p15"> According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from + Whom, by Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; + which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by + reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition "by" + [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is + not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, "All things were + made by Him" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p15.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>); not that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle." Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form + "by" which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as + wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the + habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to + be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated to the Son. In another + sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting + end; + and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness." Nor need the habitude + of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": + because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of + Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p16"> Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth" belongs to the intellect, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the + thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and + not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from + Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge but indirectly it means + life. For, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q39_A8-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">Q[24], A[1]</a>), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although + life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property + of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another + is not of the essence of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply + origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the + Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery + of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes + relate + to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is the + begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although + the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to + can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, "this stone," and + "this + ass." So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter + may be designated by the pronoun "this," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q39_A8-p16.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.2" target="asv"> Ex. 15:2</a>: "This is my God, and I will glorify Him." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p17"></p> + <p id="FP_Q39_A8-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q38_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q40" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q40-p0.1">OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q40-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40-p2"> We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or properties; and there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q40-p3"> (1) Whether relation is the same as person?</p> + <p id="FP_Q40-p4"> (2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q40-p5"> (3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypostases distinct?</p> + <p id="FP_Q40-p6"> (4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?</p> + <div id="FP_Q40_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q40_A1-p0.1">Whether relation is the same as person?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God relation is not the same as person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others + are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in the person of the Father there is paternity and common + spiration. Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the Father and in the Son. Therefore relation + is not the same as person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; + nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore + relation, or property, is not the same as person in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated + of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting. + Therefore property is not the same as person in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by paternity. + In the same way, the other properties are the same as the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Different opinions have been held on this point. Some have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons; + and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" + something, but rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations "assistant," as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A2.html">Q[28], A[2]</a>). But since relation, considered as really existing in + God, is the divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A1.html">Q[39], A[1]</a>), relation must necessarily be the same as person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p7"> Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; + for, they said, there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>). We must, however, say that there are properties in God; as we have shown ( + <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>). These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, since the nature of a form + requires it to be "in" that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they + are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God, and yet is God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, + the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real + identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter + and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as + "Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever + is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine + essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For personal properties are the same as the + persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as + paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties + are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. + Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting + person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above + explained ( + <a id="FP_Q40_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a> ). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity, + not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine + and distinguish the persons, but not the essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a "suppositum." Now, properties are not designated + as "supposita," but as forms of "supposita." And so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs + being predicated of the properties. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q40_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q40_A2-p0.1">Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But + the persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by the relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But + "hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction. + Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, + which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle + in God cannot be relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. + So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are + several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although + these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for + "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by way of the form, as "paternity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p8"> Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, + so that we may say that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is begotten. + Further, that the relations, or the properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as resulting therefrom; + as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused + by the material principles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p9"> This opinion, however, cannot stand---for two reasons. Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, + their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both; thus in things created it results from + their matter or their form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means the way from something, + or to something; as generation signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator. + Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the + generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a divine + person there is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it + only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because the distinction + of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence remains + undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or + the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; + as paternity is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it + is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies + proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as "nativity," signifies + the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting the person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p10"> It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although + in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly + by relations; whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter" + or "Begetting" signifies property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation which is + distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term "Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive + and constitutive of the hypostasis. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them + to be distinguished by the relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards + something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So + the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does + not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word + "another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A2-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q40_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q40_A3-p0.1">Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that + to which something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken away; as man is something added to animal which + can be understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis; for person is "a hypostasis distinguished + by a property of dignity." Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a + person, the hypostasis remains. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity, + supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." + So when paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains "someone"---that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if + property be removed from person, the hypostasis remains. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son, + nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. + Therefore, if paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation be removed, + the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as regards the other persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Abstraction by the intellect is twofold---when the universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from + man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible + matter. The difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the + particular, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the + difference of rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the intellect, but animal alone remains. But in + the abstraction of the form from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect; as, for instance, if we + abstract the form of a circle from brass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle, and + of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards + the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, + 6) that "substance is common and hypostasis is particular." So, if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular, + the common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father, + which is, as it were, a particular. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p7"> But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of + the hypostases and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's being unbegotten or spirating be mentally + abstracted from the Father, the Father's hypostasis or person remains. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p8"> If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal + properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they + carry with them their own "supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. + For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as + relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q40_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however, think, + as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father + is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And that the consequent relations + which are to be + regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence, if + these relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the persons, remain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p9"> But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown + above + <a id="FP_Q40_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html">(A[2])</a>; secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. + Nat.) that, "person is the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, to have hypostasis and not person, it would + be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature, but not the property + from the person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all of + which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood + as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer + remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed; for + both person and hypostasis are individual substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially + to both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow, however, + that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it does not follow that He is not a person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed, + as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being + unbegotten" says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch + as not every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the + hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; + as the Jews understand it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q40_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q40_A4-p0.1">Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the notional acts are understood before the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i, + D, xxvii) that "the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the Son." So it seems that generation precedes paternity + in the order of intelligence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes quantity. + But paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is + so called because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Generation is the operation of the person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore in + the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the opinion that the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest them + as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the + notional acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because He begets, He is the Father." A distinction, + however, is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the + divine hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive signification---active, as generation is attributed to the + Father, and spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed + to the Son, and procession to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes + the personal properties of the person proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way to a person + constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal + relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative + property common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, + as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, as such, is + founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the relation, + as an action presupposes a person acting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the Master says that "because He begets, He is Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but not + as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary to say conversely that because He is Father He begets. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but not as constituting a person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as constituting + the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes + the personal property of the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q40_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q39_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q41" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q41-p0.1">OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q41-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41-p2"> We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise:</p> + <p id="FP_Q41-p3"> (1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q41-p4"> (2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?</p> + <p id="FP_Q41-p5"> (3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or from something?</p> + <p id="FP_Q41-p6"> (4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?</p> + <p id="FP_Q41-p7"> (5) What this power means?</p> + <p id="FP_Q41-p8"> (6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?</p> + <div id="FP_Q41_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q41_A1-p0.1">Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is + predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action + is one of the ten "genera." Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance, + or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the + relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts + are not to be attributed to the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional + acts to be placed in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional + acts are to be placed in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore, + to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional acts to the persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from + Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding + of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God regards the procession of person from person; + wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional; + because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what was above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether + the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D, xxvi). + To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything + be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause. + Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, + is called "passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called + "action." Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds + from some cause or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the personal action + of + the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes + are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner + of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ + from the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons + separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really + the same, differing only in their mode of signification. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to + God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, + as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q41_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q41_A2-p0.1">Whether the notional acts are voluntary?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father + led to beget the Son." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.13" target="asv">Col. 1:13</a>). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore + He proceeds voluntarily. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore + the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that + He begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative + designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will---that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can + be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the + Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that + the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God the + Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the book De Synod, it is said: + "If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason + of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while + the will is not determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter + acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself, + such also is its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas understood. + Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and + understanding. So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which + can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, + whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made + from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking + will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature. + Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son + a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, + born of God, subsists in the perfect likeness of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the + Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we + ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity---as, for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This + appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for + thus we read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the Father beget + the Son." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if + love were the principle of the Son's generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God naturally + wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, + as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds + by mode of + will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally + understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of the divine Word is natural. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning: + firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, + when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, + so well attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary; + because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which + cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the + Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q41_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q41_A3-p0.1">Whether the notional acts proceed from something?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this + will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists + in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is + laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In them nothing diverse or different exists." If the + Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent, receives as + predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he + is made white---it follows that either the Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, + which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son + from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is + not a material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as + the begetter is the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates, + which was disproved above ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A5.html">Q[39], A[5]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not + another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is + not from the Father's essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:5</a>), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures": and + further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:14</a>) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was + not begotten from something, but + from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Zech.12.1" target="asv">Zech. 12:1</a>): "Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit + of man within him"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Amos.4.13" target="asv">Amos 4:13</a>) according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth, and create the spirit." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says: "God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal + to Himself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father's substance. For it was explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html">Q[33], AA[2]</a> ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true "generation," + whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter + makes a bench out of wood, + whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of + nothing, as will be shown later on ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A1.html">Q[45], A[1]</a>), not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is produced + by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the + Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to + the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son + of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is + stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:20</a>): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ." Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p8"> That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according + to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of God, He + is called the "only begotten," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv"> Jn. 1:18, </a> "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons of adoption + by their similitude to Him, He + is called the "first begotten," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born + of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is + born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine + nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily + follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to + Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A3-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html">Q[40], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle, but + not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. + But the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this + denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"---that + is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is + the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p11"> This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is + essence; but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of" + [de] always denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder, since he is not the consubstantial + cause. We can say, however, that something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no + matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, + as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not accidental + to another, for we can say that an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is begotten + 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the + Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when + we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified + by the preposition, so there is no parity of argument. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given + by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His + works" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q41_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:9,10</a>). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created + is a kind of participation of the + uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the + beginning and before the world was I made"---that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as + both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what is generated + receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but + the + creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea + of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the + Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not refer to + the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also + the soul, or any other invisible substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q41_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q41_A4-p0.1">Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or + passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we call passive power, as above explained + ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons were not made, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q41_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore in God there is no + power in respect of the notional acts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore, + as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which + belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>). Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God + the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the + principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle + of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; + for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every + generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator + the power of spirating. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has + no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God + there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; + and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible that the Son should be + generated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe + a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real + distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person + is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God + the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore with + regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or essentially, + we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may ascribe + the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate the + procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot + ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by + different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very essence + which has no principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q41_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q41_A5-p0.1">Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies + a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. + But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, + the same applies to the power of begetting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to + the three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore, + also, the power to beget. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly + called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, + as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father + has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of + begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p7"> Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is + in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot but contain that nature from which + it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p8"> We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. + i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both + equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect + to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual + form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates + would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person + of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which + the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation is the "work of nature," + not of nature generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting + signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies + that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that + by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates: + but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and + so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by + which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only of species, as in things + created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the divine essence "is the principle by which the Begetter begets," it + does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine + essence begets. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the + act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the + "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the + three persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q41_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q41_A6-p0.1">Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated + in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. + But He cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be several Sons in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved + Him not." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore + God can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In God "that which is possible," and "that which is" do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be + several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p7"> The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are + the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more + than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: + since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there + can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p8"> The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act. + Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding + after the manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p9"> The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said + + <a id="FP_Q41_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, and nature is determined to one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p10"> The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire + divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the + power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that + the Son has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is + the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of + being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son---that is, the power of + being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power + of generation"---that is, a power by which it is generated by some person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because + He could not, as we shall see later on ( + <a id="FP_Q41_A6-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html">Q[42], A[6]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained. + Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q41_A6-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q40_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q42" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q42-p0.1">OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q42-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42-p2"> We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, + with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42-p3"> (1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q42-p4"> (2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity?</p> + <p id="FP_Q42-p5"> (3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q42-p6"> (4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?</p> + <p id="FP_Q42-p7"> (5) Whether the one divine person is in another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q42-p8"> (6) Whether they are equal in power?</p> + <div id="FP_Q42_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q42_A1-p0.1">Whether there is equality in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in + quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous + intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be + equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality + is not becoming to the divine persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q39_A2.html">Q[39], A[2]</a>). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we + may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine + persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly + to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal + to the image." But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the + Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of + the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality + signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius + says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the + Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus + involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, + is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would + not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality + among the divine persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and + has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of "virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some + nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it + is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its + source---that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of + great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, + but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity + is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by reason of its + form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both + in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer + duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine + (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one + of + them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes + excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, + just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more + perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father + and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order + to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways---namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality + in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is + because the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, + and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the + Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness + are not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, + for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p11"> But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, + the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say + that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in + which they are distinct. Now equality implies both ---namely, distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal + to itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness + and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real + relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed + to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would + be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the + personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence. + For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are relative." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q42_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q42_A2-p0.1">Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives + twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. + The second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or + impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The + fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an + accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as + sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the + exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made + of + brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth + is the taking of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the + genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the + mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is + clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from + the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not + eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is + existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is + begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in + successive things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, + which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the + Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are co-eternal with each other." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds + from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on + the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free + agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives + to the effect, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">Q[41], A[2]</a>), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not + having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man + is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist + simultaneously with its principle when the action is + successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, + but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A2.html">Q[41], A[2]</a>), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; + and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would + be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. + Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and + likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine + generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat + supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son + existed always with the Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; + let the name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents + it more exactly; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality + to act; and this cannot be said of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however, + is not changed, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In time there is something indivisible---namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures---namely, time. But + in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ad 1, A[4] ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express + the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever being born," as + Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.2.7" target="asv"> Ps. 2:7</a>] said, it is better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of + the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q42_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q42_A3-p0.1">Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, + or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore + there is no order of nature in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But + in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine + persons there is no order of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is + not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of + nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. + Therefore in God order exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle---namely, according to site, + as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause---so are there + many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q33_A1.html">Q[33], A[1]</a>): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without + priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior + to another, but whereby one is from another." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still + comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations + of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous + in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the + definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the + part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and + reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to + natural origin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly + called the order of nature than the order of essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q42_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q42_A4-p0.1">Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.28" target="asv">Jn. 14:28</a>): "The Father is greater than I"; and the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>): "The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not + possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are + more than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions + are included. Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently + not equal to the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.6" target="asv">Phil. 2:6</a>): "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature. + Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of + the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation + is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it + follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing + to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A2.html">Q[27], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q42_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q33_A2.html">Q[33], AA[2]</a> ,3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation + in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a + successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, + Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): "Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, + then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but in + His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, "Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than + the Father in humanity": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to + Whom the same being is given"; and (De Synod.): "The Son subjects Himself by His + inborn piety"---that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas "creatures are subject by their created weakness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (A[1], ad 1), + and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or + dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), "The question + of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how + great, is he?" Therefore, paternity is the Father's dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something absolute, + and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so + the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses + whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue---"the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity," for + there is a transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist + in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are + one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. + Persons likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A4.html">Q[30], A[4]</a>). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the persons + something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q42_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q42_A5-p0.1">Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes + of one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone + who examines each mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that has come out from another is within. But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.5.2" target="asv"> Mic. 5:2</a>: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot + be in the other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.10" target="asv">Jn. 14:10</a>): "I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and + according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father + is His own essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's + essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His + own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), + "The unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the + nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God." It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative + opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word + is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein + contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated + by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be + found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that the unity of essence between the principle + and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains + therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in + the other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q42_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q42_A6-p0.1">Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in power. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.19" target="asv">Jn. 5:19</a>): "The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore + the Father's power is greater than the Son's. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the + Son according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.31" target="asv"> Jn. 14:31</a>: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do I." The Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him + all things that Himself doth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#John.5.20" target="asv">Jn. 5:20</a>). Also, the Son hears: "As I hear, so I judge" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p3.3" href="./asv.html#John.5.30" target="asv">Jn. 5:30</a>). Therefore the Father has + greater power than the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. + iii, 7), "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot + beget a Son, as proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q42_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html">Q[41], A[6]</a>). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q42_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.19" target="asv">Jn. 5:19</a>): "Whatsoever things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, + for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above + <a id="FP_Q42_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html">(A[4])</a> that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness---that + is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son + is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do anything," do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since + it is immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner"; but their meaning is to show that + the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), "The unity of + the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not + act by Himself [a se]." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing" are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the + Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity + knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the + Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can + beget; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation signifies a divine relation. So + the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father + possessing power as "giving" signified when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son possesses the power of "receiving," + signified by saying that He can be begotten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q42_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q41_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q43" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q43-p0.1">THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q43-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p2"> We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p3"> (1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?</p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p4"> (2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?</p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p5"> (3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?</p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p6"> (4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?</p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p7"> (5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?</p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p8"> (6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?</p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p9"> (7) Of the visible mission</p> + <p id="FP_Q43-p10"> (8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?</p> + <div id="FP_Q43_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q43_A1-p0.1">Whether a divine person can be properly sent?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine person + is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.16.53" target="asv"> Ezech. 16:53</a>: "What is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent." But in the divine persons there is nothing that is separable, as Hilary + says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one person is not sent by another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, + Who is everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be sent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.16" target="asv">Jn. 8:16</a>): "I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> the notion of mission includes two things: the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to the end + whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender: either according + to command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an adviser may be said to send the king to battle; + or according to origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term to + which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there: either because in no way was he present + before in the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus + the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as + meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began + to + exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas "He was" previously "in the world" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.1" target="asv">Jn. 1:1</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; + forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession + of origin, which is according to equality, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q43_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q42_A4.html">Q[42], AA[4]</a>,6). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is necessarily + separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent + neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place + without a separation, having only distinction of origin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q43_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q43_A2-p0.1">Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), "The Son is sent as He is begotten." But + the Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the mission + of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.4" target="asv">Gal. 4:4</a>): "When the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A certain difference is to be observed in all the words that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express only + relation to the principle, as "procession" and "going forth." Others express the term of procession together with the relation + to the principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as "generation" and "spiration"; for generation is the procession + of the divine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession + of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to the principle, as "mission" and "giving." For + a thing is sent that it may be in something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but that a divine person be possessed + by any creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p7"> Hence "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in God; but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal; + whereas "procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally + as God; but temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to His + invisible mission. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean + that He could be sent because eternally begotten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That a divine person may newly exist in anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine + person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called Lord temporally by change of the creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence + mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For + the relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal + and temporal, not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double + term, temporal and eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q43_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q43_A3-p0.1">Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For + the sending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying + grace, the divine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this is the error of those who say that the Holy + Ghost is not given, but that His gifts are given. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this preposition, "according to," denotes the habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the + gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5, </a> "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." Therefore it is improperly said + that the divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is sent." But the Son is + known not only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and knowledge. Therefore the divine person + is not sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a + gift of sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person is not given only according to the gift of + sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification." But mission + is a temporal procession. Since then the creature's sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of + the divine person is only by sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone; + and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p8"> For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the + effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging + to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. + And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to + this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So + no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying + grace. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p9"> Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can + only be according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift + itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, + but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace; + and yet the divine person Himself is given. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the divine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy Ghost + is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the + words, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the Son can be known by us according to other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us + according to those effects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence + gratuitous grace is called the "manifestation of the Spirit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given + to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace itself, it would not + be simply + said that the Holy Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term; just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of + the spirit of prophecy, or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying or of working miracles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q43_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q43_A4-p0.1">Whether the Father can be fittingly sent?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given. + But the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father + sends Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the divine person is sent according to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.23" target="asv">Jn. 14:23</a>: "We will come to him and make Our abode with him." Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all, except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify + any person; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q43_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A3.html">Q[32], A[3]</a>). Therefore every divine person can be sent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), "The Father alone is never described as being sent." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The very idea of mission means procession from another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above expounded. + Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son + and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed + by the creature. But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what is given, "to be given" only applies in God to + the Person Who is from another; and the same as regards "being sent." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the effect of grace is also from the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still + He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when + known by anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He is, or from whom He proceeds." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in general; + thus "to be from another" is common to two of the notions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q43_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q43_A5-p0.1">Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is according + to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:11</a>: "One and the same Spirit worketh all things." Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mission of the divine person is according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of + the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held without the gift of charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>: "If I should have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith so that I could + move mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore, + since the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent invisibly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as expounded above ( + <a id="FP_Q43_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4). But the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if both + are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous, since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of divine Wisdom ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.10" target="asv">Wis. 9:10</a>): "Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.23" target="asv"> Jn. 14:23</a>: "We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies + both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son + and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore + belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong + to Him to be from another, and consequently He is not sent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the first + Gift, since He is Love, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q43_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q38_A1.html">Q[38], A[1]</a>), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, + namely, which belong to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of the Son. Hence Augustine says (De + Trin. iv, + 20) that "The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a likening + of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated + to the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas + the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. + Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): "The Word we speak of is knowledge with love." Thus the Son is sent not in accordance + with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into + the affection of love, as is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.45" target="asv">Jn. 6:45</a>): "Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath learned, cometh to Me," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.38.4" target="asv">Ps. 38:4</a>): "In my meditation a fire shall flame forth." Thus Augustine plainly + says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." Now perception implies a certain + experimental knowledge; and this is properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia], according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.23" target="asv"> Ecclus. 6:23</a>: "The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q43_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, if we speak of mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the Holy + Ghost, as generation is distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the effect of grace, in this sense + the two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are + distinguished in the effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection. + Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying grace, nor + is one person separated from the other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q43_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q43_A6-p0.1">Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their + share of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv">Jn. 7:39</a>): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers + in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because progress + in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the + invisible mission is not to all who share in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace. But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas + Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in + grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore + the invisible mission is not to all that have grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27), the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every creature + that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every such creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q43_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,4,5), mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before, as occurs to + creatures; or begins to exist where he was before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons. + Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal by + grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent + to all in whom are to be found these two conditions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that + the invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men. This was done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets." + Thus the words, "the Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took + place on the day of Pentecost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. + iv, 20), that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived + according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him." Such invisible mission, + however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new + act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles + or of prophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his + possessions, or to undertake any arduous work. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made + to them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day + of judgment. Such an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a greater number of objects. To Christ + the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, + since from the beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments + of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as + directed to its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace + through the sacraments. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q43_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q43_A7-p0.1">Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is + said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is + not fittingly sent in a visible manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. + But the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures + than in others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus + the Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place + in all these things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason + of those visible creatures more than any other person. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind of creature---namely, the human nature. Therefore if the + Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). + So visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as invisible + things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible + mission; and to all who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought + likewise to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent + visibly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.16" target="asv">Mat. 3:16</a>) that, when our Lord was baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible + by visible things, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q43_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in + a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs; + so was + it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p10"> This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, + Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author + of this sanctification. Thus the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Ghost as the sign of + sanctification. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said of + that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. + But the Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into the unity of His person; so that what is + said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the + Father by reason of any visible creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine + says (De Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit + by the spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire, saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy + Ghost the same relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because + it is said, "The rock was Christ" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:4</a>). For that rock was already created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it typified; whereas the dove + and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame of the burning + bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth + when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily + appearances of those things was that they might signify, and then pass away." Thus the visible mission is neither displayed + by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New + Testament, wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, + inasmuch as He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or + that person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse names, so also can They each one be signified + by different things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible mission + of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification; + whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a purpose, + necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His person, since it + was not assumed or used for the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not required + to last beyond what its use required. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify + the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, + on that account the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> It is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is said + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p16.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>)---"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"---that is, of the Church. This utility consists in + the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.3" target="asv"> Heb. 2:3, + + </a>"which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p17"> Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints + on whom the Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the visible mission made to Christ should show forth + the invisible mission made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of His conception. The visible mission + was directed to Christ at the time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show + forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My + beloved Son" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.17" target="asv">Mat. 3:17</a>), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance + of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it was said, "Hear ye Him" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.5" target="asv">Mat. 17:5</a>). To the apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing to show forth + the power of their ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they + are forgiven" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p17.3" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv">Jn. 20:23</a>): and again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of teaching; whence it is said that, "they began to + speak with divers tongues" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A7-p17.4" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.4" target="asv">Acts 2:4</a>). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the visible mission + of the Son was to be + accomplished before that of the Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son manifests the Father. Visible + apparitions of the divine persons were, however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed, cannot be called + visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the + divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p18"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A7-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q43_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q43_A8-p0.1">Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. + iv), "The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one." Therefore if a divine person is sent by another, He must be + from that other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from + origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although + He proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only + by the one whence He proceeds. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q43_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.48.16" target="asv">Is. 48:16</a>, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit." But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent + by one from Whom He does not proceed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are different opinions on this point. Some say that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally; + and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, + by reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine, however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent + by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the + Son; so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to the person proceeding from + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p7"> another, whereas to send belongs to each person.</p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p8"> There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person is described as being sent, the person Himself existing + from another is designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the divine person. Thus if + the sender be designated as the principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but that person only Who + is the principle of that person who is sent; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by + the Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission, + in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch + as man cannot cause the effect of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p9"> The answers to the objections appear from the above.</p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q43_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.iv.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q42_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q27.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file